ORS, Vol. 6, No. 3 - Air Force Space Command

lance System have yet to be fielded. Concurrently, the globalspace surveillance network (SSN), made up of legacy systemsdesigned to detect and track satellites and missiles launched fromthe former Soviet Union, continues to age, requires major refurbishment,and does not provide the capabilities needed in thepresent threat environment. Even with today’s SSA capabilities,significant coverage gaps exist within the US network. Regionsof the world outside the western hemisphere, not covered by theSSN, provide significant opportunities to interfere with or attackour satellites, without fear of detection or attribution. For this reasonalone, Tier 1 partnerships with allies to expand our coveragebeyond current capabilities provide immediate benefit towardssurveillance of space. Agreements to share SSA data, especiallyin regions with limited or no SSA coverage, would increase ourability to detect a possible attack, but more importantly, attributeit back to the aggressor.Access to allied SSA capabilities and data from outside oursurveillance visibility begins to close US coverage gaps. By increasingour detection capability, we reduce the likelihood of anunattributed attack. This likely would deter an adversary fromtaking actions on-orbit, or even attacks utilizing ground-basedcapabilities. Through proper agreements, there’s great value inadding these capabilities into routine, day-to-day operations. Yet,there may be legitimate reasons why we might only access someallied capabilities during increased tensions or time of conflict,viewing them as a “ready reserve” only. By doing so, and communicatingour intent to tap into non-specified capabilities, wemaintain a valid surge capability, while limiting our adversary’sability to develop tactics, techniques or procedures to counterthese non-standard modes of operation. Stating and exercisingthese reserve modes would demonstrate their credibility, aidingtowards denying the benefit of military space actions outside therange of the US SSN. With the appropriate agreements, operationalconcepts and data feeds in place, routine modes would providecontinuous 24/7 support, while ready reserve modes wouldallow our joint commanders flexibility in accessing additionalSSA capability within minutes, resulting in a true on-orbit ORSTier 1 capability.Rapid Augmentation of On-Orbit Intelligence,Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ORS Tier 2):The US’ need for information and situational awareness continuesto increase through all phases of military operations, aswitnessed in the current conflicts in both Iraq and Afghanistan.For example, over the past several years, the Air Force surgedunmanned aerial system (UAS) coverage within Iraq and Afghanistan,increasing overhead air persistence and providingnear-continuous situational awareness to troops on the ground.Counter to this, overhead reconnaissance provided by space hasnot been this responsive. The high cost to access space, both inlaunch vehicles and the exquisite nature of the systems have beencontributing factors. This is not to say that satellite reconnaissancehas not played a vital role in these conflicts. Nor shouldit suggest that we abandon these systems for less exquisite, lesscapable intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms.Exquisite systems and their capabilities play a key role inour national security, enabling the strategic decision-making ofour senior government and military leadership. However, due totheir low-density nature yet high-demand information services,they provide an attractive target for a future adversary.Space-based collection systems deliver key strategic indicationsand warning of denied areas. Future adversaries will likelyseek to deny the US access and visibility of their movement, evenwith the limited persistence provided by our low-density, highdemandspace systems. Early indications and warning, especiallyof sites known to possess space negation capabilities, will be criticalduring Phase 0 of joint operations, the shaping phase, as weattempt to prevent or prepare for a conflict. 17 The actual denialof space capabilities may serve as the transition trigger to Phase1 of joint operations, as we struggle to gather information andgain the necessary situational awareness required to define thecrisis. The time frame for Phase 1 may be limited, likely occurringover just a few short weeks. Our ability to observe, orient,decide, and act on the situation could be greatly hampered if earlyindications and warning is denied during these critical early daysof a potential conflict. This end-state provides great benefit to apotential adversary.Denial of our ISR may occur through several means: Eitherpurposeful, reversible interference such as blinding or a morecatastrophic, direct-kinetic attack against an on-orbit system. Regardlessof the means, one of the adversary’s goals would be todeny the US full-spectrum electromagnetic “visibility” to deniedareas. Yet, a credible Tier 2 ORS capability to rapidly access,augment or replace some aspects of ISR would deny this benefit.This sort of rapid capability, especially in a small satellitesystem, will not provide all the exquisite capabilities affordedby our national systems. However, if credible, it should providemilitary planners the responsiveness necessary for situationalawareness and intelligence to define the crisis, effectively denyingthe adversary the benefits they desire in the early stages of aconflict. Further, by reducing the cost of Tier 2 launch and spacesystems to just tens of millions of dollars, we have the potentialto launch numerous ISR systems in a very short period. In thiscase we quickly move from high-demand, low-density overheadspace reconnaissances to a relatively large ISR constellation withhigh revisit coverage and increased space-based persistence. Inshort, ORS would provide surge or swarming global coverage,with increased access and revisit to regions of interest. While theadversary seeks to limit or deny our access, their actions wouldinstead result in ORS denying these benefits through increasedpersistence that did not previously exist. If proven credible, bothin our ability to rapidly launch and access space, and to providedecision makers useful intelligence of the situation, ORS Tier 2augmentation of ISR provides a key deterrent against attacks.Tier 1 SSA cooperation and Tier 2 ISR augmentation are justtwo examples of how ORS could act as a deterrent. Yet, deterrencefor space can and should extend beyond the space domain… high altitude, long duration systems, UAS’s, and new aircraftcapabilities could be used to augment, or replace on a limited basis,capabilities provided by space. These cross-domain capabilitieslikely will not enable the same speed, precision, and lethalityto military operations afforded by their space-based equivalents.Yet they would provide a degree of mission assurance, enablingthe US to “fight through” a denied period until full space capabilitiescould be restored. In fact, if our adversaries are convincedthat the US can “fight through” disruptions in space, deterrence41 High Frontier