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Counter 

Th e 

CONTENTS 

COVER STORY: 


VOLUME 1• NUMBER 3 

Offi cial Journal of the 

Homeland Security Professional 

Circle 175 on Reader Service Card 

2 The Counter Terrorist ~ September/October 2008 The Counter Terrorist ~ September/October 2008 3 

24 

18 

34 

44 

24 

TERRORIST THREAT INDICATORS 

by Richard Marquise 

FEATURES: 

6 

18 

34 

44 

50 

Case Study: 

NORD-OST A Mass Hostage Scenario 

by John Gidduck 

NYCWiN INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS 

by Henry Morgenstern 

HOW TERRORISTS EXPLOIT E-COMMERCE 

by Jennifer L. Hesterman 

JUST 2 SECONDS 

Using Time and Space to Defeat Assassins 

by Gavin de Becker, Tom Taylor and Jeff Marquart 

CIVILIAN STANDBY CT GROUPS (PART 1) 

by Mickey Hargaash 

DEPARTMENTS: 

4 From the Editor 

42 Book Review 

57 Did You Know? 

59 Training Review 

Cover Photo: Scott Morrison

FROM THE EDITOR: 

The Struggle 

Continues 

Welcome back to 

By Chris Graham 

W elcome back to Th e Counter Terrorist. In the time that has elapsed 

Wproliferation 

since our previous issue, the world has witnessed a continued 

proliferation of terrorist actions. More bombs have been detonated, more 

people have been killed. A range of groups have continued attempts to further 

their objectives by deliberately targeting civilians. Belligerent nations cultivate 

relationships with like-minded terror groups. In short, the struggle continues. 

As you receive this issue, we will also be commemorating the loss of our 

countrymen murdered on September 11, 2001. Th e 9/11 hijackings and 

attacks on the World Trade Center and pentagon are a watershed event. Th is 

event marks the fi rst occasion many Americans realized the extent of their 

vulnerability and the fact that people exist both committed to their destruction 

and unwilling to compromise. Let us take this moment in time to re-commit 

ourselves to hunting down these enemies and preventing circumstances likely to 

produce more of them. 

Congratulations are due to the intelligence and special operations personnel 

of Colombia. On July 2, they successfully rescued 15 hostages from the 

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in a historically audacious 

operation. Th ree Americans held hostage for more than fi ve years were among 

the rescued. 

Coalition personnel have also experienced successes. Senior terrorists have 

been killed or captured in attempt to disrupt militant activities. Domestically, 

eff orts are ongoing. Surveillance of suspected terror group members continues. 

fi rst responders continue to train and prepare to prevent and respond to terrorist 

acts. 

Th e Counter Terrorist stands as a forum for communication for counter- and 

anti- terrorism professionals. In this issue you will fi nd some useful articles 

and products. Our cover story will provide identifi able indicators of terrorist 

activity. Not a 20 year old check-list; this piece will provide specifi cally useful 

information based on a detailed understanding of recent terrorist events from 

the perspective of an experienced CT investigator. Our Case Study will provide 

a close look into the degree of complexities faced in a large-scale hostage 

scenario undertaken by jihadi terrorists. I am confi dent that you will fi nd 

insight throughout the magazine. As always, Th e Counter Terrorist is here to 

assist in the refi nement of eff ective counter- and anti- terrorism eff orts. 

I look forward to hearing from you. 

Semper Fidelis, 

Chris Graham 

Editor of Th e Counter Terrorist 

Counter 

Th e 

Offi cial Journal of the Homeland Security Professional 

VOLUME 1 • NUMBER 3 


Editor 

Chris Graham 

Director of Operations 

Sol Bradman 

Director of Advertizing 

Carmen Arnaes 

Director of Production 

Kelli Richardson 

Contributing Editors 

John Andrews 

Jennifer Hesterman 

Richard Marquise 

Chuck Pfarrer 

Graphic Design 

Morrison Creative Company 

Copy Editor 

Th omas Duxbury 

Offi ce Manager 

Lily Valdes 

Publisher: 

Security Solutions International 

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14300 SW 129th Street 

Miami, Florida 33140 

ISSN 1941-8639 Th e Counter Terrorist 

Magazine, Th e Offi cial Journal of 

the Homeland Security Professional, 

is published by Security Solutions 

International LLC, as a service to the 

nation’s First Responders and Homeland 

Security Professionals with the aim of 

deepening understanding of issues related 

to Terrorism. No part of the publication 

can be reproduced without permission 

from the publisher. Th e opinions 

expressed herein are the opinions of the 

authors represented and not necessarily 

the opinions of the publisher. Please 

direct all Editorial correspondence related 

to the magazine to: Security Solutions 

International SSI, 14300 SW 129th 

Street, Suite 204, Miami, Florida. 33186 

or info@thecounterterroristmag.com Th e 

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Please visit the magazine web site where you can 

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www.thecounterterrroristmag.com 

© 2008 Security Solutions International 

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Case Study: 

NORD-OST 

A MASS HOSTAGE SCENARIO 

By John Giduck 

Photographs for this article are derived from video footage shot by the hostage 

takers and provided by Russian Special Forces courtesy of Archangel Group. 

Before America confronts the fi rst mass-hostage siege 

on her soil she can prepare herself by looking at how a 

determined and coordinated enemy plans, prepares and 

executes such operations. For years, starting in June 

1995–just six months after Usama bin Laden sent ten top 

al Qaeda terrorist trainers and planners into Chechnya 

to take over the Islamist side of that confl ict–Russia 

suffered a long series of these sieges, where the lives of 

dozens and even hundreds hung in the balance. 

y October 2002 the world 

witnessed one of our terrorist 

enemy’s most complex 

operations for the taking and 

holding of innocent people. 

At that time, the taking of more than 

800 people at the Dubrovka–or Nord- 

Ost–Th eater in Moscow was the best plan 

yet executed, and we have much to learn 

from it. 1 By October 2002 the world 

witnessed one of our terrorist 

enemy’s most complex 

operations for the taking and 

holding of innocent people. 

At that time, the taking of more than 

As Lt. Col. Dave Grossman 

frequently lectures, when it comes to our 

enemies, “the best predictor of future 

behavior is past behavior.” Nor should 

it be lost on our nation that bin Laden 

himself has promised us that everything 

they are doing to Russia now, they will 

visit on America many times over. I had 

been engaged in a training program with 

the Ministry of International Aff airs 

(MVD’s) Vityaz Spetsnaz Anti-Terror 

Unit on the Balashikha Army Base 

approximately 50 km east of Moscow the 

week prior to the hostage taking. Vityaz, 

known as Krapovoi Bereti, or the Blood 

Red Berets, was one of the units tasked 

with responding to this crisis and we were 

in regular contact with them throughout. 

After the siege I was able to pay a visit to 

the theater itself. 

A spectacular musical, the fi rst ever 

all-Russian production of the Nord- 

Ost Th eater, had been playing for more 

than a year. A tall, modern building, 

the theater sits at the intersection of 

Dubrovka and Melnikova Streets, wide 

and open, tree-lined boulevards in north 

Moscow just a few kilometers from the 

Kremlin. Playing to a packed house, and 

enjoying overwhelming critical acclaim, 

the musical’s popularity continued in the 

days following its debut. At 9:05 p.m. 

on Wednesday, 23 October 2002, during 

the beginning of the second act, a masked 

man dressed in camoufl age stormed onto 

the stage, fi ring an AK-47 assault rifl e 

into the air. More Chechen terrorists, 

with bombs and automatic weapons, 

quickly appeared and took more than 

800 theatergoers, dancers, actors and 

production personnel, including many 

children, hostage. Th e performers were 

made to sit with the audience. At fi rst, 

many in the audience thought it was part 

of the show. Symbolically, the terrorists 

had waited until the scene in which 

actors, dressed in World War I Russian 

Air Force uniforms, were dancing. 

Female terrorists, seated in the audience 

throughout the performance, quickly 

donned black Muslim robes and veils, 

strapping explosive suicide belts about 

their waists. 

Th e terrorists had arrived in three 

SUV-type vehicles, which were left 

running outside as a fallback in the event 

their initial takeover proved unsuccessful. 

Strangely, no one who saw the driverless 

vehicles idling just outside the front 

Th e stage is stormed. 

At 9:05 p.m. on 

Wednesday, 23 

October 2002, 

during the beginning 

of the second act, a 

masked man dressed 

in camoufl age stormed 

onto the stage, fi ring 

an AK-47 assault rifl e 

into the air. 

6 The Counter Terrorist ~ September/October 2008 The Counter Terrorist ~ September/October 2008 7

We have come 

here to die, and 

you are going to 

die with us. 

An aspiring martyr displays her 

explosive device to the camera. 

doors seemed to think this suspicious. 

Th e selection of several large vehicles for 

delivery had been done before, and would 

ultimately be repeated at the Beslan 

Middle School No. 1 in southern Russia 

two years later. 

Th e entire theater was quickly rigged 

with explosives, including one major 

device in the center of the main seating 

area of the auditorium, and another in 

the balcony. Both were fashioned from 

large gas tanks taken from military 

vehicles. An additional 20 smaller bombs 

were spread throughout the theater, in 

addition to 25 suicide bombs strapped 

to the females. Th e Chechens had also 

brought with them 100 hand grenades. 

Th e women, part of the Black Widows 

and Fiancées of Allah, wore bomb belts, 

each containing 3 to 5 kilograms (6.6 to 

11 pounds) of explosives, wrapped with 

metal nuts, bolts and ball bearings. Th e 

women were constantly in the theater 

with the hostages, working in shifts, a 

schedule of terrorist control that would 

also be seen at Beslan. Th ey held the 

detonators–literally, the fate of their own 

lives and the hostages around them–in 

their hands. 

Th e Chechen leader was 25-yearold 

Mozar Barayev, though Russian 

intelligence determined that his original 

name was Barsayev. It was speculated 

that he had dropped the single “s” 

from his surname in order to create the 

impression there was some connection 

between him and the famed Chechen 

rebel leader Arbe Barayev. Others 

continue to insist that he was a cousin of 

the famous terrorist. Barayev demanded 

that Russia completely withdraw from 

Chechnya or all the hostages would die. 

He addressed the captives, telling them 

that Russia had just three days to pull 

out of Chechnya, and that if troops tried 

to storm the building it would be blown 

up. He also encouraged the hostages to 

use their cell phones to call police and 

loved ones, informing them of their dire 

situation and the steps necessary for the 

government to take in order for them to 

live. 

Th roughout the 58-hour ordeal the 

Chechens would periodically shoot their 

weapons into the theater ceiling, and 

scream across the auditorium to each 

other rather than utilize any type of 

conventional communication, fearing 

Spetsnaz (special operations forces) 

might intercept any communications 

system. Th is only had the eff ect of further 

terrifying an already inconsolable and 

panic-stricken 800-plus people. Prior to 

taking the theater, the terrorist group had 

videotaped a statement explaining why 

they were doing so: “Every nation has 

the right to decide their own fate. Russia 

has taken this right away from Chechnya. 

We have long waited for the world to 

notice that the innocent are dying in 

Chechnya. Th at women, children and the 

weak are being killed.” 

Barayev was the last to speak. Eyes 

down cast throughout his speech, he said: 

“Each of us is ready to give over life for 

Allah, and the freedom of Chechnya. I 

swear by Allah we desire death more than 

you desire life.” Th e hostages had been 

told: “We have come here to die, and you 

are going to die with us.” Th is haunting 

refrain would be repeated to the children 

of Beslan. 

Winter comes early in Russia. By 

10:00 o’clock that black, wet and frigid 

October night police and the Moscow 

contingents of several Special Forces 

units had surrounded the theater. Alpha, 

Vympel, the SOBR Rapid Reaction 

Force, and the famed Vityaz Anti-Terror 

group of the Interior Ministry had all 

responded to the call. Historically, Alpha 

and Vityaz had worked together, trained 

together, and had launched several 

successful joint operations in recent years. 

Vympel, with its focus on terrorist assault 

operations, was the newcomer to Russia’s 

8 The Counter Terrorist ~ September/October 2008 The Counter Terrorist Circle ~ September/October 237 on Reader Service Card 

2008

December 11-12 - Washington, DC 

November 17-18, 2008 - Chicago, IL 

November 20-21, 2008 - Washington, DC 

October 7-10, 2008 - Camp Blanding, FL 

November 4-7, 2008 - Anaheim, CA 

January 12-13, 2009 - Arlington, VA 

battle against terror on its own soil. Th e 

truth be known, the hostages could not 

have been in better hands. Within an 

hour of their arrival, 11:00 o’clock p.m., 

the elite Spetsnaz forces had sealed off 

the entire area, leaving outer perimeter 

security to Vityaz and SOBR, in addition 

to the lesser trained police and other 

government units. Electricity was shut 

off to surrounding buildings and homes. 

Major Kontantin Komarov, a Russian 

Spetsnaz career offi cer, was an eightyear 

veteran of the Main Intelligence 

Directorate (GRU’s) 10 th Spetsnaz 

Brigade and seven-year commander 

with SOBR. Possessing a Ph.D. in 

psychology, he had been called in to 

begin psychological profi les of all the 

terrorists, particularly the women, to aid 

in the assault groups’ plans and determine 

the lengths to which the terrorists would 

likely go. 

Th e Spetsnaz were able to learn that 

the women were wearing all black 

burkas, face veils and headscarves. Th is 

was certainly not the cultural dress of 

Chechen women. All of the terrorists 

were wearing cravats with Arabic 

sayings written across their foreheads. In 

addition, the terrorists had hung a large 

Arabic fl ag in the theater. Chechens do 

not speak Arabic, and it was unlikely 

that any single one of them could have 

read the Arabic expressions of hatred 

they had adorned themselves and the 

theater with. Th is did not bode well for a 

peaceful resolution. All of this, together 

with the Palestinian-style suicide belts, 

demonstrated the Arabization of the 

Chechen cause and that this group of 

terrorists was well under the infl uence of 

an Arab-type terrorist policy. 

However, as would be seen at Beslan, 

appearances could not be allowed to 

incite fear. According to SOBR Col. 

Sergei Gritsenko, the women were 

ultimately found to have died their hair 

blonde and were wearing blue jeans under 

their dresses, signs they hoped to escape 

the holocaust that would eventually 

take their lives. While this was one 

expert’s opinion, and must be accorded 

commensurate consideration, it is just 

as likely that they had died their hair 

blonde and wore jeans in order to enter 

the theater with the other members of 

the audience, taking their seats without 

arousing suspicion. Police harassing 

Chechens, or anyone who appears to hail 

from the North Caucasus, is a constant 

occurrence in Moscow. 

Th en in the early morning hours 

of Th ursday, 24 October, a woman 

simply walked through the supposedly 

impenetrable security perimeter and 

marched into the theater. She was 

merely a citizen intent on speaking to 

the terrorist leader and demanding an 

end to the monstrosity. Th e terrorists, 

believing she was working for the special 

forces, took her out into the lobby and 

shot her fi ve times. Later they would 

demand that a team of physicians enter 

to treat the wounded, and they had 

them drag her body away. Despite the 

insistence of the Russian government 

publicly that she was merely a concerned 

citizen from the neighborhood, military 

offi cials would later tell me that she was, 

in fact, a Federal Security Service (FSB) 

intelligence offi cer who volunteered 

to enter the building in the hope that 

she could talk her way out with critical 

intelligence. 2 

Later that morning, Barayev, in 

communication with outside forces, 

threatened to begin killing groups of 

hostages within 48 hours if his earlier 

demands were not met. At this point, 

the negotiators attempted to persuade 

Barayev to release the children. He 

refused. Rather, he distributed cell 

phones to the child hostages, ordering 

them to call their parents and tell them 

not to let the government troops storm 

the building. Th ey were told to say 

Terrorist strapped with bombs and booby traps. 

The Counter Terrorist ~ September/October 2008 The Counter Terrorist ~ September/October 2008 11 


As the gas poured 

in, pandemonium 

broke out in the 

theater. Hostages 

began screaming. 

The male terrorists 

put on gas masks 

and took up position 

for the battle that 

was to ensue in the 

hallways outside. 

that if the parents organized televised, 

public demonstrations against the 

war in Chechnya, the kids would be 

released. Th e family members of the 

children quickly did so, but none of the 

government controlled TV stations would 

air them. Accordingly, Barayev reneged 

on his agreement, and the children 

remained. 

For all this, however, the male terrorists 

raped no women, and up to the time of 

the assault no hostage executions had 

been carried out. Still, one colonel with 

MChS, the Russian federal emergency 

services department, in full uniform and 

attending the play, was killed outright, 

as was another police offi cer. Another 

girl was reported to have taken some 

kind of drug due to the stress of the 

situation. It caused her to act out and 

she, too, was shot. On the second day 

two girls jumped from a second story 

window. One broke her leg on landing. 

A soldier came to help and he was shot 

and wounded, as was the other girl who 

had not been injured in the fall. 

As dawn came on that Th ursday–the 

fi rst morning of the siege–Alpha, Vympel 

and Vityaz commandos were already 

practicing storming the Nord-Ost 

Th eater at an identical building nearby. 

No one expected a peaceful outcome to 

this drama. Th e terrorists were constantly 

fearful they would be attacked through 

the roof of the theater and focused much 

of their attention in that direction. Th e 

hostages were forced to use the orchestra 

pit as a communal toilet. 

At 11:45 p.m. on Friday, 25 October, 

only seven hours remained until 

Barayev began executing hostages. He 

had been promised that Russian Army 

General Kazantsev, the highest profi le 

commander in the Chechen War, was 

coming to negotiate with them. Barayev 

said that if Kazantsev did not appear, he 

would begin “cutting the heads off ” the 

hostages and “throwing them outside.” 

In reality, the offi cials in charge of the 

situation had never even contacted 

Kazantsev. At 5:00 in the morning, 

Saturday, 26 October, the tasked special 

forces units fl ooded the theater with a 

fentanyl-enhanced gas which the U.S. 

government would identify as carfentanyl 

in 2007. Th e male terrorists, including 

the leaders, had positioned themselves in 

the corridors leading to the auditorium, 

rendering it impossible to give the order 

to the women to detonate their belt 

bombs; an act they were trained to not 

undertake absent an express order. As 

the gas poured in, pandemonium broke 

out in the theater. Hostages began 

screaming. Th e male terrorists put on 

gas masks and took up position for the 

battle that was to ensue in the hallways 

outside. Th e females had not been given 

masks, and they quickly succumbed to 

the gas. Alpha and Vympel, paired up 

with operators from Vityaz and SOBR, 

waited 30 full minutes from the delivery 

of the gas to assault the building. Other 

elements of Vityaz and SOBR were held 

in reserve. Th e assault launched at 5:30 

a.m. Th irty minutes later the battle 

was over and all of the terrorists were 

dead. Th e females, found seemingly 

unconscious in their seats, each received a 

bullet to the head. 

Th e Russian Special Forces would, 

receive criticism from an unrealistic 

international press for their shooting 

of the female terrorists. In reality, this 

was a tactic to be criticized only for 

its reliance on a single round, rather 

than redundancy for the sake of safety. 

Not everyone had succumbed to the 

fentanyl, and many of the hostages were 

found stumbling about. Th e female 

terrorists were found lying back in their 

seats, gripping the handles of their belt 

bombs and the detonators of the larger 

devices. Th ey could just as easily have 

been feigning sleep, awaiting the moment 

when government forces entered the 

theater before detonating all of the 

bombs, substantially increasing the body 



Inadequate medical support proved to be 

the undoing of an audacious operation 

count. Th is is standard al Qaeda training 

and doctrine: to draw in the rescuers 

before detonating major explosives, 

killing as many of the hostages and 

saviors as possible. Our own troops have 

seen this in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Th at the storming of the Nord-Ost 

Th eater and the saving of these hostages 

would not go down in history as the 

single greatest hostage rescue in history 

was not the fault of the Russian Special 

Forces. Senior leaders had failed entirely 

to alert area hospitals that an assault 

of the building was to take place, or to 

inform doctors that gas was to be used. 

Once confronted with scores of aff ected 

gas victims, the government still refused 

to tell physicians what substance had 

been used, or that gas had been used 

at all. Moreover, no ambulances were 

in place and the entire area had been 

surrounded by enormous dump trucks, 

fi lled with sand, to absorb the blast in 

the event the terrorists blew the entire 

building up. Th e drivers of the trucks 

were long since gone, and no one had 

the keys. When word fi nally reached 

emergency services, the sand trucks 

and crowds prevented the ambulances 

from approaching the building. Many 

hostages, suff ering the eff ects of the gas, 

died in city buses, driving for hours while 

ignorant bus drivers sought hospitals they 

were unfamiliar with. Still others died 

when soldiers attempted to drag them 

outside to fresh air, pulling them along 

by their arms, allowing their heads to tilt 

back, suff ocating them. 

Despite all of this, the soldiers of 

Russia’s Special Forces managed to save 

more than 600 of the 800 hostages, 

losing 129, including many children. 3 

In the process they dispatched every 

single one of the 42 terrorists. It is a 

reminder of the grim reality of such 

situations to think that probably not 

a single one of those 129 would have 

died had the government prepared for 

the aftermath of the assault. Sadder 

still is the recognition that the Nord- 

Ost production was a show full of child 

performers. Th e terrorists knew this, 

planned the assault, and refused to release 

the children once taken. Who could not 

have seen this as a harbinger of things to 

come at Beslan two years hence? 

But these would not prove to be the 

only mistakes to be repeated at Beslan. 

One commander contends that a main 

mistake in Russia’s recent experiences in 

dealing with terrorist-hostage situations 

is a division between government units. 

He explains that at the siege, the FSB, 

through its “arms” Alpha and Vympel, 

unilaterally planned the assault and use 

of gas. Being in the loop, the Alpha 

and Vympel commandos entered the 

theater with gas masks. SOBR and 

Vityaz, MVD units, and to which the 

overall plan had not been fully disclosed, 

entered behind them–with no gas masks. 

Upon entering the building to neutralize 

terrorists and begin assisting the hostages, 

twelve operators from SOBR were 

stricken. Th is very failure to coordinate 

between government units would be a 

factor in the chaos that would ultimately 

engulf Beslan. 

How well America will deal with 

the tactical hurdles that our law 

enforcement–and perhaps even some 

military units–will confront upon our 

fi rst experience with this type of attack 

is dependent upon how willing we are 

to study our enemy’s operations in other 

countries. Any belief that a peaceful 

settlement will be negotiated is naïve. 

As a Russian Spetsnaz colonel once told 

me, when it comes to America there are 

only two guaranteed consequences of 

that attack: Th ere is going to be a battle, 

and people are going to die. All of the 

terrorists will die; they will allow no other 

solution. Some of the hostages will die, 

and there is nothing anyone can do to 

keep them all alive. Some will have been 

One analyst sees a doorknob. 

Another analyst sees a corroded doorknob. 

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killed early on. And some of our rescuers 

are going to die. 

When it comes, our brave warriors 

who enter the building will be in an 

immediate deadly-force situation so 

long as a single terrorist is left alive. It 

cannot matter that they are “appearing” 

to surrender or are wounded. Th ey 

are trained to exploit American legal 

restraints and await our rescuers 

coming closer before detonating hidden 

explosives. Overall, the number and 

magnitude of fi rearms, explosives, booby 

traps and threats to hostages will stretch 

our units to their limits. Th e terrorists 

will arrive with a plan that likely was in 

the making for more than a year, based 

on near-perfect intelligence. Unless 

interdicted, we will only be able to react. 

How we react will depend on what we do 

to prepare now, for an attack like Nord- 

Ost on American soil. It may be a matter 

of when, and not if. 

if. • 

1 Portions of this article have been excerpted 

from an analysis of Russia’s recent terrorist 

mass-hostage sieges in the book, Terror At 

Beslan: A Russian Tragedy with Lessons 

for America’s Schools, available at 

www.antiterrorconsultants.org. 

2 Th e FSB is the current evolution of the 

former KGB. 

3 Four or fi ve were killed early on by the 

terrorists. 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR 

John Giduck is a senior consultant with the 

Archangel Group (www.antiterrorconsultants. 

org), providing training to U.S. law 

enforcement, government agencies and the 

military. He has a law degree and a master’s 

degree in Russian studies, and has worked with 

several Russian Special Forces units. He has 

authored the book Terror at Beslan 



16 The Counter Terrorist ~ September/October 2008 The Counter Terrorist ~ September/October 2008

NYCWiN 

INTEROPERABLE 

COMMUNICATIONS 

By Henry Morgenstern 

A report on 

the New York 

City Wireless 

Network 

Innovations 

The tragedy of 9/11 made it clear that communications 

is one of the key weaknesses not just of New York, but of 

every city around the world. Consider some of the statements 

gleaned from the 1,613 taped conversations released by 

New York City offi cials in August 2006. These dialogues 

between fi rst responders and victims, which were recorded 

during the events of 9/11, clearly underline the vulnerability 

of the city’s communications systems. 

Photo: NYC DOITT 

T 

he tragedy of 9/11 made it clear 

that communications is one of the 

key weaknesses not just of New 

York, but of every city around the world. 

Consider some of the statements gleaned 

from the 1,613 taped conversations 

released by New York City offi cials in 

August 2006. Th ese dialogues between 

fi rst responders and victims, which were 

recorded during the events of 9/11, 

clearly underline the vulnerability of the 

city’s communications systems. 

In one of the tapes, for example, Chief 

Dennis Devlin of the New York City Fire 

Department’s Battalion 9 can be heard 

to remark, “We’re in a state of confusion. 

We have no cell phone service anywhere 

because of the disaster... Bring all the 

additional handy talkies.” Devlin was 

trying to get a rundown of which fi re 

companies had been dispatched to the 

burning World Trade Center. Sadly, he 

was still inside the south tower when it 

collapsed. 

Since 9/11 several large-scale projects 

have been initiated in an attempt to 

remedy such issues. One of the most 

spectacular eff orts, a project named 

NYCWiN, will make New York City a 

model of integrated communications. 

Th ere is every reason, of course, 

that New York City takes the threat of 

terrorism seriously. In fact, in response to 

the events of 9/11, the city has not only 

improved its communication system, but 

it has also created a complete counterterrorism 

division, including its own 

intelligence capability, within the NYPD. 

Th is division, which includes personnel 

stationed in hot spots around the world, 

rivals anything federal agencies can fi eld. 

“We remain a prime—if not the 

prime—target for al-Qaeda and other 

terrorist groups,” said Mayor Michael 

Bloomberg in testimony before Congress 

in 2007. Indeed, New York City’s 

large counter-terrorism force has so far 

managed to foil at least seven terrorist 

attempts, including an Islamic terror 

plot to blow up fuel-tank farms at John 

F. Kennedy International Airport. Th us, 

while most other cities spend their federal 

homeland security money on things like 

street lighting, New York means business 

when it comes to counter-terrorism. 

But no matter how elite New York’s 

counter-terrorism task force is, nor 

how prepared its police, fi re, emergency 

management, and transportation 

and traffi c departments are, none of 

these groups can function without a 

communications system built to resist 

tragedies such as 9/11 or Hurricane 

Katrina. 

I spoke to two people at New York 

City’s Department of Information 

Technology and Telecommunications 

(DOITT) to fi nd out exactly what is 

involved in the planning, requisitioning, 

and implementation of a system like 

NYCWiN. Although allotted a $500 

million budget and implementation time 

frame of fi ve years, it is believed that 

the project, which is being undertaken 

by homeland security giant Northrop 

Grumman, may eventually require up to 

15 years and $1.5 billion. 

First, I interviewed Paul J. 

Wireless call box. Photo: NYC DOITT 

Indeed, New York 

City’s large counterterrorism 

force has so 

far managed to foil 

at least seven terrorist 

attempts, including 

an Islamic terror 

plot to blow up fueltank 

farms at John F. 

Kennedy International 

Airport. 


So far, the system’s 

redundancy has been 

tested by simulated 

loads that exceed 

those of 9/11, and it 

has withstood the test. 

Cosgrave, who was appointed DOITT 

commissioner by Mayor Bloomberg in 

June 2006. With more than 30 years of 

experience, Cosgrave has the primary 

goal of making the power of technology 

available to both the public and private 

sector. In describing NYCWiN, Cosgrave 

stated the following: 

Our aim was to create a system 

that would provide our fi rst 

responders, police, fi re, EMS, and 

transportation [offi cials] with a better 

data communications infrastructure 

that will allow building plans to 

reach fi refi ghters, data on current 

developments to [reach] emergency 

management, communication [to 

occur] between the police (including 

[transmission of] graphic components 

like fi ngerprints), and will also allow 

the Department of Transportation to 

thoroughly control traffi c both on a 

daily basis and in emergencies—even 

severe ones. 

According to Cosgrave, New York’s 

diff erent agencies were all planning 

communications upgrades prior to 9/11, 

but once that day’s events highlighted the 

importance of interoperability, a citywide 

eff ort was requisitioned. “We learned a lot 

about the necessity of redundancy in the 

system from 9/11,” continues Cosgrave, 

“but we also learned how important... 

power supplies and the private cellular 

networks [are] at times of emergency.” 

Based on these lessons, NYCWiN 

is designed to support multiple, 

simultaneous transmission of full-motion 

video or large fi les to and from anywhere 

in the city; real-time tracking of all city 

vehicles and control of traffi c lights; 

continuous monitoring of air and water 

purity; transmission of patient vital signs 

from ambulances to receiving hospitals; 

and reliable voice communications to 

back-up radio and cell phone signals. So 

far, the system has been operational in the 

area below Canal Street. 

“We know the value of keeping the 

communications nodes working, because 

on 9/11, one of the lost nodes was put 

out near the towers,” notes Cosgrave. 

“Today, no site failing will have that eff ect 

on the network.” Similarly, according to 

Cosgrave, less visible events, such as small 

plane crashes and crane collapses, will 

also no longer cause cell phone network 

outages as a result of the implementation 

of NYCWiN. 

Of course, the amount of video 

processing that a city like New York 

has in play makes quality of service 

(QOS) and priority of service (POS) 

critical concepts in a system such as 

NYCWiN. For example, the New York 

Department of Transportation currently 

operates nearly 100 still and video 

cameras from its Traffi c Management 

Center in Long Island City, Queens; the 

Metropolitan Transportation Authority. 

Another 20 still and video cameras on 

the city’s major bridges and tunnels; 

and the New York Police Department 

operates several thousand cameras. Th e 

NYPD announced in July 2008 that 

it was seeking $90 million to deploy 

an additional 3,000 cameras in lower 

Manhattan. 

Th us, according to Brian Snodgrass of 

the DOITT, NYCWiN is not only built 

to foster video streaming, but also to 

ensure “a dynamic scheme for taking into 

account POS and QOS—for example, 

where we need to have critical laptops 

remain connected during an emergency.” 

Th is versatility also includes system 

scalability. Snodgrass worked at a private 

cellular provider during the 9/11 attacks 

and found that it was diffi cult to meet the 

immediate needs of getting 200 to 500 

phones activated immediately. “By having 

the system under the complete control of 

the city, we can mobilize those resources 

without going out to a third party,” says 

Snodgrass. 

Critics of NYCWiN have mentioned 

incompatibility as a possible problem 

associated with this system. According 

to Snodgrass, the system’s consistent IP 

interface opens it to transmission that 

would otherwise be incompatible. By 

utilizing gateway systems, NYCWiN 

should off er good access, if not complete 

interoperability. Th e system is also 

adaptable and can provide interfaces 

to equipment not compatible with the 

transmission network. 

“Th e Manhattan Security Initiative [a 

wide-ranging closed-captioned television 

network similar to the system in place 

in London] is just one example of the 

preventative side of the NYCWiN 

network,” says Cosgrave. “We are now 

working to link all kinds of monitoring 

and detection devices to the system and 

make results available system-wide. We 

are looking at radiological [monitoring], 

biological [monitoring], and more.” 

So far, the system’s redundancy has 

been tested by simulated loads that 

exceed those of 9/11, and it has withstood 

the test. Also, as previously mentioned, 

NYCWiN has been operational in lower 

Manhattan for some time. Th e robust 

system is already attracting the attention 

of other cities, including Oklahoma 

City, Tucson, and Washington, DC. 

In addition to its uses in terrorism 

prevention and response, some other 

features of NYCWiN that make this 

20 The Counter Terrorist ~ September/October 2008 Circle 257 on Reader Service Card 


system attractive include the following: 

• Water and electric utilities will 

be able to conduct meter reading 

without sending staff door to door. 

• Offi cials will be able to instantly 

locate and access any city vehicle, 

whether a patrol car, a bus, or a 

garbage truck. 

• Police will be able to locate pictures 

of suspects from their cars. 

• Fire chiefs will be able to watch 

live video of fi res taken from traffi c 

helicopters. 

• Inspectors will be able to look up 

building plans while at inspection 

sites. 

• Data can be sent 50 times faster 

than over current networks. 

• Satellite tracking devices can be 

shared around many diff erent 

applications. 

• Police and fi re offi cials will be able to 

see diff erent angles of a crime or fi re 

scene simultaneously. 

• All NYC employees will be part of a 

unifi ed communications network. 

It is hoped that New York, having 

suff ered so much, may be able to reach 

other municipal governments with their 

example, thus helping cities all over the 

country to do more to enhance fi rstresponder 

communications. 

SOME SPECS ON 

NYCWIN 

Th e original specifi cations for 

NYCWiN called for it to support 

multiple, simultaneous transmission 

of full-motion video or large fi les from 

and to anywhere in the city; real-time 

tracking of all city vehicles and control 

of traffi c lights; continuous monitoring 

of air and water purity; transmission of 

patient vital signs from ambulances to 

receiving hospitals; and reliable voice 

communications to back up radio and cell 

phone signals. Other specifi cs regarding 

this system include the following: 

• NYCWiN is not technically Wi- 

Fi, because it will use a licensed 

spectrum. 

• NYCWiN is not a WIMAX 

system, but it uses universal 

mobile telecommunications system 

technology on the 2.5 GHz band to 

provide a broadband data network 

and IP services. 

• NYCWiN York City is using IP 

wireless technology for their citywide 

safety network, with each cell site 

providing in-building coverage up to 

3 to 5 miles from the cell site in an 

urban setting. It operates in a single 

channel of 5 or 10MHz of spectrum 

and supports voice over IP with full 

QOS based on SIP. • 

September Mission: SOLD OUT! 

November Mission: November 14-21, 2008 


22 The Counter Terrorist ~ September/October 2008 The Counter Terrorist ~ September/October 2008 


TERRORIST THREAT 

INDICATORS 

By Richard Marquise 

Photo: Scott Morrison 

On September 5, 1972, Palestinian terrorists 

from the Black September Organization entered 

the world stage at the Olympic Games in 

Munich. Before it was over, 11 Israeli athletes 

were dead and the world was forever changed. 

I 

n the following weeks, the United 

States Government received 

information that a terrorist attack 

would occur within the United States. 

FBI agents familiar with the threat from 

the enemies of the time, the Soviet Union 

and China – the Communists—were 

dispatched to prevent it. 

Due to the large “Arab” population 

in the Dearborn, Michigan, area, agents 

began surveillances and conducted 

numerous interviews. Few of them 

understood the diff erence between 

Sunnis and Shiites or knew about the 

complex political situation in the Middle 

East. Th e police in Dearborn were 

unaware of the FBI activities in that 

community. Th e FBI believed it alone 

was equipped to deal with this threat, 

and since the information came from 

“intelligence” sources, it could not be 

shared. Fortunately we have come a long 

way since this time. 

Today, there are approximately 13,000 

FBI agents in the United States, not all 

of whom work terrorism. It is the great 

force multiplier of 800,000 federal, 

state, local and tribal law enforcement 

offi cers who will prevent the next act of 

terrorism. Th ese offi cers may encounter 

terrorist indicators during contact with 

the general public, through undercover 

operations, searches and car stops, as well 

as interviews, technical coverage and jail 

intelligence. Law enforcement analysts 

review large amounts of information 

and are a source of identifying pre-attack 

indicators. A knowledgeable general 

public can also identify and report 

indicators of terrorism. 

Not all terrorists look like the 19 men 

who hijacked airplanes on September 

11. Th ey look like each of us. John 

Walker Lindh, José Padilla, or any of 

the terrorists who have attacked targets 

in Russia, east Africa, the Philippines, 

India, Jordan, Pakistan, Indonesia, Spain 

or the United Kingdom over the past 

15 years are proof of this. While this 

makes an offi cer’s job more diffi cult, each 

must examine behaviors and activities, 

rather than appearance, to spot a terrorist 

planning an attack. Terrorists plan, 

collect intelligence, acquire materials 

and exhibit certain behaviors during 

this process, which, if recognized, could 

prevent an act of terrorism. 

Th roughout our nation’s history, 

terrorism has been prevented by state 

and local offi cers. In late 1987, the 

chief of police in a small Vermont town 

arrested three Middle Eastern men near 


The planning stage 

is the best opportunity 

to prevent attacks, 

and it is through 

the recognition of 

indicators that law 

enforcement can stop 

an attack. Just as 

terrorists learn from 

previous attacks, 

law enforcement can 

study their methods to 

prevent future attacks. 

the Canadian border. It appeared that 

these men had circumvented the border 

crossing and later provided confl icting 

information in response to the chief’s 

questions. Investigation determined 

they were preparing to commit a terrorist 

attack in the United States. 1 Months 

later, a Japanese Red Army member was 

arrested by a New Jersey state trooper 

outside New York City en route to 

commit terrorist attacks. 2 Th e bombers of 

the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City 

and the Atlanta Olympic games in 1995 

and 1996, respectively, were arrested by 

state and local police offi cers just doing 

their jobs. 

Th ere are many challenges to 

preventing terrorism. Th ese include 

target displacement, sleeper cells and 

the fact the threat is ever-changing. Th e 

solution is to understand the threat, 

collect information and share it. 

Terrorist targets have changed. 

Historically, most attacks were symbolic, 

not designed to cause mass casualties, 

but simply send a message that terrorists 

could strike at will. Nonmilitary 

government institutions have traditionally 

been targeted. Police stations in America 

were attacked by domestic terrorists 

in the 1960s and 1970s. In Iraq, law 

enforcement and nonmilitary government 

entities are daily targets. Approximately 

17 percent of the 25,000 international 

terrorist attacks which occurred in 

2005-06 were directed against law 

enforcement. 3 Th e Murrah Building 

was targeted by domestic terrorists. 

Military facilities and specifi c individuals 

have been targeted by domestic and 

international terrorists throughout 

history. FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, 

in Congressional testimony, stated that 

future attacks will be against “economic 

targets such as aviation, the energy sector 

and mass transit; soft targets such as large 

public gatherings; and symbolic targets, 

such as monuments and government 

buildings.” 4 

United States law enforcement has 

had the al Qaeda manual or “playbook” 

for more than a decade. First discovered 

in the mid-1990s, one version says the 

best targets for spreading fear in the U.S. 

and Europe include skyscrapers, nuclear 

plants, and crowded football stadiums. 

It discusses hitting sites of sentimental 

value, including the Statue of Liberty, 

Big Ben and the Eiff el Tower, to generate 

intense publicity. Th eir targets include 

Jewish organizations and large gatherings 

to cause as many deaths as possible. 

Th is manual stipulates the strikes must 

be strong and have a wide impact on 

the population. 5 Th eir tactics are also 

outlined in the manual and include 

gathering information about the enemy 

(intelligence collection), kidnapping 

and assassinating enemy personnel, and 

how to respond to law enforcement 

contacts. Other sections are devoted to 

fi nding the ideal apartment and forging 

documents, as well as training in making 

chemical and biological weapons. 6 Every 

law enforcement offi cer should read this 

manual, a version of which is available 

on the Internet, in order to “know the 

enemy.” 

Terrorists are opportunistic and 

will strike where we are vulnerable 

and inattentive, much as we were on 

September 11. Th e planning stage is the 

best opportunity to prevent attacks, and 

it is through the recognition of indicators 

that law enforcement can stop an attack. 

Just as terrorists learn from previous 

attacks, law enforcement can study their 

methods to prevent future attacks. 

Terrorists surveil their targets. During 

an offi cer’s daily work, he or she may see 

unusual cameras, night-vision equipment, 

maps with targets highlighted, blueprints 

and law enforcement or terrorist training 

manuals. Offi cers may notice individuals 

loitering near or photographing 

potential targets. During 2004, offi cers 

from Baltimore County, Maryland, 

noticed individuals videotaping on the 

Chesapeake Bay Bridge, a major eastcoast 

route. Th ey tried to conceal their 

activities, but the offi cers spoke with 

them and shared the information with 

the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). 

Investigation determined the driver of 

their vehicle was a co-conspirator in a 15year 

scheme to fi nance terrorist activities 

in Israel for Hamas, a Palestinian terrorist 

organization. 7 Although Hamas has 

never conducted an attack in the United 

States, we have been a major source 

of funds for them. However, as the 

U.S. Government increasingly restricts 

fundraising, groups like Hamas have less 

and less reason not to conduct an attack. 

During the past several years, 

automatic weapons attacks have replaced 

bombings as the number one weapon 

of choice for international terrorist 

organizations. 8 If offi cers receive reports 

of thefts or unusual sales of weapons or 

ammunition, these should be shared with 

the JTTF. Th e same is true for reports of 

automatic weapons fi ring, theft or sale of 

body armor to non law enforcement, as 

well as any unusual paramilitary training. 

An alert offi cer in Skamania County, 

Washington, investigated reports of 

automatic gunfi re shortly after 9/11 and 

reported his fi ndings to the JTTF. Th is 

resulted in convictions of the “Portland 

Seven,” a group of American citizens who 

were preparing to go to Afghanistan and 

wage war on American troops. 9 

Since terrorists still use explosives 

to carry out attacks, any theft, sale or 

storage of explosive components should 

be shared with the JTTF. Vehicles are 

used to transport explosives, and reports 

about the modifi cation of cars, trucks or 

limousines should be shared. Th e same 

is true if information is received about 

individuals undergoing emergency room 

treatment for missing fi ngers, hands or 

chemical burns. Th ese may be indicators 

of terrorist bomb-making activity. 

In the fall of 2005, a University 

of Oklahoma student detonated a 

homemade bomb outside the school’s 

football stadium during a game attended 

by more than 80,000 people. It is not 

conclusively known whether the bomb 

detonated prematurely, whether he 

intended to take it into the stadium, or 

whether it was his intention to wait until 

the game was over and kill passersby. Th e 

investigation turned up no connection 

to terrorism, yet this young man had 

attempted to buy ammonium nitrate 

several days before he detonated his 

bomb. Th e bomb he made with easily 

obtainable items was similar to those used 

in the 2005 London subway attacks. 10 

Technology has made the creation of 

identifi cation documents easier and more 

diffi cult to detect. Legal documentation 

is often easy to acquire through illegal 

means, but others counterfeit driver’s 

licenses, vehicle registrations and license 

plates, identifi cation cards, social security 

cards, as well as immigration documents, 

visas and passports. Each document 

should be questioned and offi cers should 

look for alterations. Compare the 

individual with the photograph on the 

document presented. Ask where the 

document was obtained, and inquire as 

to citizenship and place of birth. If the 

offi cer is unable to ascertain whether the 

documents are legitimate, have an expert 

verify them. 

Offi cers may come upon evidence 

that drug proceeds support terrorist 

organizations. Th e Madrid train attacks 

in 2004 may have been in part fi nanced 

through the sale of drugs. 11 In South 

America, there is a close relationship 

between drug traffi ckers and terrorist 

organizations. 12 Because terrorists 

must fi nance their operations and most 

governments are making concerted eff orts 

to seize assets and shut down fund-raising 

mechanisms, “routine” criminal activity is 

one way they can earn money. 

State sponsors and nongovernmental 

organizations have historically funded 

terrorist operations. As governments 

have clamped down on these activities, 

terrorists have turned to various criminal 

enterprises. Th ese include credit- and 

telephone-card fraud, traffi cking in stolen 

property, counterfeiting, bank- and 

mail-fraud schemes, as well as selling 

counterfeit designer clothing, high end 

beauty products, CDs and DVDs. 

In the late 1990s, a deputy sheriff in 

North Carolina was working security at 

a cigarette mart. He noted that some 

men were regularly purchasing large 

quantities of cigarettes. Engaging them 

in conversation, he learned they were 

taking them to Michigan where taxes 

were ten times those of North Carolina. 


He initially reported this information 

to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 

Firearms (ATF). Investigation soon 

determined these men were fund raisers 

for Hezbollah, an Iranian-backed terrorist 

organization, which, before September 

11, 2001, had killed more Americans 

than any other international terrorist 

organization. Th e FBI and ATF worked 

together and brought down this group, 

a major Hezbollah cell, which had 

transferred $8 million to the Middle 

East. Th e observations of one alert police 

offi cer had disrupted a major terrorist 

fund-raising cell. 13 

In addition to cigarette smuggling 

schemes, law enforcement offi cers should 

be alert for baby-formula and grocerystore 

coupon fraud, as well as individuals 

having connections to foreign charities. 

Offi cers should also be aware of 

individuals having multiple forms 

of identifi cation during car stops, 

contacts and searches. In addition, they 

should be alert for individuals having 

law enforcement or terrorist training 

manuals, radical literature, maps which 

have possible targets highlighted, as well 

as unusual photographs or decals and 

bumper stickers. 

When interacting with an individual, 

the offi cer is the expert on the scene. 

Based on his or her experience, the 

offi cial may see things that appear to be 

unusual. If something appears unusual 

to the expert on the scene, it probably 

is and should be shared with the JTTF if 

it appears to be terrorist related. 

We have not seen suicide bombing 

in the United States, however, Pakistan 

had only one suicide bombing prior to 

2007, yet had 59 attacks during that year 

alone. 14 Many believe it is only a matter 

of time before a suicide bomber strikes 

in our country. Th e Israelis have studied 

suicide bombers in depth and include 

the following as telltale signs of a possible 

suicide bomber. Th ey: 

• Conduct boundary probing (how 

close can they get to the target?) 

• Wear heavy clothing to hide 

explosives regardless of the season 

• Display a robotic gait or nervously 

look around 

• Show signs of tunnel vision and are 

not responsive to commands 

• Give the appearance of being 

drugged 

• Wear too much cologne or have 

other unusual smells 

• Carry a large backpack 

• Have wires protruding from sleeves 

or hands in pockets (for detonator) 

• Have a fresh shave or make other 

15 16 

attempts to “blend in.” 

While these indicators may be 

appropriate to Israel, other suspicious 

behavior outlined in this article may be 

more applicable to a suicide bomber in 

the United States. In 2004, the Capitol 

police in Washington believed if suicide 

bombers struck America, they would 

target the U.S. Capitol. Th at agency 

has documented a plan to deal with 

suicide attackers. Police offi cers receive 

comprehensive training on when and 

how to use deadly force. However, few 

are trained to deal with a suicide bomber. 

Every law enforcement department is 

encouraged to develop a plan to deal with 

a suicide attacker. Th is plan should be 

written and practiced, and every offi cer 

should be aware of its contents. 

Almost every terrorist attack in 

history was presaged by indicators which 

should have been recognized and acted 

upon by law enforcement. Ahmed 

Ressam, the “Millennium Bomber,” was 

arrested in December 1999 by a U.S. 

Customs inspector. Ressam’s activities 

had been noticed by law enforcement 

and intelligence offi cials in two countries 

before he ever arrived at the U.S. border. 

An Algerian, he arrived in Canada via 

France in February 1994, and although 

he possessed false documentation, he 

was welcomed and provided with social 

assistance. Ressam failed to appear for 

his immigration hearing and became 

involved in criminal activity. 

A French magistrate, investigating 

the al Qaeda threat in France, told the 

Canadians about Ressam. Although the 

Canadians monitored Ressam and his 

colleagues’ telephone conversations, they 

did not consider them a threat. Th ey 

learned that Ressam, who had acquired 

another identity, was on his way to 

“camp” in Afghanistan. He spent most 

of 1998 there learning to make bombs. 

Ressam returned to Canada via Los 

Angeles, and despite spending nearly a 

year in Afghanistan, and having been the 

focus of Canadian and French authorities, 

he was on no one’s radar. He drove to 

western Canada and began assembling 

his bombs at a motel. While there for 

several weeks, no one noticed that he left 

windows open, did not allow maid service 

into his room, and had strange odors 

emanating from the room. It took the 

last line of defense, an American customs 

inspector, to arrest him because numerous 

Almost every 

terrorist attack 

in history was 

presaged by 

indicators which 

should have been 

recognized and 

acted upon by 

law enforcement. 



precursors were ignored. 17 She prevented 

a signifi cant attack at the Los Angeles 

International Airport. 

Th e events of September 11th have 

been widely detailed. Indicators leading 

to this attack began as early as the murder 

of Meir Kahane by El Sayyid Nosair in 

1990. During their investigation, the 

New York City Police Department and 

the FBI recovered 47 boxes of documents, 

mostly written in Arabic. Th ey were not 

translated or analyzed until after the 1993 

World Trade Center attack. Some believe 

examining them could have prevented 

this attack. Ramzi Yousef, a Pakistani, 

had entered the United States a few 

months before with false documentation. 

Like Ressam in Canada, he had been 

allowed into the country. Working with a 

local cell, Yousef designed the plan which 

he hoped would topple both towers, 

killing 50,000 people. Following the 

attacks he fl ed to Pakistan. 18 

In December 1994 terrorists in Algeria 

hijacked an Air France plane hoping to 

fl y it into the center of Paris (one target 

No one can 

afford to lose 

focus and believe 

the prevention 

of terrorism will 

be handled by 

someone else. 

in the al Qaeda manual is the Eiff el 

Tower). French commandos were able to 

kill the hijackers prior to their carrying 

out the plan. 19 

In January 1995 authorities in the 

Philippines encountered Yousef. He 

was plotting to destroy 11 airliners 

over the Pacifi c using an innovative 

liquid explosive. Yousef’s partner later 

confessed to wanting to fl y a plane into 

CIA Headquarters, among other targets. 

Yousef escaped but was arrested two 

months later in Pakistan. One of the 

plotters in the Filipino plan was Yousef’s 

uncle Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the 

mastermind of 9/11. 20 

In March 1995 the fi rst of the al 

Qaeda manuals was found, which 

outlined the targets of the organization. 

Other copies were also found: in the 

United Kingdom in 2000, and then in 

Afghanistan in 2001. Th e manual stated 

that among their targets were skyscrapers, 

but the information contained in it was 

not widely disseminated. 

In January 2000 intelligence agencies, 

including the CIA, surveilled a meeting 

in Malaysia of senior al Qaeda offi cials. 

Because information was not shared with 

American law enforcement, two of the 

men freely traveled to Los Angeles and 

San Diego, where they lived, attended 

local mosques and took fl ight lessons. 

On 9/11, they would be among the 19 

hijackers. 21 

In July 2001 an FBI agent in Arizona 

documented that Middle Eastern men 

were taking fl ying lessons and that he 

believed they should be investigated. 22 

For fear of being accused of racial 

profi ling, nothing was done, despite the 

information contained in the al Qaeda 

manual, the documents seized in New 

York, and the events aboard the Air 

France fl ight and in the Philippines. A 

month later, another pilot, Zacharias 

Moussaoui, attracted attention in a fl ight 

school in Minnesota and was arrested on 

immigration charges. Each of the above 

circumstances, taken individually, meant 

little. Collectively the entire plot could 

be seen. Th e 9/11 Commission report 

detailed the failures of American law 

enforcement and intelligence agencies 

to share information which may have 

prevented the attacks. 

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, 

Chechens have tried to establish an 

independent Muslim state in southern 

Russia. In the early 1990s, Chechen 

terrorists invaded a school and later 

hijacked a school bus. Teachers and 

students in both cases were held for 

ransom. 23 Chechen terrorists also 

assassinated and kidnapped government 

offi cials, military leaders and soldiers. 

On August 18, 2004, the Russian 

security service reported that an attack by 

terrorists was imminent in North Ossetia 

(near Chechnya). On August 28 there 

were specifi c reports that terrorists had 

infi ltrated the North Ossetian town of 

Beslan. In the week before the raid, three 

terrorist attacks, including two airline 

bombings, had killed 100 people. At 

5:00 am on September 1, an informant 

in Chechnya advised authorities that 

an attack would take place at one of the 

four schools in Beslan that morning. 

Although the warning was target- and 

time-specifi c, as school opened at 

9:30 a.m., 32 armed men and women 

overtook the lone, unarmed police offi cer 

assigned to guard the facility. Th e offi cer 

had no radio or cell phone. Th e siege 

ended on September 3 with the deaths 

of 31 terrorists and approximately 332 

others, including 186 children. 24 

Each of these attacks may have been 

prevented if there had been proper 

analysis and sharing of information. 

Ressam should have been stopped before 

he reached the Washington-Canadian 

border. Two of the 9/11 hijackers 

should never have been allowed to live 

unimpeded in the United States for two 

years. Th e Phoenix memo should have 

been perceived as an eff ort to conduct 

good solid investigation, not one for 

profi ling. If authorities in Russia had 

taken the information they received 

in August and early September more 

seriously, they may have prevented the 

terrorists from taking over the school in 

Beslan. 

Recognition of events before they 

occur can prevent acts of terrorism. Just 

seeing them will not be enough, however. 

Information has to be collected, analyzed 

and shared with the appropriate entity, 

the JTTF. Th ere are now more than 100 

of them in the United States. Th e JTTFs 

must also share information with their 

local, state and tribal counterparts. It is a 

two-way street. 

Th ere have been many successes in 

America and around the world since 

the events of September 11, 2001. Law 

enforcement and intelligence agencies 

have disrupted dozens of planned attacks, 

and many arrests have been made. 

However, disruptions get far less attention 

than successful attacks, and it would 

be incorrect to assume the problem 

of terrorism has gone away. No one 

can aff ord to lose focus and believe the 

prevention of terrorism will be handled 

by someone else. 

Terrorism aff ects us all, regardless of 

whether we live in a major metropolitan 

area or a rural state. It is in our national 

interest to prevent the next act of 

terrorism, before anyone else loses his 

or her life, property is destroyed, and 

all of us are fi scally impacted. It can be 

done if the 800,000 federal, state, local 

and tribal law enforcement offi cers see 

themselves as a force multiplier and 

watch for indicators. In addition to the 

police, an informed public can also report 

suspicious activities. Once observed, 

Buildings are targeted as an opportunity for infl icting mass casualties. Photo: SSI 

information should be shared with the 

JTTF, as well as with each other. 

Law enforcement and intelligence 

agencies around the globe should examine 

their relationships with each other. Every 

agency should put offi cers in a position to 

recognize the indicators of terrorism, then 

collect, analyze and share information 

to keep each of our communities safe. 

Federal, state, local and tribal offi cers, the 

great force multiplier, are our fi rst line of 

defense against future acts of terrorism. 

Each can make a diff erence. • 

NOTES: 

1 Jeff rey J. Martel, “America’s Last 

Line of Defense,” interview with Chief of 

Police Richard Jewett, 2006. 

2 Oliver B. Revell, “International 

Terrorism in the United States,” Th e 

Police Chief magazine, March 1989. 

3 National Counterterrorism 

Center reports retrieved 3/29/08 from 

nctc.gov. 

4 Robert S. Mueller, FBI Director, 

testimony before the Senate Select 

Committee on Intelligence, January 11, 

2007. 

5 Hamza Hendawi, “Manual 

Teaches How to Kill Th ousands,” Th e 

Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Sentinel February 2, 2002. 

6 Al Qaeda Manual, Manual Author 

unknown. 

7 Gretchen Parker, “Hamas 

Suspect Arrested After Wife Videotapes 

Chesapeake Bay Bridge,” Th e Milwaukee 

Journal Sentinel, Sentinel August 25, 2004. 

8 National Counterterrorism Center 

“Reports on Incidents of Terrorism 2005.” 

9 Terence P. Jeff rey, “Terrorist 

Blamed His Failure on Bush,” February 

2006, retrieved March 23, 2007. from 

http://www.discoverthenetworks.org/ 

Articles/Terrorist%20Blamed%20His%20 

Failure%20on%20Bush.html 

10 Nolan Clay and Randy Ellis, “No 

Terror Link Seen So Far in Blast; OU 

Tightens Security After Death Outside 

Stadium,” Th e Daily Oklahoman, October 

5, 2005. 

11 Mar Roman Associated 

Press, “Madrid Train Bombing Trial 

Begins,” February 16, 2007, retrieved 

March 23, 2007 from http://www. 

suburbanchicagonews.com/couriernews/ 

news/260019.3_1_EL16_A5SPAIN_ 

S1.article 

12 Mark S. Steinitz, “Th e Terrorism 

and Drug Connection in Latin America’s 

Andean Region,” Policy Papers on the 

Americas, Volume XIII, Study 5, July 2002. 

13 Author interview with Deputy 


Sheriff Robert Fromme, Iredell County 

Sheriff ’s Department, North Carolina, 

December 11, 2003. 

14 Khuram Iqbal, “Drivers of 

Suicide Terrorism in Pakistan,” RSIS 

Commentaries, February 27, 2008. 

15 International Association of Chiefs 

of Police Training Key #581, retrieved 

on March 23, 2007, from http://www. 

theiacp.org/pubinfo/IACP581SuicideBo 

mbersPart1.pdf 

16 Neil Livingstone, “Th e Detection 

and Prevention of Suicide Bombings,” 

Total Integrated Preparedness Solutions, 

Volume I, Number 10, May 18, 2005. 

17 Hal Bernton, Mike Carter, David 

Heath and James Neff , “Th e Terrorist 

Within: Th e Story Behind One Man’s 

Holy War Against America,” Th e Seattle 

Times, June 23-July 7, 2002. 

18 Peter Lance, “Triple Cross,” (New 

York, Regan , 2006), page 58. 

19 Peter Lance, “Triple Cross,” (New 

York, Regan, 2006), page 188. 

20 Th e 9/11 Commission Report, Report July 

2004, page 491. 

21 Th e 9/11 Commission Report, Report July 

2004, page 182. 

22 FBI FD-302 of SA Kenneth 

Williams, July 10, 2001, retrieved 

March 23, 2007 from http://www. 

thememoryhole.org/911/phoenix-memo/ 

23 Paul Murphy, “Th e Wolves of 

Islam,” (Dulles, Virginia, Brassey, 2004) 

pages 242-243. 

24 John B. Dunlop, “Beslan, Russia’s 

9/11?” Th e American Committee for 

Peace in Chechnya and the Jamestown 

Foundation, October 2005. 


Richard A. Marquise is a Senior 

Research Associate with the Institute for 

Intergovernmental Research and teaches 

in the State and Local Antiterrorism 

Training (SLATT) program. He also 

teaches for the U.S. Department of State 

in the Anti Terrorism Assistance Program 

and has assisted the countries of Pakistan, 

Kenya, Serbia and the Philippines in 

creating and training their terrorist task 

forces. Mr. Marquise is a retired FBI agent 

who has had extensive counterterrorism 

experience. He led the American task force 

that investigated the bombing of Pan Am 

Flight 103 over Scotland and is the author 

of Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie 

Investigation, Algora, 2006. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


The Counter Terrorist The Counter ~ September/October Terrorist 2008 33 

 

 

 

 


How Terrorists and Criminals 

EXPLOIT 

E-COMMERCE 

To Store and Move Money 

By Jennifer L. Hesterman 

All good investigators know the value of the money trail 

to an investigation. Whether tracing a petty fund in a 

continuing criminal enterprise or millions of dollars moved by 

an international terrorist group, an investigator can learn a 

great deal about the unique story of an operation by paying 

attention to the origin, path, and destination of the money. 

Often, this story yields evidence that allows infi ltration of the 

group, identifi cation of its key players, and ultimately, the 

eradication of the organization or one of its cells. 

Photo: Scott Morrison 

A lthough improved technology 

has greatly improved the 

Alife 

quality and ease of daily 

life in recent years, it is not without its 

problems. One downside to technological 

advances is that terrorists and criminals 

are users, just like law-abiding citizens. 

With this new technology comes 

innovative means to move, store, and 

liquidate funds, often in ways that 

are not transparent or detectable. 

Unfortunately, as corporations continue 

to rush cutting-edge products to market, 

technology is sometimes fi elded without 

complementary safeguards to prevent 

exploitation by individuals who are 

engaged in illegal activities. Th e emerging 

nexus between telecommunications 

technology and illicit fi nancial 

transactions is one such area of concern. 

A lthough improved technology 

quality 

NEW PAYMENT METHODS 

Th e Financial Action Task Force 

(FATF) is an intergovernmental body 

that works internationally to combat 

money laundering and terrorist fi nancing 

(ML/TF). In recent years, the FATF 

has become increasingly concerned over 

so-called “new payment methods,” or 

NPMs. 1 NPMs, also referred to in the 

fi nance industry as “e-money,” “digital 

cash,” or “e-cash,” facilitate the transfer 

of value between individuals and 

organizations by way of the Internet, 

cellular phones, or other electronic 

methods. 

It is important to note that e-cash was 

intended to be analogous to physical cash 

by design; thus, it off ers unconditional 

anonymity and is impossible to trace 

because payments are not linked to a 

particular customer account. Other 

benefi ts associated with the use of e-cash 

include rapid transaction times and the 

ability to accumulate value. Obviously, 

these characteristics make NPMs 

appealing to those engaged in nefarious 

activity. 

Common examples of NPMs include 

the following: 

• Internet payment services. 

Th rough privately held companies labeled 

by the FATF as “nonbanks,” Internet 

payment services allow users to pay bills 

online, make purchases at participating 

websites, buy and sell items from auction 

sites, and contribute to charities. Niche 

companies have also emerged that serve 

markets not engaged by larger providers, 

such as Internet gambling sites. Setting 

up an account with a nonbank is simple 

and requires little personal data, most of 

which can easily be fabricated. Money 

may be accumulated in a nonbank 

account; then, when the account’s owner 

is ready, the balance can be liquidated 

in several ways, including through 

untraceable debit cards that can be used 

to withdraw cash from ATMs worldwide. 

Notably, a few nonbanks operate 

globally, and their transactions can cross 

borders. Such companies need only 

follow licensing and regulatory guidance 

in the countries in which they are based. 

Th erefore, the regulations that apply to 

The ease of 

obtaining and 

using open system 

cards opens the 

door for “smurfi ng,” 

a money-laundering 

activity in which 

criminals spread 

a great deal of 

cash across many 

sources, concealed 

from regulators and 

law enforcement. 


individual nonbanks vary and directly 

correlate to the strength of the rule of law 

in each nonbank’s host nation, as well as 

whether ML/TF is an area of concern or 

focus in that country. Of further concern 

are off shore nonbanks, which off er even 

more anonymity to customers and fewer 

restrictions on transaction limits. 

• Stored value cards. Th is popular 

category of NPM includes phone, retail, 

and credit cards that can be purchased 

with cash at many grocery and drug 

stores. Th e owners of these cards remain 

anonymous, an unlimited number of 

cards may be purchased and held by 

one person, and any subsequent use is 

virtually untraceable. Stored value cards 

can be divided into two types: 

• Limited-purpose or closedsystem 

cards. Th is category consists of 

merchant-issued gift cards and calling 

cards. Such cards can only be used 

for specifi c purposes, may have an 

expiration date, and usually cannot be 

reloaded. However, there is still a ML/ 

TF risk associated with these cards. 

In particular, an unlimited amount of 

cards can be purchased anonymously 

with cash and then sold through online 

auction sites, with the value transferred 

to a nonbank for subsequent 

liquidation through an untraceable 

ATM card. 

• Multipurpose or open-system 

cards. Of much greater ML/TF risk 

are multipurpose or open-system 

stored value cards, which bear the 

name of a major credit card company 

and may also be purchased with cash 

in unlimited quantities. Value can be 

added to these cards through an online 

nonbank or with cash at a participating 

retailer. Th en, when the cardholder 

is ready to cash out, money can be 

withdrawn from most ATMs, or these 

cards can be sold online with payments 

being laundered through the nonbank. 

As long as the amount doesn’t exceed 

the $10,000-per-day threshold that 

necessitates generation of a currency 

transaction report (CTR), such 

transactions will occur off the radar 

screen, with no documentation. 

Th e ease of obtaining and using 

open system cards opens the door 

for “smurfi ng,” a money-laundering 

activity in which criminals spread a 

great deal of cash across many sources, 

concealed from regulators and law 

enforcement. Indeed, the multipurpose 

card industry is booming; in fact, the 

National Drug Intelligence Center’s 

2006 threat assessment indicates 

there are already more than 7 million 

MasterCard and Visa prepaid debit 

cards in circulation. 2 

• E-purse. Unlike a stored value 

card, which has a magnetic strip, an 

e-purse stores value directly on a card 

itself using a microchip. Currently, 

the most popular e-purses are the socalled 

“smart cards” used for public 

transportation, tollbooths, parking 

garages, and vending machines. Th ese 

cards can be reloaded with cash at 

specialized vending machines and are 

also sold through online auctions. 

In addition, many cell phones will 

soon be transformed into e-purses 

through new technology that imbeds 

debit or credit card information into 

the phones’ SIM cards. Th is method, 

dubbed “mobile ticketing,” will 

allow users to simply tap their phone 

against a terminal to complete a sales 

transaction. 3 

• Mobile payments. Th e State 

Department recently issued its latest 

International Narcotics Control Strategy 

Report, 4 which includes a new section 

entitled “Mobile Payments—A Growing 

Th reat.” 5 Th is document sounds the 

alarm on a new type of remittance 

method with an extremely high ML/TF 

risk. 

Mobile payments, also known as “mpayments,” 

“proximity payments,” or 

“micropayments,” are point-of-sale cash 

transactions made through a mobile 

device such as cell phone or personal 

data assistant. Th e sender takes the cash 

to a remittance center, which charges 

a modest service fee. Th e center then 

“sends” the amount to the recipient’s 

mobile account, also known as an ewallet. 

Th e recipient gets a text message 

on his or her mobile device indicating 

that the sum has been placed in the 

account. Th e cash can then be collected 

at any participating remittance center, 

retail store, or, if business evolves as 

predicted, fast-food outlet. Although the 

entire transaction takes mere minutes, 

the ML/TF implications are tremendous 

and inevitable. 

One of the world’s leading 

information technology research and 

advisory companies, Gartner, Inc., 

predicts that mobile payment services are 

just beginning to take hold, with today’s 

projected 32.9 million users worldwide 

swelling to 103.9 million users by 2011. 6 

Th ese services are heavily marketed to 

segments of the world population that 

are unbanked or underbanked due to the 

cost of maintaining accounts or a lack 

of access to banking facilities. Consider 

the fact that over 3 billion people in the 

world have mobile phones, but only 1 

billion people have bank accounts; 7 given 

these statistics, the market for mobile 

payment services is vast. 

Th e recent intersection of two popular 

NPMs has also led to emerging ML/TF 

concerns. Specifi cally, a partnership 

between a major Internet payment service 

and a global cellular phone company now 

allows the instantaneous transfer of funds 

directly between nonbank accounts. 

Use of a “throw-away” cell phone, 

anonymously purchased with cash, 

will make any of type of m-payment 

transaction even more obscure and 

diffi cult to trace. 

• Digital precious metals. Finally, 

another NPM worth watching is the 

emerging practice of using digital 

precious metals as a way to store and 

move large amounts of currency. 

Th rough this service, users create an 

account and then secure cash deposits 

against gold, silver, and platinum. Th e 

major companies engaging in this NPM 

actually hold vaulted precious metal in 

the name of the investor, employing 

major companies such as Brinks for 

security. Gold is the most popular 

product on the market, with over $1 

billion worth of transfers through the 

e-gold Ltd., corporation in 2007 alone. 8 

Notably, Brinks stores over 48,000 fi ne 

troy ounces of gold purchased online in 

their vaults located around the world. 9 

Similarly, e-dinar, an off shoot and 

former partner of e-gold, provides a 

unique, niche service. Since 1992, the 

company has minted its own gold Islamic 

dinar to provide its customers a means 

of exchange in line with the religious 

specifi cations found in the Koran. 

Th erefore, the Islamic dinar retains a 

unique fungibility and can be directly 

used to pay zakat and dowry as required 

by Islamic law. 10 

Th e FATF reports that some 

companies in this international business 

allow investors to remain anonymous. 11 

Indeed, a quick Internet query yields 

Similarly, e-dinar, an 

offshoot and former 

partner of e-gold, 

provides a unique, niche 

service. Since 1992, the 

company has minted its 

own gold Islamic dinar 

to provide its customers 

a means of exchange 

in line with the religious 

specifi cations found in 

the Koran. 


several sites that indicate metals may be 

purchased using a nonbank account and 

possibly even with untraceable stored 

value credit cards. 

CRIMINALS AND 

TERRORISTS ARE 

TURNING TO NPMS 

Evidence shows that those individuals 

and groups engaged in criminal or 

terrorist-related activities are already 

turning to NPMs as a way to move and 

store money. In fact, the number of 

suspicious wire transfers in previously 

heavy markets is down, perhaps as a 

result of an increase in the use of NPMs 

to move money. 

• Ample evidence of exploitation. 

Several high-profi le cases confi rm 

that NPMs are attractive to criminals 

and terrorists. Examples include the 

following: 

• In 2008, Indonesian police 

reported that radical Islamic terrorists 

were observed selling phone cards, 

generating upwards of $500 per day to 

fund operations. 12 

• A Mexican criminal caught at the 

U.S. border in 2005 was using stolen 

credit cards to transfer value to prepaid 

cards. 13 

• In 2001, a suspicious activity 

report (SAR) fi led in the United 

States detailed the acquisition of more 

than 300 prepaid cards by a single 

individual who used them to transfer 

almost $2 million to Colombia. 14 

• In 2004, German tax investigators 

discovered a case of ML through 

prepaid cards. Two participants of a 

criminal fraud/embezzlement scheme 

had transferred parts of their shares 

of the criminal proceeds onto several 

prepaid cards. In this case, more 

than €350,000 were hidden and 

laundered. 15 

• Members of the criminal 

networking site “Shadowcrew” used egold 

to send and receive payments for 

illicit goods and services. 16 

• Cards as a form of payment for illicit 

activity. In lieu of traceable currency, 

stored value cards are becoming the 

preferred form of payment for illegal 

services rendered. Some examples in 

which these cards were used are as 

follows: 

• A joint Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement/Internal Revenue Service 

investigation uncovered a relationship 

between a U.S. criminal organization 

and a Mexican co-conspirator who 

was creating fake credit cards. Th e coconspirator 

was paid for his assistance 

with retail gift cards. He then sold the 

gift cards and moved the cash back 

across the U.S. border to buy phone 

cards, which were then smuggled into 

Mexico in a separate operation. 17 

• Th e U.S. Drug Enforcement 

Agency uncovered an operation in 

which drug dealers were loading cash 

onto prepaid cards and then sending 

the cards to suppliers outside of the 

country, who in turn liquidated the 

funds using ATMs. 18 

• In 2005, U.S. Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement offi cials 

initiated an investigation into a state 

employee in Ohio who was selling 

fraudulent drivers’ licenses and 

identifi cation cards in exchange for 

prepaid telephone cards. 19 

• Stored value cards are a smuggling 

risk. Th e smuggling of bulk currency out 

of the United States is on the rise, and 

according to offi cials, it is “the largest and 

most signifi cant drug money laundering 

threat facing law enforcement.” 20 Many 

experts believe that prepaid stored value 

cards are now an attractive alternative 

to bulk cash smuggling. 21 Cards are not 

subject to the same rules as cash at the 

border. For instance, cards cannot be 

seized if the amount carried exceeds the 

$10,000 threshold and is not properly 

declared. 

Cards can easily be smuggled without 

detection onboard a commercial aircraft, 

train, bus, or ship. Th ey are lighter 

in weight and more compact than a 

bundle of equivalent-value paper bills. 

Th ese physical properties, along with 

easy, anonymous acquisition and lack of 

regulatory guidance, make cards the ideal 

smuggling mechanism. 

THE BATTLE AHEAD 

Th e potential exploitation of NPMs 

by criminals and terrorists is a global 

problem; thus, it must be addressed 

with a comprehensive set of regulatory 

guidelines that are adhered to by all 

parties. Until this massive undertaking 

is realized, self-regulation within the 

industry would be a positive step 

forward. Most importantly, there must 

be ongoing dialogue between counterterrorism 

experts who research emerging 

ML/TF risks and operators on the front 

lines, as each group has information the 

other needs to ensure a united, relevant, 

and uncompromising strategy in the War 

on Terror. 

Traditional money laundering makes 

“dirty” money “clean” after a crime 

has been committed; today, however, 

terrorists are increasingly laundering 

“clean” money by moving and storing 

it for the purposes of fi nancing training 

and future operations. No matter 

which type of laundering a criminal 

organization conducts, that group 

stands to benefi t from the nexus 

between telecommunications, for-profi t 


38 The Counter Terrorist ~ September/October 2008 The Counter Terrorist ~ September/October 2008

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“nonbanks,” and the banking industry. 

Th e lack of physical evidence in mobile 

transactions, compounded by the ease 

of moving and storing money through 

various NPMs, should be of great 

concern to policy makers and the law 

enforcement community alike. • 


Jennifer Hesterman is a retired Air Force 

colonel. She is currently a senior analyst for 

Th e MASY Group, a global intelligence and 

risk Management fi rm, as well as a professor 

at American Military University, teaching 

courses in homeland security and intelligence 

studies. Her book, Transnational Crime and 

the Criminal-Terrorist Nexus was published 

in 2005. 

NOTES: 

1 Financial Action Task Force, 

Report on New Payment Methods (Paris: 

Author, 2006), http://www.fatf-gafi .org/ 

dataoecd/30/47/37627240.pdf (accessed July 

22, 2008). 

2 U.S. Department of Justice National 

Drug Intelligence Center, “Prepaid Stored 

Value Cards: A Potential Alternative to 

Traditional Money Laundering Methods” 

(Johnstown, PA: Author, 2006), http://www. 

usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs11/20777/20777p.pdf 

(accessed July 22, 2008). 

3 George Smith Alexander, “It’s Time 

to Shop through Cell Phones,” Rediff .com, 

December 22, 2003, http://in.rediff .com/ 

money/2003/dec/22betterlife.htm?zcc=ar 


4 United States Department of State, 

International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 

(Washington, DC: Author, 2008), http:// 

www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2008 (accessed 

July 22, 2008). 

5 United States Department of State, 

“Mobile Payments—A Growing Th reat,” 

in International Narcotics Control Strategy 

Report, vol. 2 (Washington, DC: Author, 

2008), http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/ 

nrcrpt/2008/vol2/html/101346.htm (accessed 

www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=652308 


7 “Mobile Phones to Send Money Home,” 

BBC News, February 12, 2007, http://news. 

bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6353797.stm 


8 e-gold Ltd., “e-gold Benefi ts,” http:// 

www.e-gold.com/benefi ts.html (accessed July 

22, 2008). 

9 e-gold Ltd., “Gold Held by the e-gold 

Bullion Special Purpose Trust Stored at 

Brinks,” http://www.e-gold.com/examiner_ 

blowup.asp?id=400&metal=1 (accessed July 

22, 2008). 

10 e-dinar, “What Is the Dinar?” http:// 

www.e-dinar.com/html/1_2.html (accessed 

July 22, 2008). 

11 Financial Action Task Force, Report on 

New Payment Methods. 

12 Eva C. Komandjaja, “Indonesia: 

Terrorists ‘Selling Phone Cards,’” Jakarta 

Post, Post November 22, 2005, http://www. 

asiamedia.ucla.edu/article-southeastasia. 

asp?parentid=34173 (accessed July 22, 2008). 

13 Chester Dawson, “Prepaid Cards: 

Candy for Criminals?” BusinessWeek. 

com, December 12, 2005, http://www. 

businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_50/ 

b3963115.htm (accessed July 22, 2008). 



15 Ibid. Ibid 

16 Brian Grow, “Gold Rush,” BusinessWeek. 

com, January 9, 2006, http://www. 

businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_02/ 

b3966094.htm (accessed July 22, 2008). 

17 U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, “Prepaid Cards an Emerging 

July 22, 2008). 

Th reat,” Cornerstone Report, Report December 2006, 

http://www.ice.gov/doclib/pi/cornerstone/pdf/ 

CS1206.pdf (accessed July 22, 2008). 

18 http://www.ice.gov/doclib/pi/ 

cornerstone/pdf/CS1206.pdf 



20 U.S. Department of the Treasury, et 

al., 2007 National Money Laundering Strategy 

(Washington DC: Author, 2007), http:// 

www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/nmls.pdf 


6 Gartner, Inc., “Gartner Says Worldwide 21 U.S. Department of Justice National 

Mobile Payment Users to Total 33 Million in Drug Intelligence Center, “Prepaid Stored 

2008,” press release, April 21, 2008, http:// 


40 The Counter Terrorist ~ September/October 2008 

Value Cards.” 


The Counter Terrorist ~ September/October 2008

BOOK REVIEW 

Terrorist Recognition Handbook, 

Second Edition by Malcolm Nance Reviewed by: Chris Graham 

A 

fter returning from my 

third tour of duty in Iraq, 

I generally avoided books on 

the ongoing war in that country. I was 

extremely unimpressed with the accuracy 

and perspective of the accounts that 

were provided by major news outlets 

and many publishers. It often 

seemed to me that the U.S. Central 

Command issued orders based on 

this fl awed reporting. Th e only thing 

I was certain of was that little of 

the “conventional wisdom” seemed 

consistent with what I observed 

on the ground in Iraq, living with 

Iraqis, conducting operations, and 

patrolling. 

Th is changed when I encountered 

Malcolm Nance’s book Th e Terrorists 

of Iraq. To my surprise, this volume 

accurately captured my perspective 

on encounters with members of 

various terror groups in Iraq and 

provided additional information 

I was unaware of. Nance’s book 

refl ected lessons learned by “grunts” 

in the fi eld, even if this knowledge 

hadn’t always fi ltered uphill. 

Furthermore, Nance went into 

signifi cant detail, off ering little 

that I could dispute. Th us, when I 

learned that the second edition of 

Nance’s Terrorist Recognition Handbook: 

A Practitioner’s Manual for Predicting and 

Identifying Terrorist Activities (CRC Press/ 

Taylor and Francis Group, 2008) had 

been released, I immediately requested a 

copy. 

Nance did not gain his insight by 

earning a PhD and watching CNN; 

rather, he is a 20-year veteran of 

intelligence operations in the Balkans, 

the Middle East (including Iraq and 

Afghanistan), and Africa. As a result, the 

Terrorist Recognition Handbook is truly 

a “practitioner’s manual,” as its subtitle 

indicates. Broken into six sections, this 

volume off ers a wealth of information for 

any security, law enforcement, military, 

or intelligence personnel involved in 

counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism 

operations. 

In section one of the Terrorist 

Recognition Handbook, entitled “Know 

the Terrorist,” Nance begins with 

a discussion of critical awareness, 

including how to identify operatives, 

profi le suspects, and understand terrorist 

training, motivation, and beliefs. Th is 

section is essential in that it demystifi es 

the terrorist from a phantom-like enigma 

while simultaneously discouraging the 

equally detrimental belief that 

terrorists are incompetent human 

caricatures. 

Later portions of the text 

expand on many of the topics 

introduced in section one. For 

example, section two, “Identifying 

the Terrorist Group and Its 

Cells,” explores how these groups 

organize themselves, while section 

three, “Detection of Key Terrorist 

Activities,” examines the typical 

signatures of terrorist actions. 

Discussion of the processes by 

which terrorists acquire safe 

houses, money, and transportation 

reveals the level of coordination 

necessary to support their eff orts. 

Also of particular note is Chapter 

12, which discusses equipment and 

other indicators that may reveal 

a group’s intended use of nuclear, 

biological, or chemical materials. 

In section four, “Predicting 

an Attack,” the activities of our 

opponents are further revealed. After 

noting that attacks are preceded by 

surveillance, Nance discusses the elements 

of surveillance in depth. Infi ltration 

techniques, as well as the decision-making 

processes used by terrorist groups, are 

analyzed. Perhaps the most useful portion 

of this section—indeed, of the book 

as a whole—is Chapter 17, “Point of 

Danger: Law Enforcement Traffi c Stops 

and Encountering Terrorists.” Because 

the patrol offi cer is far more likely to 

encounter militant activity than other 

specialized personnel, this chapter 

provides a number of detection ideas that 

can be implemented in the fi eld. Finally, 

this section concludes with Chapter 18, 

“Point of Failure: Terrorist Operations 

and Tactics.” Th is chapter discusses the 

types of terrorist action that may unfold 

if not detected and interdicted in earlier 

stages. In doing so, this piece familiarizes 

the reader with a wide range of attack 

methods previously employed and likely 

to be implemented in the future. 

Nance closes out the textual portion 

of his book with section fi ve, “Th e New 

Field of Terror,” which explores several 

key developments in modern terrorism. 

Individual chapters are devoted to the 

examination of al-Qaeda and related 

worldwide movements, to suicide 

terror and its implementation, and to 

major developments in the Iraq War 

between 2003 and 2008. Finally, in 

section six, Nance provides a number 

of supplemental resources, including 

a bibliography, a list of known global 

terror groups, and checklists for explosive 

materials. 

Malcolm Nance has acquired a level 

of understanding that surpasses that 

of many senior government offi cials 

with regard to the topics of terrorism, 

Iraq, and Afghanistan, and he shares his 

vast knowledge with us in the second 

edition of the Terrorist Recognition 

Handbook. Th ough Nance withholds 

some technological details for security 

purposes, this book is an excellent 

introduction to terrorist methodologies 

for both vigilant fi rst responders 

and personnel who are preparing for 

deployment. • 

If you 

read one 

book on 

radical 

Islam this 

year, read 

this! 

$12.95 

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To order go to: 

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Or, call Woodmont Publishers at 561-441-5484 



JUST 2 SECONDS 

Using Time and Space to Defeat Assassins 

By Gavin de Becker, 

Tom Taylor, and Jeff Marquart 

NOW 

This is not the time for thinking. This is not the time for planning. 

This is the time for action. It is 2:25 PM on March 30, 1981, and 

the system of Presidential appearances is chugging along just 

fi ne, at least by all appearances. 

A group of people behind a slender cordon is waiting to see 

President Reagan walk to his car. Some are waiting to get a 

closer look at him, some are waiting to photograph him, others 

are waiting to call out questions, and one is waiting to kill him. 

T he media reporters and 

Tof 

technicians are part of the system 

of Presidential appearances. Political 

promoters like them to be close, 

protectors like them to be far away, 

and presidents don’t like them at all. 

Nonetheless, they are part of the system, 

and this afternoon, they are helping to 

conceal John Hinckley, who is not part of 

the system. Not yet anyway. 

In a second or two, Hinckley’s actions 

will cause the system’s gears to grind 

as they try to digest something new: 

bullets. Th e assailant has six bullets in 

his handgun, and he’s about to fi re them 

all. When this happens, some people will 

fl inch and duck, some will fall, others will 

stand tall. John Hinckley will become 

part of the system, his quality-control test 

improving it in the long run, but having 

terrible consequences in the short run. 

Th e President walks out of the hotel. 

Th ough Hinckley glimpses him for just 

an instant, he draws the gun and begins 

fi ring. At the sound of the fi rst gunshot, 

nobody standing on the sidewalk of the 

Washington Hilton Hotel recognizes 

what is happening—nobody other than 

Hinckley, that is. For some, it takes 

another shot and seeing people fall. For 

others, it will take all six shots to call their 

minds into this moment. 

Since the attack began and ended 

in less than two seconds, it’s easy to 

understand how some people who 

were right there had no idea what had 

happened until afterwards. Just two 

seconds, and the shooting was over. Th is 

book is entirely about those tiny fractions 

of time. Th ese pages do not explore 


T he 

the planning that precedes attacks, 

the rationale behind them, the nature 

of conspiracy, the social and cultural 

conditions that foment them, or the 

psychology of attackers—all important 

topics that have been addressed in other 

books. We are concerned here only with 

events at the scene of the attack, during 

the attack. 

Th ere are many disciplines that break 

events down to their elements. When 

judging a guitar, for example, experts 

listen for four things in particular, 

described by the term ASDR: 

Attack ttack (the fi rst sound that comes from 

the instrument when a note is played), 

Sustain (how long the instrument 

body holds the pure sound of the note), 

Decay (how long it takes the sound 

to die), and Release (the end of the 

sound). 

Our scrutiny must be as precise, given the 

stakes. Were this a book for pilots, it would 

be about crashes and near-crashes, not 

about routine fl ight, aircraft maintenance, 

nor navigation. Instead, it would explore 

the lessons that present themselves from 

the moment an aircraft comes out of 

stable fl ight until the moment the incident 

ends—such incidents always ending in one 

of two ways: Th e pilot regains control, or 

the aircraft crashes. 

Th e moment protective operations 

come out of stable fl ight is usually 

marked by the sound of gunfi re. In most 

of the hundreds of incidents we studied, 

that sound is what led protectors to know 

an attack had commenced. However, 

there’s an event before the sound of 

gunfi re that actually marks the start of 

From the Moment 

of Commitment 

onward, the 

overwhelming 

majority of public 

fi gure attacks are 

over in less than fi ve 

seconds. Within just 

those few seconds, 

all the damage that 

will be done has 

been done.

an attack: the Moment of Commitment. 

Th at’s the instant in which an assailant 

fi rst takes an obvious action likely to 

reveal intent, an action from which he 

cannot easily retreat. It might be his 

bringing a gun into view, or pushing 

forward through the crowd, jumping 

onto the stage, or raising his arm with a 

knife, but whatever it is, he knows he’s 

not likely going home when his act is 

over. It is this Moment of Commitment 

that starts the clock on a critical race 

between safety and lethality. 

Sometime (i.e., some time) after the 

Moment of Commitment comes the 

Moment of Recognition. Th is is the 

instant when protectors get their minds 

around what is happening, a prerequisite 

to getting their arms around what is 

happening—and more signifi cantly, 

getting their arms around the assailant 

or the protectee. Watch the videos and 

fi lms of attacks and the Moment of 

Recognition is unmistakable. You will see 

a powerful energy bolt through everyone 

present. Th e target freezes and recoils, 

the bodyguards and the attacker begin an 

awkward and disturbing ballet, onlookers 

surge forward to see, then backward to 

survive. A chorus of screams and gasps is 

heard long after the violence has stopped. 

Th e extensive study undertaken for 

this book has produced many insights, 

the most striking of which is also the 

simplest: 

From the Moment of Commitment 

onward, the overwhelming majority 

of public fi gure attacks are over in less 

than fi ve seconds. Within just those few 

seconds, all the damage that will be 

done has been done. 

Th e fi ve-second statistic could be 

discouraging to protectors, because it 

grants them very little time to respond 

eff ectively. However, embedded within 

that fi ve-second statistic is one of the 

most encouraging lessons we learned: 

Attackers are even more handicapped 

by the speeding clock than are 

protectors. 

Just as an attacker benefi ts from the 

narrowness of time in which protectors 

can respond, so do protectors benefi t 

from the ever-narrowing time the attacker 

has to complete his act. 

For an attacker like Hinckley, the 

choice to bring a handgun into play 

carries an enormous and immediate 

consequence: Where time served him 

before he revealed the gun, afterwards, 

it begins to enslave him. Th e gun he 

wields as a weapon can also be seen as 

the starting pistol for a race. From the 

moment he introduces it, he is fi ghting 

time, and hopefully (for our purposes), he 

is fi ghting capable protectors. 

Given such a small window of time, 

if the Moment of Recognition is moved 

forward by even a fraction of a second, 

allowing a protector to respond during 

that gained time, the odds of survival 

increase profoundly. You are about 

to learn concepts that can prepare 

your mind to reach the Moment of 

Recognition sooner. 

Attackers have plenty of time before 

the Moment of Commitment, but from 

that instant onwards they have almost no 

time at all. Th e asset of surprise cannot 

sustain its value for it’s spent entirely in 

a fl ash. After that fl ash, most attackers 

rely so heavily upon speed that it quickly 

becomes their greatest weakness. Speed is 

an enemy of accuracy and composure— 

both necessary components of successful 

attacks. If the presence of protectors 

doesn’t deter an attack, protective 

strategies can at least compel an attacker 

to rush. 

Th ose intending assassination have 

some advantages over their targets, but 

many more factors work against them 

than for them. Th ousands of opportunities 

exist for them to fail, and only one slender 

opportunity exists for them to succeed. 

Often, both literally and fi guratively, 

assassins have one shot at success—and 

they know this. Accordingly, though 

assassination might be seen as a reckless 

act, it is rarely committed recklessly. 

Th ere’s a popular belief that 

attackers have the advantage, even over 

sophisticated protective operations, 

because they can choose when to attack. 

In reality, however, most attackers do 

not get to choose precisely when to 

attack. Th ey may select the date or 

the general period, but the timing 

that really matters—the Moment of 

Commitment—is dictated and stimulated 

by events attackers rarely control: When 

does the target come into view or into the 

killing zone? How long will he remain 

there? When is the target nearest? Are 

protectors close to the attacker? Are 

protectors focused on the attacker? Are 

bystanders focused on the attacker? Is 

the target moving or stationary? When 

is the space between attacker and target 

most free of obstructions? Is this instant 

the best moment for attack, or this 

one… or will there be a better one if 

I wait? Eff ective protective strategies 

can infl uence how an attacker answers 

these questions, and often, more often 

than we know, the answers cause him to 

delay, postpone, or even cancel his plans. 

Th ough history off ers many examples of 

attackers who aborted their attempts, this 

book focuses on those who acted on their 

plans—and on the few seconds it took 

them to do so. 

IT’S ABOUT TIME 

Th e cases in the Compendium show 

the number of attacks that happened in 

the daytime versus at night, and how 

many were political versus personal—but 

such information is not useful for our 

purposes here. If you know, for example, 

that 70% of past attacks occurred in the 

daytime, it doesn’t mean you give 30% 

less attention or preparation during the 

night. Similarly, knowing that 75% of all 

assassins were mentally ill does not have 

much value to a bodyguard intercepting 

someone who suddenly charges through a 

crowd. Th ere is no time for mental health 

diagnosis, and the bodyguard must not 

ignore people just because they appear 

sane or reasonable, nor focus only on 

those who appear deranged. 

Some statistics, however, can be useful 

to protectors. For example, knowing 

that most attacks are launched from 

within 25 feet of the target can encourage 

protectors to focus most of their attention 

and resources on the close range, rather 

than watching only for snipers on distant 

rooftops. 

Th e Compendium cases off er other 

useful insights: 

• In the U.S., attacks are most 

likely to be undertaken by lone 

assailants (87% of the time). 

Outside the U.S., attacks are most 

likely committed by multiple 

assailants (71%). 

• Attacks in the U.S. are about as 

likely to be indoors as outdoors 

(53% versus 47%). Outside the 

U.S., they are far more likely to 

occur outdoors (80%). 

• Firearms are the most likely 

weapons of attack (71%). 

• In the U.S., handguns are more 

than twice as likely to be used 

than long guns (51% handguns, 

20% long guns). Outside the U.S., 

the reverse is true. 

• Attacks in the U.S. are most likely 

to be at close range, less than 25 

feet (81%). Only 19% occurred at 

more than 25 feet, with the longest 

range being 263 feet. Outside the 

U.S., even though long guns are 

used twice as often, most attacks 

still occur at close range (70%). If 

you combine this fact with the less 

eff ective emergency medicine found 

in most other countries, it’s not 

surprising that attacks outside the 

U.S. are more likely to be lethal. 

• Bombs succeed at killing intended 

targets only slightly more often 

than they fail (57% of the time). 

• Th e most dangerous place to be is 

in or around the protectee’s car. 

To be present at the 

location is one thing, 

but to be there in 

time is the central 

issue of this book. 

Sixty-four percent of attacks happen 

when the protected person is in or 

around the car, and these attacks 

succeed an astonishing 77% of the 

time. 

While this information has value for 

developing protective strategies, once 

an attack has commenced, almost all 

knowledge becomes useless mental 

clutter. Perhaps the single most valuable 

thing a protector could know is when 

future attacks will happen—and that we 

do know, precisely: 

One hundred percent of all attacks 

happen at exactly the same time: 

Now. 

Th e only time anything can happen is 

in the present moment. Everything else 

is a memory (the past) or a fantasy (the 

future), and nothing in the past or future 

can hurt your protectee. An attacker’s 

Moment of Commitment is always in the 

Now, and if you hope to meet him there, 

you too must be in the Now. Focusing 

attention on the Now is the surest way to 

be present and ready in the event of an 

attack, literally to be in the event, and not 

just a bystander watching events unfold. 

To be present at the location is one 

thing, but to be there in time is the central 

issue of this book. You could place yourself 

in the perfect position for foiling an attack 

(many bodyguards have), and yet if you 

are not present in the moment, pre-sent as 

it were, your body being there is not likely 

to be of constructive consequence. 


PREPARING TO BE PRESENT 

Professional protectors already 

know a lot about maintaining physical 

readiness, but it’s the mind that must 

fi rst be properly prepared, the mind that 

controls the hands, arms, eyes, and ears. 

Th ere are strategies available to help 

prepare warriors, based upon knowing 

how the body responds to lethal combat, 

what happens to your blood fl ow, your 

muscles, judgment, memory, vision, and 

your hearing when someone is trying 

to kill you. Police offi cers, soldiers, and 

protectors can learn how to keep going 

even if shot, and how to prepare the 

mind and body for survival instead of 

defeat. Th is is much more than mere 

information; the knowledge itself can be 

a kind of armor. 

Just as a computer functions best when 

loaded with accurate and relevant data, 

we encourage protectors to mentally 

download the information in this book. 

Getting the strategies into practice 

begins with getting them into your 

mind. Speaking of the mind, imagine 

for a moment that your mind is a time 

machine able to take you into the past or 

the future. Now realize that you need not 

imagine this at all, because your mind is 

a time machine, one that almost always 

takes you out of the present moment. 

You might have enjoyable or even useful 

journeys, but while you’re on them, you 

cannot truly be in the present. 

Every thought about anything outside 

the Now is a burden that makes you 

mentally heavier, while focusing your 

perception on the ever-changing Now 

makes you lighter and more agile. For 

a protector, it all comes down to this 

question: Will you be present to recognize 

the earliest detectable signs of an attack, 

or will you be elsewhere, called back to 

the moment by the sound of gunfi re? 

Even if a loud sound ends your time 

travel and pulls you back to the present, 

that doesn’t mean you’ve reached the 

Moment of Recognition. You still have to 

spend time coming to understand what’s 

happening. Your senses can alert you to 

danger, but on their own they can’t tell 

you what caused that loud noise. In other 

words, the gunshot and the Moment of 

Recognition are rarely simultaneous. 

You might think that all of your 

training on how to respond to an attack 

automatically kicks in at the sound of 

gunfi re. But it doesn’t. Nor should it. 

If you’re an experienced protector, you 

already know this. You’ve heard many 

sounds at public appearances that were 

indistinguishable from gunfi re—dropped 

trays, fi recrackers, cars backfi ring, 

balloons popping—and yet you didn’t 

always pull your protectee from the stage. 

Th at’s because even a sound like gunfi re is 

rarely enough on its own to get you to the 

Moment of Recognition and stimulate 

the Big Response that might follow. On 

hearing such sounds, protectors (for 

better or for worse) tend to look for other 

indicators to complete the puzzle before 

responding. 

On the one hand, protectors want to 

respond eff ectively at the earliest possible 

instant; on the other hand, they dread 

acting prematurely. Nobody wants to 

charge across the baseball fi eld during 

the National Anthem, knock the famous 

singing star to the dirt—and then fi nd 

out that the gunshot sound was actually 

a backfi re in the parking lot. Th is is the 

protector’s great confl ict: Act too early 

and risk embarrassment. Act too late, and 

risk everything. 

Th e only way to be fully certain before 

responding is to allow more of the event 

to unfold. But how many pieces of the 

puzzle must you see before you can know 

what image is being formed (or at least be 

willing to commit to a guess)? Th e answer 

might diff er from person to person, but 

clearly, in order to see the earliest pieces 

of the puzzle, your attention must be 

focused on the Now. 

Consider the true meaning of the 

popular expression, passing the time: 

When someone is merely passing the 

time, he is passing events that are 

occurring right in front of him, passing 

the Now. Or another expression, killing 

time, which is, quite literally, killing the 

one resource a protector needs most. 

Imagine that a protector’s mind is 

anywhere else when something calls him 

back to the present. He’ll then need time 

to land, time to assess, time to conclude, 

time to respond. But he has been killing 

the very time he needs. 

Th e concept of spending time is 

perfectly apt: Once spent, time is gone, 

just like any other resource. In the 

economy of public fi gure attack, time is 

spent in tiny increments—and each one 

is priceless. 

Just an instant before confi rming that 

the sound of gunfi re actually is gunfi re, 

a bodyguard might have been thinking 

about the complicated route back to the 

car, or whether the protectee’s speech is 

almost over, or about the loading dock 

door that got stuck at the half-way point 

on this morning’s advance. A bodyguard 

might have been thinking about staying 

on schedule, keeping intact a complex 

web of logistics, or he might be even 

farther from this moment, thinking about 

an upcoming vacation. 

But wherever attention might have 

been an instant ago, from the Moment 

of Recognition onward, bodyguards are 

fi rmly rooted in the present, riding a 

terrible roller coaster of shifting priorities: 

• Cover the protectee 

• Stop the attack 

• Subdue the attacker 

• Get the protectee out of here 

Th ough a bodyguard might have the 

objective of stopping the gunfi re, that 

goal is rarely reached. In most of the 

1400 incidents we studied, it was the 

gunmen who decided when to stop 

shooting. 

If the protectee has not been hit by 

gunfi re, your priority might be to pull 

or push him out of danger, or to cover 

him. If you are closer to the attacker, your 

priority might be to disrupt the shooter’s 

aim or view. If the protectee has just been 

shot, your priority shifts again, this time 

to ensuring that he is not hit by another 

bullet. 

If the protectee has been injured 

and the attacker is no longer shooting, 

your priority likely shifts to stopping 

blood loss and getting the protectee to 

emergency medical care. Th at priority 

doesn’t change even if the protectee 

is dead: Protectors rush to the damn 

hospital anyway, knowing all along the 

awful drive that doctors won’t be able 

to do anything more than confi rm the 

obvious. 

Th is was the experience of protectors 

rushing to hospitals with the dead 

or soon-to-be-dead bodies of John 

F. Kennedy, Israeli Prime Minister 

Rabin, and Egyptian President Anwar 

Sadat—hoping that time still mattered, 

while facing the one situation in which it 

doesn’t matter at all. It’s hard to imagine 

that gunfi re aimed in one’s direction 

is ever desirable, yet the protectors in 

these three cases would tell you they 

preferred the moments of danger over 

the moments that followed, and the years 

that followed. • 

Th is passage was excerpted from the forthcoming 

book Just 2 Seconds: Using Time and Space 

to Defeat Assassins. Special advance copies are 

available to readers of Th e Counter Terrorist at 

a discounted price. For more information on the 

book, visit http://www.just2seconds.org. 


Gavin de Becker, is a highly regarded 

expert in public fi gure protection, and 

his 200-member fi rm provides protective 

coverage for many of the world’s most at- 

risk people. Mr. de Becker also designed the 

MOSAIC threat assessment systems used 

by the CIA, the U.S. Supreme Court, and 

the U.S. Capitol Police. His bestselling 

books, including Th e Gift of Fear, have been 

published in 14 languages. 

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CIVILIAN STANDBY 

CT GROUPS PART 1 

By Mickey Hargaash 

sraeli governmental security 

organizations had much experience 

with terror attacks in the 20th Israeli governmental 

organizations had much experience 

with terror attacks in the 20 century, 

especially outside the country’s borders. 

Th e same could not (previously) be said 

within community settlements. 

Th e Israel Defense Force (IDF) 

had only a few experiences with terrorist 

killing attacks until recent years, and no 

professional doctrine was formed to face 

the threats. Th e military CT tactics and 

special forces activities were directed solely 

Photo: SSI International 

TEST CASES: FOUR TERRORIST KILLING 

ATTACKS THAT SHAPED ISRAELI TACTICS 

towards the well-known hostage terrorist 

takeovers, like the famous Entebbe rescue 

operation in 1976. 

During the “hang gliding night” in 

1987 and the “pitch forks night” in 1992, 

terrorists infi ltrated military compounds 

and killed numerous soldiers until they 

were shot at on one occasion and ran 

away with stolen M16s on the other. 

Lessons learned included very long 

summaries focusing on personal blame. 

Th e HIC (High Intensity Confl ict) was 

the only relevant interest, and there was 

no decision made to form any doctrinal 

knowledge in relation to the LIC (Low 

Intensity Confl ict), in particular the 

terror killing attacks. 

Civilian community settlements 

had little experience either, though they 

had the ambition to prepare for terrorist 

threats, along with volunteers. Th e threats 

materialized in the year 2000 with the 

Palestinian General Security Police, but 

expertise was not yet available. 

Defeating suicide bombers by using 

basically trained civilians in an urban 

environment on three diff erent occasions 

at the beginning of 2002 established 

a new eff ort. Local eff orts to combat 

terrorism could be helpful, but somebody 

had to take responsibility. 

In 2002 the IDF made a decision 

to “adopt” the combatant local-eff ort 

approach and opened a special CT 

school for civilian groups in community 

settlements. It also pushed for a crossorganizations 

exchange of knowledge 

in order to develop the proper doctrine 

needed. Th is was the beginning of 

establishing civil defense to combat terror 

in the community environment in Israel. 

ELEY SINAI, 2001 

Basic data: A terrorist attack in a small 

neighborhood at a civilian settlement 

near Gaza. Two terrorists; approximately 

three hours of ongoing killing; many 

military forces, including special forces, 

with no organized or trained civilian force 

around at the time. 

Timetable: Taken by the division’s 

operations room and made available to 

the public: 

19:25 hours: Two terrorists infi ltrated 

a military-secured civilian settlement. 

Th ey shot a soldier and walked around 

for about an hour shooting and throwing 

many grenades in between the houses. 

Military teams did not make any contact 

with them. 

20:30: After a local civilian called the 

operations room and directed authorities 

to the precise location, military forces 

started to close on the two. 

20:50: A cordon was placed around the 

house where the terrorists shut themselves in. 

22:50: Th e terrorists were hit by snipers 

after trying to escape by pretending to be 

a terrorist kidnapping a civilian. 

Outcome: Two killed; 16 wounded; 

two terrorists killed. 

Disadvantages were the endless time 

needed for engagement, the large military 

employment, and the lack of knowledge 

to enable effi cient use of combat forces. 

Lessons learned were written at 

all levels and included very long lists, 

though the focus was not on personal 

blame. Th e basic understanding was 

that the conservative equation of 

Terrorists=hostage situations does not 

work, and time until engagement (of 

terrorists) is highly important. 

MARGANIT, 2002 

Basic data: A terrorist attack on a small 

military compound near Gaza, only 30 

meters in length. Th e attack lasted for 

15 minutes. Th ere were two terrorists – 

policemen of the General Security Police 

Force, 11 infantry trained soldiers with no 

CT training asleep, three guards on duty. 

Timetable: taken by the division’s 

operations room and made available to 

the public: 

02:50: A last warning was given 

following a few others of a fence cut a few 

hundred meters from the compound. No 

one bothered to check the warning. 

03:01: Shooting and grenade explosions 

were heard from the compound. Two 

terrorists shot at the guard at the gate 

Like many tough 

issues, private 

police, jurisdiction 

and responsibilities 

are ones that have 

to be faced and 

will eventually rise 

to a critical point, 

from either needs or 

liability or both. 


from a distance of 15 meters. He was 

not hurt, and in fact he ran to call his 

commander. Th e other two guards did 

not initiate any contact, as they were 

afraid to leave their posts. No contact 

by sight or fi re was initiated by the 

awakening soldiers. Th e terrorists walked 

around and kept shooting in all directions 

in the compound. 

03:10: Reinforcement arrived with 

the major, second in command of the 

battalion, who found that no one was 

actually doing anything, aside from some 

aimless shooting. He was the only one to 

move around in the compound, and was 

hit while fi ghting. 

03:16: After local soldiers started to 

aim and shoot from static posts, one 

terrorist was hit and the other one ran 

away. 

Outcomes: Th ree were killed, seven 

wounded; two terrorists killed, including 

one at the end of a pursuit at 07:00. 

Disadvantages start with the near 

endless time that was needed to shoot the 

terrorists at virtually no distance. Th is is 

added to the “on-guard team” available 

inside the compound, which had the best 

starting point, even better than that of a 

“stand-by team” located nearby. 

Lessons learned were written at all 

levels and included very long lists. Focus 

was on personal blame, and still no 

connection was made to the method of 

fi ghting and training of combatants. 

ITAMAR, 2002 

Basic data: A terrorist attack on a 

civilian settlement in Samaria, starting 

with shooting in the neighborhood and 

fi nally shooting civilians inside one of 

the houses. One terrorist was involved 

as were many military and police forces, 

with no civilian trained force available. 

Timetable: Not available. 

21:00: One terrorist infi ltrated, fi red 

rounds and threw grenades while he 

walked around the neighborhood. Finally 

he entered a house and shot the children 

and parents inside. 

A police special operations unit 

performed a cordon around the house 

and started rescuing the victims. Th e unit 

had to improvise since the scenario did 

not meet any hostage situation that was 

familiar at that time; thus, the unit went 

in using grenades. Th ree kids were saved 

though injured, and the terrorist who 

tried to escape through a window on the 

second fl oor was shot by a sniper. 

Outcomes: Five were killed, three of 

them children, and three children were 

wounded. 

Disadvantages were the excessive time 

needed to shoot the terrorist and the 

inappropriate combat tactics used by the 

on scene police unit. 

Lessons learned focused on the 

improvements needed with the CT 

combat tactics. At a diff erent level, a 

military decision was made to create 

a designated school for local civil 

combatant groups. 

ITAMAR, 2004 

Basic data: Multiple terrorist actions 

started with shooting at civilian vehicles. 

Th ey were driving along a road located in 

an orchard contour that connected two 

separate neighborhoods of the settlement. 

Timetable: Was measured according to 

a reconstruction of the event I conducted 

in the fi eld. 

10:30: A report was heard of local 

civilians being shot at on the inner road 

mentioned above. Four members of the 

local civilian combat team heard it on the 

military radio, along with several shots 

they could hear from the mentioned 

direction. 

A military team on a logistics mission 

with a vehicle nearby also heard it. Th ey 

were asked to observe until the standby 

team of the military company in charge 

and the commander would join them. 

10:40: Four civilian members 

mentioned above took their weapons and 

rushed towards the observing military 

vehicle to get more information. Th ey 

saw a civilian vehicle on the road and 

thought it might be a car being attacked. 

10:45: Th ey spread into a square 

formation and, under the orchard’s 

cover, ran towards the car. From this 

distance they managed to see a civilian 

shooting another civilian lying next to 

the car while trading his rifl e for one on 

the ground. Th en, after he shot at them 

and they made a brief attempt to identify 

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........

themselves, they determined it was the 

terrorist. 

10:48: Th ey shot and killed him. As 

the military standby team arrived, they 

passed on command for a secondary 

search around the entire orchard area. 

Outcomes: One terrorist killed, one 

civilian killed – the new security offi cer in 

charge of the settlement who rushed into 

the orchards when he heard the shots. 

Advantages were the relatively short time 

needed for engagement, even though the 

terrorist was distant and ambushing, and 

the absence of need for large military 

employment. It was a local civilian 

combatant standby team, which pursued 

contact and shot the terrorist. 

Lessons learned were written very 

briefl y. It appeared that both civilian 

and military forces can supplement 

each other, along with the eff ectiveness 

of combatant civil groups. Urgent 

development of contact emphasized for 

an actively shooting terrorist, not when 

the terrorist is quiet, ambushing and not 

NHDF has issued a 

CALL FOR PAPERS. 

Papers selected will be presented at 

Symposium VI and archived 

in the NHDF actively killing. Library. 

Th e tragic killing attacks portrayed 

above presented a new challenge, which 

emphasized the logic and importance of 

local combatant groups. 

Securing the Future of Liberty 

October 27-30, 2008 • Colorado Springs, Colorado 

The theme of Symposium VI is “Securing our Homelands Through 

International Collaboration; Neighbors Helping Neighbors.” 

Presentations will include key officials from the US, Canada, 

Mexico, Australia, and other nations. This annual conference is the 

nation’s leading public forum on homeland defense and security 

matters and offers valuable networking opportunities. 

Plan to exhibit and attend by registering at www.nhdf.org 

The world class 5 

Star 5 Diamond 

Broadmoor Hotel is 

the host location for 

Symposium VI. 

For more information, visit www.nhdf.org 

NHDF has issued a CALL FOR PAPERS. Papers selected will 

be presented at Symposium VI and archived in the NHDF Library. 

CHARACTERISTICS 

OF THE AREA THE 

ATTACKERS CHOOSE 

Wherever helpless victims can be 

attacked and killed, defensive ability is 

needed – whether on the streets or inside 

houses, whether on a military compound 

or in a soldier’s bed room, or in an 

ambush on an orchard side road. 

Implications: Defense of, and coverage 

of, an entire area is problematic, 

especially against terrorists. A possible 

solution would be to form available local 

standby combat groups. 

CHARACTERISTICS OF 

THE THREAT 

Th e number of terrorists in a single 

attack is usually somewhere between one 

and a few. Th e backgrounds of terrorists 

range from no professional training to 

police level. Th eir professional ability is 

generally very low. Th ey usually need a 

great deal of time to “achieve deaths,” 

even when the helpless don’t fi ght back, 

despite their possession of assault rifl es 

and grenades and the close ranges they 

use. Th eir advantages include the ability 

to operate as excellent hunters, their 

ability to use the element of surprise, and 

their ability to get as close as possible 

to their targets. Th e sacrifi cing element 

varies; sometimes they tried to run away, 

but generally they didn’t even try. 

Implications: Th e average terrorist is 

not a demon. It would be reasonable to 

marshal effi cient resistance against him 

by using locally designated and trained 

combatant groups. 

FRIENDLIES: KNOW- 

HOW, LEARNING ABILITY 

AND COOPERATION 

Knowledge of how to combat a 

specifi c threat is highly important. Th e 

availability of such knowledge is generally 

not obvious and even special forces 

units in the area will not necessarily help 

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54 The Counter Terrorist ~ September/October 2008 The Counter Terrorist ~ Circle September/October 255 on Reader Service 2008 Card 

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kept more than fi ve diff erent military 

forces busy while shooting for several 

hours (some of them were special forces 

designated for hostage situations) and the 

whole scenario was limited to only a small 

neighborhood. At Marganit, well-trained 

infantry combatants were attacked, but 

that did not help them save themselves. 

Flexibility and learning during combat is 

not limited to military forces. In Itamar, 

2002, a police force had improvised 

according to the goals and the situation, 

and succeeded to a certain degree. In 

Itamar, 2004, the civilian combatant 

group had to improvise in relation 

to the non-familiar orchard contour, 

without waiting for the military force. 

It actually succeeded well in initiating a 

swift engagement and neutralizing the 

ambushing terrorist. 

Th e idea of the need for special units 

in order to fi ght terrorists is not always 

justifi ed. Local civilian combatants can 

act more effi ciently in certain contexts. 

Cooperation between local civilians 

and combat forces is essential. Th is 

includes civilians directly confronting 

terrorists and coordination / deconfl 

iction between the various 

forces. In Itamar, 2004, mutual radio 

frequencies shortened the response time, 

as implemented by the civilian standby 

combatant group. 

Implications: Properly trained local 

civilian combatant groups could be a 

highly valuable part of the defense puzzle 

when terrorist attacks take place in their 

own community environment. • 


Mr. Hargaash served in Israeli 

governmental and military organizations, 

and specialized in counter terrorism and 

guerrilla operations for the last 25 years. 

Th e above is based on three years of work as 

the military professional liaison to the new 

CT school for civilian standby teams. Next 

month, Mr. Hargaash further develops the 

concepts behind the Israeli civilian standby 

CT teams in part two. 

DID YOU KNOW? 

SATGIN Organization formed to 

Counter Organized Crime 

S 

outh American Th eft Groups 

Intelligence Network (SATGIN) 

Sestablished 

is a not-for-profi t organization 

established to facilitate a networking 

platform for law enforcement, corporate 

and the private sector for the sharing 

of intelligence information relating to 

organized theft crimes, with a specifi c 

and unique focus on the South American 

Th eft Groups (SATG). Th is transnational 

criminal network has operated worldwide 

for decades virtually unknown to the 

public and to much of law enforcement 

until now. 

SATGs are recognized by the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation as a violent, 

organized criminal syndicate who 

travel the world conducting crimes 

ranging from pick pocketing to violent, 

commando-style carjacking of jewelers. 

Th e SATGs are a loosely knit, laterally 

structured crime syndicate unlike the 

historical, pyramidal structures of the 

well-studied Italian mafi a. 

Everyone is already an indirect victim 

of their crimes with regard to the costs 

in losses to the retailers and insurance 

companies who then pass them on to the 

general consumer. Someone becomes a 

potential target every time they purchase 

jewelry or a big ticket item, make a sales 

call visit, travel to and from the airport, 

rent a car, use public transportation, or 

withdraw money from the bank. 

SATGIN’s basic premise of 

communication, awareness, education, 

and training has already made a diff erence 

in deterring these criminals from their 

on-going criminal enterprises. 

South American Th eft Groups 

Th e SATGIN organization is 

comprised of retired and active law 

enforcement offi cers from federal, 

state and local agencies who specialize 

in the SATG’s. Collectively, we have: 

participated in numerous tack forces; 

investigated, arrested prosecuted and 

deported hundreds of SATG members; 

published manuscripts and articles on 

the SATG; and, trained hundreds of 

law enforcement offi cers and corporate 

security personnel throughout the world. 

We provide verifi ed law enforcement 

offi cers access to specifi cally designed, 

secured areas of our website for them 

to remain updated on the most recent 

criminal activities of the SATG, as well 

as to communicate among themselves 

on a secured platform in order to share 

intelligence on crimes and suspects. Th ey 

also share contact information so that the 

more sensitive aspects of the cases may be 

discussed off -line. 

Our Corporate and Professional 

SATGIN Team Members, for a low-cost 

annual membership, enjoy access to their 

own secured areas of the site where they 

will also be kept updated on the latest 

criminal activities of the SATG. Th ey are 

also provided a secured forum with which 

to communicate with other SATGIN 

Corporate Team members on a variety of 

topics. 

Most of the crimes committed by 

the SATG go either unreported or are 

not properly attributed to having been 

committed by an organized theft group. 

Rather, these crimes are concluded to 

have been “random”. SATGIN feels that 

Someone becomes 

a potential target 

every time they 

purchase jewelry 

or a big ticket 

item, make a 

sales call visit, 

travel to and from 

the airport, rent 

a car, use public 

transportation, or 

withdraw money 

from the bank. 

these forums will provide a way for the 

Law Enforcement and private sector to 

exchange, share, and provide the needed 

information to locate, apprehend and 

convict these organized crime members. 

Th ese forums allow for the immediate 

dissemination of facts, leads or losses 

occurred by the victims. 

SATGIN allows for the interactive 

participation in the website design, 

forums and changes that will benefi t all 

members. 

With these basic types of 

memberships, SATGIN allows for 

anyone who may be a potential target 

to get involved, become informed, and 

participate in an active forum. 

You can visit our website at 

www.SATGIN.org. • 



Call to register for OCTOBER 7TH - 10TH, 2008 at CAMP BLANDING, FL 

TRAINING REVIEW 

onPoint Tactical’s Urban Escape 

and Evasion 

O 

n February 13, 2003, a single 

engine, propeller-driven 

Othe 

Cessna 206 crashed into 

the lush jungle of Colombia’s Caquetá 

Province. Revolutionary Armed Forces 

of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas quickly 

apprehended the fi ve survivors. Two 

of these men—pilot Tom Janis and a 

Colombian soldier—were immediately 

executed. Pilot Th omas Howes, fl ight 

engineer Keith Stansell, and systems 

analyst Marc Gonsalves were quickly 

marched into the bush. 1 

Survival, evasion, resistance, and escape 

(SERE) training has long been taught 

to military and intelligence personnel. 

Unfortunately, even within the 

military and intelligence communities, 

opportunities for formal school-based 

training are available to only a minority 

of individuals. Moreover, military 

SERE training has historically focused 

on conventional warfare scenarios; 

soldiers have been taught to adhere to 

Geneva Convention requirements and 

seek the permission of senior personnel 

before attempting escape, for example. 

Unfortunately, in an unconventional 

setting, adversaries do not uphold legal 

niceties, and individuals are unlikely to 

be taken to a prisoner-of-war camp where 

seeking permission from senior personnel 

may be practical. 

Not only soldiers are at risk in regard 

to terrorists. Contractors, the hidden 

multiplier behind many government 

agencies, also face signifi cant danger. 

Whether driving logistics convoys 

in Iraq, serving on personal security 

Must be an active member in a SRT Team or SWAT Team 

The Counter Terrorist ~ September/October 2008 Circle 179 on Reader Service Card 

The Counter Terrorist ~ September/October 2008 59 

O 

n 

engine, 

Cessna 

details for State Department personnel 

in Afghanistan, or fl ying surveillance 

planes in South America, contractors are 

frequently targeted by terrorists. While 

it is common knowledge that FBI, DEA 

and other federal agents work overseas, 

local law enforcement agencies such as 

the New York and Los Angeles police 

departments increasingly pursue their 

own international interests and send 

offi cers abroad. 

By Chris Graham 

Photo: Courtesy Wade Heninger and onPoint Tactical 

Th us, there is ultimately a growing 

number of people in need of SERE 

training, as well as a need to supplement 

existing training with threat-specifi c 

capabilities and relevant enhancement. 

In the course of pursuing supplemental 

training, I had the opportunity to attend 

onPoint Tactical’s urban escape and 

evasion (E&E) course. 

Day one of onPoint’s E&E course 

began in the classroom with PowerPoint

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presentations on several topics, including 

training, planning, and the body’s 

reaction to stress. We also discussed E&E 

priorities, diff erent types of useful gear, 

urban caches, knowledge of terrain, and 

the use of intelligence. Th e instructors 

emphasized the value of creating a 

briefi ng book that contains various 

types of data relevant to escape, such 

as locations of transportation systems, 

communications resources, governmental 

services, military/paramilitary 

installments, commercial establishments, 

fi nancial/medical services, and major 

industrial facilities. Next, we examined 

the importance of tracking the locations 

and volume of hostile activity in an area 

and preplanning safe houses and hides. 

Th e second half of day one was 

dedicated to the topic of urban 

movement. Discussion focused on the 

uniqueness of neighborhoods, including 

baselines of normal activity and the 

value of matching a given baseline. 

We considered the use disguises and 

possibilities for constructing fake 

identity documents and credentials. 

Th e instructors then moved on to issues 

of “social engineering,” elicitation, 

and improvised weapons. Finally, they 

presented us with techniques for urban 

climbing, ideas for dealing with dogs, and 

considerations for moving at night and 

fi nding hiding places. 

Day two of the course also began 

with PowerPoint presentations in the 

classroom. Th is time, however, our fi rst 

topic was lock picking. While on the run, 

the ability to pick locks can aid in escape 

and/or the acquisition of resources. We 

discussed lock picking tools, methods 

for concealing these tools, and methods 

for improvising them. We also talked 

about characteristics of pin tumbler locks, 

including the benefi ts and disadvantages 

of “raking” versus “feel picking” to defeat 

these locks. Next, participants spent 

several hours practicing these skills and 

defeating various locks. 

Th e discussion of lock picking led 

into the next major topic covered on day 

two: how to escape from captivity. Th e 

fi rst series of lectures related to this topic 

described how to defeat various restraints, 

including handcuff s, fl ex cuff s, and ropes. 

We improvised picks and shims and used 

these devices to get out of both single- 

and double-locked handcuff s. Ultimately, 

we practiced this process with our hands 

behind our backs and while locked in 

the trunk of a car. Th e instructors then 

introduced an ingenious technique for 

defeating fl ex cuff s and ropes that I had 

never seen before. 

Following our exploration of how 

to overcome cuff s and ropes, we spent 

some time talking about methods for 

negotiating fences, including those made 

of barbed and razor wire. We also talked 

about sensors, lighting considerations, 

and methods of dealing with television 

cameras, and the instructors delivered a 

presentation on night vision and thermal 

imaging. 

Finally, day two concluded with a 

discussion of how to fi nd transport 

following escape. We received a lecture 

on defeating car locks and ignition 

systems. We also talked about evasive 

driving techniques and linking back up 

with friendly forces without instigating a 

violent confrontation. 

Th e third and fi nal day of onPoint’s 

urban E&E training began on the 

outskirts of Chicago. Th is was fi nal 

exercise day. As the morning began, I 

stood blindfolded and handcuff ed. I took 

my blindfold off to discover that I was 

in an upstairs bathroom, and my leg was 

shackled to one of the stalls. As I surveyed 

the debris in my environment for possible 

tools, fi rst one of my teammates and 

then the other showed up; they had 

already escaped. I was in the process of 

improvising a pick when my partners 

went to work on my cuff s. Before I even 

had time to access my hidden cuff key, 

Captain F had my ankle free. Meanwhile, 

Photo: Courtesy Wade Heninger 

and onPoint Tactical 

While it is common 

knowledge that 

FBI, DEA and other 

federal agents work 

overseas, local law 

enforcement agencies 

such as the New 

York and Los Angeles 

police departments 

increasingly pursue 

their own international 

interests and send 

offi cers abroad. 




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Major B inadvertently cinched my left 

handcuff down to the point of cutting off 

circulation, but quickly freed my right 

hand, then returned to the left. After the 

fact, I would regret that we made noise 

ratcheting a cuff and plodding across 

the fl oor. We fl ew down a set of stairs 

and exited a side door of the building, as 

people came up the primary staircase. 

Exiting the building, we passed several 

people. Either our blighted warehouse 

was a popular site on Saturday mornings, 

or we were bumping into the opposition’s 

surveillance. Th rowing subtlety out the 

window, we ran and took a few turns. As 

we encountered our playmates again in 

diff erent clothes, it became clear that they 

were the opposition. 

After dropping my external shirt 

and trying some other minor attempts 

at misdirection, my teammates and I 

drifted apart from each other and took 

a circuitous route toward the site of our 

fi rst task. As we traveled, we discovered 

that we were in a poor neighborhood and 

did not match the racial norm for the 

area. As we moved on, trying to get out of 

the area in which we stood out so badly, 

I observed a young black man fl ashing 

gang signs behind Captain F’s back. 

Our challenge was enhanced by the 

presence of police. Police vehicles seemed 

to be pre-positioned at neighborhood 

boundaries. Even though my teammates 

and I were blending in as best as possible, 

we still stood out. In addition, I was 

uncertain whether law enforcement 

was in play. I didn’t know whether I 

was being scrutinized for participation 

in the exercise or simply for appearing 

suspicious. Either way, I needed to 

maintain a low profi le and avoid 

apprehension. As I turned onto a side 

street, a grey Crown Victoria paralleled 

me at a distance. I took another logical 

turn and was back in distant trail of 

Maj B in what I hoped appeared to be a 

natural chain of events. 

After several hours and several more 

tasks, our exercise was complete. My 

teammates and I had demonstrated most 

of the skills we were taught in the course. 

We had picked handcuff s and locks; 

hidden and moved through unfamiliar 

neighborhoods without money or 

transport; and acquired water and food. 

Finally, we rendezvoused with the other 

teams and instructors at the Chicago 

House of Blues. Frosty beer in hand, we 

relaxed after accomplishing our E&E 

mission. 

Exercise complete, it is apparent 

how many types of individuals would 

benefi t from this sort of training. 

Th omas Howes, Keith Stansell, and 

Marc Gonsalves endured more than 

fi ve years of humid, mosquito-fi lled 

days, shivering nights, and constant 

uncertainty as hostages before they were 

rescued by Colombian intelligence and 

special operations personnel on July 2, 

2008. 2 Numerous other contractors and 

soldiers have been captured, tortured, 

and executed around the world. Clearly, 

law enforcement offi cers and security 

personnel face similar risks. Ironically, 

civilians are targeted even more 

frequently. 

Each of these groups would benefi t 

from training that enhanced their ability 

to evade and resist capture. Any person 

involved in counter- or anti-terrorism 

work must evaluate the risks they face. 

Each individual must decide whether 

their skills and training are suffi cient or 

whether they need to be supplemented. 

One source of useful SERE skills is 

onPoint Tactical’s urban escape and 

evasion course. • 

1 Juan Forero, “Private U.S. Operatives 

on Risky Missions in Colombia,” New 

York Times, February 14, 2004. 

2 Tim Padgett, “Colombia’s Stunning 

Hostage Rescue,” Time, July 2, 2008. 

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The Counter Terrorist ~ September/October 2008

Terrorist Threat INDICATORS - onPoint Tactical LLC

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