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CHAPTER TWOON THE CONCEPT AND HISTORY OFPHILOSOPHICAL RELIGIONSCarlos FraenkelIntroduction 1When the medieval Muslim philosopher Averroes, who spent most ofhis life explaining Aristotle, examined the relationship between Islamand philosophy, he reached the following conclusion:Since this Law (sharîah) is true and calls to the reflection leading to cognitionof the truth, we, the Muslim community, know firmly that demonstrativeinvestigation cannot lead to something differing with what is setdown in the Law. For the truth does not contradict the truth (al-aqq lâyuâd al-aqq); rather, it agrees with it and bears witness to it. 2According to Averroes, “demonstrative investigations” are conductedby philosophers. The results they reach, he claims, cannot differ fromthe content of the sharîah, because the truth of the former is the sameas the truth of the latter. 3It is instructive to compare Averroes’s assessment of the Muslim Lawwith the assessment of the Mosaic Law by Paul-Henri Thiry, Barond’Holbach, an important representative of the French Enlightenment: 41I will refer to both primary and secondary sources by author and date of publication.If a translation is my own I give the full original text in a footnote. Where I relyon existing translations I provide references to both the original and the translation,except when references are standardized (e.g., references to Plato, Aristotle, Philoetc.). In the latter case, I will only list the translation in the bibliography. I will oftenmodify existing translations.2Averroes 2001, Arabic and English 8–9 (in the edition I use the pagination of theArabic text corresponds to that of the English translation).3This, at any rate, is Averroes’s intention. Strictly speaking, the view that the truth ofphilosophy does not contradict the truth of religion is also compatible with the weakerclaim, proposed for instance by Thomas Aquinas, that revelation contains truths thatdo not contradict philosophy, but are also not accessible to it.4d’Holbach 1776, 87–89: “[ D]ès l’entrée de la Bible, nous ne voyons que de l’ignoranceet des contradictions. Tout nous prouve que la Cosmogonie des Hébreux n’est qu’un tissude fables et d’allegories, incapable de nous donner aucune idée des choses, et qui n’estpropre qu’à contenter un peuple sauvage, ignorant et grossier, étranger aux sciences,

36 carlos fraenkelFrom the outset of the Bible we see nothing but ignorance and contradictions.Everything proves to us that the cosmogony of the Hebrews is nomore than a composition of fables and allegories, incapable of giving usany [true] idea of things, appropriate only for a savage, ignorant, andvulgar people, unfamiliar with the sciences and with reasoning. In theremaining works attributed to Moses, we find countless improbable andfantastic stories and a pile of ridiculous and arbitrary laws. At the endthe author describes his own death. The books following Moses are noless filled with ignorance. . . . One would never come to an end if oneattempted to note all the blunders and fables, shown in every passage of awork which people have the audacity to attribute to the Holy Spirit. . . . Inone word: In the Old Testament everything breathes enthusiasm, fanaticism,and raving, often ornamented by a pompous language. Nothing ismissing from it, except for reasonableness, sound logic, and rationalitywhich seem to have been excluded stubbornly from the book that servesas guide to Hebrews and Christians.To be sure, the Enlightenment’s attitude to religion is not monolithic.Materialists like Julien de La Mettrie and d’Holbach who reject religionaltogether represent only one side of the spectrum. 5 On the oppositeside intellectuals like Mendelssohn and Lessing try in different ways toreconcile their Enlightenment commitments with traditional forms ofJudaism and Christianity. 6 In between are Deists like Voltaire, HermannSamuel Reimarus, and Thomas Paine who can be as acerbicas d’Holbach when it comes to the “fabulous theology” of traditionalreligion, “whether Jewish, Christian, or Turkish,” while espousing whatthey consider the “true theology” of reason. 7au raisonnement. Dans le reste des ouvrages, attribués à Moïse, nous verrons unefoule d’histoires improbables et merveilleuses, un amas de loix ridicules et arbitraires,enfin, l’auteur conclut par y rapporter sa propre mort. Les livres postérieurs à Moïsene sont pas moins remplis d’ignorance. . . . On ne finiroit point si on vouloit relevertoutes les bévues et les fables, que montrent tous les paflages d’un ouvrage qu’on ale front d’attribuer à l’esprit saint. . . . En un mot: dans l’ancien testament tout respirel’enthousiasme, le fanatisme, le délire, souvent ornés d’un langage pompeux; tout s’ytrouve, à l’exception du bon sens, de la bonne logique, de la raison, qui semblent êtreexclus opiniâtrement du livre qui sert de guide aux Hébreux et aux chrétiens.” Interestinglyd’Holbach is aware of the fact that what he describes as the irrational contentof the Bible can be reconciled with philosophy by means of allegorical interpretation.See his reference to Origen’s and Augustine’s allegorical reading of Genesis in thenote on p. 88. This is Averroes’s solution as well for contradictions occurring betweenphilosophy and the sharîah. See e.g., Averroes 2001, Arabic and English 9–10.5For his materialism, see in particular de la Mettrie 1996. On the different trendsin the Enlightenment, see Israel 2001 and 2006.6See Mendelssohn 1983; Lessing 1886–1924.7Paine 1794, 6. For the opposition of “true and fabulous theology,” see the titlepage of the first edition 1794. See Reimarus 1972; Voltaire 1980 (e.g., articles “Église,”“Fanatisme,” “Religion,” “Superstition,” etc.).

38 carlos fraenkelit takes religion to coincide with philosophy. On another level it takesreligion to be philosophy’s handmaid. Philosophy in this context meansthe pursuit of knowledge with the ultimate goal to attain knowledgeof God. This gives rise to an obvious question: What does religionin this sense have in common with the literal content of a traditionalreligion—with the narratives of Scripture, its pious exhortations, areligious law-code, or individual and communal forms of worship?According to proponents of a philosophical religion, all of these thingsare components of a pedagogical-political program, devised by philosophersfor the guidance of nonphilosophers. This program is conceivedas an imitation of philosophy that allows nonphilosophers to share asmuch as they can in the philosopher’s perfection. Albeit daring, theinterpretation of traditional religions as philosophical religions was byno means marginal. It was set forth by pagan, Jewish, Christian, andMuslim philosophers in a wide range of contexts from antiquity to theearly modern period. Since this interpretation has not yet been systematicallyexamined, an exhaustive account of its history is not possibleat this point. In what follows, my goal is to explain how the patternworks in a number of representative authors in late antiquity and in theearly Middle Ages. Plato’s political philosophy in the middle and latedialogues provided the conceptual framework for this interpretation,although concepts from other intellectual traditions were integrated intoit, most importantly Aristotelian and Stoic concepts, and, in Spinoza’scase, early modern concepts as well. Besides discussing Plato’s politicalphilosophy as it informs the philosophical interpretation of traditionalreligions, I examine three contexts that I argue are conceptually andhistorically related as parts of the reception history of Plato’s politicalthought: Firstly, the interpretation of Judaism and Christianity asphilosophical religions in ancient Alexandria, focusing on the Jewishand Christian philosophers Philo (d. ca. 50 CE), Clement (d. 215), andOrigen (d. ca. 254). Then the interpretation of Islam and Judaism asphilosophical religions in the Middle Ages. Here I will look mainly atal-Fârâbî (d. 950), Averroes (d. 1198), and Maimonides (d. 1204). 1111The close connection between Philo of Alexandria and the Christian PlatonistsClement and Origen has been well established. See van den Hoek 1988 and 2000,Runia 1993 and the special section in Studia Philonica 1994. Al-Fârâbî was the founderof the philosophical school, of which Averroes and Maimonides were the last twoimportant representatives in Muslim Spain. The model he proposed for describing therelationship between philosophy and religion was applied by Averroes to Islam andby Maimonides to Judaism. In addition to being good examples for illustrating this

concept and history of philosophical religions 39Finally, I examine Spinoza, who is well known for his astute critiqueof the medieval interpretation of Judaism as a philosophical religion.While some scholars noted that elements of a philosophical religionare present in Spinoza’s thought—prominently in his portrait of Christfor example—they usually dismissed them as the strategic maneuverof a radical philosopher who in his youth had been ostracized by theJewish community and wished to avoid suffering the same fate byChristians. I suggest turning this interpretation on its head: Althoughastute, Spinoza’s criticisms are an incidental by-product of his critiqueof Christian orthodoxy which he perceived as a threat to the “freedomto philosophize.” His systematic commitments, I contend, are notonly compatible with the concept of a philosophical religion but oftenrequire it. As a critic, however, Spinoza arguably puts an end to thisintellectual tradition as a viable approach to religion. 12* * *After having said what I will do in this chapter, let me briefly say somethingabout what I will not do and why. As I already stressed: my goalis not to present an exhaustive account of the interpretation in question,but to provide a foundation that I hope will give rise to further studies.These should include the relation of later patristic developments to theAlexandrian philosophers, a comparative study of Neoplatonic interpretationsof pagan religious traditions which are often strikingly similarto the interpretations here examined, and a comprehensive account ofmedieval Muslim and Jewish proponents of a philosophical religion.Also various traditions of Christian thought remain to be investigatedin this context, ranging from Byzantine Christianity to Arabic-Christianphilosophers in the Islamic world. Moreover, when Plethon (d. 1452)and other Byzantine scholars introduced the works of Plato and laterPlatonists into Renaissance Italy, some of the interpretative strategiesthat I analyze in this chapter were used to integrate Platonism andinterpretation, Averroes and Maimonides also shaped the medieval tradition leadingto Spinoza.12To be sure, elements of this interpretation of religion can still be found in authorsafter Spinoza. The most interesting example is perhaps the German Enlightenmentintellectual Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (d. 1781). See in particular Lessing 1886–1924.But the last sustained attempt to interpret a religion in philosophical terms was madeby the medieval Jewish intellectual tradition whose fundamental assumptions Spinozacriticizes in the TTP.

40 carlos fraenkelChristianity—most prominently by Marsilio Ficino (d. 1499), the maintranslator of Platonic writings from Greek to Latin.From the point of view of my project the question why the interpretationof Christianity as a philosophical religion did not take holdin medieval Christian thought is, of course, one of the most interestingquestions yet to be explored. The fact that Christian philosophers inlate antiquity did propose such an interpretation shows that there isnothing in the nature of Christianity that would preclude it from theoutset. There are, moreover, some similarities between the intellectualtraditions examined in this chapter and the medieval Latin West.Figurative interpretation, for instance, played an important role in bothcontexts, even though it took on different forms and served differentpurposes. 13 But these similarities remain on the surface and should notprevent us from seeing the substantive differences. While the relationshipbetween philosophy and Christianity in the Middle Ages took ona wide range of shapes, the two always remained identifiable as twodistinct traditions. Latin Averroists, for instance, who tried to work outa consistent philosophical position on the basis of Aristotle and Averroes,reached the conclusion that a number of their core philosophicaldoctrines contradicted Christian beliefs. 14 This is the exact oppositeof the position advocated by Averroes with respect to philosophy andIslam. The tensions between philosophy and Christianity culminatedin the condemnation of 219 philosophical and theological theses by13Thus the “allegorical sense” is one of the four senses of Scripture assumed bymedieval Christian exegetes. See e.g., Hugo of St. Cher (d. 1263): Postillae in universabiblia secundum quadruplicem sensum: historicum, allegoricum, moralem et anagogicum (Glosseson the entire Bible according to the fourfold sense: historical, allegorical, moral, andanagogical). But as far as I can see, this exegetical program has little in common withthe approach adopted by proponents of a philosophical religion. The important differencedoes not concern the number of levels of meaning. While I will normally speak ofonly two levels—the allegorical and the literal—this is to some extent a simplification.Origen 1913, for instance, distinguishes between three levels of meaning (Book 4) andso does Averroes 2001 (see e.g., Arabic and English 8). Al-Fârâbî suggests a scale ofmeanings that gradually approach scientific knowledge (see al-Fârâbî 1985, ch. 17,sec. 3. Section numbers refer to both the Arabic and the English trans.). The crucialdistinction, however, is the one between the philosophical and the nonphilosophicalunderstanding of religion, whereby the nonphilosophical understanding is often furthersubdivided into levels that gradually approach the philosophical understanding. Theassumption governing this approach is that the true core of religion coincides withphilosophy. As I will argue in what follows, this assumption was not shared by Christianexegetes in medieval Europe.14See e.g., philosophers like Boethius of Dacia (fl. ca. 1275) or Siger of Brabant(d. ca. 1284). See Boethius 1987 and van Steenberghen 1977, respectively.

concept and history of philosophical religions 41Bishop Tempier in Paris which institutionalized the division betweenChristianity and many of the teachings constituting the Greco-Arabicphilosophical legacy in the West. 15 In part these differences can beaccounted for by the fact that the Platonic conceptual frameworkwhich informs the interpretation of religious traditions as philosophicalreligions did not play a significant role in the medieval Latin context.This, of course, does not answer the question, but only moves it up onelevel: since Christian appropriations of this Platonic framework wereavailable in patristic literature, it remains to be explained why it wasnot adopted for integrating Christianity with Greco-Arabic philosophyin the Middle Ages. Attempting to answer this question would go farbeyond what I can accomplish in this chapter. It is safe to assume, onthe other hand, that one important reason for the lack of a comprehensivestudy of the concept and the history of philosophical religionsis the fact that the historiography of medieval philosophy was traditionallyshaped by the specific character of medieval Latin philosophyand hence did not pay attention to a tradition that does not fit on thelatter’s intellectual map.Let me fi nally address—with some reluctance I admit—what issometimes called the “principle of accommodation,” because scholarshave claimed that several of the authors examined in this chapter—e.g.,Origen, Eusebius, and Maimonides—have adopted such a principle. 16According to Stephen Benin,divine accommodation . . . alleges, most simply, that divine revelation isadjusted to the disparate intellectual and spiritual level of humanity atdifferent times in history. . . . The Lord accommodates or condescends,freely and benevolently, to the human level lest his salvific message gounheard or unheeded. 17I am not competent to judge whether this view has ever been held inthe way Benin describes it. I am confident, by contrast, that its strikinganthropomorphism is incompatible with the metaphysical commitmentsof all the philosophers whom I will discuss in this chapter. To besure, they sometimes write as if they subscribed to such a principle.But this is because they themselves—not God!—use traditional religiouslanguage in order to mediate between their philosophical views15For a recent edition with commentary, see Tempier 1999.16See Benin 1993, 10–13; 13–22; 147–162.17Ibid., xiv.

42 carlos fraenkeland the conceptual framework of their audience. In this they followthe model of the prophets (according, of course, to their concept ofphilosopher-prophets that I will outline below), but also of Plato, whotranslated some of his central philosophical doctrines into parables andmetaphors—the parable of the cave in the Republic, for instance, or themetaphor of the chariot in the Phaedrus. One problem that concernsin particular Hellenistic-Jewish and patristic thought is that it is oftenstudied by scholars who are trained as theologians or historians ofreligion and not as philosophers. As a consequence they usually fail todistinguish between the philosophical commitments of their authors andthe figurative language used to express them. I cannot further discuss,much less attempt to solve, this problem here. The interpretation thatI propose below succeeds, I believe, to make sense of the texts withouthaving to assume something like the principle of accommodation. Inmy view it is superior to interpretations that appeal to such a principle,not least because it avoids attributing doctrines to the authors underdiscussion that are highly implausible within the respective frameworksof Platonic or Aristotelian metaphysics that they adopt.Philosophy as the Foundation andGoal of ReligionAverroes was certainly convinced that the highest worship of God towhich Islam exhorts the members of the Muslim community is notdifferent from the one promoted by Plato and Aristotle. 18 Aristotle, forexample, writes at the end of the Eudemian Ethics that the goodness orbadness of every human action depends on whether it contributes “toworshipping and contemplating God (ton theon therapeuein kai theoreîn).” 19If we take the “kai” in this passage to be epexegetic, worshipping God,insofar as it constitutes the highest good, means contemplating God.This corresponds to the “felicity (saâdah)”—i.e., the highest good—towhich according to Averroes the sharîah calls: “the knowledge (marifah)of God, Mighty and Magnifi cent, and His creation.” 20 Even moreclearly, Aristotle’s stance is reflected in the highest good of the Law of18Medieval Arabic philosophers usually adopt a strong version of the late ancientview of the harmony of Plato and Aristotle. For a comprehensive statement of thisposition, see al-Fârâbî 1999.19Aristotle 1952, 1249 b20–21.20Averroes 2001, Arabic and English 8.

concept and history of philosophical religions 43Moses as conceived by the medieval Jewish philosopher Maimonides(d. 1204):Man needs to subordinate all his soul’s powers to thought . . . and to sethis sight on a single goal: the apprehension of God (idrâk Allâh), may Hebe glorified and magnified, I mean knowledge (al-ilm) of Him, in so faras this lies within man’s power. He should direct all his actions, bothwhen in motion and at rest, and all his conversation toward this goalso that none of his actions is in any way frivolous, I mean, an actionnot leading to this goal. For example, he should make his aim only thehealth of his body when he eats, drinks, sleeps, has sexual intercourse, isawake, and is in motion or at rest. The purpose of his body’s health isthat the soul finds its instruments healthy and sound in order that it canbe directed toward the sciences (al-ulûm) and toward acquiring the moraland rational virtues, so that he might arrive at that goal. . . . On the basisof this reasoning the art of medicine is given a very large role with respectto the virtues, the knowledge of God, and attaining true happiness. Tostudy it diligently is among the greatest acts of worship. . . . This is whatthe Exalted requires that we make as our purpose when He says: “Andyou shall love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all yoursoul” (Deut. 6:5). He means, set the same goal for all the parts of yoursoul, namely, “to love the Lord your God.” 21In the Eight Chapters, from which the quotation is taken, Maimonides’main aim is to show that in the same way as the prescriptions of themedical doctor lead to and preserve the health of the body, the prescriptionsof the Law of Moses lead to and preserve the health of thesoul, thus putting it into the condition in which it can devote itself tothe intellectual love of God. In his chief philosophical-theological work,the Dalâlat al-âirîn (Guide of the Perplexed), Maimonides quotes thesame verse from Deuteronomy and explains the commandment to loveGod as a “call” to acquire “all the . . . correct opinions concerning thewhole of being—opinions that constitute the numerous kinds of all thetheoretical sciences (al-ulûm al-naariyyah) through which the opinionsforming the ultimate end are validated.” 22 What Maimonides meansby the “theoretical sciences” is mathematics, physics and metaphysics,preceded by the study of logic as the “tool” of philosophy. 23 Aristotelianphysics, i.e., the investigation of things in motion, leads via the eternalmotion of the celestial spheres to the apprehension of divine Reason,21Maimonides 1963–68 5, Arabic 164; English 75–76.22Maimonides 1931 3.28, Arabic 373; English 512.23Maimonides 1931 1.34, Arabic 50; English 75.

44 carlos fraenkelwho as the unmoved mover is the first cause of nature’s rational order. 24The same idea is encapsulated in Averroes’ definition of “philosophy( falsafah)” which in his view Islam calls to pursue: “the rational inquiry(al-naar) into the existing things and their contemplation (itibâruhâ)insofar as they are proof (dalâlah) of the Maker (al-âni ).” 25 This in turnrequires the study of logic whose relation to philosophy is like the relation“of tools (âlât) to work.” 26 Both Aristotle’s writings and Averroes’commentaries can be seen as the implementation of this program andthus as an expression of divine worship in the sense of the passagefrom the Eudemian Ethics. But in Averroes’ case they are also his maincontribution to Islam and the fulfillment of his duty as a Muslim. 27Maimonides for his part not only claims that the intellectual loveof God is the goal of the Law of Moses, but he also portrays Mosesas the exemplar of a person whose life was devoted to intellectuallyloving God. According to the Talmud, Deut. 34:5—“And Moses theservant of the Lord died . . . by the mouth of the Lord”—means thatMoses “died by a kiss” which Maimonides in turn interprets as theintellectual union with God at the end of a life consumed by intellectuallove. 28 Intellectual love is also more generally a key to understandingMaimonides’ concept of prophecy. As we saw, intellectuallove for Maimonides consists in the acquisition of knowledge throughthe study of the theoretical sciences. In De anima 3.5 Aristotle haddescribed the acquisition of knowledge as the transition of the humanintellect from potentially knowing to actually knowing and the agentcausing this transition as the “active intellect (nous poiêtikos).” 29 Buildingon an exegetical tradition of the relevant passages in the De anima thatcombined Aristotelian and Neoplatonic concepts, medieval Islamicand Jewish philosophers did three things: they identified the ultimatesource of knowledge with God, described God’s agency as “emanation”and made the transition from potentially knowing to actually knowinginto the foundation of prophecy. Thus for Maimonides, “prophecy(nubûwwah)” is based on “an emanation ( fay ) emanating from God,24Aristotle Physics 8.5–6 and Metaphysics 12.6–7. Maimonides refers to the Aristotelianproof as “the greatest proof through which one can know the existence of the deity”in Maimonides 1931 1.70, Arabic 121; English 175.25Averroes 2001, Arabic and English 1.26Ibid., Arabic and English 3.27On the study of philosophy as a religious duty in medieval Islamic and Jewishphilosophy, see Davidson 1974.28Maimonides 1931 3.51, Arabic 463; English 628.29Aristotle 1957, 430a10–25.

46 carlos fraenkel* * *Aristotle’s description of the highest good at the end of the EudemianEthics is only one striking example for the attitude to the divine thatGreek philosophers shared with medieval philosophers like Averroesand Maimonides. A visitor to Hellenistic Athens would, in fact, find thatmost major philosophical schools of the period—Platonists, Aristotelians,Epicureans, and Stoics—take “Godlikeness” to be the highest humanperfection and promote their philosophy as the path to attain it. 34 Thesecond main intellectual context that I will examine in this chapter isthe philosophical interpretation of Judaism and Christianity in ancientAlexandria. For this context, the most important Greek philosopher isPlato. It is clear that for Plato philosophy in some form is a religiouspractice. Let me only note that from the middle dialogues onwardsthe incorporeal forms which the philosopher studies and according towhich he orders his life are the highest constituent of the realm of thedivine. In the Republic the philosopher consorts “with what is divine andwell ordered” and consequently “becomes himself as divine and wellordered as a human being can be.” 35 In the Timaeus Plato asserts that“if a man has seriously devoted himself to the love of learning and totrue wisdom . . ., then there is absolutely no way that his thoughts canfail to be immortal and divine, should truth come within his grasp.” 36According to the Timaeus the realm of forms can be described as theintelligible order of nature. Plato assumes the existence of such an orderto explain nature’s recurrent patterns. The form e.g., of an animal speciesserves to explain the recurrent physical instantiation of that species.On this account the formula of the Theaetetus—“to become like God asmuch as possible”—which was adopted as the definition of the goal ofhuman perfection by the entire later Platonic tradition, must be takento include establishing the generic features of trees, fish, birds etc. andthe systematic connections between them. 37 When we turn from Athens34That this holds for Epicureans too, may surprise some. But see e.g., Diogenes ofOenoanda 1993 fr. 56 and 125. On this issue, see in general O’Meara 2003, 32–34.35Plato 1900–1907, Republic 500c; cf. 540a–b. English translations are based on Cooper1997.36Ibid., Timaeus 90b–c.37Ibid., Theaetetus 176a–b. Plato explains that becoming like God means becoming“just and pure (hosios), with wisdom ( phronêsis).” Being “just” in the Republic cancertainly be interpreted as devoting one’s life to the pursuit of knowledge. For a personis just if each of the soul’s three faculties performs the task appropriate to it (see435b–441c). Since “the intellectual faculty (to logistikon)” is the soul’s highest faculty,its task is to govern the lower faculties, as well as to carry out its natural activity, that

concept and history of philosophical religions 47to Alexandria we find that this is precisely what Moses did—at leastaccording to Philo of Alexandria whose work represents the culminationof the first encounter between Greek culture and Judaism. How isMoses’ interest in the generic features of trees, fish, and birds motivatedfor Philo? To begin with, Philo follows Plato in explaining the recurrentpatterns of nature as physical instantiations of incorporeal forms. 38 Butwhile the form of the bird, for instance, explains its physical instantiations,it does not explain the place of birds in relation to other classesof things. In other words: the order of nature itself requires explanation.Precisely for this purpose Plato in his late theology introduces God as“Reason (Nous)” described as divine Craftsman in the Timaeus, whoseactivity consists in ordering the physical world in view to what is best. 39Philo, however—like other later Platonists—goes beyond Plato whenhe makes the existence and order of the forms themselves dependenton divine Reason by interpreting them as God’s intellecta. Note thatPhilo calls divine Reason “Logos” or “Sophia” instead of “Nous,” the termcommonly used by pagan Platonist. Since Logos also means “speech,”this choice may reflect the biblical account of creation in which God’sspeech brings things into existence. 40 The use of “Sophia” on the otherhand is based on Prov. 8:22 where God is said to have created Wisdomat the “beginning of his work.” 41 Comparing God’s creative activity tothat of an architect who first conceives the city’s different buildings inhis mind, then puts the city’s plan together, and finally executes theplan “in stone and timber,” Philo writes:is, the apprehension of what exists (see 582c). For the scope of the world of forms,see Parmenides 130a–e where Plato suggests that the forms include general ontologicalcategories (e.g., likeness, one, and many), moral and esthetic norms (e.g., the just itselfand the beautiful itself ), and forms of physical objects (e.g., human being, fire, water).The last group seems to extend to things that at first seem “undignified and worthless”(e.g., hair, mud, and dirt). For Godlikeness in Plato, see Sedley 2000; on the adoptionof Godlikeness as the goal of human perfection in the early Platonic tradition,see Dillon 1977, 44. For the Neoplatonic ideal of “divinization,” see O’Meara 2003,in particular part 1.38See Philo 1929–1962, De specialibus legibus (On the Special Laws) 1.45–50; 327–329.References are to the Greek and English translation in the Loeb edition of Philo’sComplete Works.39See the account in Menn 1995.40Note that the Septuagint uses “eipein” and not “legein” in Genesis 1. But see SapientiaSalomonis (Wisdom of Solomon) 9:1–2.41See Philo 1929–1962, De ebrietate (On Drunkenness) 31 and Legum allegoriae (AllegoricalInterpretation) 1.43.

48 carlos fraenkelSimilarly must we think about God. When he was minded to found theGreat City, he first conceived the forms of its parts, out of which he puttogether the intelligible world (kosmos noêtos), and, using that as a model,he also brought to completion the sensible world (kosmos aisthetos). 42The “intelligible world,” Philo stresses, contains the forms of all thingswhose creation is described in Genesis 1, including, of course, trees,fish, and birds. 43For Philo, like for Averroes and Maimonides, “the first and highestgood” is “to know Him who truly is,” i.e., God. 44 Moses’ dialoguewith God in Ex. 33:13–23 is interpreted by Philo as the paradigmaticexpression of the intellectual love informing the “search for the trueGod.” 45 But before Moses embarks on his philosophical quest, he firstreceives a solid scientific education by a group of teachers coming fromdifferent parts of the world. Among others he is instructed in arithmetic,geometry, and music by the Egyptians, in astronomy by the Chaldeans,and in “the rest of the encyclical studies” by the Greeks. Moses, therefore,first studies with teachers from the nations credited with ancientwisdom in Hellenistic Alexandria. 46 But next and more importantly, hegreatly surpasses his teachers, opening up “new spheres of knowledge”thanks to his outstanding intellect until he has “reached the summitof philosophy.” Not unlike al-Fârâbî and Maimonides, Philo equatesreaching “the summit of philosophy” with divine revelation by addingthat Moses “was divinely taught (anadidachtheis) the greater and mostessential truths of nature.” 47 Elsewhere Philo interprets Moses’ entering“the darkness where God was” in Ex. 20:21 as Moses’ entering “theunseen, invisible, incorporeal, and paradigmatic essence of existingthings.” 48 In other words: Having reached “the summit of philosophy,”Moses apprehends the incorporeal forms constituting the intelligibleworld in God’s mind which, as we saw, is the model of the physicalworld and accounts for its recurrent patterns and order, for example42Philo 1929–1962, De opifi cio mundi (On the Creation of the World) 19.43Ibid., Opifi cio 129–130. See also Runia 1999.44Ibid., De decalogo (On the Decalogue) 81.45Ibid., Specialibus legibus 1.41–50. But note that in this passage Philo denies thatMoses is able to apprehend the forms whereas he affirms it in the passages discussedbelow.46Ibid., De vita Mosis (On the Life of Moses) 1.21–24.47Ibid., Opifi cio 8; cf. Winston 2001, 156. See also the identification of “true andauthentic philosophy” with the “utterance and word of God” in De posteritate Caini (Onthe Posterity of Cain) 101–102.48Ibid., Mosis 1.158.

concept and history of philosophical religions 49the recurrent instantiations of trees, fish, birds, and so forth, as well astheir relations to other classes of things.For Philo, like for Maimonides, Moses is an exemplar of a life devotedto the intellectual love of God, i.e., to what Plato in the Timaeus calls“the love of learning” and “true wisdom.” A formal account of thecurriculum which Moses’ intellectual path illustrates is given by Philoin his allegorical interpretation of Abraham’s relationship to Hagarand Sarah where the preliminary studies represented by Hagar aredescribed as the means for attaining philosophy represented by Sarah. 49But according to this account philosophy is not the end of the curriculumeither. Defined as “devotion to wisdom (epitêdeusis sophias)” it is themeans for attaining wisdom itself which consists in “the knowledge ofthings divine and human and their causes.” 50 Whereas the immediatesource of the definitions of philosophy and wisdom in this passage isStoic, the concept of philosophy as a process culminating in wisdomultimately stems from Plato’s Symposium. 51 The fi rst cause “of thingsdivine and human” for Philo is, of course, God. Elsewhere he describeshow the human mind explores the different parts of the physical worldthrough the “arts” and “sciences” until it is seized by “love of wisdom(erôs sophias)” carrying it up to the apprehension of the “intelligibleworld” and finally toward “the Great King Himself.” 52 In yet anotherpassage, Philo identifi es “true and authentic philosophy” with both“the word and utterance of God” and the “royal road” leading to“the first and sole King of the universe.” On the basis of this twofoldidentification he goes on to interpret Deut. 28:14—“You shall not turnaway from the word which I command you this day to the right orto the left”—as an exhortation to pursue philosophy as the “royalroad” to God. 53 Also for Philo, therefore, the intellectual love of Godis the highest form of worship. It is, moreover, the worship to which,according to his self-portrait, he has devoted himself. After having firstconsorted with philosophy’s “servants,” e.g., grammar, geometry, and49For a similar allegorical interpretation of Penelope and her handmaids in pagancontexts, see e.g., Diogenes Laertius 1925, 2.79–80 and Aristo of Chion apud Stobaeus1884–1923, 4.140.50Philo 1929–1962, De congressu eruditionis gratia (On the Preliminary Studies) 79.51Cf. Seneca 1917–25, Letter 89, 4. And see Diotima’s speech on “desire (erôs)” and“philosophy” as motive forces of the ascent from the human level to divine wisdom inSymposium, 201d–212c, Plato 1900–1907.52Philo 1929–1962, Opifi cio 69–71.53Ibid., Posteritate 101–102.

50 carlos fraenkelmusic, Philo proceeds, like Abraham and Moses, to court the “lawfulwife,” i.e., philosophy itself. 54 This courtship he describes as follows:There was a time when I devoted myself (scholazôn) to philosophy and thecontemplation of the world and its contents, when I enjoyed the beauty,exceeding loveliness and true blessedness of its Reason (Nous), when Iconsorted always with divine principles (logoi ) and doctrines (dogmata)wherein I rejoiced with a joy that was insatiate and unceasing. 55It is plausible to take the world’s “Reason” in this passage to refer tothe same entity that Philo elsewhere calls “Logos” or “Sophia,” i.e., therealm of incorporeal forms which later Platonists had identified withthe content of God’s thinking and which Philo had interpreted as theintelligible pattern of the creation of the world. This pattern, as wesaw, accounts for the recurrent instantiation of things like trees, fish,and birds, as well as for the orderly relations between them.In the context of the philosophical interpretation of Christianity inAlexandria on which Philo had a formative influence the same patternreceived a new name. While being Nous for pagan Platonists, andLogos and Sophia for Philo, Clement and Origen of Alexandria, themain proponents of this interpretation, identify the intelligible orderof nature with Christ as well. 56 Exegetically this step was, of course,facilitated by a number of biblical texts, for example the Prologue toJohn where Christ is identified with the Logos by which God createdthe world. 57 Without having to abandon the fundamental metaphysicalcommitments of the pagan and Jewish Platonic tradition, Clement andOrigen can thus present Christianity as the source of both. WhereasPlato and Moses where accomplished lovers of wisdom, Christ is Sophiaitself. Whereas Plato and Moses strove to understand the incorporealforms of trees, fish, birds, and other things making up the world, Christis these forms themselves. Identifying Christ with the Wisdom whichGod according to Prov. 8:22 created at the “beginning of his work,”Origen writes, for instance, that “she preformed and contained within54Ibid., Congressu 74–76.55Ibid., Specialibus legibus 3.1.56See Origen 1913 2.6, 1, Greek and Latin 140; English 108 where Christ is identifiedwith Verbum, Ratio, and Sapientia to which Origen adds Veritas.57See in general Origen 1989, chap. 1 and 2. These passages in the New Testamentas well as in other texts included in the Christian Bible—e.g., the SapientiaSalomonis—in part stem from the same intellectual milieu to which Philo belongs. SeeRunia 1993, chap. 4.

concept and history of philosophical religions 51herself the species and models of all creation.” 58 In another passage,Origen borrows Philo’s image of the architect to illustrate the formationof the intelligible world. 59 But how does Christ as God’s Logos relateto the embodied Christ of the Gospels? The shortest chapter in Periarchôn (On First Principles), Origen’s chief theological work, clearlybears witness to his puzzlement about the doctrine of incarnation. 60The explanation he suggests is that as a human being Christ had a“human and rational soul (humana et rationabilis anima)” whose nature“is the same as that of all other souls.” 61 In this sense, Christ is merelyone of the “rational creatures” who in differing degrees have part inChrist the Logos, depending on the strength of their love for him. 62The difference is that the soul of Christ is more perfectly united withthe intelligible world—i.e., with Christ the Logos—on account “of [hissoul’s] perfect love” and as “the reward of its virtues.” 63 None “of theother souls that descended into human bodies had a pure and genuineimage (similitudo) of the archetype [i.e., the Logos] in it.” In other words:The soul of the embodied Christ is, according to Origen, more virtuousthan any other soul; it is driven by a greater intellectual love of Godthan any other soul. As a consequence it is more perfectly united withthe Logos than any other soul. But while this makes the embodied Christinto the greatest philosopher of all times who on a scale of perfectioncomes out at the top, his soul is not fundamentally different from otherrational souls. It surpasses them in degree, not in essence. 64 Concerning58Origen 1913 1.2, 3, Greek and Latin 30; English 16; cf. also the end of 1.2, 2.59See the discussion of archê in Origen 1989 1.23.60Origen 1913 2.6, 1, Greek and Latin 140; English 108–109; 2.6, 2, Greek andLatin 141; English 109–110. See also the expression of uncertainty concerning thedoctrine in ibid. and the suggestion of its preliminary character in 2.6, 7, Greek andLatin 147; English 114–115.61Ibid. 2.6, 4, Greek and Latin 144–145; English 112–113.62Ibid. 2.6, 3, Greek and Latin 141–142; English 110.63Ibid. 2.6, 4, Greek and Latin 143; English 111–112.64This is, of course, a controversial reading. Origen’s Christology was and continuesto be a battlefield. See e.g., the first five accusations to which Pamphilus of Caesarearesponds in 2002, 88–121, in particular the third. But I cannot find strong textualevidence in 2.6 that for Origen the unity of Christ’s soul with Christ as the Logosmeans identity. As we saw above, he claims that Christ’s soul contains a “pure andgenuine image” of the Logos. Elsewhere he describes their relation as that of a shadowto a body, or of iron heated in fire to fire, or of a vessel to oil. Concerning the unionof Christ’s soul with the Logos he says that they “are more in one flesh than man andwoman” (Origen 1913 2.6, 3, Greek and Latin 143; English 111); cf. Matt. 19:5–6.With reference to 1 Cor. 6:17, moreover, he compares this union to the union attainedwith Christ by those who “imitate” him. All this suggests that Christ’s soul and the Logos

52 carlos fraenkelthe superior virtue of Christ’s soul, Origen accepts the claim that Christwas incapable of sin, but rejects that this implies that his soul was nothuman. Instead he offers an Aristotelian explanation for the claim:The readiness to do good which at first “depended upon the will, waschanged by the effect of long custom into nature.” 65 Like every otherhuman being, Christ, according to Origen, had to choose between goodand evil. On account of his devotion to the intellectual love of Godhe invariably chose good until doing good became a stable characterdisposition through habituation.As in the case of Judaism for Philo, Christianity for Clement andOrigen is not only grounded on wisdom but also has wisdom as itsgoal. Both Clement and Origen adopt the structure of the intellectualcurriculum that Philo set out in his allegorical interpretation ofAbraham’s relation to Hagar and Sarah: the preliminary studies whichare subservient to philosophy and philosophy which is subservientto wisdom. Clement, in fact, quotes and discusses the entire passagein Stromateis 1.5. At the end of the chapter he returns to the theme,characterizing the preliminary studies as “exercising the mind” and“rousing the intellect” and philosophy as an “investigation into truthand the nature of things.” Wisdom, however, as the end of philosophy,is replaced through “rest in Christ” in this passage. The same replacementis made by Origen:But I would like that you use all the power of your natural dispositionshaving as the goal Christianity (telikôs eis ton christianismon). The means thatI wish you to use is to take from the philosophy of the Greeks everythingthat can serve as encyclical or propedeutical instruction for introducinginto Christianity. . . . And in this way, what the philosophers say aboutare united in a way that does not entail identity. That this union differs in degree andnot in essence from the union of other souls with the Logos is equally suggested by themetaphors that Origen uses. Thus the heat transmitted by the fiery iron to other soulsis not essentially different from the heat caused by the fire in the iron itself. Likewise theodor reaching other souls is not essentially different from the perfumed oil containedin Christ’s soul. While other passages may support a more orthodox interpretation ofOrigen, it can often not be ruled out that they reflect dogmatic corrections in light ofthe Nicene Creed made by Rufinus in his Latin translation of Origen’s work. See theobservations of Studer 1972. In my opinion, the issue cannot be conclusively settledon textual grounds. If the choice is between philosophical consistency and orthodoxy,preference must, in my view, be given to the former. Someone who takes Christ asthe Logos to be the intelligible order of nature will hardly concede that the doctrine atthe heart of Christianity is not accessible to reason.65Origen 1913 2.6, 5, Greek and Latin 145; English 112.

concept and history of philosophical religions 53geometry, music, grammar, rhetoric and astronomy as being the servantswith regard to philosophy, this we say about philosophy itself with regardto Christianity. 66In light of the fact that Clement and Origen conceive Christ as theintelligible order of nature it should be clear that the replacement of“wisdom” through “Christianity” is only a change in name, not incontent. Clement and Origen do not hold that philosophy is the handmaidof Christianity if Christianity is taken to mean something differentfrom wisdom. As we will see below, they conceive the literal content ofChristianity as the handmaid of philosophy. Like other Platonists theytake wisdom to consist in the apprehension of the incorporeal forms. Butsince these forms constitute Christ as the Logos in their interpretation,philosophy becomes a means to attain both wisdom and Christ—whichare two names for the same thing: the apprehension of the intelligibleorder of nature, i.e., of the forms and the orderly relations betweenthem. This equation of Christ and wisdom was, as far as I can see,not adopted in the Latin intellectual traditions of the Middle Ages. Itrecurs, however, in the work of a philosopher in whom one would atfirst not expect it: Spinoza.* * *In the Ethics Spinoza describes the “spirit of Christ (spiritu Christi )”as the “idea of God (idea Dei ).” 67 The “idea of God” in turn is God’s“infinite intellect,” which apprehends the “attributes of God and hisaffections.” 68 The content of the “idea of God,” therefore, is God’s“essence” and “everything that necessarily follows from his essence.” 69Spinoza had suggested the same much earlier in the Short Treatise whenhe called the mode of understanding immediately dependent on Godthe “Son of God.” 70 This mode corresponds precisely to the “infiniteintellect” in the Ethics. Since for Spinoza “the order and connection ofideas” that constitutes the “infinite intellect” is “the same as the orderand connection of things,” his Christ, like the Christ of Clement and66Origen 1969, Greek 1; English 211.67Spinoza 1925 EIVP68 (= Ethics, part 4, proposition 68) scholium; Gebhardt editionvol. 2, 262. The English translation indicates the Gebhardt pagination on the margin.On the context of this portrait of Christ, see Fraenkel 2008a.68Spinoza 1925 EIIP4 demonstratio; vol. 2, 88.69Spinoza 1925 EIIP3; vol. 2, 87.70Spinoza 1925 KV (= Korte Verhandeling [Short Treatise]) 1, 9; Gebhardt editionvol. 1, 48.

54 carlos fraenkelOrigen, can be said to be the rational order of nature. 71 Historically,the conception of the “infinite intellect” in Spinoza’s ontology is, in fact,related to elements of the conception of Nous in both the Platonic andAristotelian tradition. 72 I must stress, however, that Spinoza’s Christdoes not consist in the generic forms of things like trees, fish, and birds.For Spinoza universals have no real existence and are not part of trueknowledge at all. 73 Trees, fish, and birds—like all other things in thephysical world—are configurations of atoms, brought about mechanicallythrough universal laws of motion and not instantiations of eternaland incorporeal forms. As idea Dei, therefore, Christ is the scientificunderstanding of these laws and of how they are causally dependenton God, as well as of everything that follows from them—e.g., thingslike trees, fish, and birds and their interrelations. But while this bearswitness to important ontological, epistemological, and scientific developmentsthat took place between the time of Clement and Origen andthe time of Spinoza it does not change the fact that for both the Alexandriansand Spinoza everything serving to attain true knowledge bythe same token serves to attain Christ. The acquiring of true knowledgefor Spinoza results from what he describes as the “intellectual love ofGod (amor Dei intellectualis).” 74 Loving God intellectually constitutes thehighest human perfection. The more true knowledge a person acquiresthrough practicing it, the greater is that person’s share in Christ. ForSpinoza, as for Clement and Origen, the Wisdom represented by Christis, therefore, both the foundation and the goal of Christianity.Religion as the Handmaid of PhilosophyOne may, of course, ask what this religion of the philosophers has todo with traditional religion—with the narratives of Scripture, its piousexhortations, the codes of religious law, or the prayers and services ofthe religious community. And how do the philosophers explain that theepics of Homer, for example, or the Hebrew Bible, the New Testament,and the Koran teach so many things that appear to be at odds withphilosophical doctrines? If the founders of the traditional religions were71Spinoza 1925 EIIP7; vol. 2, 89.72See Fraenkel 2006.73See Spinoza 1925 EIIP40 scholium 1.74Spinoza 1925 EVP32 corrolarium; vol. 2, 300.

concept and history of philosophical religions 55indeed exemplars of a life devoted to the intellectual love of God—whydo the religions themselves not seem to have a clearly recognizablephilosophical content?Tensions between philosophy and traditional religion, as well asattempts to solve these tensions accompany philosophy from its inception.Xenophanes (sixth–fifth century BCE), for example, rejects theanthropomorphic representation of the gods in Greek poetry as incompatiblewith the philosophical conception of the divine. 75 At the sametime his contemporary, Theagenes of Rhegion, tries to reconcile thetwo through allegorical interpretation. 76 On the whole one can saythat Theagenes’ approach prevailed over the hostile attitude to thereligion of the poets exemplified by Xenophanes. Plato, of course, israther harsh with Homer and Hesiod in Books 2 and 3 of the Republic.Most of what they wrote is discarded by Plato because he considersit pedagogically inappropriate for the citizens of a virtuous state.Instead of proposing a philosophical reconstruction of existing Greekreligious stories, Plato in the Republic provides philosophical guidelinesfor composing new ones. But already Aristotle suggests that Greekmyths can be seen as allegorical statements of scientific insights. 77 TheStoics systematically explore Homer and Hesiod for ancient wisdom.And to the later Platonic tradition Plato’s criticism in the Republic wasclearly an embarrassment rather than a model. Middle- and Neoplatonistsas a rule take Homer to be an accomplished theologian whoconveyed his wisdom through metaphors and parables. 78 AlthoughPlato did not rehabilitate Homer and Hesiod, he nonetheless made asubstantial contribution to the philosophical interpretation of existinglegal and religious traditions. For the divine nomoi established in theLaws for the fictional polis of Magnesia have been shown to be a philosophicalreconstruction of Greek legislation. 79 In other words: Platointerprets the nomoi of ancient Greece as if they had been establishedby a philosopher. In this sense his procedure is analogous to laterPlatonists when they interpret Greek poetry as if philosophers had75See Diels and Kranz 1960, 21 B10–17.76Ibid., 8.2. Note that the earliest allegorical reading of Homer was probably notdefensive. See Lamberton 1986, 15; 31–43.77See Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.8.78On the history of the allegorical interpretation of Homer, see in general Lamberton1986. Note, however, the distinction between the Stoic and the Platonic interpretationof Homer suggested by Long 1992 and 1997.79I will discuss this issue at greater length below.

56 carlos fraenkelcomposed it. These strategies of philosophical reconstruction andinterpretation in antiquity, are, of course, not confined to the divinenomoi and religious stories of the Greeks. The same strategies recur,for example, in the philosophical reconstructions of Egyptian religionproposed by Chaeremon, Plutarch, and Iamblichus, or the philosophicalreconstruction of Roman political, legal, and religious traditionsproposed by Cicero. 80 They also recur when Jewish and Christianphilosophers in late antiquity such as Philo, Clement, and Origen takeon the task of clarifying how philosophy relates to the historical formsof Judaism and Christianity. And they are taken up once again whenMuslim and Jewish philosophers in the Middle Ages take on the taskof clarifying the relationship of philosophy to the historical forms ofIslam and Judaism.* * *The key for understanding the philosophical interpretation of Judaismand Christianity in late antiquity and of Islam and Judaism in theMiddle Ages lies in Plato’s political philosophy which provided theconceptual foundation for integrating traditional religions into a philosophicalframework. This is the main thesis for which I will argue in thissection. The philosophers under examination are not only philosopherswith respect to doctrines that fall into the domain of philosophy properlyspeaking, for example, their psychology, cosmology, metaphysics,and ethics. They also follow a philosophical model when it comes tointerpret their respective religious tradition: the purpose of its narratives,exhortations, laws, prayers, forms of worship and so forth. Concerningthese contents which are, of course, outside the scope of philosophyin the strict sense they offer what is best described as a philosophicalreconstruction. The main framework for this reconstruction was providedby the solution that Plato proposes for what he came to seeas the problem of nonphilosophers in the middle and late dialogues.Let me stress from the outset that my claim is not that Plato accountsfor all elements of the interpretation of religion as the handmaid ofphilosophy. In late antiquity Philo, for example, integrates the Stoicnotion of ‘natural law’ into the Platonic framework. Most significant is,80See the extant fragments of Chaeremon in Chaeremon 1984; Plutarch 1936;Iamblichus 1989; Cicero 1928. Cf. also the attempts, documented in Jeck 2004, tolink Plato’s wisdom to a wide range of oriental sources.

concept and history of philosophical religions 57of course, the integration of a wide range of Aristotelian concepts intothis framework by medieval Muslim and Jewish philosophers. Theyexplain, for example, the process of prophecy in terms of Aristotle’spsychology, the character of the pedagogical-political program in termsof a late ancient version of Aristotle’s Organon, and the purpose of thedivine Law in terms of Aristotle’s theory of habituation. Only the overallframework, I contend, is derived from Plato.To substantiate my claim that Plato can be seen as the source ofwhat I suggest describing as the concept of religion as philosophy’shandmaid, I will discuss two changes that occurred in Plato’s politicalthought from the early dialogues to the middle and late dialogues. Bothchanges are motivated through developments in Plato’s conception ofthe soul. 81 A basic assumption underlying Plato’s political philosophyfrom the Apology to the Laws is that a good ruler is a ruler who possessesthe art of making the citizens better, i.e., is capable of leading them to“aretê (excellence or goodness).” 82 Since for Plato it is the philosopherwho has knowledge of the good, as well as of the way how to achieve it,the philosopher is best qualified to be the ruler. In this sense, Socrates,although he deliberately stays out of Athens’ public affairs, is praised asthe only Athenian to practice “the true art of politics.” 83 In the earlydialogues, the Socratic project of making the citizens better has thefollowing important characteristics. For one thing it is intellectualistic:Knowledge of the good is a necessary and sufficient condition for doingthe good. For it is the only way of motivating good action and on theassumption that it would be absurd to act knowingly against one’sbest interest, it does so necessarily. 84 It is, therefore, not surprising thatSocrates seeks to guide all citizens to the knowledge on which theirperfection depends: “I never cease to stir up each and every one ofyou, to persuade you and reproach you all day long and everywhere Isit down.” 85 Nor is it surprising that the characteristic form of Socratic81This development and its consequences for Plato’s ethics have been the object ofa considerable amount of scholarship. See e.g., Price 1995 and Irwin 1995. My maininterest, however, is in the political implications.82For a number of characteristic passages, see Plato 1900–1907: Apology 25a–c;Protagoras 318c–d; ibidem 319e–320b; Gorgias 464b–465a; ibid. 515b–521d; Republic420b–421c; Statesman 296e–297b; Laws 630a–631d; ibid. 650b.83Plato 1900–1907, Gorgias 521d.84See Plato’s argument in the last part of the Protagoras, Plato 1900–1907.85Ibid., Apology 30e.

58 carlos fraenkelpolitics is the elenchos: for the “greatest good (megiston agathon) for manis to discuss virtue every day and those other things about which youhear me conversing and testing myself and others.” 86In the middle and late dialogues, however, Plato partly modifies andpartly abandons the premises informing the Socratic project. At thesame time there are points of continuity: The best life continues to bethe philosophical life: it is not only the most pleasant, but also the mostdivine, a form of imitatio Dei, since the philosopher acquires knowledgeof the forms, the realm of the divine, and the soul becomes like theobjects it apprehends. 87 Likewise the perfection of the city continuesto depend on the rule of the philosopher who as philosopher acquiresknowledge of the divine and becomes like it, and who as ruler is a“craftsman” of virtue, i.e., leads the citizens as close as possible to thesame goal by shaping them according to the divine as his model. 88Philosophical instruction in the Republic, however, constitutes the laststage of the educational curriculum that only very few and rigorouslyselected citizens reach. This gives rise to three questions: What is thefunction of pre-philosophical education in Plato’s curriculum? Why aremost citizens excluded from philosophical instruction? And finally, howcan they still have a share in the best life? To begin with, knowledgeis no longer considered a sufficient condition for goodness by Plato.He now recognizes a twofold irrational part of the soul, as well astwo conditions under which it cannot be governed by reason. First,our rational faculty develops at a relatively late stage in life, for “noanimal to which it belongs to have intellect (nous echein) after reachingperfection, has this faculty, or has it in the same measure, when it isborn.” 89 One purpose of the prephilosophical educational program is,therefore, to prepare the citizens for a philosophical life. This is achievedby habituating the irrational part of the soul in such a way that itacts and reacts as if it were guided by reason, so that a person “willwelcome reason when it comes and recognize it easily because of itskinship with himself.” 90 Since, however, only very few citizens actuallyreach the level of philosophical instruction, preparation for it cannotbe the program’s only purpose. Although for Plato all human beings86Ibid., Apology 38a.87Ibid., for the former, see Republic 9; for the latter, see ibid. 500b–d.88Cf. Plato 1900–1907, Republic 500d–501c.89Ibid., Laws 672b–c.90Cf. Plato 1900–1907, Republic 402a; Laws 653b–c.

concept and history of philosophical religions 59share the basic structure of the soul, the dominating part of the soulvaries from one to another. The rational part “rules in some people’ssouls, while one of the other parts—whichever it happens to be—rulesin other people’s.” 91 Accordingly, Plato distinguishes between “threeprimary kinds of people: wisdom-loving, victory-loving, and profit-loving.”92 Thus human beings for Plato are in an important sense unequal,which explains why in his view most citizens will not reach the level ofphilosophical instruction at all: they simply are not capable by nature.In this sense Plato abandons the goal of Socratic politics of leading allcitizens to virtue through knowledge. Prephilosophical education has,therefore, not only a pedagogical, but also a political purpose: it functionsas a replacement of philosophy for all those who by nature have noaccess to it. As either a preparation for or a replacement of philosophy,the pedagogical-political program thus plays an important role in the lifeof all citizens of the virtuous state. This explains the elaborate discussionthat Plato devotes to nonphilosophical devices—most prominentlyin the Laws. The program’s main components are religious stories,persuasive speeches, laws, and religious practices. Later philosophersdescribe them as constituents of an “imitation” of philosophy, perhapson account of Plato’s claim that the “entire politeia” set out in the Laws isan “imitation (mimêsis) of the finest and noblest life.” By this he arguablymeans the life of the philosopher. 93 The religious stories about gods,demons, and heroes, for example, can be interpreted as imitating theforms of justice and of the good known by the philosopher who sets upthe “norms (typoi )” to which these stories must conform. 94 Laws in turnprescribe actions that imitate the philosopher who acts on the basis ofrational insight. 95 In this way the not-yet-philosopher is prepared forthe philosophical life and the nonphilosopher is led as close as possibleto it: to a second-degree likeness of the divine, as it were, achieved bymeans of an imitation of the philosopher’s first-degree likeness of thedivine. Thus Plato’s educational-political program, while not philosophicalitself, is integrated into the over-all project underlying his politicalphilosophy, i.e., the project of making the citizens better.91Plato 1900–1907, Republic 581b.92Ibid., 581c.93Ibid., Laws 817b.94Ibid., Republic 379a.95Cf. Plato 1900–1907, Republic 590d.

60 carlos fraenkelOne last implication of the turn from Socratic politics to Plato’slater political thought must be noted. A nonphilosopher in the bestcity possesses only an imitation of philosophical knowledge, that is,notions of justice and goodness derived from stories about gods, demonsand heroes. He would, therefore, neither be able to defend them in aSocratic elenchos, nor derive any benefit from the insight that he does notreally know what he thought he knew, given his incapacity to replacethe refuted notions through knowledge. In this sense the Socratic projectas presented in the Apology is not only judged inadequate given thereality of the human soul; it is also dangerous, because it potentiallyleads to the moral corruption of the nonphilosopher who is left withoutphilosophy’s imitation while being unable to reach philosophy itself.In the Republic Plato, in fact, explicitly criticizes the use of the elenchosfor testing the beliefs of nonphilosophers: because it will cause themto loose the traditional beliefs established by “the lawgiver” in whichthey were brought up and because they lack the ability to “discover thetrue ones.” After having been “law-abiding,” therefore, they “becomelawless.” 96 Although philosophy still holds the key to the best life, Platonow thinks that it should be practiced outside the public sphere.* * *How did Plato’s later political philosophy become useful to philosopherslike Philo, Clement, and Origen in late antiquity, and al-Fârâbî,Averroes, and Maimonides in the early Middle Ages for integratingtheir religious traditions into a philosophical framework? In a somewhatschematic way the basic pattern can be described as follows: Theexcellence of the religious tradition, according to these philosophers,is due to the fact that it makes the members of the religious communitybetter by leading them to aretê. They adopt the fundamentaldivision of humankind into philosophers and nonphilosophers thatresulted from the development of Plato’s psychology. The foundersof the religion—Moses, Christ, and Muhammad—are presented asaccomplished philosophers. They can, therefore, convey knowledge tothe philosophically talented members of the religious community. Butthey are also prophets, lawgivers, and teachers, and as such devised apedagogical-political program for the guidance of nonphilosophers. Theliteral content of the religious tradition is interpreted as this pedagogical-96See the entire passage in Plato 1900–1907, Republic 538c–539a.

concept and history of philosophical religions 61political program, functioning as a preparation to philosophy for not-yetphilosophersand as a replacement of philosophy for nonphilosophers.Like Plato’s program, it consists of religious stories, exhortations, laws,and religious practices. But in contrast to what Plato does with Homerand Hesiod in the Republic, the philosophers here considered integratethe foundational texts of their religious traditions into a philosophicalframework by attributing to them an allegorical content coinciding withphilosophy. This content in turn can be uncovered through allegoricalexegesis. Moreover, Plato’s view that philosophy should be keptout of the public sphere, because it can lead to the moral corruptionof nonphilosophers, is used by the philosophers considered here, asan explanation for the absence of philosophy from their respectivereligious traditions. Maimonides, for instance, claims that in antiquityphilosophy was transmitted only orally from one generation of Jewishphilosophers to the next until the unfavorable circumstances of theDiaspora interrupted the chain of transmission. 97 The supposed interruptionin turn is used as a justification for studying philosophy fromnon-Jewish sources. Since the religious tradition is an imitation ofphilosophy, it contains philosophy only as its allegorical content whichcannot be apprehended without the prior study of philosophy. Also inthis sense, therefore, studying philosophy becomes a religious practice,for it is essentially the same as the study of the allegorical content ofa religious tradition.All the components of the pedagogical-political program are part ofthe code of divine nomoi set forth in the Laws. There is, moreover, awell established scholarly tradition of interpreting the Laws as a religioustext. Andrea Nightingale, for instance, describes it as a “sacredtext.” 98 For André Laks it is “le premier traité théologico-politique.” 99The Laws can, in fact, be read as both a programmatic statement aboutwhat the nature of a divine law-code must be and as the philosophicalreconstruction of a historical law-code in light of this program. Platoargues that what makes nomoi divine is that they aim to lead the citizensto “hê megistê aretê ”—the highest virtue which consists in the fourcardinal aretai that Plato defined in the Republic: courage, self-control,wisdom, and justice. 100 These in turn are identified as the “divine goods”97See Maimonides 1931, 1.71.98Nightingale 1993.99Laks 2005, 22.100Plato 1900–1907, Laws 630b–c.

62 carlos fraenkelon whose acquisition eudaimonia depends. 101 The divinity of the nomoithus consists in their ability to turn citizens into excellent citizens byguiding them towards the highest virtue. This in turn requires that thenomoi are rational, i.e., grounded on God as Nous whose role in Plato’slate dialogues is to order things in view to what is best—both in thecosmological context of the Timaeus and in the political context of theLaws. 102 Scholars have convincingly argued that the politeia of Magnesiathat the Athenian and his Spartan and Cretan interlocutors conceive inthe course of their discussion is in fact a philosophical reconstruction ofGreek legislation. “Outright invention,” Glenn Morrow, for example,claims, “plays almost no part at all” in the Laws. 103 The project of theLaws, therefore, seems to be less the philosophical construction of anew law-code than the philosophical reconstruction of existing legaland religious traditions making them conform to the rational characterthat defines divine nomoi. But if this can be done for the nomoi of Greekcities—why should it not be possible to do the same for the nomoi ofother communities as well? The program of philosophical reconstructionthat Plato outlines and in a sense puts into practice in the Lawswas, for instance, enthusiastically adopted by Philo and applied to aphilosophical reconstruction of the nomoi of the Jews. The claim that theLaw of Moses, precisely like the divine nomoi described in Plato’s Laws,aims at imparting the four cardinal aretai that Plato had defined in theRepublic is, in fact, a topos in Hellenistic-Jewish literature. 104 As we willsee below, almost all of Philo’s extant work can be understood as anattempt to substantiate this claim. Plato’s philosophical reconstructionof Greek legislation thus may be said to have its counterpart in Philo’sphilosophical reconstruction of Jewish legislation. A similar claim canbe made for the work of Maimonides in the medieval period. 105 Mythesis, then, is this: Plato’s Laws were read by the philosophers hereexamined as a pedagogical-political program conceived to guide not-101Ibid., 631b–d.102See Menn 1995.103Morrow 1960, 591. But Morrow argued that the politeia of Magnesia is theidealized politeia of ancient Athens which is much less plausible than Stephen Menn’ssuggestion that Plato’s reconstruction is a critical response to the literature written inpraise of the Spartan politeia, e.g., Xenophon’s Politeia of the Spartans. See Menn 2005.104See e.g., Josephus 1926 2.170–171; Sapientia Solomonis 8:7; 4 Macc. 1:2–4 and 1:17–18.105See in particular the definition of “divine Law” in Maimonides 1931, 2.40 andthe account of Moses’ Law as divine Law in 3.27–28. The ultimate purpose of thedivine Law is leading to intellectual perfection and much of Maimonides’ work consistsin showing that this is what the Law of Moses does.

concept and history of philosophical religions 63yet-philosophers and nonphilosophers towards perfection as defined inthe Republic. This program cannot convey perfection in the full sense.The highest perfection can only be attained through what Plato in theTimaeus describes as “the love of learning” and “true wisdom.” But itis a preparation or a substitute for this perfection.The most compelling evidence that this is how Plato’s political philosophywas read in the context of the philosophical interpretation ofJudaism and Christianity in ancient Alexandria is provided by Eusebiusof Caesarea (d. 339). Intellectually, Eusebius clearly sees himself ascontinuing the project of the Alexandrians whose portrait he draws inhis Historia Ecclesiastica (History of the Church). 106 But the main interestof Eusebius does not lie in the originality of his philosophical contributionto this tradition. He is, in fact, not primarily a philosopher but ahistorian. Eusebius’s importance stems from the fact that he makes thephilosophical assumptions underlying the Alexandrian project explicit.For in book 12 of his Praeparatio Evangelica (Preparation to the Gospel)he quotes almost every single passage from the Republic and the Lawson which I rely in my interpretation of Philo, Clement, and Origen.By adducing what he takes to be biblical parallels to the passages fromPlato, Eusebius, of course, wants to demonstrate that Plato derivedthe principles of his political philosophy from the tradition of ancientHebrew wisdom. What he in fact shows, however, is how the Alexandriansinterpreted Judaism and Christianity in light of Plato’s politicalphilosophy. Let me give just one example:Moses had made his entire legislation (nomothesia) and the constitution( politeia) established by him dependent on the religion (eusebeia) of the Godof the Universe. He had made the Demiurge of all things the startingpoint of the legislation. Then he taught that from the divine goods thehuman goods proceed and referred the divine goods to the ruling Reasonof all things (ho pantôn hêgemôn Nous), i.e., to the God of the Universehimself. Consider how the philosopher [i.e., Plato], walking on the samepath, criticizes the legislators of the Cretans and the Lacedaemonians,and teaches (ekdidaskei ) the Law dear to Moses. 107106See in particular the account of Philo’s writings in Eusebius 1926 2.18; thechapter on Pantaenus “the philosopher,” described as the founder of the catecheticalschool in Alexandria and as the teacher of Clement in 5.10; the chapter on Clementof Alexandria in 5.11 (cf. 6.6), as well as the list of his writings in 6.13. Much of 6 isdevoted to Origen.107Eusebius 1982 12.16; English vol. 2, 637.

64 carlos fraenkelEusebius first incorporates Plato’s account in Laws 631b–d of the relationshipbetween human and divine goods and their ultimate goal: “theruling Reason of all things.” Then he claims that Plato adopted thisaccount of the goal of divine nomoi from Moses and used it to criticizethe Cretan and Spartan legislation as set forth by Clinias and Megillusat the beginning of the Laws. For my purpose, however, Eusebius isthe chief witness for how Judaism and Christianity were philosophicallyreconstructed in light of Plato’s political thought.A full discussion of the Alexandrian philosophers is not possible here.But let me give a few examples of how Eusebius’s testimony can beused as a hermeneutical key to their project. The conceptual frameworkwithin which Philo carries out this project can be sketched as follows:The pursuit of knowledge, aiming at knowledge of God, is the highestgood and Moses is the exemplar of a life devoted to achieving it.After a comprehensive scientific education he reaches the summit ofphilosophy and apprehends the forms constituting God’s Logos, i.e., theintelligible order of the world which is the highest manifestation of Godaccessible to human beings. 108 But Moses is not only a philosopher,but also a lawgiver and Philo explicitly describes him in terms of thephilosopher-king in the Republic. 109 As a lawgiver, Moses establishes apedagogical-political program that aims at leading all members of theJewish community to aretê: by preparing not-yet philosophers for thephilosophical life and by making the intellectual and practical contentsof philosophy accessible to nonphilosophers. 110 How Philo’s program ofphilosophical reconstruction is modelled on Plato’s is most in evidencein De decalogo and De specialibus legibus. Here Philo explains in detail howthe nomoi of Moses contribute to what he takes to be their general purpose:“to prepare and exhort us to wisdom and justice and piety andthe rest of the chorus of virtues (aretai )” (Spec. 4, 134). As a whole thispedagogical-political program relates to the objects of the philosopher’sknowledge as a shadow relates to a real thing. 111 Philo thus appliesPlato’s ontological dualism to the Law of Moses: its literal content isan imitation of the doctrines established in philosophy which in turn108For references, see my account in the second section, Philosophy as the Foundationand Goal of Religion.109Philo 1929–62, Mosis 2.2.110See e.g., Philo 1929–62, Quod Deus sit immutabilis (On the Unchangeableness ofGod) 51–69.111See Philo 1929–62, De confusione linguarum (On the Confusion of Tongues) 190;cf. De vita contemplativa (On the Contemplative Life) 78.

concept and history of philosophical religions 65correspond to its allegorical content. 112 Whereas the philosopher, forinstance, knows what justice is, the narratives of the Mosaic Law imitatethat knowledge by describing the behavior of exemplary just individuals.113 Plato’s view that philosophy, although inherently good, can provedestructive for nonphilosophers, is developed by Philo into a generalontological principle: As God must restrict the goodness bestowed onhis creatures because of their ontological limitations, Moses must teachan imitation of philosophy to the religious community because of theintellectual limitations of most of its members. 114Clement and Origen, I argue, did not introduce major changes intothe philosophical framework adopted by Philo, but simply identifiedits foundation with Christ. As I suggested above, whereas Moses andPlato strove to apprehend the forms constituting God’s Logos, Christ isGod’s Logos; whereas Moses and Plato were lovers of wisdom, Christ isWisdom. The conception of Christianity as an imitation of philosophyis made explicit in Origen: like Philo he applies Plato’s ontological dualismto Scripture by comparing the relationship between the gospel’sliteral and allegorical content to that of a shadow to a real thing. 115This conception informs the discussion of exegesis in the last book ofPeri archôn (Book 4) and explains how the systematic exposé of Christiandoctrine in the preceding three books relates to Scripture’s literalcontent. Within this framework Origen also can address the objectionsagainst Christianity set forth by the pagan Platonist Celsus: that the Biblewas a compilation of baseless fables, for example, or that Christianshad replaced rational judgment through blind faith. Origen points tothe pedagogical-political utility of faith and fables for the perfectionof nonphilosophers and at the same time claims that their allegoricalcontent coincides with the doctrines established by reason. 116What most sets the Christian philosophers apart from Philo is howthey connect the distinction between philosophers and nonphilosophersand between philosophy and philosophy’s imitation with a notion ofprogress built into a concept of universal history. For Origen all rationalsouls were equally united with the Logos in an initial state of perfection.112See Philo 1929–62 Posteritate 1.1; De agricultura (On Agriculture) 96–97.113See e.g., the description of the Patriarchs as “living laws” in Philo 1929–62 DeAbrahamo (On Abraham) 2–6.114See Philo 1929–62 Opifi cio 23 with Posteritate 143–145.115See Origen 1989 1:1.116See e.g., Origen 1965 1.9.

66 carlos fraenkelTurning away from the Logos—thus Origen interprets the biblical‘fall’—leads to the embodiment of the souls. In successive embodimentsthey gradually move further away from or back up to the Logosdepending on how rational a life they lead. Christianity’s mission is toturn humankind as a whole back to the Logos by directing all humanbeings to aretê. This means bringing them as close as the current stateof their souls allows to intellectual perfection which is attained throughthe apprehension of the Logos: philosophers by means of philosophy andnonphilosophers by means of philosophy’s imitation. 117 In the course ofsuccessive embodiments, however, also nonphilosophers—once turnedinto the right direction—will be able to gradually replace philosophy’simitation through philosophy itself. In this sense the advent of Christianityis seen as a turning point in the history of humankind: it initiatesthe restoration of the souls to the state of intellectual perfection whichthey had lost through the ‘fall.’ 118* * *A hermeneutical key like the one provided by Eusebius for understandingthe Alexandrian project is not required for the medieval period.Leo Strauss has long ago established that Plato’s political philosophyplayed a crucial role for the conception of the relationship betweenphilosophy and religion from al-Fârâbî onwards. 119 Al-Fârâbî himself,moreover, wrote an Epitome of Plato’s Laws and Averroes a Commentaryon the Republic. 120 The main problem in this context is thatStrauss’s interpretation of how Plato’s political philosophy shaped themedieval approach to religion is in my opinion wrong. For Straussthere is an irreconcilable “struggle” between philosophy and religion.From this assumption his notions of persecution and an esoteric art ofwriting promptly follow. To avoid persecution and to preserve religionas a means to control the “masses,” philosophers like Plato, al-Fârâbî,Averroes, and Maimonides feigned religious orthodoxy while signaling117For the education of nonphilosophers through the Logos, see Origen 19654.71–72.118This paragraph summarizes what I take to be the main line of argument of Origen1913 1.4–3.6. See in particular 3.6 where Origen stresses the circular character of thedevelopment of the rational souls.119See in particular Strauss 1935, Strauss 1952, 7–21, and Strauss 1967.120The question whether al-Fârâbî had access to Plato’s text or relied on a summaryby Galen has not yet been settled. For the latest contribution to the debate, seeS. Harvey 2003.

concept and history of philosophical religions 67their heterodox philosophical views between the lines to initiated readers.Let me try to sketch an alternative to this interpretation by brieflypresenting al-Fârâbî’s concept of religion. 121 Al-Fârâbî is not only thefounder of the medieval intellectual tradition under consideration butalso provided a particularly clear statement of the general pattern thatI outlined schematically above.Al-Fârâbî adopts Plato’s fundamental premise that human beingsare unequal by nature and divided into a minority of philosophers anda majority of nonphilosophers. 122 In his account of the philosophy ofPlato, moreover, he clearly distinguishes between the Socratic methodand the method advocated in Plato’s later dialogues. 123 “Socrates,” heclaims, was only able “to conduct a scientific investigation of justice andthe virtues . . . but did not possess the ability to form the character of theyouth and the multitude (al-adâth wa-al-jumhûr).” The “philosopher,the king, and the lawgiver,” by contrast, must be able to do both: toinstruct “the elect (al-khawâ)” by means of “the Socratic method”and to form the character of “the youth and the multitude” by meansof a pedagogical-political program. 124 The distinction between “theyouth” and “the multitude” corresponds to the distinction betweennot-yet-philosophers and nonphilosophers by nature. That al-Fârâbîat a minimum was familiar with the main traits of the pedagogicalpoliticalprogram that Plato had worked out in the Laws is clear fromthe Epitome he wrote of the dialogue.In the Kitâb al-urûf (Book of Letters) al-Fârâbî, describes the processby which theoretical and practical philosophy reach perfection. Thisis followed by an outline of the two methods used for disseminatingthe results of this process to the political community. They correspondprecisely to the two methods that we just saw: the “instruction” of philosophers“proceeds by demonstrative methods,” whereas the instructionof nonphilosophers, “which is public, proceeds by dialectical, rhetorical,121A number of important contributions have been made to the interpretation ofal-Fârâbî’s political thought outside Strauss’s conceptual framework. See e.g., Walzer1957, O’Meara 2003, and Vallat 2004. For a more detailed discussion, see Fraenkel2008b.122For the former, see al-Fârâbî 1964, Arabic 44; English 35; for the latter, seeal-Fârâbî 1992, Arabic 36–37; English 41.123al-Fârâbî is of course not led by considerations of Platonic chronology to makethis distinction.124al-Fârâbî 1943, Arabic 21–22; English 66–67. Cf. Aristotle’s characterization ofSocrates in the Eudemian Ethics 1.5 (Aristotle 1952).

68 carlos fraenkelor poetical methods.” 125 This second kind of instruction in turn constitutes“religion (millah)” which al-Fârâbî takes to be an “imitation ofphilosophy (muâkiyyah li-l-falsafah).” 126 Religion thus conceived fulfillsprecisely the role of Plato’s pedagogical-political program: “throughreligion, the multitude is taught, educated, and given all that is neededto attain felicity.” 127 Its purpose is to convey “theoretical and practicalmatters that have been inferred in philosophy, in such a way as toenable the multitude to understand them by persuasion or imaginativerepresentation, or both.” 128 Religion thus serves as the “tool (âlah)” ofphilosophy which makes philosophical contents accessible to nonphilosophers.129 God’s description as a king in Scripture, for instance, is seenas a pedagogically useful metaphorical imitation of the philosophicaldoctrine of God occupying the first rank in the hierarchy of existents.The notion of the king conveys an approximate idea of God’s rankto nonphilosophers who cannot understand the ontological order, butwho do understand the political order. 130Plato’s philosopher-king who has the task of guiding both philosophersand nonphilosophers to the perfection possible to them is replaced byal-Fârâbî through the prophet. 131 The virtuous political community is,therefore, by the same token a virtuous religious community. The differencebetween the philosopher and the prophet is explained in termsof Aristotle’s psychology: the prophet has not only perfected his intellectlike the philosopher, but he also has a perfect imagination. And oneof the imagination’s functions, according to al-Fârâbî, is precisely “toimitate” things. 132 In other words: The prophet is not only a philosopher,but a poet and orator as well which allows him to guide both thephilosophers and the nonphilosophers in his community. Taken literally,religious texts for al-Fârâbî consist mainly in metaphors, parables, andrhetorical and dialectical arguments.But what is this perfection that religion supposedly conveys to nonphilosophers?Both the Alexandrians and the medieval Islamic and Jewish125al-Fârâbî 1969, sec. 143 (section numbers refer to both the Arabic and theEnglish trans.).126al-Fârâbî 1992, Arabic 185; English 44. al-Fârâbî 1968 is his most elaboratediscussion of religion.127al-Fârâbî 1969, sec. 144.128Ibid., sec. 108.129Ibid., sec. 110.130See e.g., al-Fârâbî 1992, Arabic 185; English 45, quoted by Averroes (1969) in hisCommentary on Plato’s Republic, Hebrew 30; English 18–19; cf. Maimonides 1931 1.8–9.131See in particular chapter 15 of al-Fârâbî 1985; see also Walzer 1957.132al-Fârâbî 1985, 14, sec. 2.

concept and history of philosophical religions 69thinkers identify the highest form of perfection with intellectual perfection.But already Plato uses the terms “wisdom” and “knowledge” in aderivative sense in Republic 441e–442c to describe the state of the rationalpart of the soul after having been shaped by the pedagogical-politicalprogram. I suggest describing this kind of wisdom as an imitation ofthe wisdom and knowledge accessible to the philosopher only. Thisat least is arguably al-Fârâbî’s understanding. Intellectual perfection,according to him, includes various levels of which scientific knowledgeand the pleasure derived from it is only the highest. Below it are a widerange of experiences that may be characterized, broadly speaking, ascultural-religious. Like scientific knowledge they are “apprehensionsthat are sought only for the sake of apprehension and the pleasure ofapprehension, not for the sake of being utilized” to attain other goals.They thus constitute the highest good for nonphilosophers. Theseexperiences includethe myths, stories, histories of peoples and histories of nations, that mannarrates and to which he listens solely for the pleasure they give. For totake pleasure in something means nothing other than the achievementof comfort and delight. Likewise, looking at imitators and listening toimitative statements, listening to poems, and going over what one comprehendsof the poems and the myths he recites or reads, are used bythe man who delights in them and is comforted by them only for hispleasure in what he comprehends. The more certain his apprehension,the more perfect his pleasure. The more excellent and perfect in himselfthe man who comprehends, the more perfect and complete his pleasurein his apprehension (Wa-kullumâ kâna al-mudrik afal wa akmal fî nafsihi kânaal-iltidhâdh bi-idrâkihi akmal wa-atamm). 133Hence the perfection derived from philosophy and the perfectionderived from philosophy’s imitation do not differ in kind, for al-Fârâbî,but only in degree.The Apparent Paradox of Spinoza 134The interpretation of religious traditions as philosophical religions isnot entirely confined to antiquity and the early Middle Ages. Versionsof it recur in a number of later contexts: I already mentioned MarsilioFicino who uses some of the strategies that I described above to integrate133al-Fârâbî 1961, Arabic 61; English 73.134This section summarizes Fraenkel 2008a where I discuss the issue in greaterdetail and give an outline of the scholarly context.

70 carlos fraenkelPlatonism and Christianity in fifteenth-century Florence. But as I stressedin the introduction: this interpretation did not become part of the mainintellectual configurations of Christian Europe. The most importantlater philosopher requiring examination is Spinoza who was familiarwith the interpretation in question through medieval Jewish sources.The apparent paradox of Spinoza is that he appears to advocate boththe view of Averroes—that the truth of Scripture does not contradictthe truth of philosophy—and the view, later adopted by Enlightenmentcritics of religion, that one would search in vain in Scripture for thetrue doctrines demonstrated in philosophy. It is mainly as a critic ofreligion that Spinoza was both cursed and celebrated. Reviled as anatheist already in his lifetime, “Spinozism” became a swearword byand large synonymous with atheism and materialism throughout theseventeenth and eighteenth century. But Spinoza has also been recruitedmany times for genealogies of modernity, most recently by JonathanIsrael who celebrates him as the founder of what he describes as the“radical enlightenment.” 135 Almost no attention, on the other hand, hasbeen paid to the ample evidence that Spinoza adopted a version of theconception of a philosophical religion. I have already briefly discussedSpinoza’s portrait of Christ. Consider now a passage from the CogitataMetaphysica (Metaphysical Thoughts), a treatise that Spinoza wrotebefore he worked out his critique of religion in the TTP:But when we say that God hates certain things and loves certain things,this is said in the same way as Scripture says that the earth will spit outhuman beings and other things of this kind. That God, however, is notangry at anyone, nor loves things as the multitude (vulgus) believes, canbe sufficiently derived from Scripture itself. For this is in Isaiah and moreclearly in Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, chapter 9. . . . Finally, if in the HolyScriptures some other things occur, which induce doubt, this is not theplace to explain them; since here we only inquire into the things whichwe can grasp in the most certain way through natural reason (rationenaturali ); and it is sufficient that we demonstrate these clearly in order toknow that Scripture must also teach the same things (ut sciamus Sacrampaginam eadem etiam docere debere); because the truth does not contradict thetruth (veritas veritati non repugnat) and Scripture cannot teach the absurdities(nugas) which the multitude imagines. . . . Let us not think for a momentthat anything could be found in Sacred Scripture that would contradictthe Natural light (quod lumini naturae repugnet). 136135See Israel 2001 and 2006.136Spinoza 1925 TTP Gebhardt edition vol. 1, 264–265.

concept and history of philosophical religions 71Spinoza here makes the exact same claim that defines Averroes’ stanceon the relationship of philosophy and Islam: “veritas veritati non repugnat.”The problem I am interested in is this: In his critique of religionSpinoza develops an exegetical method by which he intends to showthat Scripture contains no truth and, therefore, cannot interfere withphilosophy. 137 Whereas philosophy determines what is true and false,religion based on Scripture secures obedience to the law. 138 On the otherhand, there are a significant number of passages throughout Spinoza’swork—from the Metaphysical Thoughts to the Ethics and the late correspondencewith Oldenburg—in which he attributes a true core to Scripture,often presented as its allegorical content. The main thesis for which Iwill argue is that this inconsistency is best explained by assuming thatSpinoza is committed to two projects that he ultimately was unable toreconcile: he wants to use religion as the handmaid of philosophy thatprovides the basis for the best life accessible to nonphilosophers andhe wants to refute religion’s claim to truth in order to defend what hecalls the “freedom to philosophize (libertas philosophandi ).” 139 Spinoza’scritique of religion was, of course, momentous. He argued that we haveno good reason to take for granted what everyone committed to a religionbased on Scripture must assume: that the content of Scripture istrue—whether this truth is taken to coincide with scientific knowledgeand derived from the intellectual perfection of the religion’s founder orwhether it is taken to be above scientific knowledge and derived from amiraculous act of divine revelation. Both positions stand and fall withthe assumption of Scripture’s truth. After suspending this assumptionat the beginning of his examination of Scripture, Spinoza proceeds inan analogous way to the scientist whose aim is to explain nature. Bothwork out a “history,” i.e., a methodical account, of the object of theirstudy. 140 For the Bible scholar this means collecting and ordering thedata contained in Scripture and then interpreting them in light of therelevant historical and socio-cultural contexts as well as the psychologicalpeculiarities of the prophets insofar as these can be reconstructedfrom the available sources. This is what Spinoza means by the claimthat “the knowledge of all the contents of Scripture must be sought137See in particular Spinoza 1925 TTP 7.138See in particular Spinoza 1925 TTP 12–15.139Spinoza 1925, see the subtitle of the TTP and Letter 30 in which Spinoza laysout the project of the TTP.140Spinoza 1925 TTP 7 vol. 3, 98; English 89.

72 carlos fraenkelfrom Scripture alone.” 141 Only after reconstructing the meaning of thetext in this manner its truth or falsehood is assessed, which in the caseof the Bible usually leads to the conclusion that it is false. It is perhapsnot surprising that this strand in Spinoza’s thought stood at the centerof the scholarly interest in his views on religion. The few scholars whotook note of the inconsistency in Spinoza’s work at all usually dismissedthe passages reflecting the medieval Islamic and Jewish position as thestrategic maneuver of a radical philosopher who in his youth had beenostracized by the Jewish community and wished to avoid suffering thesame fate by Christians. This explanation seems untenable to me, notleast because even after cutting all ties between philosophy and religion,Spinoza determines their respective roles in a way that bears a strikingresemblance to Averroes’s version of the concept of a philosophicalreligion. Turning the prevalent scholarly view on its head proves inmy view a more promising approach: Spinoza’s prior commitment isto a version of the medieval concept of a philosophical religion. Hiscritique of it, by contrast, is an incidental by-product of his critiqueof Christian orthodoxy. One of the main reasons that motivated Spinozato compose his critique of religion in the TTP, is “the excessiveauthority and the impertinence of preachers” which he perceived as afundamental threat to “the freedom to philosophize and to say whatwe think.” 142 This critique is thus not motivated by his philosophicalproject, but by historical circumstances in seventeenth-century Hollandwhen the alliance of the Calvinist Reformed Church with the monarchistsupporters of the House of Orange threatened the relatively liberal andtolerant Dutch Republic under Johan de Witt. 143To begin with we know that Spinoza read and understood Maimonides’philosophical interpretation of Judaism from his restatementand astute criticism of this position in the TTP. 144 It is, moreover, verylikely that Spinoza was familiar with the main premises underlying Averroes’sapproach to religion on account of the striking parallels between141Ibid., vol. 3, 99; English 90.142Ep. 30, written in 1665; Spinoza 1925 TTP vol. 4, 166; English 844.143For the general historical setting, see Israel 1995, ch. 30, in particular 785–795in which the composition of the TTP is situated against the background of the period’sconflicts and tensions. For a more detailed account of the historical circumstances underwhich Spinoza composed the TTP, see Nadler 1999, ch. 10. Note, however, that I donot share Nadler’s view about the continuity of Spinoza’s stance concerning religionfrom the time of his excommunication to the TTP.144Spinoza 1925 TTP 7 and 15.

concept and history of philosophical religions 73Averroes’s and Spinoza’s stance. These parallels can be explained onthe assumption that Spinoza read the short Hebrew treatise Beinat hadat(The Examination of Religion) by the Jewish Renaissance AverroistElijah Delmedigo, a copy of which was in his library. 145 In the passagefrom the Metaphysical Thoughts quoted above the conflict between thephilosophical doctrine of God’s will and Scripture is resolved in theway most medieval Muslim and Jewish rationalists would resolve it:the statements about God’s love and hate in Scripture must be understoodallegorically. Only the vulgus understands them literally. Thecriterion to determine which passages of Scripture are to be understoodliterally and which allegorically clearly is their agreement or disagreementwith the corresponding philosophical doctrine. The need to explainScripture derives from the fact that it does not teach things more philosophico,i.e., in the way we grasp them when we inquire into them bymeans of “natural reason.” But since the truth arrived at by reason isthe same as the truth contained in Scripture, we can rest assured thatnothing clearly demonstrated by reason contradicts what Scriptureteaches. The literal content of the teachings of Scripture is adapted tothe imagination of nonphilosophers.Whereas from this passage we learn that Scripture’s anthropomorphicrepresentation of God has an allegorical sense, there are a number ofadditional passages in Spinoza’s writings in which he explains howthe literal sense is useful to nonphilosophers. In the first letter to Willemvan Blyenbergh, for instance, Spinoza explains that by speakingof God more humano—that is in a way that simple human beings canunderstand—and by translating causal connections into laws associatedwith rewards and punishments, Scripture is able to replace fornonphilosophers philosophical insight as a guide to virtuous action. 146This I take to be the most important reason for why Spinoza adoptedthe medieval position: 147 it allows preserving the authority of Scriptureas the basis of traditional religion which provides a pedagogical-politicalprogram replacing philosophy for nonphilosophers.Before Spinoza started working on the TTP in 1665, he, in fact,consistently endorsed the medieval position whenever he discussed145See Freudenthal 1899, No. 56 and 161. For a detailed discussion of the relationshipbetween Averroes, Delmedigo, and Spinoza, see Fraenkel (forthcoming).146Spinoza 1925, Letter 19.147Note that by ‘medieval position’ I mean here and in what follows the positionexemplified by Averroes and Maimonides.

74 carlos fraenkelthe character of Scripture. Supporting evidence for this claim is thatLodewijk Meijer, Spinoza’s doctor and close friend, who assisted himwith the publication of his works, not only defends a version of themedieval position in his Philosophia S. Scripturae Interpres, written in themid-1660s, but announces the Ethics as the “infallible norm” providedby philosophy for the correct interpretation of Scripture. 148 The puzzle,how a close friend of Spinoza such as Meijer could in the first half of the1660s elaborately argue for a position that Spinoza explicitly rejects inthe TTP can best be solved on the assumption that at the time Meijerworked out his position, Spinoza had not yet rejected it.If until about 1665 Spinoza’s position on the relationship betweenphilosophy and religion is indeed the same that he rejects as Maimonides’“dogmatism” in the TTP, i.e., the position, according to whichtheology is the ancilla philosophiae, the issue becomes more complicatedafter 1665 when he begins to work out his critique of religion, publishedin 1670 as the TTP. But despite the critique of religion in theTTP, different versions of the medieval position reappear throughoutSpinoza’s later writings. Spinoza’s portrait of Christ that I briefly discussedabove is only one prominent example. What all the passagesin question have in common is this: none of them can be justifi edthrough the exegetical method that Spinoza promises to adopt in theTTP, namely “to neither affirm anything of Scripture nor to admitanything as its doctrine which I did not most clearly derive fromit.” 149 To put it in a provocative way: If Spinoza had never written hiscritique of religion, these passages, together with those of his earliestwritings, would have allowed him to claim that the allegorical contentof traditional religion is never in conflict with what the Ethics teachesphilosophers more geometrico and that the literal content of Scriptureteaches nonphilosophers more humano, i.e., by means of parables andlaws, an imitation of the doctrines of the Ethics.Taking for granted for now that the textual evidence supports myclaim, this raises, of course, a number of questions: Why did Spinozaadopt the medieval position in his early writings, why did he argueagainst it in the TTP, and why did he continue to make use of it evenafter having argued against it? It is clear that he had good reasons to148Meijer 1666, Epilogus, 10. On Spinoza’s identification of Meijer’s and Maimonides’position in the TTP, see Walther 1995.149Spinoza 1925 TTP, Preface vol. 3, 9; English 5; Spinoza elaborates the methodin TTP 7.

concept and history of philosophical religions 75endorse it, most importantly because he shares the premises whichmotivated the interpretation of traditional religions as philosophicalreligions in late antiquity and in the Middle Ages: the division of humanbeings into philosophers and nonphilosophers, the disruptive effect ofirrational passions in relation to reason and the identification of humanperfection with intellectual perfection. 150 As far as I can see the viewthat philosophy determines the true core of religion does not interferewith Spinoza’s philosophical project in the Ethics, or with the freedomto philosophize that he sets out to defend in the TTP. On the contrary:a pedagogical-political program that could serve as preparation to oras replacement of philosophy for nonphilosophers would seem to fitwell with his systematic commitments.But if this is indeed the case, why did Spinoza elaborately argueagainst the philosophical interpretation of Scripture? Let me brieflyoutline what I think is the correct answer. It is clear that Spinoza’s mainopponent in the TTP is not the position of medieval Islamic and Jewishphilosophers or of Lodewijk Meijer, but the position of the Christianorthodoxy in the Netherlands of the seventeenth century and, moregenerally, any form of religious orthodoxy that takes the authority ofScripture to override the authority of reason. 151 Spinoza describes thisposition as “scepticism” in the TTP and contrasts it with the medievalposition. It is this form of “scepticism” that turns philosophy into the“handmaid (ancilla) of theology” which, according to Spinoza, is the chiefthreat to the libertas philosophandi. 152 The only efficient way to refute thesceptic in Spinoza’s view is to show that Scripture contains no truth.But although the medieval position and the orthodox Christian position150For Spinoza’s intellectual elitism, see Spinoza 1925; e.g., EVP42, scholium; for therole of the passions and intellectual perfection, see in general Ethics IV and V.151On the identity of scepticism and “orthodox Calvinism,” see already Gebhardt1987, 82. For Calvin’s sceptical stance, see for example Calvin 1960 1.5, 11–12 whereCalvin introduces the motive of the “blindness of the human mind (mentis humanaecaecitas)” and describes the irresolvable disputes among philosophers. See also theargument of 1.6 for the need of Scripture to attain knowledge of God. Spinoza hadthe 1597 Spanish translation of the Institutiones; cf. Freudenthal 1899, 160, no. 27.Although Spinoza’s immediate target was the Calvinist Reformed Church, this wasnot the only version of scepticism advocated in this period. For a general account ofthe “sceptical hypothesis,” see Harrison 2007, 73–88.152See Spinoza 1925 TTP 15 for a characterization of the “sceptical” position. Inthe preface to the TTP Spinoza mentions only scepticism as an “obstacle” preventingpotential philosophers from philosophizing (vol. 3, 12; English 8). As I alreadymentioned, Spinoza states in Letter 30 that his aim is to defend the “freedom tophilosophize” against the “excessive authority and the impertinence of preachers”(vol. 4, 166; English 844).

76 carlos fraenkelare in a sense opposed to each other—the former subordinates religionto philosophy, the latter philosophy to religion—in different ways bothdepend on the premise that religion is true. Thus rejecting the oneentails rejecting the other. While his immediate target is contemporaryChristian orthodoxy, Spinoza has no choice but to give up the medievalposition as well. At the same time he has no new solution for theproblem of nonphilosophers. This explains why, despite rejecting it, hecontinues using it in various contexts in his later writings.ConclusionHow do proponents of a philosophical religion conceive the relationshipbetween the study of nature, culminating in knowledge of God,and the sources of their religious traditions, for example the HebrewBible, the New Testament, and the Koran? The former, it turns out,clearly provides the ground for the latter. Since revelation is interpretedas the achievement of intellectual perfection—the intersectionof human knowledge and divine reason—philosophy providesreligion’s foundation. Intellectual perfection is also the goal of religion:the highest worship of God consists in the pursuit of knowledge. Onthis level, therefore, philosophy and religion cannot be meaningfullydistinguished at all! This, of course, raises the question what such areligion of philosophers has in common with religion in its historicalform: the narratives of Scripture, its pious exhortations, religious laws,prayers, forms of worship and so forth. After all, none of these have aclearly recognizable philosophical content. Proponents of a philosophicalreligion concede that taken literally the content of the religious sourcesis not philosophy. But it is, they argue, integrated into a philosophicalframework—as philosophy’s handmaid, which they conceive accordingto a model first developed by Plato. The problem Plato addressed washow nonphilosophers can be led to perfection. The program that heworked out for this purpose—most importantly in the Laws—is a philosophicalreconstruction of existing Greek legal and religious practices.Whereas the philosopher determines what perfection is, these practicesare put to use for guiding all members of the political communitytowards it—as if they had been established by philosophers in the firstplace with the aim to order the community in view to what is best. Inthe same manner it proved possible to philosophically reconstruct thehistorical forms of other traditions—for instance the contents of the

concept and history of philosophical religions 77Hebrew Bible, the New Testament, and the Koran. The philosophersexamined in this chapter, I contend, are not only philosophers withrespect to doctrines that fall into the domain of philosophy properlyspeaking, for example their psychology, cosmology, metaphysics,and ethics. They also adopt a philosophical model—more preciselya Platonic model—when it comes to interpret the historical forms oftheir respective religious traditions. With Plato they argue that no oneis born a philosopher and most human beings lack what it takes tobecome philosophers. This observation they use to support the claimthat the literal content of religious sources like the Hebrew Bible, theNew Testament, and the Koran is an imitation of philosophy, designed byaccomplished philosophers like Moses, Christ, and Muhammad for thepedagogical-political guidance of nonphilosophers. As an imitation ofphilosophy, religion translates the philosopher’s knowledge and way oflife into a program which prepares not-yet-philosophers for the philosophicallife and allows nonphilosophers as much as possible to sharein the philosopher’s perfection. The truth of the religious sources inturn, on which their validity depends, is secured through the notionof their allegorical content according to which the doctrines imitated bytheir literal content are the doctrines demonstrated in philosophy. Therelationship between the study of nature, culminating in knowledge ofGod, and religious sources like the Hebrew Bible, the New Testament,or the Koran is thus twofold: taken literally these sources serve to eitherprepare for a life devoted to scientific study or to replace it. Studentswho successfully make the transition from potential philosophers toactual philosophers in turn gain access to the allegorical content of thesources in question which coincides with the objects of their studies.They can thus move up from a literal to an allegorical understandingof the texts. This is, no doubt, a daring interpretation of traditionalreligions. While philosophy is the highest worship of God, religion’shistorical forms, as articulated in the Hebrew Bible, the New Testament,and the Koran, are no more than philosophy’s handmaid.Bibliographyal-Fârâbî, Abû Nar. 1943. Falsafat Afl âûn. Ed. F. Rosenthal and R. Walzer. London:Warburg Institute. Eng. trans. M. Mahdi. In Al-Farabi’s Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle.Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.——. 1961. Falsafat Arisûâlîs. Ed. M. Mahdi, Beirut. Eng. trans. M. Mahdi. In Al-Farabi’s Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

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