US Peacebuilding in Afghanistan - Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

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Beyond being ineffective at instilling basic individual skills, the short duration of the trainingprohibited exposure to the principles of democratic policing – possibly the most important aspectof any police development program. This led to issues in the operational ANP force which willbe discussed later.The United States transferred responsibility for police assistance from the Department of State tothe Department of Defense (DoD) in 2005, as it had done in Iraq, in order to provide greaterfunding and manpower for the endeavor. The DoD lead for this program was given to theCombined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A), a military command alsoresponsible for Afghan National Army development. CSTC-A retained INL as the contractmanager for all elements of police development, including ministry reform. INL in turn retainedDynCorp as the primary provider of police trainers and advisors. There were numerous issueswith the transfer so that even a year after the police assistance program fell under CSTC-Acontrol, that command had still not received the primary contract between INL and DynCorp orthe modifications to this contract. Indeed, INL’s contracting representative to the U.S. Embassyin Kabul (on a temporary assignment) could not provide the required documentation for thecontract to auditors in 2006. 9 The interagency coordination between INL and CSTC-A was notexecuted well because of poor internal practices in each organization and murky delineation ofresponsibilities between the two.The transfer of responsibility of police assistance in Afghanistan to CSTC-A coincided with areturn of the Taliban and an increase in fighting between ISAF and the Taliban, causing theformer to take more of a counterinsurgency approach to the conflict. 10 With command of policedevelopment and employment, CSTC-A incorporated the ANP as an integral part of itscounterinsurgency strategy to defeat the Taliban, shifting the ANP’s focus away fromcommunity policing and the protection of the population and towards a military auxiliary againstarmed groups. 11 In December 2009, when President Barack Obama announced a surge of U.S.military and civilian personnel into Afghanistan in support of a counterinsurgency approach, theANP became integral to that approach. When CSTC-A was asked to produce more trained policepersonnel (and faster), the basic course for ANP was reduced to six weeks, further decreasing thetrainees’ proficiency upon graduation.The U.S. approach to police development in Afghanistan has been marred by a number ofproblems: disunity with international partners, disunity within the U.S. mission, an emphasis onquantity over quality from the training program, an inability to inculcate democratic communitypolicing principles, poor oversight of the training program, and until recently limited mentorship9 Inspectors General, 35.10 Throughout this paper, the term “Taliban” refers to the myriad groups that could be classified as insurgents inAfghanistan, understanding that there is more than one Taliban group as well as other insurgent groups notassociated with a particular Taliban group and that these many organizations do not necessarily coordinate orassociate with each other as part of a monolithic hierarchy11 Inspectors General, 95.4
of ANP units in the field, to name a few. The result of these missteps has been an ANP force thatnot only is generally incapable of conducting policing in its assigned jurisdictions, but is corruptand incompetent to the extent that officers are often drivers of conflict within their owncommunities. This is all predominately due to the United States’ insistence on training anddeveloping the ANP to be a counterinsurgent force instead of a police force, especially after thetransition of responsibility from INL to CSTC-A. The ANP is now an organization incapable ofcommunity policing and yet is neither trained nor equipped for the essentially counterinsurgentinfantry role its members now fill.The development of democratic community police is an essential element of peacebuilding,particularly in an environment such as Afghanistan where the central government has difficultyin exercising control in large swathes of the country. The police, the ANP in this case, shouldprovide a vital and everyday link between the citizens and the government and should be there toprotect the people from violence. The U.S. approach to police development has not supportedthis and instead of forming an Afghan entity capable of pacifying communities, it has turned itinto another element of the war effort. An indicator of this mindset is the fact that between 2002and 2009, the United States had given more than $21 billion in aid to the Afghan National Armyand Police, while only providing $2.5 billion in aid for rule of law, democracy, and governanceinitiatives combined. 12 The fact that the United States has not invested a proportional share ofresources in the reform of the Afghan judicial system (particularly the corrections and courtselements) suggests its focus, when it comes to ANP development, remains on war fighting. Thepeacebuilding objective is little more than an afterthought, to the detriment of both progress inwar and long-term prospects for civilian order through effective community policing.U.S. Efforts at ANA Development in AfghanistanThe United States was given the responsibility of leading the army pillar of Afghan developmentand, with the assistance of international partners, began recruiting for the ANA in 2002. Endstrength goals for 2005 were set at 70,000 members of the ANA, to be drawn from the pre-warmilitia groups and the populace at large. Subsequent goals as the security situation deterioratedwere expanded to 100,000 troops by the end of 2009 and then again to 171,600 by October2011. 13 The ANA is based on a standard military hierarchy from platoons up to corps commandsand it members classified in rank as enlisted, NCOs, or officers.Officer training in the ANA can take one of three forms for entry-level officer candidates, all ofwhom must demonstrate basic reading and writing skills. Former Afghan Army officers receivean eight week Officer Training Course, which includes professional ethics training. New officersattend either a six-month Officer Candidate School or the four-year National Military Academy12 Marc J. Cohen and Tara R. Gingerich, “Protect and Serve or Train and Equip? US Security Assistance andProtection of Civilians,” Oxfam America, 2009, 3.13 International Security Assistance Force, “International Security Assistance Force and Afghan National ArmyStrength & Laydown,” February 1, 2010, http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf.5
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US Peacebuilding in Afghanistan - Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

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