Here - Nixon Tapes

3. Finally, and this is whereKutler's critics move from evidenceto speculation, they aqgue that hedeliberately omitted and conflatedsome conversations and that heharbors some motive for dointso. While this distortion does notchange what we know about thebreak-in and only marginallyaffucts our understanding of thepr€sidenfs role in the cover-up,Kutler's critics argue that Dean'srole on the path to "Cancer" has notreceived a proper exposition and thatKutler's presentation of the criticalweek leading up to the "Cancer"conversation is skewed. As toalletations that he made Dean appearmore benign on the path to "Cancer"than he really was, Kutler admits thathe is friends with Dean but notes thatthe friendship blossomed only afterthe publication of Abuse of Pozoer . Ol.course, this is the weakest part of theaqgument made by Kutler's critics.Without evidence of any acts ofcommission or omission, Kutler mustbe taken at his word.The articf e in ahe NeTo Yotk Timesobviously piqued the interestof many scholarg but they havereserved iudgment, pending furtherevidence. Most people I believewerc as surprised as I was to seethis article on the front page of theIinas, and they simply want toknow whether this issue is worthpaying attention to and whethertherc is anything "new" in this longstandingfeud. The real story, whichhas been missed up to this point, isthat we now have the technology tos€ate improved transcriptions ofthe tapes and disseminate them andthe original audio recordings widely.It is therefore time for a completereevaluation of Watergate, and it isto be hoped that the Times articlewill prompt such a reevaluation,focusing in particular on the week ofMarch 13 and the path to "Cancer."This rcexamination should do whatlournalist David Frost was unableto do in the 1970s and what StanleyKutler was unable to do in the 190s.As someone with the necessarybackground in the Nixon tapes, Ifelt that I had a responsibility to tryto explain the dispute to a wideraudience, and when I was asked toPnssF i April 2009do so, I agreed without reservation. Icertainly do not seek to insert myselfin a debate that began before I startedgraduate school. I happen to believethat Klingman's fight against Kutleris misplaced and that the real story isnot Kutler, although he plays a rolein it. But readershould come to theirown conclusions. To help them dothat I have assembled all the uncutaudio files and conversations fromthe six Nixon/Dean conversationsnow under scrutiny from the week ofMarch 13. For reasons of space, I havecondensed the hours of audio andhundreds of pages of transcripts here.Much of this material is being madereadily available to the public for thefirst time.March 13, 1973, 12142-2:00 p.m.Oval Office 87&.014; Richard Nixon,John W. Dean IIl, H.R. HaldemanllDean informed the presidentthat the week of March 13 might beperhaps the single most importantweek of the cover-uo.l2 Theconversation began is a generaldiscussion about why it would notbe in the oresidenfs inter€sto allowlive testimony of Nixon aides beforethe Ervin Watergate committee.Nixon and Dean wanted to prctectaides Dwitht Chapin and ChuckColson, then in the private sector,because of the likelihood that theinvestigation would more quicklyDenetrate the White House. Thediscussion tumed towards otherWhite House vulnerabilities. TheCampaign to Re-Elect the President(CREEP) had paid a minor toinfiltrate "peace groupg" a schemethat had r€cently unraveled because"he apparently chatted about itaround school," Dean surmised."It's absurd. It reallv is. He didn't doanything illegal."l3'Dean also toldNixon that a speech supporting theadministration would be plantedin Senator Barry Goldwater's officefor deliverv on the Senate floor. "lfsin the mill/' Dean said.l4 Nixonasked Dean if he needed any helpfrom the Intemal Revenue Service,ostensibly to maintain disciplinewhile managing the cover-up. Deanresponded that he already had accessto the IRS and had a mechanismto bypass Commissioner JohnnieWalters.l5 Referring to himself in thethird persoryl6 Dean informed thepresident for the first time that Chiefof Staff H.R. Haldeman had advanceknowledge of Donald Segrctti's"prankster-type activities."u Toslow the FBI's investigation. Deansuggested restructu ring the FBIISand emphasized the need to movethe focus of the investigationimmediately from the Nixon WhiteHouse to Democrats and pastadministrations.l9 After complainingto the Dresident about "dishonest"media'reporting that was "out ofsequence," Dean explained theconvoluted way in which GordonLiddy received his Watergate breakinfunds. Liddy's error, Dean saidwas unnecessarily involving a thirdparty in the cashing of checks, whichleft a traceable record.zu Anotherproblem for the White House wasformer CREEP treasurer HughSloan. Dean said he was "scared,""weak" and had "a compulsion tocleanse his soul bv confession."2lDean also stated his preference toanswer all Ervin committee inquirieswith "sworn interrogatories" ratherthan live testimony, sinc€ writtenresponses could be "artfullv"ans*ered.22 Finally, Dean ircdictedthe direction that the investigationwould take.a "l don't think the thingwill get out of hand," he said, butthose in danger included CharlesColson John Mitchell, GeorgeStrachan, Dwight Chapin, and, byextension, H.R. Haldeman and JohnEhrlichman. Dean also wamed of a"domino situation" if bank recordswere traced.24 For example, he toldthe presidenthat bank recordswould show that the administrationhad been paying someone to tailSenator Edward Kennedy for "almosttwo vears." The tail began "withinsix hlurs" of Chapp"qiiddick.sln concluding the conversatior!Dean said he would work withaide Richard A. Moor€ to work outa plan to broaden the focus of theinvestigation beyond the NixonWhite House.26March 16 1973, 10:31F11:10 a.m.Oval Office 881-003; RichardP.rge 5