MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION ...

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2. Connecticut’s unique and uniquely burdensome restrictionsgoverning access to the primary ballot in multi-town and statewidedistricts are not narrowly tailored toward achieving any legitimategovernment interest in regulating access to the primary ballot.Because the burdens imposed on voters and candidates in multi-town districts areso severe, the state must come forward with compelling government interests to justifythese restrictions, and, these restrictions must be narrowly tailored to toward achievingthat interest. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992); Anderson, 460 U.S. at789. The very existence of the less burdensome alternative for single-town districtsdemonstrates that Connecticut’s interest in regulating access to primary ballots can bemet by a significantly less burdensome requirement. See Rockefeller v. Powers, 78 F.3dat 46. It is not narrowly-tailored toward achieving a legitimate government interest;indeed, it is not rationally related to a legitimate government interest in regulating accessto the primary ballot.a. The traditional government interests in regulating access to theballot are clearly met by the petition requirement imposed onsingle-town districts.The cumbersome set of rules imposed on non-favored candidates seeking primaryballot status in multi-town districts is certainly not about guaranteeing “a preliminaryshowing of a modicum of support” or about avoiding “confusion, deception, and evenfrustration of the democratic process.” Jenness, 403 U.S. at 442. Connecticut has madeit clear that a simple requirement of 5% of the party’s registered voters is sufficient tosatisfy these government interests. Indeed, Connecticut applies this simple requirementto districts as large and complex as the City of Hartford and the City of Bridgeport, whileapplying the more burdensome requirements to state house seats that happen to cross a32
town line. This demonstrates that Connecticut has no compelling interest in a rule that ismore burdensome than the current petition requirement imposed on single-town districts.See Rockefeller, 917 F. Supp. at 164 (holding that less burdensome ballot access rules forNew York’s Democratic presidential primary demonstrated that New York could notjustify the requirements for the state’s Republican primary). Furthermore, almost everyother state in the nation is able to satisfy its ballot access interests with a petition or feerequirement.b. The rationale for the dual system approved in the 1970decision, Tansley v. Grasso, will not stand in light of historicalexperience and changing precedent.In 1970, a federal district court upheld the dual system in use today – andchallenged here – after applying a loose rational basis test in its consideration of thegovernment’s interest in enacting such a scheme. Tansley v. Grasso, 315 F. Supp. 513,516 (D. Conn. 1970). The court’s reasoning stands in stark contrast to Rockefeller v.Powers, 78 F.3d at 45-46, Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789, and most more recent ballot accessauthority in that it found that the legislature “could reasonably conclude that validpractical grounds existed for distinguishing between single and multiple town” districtswithout first considering the burden this dual system imposed on voters and candidates inmulti-town districts. Tansley v. Grasso, 315 F. Supp. at 516 (emphasis added). 1515 Indeed, the Tansley court explicitly stated that it would not decide whether therequirements in the multi-town districts were more onerous than the requirements in asingle-town district and that the parties had not proven the differing burdens. Id. at 518.With no assessment of the burden imposed on candidates in multi-town districts, thecourt proceeded to apply a loose rational basis test to the convention requirement inmulti-town districts. Id. Here, of course, plaintiffs have demonstrated with decades ofelectoral history that the burden imposed by the requirements for ballot access in multitowndistricts are severe standing on their own, in comparison with single-town districts,33
Page 1 and 2: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTDISTRIC
Page 4 and 5: TABLE OF AUTHORITIESAnderson v. Cel
Page 6 and 7: a grueling, months-long process tha
Page 8 and 9: single-town state house districts w
Page 10 and 11: state’s 151 Assembly seats. 5In t
Page 12 and 13: of delegates, which takes place, by
Page 14 and 15: outsiders trying to achieve ballot
Page 16 and 17: 14; Byrnes Decl. at 5. In short, i
Page 18 and 19: Decl. at 10-11; Rapoport Decl. at
Page 20 and 21: in multi-town districts, out of a t
Page 22 and 23: for delegate slates, is more burden
Page 24 and 25: Rapoport Decl. at 15. Notably, the
Page 26 and 27: I. THE BALANCE OF HARMS TIPS OVERWH
Page 28 and 29: primary ballot access while multi-t
Page 30 and 31: activities. See Statement of the Fa
Page 32 and 33: Not one state has legally-mandated
Page 34 and 35: McLoughlin Decl. at Exhibit C. But,
Page 38 and 39: In addition, the court’s assessme
Page 40 and 41: In contrast to the court in Tansley
Page 42 and 43: The classification at issue here -
Page 44: e granted.CONCLUSIONFor all the for

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