MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION ...

In contrast to the court in Tansley, the courts in Rockefeller, 917 F. Supp. at 164-5, and Molinari, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 77, made it plain that when a court reviews suchlegislative judgments it need not defer. As the court in Rockefeller stated, the desire ofincumbents to craft a system that “consistently and decisively advantages” incumbentsand “disadvantages” challengers or any candidate not in favor with party leadershipcannot be “characterized as a legitimate state interest.” Rockefeller, 917 F. Supp. at 165.Whether or not any of the interests cited in Tansley can be viewed as compellingor even legitimate, plaintiffs have amply demonstrated that the state has not narrowlytailored its law to achieve those interests. See Illinois v. Socialist Workers Party, 440U.S. at 185 (“[W]e have required states to adopt the least drastic means to achieve theirends.”). Every other state achieves the same interests without such draconian rules.Connecticut itself has provided a significantly less draconian set of ballot access rules forother offices. See Rockefeller, 78 F.3d at 46. The dual system cannot withstand suchscrutiny.History and the practical impact of this dual system demonstrate that the multitownballot access rules do not serve legitimate state interests. They were not designed toavoid confusion, to exclude frivolous candidates, or to protect the integrity of the ballot.They were designed, instead, to ensure that party leaders maintained control over theprimary ballot for most races in the state, thus dictating to rank and file party memberswhat choice to make. This system is undemocratic, and it is unconstitutional.36