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www.tamilarangam.netColombo Set To Use ForceNeutralising India Key To StrategyBy A.S. ABRAHAMNew Delhi's snafu over the deportationof two Tamil militant leaders (a third leftthe country before the order could beserved on him), reinforces the gloomengulfing not merely the reconciliationtalks at Thimpu between the guerillas andthe Sri Lanka government, but also theoverall situation in Sri Lanka where theethnic conflict is fast taking on the dimensionsof a full-scale civil war. AlthoughNew Delhi is trying hard to put the talkson an even keel, the chances of it succeedingare daily becoming more and moreremote. If Thimpu is in danger of becominglittle more than an innocuous sideshowto the unstanched bloodletting in Sri Lanka,for which the brutal rabble that passesfor the Sri Lanka soldiery is mainly responsible,then that is because both antagonists,the guerillas as well as Colombo are busypreparing to settle the issue through theforce of arms.Again, however, the evidence, as providedby independent accounts by foreigncorrespondents and international humanitarianbodies like Amnesty International,suggests that Colombo is chiefly to blame.The June 18 ceasefire, which India helpedto bring about, was violated by Sri Lankasoldiers when the ink on the agreementhad scarcely dried, as our Colombo correspondenthas reported (August 19). Whilethe guerillas have responded in kind, theircommitment to the search via Thimpu fora political solution envisaging autonomybut short of "Eelam" has been genuine.Buying timeAlong with Tamil United Liberation FrontLeaders, they have been seeking a measureof self-governance for the Tamildominatednorthern and eastern provincesand for, if not the merger of, then at leasta structural link between, them. Initially,it is true, they set four principles as aframework for any settlement, and theseappeared to emphasise Tamil political andcultural separateness. But apart frombeing generalised formulations, there wasnothing in them that could not be reconciledwith the degree of autonomy theTamils could in practice be persuaded tosettle for and which would have beenwholly in line with Sri Lanka's unity.Unfortunately — and this New Delhieither cannot or will not see — the SriLanka government has given every indicationof being interested in palavering atThimpu only in order to buy time while itreadies itself for a military solution. Itsstrategy includes pressuring New Delhito crack down on guerilla operations frombases in Tamil Nadu and to twist themilitants' arms to induce them to climbdown more and more in negotiations, tryingto set the insurgents against New Delhi;putting India on the defensive by constantlyraising the bogey of "intervention"; andcounting on its western aid donors, whohave been as enamoured of the post-1977 Jayewardene government and itspro-western policies as they were previouslyhostile to Mrs.Bandaranaike's anti-westernsetup, to deter India from succumbing tomounting domestic pressure from TamilNadu, buttressed by growing internationalhumanitarian concern over the persecutionof the minority Tamils, to intervene militarilyand enforce a Cyprus-type solution.Vital to this approach is the show ofapparent reasonableness by publiclyagreeing with New Delhi's view that apolitical solution is the only way out andby going on participating in the dialoguewith Tamil representatives that New Delhihas arranged. In reality, however, -thepolicy is to use the ceasefire (theoreticallyin force until September 18) to build upthe Sri Lanka security forces and, evenwhile spinning out the powwow at Thimpuendlessly without giving away anythingof substance, to resume military operationsagainst the guerillas when their own handsare tied because of their commitment toThimpu and, more important, because theyare subject to the control of New Delhi,which has needlessly put its prestige onthe line in working for a settlement atThimpu.So it is that while Mr.Hector Jayewardene— Colombo has not seen'fit to sendto Thimpu anyone of greater politicalweight than a legal-constitutional expert,Albeit one who happens to be the SriLanka president's brother — regurgitatesthe same old proposals that were longago found inadequate by the Tamil delegates,the Sri Lanka army gets to work onTamil guerillas and civilians in Trincomalee,Vavuniya and elsewhere in an intensifiedoffensive aimed at bringing the rebelliononce and for all to heel.Poorer LightAnd when, incensed at Colombo's duplicityand at the butchery of hundreds offellow-Tamils, the Tamil representativesstorm out of Thimpu, New Delhi rounds,not on those who are in fact sabotagingthe talks while going through the motionsof taking part of them, but on those whohave shown a genuine willingness to lookfor a political solution at New Delhi'sbidding. What puts New Delhi in an evenpoorer light is that its irritation at thesudden rupture of the Thimpu deliberationsmakes it so edgy as to construe the returnto Madras of the guerilla delegates, insteadof going directly to New Delhi for discussionsat the Prime Minister's invitation, asdefiance of the Indian government, therebywarranting some deportations as exemplarypunishment. Its belated revocationof its expulsion of one of the militantleaders, Mr.Chandrahasan, after he hadjourneyed to the U.S. and back and afterhe had been detained in Bombay for over24 hours only underwrites its initial blunder.Should it revoke the marching orders ofthe other two leaders as well (as it properlyshould), its clumsiness would be fully exposed.Such erratic behaviour is not onlyunbecoming of a mature governmentrunning a major country, it is also downrightbad policy. It plays straight into Colombo'shands, confirming in its eyes the wisdomof its strategy of pitting the guerillas againstNew Delhi and of getting the latter topressure the militants into making moreand more concessions. It ensures thatColombo will have even less reason totake Thimpu seriously — except as a forumof procrastination while it prepares for amilitary solution. It diverts attention, toColombo's relief and delight, from the16jkpo;j; Njrpa Mtzr; Rtbfs;