Information

www.tamilarangam.netRajiv's Camp David ?Sri Lankan journalist asksAfter the next round of talks in Thimpu(Aug. 12) we may be in a better positionto know whether President JR can pulloff a Rajiv-like Punjab with Rajiv's help.With no trace of conscious irony PremierGandhi chose his Minister of State forExternal Affairs and our own DeputyForeign Minister Tyrone Fernando's "bigbully" of late April, Mr. Khursheed AlamKhan, to transmit that message to Colombojust 24 hours after he had signed a treatywith top Sikh leader, Harchand SinghLongowal.The Tigers' were frog-marched to Thimpureported INDIA TODAY'S Madras correspondentS. Venkatramani The pressureon the "boys" in Madras has been soheavy that every report on the mood inthe camp of the expatriate Tamil militantssuggests disappointment, despondencyand anger. Mr. Rajiv Gandhi must haveknown of this mood when he addresseda massive meeting in Madras. The main-Stream press in the Tamilnadu capitalrecorded another personal triumph forthe Indian leader but some Tamil sourcestook note of a boisterous section in thecrowd that at some points turned rudeand noisy.The point is that Mr. Gandhi cannot"solve" Punjab and then go on to converta traditionally orderly southern state intonext year's Punjab. Tamilnadu, as we anknow, was the first serious separatist threatto the Indian Centre from the south.Regional nationalism was appeased andthen co-opted by Mr. Nehru's skillfuldecision on language, a process greatlyassisted by the nationalism which transcendedthe regionalism when India wentto war with China.Tamilnadu opinion on the Sri LankanTamil issue tends to be ambivalent. Itidentifies itself closely and quite warmlywith the plight of fellow Tamils in thenearby island but it does not take tookindly to the presence of an estimated100,000 refugees and less so to theactivities of heavily armed Sri Lankan Tamilyouths roaming freely in the capital andits outskirts. As one Madrasi academicput it "The quarrel between the DMK andAIDMK has always been bitter as is usuallythe case between a parent body and ahostile faction which becomes a powerfuland independent challenger, in this casesuccessfully... but these fights, wheneverthey became physical and moved intothe streets, particularly during electionbattles, rarely went beyond cycle-chainsand sticks and stones. Never guns. TheJaffna 'boys' have introduced guns andthat really worries both the TamilnaduEstablishment and the Centre in Delhi."The problem is and will become increasinglyacute on account of an unpredictablefactor which is the key to any future powerequation — the state of health of Mr.M.G. Ramachandran. MGR, a charismaticfigure who holds political power in hispalm, could die at any time. The mostoptimistic medical reading is 1 to 2 years.Mr. Gandhi knows that. He also knowsthat the AIDMK will crack up. The Congressmust move in quickly to see that Tamilnaduremains under Delhi's sway. It is the onlystate in the South which is NOT ruled byan Opposition party. Mr. Gandhi wantsto make certain that when the AIDMKdoes crack up more than half of it — andhopefully the politically more influentialpart — will team up with the Congress.The problem of separatism and terrorismhaunts the Congress leadership, and thethreat of fissiparous forces frightens theIndian elite. The Indian government wantsto have the Sri Lankan Tamil issue out ofway and out of Tamil Nadu physicallybefore the post-MGR crisis faces Delhi.This explains Delhi's two-track persuasion-pressurepolicy; persuation vis-a-visthe TULF by Delhi and Delhi's politicalarm, MGR, and pressure vis-a-vis the 'boys'through Delhi's tougher arm, its intelligenceagency RAW.What accounts for the disappointmentand bitterness in Madras-based Sri LankanTamil circles is their shared view that thepressure has been more on them than onthe Colombo government. In their viewthis is the salient difference between thetwo Gandhis. Mrs. Indira Gandhi, theyfeel, would have put equal pressuresimultaneously on both the Madras-basedseparatist groups as well as the UNPadministration. Or, she would have allowedthe situation-on-the-ground to deteriorateso badly that Colombo would have beencrying for help, and therefore more amenableto granting much larger concessions thanprovincial councils, they argue.It is possible to argue however that theSri Lanka government has already madea major concession, not on the substantiveissue of devolution but on the highiysensitive and potentially explosive questionof the agreed modalities of popular (Sinhala)approval. President JR has said therewill be no referendum or general election.Any agreed package will obviously beplaced before the UNP, the CabinetondParliament. Opposition MP's and sectionsof the press see a contradiction betweenthe President's rejection of a direct mandatefrom the people and Mr. Lalith Athulattimudali'srepeated assertion that anysettlement will have to seek "the consentof the people". Any law student canresolve that imaginary contradiction.Parliament, after all, is the soveriegn forumof the people and the expression of theirwill!Thimpu stopped with "provincial councils*,though the Sri Lankan lawyers went throughthe motions of arguing first principles andsticking as closely as possible to whereAPC broke down. Thimpu 2 will be anexercise in filling an empty bag. Howmuch power to be devolved, which areas(jobs, education, police-and-judicial powers,language and most of all, land settlement),and the checks and balances. Even ifthe TULF's maximum is granted, wilt themilitants accept? If they don't, can RajivGandhi pressure Colombo into comingsomewhere between 'union territories"and Indian 'states'? If he does not, thenthe militants have to take the path recommendedby the Tamil Information editorial— flight it out on native soil. Then, a fieldThimpu 2 will lead to Battleground RoundTwo Both sides know it, and presumbalyboth are preparing for it.If that happends Mr. Gandhi's first essayin regional "conflict management' oroptimistically 'conflict-resolution' will notbe another APC nor a Punjab but awreckage of a South Asian "Internal1 CampDavid on a smaller scale. ••24jkpo;j; Njrpa Mtzr; Rtbfs;