A highly restrictive policy regime insulated India’seconomy from global markets. The Indian governmentheavily regulated food grains and related products,banned maize exports in the 1960s and 1970s, and inthe 1980s allowed maize imports only through theFood Corporation of India. Later, when the demandfor poultry feed began to grow, the feed industry wasallowed to import maize without license, and maizeexports were allowed under a ceiling. In 1999, a TRQfor maize of 15% in-quota and 60% out-of-quota wasset (Table 2.6). Trade liberalization remains slow,however, and any move toward liberalizing externaltrade policy is usually accompanied by measuresdesigned to counter the effects of such a move.In China, food self-sufficiency goals led policymakersto restrain imports of land-intensive grains. Nearly20 years of policy reforms gradually changed China’sforeign trade regime from a highly centralized,planned, and import substitution-oriented regime toa more decentralized, market-oriented, and exportpromotingone. Trade and other policy reformssignificantly altered China’s trade composition infavor of products for which China has a comparativeadvantage. China’s maize trade liberalization,however, was fairly minimal prior to WTO accession(Huang and Rozelle 2005). Maize imports were limitedto those who had licenses and import quotas, and thecurrent maize trading system results in considerabledistortions and inefficiency.China’s WTO accession commitments includedecreasing overall agricultural import tariffs fromabout 21% in 2001 to 17% by 2004; a maize in-quotatariff of only 1%, and decreasing the maize out-ofquotatariff to 65%; increasing maize TRQ volumesfrom 5.7 Mt in 2002 to 7.2 Mt in 2004; and phasingout all maize export subsidies (on average, 34% ofthe export price) (Huang and Rozelle 2005). Afterthe removal of maize export subsidies, maize pricesinitially fell by 20%, but exports continued duringChina’s first year as a WTO member.Thailand’s self-sufficiency objective restricted maizeexports during 1961-81, but increasing domestic feedmaize demand led to re-instituting export quotasfrom 1992 to date. Following the 1995 WTO minimumaccess requirements, Thailand implemented TRQs formaize, which actually represented a step backwardfrom liberalization in the early 1990s. The tariff rateis now 20% and 76-80% for in-quota and over-quotamaize, respectively (Table 2.6); in-quota rates can beannounced on a year-by-year basis.After opening up its economy considerably sincethe late 1980s, when it was nearly closed, Vietnam’sstate agencies still control imports and exports, andtariffs on maize are high. Prior to 2000, quantitativerestrictions and licensing requirements controlledmaize imports. Under the ASEAN Free TradeAgreement (AFTA), however, Vietnam has committedto reducing tariffs to 20% by 2003 and 5% by 2006.Indonesia too is reducing its tariffs on a number ofagricultural products, including maize, to a maximumof 5% under an agreement with the IMF. The WTOagreements on maize in the Philippines meanwhilerequire that out-of-quota tariffs be reduced to 50%by 2004. The in-quota tariffs are, however, stillrelatively high at 35%. In Nepal, maize trade isrelatively unimportant; hence there are no qualitativerestrictions on agricultural trade, and no customsduty is applied to imports from India, Nepal’sdominant trading partner (Paudyal 2005).2.2.3 Macroeconomic policieson exchange rateExchange rate policies. Macroeconomic policiescan significantly influence overall incentives toagricultural producers. In fact, agriculture may bemore sensitive than other sectors to macroeconomicpolicies (Bautista and Valdes 1993). One of the mostimportant factors influencing maize incentives is thenation’s exchange rate policy (Beghin and Fang 2002).Overvalued exchange rates depress incentives todomestic producers of tradable goods, and increaseincentives for imports. The real depreciation ofdomestic currency raises the local currency pricesof tradable relative to non-tradable goods, and thuscontributes to the price-competitiveness of domesticexports.The seven Asian governments fixed their exchangerates in the early 1980s, as did most developingcountries. There was also a general bias againstagriculture, with overvalued exchange rates andhigher import controls on industrial products. Sincethen, there has been a general movement towardfloating exchange rates, although applied rates inthese countries are, to some degree, still overvalued.China highly regulated its foreign exchange marketthrough the mid-1990s, and maintained a two-tieredforeign exchange rate system before 1994. Whilepolicy determined the official exchange rate, tradingat a swap center determined the other rate. In 1994,liberalization united the two exchange rates to createa single managed exchange rate system, resultingin an official devaluation of the yuan of over 50%.This rate has stayed remarkably constant since then,although it has depreciated slightly in recent years.It is widely believed, however, that the domesticcurrency has gradually become overvalued since1994, and as such has provided a disincentive to thetradable agricultural sector.9
In India, the real exchange rate declined by 53%between 1985 and 1991. A further devaluation in July1991 accompanied substantial liberalization of themanufacturing sector, and may have significantlyreduced the anti-agriculture bias in the country(Narayanan and Gulati 2005). Similar patterns ofgradual devaluation were observed in the other Asiancountries. The Philippine peso was overvalued priorto having a flexible exchange rate policy after the fallof the Marcos regime in 1986. The official value ofthe peso depreciated by 274% in 1985-2000, duringwhich a market exchange rate system prevailed, withperiodic Central Bank interventions in times of highfluctuation. Similarly, Vietnam’s exchange rate policysince 1990 involved making frequent adjustments tothe market rate. Nepal switched from a fixed exchangerate system to a floating system in 1983, resultingin substantial devaluation of the Nepali rupeeduring 1985-2001. Because India is Nepal’s largesttrading partner, Nepal maintained a special fixedexchange rate with the Indian rupee, and incentives toagricultural producers have remained fairly unaffectedby the depreciation of the Nepali rupee relative toother foreign currencies (Paudyal 2005).The Asian financial crisis. The 1997 Asian financialcrisis was a major factor that led to substantialdevaluation of most currencies in the region, hittingThailand and Indonesia especially hard. Prior to thecrisis, Thailand had a fixed exchange rate system, andthe prevailing rate had been 25 baht/US$ from the late1980s to 1997. In the 1990s, the overvalued exchangerate led to serious balance of payment deficit andcapital outflows, which contributed to the economiccrisis (Ekasingh and Thong-ngam 2005). In 2001-2002,Thailand adopted a managed floating exchange ratepolicy, which devaluated the baht to 40-45 baht/US$.In Indonesia, the exchange rate was tightly managedand quite stable before the economic crisis. The Asianfinancial crisis threw the economy into completedisarray, and the value of Indonesian rupiahplummeted upon the adoption of a floating exchangerate in August 1997. Within a year, the rupiah’s valuefell by over 80%, the largest devaluation in Asia inthat period. Prices of tradable commodities soared,resulting in economic hardship and social unrest. Theexchange rate has since then fluctuated considerably.The exchange rates in India and the Philippines werealso significantly affected by the Asian financial crisis.During 1997-2001, official exchange rates in thosecountries depreciated by 30% and 116%, respectively.In contrast, official exchange rates in China, Vietnam,and Nepal were largely unaffected.2.3 Impact of Policies on MaizeProductionThe net impact of government policies on maizeproduction (as incentives to maize producers) canbe measured by examining the difference betweendomestic prices and their corresponding internationalprices (the prices that farmers would have receivedunder a counterfactual free-trade situation), afteradjusting for transport and other costs. The nominalprotection coefficient (NPC) is a straightforward measureof this divergence between domestic and international(or reference) prices, and defined for maize as follows:NPC maize= (P d maize - Pw maize E) / Pw maize EwhereP d is the domestic price in local currency;maizeP w is the world reference price in US dollars; andmaizeE is the exchange rate (local currency/US dollar).If the NPC is larger than 1, the domestic price is greaterthan the world reference price, implying that maize isprotected by domestic policies, and that liberalizationwould bring greater imports, pushing down thedomestic price of maize. If the opposite is true, thenmaize is implicitly taxed or disprotected, and exportswould likely increase with liberalization. An NPCof near 1 implies a neutral protection structure, andproducers face domestic prices comparable to borderprices.Nominal protection coefficients are best examinedunder importable and exportable hypotheses, usingofficial and shadow exchange rates. When domesticallyproduced maize competes with imports (under theimportable hypothesis), international transport costsprovide a degree of protection for domestic maizeproducers. In contrast, if maize is an exportable item,the domestic producers’ price must be low enough tomake their maize competitive in foreign markets afterincluding the cost of transportation to that market.2.3.1 NPC analysis using official exchangeratesThe importable hypothesis is probably most relevantfor India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.The Philippines registered the highest NPCs formaize in Asia, ranging from 1.22 in 1988/89 to 1.69in 1996/97, which implies that government policieshave systematically and heavily protected domesticmaize producers. In Indonesia NPCs have declined10
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- Page 7 and 8: Table 6.6. Top 30 priority constrai
- Page 9 and 10: Executive SummaryGlobally, 69% of a
- Page 12 and 13: 1. Introduction1.1 BackgroundOver t
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- Page 32 and 33: 3.4.1 AccessibilityMost of the surv
- Page 34 and 35: maize environments, with a maximum
- Page 36 and 37: altitude environments planted mostl
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- Page 44 and 45: 5. Maize Production ConstraintsThe
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- Page 54 and 55: downy mildew, post-flowering stalk
- Page 56 and 57: Table 6.6. Top 30 priority constrai
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Table 6.15. Area-based priority con
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primarily due to abiotic constraint
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narrow depressions or valleys to ho
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lands is classified as acidic, and
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Honduras, South Africa, Uruguay, Po
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6.6 Sources of Research andTechnolo
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to them as a source of genetic dive
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Given growing populations and incom
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output. Youth and women’s organiz
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Apart from drought, other abiotic c
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ReferencesARLDF (Asian Rural Life D
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ISAAA (International Service for th
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AnnexesAnnex 1. Survey locations, t
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Annex 2. Matrix of RRA/PRA survey s
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Annex 4. Types of soil present and
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Annex 6. List of 286 prioritized ma
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Annex 6. List of 286 ....cont’d.R
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Annex 6. List of 286 ....cont’d.R