Other People's Wars - Caledonia Wake Up Call

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Other Peoples’ Wars – Chapter Oneconnected cells, where individuals with a common background (usually derivedfrom ethnic identity) and some shared experiences can form and reform asrequired. The al Qaeda network is an example of this, although it rather foolishlydeveloped a central node and a semi-rigid planning structure in Afghanistan underthe presumption that the Taliban control of the region guaranteed its safety.Elsewhere in the Middle East, these trends are demonstrated by the rise of groupssuch as Hamas and Islamic Jihad which supplanted rigid older groups like theAbu Nidal Organization. These networks use a mélange of semi-independentcells, fronts and sympathetic organizations that communicate with each other andexchange resources. Instead of a rigid pyramidal structure, hierarchies tend to beflatter, or shallower, which results in quicker response time to threats andopportunities. Also, without a definitive leadership structure, gatheringintelligence on them becomes much more difficult.2. Redundancy in fundraising and political arms: The strength of any internationalterrorist group depends on its funding and political fronts, and they must beprotected by forming loose networks rather than a single organization. Forexample, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam has one main international frontorganization – the World Tamil Movement – but it spins off dozens of satellitegroups in every host country, and some groups will use names that betray no hintof their origin at all. This allows the illusion of a broad-band of communityactivism when dozens of social, student, human-rights, religious, and businessgroups start campaigning for a particular purpose without any overt reference tothe main organization. Fundraising is equally dispersed, with dozens ofindependent legitimate, quasi-legitimate and illegal operations all being used toraise money, rather than one big single entity that might be vulnerable to legal andcivil action.3. International fundraising techniques : The terrorist groups of the late 1960s andearly 1970s depended heavily on a combination of bank-robbery, hostage takingfor ransom, and foreign sponsorship to pay for their activities. However, the firsttwo activities became increasingly risky for the perpetrators (especially given thehuge improvements in handling hostage situations that developed in the 1970s).Surviving groups are those that diversified their fundraising activities by takingadvantage of their exile/immigrant communities in the Western world, and whoturned to organized crime. The larger communities could be used as a base and aprotective shield for a plethora of enterprises ranging from human trafficking,narcotics, extortion and “war taxes”, business and immigration fraud,counterfeiting, money laundering, and so on. 20 Terrorist groups also utilize thesecommunities to manipulate host governments in the West to provide them withtax dollars to support “cultural” and “social” activities carried out by frontorganizations. Moreover, by hiding behind cultural, social, and human rightsorganizations, a terrorist network can deter or delay unwelcome attention from theauthorities in a host country.20 A prescient study on the diversity of Terrorist fundraising techniques was written by James Adams; TheFinancing of Terror; Simon and Schuster, New York, 1986.14
Other Peoples’ Wars – Chapter One4. A claim to exclusive representation: As the terrorist normally craves leadershipand influence, it is almost inevitable that he will try to eliminate (literally orotherwise) all rival sources of influence within the community he claims to lead.First to go are usually those who represent more moderate perspectives (and whothus deny the ‘legitimacy’ of the terrorists’ emotional preference for violence);second are potential rival terrorists who refuse to be subordinated. It should bepointed out that this trait existed earlier among ‘national liberation’ movements;largely as the terrorists were competing for a chance to form a government afterwinning their struggle. For example, much of the violence attendant in thestruggle against Apartheid came out of the rivalry between the African NationalCongress and the Pan African Congress; and between the ANC and the Zulus –who refused to follow a political movement that they did not lead.5. An attraction to organized crime: As the main purpose of a terrorist group is toconfront political authority, raising money is usually – in the early stages – asecondary activity for all its necessity. However, as the terrorist group is alreadyengaged in illegal activities anyway, generating revenues through organizedcriminal activities means no real additional weight of punishment (the old Britishexpression about how one may as well be hung for stealing a sheep as a lambcomes to mind). Moreover, activities such as trafficking in narcotics andcontraband represent an additional means of undermining the authorities. Fortheir part, organized criminals find that insurgents can, in the latter’s quest forauthority of their own, sometimes shelter their activities. The relationshipbetween terrorism and organized crime can become blurred, and many insurgentgroups have slowly evolved into criminal societies with the passage of years.6. Geographical dispersion: The leading terrorist groups in the world today, theTamil Tigers and the Islamic Fundamentalists, have extensive global networksbuilt up not just in their respective homelands, but also dispersed amongimmigrant communities throughout the Western World. Whereas the groups ofthe 1970s usually restricted themselves to one or two countries, the modernterrorist who is fleeing from an outraged authority in one country can hide himselfamong people with an identical ethno-cultural background in a dozen othernations – a result of new immigration patterns in the aftermath of the SecondWorld War.7. Global communications: The computer age has allowed a revolution incommunications, with international direct dialing, e -mail and the web, electronicbanking and much more. While shared experience, occasional face to facemeetings, and traditional social interactions are still vital, they are no longeressential for the running of a terrorist network. Indeed, given the billions ofmessages fired around the world every day, it may be that electronic meetings aresometimes safer from the attention of the authorities than physical ones.8. Increasingly violent ideologies: The terrorist groups of the 1970s tended to viewundecided populations as a group from which support could be drawn as theinevitable revolution (according to the Marxist theory) approached. In a lessersense, they often looked for public sympathy, and understood that frighteningeveryone was at least counter-productive. Contemporary groups tend to be much15
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Appendix: A List of Canadian Terror
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Mahjoub, Mohamed Zeki. A Toronto ar
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Other People's Wars - Caledonia Wake Up Call

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