The Space-Time Image: the Case of Bergson, Deleuze, and Memento

170MELISSA CLARKEcouplings of the present and the past, but their interrelation is more a pluralitythan simply a bifurcation, partly because there are many pasts in relation withmany presents. In order to explain the heterogeneity of time, one might perhapssay there are multiple twofold relations .What provides the continuity of time, or its duration, has to do with memoryrelating present to past. To put it differently, the continuity of time has todo with duration of the past in the present. In fact, Bergson views memory andduration as coextensive, at least in principle: “In principle, consciousness iscoextensive with life” (1920, 13–14). Inasmuch as memory is consciousnessand material life (spatiality) endures, Bergson is pointing to their parity.Duration is the principle of memory. So there is a difference between durationand memory, since duration is a pure time relation that is necessary for the experienceof time, while memory is the individuated or psychological functionbetween present and past. It should also be noted that without memory there isstill duration, according to Bergson, because he is careful not to psychologizethe experience of time. 3Let me now briefly enumerate several aspects of time as divergent, and verybriefly highlight the way memory and/or duration function in each. First, thereis the actual present. But the present is always already passing, so the presentmight more aptly be termed the “passing-present.” There is thus a function ofbecoming-past in the actual present. That is to say that there is always a durationoperating in the present for the present to become past. Experience alwaysalready presupposes extended time (or enduring time, or “duration”) becausethere must be some continuity between the present and the next moment; in otherwords, a past must be somehow present in order for the present to move to thenext present moment. That continuity is provided by the aspect of duration thatis past, and this functions on the individual level, as memory. Bergson observes:“the following moment always contains, over and above the preceding one, thememory the latter has left it” (1946, 193). But that is also to say that memoryand/or duration of the past is implicit in any real experience, then, since they arethe continuous relations of the past subtending the present. Once Bergson hasmade the point that the present is always becoming, that is, it is always becomingpast, he confronts a common confusion with respect to time. The commonunderstanding of time is that the present has ontological status, while the past isconsidered to “be” no longer. Traditionally speaking, the present “is” and thepast “was.” In contradistinction to this, Bergson points out that precisely theopposite is the case, that it is more reasonable to claim that the past is, in an ontologicalsense, while the present more precisely becomes: “When we think thepresent as going to be, it exists not yet; and when we think of it as existing it isalready past” (1959, 143). 4 Bergson is attempting to reorient our understandingfrom what he calls its usual “confusion,” in this case to show the difference inkind between present and past.

The Space-Time Image 171We are thus already addressing another divergent relation of time by discussingthe past, which we must consider in addition to the present. Properlyunderstood, the past diverges into both the past and the present that it was, constitutinganother twofold relation. In order for each present to become a past, wesaw that there must be an element of past in each present. This also means, conversely,that each past must still contain an element of the present that it was,that it had been. An alternate way of saying the same thing is that pasts each havea “now” or present that they were.Further, what we commonly call “the” past is simultaneously many levels ofpast, possibly even extending back to an ultimately contracted “whole” past.There are innumerable layers of past, all of which coexist. As an illustration ofthis, consider Bergson’s notable drawing, in which the present is represented asa plane, with a cone of layers balanced on its point on that plane (1959, 156):The present is represented as a plane, with a cone of layers balanced on its pointon that plane. The cone represents layers of the past supporting the present. Theway to access these levels of past from the present is through memory and/orduration. Memory relates between all these levels of past, performing the operationsof selectivity and interpretation required for each layer of past.We now see that there are multiple pasts. However, the implication ofBergson’s descriptions is that there are multiple possible presents as well. Thisis because each present moment is contingent on which past is connected to thatpresent moment. In addition, then, pasts can be accessed by memory and becomeactual, thus influencing the present. Finally, while the past in most senses is virtual,it can be accessed in present memory, so in that particular way the past canbe actual as well. Memory can bring the past to bear on the present, and also simplybring the past to the present. Thus the past can be actually relevant, and memorycan actualize it.For these divergencies of time to be possible, then, the present and past mustbe coextensive. The past must be somehow real, albeit necessarily in a way differentfrom the actual present. The only possible explanation for this is that thepast must be virtual and that the virtual must be a form of reality. Sheets of pastare always really existent whether or not they are actual. The real, then, is dividedinto the actual and the virtual. All the levels of past are consequently real. As weshall see below, this turns out to be the keystone for the explanation of how timecan be evoked in film.In sum, then, time is the present, which is always already passing, and the(virtually) present pasts, all levels of which are simultaneously real for ourexperience. Time has two aspects: the present, which is actual, and the past,which, although it is virtual, is also real. Duration facilitates the connectionbetween present and layers of past, and duration also has two aspects. Thereis duration properly understood, and there is memory. Duration proper is thelogical relation that necessarily functions between the actual present and all

Chapter 1 Introduction to LabVIEW and APTLabVIEWLabVIEW is a graphical programming language that uses icons instead of lines of text tocreate applications. In contrast to text-based programming languages, where instructionsdetermine program execution, LabVIEW uses dataflow programming, where the flow of datadetermines execution.In LabVIEW, you build a user interface with a set of tools and objects.The user interface is known as the front panel. You then add code using graphicalrepresentations of functions to control the front panel objects.The block diagram contains this code. In some ways, the block diagram resembles aflowchart.Refer to the National Instruments web site at www.ni.com for more general information aboutLabVIEW.APTThe apt Suite of controllers includes a range of compact drivers, high power bench topcontrollers and 19" rack based units that, together control our range of precision stages andactuators, support motion control from the 10’s of cm to the nm regime. The product offeringcomprises stepper motor and DC motor controllers, closed loop and open loop piezocontrollers, strain gauge readers, and solenoid drivers, together with a sophisticated feedbackcontroller (NanoTrak) that fully optimizes coupled optical powers in a wide range ofalignment scenarios. All of our controllers are supported by unified PC based user andprogramming utilities (the apt software suite) that enables higher level custom applicationsto be constructed extremely effectively and quickly. Thanks to the USB connectivityimplemented on all of our controller units, it is extremely easy to link multiple units together torealize a multiaxis motion control solution for many positioning and alignment needs.APT within LabVIEWProgrammers of LabVIEW through the use of ActiveX technology, used within the APTplatform, can communicate and control any APT controller. By simply specifying whichcontroller to be used within code function calls, properties and events can be used to exposea controllers functionality.Guide to LabVIEW and APT Page 6

The Space-Time Image 173between scenes, or even by the dissonance between sounds and visual imageryall of which are so commonplace in today’s films. Whenever these mechanismsportray undecidability between the real and the imaginary, the relation of actualvs. virtual is evoked. But direct time-images are even more clearly produced whenthe film is about peculiarities unsettling the viewer’s expectations of “reality”;and, I would argue, this is compounded when the film itself is also concerned withmemory. In an interesting passage in Cinema 2, Deleuze describes the way inwhich the conflict between the actual and the virtual can be represented by a“strangely obscure criminal or justice-bringing activity” (72). Deleuze is claimingthat oddities with respect to the character (such as inabilities to fit the characterin with a definite categorization, a “type,” a determinate kind) present adissonance between a “real” image of what that type should be and an “imaginary”image. The greater the degree of indiscernibility between what the character’srole intuitively “should be” and what that character is “really” like, the moreblurred the distinction between the real and the imaginary becomes. Deleuze citesAlfred Hitchcock’s Murder and Todd Browning’s The Unholy Three as examples.The Unholy Three, he notes, features a character’s role taking on two simultaneouslevels: an intuitively consonant one, and another, darker role:A fake limbless man has his arms cut off for the love of a woman who couldnot bear a man’s hands, but tries to recover his dignity by ordering the murderof a rival who is whole. . . . The virtual image of the public role becomesactual, but in relation to a private crime, which becomes actual in turn andreplaces the first image. (Deleuze 1959, 72)What is of interest is that there is a shifting between the publicly accepted roleand the private role of the character, and there is a rather mysterious and perpetualcognitive dissonance as to which is the “real” and which is the “imaginary”role of the character; the character moves into and out of the roles. Thiscreates the experience of the simultaneous qualities of actuality and virtuality ofwhich time is composed.As an exemplification of this, however, Memento’s protagonist serves evenbetter than these examples. The oddly malfunctioning Leonard becomes the quintessentiallyobscure criminal. Throughout the film, there are several scenes inwhich it becomes apparent that other characters have manipulated Leonard intohurting or killing someone for them. Yet Leonard starts to wear suspiciously niceclothes and to drive a suspiciously nice car. He also attacks and kills all alone,based only on cryptic notes. Although it is disturbing to think of the impairedLeonard as a pawn in other characters’ killing games, it is equally disturbing toconsider that Leonard could be relatively unaffected by his own acts of violence.We are never sure to what extent Leonard might be able to control his decisionsin this regard, and this blurs our attempts to distinguish between the real andimaginary with respect to his character.

174MELISSA CLARKEThe most troubling scene, the one in which the conflict over the criminalityof this nebulous character comes to a head, is, of course, at the end of the film,which is supposed to be the earliest point in the story that has unfolded. Leonardhas an acquaintance (we are unsure whether he is a friend or foe) named Ted,and there is an argument between them. Ted tells Leonard that he has alreadykilled the person he was looking for, a “John G.,” the one who injured Leonardand killed his wife. Ted shows Leonard a picture that was taken of him just afterthe vengeful murder. Then Ted begins to accuse Leonard of having become akiller, of having begun to like to kill people, and even of needing to kill in orderto give his life meaning. This brings our fear of Leonard into sharper focus; wehave thought he was only a hapless victim and we have watched him beingmanipulated, but now he appears to be a deranged killer. How many people hashe killed or will he kill? His affliction only makes his status as a criminal moredisturbing.Leonard is also preoccupied throughout with justice and vengeance. Itbecomes increasingly clear that Leonard can, will, and has hurt or killed peopleaccording to his desire for revenge. Because of his condition, he makes for a verycounterintuitive, unreal vigilante character, unlike those we would imagine to bemore “realistic” possible candidates. It is precisely because Leonard is an obscurecriminal, and precisely because his control of his pursuit of justice is in question,that the film is so adept at producing the time image.In addition, because the film features memory aiding the obscurity, it evenmore clearly connotes the relation between present and past. The relation ofmemory (or its absence) is always in question; it is always a specific part of theobscurity.Of course, since the characters in films are already imaginary, this exerciseis reflected back on us and on our basic assumptions about what is actual andwhat is virtual. When that which is virtual can become actual, or is shown to beindistinct from that which might be actually real, then we have found the structureof time, with its virtually real past and the fluidity of exchange between itand the actually real present.In addition to arising from an indiscernibility between the real and the imaginary,the time-image can be directly produced through various other relationson the screen, among characters, and in the viewer, when these relations producetriggers that Deleuze has termed “chronosigns.” He defines a chronosign as “animage where time ceases to be subordinate and appears for itself” (1989, 335).This is similar to what Roland Barthes has called a “trace,” i.e., it is that whichis evoked by the image. Bergson calls this a “mediating image” or “phantom.”Traces are signs of the “in-between” that marks the divergence of time, that is,the precise movement or moment when the present becomes past, or what inDeleuzian terms is the “event” of divergence.Deleuze has provided a useful organizational schema, suggesting that thereare two identifiable ways in which these signs can be categorized: as “order of

The Space-Time Image 175time” (l’ordre du temps) signs and as “time as series” (le temps comme série)signs. What is interesting is that both of them support a Bergsonian understandingof time as the contemporaneity of pasts with the present rather than a successionof “now”s.A consideration of these chronosigns will shift our focus from indiscernibilityof the imaginary and the real to questions of the undecidability of the trueand false, thus from metaphysical questions to epistemological ones. The firstof these types of signs, the order sign, can have at least two manifestations. Thefirst concerns undecidable alternate truths in the present, whereas the secondfocusses on ambiguity of truth in the past.When we are perpetually uncertain as to the truth of several alternate interpretationsof the present, we are directly confronting time. The characteristics oftime reveal themselves because indiscernibility among the truths of presentsshows that there can be multiple possible presents informed by various pasts.This shows time to be continuously manifest and shifting rather than a succession.This of course works only when the feeling of indecisiveness remains,because to resolve the issue definitively would be to fall back into traditionalunderstandings, viz., of time as a linear progression.Memento is characterized by a chronic undecidability between what is trueand false in the present; in fact, in each scene we are presented with a simultaneityof possible interpretations of the present. Because Leonard can’t formshort-term memories, his given situation is frequently indecipherable, and italways contains the most extreme potential to be deceiving. In each scene, thereis an encounter between Leonard and someone whom he, of course, doesn’tremember, and we are shown a plausible explanation of his connection with thatperson. But as the film moves to a new scene prior in time, we may be shownthat what appeared to be the truth of the present that we just experienced was notas it appeared. This continues in scene after scene.Let us consider Leonard’s relationship with Ted. In the first scene Ted is beingkilled by Leonard. But in the next scene in which Ted appears (and this scene isclearly understood to have taken place prior in time), he is telling Leonard he ishis friend and asking him whether he is “ready to go” somewhere. But in a subsequentscene (prior in time) someone is telling Leonard that Ted is “the one”—the one who killed Leonard’s wife. And then in the next scene (earlier), we againsee Ted telling Leonard that they are friends. We see that they may or may notbe friends. The same thing happens with another character, Natalie. Is NatalieLeonard’s friend? In one scene she appears to be helping, in another she is shownto be annoyed with him. In still another scene Ted tells Leonard not to trust her.We cannot decide; we do not know whether Ted is Leonard’s friend nor do weknow whether Natalie is his friend. But there really is no characterizing eitherTed or Natalie as friend or foe. It is essentially a question of the utter indiscernibilityof truth or falsity in the present. Throughout the film, with the continualjuxtaposition of contrary images, the aporias of truth and falsity in the

176MELISSA CLARKEpresent become more and more urgently revealed. In the end, some of the questionsas to truth and falsity in the present are never resolved, leaving only theunequivocal sense that there is no resolving these questions. This “sense” we areleft with is precisely the order sign indicating time’s characteristics. The irresolvabilityof truth in the presents shows each is contingent on its connectionwith one among several alternate, coexisting pasts. Without any past to consult,there is no way to interpret the presents at all. The structure of a present is evidentlypure becoming. Moreover, an ongoing paralysis of veridicality shows thatwe expect the past to exist and be newly relevant to the present.At the same time, the problem is not simply that of Leonard’s condition.The indeterminacy of the viewer’s own memory of what definitively happenedis also evidenced. For after all, it is we who cannot discern what is happeningor what the definite nature of the relationships are. So it is not just in the caseof a malfunctioning memory that time is revealed, although having no memorycapabilities is a shortcut to showing some of the aspects of a time-image.The audience has to respond to the same irresolvability of present “truths,” astate of irresolution that shows the contingency of the present on whicheveramong several pasts is subtending it, regardless of whether we can access oneto provide interpretive support.The second way the time-image can be revealed under the “order” categoryis through representation of undecidable alternative truths concerning layers ofpast. The way this reveals time is very similar to that which characterizes theproblem of truth and falsity in the presents, viz., in indiscernibility between truthand falsity, the multiplicity of the pasts and their simultaneous realities are bothdisclosed.Memento continually moves into and out of the past. There is a continualindiscernibility between what “happened” in the immediate past, in the time sinceLeonard’s problem began, and then, overall. It is difficult to differentiate clearlybetween the previous discussion of the presents and that of irresolvability in thenear past and in the past since Leonard’s accident, since it is merely the samephenomenon seen from a different perspective. With no memory, there are necessarilygaps between the crime and the present. But what is immediately elicitedin the moments when these gaps become obvious is already the time-image,because it is clear that there should be a near past to consult in order to interpret.This is a simple testament to Bergson’s claims that the past remains, and is thatwhich drives the present.At the same time, those gaps in Leonard’s memory are part of the universalsocial past and as such are nonetheless real, even for Leonard because they willstill be pasts of his present whether or not he explicitly accesses them throughmemory. That is to say, when individual memory fails, there is still duration. Thisrealization again supports Bergson’s understanding of time.As an example of this, let us consider the scene where Leonard gets out of acar, reading a note he wrote himself that says “Meet Natalie. Cafe. 1:00.” He

The Space-Time Image 177goes to the place and walks in, and is walking right past Natalie, who stops himas he walks by to say that it is she whom he is supposed to meet. Leonard’s memoryis malfunctioning, but there is Natalie—their interaction is part of the durationof the general past.But it is a different case when we consider the past overall with respect toMemento. For there is even a perpetual indiscernibility as to the truth ofLeonard’s memory of the past prior to the commencement of his affliction.Distant memories accessed by Leonard in the present are conflicting and theirtruths are indeterminate. In other words, at a certain point Leonard does notknow, and cannot know with absolute certainty, what the truth of his pre-injurypast was, and neither do we.Consider, for example, that in order to keep straight his “condition” Leonardconstantly tells anyone and everyone about a certain “Sammy Jankis,” who hada similar condition and for whom Leonard had denied insurance coverage, priorto his own accident. Sammy’s wife, Leonard tells everyone, had essentially killedherself in an desperate attempt to try to prove that Sammy was “faking” his condition.But then Ted, someone who at least knows Leonard, casts aspersions onthe story. Was the story about Sammy “true”? Or was the story rather aboutLeonard, and was it Leonard’s wife rather than Sammy’s wife who was diabeticand killed herself to try to snap Leonard out of it? Was Leonard’s wife even reallykilled in the accident? These questions are raised by Ted, but can Ted be trustedto tell the truth? In any event, Ted himself does not necessarily know the truthand claims to be only speculating. And so on. The “truth” of the past is undecidablefor these and other issues; for example, we never do find out whetherLeonard did or did not kill “John G.”At this level, the viewer becomes aware of the indiscernibility between thetruth or falsity of layers of past. And again, the structure of time is directlyrevealed. If instead we were confident in a single determinate truth of the past,we would be falling into the more traditional understanding of time as linearprogress, and of the present as the only reality, and the past as no longer existent.The power of recognizing indiscernibility between truth and falsity in thepast, on the contrary, is that it reminds us of the contingency of the present onone among several pasts, and even those are interpreted. So it also reminds usof the shifting, multilayered character of that past and, therefore, of time’s nonlinearity.This directly elicits a recognition of the reality of the virtual, whichchallenges the confused view that the virtual is not, or is not real. It also showsthat time is not linear. When we accept these views, then we are accepting theBergsonian paradigm of time.These two examples (the indiscernibility between true and false in either thepresent or the past) of the “order” sign are complemented by a second kind ofsign that produces the time-image; Deleuze names this the “time as series” sign.This sign is triggered when a depiction of time as an orderly progression isreplaced by focus on a progressive sequence of changes. This, like the “order of

178MELISSA CLARKEtime” signs, reveals the reality of multiple virtual pasts and the multiplicity ofalternative presents; it also reveals that time is not an orderly progression.The Bergsonian understanding of time emerges when a sequence of imagesproduces the sense that there is a passage of power in an event or a character ina certain way. Consider a series of images in which a character metamorphizes:rather than time progressing, what progresses will be the character’s becomingsomeone or something else; as Deleuze says, the character “crosses a limit”whereupon he or she undergoes some sort of transformation. This elicits a timeimagewhen, while the character is shown to progress throughout the durationof the film, the events in the film are not progressing chronologically. Whenthere is a juxtaposing of recollections and previous events, a nonlinear depictionof time facilitates precisely a revelation of the linear progression of thecharacter’s development. Rather than events taking place in a present constantlyprogressing toward a future with a nonpresent past, it is the character who progressesor “becomes”; this reveals that shifting layers of past subtend the becomingof an individual, and that the past is really bearing on the presents and isaccessible. Moreover, time does not appear as a progression, but rather as a layeredsimultaneity.In the case of Memento, once again we have a paradigm illustration of this signindicating time. Leonard becomes a killer. The film shows him moving from whenhe kills Ted, backward in time, tracing the indefinite shifting causes that led up tothe event. But the reason Memento is paradigmatic is that all the while time is movingbackward, Leonard is depicted as progressively becoming a criminal.Let us reconsider the confrontation in the penultimate (and most prior) scene,to take note of Leonard’s progression toward becoming a definite criminal. Tedand Leonard are arguing, and we sense here, as we have throughout, that Leonardis an obscure vigilante. But much more is revealed in this scene. Ted goes furtherthan accusing Leonard of enjoying the killing; he accuses him of making upother stories, and of changing the original police report just so he could keep tryingto find the killer in perpetuity. Ted says: “You make up your own truth. Whathappened to the police report? It was complete when I gave it to you. Who tookout the twelve pages? It was you. To make up a puzzle you couldn’t solve.” Tedis threatening Leonard’s neat puzzle. “You have a nice story for yourself,” Tedcontinues, “a wife to pine for, a sense of purpose in life.” Leonard responds, “Ishould kill you.” Then, to compound the situation, Leonard gets in his car andburns the picture of himself that Ted took of Leonard after he (supposedly) killedthe real “John G.” We hear Leonard thinking, “You think I lie to myself to behappy? Well, you’re a ‘John G.’ So you can be my ‘John G.’ Do I lie to myselfto make myself happy? In your case Teddy, yes I will.” Then he writes downTed’s license plate number, and goes off to get it tattooed on his leg, of courseforgetting whose license plate number it was as he is driving.The transition has taken place. Leonard has become, by this final scene, a criminal.Yet the scene was prior in time to the opening scene. The becoming-criminal

The Space-Time Image 179took place linearly while time did not progress linearly. In fact it was through goingbackward in time that the character’s becoming was revealed. So we are againshown time to be a multiply layered reality, with a still-influential past.At this point I would like to make explicit some further connections betweenthis film and Bergson’s revelations as an addition to the questions of the real vs.the imaginary and the two types of signs outlined by Deleuze. The first is merelyto state explicitly that Bergson’s idea of the ontological status of the past in contrastto the becoming of the present is exemplified in Memento. As Bert the hotelclerk says to Leonard about his condition: “It’s all backward for you. Maybe yougot an idea about what you wanna do, but you don’t know what you just did.”In one sense, this is to say that in this bizarre condition, the past “is not” ontologically.What should be virtually in the background, accessible, isn’t.Yet, on closer inspection, the question of whether or not the memory is malfunctioningis in itself unresolvable. Therefore a second connection of this filmto Bergson’s description is the consideration of memory and its ability to function“accurately” and with precision. In one sense, Leonard’s memory malfunctions,which should be a constant reminder of the contrast to our functioningmemory. But in another sense, Leonard’s memory is really just like all of ours:he wants to create meaning for his life, which is what happens with our functioningmemories. We connect to the past to interpret or give meaning to (or tofind truth and falsity in) the present. Memento, then, is simply a reminder thatmemory serves to indicate the same time relation, viz., that of the reality of thepast and the shifting layers of that reality.IVThere are a few more conclusions to be drawn from this that haven’t been explicitlyaddressed in discussing the time-image relation. We should consider whydescribing time as primary and space as secondary would be philosophicallyinteresting. Deleuze claims that cinema moved to prioritizing this time-imageafter its initial emphasis on the movement-image (which was spatially oriented)prior to World War II, precisely out of concerns resulting from the war. He alsomakes the claim that film was retracing the path that philosophy took over severalcenturies. In either event, the movement was away from universal truths. 8There certainly is no universal truth awaiting either Leonard or the audienceat the end of Memento. There is no way to verify either the real vs. the imaginaryor any of the many questions as to the true vs. the false. At the same time,the past is always virtually present (even when it appears not to be for theindividual), and the present is always already passing. As we have seen, theseare inescapable products of Memento, which is to say that Memento producesthe direct time-image.

180MELISSA CLARKEBut it is to say more than this. Consider the question of universal truth andverifiability. What Memento shows, along with everything that the discussion ofactual and virtual and the shifting reality of the past and the present implies, isprecisely that reality and truth are the very complex results of shifting, multiplyvariant possible connections between the present and the sheets of past.Moreover, depending on which past layer is subtending the present or actualizedin the present, the present truth will vary. Memento shows that the past, while itmay “be” and have a virtual reality, is not a firm reliable source of determinateinformation with or without memory. Consequently, neither is the present,whether or not Leonard’s or our own memories are functioning. As LeonardShelby says, sounding very Nietzschean, “Memories are interpretations, not thefacts,” and the individual subject can neither control the interpretation nor relyon the “facts.” The reality is rather that we must interpret. We are “condemnedto interpret,” or perhaps more precisely, interpretation happens.This has political implications regarding the production of subjects, or as aquasi-metaphysical question in consideration of meaning and value in thesociopolitical world. Destabilizing the subject, the present, the past, and the actualallows philosophers and other theorists a starting-point from which to questionthe status quo and consider alternatives to it.Prioritizing time reveals the indeterminacy of both time and space, andemphasizing the continuity of time (the simultaneity of presents and pasts) dispelsmyths of a progression of truth, knowledge, history, and facts. Inverting thetraditional preference for a unitary subject, a single true present, and a linear progressionof time and an overemphasis on space, science, and determinate concepts,can thus have profound implications for our understanding of ourselves,our world, and most of our sociopolitical philosophy.Notes1. Ultimately, these two different elements reconnect, so that it is not in the end accurate toclaim that time is an intensive relation. For purposes of this discussion, however, let me just say thatat least in this initial respect, time is understood as an internal subjective relation. For a moredetailed summary of this, one might consult Maurice Merleau-Ponty 1964 (184) where he claimsthat “absolute knowledge is not detachment, it is inherence” for Bergson.2. In addition to being the main point of Bergson 1946, one can also find this discussion inBergson 1959, Chapter II, especially the sections: “Homogeneous Time and Space,” “Duration,Succession and Space,” and “Pure Duration.”3. For a very useful discussion of the relation between memory and duration, see Bergson 1946(187–237) or the beginning of Bergson 1920. In addition, one might also see Deleuze 1991, chap.3.4. For further discussion of this and the subsequent points, one might generally considerBergson 1959, chap. 3, especially the section on “Relation of Past and Present.”5. Bergson has a more complex set of relations in mind here, involving also consciousness andfreedom. But since in the end consciousness and freedom are essentially “produced by” memory,for purposes of this discussion I am eliding these aspects.6. Unfortunately, the term “image” must be used despite its failure to denote the relationsearched for herein. Time eludes conceptualization, precisely because conceptualizations reify and

The Space-Time Image 181time defies reification. The term “image” connotes some degree of a perceptible spatiality, but forlack of a better term, I will use “time-image” to connote those combined images that can produce asense of time.7. One must be cautious to avoid equivocation of the term “real” here. In an ordinary sense, weare discussing the difference between real and imaginary and relating it to the difference betweenactual (present) and virtual (past). In another context, however, the virtual past is still entirely real.This is a problem with language and use of terms, but I hope that the different discussions are clearlydelimited here.8. Deleuze maintains the first in the Preface to Cinema 1, p. ix, while he claims the second inthe Preface to Cinema 2, p. xi.Works CitedBarthes, Roland. 1993. Camera Lucida. London: Vintage.Bergson, Henri. 1946. The Creative Mind. Trans. Mabelle L. Andison. Connecticut: Greenwood Press.———. 1999. Duration and Simultaneity. Trans. Mark Lewis and Robin Durie. Manchester:Clinamen Press.———. 1959. Matter and Memory. Trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer. New York:Doubleday.———. 1920. Mind-Energy. Trans. H. Wildon Carr. London: Macmillan.———. 1959. Time and Free Will. Trans. F. L. Pogson. New York: Macmillan.Deleuze, Gilles. 1991. Bergsonism. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. New York:Zone Books.———. 1986. Cinema 1. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. Minneapolis: MinnesotaUniversity Press.———. 1989. Cinema 2. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta. Minneapolis: MinnesotaUniversity Press.———. 1994. Difference and Repetition. Trans. Paul Patton. New York: Columbia University Press.———. 1985. L’image-temps. Paris: Les Editions de Minuit.Gill, Carolyn Bailey. ed. 2000. Time and the Image. Manchester: Manchester University Press.Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1964. “Bergson in the Making,” in Signs, trans. Richard C. McCleary.Evanston: Northwestern University Press.Nolan, Christopher. 2000. Memento. I Remember Productions, Llc.