Security

TM 

Freescale, the Freescale logo, AltiVec, C-5, CodeTEST, CodeWarrior, ColdFire, C-Ware, t 

he Energy Efficient Solutions logo, mobileGT, PowerQUICC, QorIQ, StarCore and Symphony 

are trademarks of Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., Reg. U.S. Pat. & Tm. Off. BeeKit, BeeStack, 

ColdFire+, CoreNet, Flexis, Kinetis, MXC, Platform in a Package, Processor Expert, QorIQ 

Qonverge, Qorivva, QUICC Engine, SMARTMOS, TurboLink, VortiQa and Xtrinsic are trademarks 

of Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. All other product or service names are the property 

of their respective owners. © 2011 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.

• Automotive Body applications: Safety, and Security related 

• Security Use Cases and Freescale MCUs 

• Security Module CSE 

• Security Standards and Consortia 

• More resources 

• Q&A 

TM 

2 

Freescale, the Freescale logo, AltiVec, C-5, CodeTEST, CodeWarrior, ColdFire, C-Ware, the Energy Efficient Solutions logo, mobileGT, PowerQUICC, QorIQ, StarCore 

and Symphony are trademarks of Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., Reg. U.S. Pat. & Tm. Off. BeeKit, BeeStack, ColdFire+, CoreNet, Flexis, Kinetis, MXC, Platform in a 

Package, Processor Expert, QorIQ Qonverge, Qorivva, QUICC Engine, SMARTMOS, TurboLink, VortiQa and Xtrinsic are trademarks of Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. 

All other product or service names are the property of their respective owners. © 2011 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.

TM 








Safety & 

Powertrain Body DIS 

Chassis 

TM 

32 Bit Qorivva i.MX 

8-16 Bit S08/S12/LL18UHV (Mixed-Signal/High-Voltage) 

Driving innovation and technology in all segments 

4 





Comfort Features 

►Door Module 

►Window Lift 

►Seat Module 

►HVAC 

►Electric sunroof/shade 

►Interior lighting 

TM 

Integrated BCM 

Gateways 

5 

►Steering column lock 

►Steering column 

adjustment 

►Seat positioning 

►Wipers and rain sensors 

►Lighting and light sensors 

►Convertible top 

►Anti-pitch power windows 

• Variety of applications inside the cabin, with wide raning performance 

requirements 

• Low end, small 8-bit up to high performance 32-bit. 

• Difference between Safety and Security 

• Security for Safety 

AFS 

Front 

Light 

Front 

Light 

AFS 

CAN 

LIN 

Light / 

LED ctrl 

Door 

SLP 

ripple cnt 

W/D & 

Safety 

Light / RF 

LED ctrl Rx 

MCU 

Door 

SLP 

ripple cnt 

Light / 

LED ctrl 

MCU 

Input 

Gateway 32bit 

176 pin 

Monitor 

SBC (208/256) BCM 

Output 

Driver 

Light / 

LED ctrl 

Rear 

Light 

Input 

• Switches 

• etc. 

Output 

• Interior lighting 

• etc. 

Rear 

Light 

Vehicle Networking 

►Central Body Control 

Module 

►Central Gateways: CAN, 

LIN, Flexray, Ethernet, 

MOST 

Safety Related 

Security 

►Immobilizer 

►Keyless Entry 

►Preventing hacking and 

counterfeit modules 





• Security for safety: No safety without security ! 

− Recent publications highlight how vehicle networks could be hacked from 

inside the cabin. With the connected car, the attacker could be anywhere. 

− Software is ubiquitous and also used in safety critical systems (e.g. brakes, 

steering, etc) 

• Security for reliability 

− Counterfeit parts and ECUs can impact vehicle reliability (and safety) 

− Singular modification poses risk of malfunction or breakdown of complete 

system 

• Protection of (financial) assets 

− Car OEM: Ensure ECUs and spare parts are genuine 

− Car OEM: High $$ value feature options enabled through software switch 

− Car owner: Vehicle maintains high value - it is safe and reliable 

− Car owner: Mileage manipulation considered impossible 

• Privacy/Confidentiality 

− Car data, driver location, commute schemes, personal preferences, etc. must 

remain invisible and untraceable 

TM 

6 





TM 








► Immobilizers 

► Component protection 

► Protecting data sets (mileage) / 

Prevent “Chip tuning“ 

► Protecting personal information 

(destinations, phone book etc.) 

► Feature management (navigation map) 

and Digital-Rights-Management 

► Secure communication 

► Secure Boot 

TM 

8 





• 16-bit Devices: S12XE as example 

� NVM content protection, disable debugging features for CPU and XGATE and 

access to internal memory via debugger interface, etc 

• 32-bit Devices: MPC56xx as example 

� Censorship mode to protect the flash contents 

� CSE- Crypto Service Engine(Application Note available) 

• 32-bit Devices: i.MX51x as example 

� ARM TrustZone, Secure JTAG controller, Secure real-time clock, Secure boot 

functions 

� Cryptographic accelerator with true random number generator (TRNG) 

� Security controller with AES engine, secure/non-secure RAM 

TM 

Freescale Automotive Security Solutions 

Type Device Family Platform Security Module 

In-Vehicle 


Connected 

Vehicle 


MCU 

(internal 

Flash) 

MPU 

(no Flash) 

MPC564xB/C (90nm Body) 

CSE 

MPC5746M (55nm Powertrain) 

32bit Qorivva 

Power Architecture 

HSM 

MPC574xC (55nm Body) HSM 

Vybrid R-Series ARM Cortex-A5 Trust Zone 

i.Mx Application Processors 

9 

ARM9/11 

Cortex-A8/A9/A15 

Sahara 

CAAM 





• Many automotive security applications are based on cryptographic 

algorithms that utilize security keys. 

• Today these security keys are typically encoded and in public Flash on 

chip. By being publically accessible, the keys are at risk to SW attack. 

• The CSE stores the keys in a secure Flash array that is only accessible 

by the CSE module. 

• The CSE additionally provides cryptographic algorithms (AES-128) and 

a secure boot up feature that allows for the public Flash to be 

authenticated. 

• The CSE module is based on the Secure Hardware Extention (SHE) 

spec. 

• FSL is the first to have silicon publically available that supports the SHE 

spec. 

TM 

10 

Crypto Service Engine (CSE) 

RNG 

Key 

NVM 

AES-128 

RAM 

CODE & KEY 

ROM 





Step 1: After power on: CSE module reads 

bootloader via its bus master interface. 

Step 2: CSE module uses the boot key to 

calculates the MAC value of the bootloader. 

Step 3: CSE module compares calculated 

MAC with stored boot MAC. If identical: 

successful secure boot � set respective bit 

in host interface and unlock keys 

Step 4: MCU always starts bootloader. 

4 

Bootloader: 

Part of flash memory 

Start bootloader 

• MAC(message authentication code) protects against modification of bootloader 

and depends on the (secret) boot key � integrity and authenticity of bootloader. 

• Only if calculated MAC value matches stored boot MAC value: successful secure 

boot � set respective bit in host interface and unlock keys for further usage (see 

next demos) 

TM 

Random 

number 

generator 

1 

Bus master 

11 

Flash 

MPC5646C 

CSE module 

Unique ID 

AES-128 

2a 

3b 

MAC value 

Keys 

Boot key 

Host Interface 

Bit for successful 

3c 

secure boot 

Keys unlocked 

Freescale, the Freescale logo, AltiVec, C-5, CodeTEST, CodeWarrior, ColdFire, ColdFire+, C-Ware, the Energy Efficient Solutions logo, Kinetis, 

mobileGT, PowerQUICC, Processor Expert, QorIQ, Qorivva, StarCore, Symphony and VortiQa are trademarks of Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 

Reg. U.S. Pat. & Tm. Off. Airfast, BeeKit, BeeStack, CoreNet, Flexis, MagniV, MXC, Platform in a Package, QorIQ Qonverge, QUICC Engine, 

Ready Play, SafeAssure, the SafeAssure logo, SMARTMOS, TurboLink, Vybrid and Xtrinsic are trademarks of Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. All 

other product or service names are the property of their respective owners. © 2012 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. 

2c 

2b 

Boot MAC 

juergen.frank@freescale.com 

3a

Step 1: Successful secure boot to verify 

bootloader and to unlock keys. Then the 

bootloader configures the MCU for full speed, 

best memory timing, etc. 

Step 2: Bootloader asks CSE module to verify 

MAC for part #1 of flash memory using key #x 

Step 3: CSE module reads part of flash, uses 

key #x to calculate MAC, and compares 

calculated MAC with MAC for part #1 as stored 

in bootloader. If identical, CSE module sets 

corresponding bit in host interface. 

Step 4: Bootloader checks bit. 

If set: Part #1 of flash ok � execute part #1. 

Step 5 etc: Similar to bootloader vs. part #1 of 

flash: Part #n of flash verifies part #n+1 � 

chain of trust. 

• MACs stored in bootloader provide integrity and authenticity of the related parts in flash memory. 

• Bootloader protected by secure boot (see previous demo). 

• Part-by-part checking of flash to execute critical parts of flash (e.g., MCU configuration/IRQ table) as 

soon as possible. 

TM 

3d 

MAC 

Random 

number 

generator 

Bus master 

3a 

Part 

#1 

Flash 

Stored MAC for part #2 

Stored MAC for part #1 

Bootloader 

12 

#2 

3c 

... 

MPC5646C 

CSE module 

Unique ID 

AES-128 

3a 

1 

3e 

Keys 

Key #x 







3b 

Bit for valid MAC 

juergen.frank@freescale.com

Central ECU with MPC5646C 

Random 

number 

generators 

Step 1: Central ECU obtains 

random number and sends 

it to sensors ECU (e.g., after 

power-on of car) 

CSE module 

Unique ID 

AES-128 

Decrypted 

(sensor value;RND) 

• Random number: protects against replay attacks. 

• Encryption: protects against eavesdropping. 

• Random number and encryption: ensures data integrity and authenticity. 

TM 

Keys 

Key #x 

RND 

Step 2: Sensor ECU reads 

sensor value and asks CSE 

module to encrypt it and the 

received random number 

(using key #x) 

E.g. 

CAN 

Step 3: Sensor ECU sends 

encrypted message to 

central ECU. 

Step 4: Central ECU asks 

CSE module to decrypt 

received message (using 

key #x). 

13 

Random 

number 

generators 

Encrypted 

(sensor value;RND) 

Sensor ECU 

CSE module 

Unique ID 

AES-128 

Keys 

Key #x 

Sensor value 

Step 5: Central ECU checks 

sent random number vs. 

received/decrypted random 

number. 






other product or service names are the property of their respective owners. © 2012 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.

Step 1: Application asks CSE module to verify 

MAC of stored mileage (using key #x) 

Step 2: CSE module reads mileage and MAC. 

CSE module uses key #x to calculates MAC. 

CSE module compares both MACs. If identical: 

CSE module sets bit in host interface. 

Step 3: Application checks bit and asks other 

ECUs for mileage (via secure communication). 

If bit is set and other ECUs reports same 

mileage: stored mileage is ok. 

Step 4: ECU gets new mileage. Application 

asks CSE module to generate MAC of new 

mileage (using key #x). 

Step 5: CSE module reads new mileage. CSE 

module uses key #x to calculates MAC. CSE 

module writes MAC to system RAM. 

Step 6: Host writes new mileage and its MAC 

into flash. Host sends new mileage to other 

nodes (secure communication) 

• MAC protects mileage against modification. 

• Distributing mileage on other ECUs protects against replay-attacks (i.e., overwriting mileage and MAC with read old 

mileage and its MAC). 

TM 

2d 

MAC 

Random 

number 

generator 

Bus master 

Flash 

Stored mileage + MAC 

14 

2c 

2a 

MPC5646C 

CSE module 

Unique ID 

AES-128 

3b 

2a 

5a 

5c 

5a 

3a 

mileage 

Keys 

Key #x 


5c 

System RAM 

Calculated MAC 

Bit for valid 

New mileage 

MAC 

MPC5646C 

Other 

CSE module ECUs 

Flash 






2b 

2e

Master ECU with MPC5646C 

Random 

number 

generators 

Flash 

Step 1: Master ECU 

obtains random number 

and sends it to ECU 

. 

CSE module 

Unique ID 

AES-128 

• Replacement or modification of ECU will change its unique ID and/or keys. Both will be 

detected with this proposal for component protection. 

TM 

RND 

ID Decrypted(RND;ID) 

Keys Random Unique ID Keys 

Key #x 

E.g. 

CAN 

number 

generators AES-128 Key #x 

Step 2: ECU 

appends its unique ID to 

received RND, encrypts 

this message with key 

#x, and sends encrypted 

message to master ECU 

15 

ECU with MPC5646C 

Encrypted(RND;ID) 


decrypts received 

message with key #x. 

CSE module 


checks decrypted RND 

and ID with sent RND 

and with stored ID . 

If match: ECU is ok. 






Random 

number 

generators 

Allow more 

horse power 

Step 1: 

Customer/Dealer 

request feature (e.g., 

more horse power) 

for the car from 

OEM’s server. 

ECU with MPC5646C 

CSE module 

Unique ID 

AES-128 

• Only features with correct MAC/AES-128 key are accepted. 

• OEM server to create the MAC for feature. 

• MAC protects integrity and authenticity of feature. 

TM 

MAC 

Keys 

Key #x 

Feature; 

MAC 

Step 2: OEM server 

creates message: feature 

code and MAC using key 

#x of ECU in customer’s 

car. Message sent to 

customer 

16 

Customer/ 

Dealer 

E.g. USB 

Stick 

Step 3: Customer 

applies message 

(feature;MAC) to car. 

ECU receives 

message. 

Feature; 

MAC 

OEM server 

Feature 

AES-128 Key #x 

MAC 

Step 4: CSE module 

calculates MAC for 

received feature using key 

#x. If calculated MAC is 

identical to received MAC: 

feature is accepted (e.g., 

more horse power) 






• Crypto Service Manager (CSM) 

− Access to cryptographic services for 

applications and system functions 

− Cryptographic services: 

� Hash computation 

� Asymmetrical signature verification 

� Symmetric encryption 

• Crypto library (CAL) 

− Provides cryptographic algorithms 

− SW or HW, e.g., CSE module of 

MPC564x 

• Freescale + Elektrobit 

− Include CSE module in AUTOSAR 

TM 

17 

Appl. 1 

Driver 

(HW) 

Application Layer 

AUTOSAR Runtime Environment (RTE) 

CSM 

Appl. 2 

Crypto Library 

(SW) 

Services 

Layer 

Crypto-HW Microcontroller 

ECU Abstraction 

Layer 

Microcontroller 

Abstraction Layer 





• Dual Core Architecture 

− e200z4d + e200z0h up to 120 MHz 

• Memory 

− 3 MB on-chip code & 64 KB on-chip data flash 

− Up to 256 KB on-chip SRAM 

• Crossbar switch architecture for concurrent access 

• Busses/Interfaces: CAN, LIN/SCI, DSPI, I²C, FlexRay, 

Ethernet 

• Others modules: RTC, Semaphores, MPU, ADCs, several 

Timers modules etc. 

• Cryptographic Service Engine (CSE) 

− Implementation of the HIS SHE-Specification 

− AES-128 engine for encryption, decryption and message 

authentication , support of ECB & CBC modes 

− Random number generator (Pseudo and True for seed) 

− Unique device ID (read-only) 

− Secure key storage accessible by CSE module only 

− Secure Boot support after reset 

− Debug Detection 

TM 

18 

Due to CSE module: MPC5646C won the “Embedded 

AWARD” at the “Embedded World” (International 

Conference and Exhibition) in Nurnberg 2011. 





TM 








• Secure Core 

− 32bit Core 

− 120 MHz clock frequency 

• AES 

− Bus Master / DMA programming model 

− Supported crypto modes: 

� ECB 

� CBC 

� Minimal throughput 100 MBit/sec 

− Latency 2μs 

• Secure NVM 

− NVM emulation on secure flash blocks 

− Up to ten generic keys, additional special purpose keys 

• Secure FLASH 

− Protected by hard-coded connection with CSE, no access by other master 

possible 

• RNG 

− PRNG , TRNG for SEED generation 

− AIS20 (Class K3 high) / FIPS 140-2 

TM 

20 




All other product or service names are the property of their respective owners. © 2011 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. 

IV 

Pi-1 

ECB 

Pi 

Ek 

Ci 

Ek Ek Ek 

Ci-1 

CBC 

Pi 

Ci 

Pi+1 

Ci+1

• CSE module implements the official 

SHE-Specification (Version 1.1). 

• CSE module is open for further 

extensions (e.g. ECC, SHA-256 

etc.) 

• CSE module is core based and 

includes an AES cipher and a 

random-number generator 

• CSE module interfaces: 

− crossbar master interface 

(access to the whole system memory space) 

− configuration interface 

(host interface) 

• Fix system flash blocks assignment 

to the CSE module. Accesses from 

other masters are impossible. 

TM 

21 

CSE Block 

on/ 

off 

P 

R 

N 

G 

128bit 

random 

value 

Seed 

T 

R 

N 

G 

CSE Interface 


Debugger 

connected 

DEBUG 

JTAG 

NEXUS 

FLASH 

Sec. FLASH 

Test Interface Array 

Test Interface BIU 

Interrupt 

Config/Status 

Register 

IP SkyBlue-IF 

Peripheral 

Bridge 

INTC 

PB-IF 

MI BIU 

UTI 

Host Inter. 

INTC 

Secure „Firewall“ 

CSE 

Core 

AES 

ROM 

XBAR-IF 

RAM 

Core eDMA FlexRay 

Slaves 

Masters 

XBAR 

MPU 

SRAM 





TM 








US 

IntelliDrive 

VII 

CAR 2 CAR 

CC 

• Partly initiated and funded by Governments 

• Members: Standardization bodies, universities, research 

institutes, car OEMs, silicon manufacturers 

TM 

eSafety 

eSecurity 

WG 

WAVE 

Europe Germany Conferences 

Intelligent Car Initiative 

SeVeCom 

EVITA 

ARAMIS 

Standards 

FIPS 197 

NFC FIPS 140 

23 

eNOVA 

SEIS 

HIS 

SIM-TD 

Common 

Criteria 

escar 

ISSE 

Eurocrypt 

Asiacrypt 

Crypto 





• HIS-SHE specification 

− Version 1.1 published April 2010 

− Freescale implements the first SHE module (CSE) 2011 

− SHE specification now part of HIS (*) 

• Evita project 

− Funded by the EU, finished November 2011 

− Specification of 3 different module classes 

� Evita Full: V2X communication, H/W based asymmetric cryptography 

� Evita Medium (HSM): Multiple-purpose ECUs, H/W based symmetric 

cryptography 

� Evita Light: Sensors and actuators, cost optimized symmetric crypto H/W, 

secure NVM optional 

− Gaining global acceptance as “quasi standard” 

(*) Herstellerinitiative Software 

TM 

24 






• Tier1 specification of security module HSM 

− First samples 2010/11 

• HIS is working on a specification of a medium-level security 

module 

− Re-use of Evita Medium and Tier1 results 

− Expect Evita Medium/HSM to become part of HIS spec in 2012 

• Evita follow-on project 

• PRESERVE 

(Preparing Secure Vehicle-to-x Communication Systems) 

− Mission: Design, integrate and test a secure and scalable V2X Security 

Subsystem for FOTs and Pilot Deployments 

− Based on Evita Full module 

− Jan 2011 - Dec 2014 

TM 

25 






• Project Goal 

The objective of EVITA is to design, verify, and prototype an architecture for 

automotive on-board networks where security-relevant components are 

protected against tampering and sensitive data are protected against 

compromise. 

• Three different variants of hardware security modules 

− Full (Car2X) 

− Medium (ECU level) 

− Light (Sensor/actuator level): SHE equivalent 

• Project schedule: July 2008 – December 2011 

• http://www.evita-project.org 

• FSL was not part of EVITA, but is member in ARAMIS as a kind of 

successor project of EVITA 

• Full (Car2XARAMIS is defining security for multicore and Virtualization 

TM 

26 





• BMW and Audi commissioned escrypt to developed the SHE 

specification. 

• The SHE specification will be an official HIS (Herstellerinitiative 

Software = OEM initiative software) specification. 

• SHE is developed as free and open standard. 

• Early cooperation (2008) with Freescale. 

• The SHE specification only describes the technical parts. 

Implementation, process or backend are not subject of the 

specification. 

• SHE Specification: 

http://portal.automotive-his.de/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=41 

TM 

27 






Standards 

Main 

features 

CSE 

Module 

HSM 

Module 

TM 

EVITA Low HIS-SHE 

UID 

crypto engine 

NVM is 

mandatory 

fix function set 

supported by 

MPC564xB/C 

supported by 

McKinley , Calypso 

28 

EVITA- 

Medium 

HIS- 

Medium 

programmable 

by customer 

EVITA- 

High 

PublicKey 

HASH 

Low Complexity High 






• Security tutorial 

− Flash file to explain the security features and how to apply them. Login 

from product webpage listed below 

• Application note 

− AN4235 : Using CSE to protect your Application Code via a Chain of 

Trust 

− AN4234 : Using the Cryptographic Service Engine (CSE) 

• Security Demo and Video Introduction(In Chinese) 

− http://2011ftf.ccidnet.com/jishuzhanshiqu.html 

• Other resources including documents from MPC564xB/C Product 

Webpage 

http://www.freescale.com/webapp/sps/site/prod_summary.jsp?code 

=MPC564xB- 

C&webpageId=121120349534072559427E&nodeId=01624606C14 

27E&fromPage=tax 

TM 

29 





• Automotive Security: Protection and Enablement 

− Necessity and feature 

− Challenge and opportunity for new driver experiences 

• Automotive Security: A global concern, a requirement and a 

new trend 

− Automotive industry in search for standardization 

• Two types: In-vehicle Security and Connected Vehicle Security 

• Freescale offers a variety of solutions today 

TM 

Freescale Automotive Security Solutions 

Type Device Family Platform Security Module 

In-Vehicle 


Connected 

Vehicle 


MCU 

(internal 

Flash) 

MPU 

(no Flash) 

MPC564xB/C (90nm Body) 

CSE 

MPC5746M (55nm Powertrain) 

32bit Qorivva 

Power Architecture 

HSM 

MPC574xC (55nm Body) HSM 

Vybrid R-Series ARM Cortex-A5 Trust Zone 

i.Mx Application Processors 

30 

ARM9/11 

Cortex-A8/A9/A15 

Sahara 

CAAM

Security

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