Properties of LNG - Save Passamaquoddy Bay

Properties of LNGDon JuckettUS Department of EnergyFebruary 12, 2002LNG WorkshopSolomons, MDU.S. Department of Energy

U.S. Department of EnergyImports Will be an Important Source ofSupplies to Satisfy Growing Demand40HistoryProjection3530Consumption25Consumption in Excess of Prduction2015Total Domestic Production10501995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

U.S. Department of EnergyGas Imports From Canada and LNG ImportsAre Projected to Grow As Sources of Supply5HistoryProjection4CanadaVolume (Trillion Cubic Feet)3210Liquified Natural GasMexico-11995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

U.S. LNG ImportFacilitiesU.S. Department of EnergyEverett LNG Import Facility- Massachusetts(Expansion underway)Cove Point LNG Facility - Maryland(Import capability currently being recommissioned)Lake Charles LNG Import Facility -Louisiana(Expansion underway)Elba Island LNG Import Facility - Georgia(Currently being re-started)

U.S. LNG ImportFacilitiesU.S. Department of EnergyCurrent CapacityLocationStatusSendout(MMcf/Day)Everett, MA Active 450100 by truckStorage(Bcf)Possible CapacityExpansion3.5 165 MMcf/d– sendoutLake Charles, LA Active 700 6.3 300 MMcf/d– sendoutElba Island, GACove Point, MDRestartingoperations• Active for Storage• Planned openingfor imports 2002440 4.1 360 MMcf/d– sendout1,0005.0 2.8 Bcf – storage(nameplate) 1Note: Except where noted, sendout capacity is LNG vaporization which is then shipped via pipeline1This is Cove Point’s nameplate capacity. Capacity for reopening has not yet been determined.

U.S. Department of EnergyLNG Imports Projections by Receiving Facility300HistoryProjectionCove Point250Volume (Billion Cubic Feet)200150100EverettLake CharlesElba Island5001995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010Cove Point, MD Everett, MA Lake Charles, LA Elba Island, GA

U.S. Department of EnergyLNG Imports are a Key Element ofU.S. Supplies• LNG Imports have grown by more than 2 and one-half timesbetween 1998 and 2000, from 85 Bcf to 224 Bcf• LNG imports are expected to grow from 1.3 percent of U.S.consumption to more than 3 percent by 2008• LNG imports can be quite significant on a regional basis• New greenfield projects often meet local resistance

U.S. Department of EnergyNatural Gas Imports & Exports, 1999 (BCF)Algeria76Australia12JapanLNG64Malaysia342Qatar3368206155LNG163Trinidad and Tobago51United ArabEmirates3

U.S. Department of EnergyNatural Gas Imports & Exports, 2000AustraliaAlgeria446IndonesiaNigeriaJapanLNG66753Oman13Qatar35441046Trinidad and Tobago10512LNG22399United Arab Emirates3

U.S. Department of EnergyLNG and Natural Gas• Physical properties and behavior• Myth and Legend• Knowledge and Common Sense• Hazards -

LNG PropertiesU.S. Department of Energy• Liquefied Natural gas is a Cryogenic Liquid– LNG Density - 26.5 LB./Cu. Ft.• Lighter than water (65 LB/Cu. Ft.)– LNG Boiling point - (-259 o F)• Liquid Nitrogen - (-320 o F)• Liquid Oxygen - (-297 o F)

Natural Gas PropertiesU.S. Department of Energy• Natural gas is lighter than air– Natural Gas Density - 0.47• (Air - 1.0)• Natural gas rises under normal atmosphericconditions

U.S. Department of EnergyMyth and Legend• “Catastrophic release of LNG creates a BLEVE-- boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion”NOT TRUE– In laboratory and open ocean combustion tests,there have been no documented cases of LNGBLEVEs

Myth and Legend• “An LNG Tanker is a floating Bomb”NOT TRUEU.S. Department of Energy• Liquefied Natural Gas tankers have been runaground, experienced loss of containment, sufferedweather damage, been subjected to lowtemperature embrittlement from cargo spillage,suffered engine room fires, and been involved inserious collisions with other vessels - NO CARGOEXPLOSIONS REPORTED

U.S. Department of EnergyEl Paso Paul Kayser – In Dry Dock aftergrounding in Straits of Gibraltar64,750 dwt, 125,000 m 3 of gasPhoto- Courtesy of BP

U.S. Department of EnergyCommon Sense and Knowledge• Natural gas needs to be in vapor form andmixed with air to burn• Natural gas is combustible in the range of 5%to 15% volume concentrations in air• Combustible mixtures in confined spacewill burn explosively– LNG does not explode or burn

U.S. Department of EnergyCommon Sense and Knowledge• LNG is a cryogenic liquid – physicalcontact or spillage constitute a personneland equipment hazard• LNG Natural Gas• Natural Gas presents an asphyxiation hazard

LNG Tanker UnderwayU.S. Department of EnergyPhoto Courtesy of BP

U.S. Department of EnergyWhat happens with a spill on water?• LNG pool vaporizes rapidly (faster than an equalsized pool on land)• LNG spill on or within hull can cause brittlefracture (carbon & low alloy steel)• LNG can undergo “rapid phase transition”, aphysical vapor explosion (not combustion)• LNG pool formation accompanied by ignition• Natural gas cloud formation with subsequent burnback

U.S. Department of EnergyAssessing The Hazard30 Years of LNG Experience• LNG history in the US dates back to 1940’s• LNG tanker trade initiated with exports in 1969• Eight marine incidents have resulted in spillage ofLNG - some hull damage due to cold fracture andno cargo fires• Seven incidents not involving spillage - two fromgrounding - no significant cargo loss• LNG carriers are inherently much more robustthan typical crude, fuel, and chemical tankers

U.S. Department of EnergyLNG Tanker at Loading Berth, Kenai, AlaskaPhoto: Courtesy of Phillips Petroleum

U.S. Department of EnergyCross Section of LNG Tanker

U.S. Department of EnergyCutaway Model of LNG Tanker

U.S. Department of EnergyAssessing The Hazard• LNG vaporizes and causes condensation ofatmospheric moisture – visible cloud• As LNG vapor cloud warms it lifts• Water is a superior heat source compared tosoil/solids• Spills on water tend to vaporize rapidly creating apotentially combustible plume that migrates until a)the LNG source is exhausted, and b)dilution by airreduces the concentration below the lowerflammability limit (LFL)

U.S. Department of EnergyAssessing The Hazard• An ignition source close to the origin of the spill islikely to cause ignition and result in rapid burn offof natural gas vapors• Absence of an ignition source would result in aplume that could migrate downwind for aconsiderable distance.• A remote (downwind) ignition of a plume in theflammable portion of the vapor cloud would resultin relatively slow (subsonic) burn back to the spillpool

U.S. Department of EnergyAssessing The Hazard• The opinion of experts indicate thata catastrophic failure caused bycollision or terrorist act would resultin numerous ignition sources close tothe vessel and ignition and burndown would occur

U.S. Department of EnergyJettisoning Test – Trial to test EquipmentPhoto: Courtesy of BP

U.S. Department of EnergyWhat Has Changed Since Sept. 11, 2001?• Everyone is looking at their environmentdifferently• Potential threat to infrastructure hasincreased - Responsible parties are reacting• Assumptions about what constitutes threatsare being reassessed

Assessing the riskU.S. Department of Energy•Models• Analogs• Other related hydrocarbons/chemicals

U.S. Department of EnergyAssessing the risk• Following suspension of LNG tankerdockings at the Distrigas (Tractebel) facilityin Boston Harbor DOE, working withFERC, DOT (OPS), local and state publicsafety officials, commissioned a series ofmodel runs intended to mimic a serious andcatastrophic breaching of a single tank of anLNG carrier.

U.S. Department of EnergyAssessing the riskModeling Catastrophic Failure• One meter (3.3ft.) and five meter (16.4 ft.)hole in one tank of tanker• Rapid (but not instantaneous) loss of cargoonto water• Variable atmospheric conditions• Dispersion, Fire Radiation and Burn Times

U.S. Department of EnergyDispersion Model ResultsQUEST ConsultantsRelease From TankerHole SizeAtmosphericConditionsPasquill-Gifford*Atmospheric stabilityLiquidImpoundmentDistance to LowerFlammability Limit (LFL)5 meters1.5m/sFNo2.5 miles5 meters5 m/sDNo0.6 miles1 meter1.5m/sFNo2.3 miles1 meter5 m/sDNo0.5 miles* Stability D is characterized by fully overcast or partial cloud cover during both daytime and nighttime. The atmosphericturbulence is not as great during D conditions as during A conditions; thus, the gas will not mix as quickly with thesurrounding atmosphere.Stability F corresponds to the most “stable” atmospheric conditions. Stability F generally occurs during the early morninghours before sunrise (thus, no solar radiation) and under low winds. The combination of low winds and lack of solar heatingallows for an atmosphere which appears calm or still and thus restricts the ability to actively mix with the released gas.]

U.S. Department of EnergyPool Fire ResultsQUEST ConsultantsRelease from 25000m 3 TankDistanceToRFL (ft) *Hole SizeAtmosphericConditionsLiquidImpoundment_____________7000 Btu/hr-ft 3_____________4000 Btu/hr-ft 3_____________1500 Btu/hr-ft 35 meter9m/sNo1020126017701 meter9m/sNo83510201420* Radiant Flux Levels - measured from center of pool

U.S. Department of EnergyEstimated Burn TimesQUEST ConsultantsInventory Spilled Time to Burn OutSpill Description (cubic meters) (minutes)-------------------------- ------------------ -----------------5 m. hole in ship 25,000. 37.1 m. hole in ship 25,000. 64.

U.S. Department of EnergySummary of Conclusionsfrom the Lloyd’s ReportReport draws from many sources, historical, experimental, and modeling• Historically for all types of LNG - no loss of life - landbased property damage - environmental damage• LNG carriers inherent strength has prevented loss ofcontainment• A missile hit or explosion will provide a large number ofignition sources• If containment loss should occur under specific conditions– Holing may not be visible

U.S. Department of EnergySummary of Conclusionsfrom the Lloyd’s Report• There is potential for escalating failure due to embrittlement -with subsequent explosion/fire• Ignition and sustained burn of a vaporized LNG cloud isdifficult - multiple ignition sources would probably result in aburn back to the source• Unconfined LNG vapor cloud detonation has not beendemonstrated and unlikely• External ignition (of vapor cloud) results in slow movingflame• Rapid Phase Transition will not cause ignition but potentiallydamaging for ship/equipment

Summary of Conclusionsfrom the Lloyd’s ReportIn terms of pool spreadU.S. Department of Energy• The LFL for methane/air mixtures is ~5% so the LFLboundary is well within the visible cloud• Modeling of dispersion cloud 3-6 km. Dispersion on thatscale unlikely because of local ignition sources• Exposure at 300 meters (1000ft) from a pool fire wouldcause pain within 60 seconds• Warming gas cloud will become lighter than air and rise• No direct environmental damage or clean up from primaryspill• A fire fed by single (25,000 m 3 ) cargo tank vented througha 1m 2 hole would last 1hr - burn diameter 25 meters

U.S. Department of EnergySummary of Conclusions from theLloyd’s ReportSpecific terrorist scenario assessmentsincluded in Lloyd’s report are omittedfrom this summary because of concernfor providing “template” information

U.S. Department of EnergySecurity Issues• Security and threat discussions are notcontemplated in this presentation - Rely onUS Coast Guard to determine treatment• US DOE if asked is willing to consideraccess to security and operations personneland other resources• Security staff from DOE are present today

U.S. Department of EnergySummary• The US market for natural gas is growing -• Part of that market demand will be met by LNG• The experience of the LNG industry suggests thathazards are manageable• 30+ years of experience with marine transport ofLNG - no major failures carriers and cargoinherently safer than other hydrocarbon fuelstransported by ship• Post September 11, 2001- new risk not new hazard

U.S. Department of EnergySummary• Fundamental properties and behavior ofLNG and natural gas remain the same• Risk scenarios do not produce resultsoutside of those contemplated in previousEIS documentation for siting facilities andtransportation of LNG

Information SourcesU.S. Department of Energy• FERC documents• DOT documents• DOE National Laboratories• US Coast Guard• Energy Information Administration• SIGTTO Society of International Gas Tanker andTerminal Operators• Various consultant reports• Industry sources• Other literature