Constructing Papuan Nationalism: History, Ethnicity ... - ScholarSpace

34 Richard ChauvelTwo years later, Jouwe had become even more concerned about theprospects of self-determination, and was forthrightly critiquing theIndonesian government’s attempts at “annihilating” Papua’s right of selfdetermination. In support of his critique, Jouwe cited the examples of late1962 pressures and persuasion applied to “politically inexperiencedPapuan individuals” with expenses paid trips to Jakarta, along with “promises,flattery, persistent if gentle pressure, veiled threats and clear intimidation”to encourage the Papuans to endorse two propositions: (1) that theUNTEA transfer administrative authority to Indonesia on January 1,1963 (instead of May 1, 1963, as provided for in the New YorkAgreement), and (2) that the plebiscite scheduled for 1969 was unnecessarybecause Papuans recognized the 1945 Constitution as the basis of theIndonesian State and considered that Papua had been a part of Indonesiasince the declaration of independence in 1945. 59 Jouwe was also aware ofthe 1963–64 campaign of Indonesia’s Information Minister, RuslanAbdulgani, to undermine the “Act of Free Choice.” The campaign culminatedin the Proclamation of May 16, 1964, read to the province’s representativecouncil by West Irian’s first Governor, the Papuan E. J. Bonay,which encapsulated the second of the above propositions. According toJouwe, this proclamation not only expressed pro-Indonesian sentimentbut was drafted by the Indonesian government itself. Jouwe argued thatthis Proclamation and the earlier statements by Papuan leaders reflectedthe Indonesian government’s view that Papua’s right of self-determinationand the entire New York Agreement no longer existed. The abolition in1963 of the elected New Guinea Council, its replacement by anothercouncil whose members were all appointed by the government, and thedissolution of seven Papuan political parties in December 1963 were allactions contrary to the spirit of the New York Agreement. 60The maltreatment of Papuans was hardlyabsent from the discourse used in the earlier lobbyingby the Papuan leadership in exile, but afterthe mid-1960s it became the dominant theme.There was ample reason for this, as maltreatmentindeed increased as part of the cycle of Papuanresistance and Indonesian repression that developedafter the OPM revolts began in 1965. Thus,for example, Jouwe’s Freedom Committee letterto the UN Secretary General in September 1967, entitled “Cry of DistressThe maltreatment ofPapuans…increased aspart of the cycle ofPapuan resistance andIndonesian repression