The Oil Industry and Human Rights in the Niger Delta - EarthRights ...

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esource rich areas such as the Niger Delta. 52repression against the Ogoni as follows:The Commission summarized the stateThe resistance of the Ogoni people . . . to exploitative relations with the federaland state governments and multinational corporations attracted state repression.In the aftermath of the murder of 4 Ogoni leaders in 1994, the state governmentset up the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force (Joint Task Force). The leaderof the force, Major Paul Okuntimo, was reported to have told the media that theyhad only used 9 out of the several ways of killing people in Ogoniland. Thecommunities in Ogoniland experienced several raids aimed at fishing out theOgoni activists. In the process, several people lost their lives and property. ManyOgoni people had to go into exile . . . after the murder of Ken Saro Wiwa by thejunta. Several Ogoni activists . . . have on various occasions been arrested. In theheat of this repression, violent clashes suspected to have been instigated by thestate security erupted between the Ogoni and their neighbours such as the Andoni,Okrika and Afam. The death toll of the clashes, which is enormous, is yet to beascertained. 53On the subject of the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force – one of the majorsecurity forces used by the Nigerian government to suppress Ogoni protests – the OputaCommission concluded that:…[T]he establishment of some institutions like the Rivers State Task Force on InternalSecurity though purposely established for the sake of maintaining peace wascounterproductive because the Security Agents (i.e. Nigerian soldiers) abused theirpositions to illegally arrest and detain innocent people and also raped women in the nameof maintaining peace and order. 54Unfortunately, the abuses in Ogoniland were not exceptional. Throughout the 1990s,numerous other communities who protested against Shell or demanded compensationwere met with severe force by the Nigerian security forces. 55Shell’s ResponseWhile not accepting responsibility for any of these abuses, Shell has acknowledged that ithas taken steps to prevent the recurrence of violence connected with its operations.According to Human Rights Watch, after the Umuechem massacre, Shell stated that ithad “learned from the ‘regrettable and tragic’ incident at Umuechem, so that it wouldnow never call for Mobile Police protection.” 5652 Oputa Commission Report, Synoptic Overview, at 98-99.53 Oputa Commission Report, vol. 3, at 50-51.54 Oputa Commission Report, vol. 4 at 149.55 See generally Human Rights Watch, “The Price of Oil” (Jan. 1999); Human Rights Watch / Africa,“Nigeria: The Ogoni Crisis: A Case-Study of Military Repression in Southeastern Nigeria” (July 1995).56 Human Rights Watch, “The Price of Oil,” at 162 (Jan. 1999).Page 12 of 29
In 2002, Human Rights Watch noted that Shell had “undertaken a major review of itsattitude toward communities and issues of human rights and sustainable development”following the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa. 57 However, although “Shell has madeserious efforts to improve its performance in Nigeria . . . these efforts have in too manyareas yet to yield meaningful results on the ground. . . . For the villager living near Shell'sfacilities in the Niger Delta, little if anything has changed: too often, oil spills still destroyfarming land or fishing grounds and remediation is poor; state security forces deployed toShell’s facilities continue to harass people indiscriminately; and the benefits of the oilindustry are still channeled to a small elite.” 58 Shell has yet to resume oil production inOgoniland.Chevron and the Parabe IncidentFollowing the Ogoni crisis, one of the best-documented incidents of abuses against oilprotesters is the 1998 attack on a demonstration at Chevron’s Parabe platform. In thisincident, Chevron did precisely what Shell vowed never to do after Umuechem—itexpressly called on the military and the mobile police to respond to a demonstration.Chevron had previously had its own direct experience with the military’s use of forceagainst protestors. In May 1994, when protestors used boats to blockade Chevronfacilities at Opuekeba in Ondo State, the Nigerian security forces responded by sending abarge in that sunk sixteen boats, killing three people by drowning and causing otherinjuries. 59 When Ilaje communities engaged in protests several years later, Chevronknew of the security forces’ propensity to violence.The Ilaje are a small ethnic group of Nigerians, many of whom live in relatively remoteswamplands and river areas in Ondo State in the southwest Niger River delta region.Many of these communities can only be accessed from the air or by water. Ilajeland, as itis called, has been severely disrupted by Chevron’s operations and the environmentaldamage it has caused; the destruction of the local environment has meant great hardshipand unemployment for many Ilaje people, as well as the loss of traditional food supplies.Saltwater incursions have devastated freshwater fish stocks, killed vegetation, anddestroyed sources of potable water. 60 Gas flaring has caused dangerous air pollution andacid rain that eats through metal roofs. 61 Bola Oyinbo, an Ilaje community leader,described the impacts: “Go to Awoye community and see what they have done.Everything there is dead: mangroves, tropical forests, fish, the freshwater, wildlife. Allkilled by Chevron. . . . At Abiteye, Chevron discharges hot effluent into the creeks. Ourpeople complain of ‘dead creeks.’” 6257 Human Rights Watch, “The Niger Delta: No Democratic Dividend,” at 30 (Oct. 2002).58 Id. at 31.59 Human Rights Watch / Africa, “Nigeria: The Ogoni Crisis: A Case-Study of Military Repression inSoutheastern Nigeria,” at 33 (July 1995).60 Deposition of Monday Omosaye in Bowoto v. Chevron Corp. at 17:3-14, 19:13-20 (Aug. 18, 2005);deposition of Chief Nicholas Omomowo in Bowoto v. Chevron Corp. at 342:15-344:10 (Jan. 28, 2005).61 Deposition of Philemon Ebiesuwa in Bowoto v. Chevron Corp. at 152:18-157:12 (July 12, 2005).62 Interview with Bola Oyinbo.Page 13 of 29
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