Is comparative politics dead? Rethinking the field in the post-Cold ...

HOWARD J WIARDAmore conservative political±economy agenda. At the same time, Germany andSpain have right-of-centre governments that have done little to privatise, rollback state size, or curtail social welfare. In other words, the post-cold warconsensus on neoliberalism is forcing all governments to coalesce around afairly agreed-upon policy of opening markets and downsising the state but onlymodestly, and also reducing welfare but also only modestly. All governments ofboth Left and Right are following this essentially centrist agenda, pursuing thepolitics of `more or less’ , and thus altering both their electoral strategies andtheir search for coalition allies.Sixth, these changes also help explain the new emphasis on institutions(neo-institutionalism) in comparative politics. The implications of the argumentpresented here are that ideologies, party labels, and particularly extremist partiesof Left and Right in this new era of relative consensus on political economy arebecoming less important than in the past. Indeed, it may be that the electoralarena itself, when parties and policy are grouping around the centre and voterapathy is high, is also becoming less important, giving way to increasinglyimportant emphasis on corporatist forms of management and administration.With parties, ideologies and perhaps even elections in decline, there is renewedemphasis on institutions of government, particularly the ef® ciency, properorganisation, cost-effectiveness and deliverability of services of these institutions.Hence, within comparative politics there is a new interest in and emphasison institutions and institutionalisation that may, after a 40-year interregnum, leadus back to the quite sophisticated work on institutions of a Carl Friedrich,Herman Finer, or Karl Loewenstein in earlier decades, or Peter Merkl or JorgenRasmussen still today. 40 New approaches to studying institutions are, of course,needed but of the usefulness of the institutional focus itself there is little doubt.However, if the state is changing and/or contracting, seventh, we will need tomodify our views of state±society relations as well. The structure, main institutions,and practice of corporatism and neocorporatism will also need to bereviewed and our interpretations reformulated. Similarly, the politics of interestgroup activity, particularly the incorporation of interest groups into state decisionmaking, will require new approaches and new ways of thinking. 41 In addition,the relations between the central state, regional entities, and local governmentwill need to be re-evaluated, particularly since decentralisation is now widelyseen as a more effective way to deliver public servicesÐ back to institutionalissues again.Eighth, comparative politics is also likely to focus in the future on lower-level,more technical, narrower and more specialised topics. These will include studiesof voting behaviour, public opinion, electoral strategies and coalition management.These are, of course, all interesting and worthwhile topics; it is not ourpurpose here to denigrate them. But these topics do not carry the same pizazz,the excitement, or the portent of great changes to come as did the great systemstopics of comparative politics in the past. And that is precisely our point in thisessay.ConclusionComparative politics is a quite different ® eld from what it was 10, 20, 30 and946