Making of Bill Creech - Project Gutenberg Consortia Center

THINKING ABOUT AIR WARFARE50. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, vol. 2, 1961–1984, 554.51. Gen W. L. Creech, interview by the author, 11 January 2002.52. Creech (address, Association of the US Army, 21 October 1981), 9.53. Creech (address, Air Force Association Symposium, 13 November1981), 6.54. Creech, oral history interview, 221–22.55. Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle, 62.56. Starry, oral history interview, 21.57. Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle, 63.58. Creech, oral history interview, 222–23.59. Drew, “Two Decades in the Air Power Wilderness,” 12.60. Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Functions and Basic Doctrine, 2-13.61. Murray, “Tale of Two Doctrines,” 89.62. AFM 1-1, Functions and Basic Doctrine, 6-5.63. Tactical Air Command Manual (TACM) 2-1, Tactical Air Operations, 1-2.64. Ibid., 4-30.65. Fallows, “Muscle-Bound Superpower,” 77.66. Charles Myers, “Deep-Strike Interdiction,” 47.67. Machos, “Air-Land Battles or AirLand Battle?” 38.68. Bennie Davis, “Indivisible Airpower,” 46, 48.69. History, Tactical Air Command (U), 1 January–31 December 1979,31–36. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.70. Berry, “TAC and TRADOC,” 27, 36.71. Cardwell, “One Step Beyond,” 49.72. Machos, “Air-Land Battles or AirLand Battle?” 36. See also Starry,oral history interview, 13.73. Winton, “Ambivalent Partnership,” 405.74. “Interdiction: An Operational Perspective.” Creech’s handwrittencomments on slides, ca. 2002.75. Richard Davis, 31 Initiatives, 91–92.76. Ibid., 93–104.77. Ibid., 105–15.78. Chapman et al., Prepare the Army for War, 98.79. See Reese, “Doctrine Gap.”80. Fogleman, “Multinational Joint Doctrine,” 5.81. Starry, oral history interview, 42.82. Fastabend, “That Elusive Operational Concept,” 39–40.83. Dixon, “TAC-TRADOC Dialogue,” 45–46.84. Gen Merrill A. McPeak, to the author, e-mail, 10 January 2002. GeneralMcPeak wrote, “So, mostly, Creech’s was a holding action, using a variety ofdevices, including personal charm, which he turned on as needed, to holdTRADOC at bay, and slow rolling on any Army proposals that pushed toohard into our business. . . . He agreed to set up an office (under my generalsupervision) which was expected to do various studies leading at best to inconsequentialresults.” General Creech adamantly insists that McPeak’s interpretationis incorrect and that it was simply a matter of a shared vision49