Scope and Verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty

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CoverageAll production and use of civilian fissile materialsafter entry into force should be safeguarded.All existing civilian fissile material also should besafeguardedAll material declared as excess for weapons shouldbe brought under safeguards (if necessary afterconversion to unclassified form)Military non-explosive materials (e.g. naval HEU)should not be used for weapons
Verification ProtocolsNon-nuclear-weapon States with a comprehensivesafeguards agreement and an AdditionalProtocol have no further obligations (but mustmake special arrangements for use of fissilematerials in naval propulsion and whenproducing or using neptunium and/or americium)Other (weapon) states need to make specialagreements with the IAEAThis approach would bring convergence betweenthe basic safeguards obligations of nuclearweaponstates and non-weapon states
Page 1 and 2: Scope and Verification of aFissile
Page 3 and 4: About IPFMEstablished in January 20
Page 6 and 7: Fissile Material (Cutoff) TreatyGlo
Page 8 and 9: Modern Thermonuclear WarheadA moder
Page 10 and 11: HEU Stockpiles, 2008Global stockpil
Page 12 and 13: The Naval HEU Problemin a Disarming
Page 14 and 15: The Civilian Plutonium Problemin a
Page 16 and 17: Design Recommendations for an FM(C)
Page 20 and 21: A Conference of States Parties (CSP
Page 22 and 23: Fissile Material (Cutoff) TreatyVer
Page 24 and 25: 1: Shutdown FacilitiesLargest HEU a
Page 26 and 27: New challenge: For enrichment plant
Page 28 and 29: 4. Challenge Inspections at Militar
Page 30 and 31: 6. Non-diversion of HEU in the Nava
Page 32 and 33: Overall Conclusions1. The technical

Scope and Verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty

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