Sold down the river - Salva le Foreste

4SOLD DOWN THE RIVERIntroduction© FORESTS MONITORThe six Central Africancountries featured in thisreport – Cameroon, CentralAfrican Republic, Congo(Brazzaville), DemocraticRepublic of Congo,Equatorial Guinea andGabonLogging trucks inCameroonTHE COUNTRIES OF THE Central African region, through which the hugeCongo River and its tributaries flow, are rich in natural resources – oil, diamondsand other minerals, as well as forests. But despite this wealth, the countries’ peoplesare among the poorest in the world and their governments remain deeply indebted tomultilateral institutions and the former colonial powers.The six Central African countries featured in this report – Cameroon, Central AfricanRepublic, Congo (Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon– all contain large expanses of rainforest that have provided livelihoods, building materialsand medicines to millions of forest-dependent peoples. These countries’ governments, oftenunder strict structural adjustment and liberalisation policies imposed by multilateral andbilateral creditors, are promoting industrial timber exploitation in most of their forest areaswhilst local people have no opportunities to participate meaningfully in deciding how best touse forest resources. Although governments and creditors actively promote transnationalprivate investment in the forestry sector, they have done little to establish a framework forcontrolling these private interests. Forestry and environment laws, which provide a minimumoperating standard, are often unclear and are rarely enforced. This has led to forest policiesthat, on the one hand, undermine the livelihoods and increase the insecurity of local peopleswhilst, on the other, facilitate the dominance of unaccountable corporations.Transnational companies should not separate their operations from the broader politicalframework within which they operate. Political conflicts within countries add to thedifficulties of operating there and also throw up ethical dilemmas about direct or indirectsupport for repressive regimes and factions. Timber sector revenues may fuel conflict directly,as has happened in Liberia and Cambodia. If logging advances into areas of existing conflictwithin the Central African region, political, social and economic problems will be exacerbated,particularly if the prevalent haphazard and illegal forestry practices continue. Insecuritygenerated by unsustainable logging operations, such as loss of rights to forest resources anddeclining food availability, may also produce conflict in the longer term.Forests Monitor believes that there should be regulatory frameworks within whichtransnational corporations operate, both in the countries of operation and in the countrieswhere they are headquartered, that foster accountability and that put the needs and rights offorest-dependent peoples at the heart of their actions. Increasingly, civil society in Africa isfinding a voice to speak out against human rights abuses, the burden of debt andenvironmental degradation. Such movements should be supported so that they can play anincreasing role in defining and establishing equitable development goals that respect forestdependentpeoples’ livelihoods and knowledge.This report examines the political, social and economic context for forest managementpolices in each of the six Central African countries and focuses on the transnational loggingcompanies headquartered in the European Union (EU) that operate there. The reasons for thisfocus are three-fold. Firstly, the EU continues to play an important role politically andeconomically in Central Africa,directly and indirectly shaping forestdevelopment and conservationpolicies. Secondly, EU-based loggingcompanies continue to be significantplayers in the forestry sector of theregion, controlling most of the loggingconcessions and processing plants andplaying an active role in internationalfora on forest management in theregion. Thirdly, the EU continues tobe the primary destination for exportsof timber products from the region.For these reasons, EU member states,and the multilateral institutions ofwhich they are a part, can and shouldplay a strategic role in establishingsustainable principles by which EUheadquarteredcompanies shouldoperate.

REGIONAL OVERVIEW 5Part IRegional OverviewPeople and forests in Central AfricaTHE CONGO BASIN contains the second largest area of tropical rainforest inthe world after the Amazon Basin. Renowned for its biodiversity, this forest is hometo culturally diverse peoples who directly depend on the forest for food, buildingmaterials and medicines. Non-timber forest products (NTFPs) and subsistence agriculture havetraditionally formed the basis of local livelihoods and exchange networks between differentgroups of people living in these forest areas. Social interactions have involved complex sets ofeconomic, social and power relationships between and within these groups. For example,Pygmies have traditionally hunted bushmeat, collected honey and other NTFPs from the forestwhich they trade with neighbouring Bantu farmers for agricultural products and other goods.The relationships between these groups, however, have rarely been based on equality, andPygmies have often found themselves discriminated against. However, all the people who livein and depend on the rainforests of Central Africa, whether hunter-gatherers or sedentaryfarmers and fisherpeople, are invariably excluded from decision-making concerning themanagement and use of the forests upon which they depend for their livelihoods and, in thecase of Pygmy groups, for their spiritual and cultural identity. This exclusion means that localpeoples’ needs are not taken into account when governments, often under pressure frommultilateral and bilateral creditors, decide on forest management strategies.Local people have few or non-existent tenure rights to the forests upon which they depend.Development policies, often imposed by multilateral and bilateral creditors, and implementedby remote, weak and sometimes corrupt governments, allocate large tracts of these forests tosometimes equally corrupt forestry companies as concessions for timber extraction. Thebalance of power regarding forest use, management and rights tilts even further away fromlocal people and towards private interests, often represented by a few transnationalcorporations. In this framework, the opportunities for fostering local-level development thatPeople who live inand depend on therainforests ofCentral Africa areexcluded fromdecision-makingconcerning theirmanagement anduse.Villagers in south eastCameroon© FORESTS MONITOR

6SOLD DOWN THE RIVERLocalcommunities seejust a tinyfraction, if any, ofthe moneygenerated by theinternationaltrade in timber…On the otherhand, the arrivalof large-scaleforestry operationsdisrupts theexisting locallivelihood baseand access toforest resources.brings long-term benefits equitably to all local people, whilst safeguarding the ecologicalimportance of the forests, are rarely considered. At worst, such opportunities are lostaltogether as resources become degraded.Whilst those who promote industrial forestry as the best development option for CentralAfrica’s forests highlight the direct benefits of employment provision and infrastructuredevelopment such as schools, clinics and churches, evidence from the ground presents acomplex and far from positive picture of the impact of such operations on local developmentand livelihoods.Part of the rationale for promoting industrial timber production is that the sectorcontributes to poverty alleviation in the region. This rationale needs to be challenged. A 1991Oxfam report concluded that opening up Africa’s forests to exploitation would “cause anincrease in poverty rather than its resolution”, whilst a 1990 report for the EuropeanCommunity stated that “forestry development and deforestation generally go hand in handwith the redistribution of wealth from the poorest … to a national elite and foreign companies(and) widen the gap between the rich and the poor in tropical countries”. 1 In February 2000, aworkshop organised by the UK government’s Department for International Development(DFID) found that industrial timber production in Cameroon “tends to benefit a smallminority (often foreign investors), and its contribution to poverty alleviation is minimal.” 2The workshop made a series of recommendations which would need to be implemented beforelocal development could be equitably achieved, including greater transparency in the use of theincome generated by forest resources; equity in the redistribution of income; institutionaldecentralisation; and creating favourable conditions for local people to help alleviate povertythemselves. 3Timber is a valuable commodity, fetching high prices on international markets. In 1999, thevalue of timber imported into the EU from the Central African countries featured in this reportwas US$ 609 million. 4 Yet the producing countries struggle to provide even basic services tothe majority of their populations. Although specific social development projects may beoutlined in the logging agreement between the government and companies, these projects areThe Moabi issueBy Catarina CardosoGrowing up to 60 metres tall and 5 metresin diameter, Moabi is one of the largesttrees found in the forests of the CongoBasin. 1 Its timber is exploited in Cameroon,Gabon – where production is rapidlyincreasing - and, to a lesser extent, inEquatorial Guinea and the Republic ofCongo. 2 Moabi is very fragile in terms ofregeneration since it flowers late – not till 50or 70 years of age – and fruit productiononly occurs once every three years. 3Indiscriminate logging thus easily leads toits extinction 4 and in some areas Moabi hasindeed already been logged out. 5 Moabitrees are particularly important to the localpopulations and disputes with loggingcompanies over this species are frequent,especially in Cameroon.For Bantu villagers and Baka Pygmies(particularly the Bantu and Baka women),Moabi is important in economic, culturaland medicinal terms. 6 Moabi fruits areedible and from the bark of the tree theyextract remedies for dental and backproblems. 7 From the fruit seeds theyproduce Karité oil, which is used for bothconsumption and trade. Demand inCameroonian markets for Karité oil is higherthan supply and revenues from sellingmoabi oil represent an important source ofincome. Estimates suggest that oil revenuesfor a 10 year period surpass timberrevenues for a tree of 100 centimetresdiameter, the minimum size trees mustlegally be when logged. 8 The tree’s nontimbervalue is not only recognised by localmarkets but also by the French cosmeticsindustry which has shown an interest in theoil. 9 Moabi is also valuable in internationaltimber markets and demand from SouthernEurope is particularly high. 10 However, inrelative terms Moabi does not appear torepresent a significant component ofcompanies’ revenues and country exports.In Cameroon, Moabi timber represents 10%of companies’ total production and between3.4% and 5% of the total export value oflogs of all species. 11 The main Moabiexporter is Gabon, whose exports haveconsiderably increased in the last threeyears, from 26,052 cubic metres in 1996 to39,724 cubic metres in 1998. 12 Cameroonproduced 33,000 cubic metres in 1997 and35,000 cubic metres in 1998. 13 In EquatorialGuinea production is also on the rise, andestimates suggest that it doubled from1,000 cubic metres in the early 1990s, to2,000 cubic metres in 1999. 14Moabi trees located within 5 kilometresof the village cannot be logged unless thechief of the village agrees to it and in such acase the population must be compensated.In practice, most Moabi trees near villageshave been logged and the local populationhave not always been compensated. 15 Localpopulations in Cameroon have oftendemanded recognition of their rights butwithout success. 16Moabi logging practices are generallyunsustainable and the species maydisappear in a large part of its original areasof distribution in 10 to 20 years. 17 In the Djaforests of Cameroon nearly all valuable treesare logged without companies undertakingany initiative to ensure the regeneration ofspecies. 18 Over-harvesting occurs becausecompanies do not comply with the law aswell as because the law itself is notsufficiently protective of Moabi. Companiesregularly disrespect the legal requirementthat trees of less than 100 centimetresdiameter should not be logged. 19 In July1999, for example, logs of only 65centimetres and 85 centimetres diameterwere found in the French port of Nantes-St.-Nazaire. 20 However, even if only trees of100 centimetres diameter were cut, theregeneration of Moabi would still be atserious risk. 21 Specialists argue that it isnecessary to increase the minimumdiameter of trees logged and to implementmeasures to conserve “mother trees” thatcan ensure regeneration of the species. 22World Bank staff go further, advocating atotal ban on Moabi logging and arguing that“management plans must be devised incollaboration with local people to banlogging of similar [to moabi] trees”. 23

REGIONAL OVERVIEW 7sometimes undertaken in lieu of tax payments or under contract to the government andthus are undertaken at the government’s, not the company’s, expense. Loggingcompanies have not always met their formal or informal agreements with regard tosocial provision. 5 In some instances, meanwhile, taxes have been paid by companies forlocal infrastructure developments which have not materialised 6 or which are so poorlyequipped or staffed that they are unable to provide basic services (see boxes pages 19and 50).Local communities themselves see just a tiny fraction, if any, of the money generatedby the international trade in timber. Some employment opportunities arise, but notnecessarily for people living locally; employment is often short-term and remuneration isgenerally low. Facilities for the workforce are often provided but the quality of provisioncan be very poor and other people have varying rights of access to these facilities. Onthe other hand, the arrival of large-scale forestry operations disrupts the existing locallivelihood base and access to forest resources. NTFPs become scarce, resulting in adirect loss of income for many local peoples; women and the elderly are particularlybadly affected as they are often the ones to collect and trade in NTFPs, providingvaluable food and cash for families. The changing roles and relationships which developwithin and between communities generates conflict and often results in themarginalisation of certain communities, such as Pygmies, and community members,such as women and the elderly. Some of the most valuable trees in terms of timber havebeen highly valued locally for their many uses. The over-exploitation of these species canseriously disrupt local livelihoods and lead to a net loss of cash income for many (see theMoabi and Sapelli boxes).Forestry operations act as a magnet, often attracting thousands of newcomers deepinto the rainforest. These new settlements are totally dependent on forestry activities;once the timber extraction finishes, the towns invariably collapse. Such boom-and-busttowns are not sustainable: they cause social tensions between newcomers and existingcommunities, increase pressure on natural resources including bushmeat, and facilitatealcoholism and prostitution.Pygmies are particularly affected by the presence of forestry companies, as theybecome even more marginalised in relation to their farming neighbours and thenewcomers to the forest. 7 In the logging camps of the southern forests, especially aroundthe borders between Central African Republic, Cameroon and Congo (Brazzaville),Pygmies make up between 30% and 47% of the workforce. 8 Well-known for their skillsin the forest, they are hired as guides to find the best trees and to hunt for bushmeat. 9But Pygmies are discriminated against in relation to other ethnic groups working in thecamps, being given fewer amenities than the latter. In terms of health, food and spirituallife, they also suffer. Diseases such as alcoholism, malaria, ulcers and tuberculosis, forexample, are widespread in the camps.With the degradation of forests, traditional ways of life are being eroded, threateningfood security and livelihoods. 10 Whilst the hunting of bushmeat has been a traditionallivelihood for forest peoples, in particular Pygmies, the development of a large-scalecommercial trade in bushmeat is relatively recent and has been directly and indirectlyfacilitated by the development of timber production. As a result of thecommercialisation of the bushmeat trade, wildlife populations are being decimated,including rare and endangered animals such as elephants and lowland gorillas. Inresponse, partnerships are being formed between the private sector, internationalenvironmental NGOs and government ministries to reduce the hunting of non-protectedspecies, to establish bushmeat substitution programmes, for example fish breeding andchicken farms, and to eliminate the hunting of protected species such as primates andelephants.Other challenges, however, remain largely unaddressed: how to ensure thatdevelopment of these fragile forest areas does not lead to the deterioration of the foreststhemselves; how to ensure that traditional rights of indigenous forest peoples areupheld; how to ensure that development and/or conservation is inclusive and equitable,and does not favour one group over another; how to ensure that the benefits ofdevelopment are fairly distributed over the long-term between private companies, thestate and local populations; how to protect the integrity of key areas of biological andcultural importance in an equitable and culturally sensitive way; how to mitigate or haltcommercial forestry operations if they generate poverty, degrade the forests anddiminish local peoples’ future rights to healthy forests. The solutions to some of theseproblems will require radical changes in power balances, approaches to forestmanagement and policy formation.Indigenous Uses ForThe Sapelli Tree InNorthern CongoBy Jerome LewisFor all ethnic groups living innorthern Congo the sapelli tree(boyo in Mbendjele and mboyo inLingala) represents an importantand highly valued resource. Itsuses fall into three categories:Food, medicine, and as aconstruction material.Large sapelli are the uniquehost of the Imbrasia (Nudaurelia)oyemensis caterpillar, a highlyregarded local delicacy. Theirimportance is shown by the periodwhen the caterpillars fall from thetrees being named ‘caterpillarseason’ and studies have shownthat 75% of the protein eaten byPygmies at this time is fromcaterpillars. 1 Caterpillars fall fromlarge emergent trees during therainy season when game is difficultto hunt, fishing is unsuccessful andnext season’s crops are not yetripe. Both farmers and huntergatherersconsider the caterpillarsa blessing.Sapelli caterpillars areespecially valued for their delicioustaste and great numbers collectedin a short time. Their small size(c.60mm by 15mm) and firmtexture allow them to dry outexceptionally well for preservation.Sapelli caterpillars are a high valuetrade item in local commerce.Collecting caterpillars is acommunal task providing animportant source of income forwomen and the elderly.The most important medicinalproperties of sapelli are theanalgesic and anti-inflammatoryeffects of the bark and outer trunk.It may also have certain antibacterialproperties. 2 It iscommonly used for the treatmentof the severe head-achesassociated with malaria, of swollenand painful eye infections and alsoto relieve exhausted and painfulfeet.The qualities of durability,strength, buoyancy and waterresistanceresult in sapelli woodbeing considered the best formaking pirogues. Sapelli is alsodesired for the central roofsupportsof local houses.

8SOLD DOWN THE RIVERNationalgovernments havecontinued theforest exploitationpoliciesintroduced by thecolonial powers.They aresupported andencouraged in thisby the multilateraland bilateralinstitutions towhom they areheavily indebted.EU involvement in Central Africa’s rainforestsMANY ARGUE THAT the Central African region is still subject to a system ofneo-colonialism, perpetuated by the former colonial powers, foreign capital and afew powerful elites at national levels. 11 France, Belgium, Germany, the UK andSpain all played a significant part in the colonial history of the region and all continue to bepowerful partners in terms of trade in resources and the direction of macro-economic policiesand conservation initiatives. They are joined in their endeavours by their EU partners, NorthAmerica and multilateral development banks, notably the World Bank and IMF. There arecountless instances that highlight which of the groups of countries – the colonial powers ortheir former colonies – maintain the balance of power, not least the structural adjustmentpolicies and conditionalities imposed by creditors. President Omar Bongo of Gabon, one of theAfrican leaders most closely allied with French administrations, is said to have describedFrance without Africa as being like a car without petrol and that Africa without France waslike a car without a driver. 12 For the most part, the former colonial countries, together with themultilateral institutions of which they are a part and the transnational corporations that areheadquartered in them, remain firmly in the driving seat, dictating the terms of developmentand conservation in the region.Since their independence several decades ago, most of the six countries featured in thisreport – Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Democratic Republic ofCongo (formerly Zaire), Equatorial Guinea and Gabon – have experienced periods of oftenviolent political turmoil. None have yet achieved a robust democracy founded on the fullinvolvement of their citizens. All six countries find themselves unable to provide even basiclevels of education and healthcare for many of their citizens. They all have enormous debtburdens, paying multilateral and bilateral creditors huge sums in debt repayments each year.These crippling debt repayments, a lack of democratic space for meaningful civil societyinvolvement and corruption inhibit the emergence and implementation of policies that wouldfacilitate ecologically sustainable and socially just development.Forest management policiesWithin this context, national governments have continued the forest exploitation policiesintroduced last century or earlier by the colonial powers. They are supported and encouragedin this by the multilateral and bilateral institutions, to whom they are heavily indebted, as partof the structural adjustment policies and economic liberalisation programmes imposed bythese institutions as a condition of further lending. Thus, the primary goal of forest policies inthe region is to promote industrial timber production for export by allocating most of theforest as logging concessions. The policy framework put in place to facilitate this level ofindustrial exploitation has little regard for local peoples’ needs and rights nor the capacity of acountry’s institutions to monitor and enforce these policies. Forest laws themselves are oftenunclear or conflicting.Regardless of the wider issues of socially just development, within this narrow view offorests as a source of timber, serious problems exist in the region’s forestry sector. Nationallaws may set a minimum standard in terms of forestry management practices, but evenreaching that minimum standard seems to be the exception rather than the rule. Governmentsdo not have the capacity to monitor forestry companies’ operations nor to enforce legislation(not least because recent World Bank and IMF programmes have required reductions in thenumber of public employees and their salaries). Although on-the-ground data about forestryactivities is scarce from all six countries, it is clear from Cameroon, where the trade’s activitieshave begun to be monitored more closely by civil society and the Ministry responsible forforests, that illegal logging and illegal trade in timber is rampant; in the East Province, wheremost timber production is currently taking place, it has been estimated that 50% of timberharvested is illegal. 13 Given the weak or non-existent capacity of other national governments tomonitor companies and enforce legislation, there is little to suppose that the situation is muchdifferent in the other countries of the region.The recent influx of Asian private capital into the Central African forestry sector hasbrought more aggressive and more openly short-term logging to the area, with a greatervariety of species being exploited in a short space of time, primarily for log exports. 14 Thisapproach has been compared unfavourably to the selective logging techniques practised byEuropean forestry companies. Whilst those who advocate industrial timber exploitation inCentral Africa’s forests argue that large concessions are required in order to practisesustainable forestry management techniques over a long period, selective logging techniquesthemselves are not proven to be sustainable, even in terms of sustained yields of timber overthe long-term. Most European forestry companies practise selective logging, whereby theyextract a few, high value timber species from the forest. Although this method of loggingcauses less damage to the canopy than clearcut logging, it is not without negative

REGIONAL OVERVIEW 9environmental consequences. The search for the best trees means that companies drive roadsinto relatively large areas of forest to extract just a few trees. This opens up the forest tocommercial bushmeat hunters who have decimated wildlife in logging areas. The technique ofselecting the largest trees of a particular species has consequences for local uses and for themaintenance of biodiversity, with the regeneration of the target species not guaranteed.Despite legislation requiring increased downstream processing in-country, such as theproduction of sawn wood, veneer or other products, which would bring more revenue, theexport of whole logs from the region still predominates, with the processing taking placeelsewhere, mainly in Europe or Asia. But value-added processing policies bring problems oftheir own: demand for logs to supply large processing plants leads to increased pressure on theforests, fuelling unsustainable and illegal timber harvesting. Some argue that there is alreadyover-capacity in Cameroon if the forests are not to be destroyed.Some European companies have admitted that forestry operations have not beensustainable in Central Africa in the past: a director of French company Rougier stated in aninterview with a French trade journal that, for the last 40 years, operations generally havemined the forest. 15 This unsustainable harvesting has led to companies moving into newareas of rainforest over time, leaving a trail of forest degradation in their wake. Many of thecompanies that have been operating for decades in Central Africa are only now starting todraw up forest management plans, although often this work is subsidised and undertakenby third parties, such as bilateral government departments or international NGOs. It is notclear to what extent European companies which operate as sub-contractors can and doinsist on sustainable forest management plans when they undertake logging on behalf ofother concession holders.International financial assistanceMuch of the drive towards industrial exploitation of Central Africa’s forests has arisendirectly out of structural adjustment and liberalisation policies imposed by multilateral andbilateral creditors. France is one of the largest bilateral lenders and aid donors to the regionand French companies play a significant part in exploiting the region’s forests (see table 1,page 11). Other EU member states, as well as the EU itself, have provided large amounts offinancial assistance – as loans and grants – to Central African countries for decades. Fundsare often used for the preparation of forest inventories, for assistance to EU forestrycompanies to draft forest management plans or for the establishment and running ofconservation areas. The European Commission (EC) has made a number of policy statementsregarding tropical forests, which have made it clear that the EC sees its role in the context ofconserving tropical forests. In 1989, this included a strategy to establish actions withreference to timber trade, within which was foreseen the establishment of a code of conductfor European logging companies. 16 Despite being seen as a priority, this has not happened todate. In 1995, a Forest Protocol was added to the Lomé Convention (Protocol No 10). ThisProtocol requests, among other things, support to assist African, Caribbean and Pacific(ACP) countries to develop sustainable forest management, and stresses the need to get woodfrom sustainably managed forests onto the market. 17 One of the EU’s largest conservationand sustainable development projects is the Conservation and Rational Utilisation of theForest Ecosystems of Central Africa (ECOFAC), which operates in six protected areas in theregion. The project was established in 1992 and has received US$ 33 million.The World Bank has provided technical assistance for forestry sector reform, helpingwith the drafting of the current forestry law in Cameroon and the draft new forestry law inGabon, for example. This technical assistance has been firmly based on supporting thedevelopment of the industrial timber sector, with the objective of improving the efficiency oftimber extraction and in particular the capturing of economic rent from the sector. Whilstthe competitive tendering process introduced into Cameroon may reduce, but not eliminate,corruption among civil servants and transnational employees, the fact that the biddingprocess is weighted in favour of financial rather than technical merit does not encourage thepromotion of sustainable forestry management, and may indeed foster short-term profitseekingover long-term sustainable forest management (see Cameroon, p. 13).By far the most important step towards assisting long-term sustainable development inthese countries would be debt cancellation. Most debt is owed to the G7 group of countries,either directly or through the World Bank and IMF. Many of the countries in this reportspend more on debt repayments than they do on health and education combined, and repaymore money than they receive in grants each year. Some G7 countries have pledged tocancel at least some of the outstanding debt. The World Bank and IMF have established theHeavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC), which will cancel some, but not all, debtof some countries (see HIPC, right). Despite the levels of poverty in each of the countries inthis report, only Cameroon has qualified to have some of its debt cancelled, although this isconditional on a number of factors, including institutional reform within governmentregarding the forestry sector.The primary goalof forest policiesin the region is topromote industrialtimber productionfor export byallocating most ofthe forest asloggingconcessions.HIPCThe Heavily-IndebtedPoor Countries Initiative(HIPC) was established in1996 by the World Bankand IMF and introducedthe concept of “debtsustainability”. Creditorsassess how much of itsdebt a country can pay offover the medium- to longterm(sustainable debt)and then write-off theremainder (unsustainabledebt). Only debts accruedbefore a certain datequalify for HIPC, not alldebt. The measurement of“sustainable” debt isbased mainly on the ratioof debt service paymentsto export earnings, not toa country’s absolutepoverty or its people’spoverty.To qualify forreductions, a countrymust spend six yearsengaged in strict economicreforms under IMFsupervision. It must openitself up to foreign goods,privatise state-ownedenterprises, deregulate itsfinancial and bankingsectors, cut publicspending and implement apoverty reductionstrategy. One of thecentral purposes of theHIPC Initiative is toencourage privateinvestment. An estimatedhalf of the HIPC -designated countries willnot meet the reformtargets and thus will notqualify for debt relief.

REGIONAL OVERVIEW 11Little has been done by consuming countries to address the issues of unsustainable levels oftimber production and consumption, the trade in illegally felled logs and the smuggling oftimber. Any contribution that independent certification could make to tackling these problemswill be endangered if non-financial barriers to trade are reduced or prohibited under WorldTrade Organization non-tariff measures (NTMs) rules. Such NTMs might include ecolabellingand forest certification schemes, import and export quotas, log export bans,requirements for recycling, and subsidies. 25 Prohibition of potentially beneficial measureswould damage the prospects for the implementation of sustainable timber production,environmental integrity and poverty alleviation.CompaniesEuropean companies directly or indirectly control most of the forests in Central Africa fortimber exploitation, as concession holders and/or as sub-contractors (see maps pp. 34-39). Thecompanies who undertake logging are often the main point of contact between local peopleand the outside world. They operate almost as a surrogate state in many remote places, andare looked upon as the main provider of basic services. However, this dependence on therelative benevolence of a handful of foreign-owned private companies is not a basis uponwhich sustainable development can be assured. The company profiles in Part III of this reportindicate marked differences in European companies’ standards of operations, even by the samecompanies in different countries. The best claim to operate within the laws of each country,practise technically proficient harvesting, have committed to drawing up sustainable forestmanagement plans and provide social infrastructure for workers. The worst are involved inillegal felling of timber and/or provide no discernible benefits to workers, other than poorlypaid and insecure employment. Even the best, however, have some considerable way to gobefore their operations can be said to contribute to equitable long-term sustainabledevelopment for all local people that respects their rights and needs and ensures the integrityof forest ecosystems for future generations.Little has beendone byconsumingcountries toaddress the issuesof unsustainablelevels of timberproduction andconsumption, thetrade in illegallyfelled logs and thesmuggling oftimber.Table 1: EU-based forestrycompanies with loggingoperations in Central AfricaEU Parent Company Central African Country/ies of Operation Logging Subsidiaries in Country of Operation Concessions (ha)Alpi Italy 12 Cameroon Alpicam 128,449Grumcan 85,812Basso Italy 12 Gabon BTIG 450,000Bolloré France 123 Cameroon Forestière de Campo (HFC) 162,790SIBAF 134,765Bruynzeel The Netherlands 12 Congo (Brazzaville) Boplac (43.5%) 500,000Danzer Germany 124 Democratic Republic of Congo Siforco 2,900,000Congo (Brazzaville) UFA Est/SCBO 1,300,000DLH Nordisk Denmark 1234 Congo (Brazzaville) Boplac (43.5%) 500,000Feldmeyer Germany 124 Congo (Brazzaville) CIB 1,150,000Interwood France 12 Cameroon Coron 136,760Interwood Camerounnot knownGabon SHM 300,000 (estimate)Pasquet France 12 Cameroon R. Pallisco -Rougier France 124 Cameroon Cambois 145,176SFID 68,292Congo (Brazzaville) Mokabi 370,000Gabon Rougier Gabon 700,000SAFI Spain 12 Equatorial Guinea 30,000Sonae Portugal 12 Gabon Leroy Gabon 654,000Thanry France 12 Cameroon CFC 215,000J Prenant 54,457Propalm 125,490SAB 60,838SEBC 223,130Central African Republic Thanry Centrafrique 228,000Sofokad 131,200Gabon CEB 505,000EFG 100,000Vasto Legno Italy 12 Cameroon SEBAC 88,796SEFAC 62,597Wijma The Netherlands 12 Cameroon Wijma (Douala) -SARLWonnemann Germany 12 Congo (Brazzaville) SOCOBOIS Not knownTOTAL 11,010,552Key 1 Logging (including as subcontractor) 2 Processing 3 Transport 4 Trade in timber

12SOLD DOWN THE RIVERTable 1 identifies the major EU-based forestry companies that currently have loggingoperations in Central Africa. Other European-based companies also have significantinvolvement in the timber trade from the region. For example, the French transnationalcorporation, Pinault Printemps Redoute, and its subsidiary, Becob, used to have loggingoperations in the region until recently, and the group continues to be France’s top importerand processor of timber from Africa, Asia and Northern Europe. 26European companies have asserted their commitment to practising sustainable forestmanagement in the future. Many are members of timber trade associations such as theAssociation Technique des Bois Tropicaux (ATIBT) and the related Interafrican ForestIndustries Association (IFIA). One of ATIBT’s current priorities is sustainable management oftropical forests, and it plays an active role in international forums such as the Conference onthe Dense and Humid Forest Ecosystems of Central Africa (CEFDHAC) and the Conventionon International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), as well as engaging in debates abouttimber certification. 27 The current president of ATIBT has stated:“European timber companies (timber industry) engaged in Africa are fighting against illegal felling oftrees and illegal actions in forest use. Such actions have damaging effects not only for the forest butalso for the trade, as companies working legally can never compete with those working illegally.” 28Table 2: Official ActionsTaken Against European-Controlled Companies InCameroon in 2000Illegal timber production and trade is rampant in Central Africa, practices in whichEuropean companies, including ATIBT and IFIA members, are complicit.In Cameroon, the only country in the region where rudimentary monitoring of the sector isbeing undertaken, formal penalties were imposed on several European companies in the year2000 for infractions of forestry legislation (see Table 2 below). These reported infractions,however, are likely to be merely the tip of the iceberg, both in Cameroon and elsewhere in theregion, given the institutional weaknesses in these countries. On the rare occasions whenmonitoring does take place, inspections are often cursory and the monitors are subject tointimidation. Most logging takes place without scrutiny while those operations that aremonitored are often regulated “informally”, with bribery being rife.In conclusion, Europe, represented by governments, multilateral institutions and the privatesector, shares an enormous responsibility in the management of forest resources in CentralAfrica. There is little evidence to date that the direction of forest policies is contributing toeven the basic development goal of poverty alleviation, let alone long-term sustainabledevelopment. The six countries’ internal capacity to manage forest resources in the bestinterests of their citizens and to ensure the future integrity of forests is examined in part II.Date infraction published Subsidiary European Parent Infraction Action TakenDecember 2000 Cambois Rougier Exploitation outside limit of title FineDecember 2000 RC Coron Interwood Exploitation of endangered Fine/unauthorised speciesDecember 2000 SIM Rougier (associate company) Non-respect of exploitation norms FineJuly 2000 SAB Thanry Serious wrong-doing in their forest Disqualification from newmanagement activitiesconcession allocationJuly 2000 SEFAC Vasto Legno Serious wrong-doing in their forest Disqualification from newmanagement activitiesconcession allocationJune 2000 SAB Thanry Exploitation outside the limits of UFA FineJune 2000 CFC Thanry Exploitation outside the limit of assiette Finede coupeMarch 2000 SIBAF Bolloré Wrong demarcation of boundaries of Fineassiettes de coupeInadequately marked timber in log yardsMarch 2000 SAB Thanry Anarchic exploitation without respect of Finethe boundaries of assiettes de coupeMarch 2000 CFC Thanry Felling under-sized logs FineFailure to demarcate boundaries ofassiettes de coupeMarch 2000 EGTF RC Coron Interwood Anarchic exploitation outside the Fineboundaries of assiettes de coupeMarch 2000 SEBC Thanry Anarchic exploitation in UFA Fine and suspension ofactivities for 3 monthsExploitation without licenceMarch 2000 SEFAC Vasto Legno Exploitation outside assiette de coupe Fine and suspension ofactivities for 3 monthsNon-markation of boundaries ofassiette de coupeSources: Cameroon Tribune 24th March; 12th July; 28th December; MINEF press release no 1966, 9th June

CAMEROON 13Part II–Country ProfilesCameroonPolitical, social and economic frameworkCameroonCAMEROON COVERS 475,000 square kilometres and shares borders withNigeria, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon andEquatorial Guinea. The country is a mixture of desert plains in the north, mountainsin the central regions and tropical rainforest in the south and east. The amount of forestedarea is estimated at 225,000 square kilometres, of which 175,000 square kilometres have beenidentified by the government as productive forests. 1Cameroon was a German colony from 1884 to 1916, and then was administered by France(eastern Cameroon) and Britain (northern and southern Cameroons) until independence in1960. President Paul Biya has been in power since 1982. Multi-party elections took place forthe first time in 1992, but elections have been described as flawed by opposition parties andinternational observers.The country’s ethnically-diverse population totals 14.7 million. Per capita GNP in 1997was US$ 650, and life expectancy is 57 years. Cameroon’s primary export commodity is oil,followed by timber. The country is highly indebted, mostly to bilateral creditors, the top threeof whom are France, Germany and Austria, but also to the World Bank and IMF. 2 The countryis eligible for debt relief under the terms of the Heavily-Indebted Poor Countries initiative(HIPC) (see page 9).The country has a poor human rights record and corruption is rife from the top down,including in the forestry sector (see feature over). The international NGO TransparencyInternational (which measures corruption at a country level rather than institutional orcorporate level) has described Cameroon as the most corrupt country in the world. Companiesthat work in Cameroon (and their shareholders) do so in the knowledge of Cameroon’sreputation – and that some entity or individual within the company is paying the bribes. 3 Somecompanies have even argued that if they did not pay bribes they would go out of business.The emergence of senior political and military figures in the forestry sector from the late1990s onwards mirrors the environmentally- and socially-devastating political economy oflogging in Sarawak, Malaysia. 4 The involvement of such figures does not benefit thedevelopment of domestic forest management capacity; instead it seems to be introducing a newscale of political involvement in the forestry sector that can only hinder the application ofnational forest law and slow the progress of introducing transparency and accountability.In the July 2000 round of concession allocations, three concessions (UFAs) were allocatedto Ingénierie Forestière, a company connected to the son of President Paul Biya. The SecretaryGeneral for Defence owns one concession (UFA 10-029) which he has subcontracted to SociétéForestière de Hazim (SFH), a company known by the Government to be logging illegally on amassive scale in the neighbouring concession (UFA 10-030) and elsewhere. In a recentcontroversy, six concessions (UFAs) were supposed to have been withdrawn as a result ofirregularities, but three of the concessionaires retained their logging rights – all three weregenerals in the Cameroon army.The forests thatare beingexploited, as wellas the people whodepend on them,including localemployees,villagers andindigenouspeoples, arecaught in adownward spiral.Forest policy and practiceThe forestry industry in Cameroon is one of the few remaining sectors of the formal economyto have remained profitable in recent years. But corruption at all levels in government andillegal and bad practice in the private sector have prevented it from making a significantcontribution to the country’s development and its people’s well-being. Consequently, theforests that are currently being exploited, as well as the people who depend on them, includinglocal employees, villagers and indigenous peoples, are caught in a downward spiral. Aworkshop held in February 2000 concluded that the industrial exploitation of the country’sforests made a minimal contribution to poverty alleviation and that the sector’s contributionto State revenues was far below its potential because of the inadequate level of control andmonitoring of forestry exploitation. 5 Forest companies are now starting to diversify intoplantations, an indication that they see their future income from forest conversion rather thansustainable forest management.Following serious criticism of Cameroon’s forest policy, the World Bank assisted thegovernment in preparing new forestry legislation, which was passed in 1994. The lengthy

14SOLD DOWN THE RIVER‘The goat grazes where itis tied’Remarks on the neo-patrimonialadministration of Cameroon’sforestry sectorBy Samuel Nguiffo, CEDFor several years now, numerous reportshave attested to the frequency and extent ofillegal practices in Cameroon’s forestry sector.There are serious problems in the relationshipbetween the State and donors (especiallyregarding the smooth-running of thestructural adjustment programme). However,this is not the only thing to tarnishCameroon’s image; worse still, the differentdevelopment programmes suffer from a lackof coherence and sustainability. It is importantto note that the sums of money we are talkingabout here are sometimes extremely largeand represent a real loss to the nationaltreasury. In the context of the only justificationof the industrial exploitation of wood being itsprofitability for the State, one has to ask whythese practices continue, and consider theimpunity which surrounds them.Until now, illegal activities within theforestry sector have generally been seen asbeing isolated incidents, The aim of this paperis to demonstrate how the ‘system’ operates -a system which allows illegal activities in theforestry sector to develop - and whichexplains the resistance to the remedies whichhave been put forward by the donors.Inspired by the work of Max Weber, thetheoretical outline of the neo-patrimonialstate developed by Prof. Jean-FrançoisMédard offers a way of seeing how the Statein Africa, and the relationship between theState’s leaders and the State’s resources,functions. According to Prof. Médard, theneo-patrimonial State is characterized by thefollowing aspects:1. The personalization of power which‘irrigates the whole of the State apparatusfrom the top to the bottom. Each official witha little bit of power appropriates andmanages it for their own benefit [...]. At alllevels it is patronage and clientelism whichdominates’. This is accompanied by theinstitutional atrophying of the State which, inthe example which concerns us, couldexplain the weakness of the controlmechanisms (both material and human) offorestry administration.2. The reign of the arbitrary which theadministration is incapable of stopping. Thebehaviour of those with State authority hasnot been curbed by any means, they are leftto their own devices - most notably inensuring that those who rebel are brought torespect the rules of the ‘system’. It isimportant to mention that the law, which issupposed to prevent illegal activities,frequently helps to further this corruption.Here, for example, it is worth noting that theforestry administration enjoys the power tocome to an out of court settlement withoffenders of the forestry law. This legalarrangement constitutes an incitement tocorrupt practices. A judge should have alegal obligation to act here.3. Confusion between the public and theprivate, which is the key plank of the neopatrimonialsystem. In this system, ‘allgovernmental authority and correspondingeconomic rights, tend to be treated aseconomic gains, privately appropriated’. 1 Adialectic exists between wealth and power,and Prof. Médard indicates, ‘Searching forpower is to search for wealth, and searchingfor wealth is to search for power, because oneleads to the other and vice versa.’ 2 It is thiswhich explains the large number of the elite,whether local or national, in the forestryindustry, who see it as a way to both enjoy thespin-offs of political-administrative status, andto obtain the necessary financial resources toensure that their status is maintained orimproved. This is the way in which theadministrative functions ‘are distributed tothose friends, family or clients as payments, inorder to sustain their own position, and extractthe surplus for themselves.’ 3 A Camerooniansaying deftly explains this situation: ‘the goatgrazes where it is tied’.The management of the forestry sector inCameroon is a good example of thepatrimonial tendency of the State. The forest iscontributing to an enterprise of theaccumulation of private wealth amongnumerous people with a degree of power. Inthe dividing up of the ‘forestry cake’, thehierarchy of power is respected. Pressure onthe forest is growing, other sources of wealthcreation are drying up with the onset of thestructural adjustment programme. There aretwo main routes of access to patrimonialbenefits from the forest:§ a direct route, through the conversion of aposition of power into a position ofexploitation (whether legal or de facto) orvia capitalizing on the services provided inthe normal framework of the role (grantingof logging rights, but also controllingforestry exploitation);§ an indirect route, by putting pressure onpoliticians and the administration to obtainfavourable decisions which they would nototherwise have taken.It is the operation of these cross-cuttingstrategies of wealth creation which haveallowed the growth of a system of corruptionaround forestry in Cameroon. The managementof approvals, the granting of forestryexploitation rights, the control of forestryactivities, and the management of forestry dues,are strongly influenced by this system.Looking at the list of solicitors working inforestry in Cameroon, it is easy to spotindividuals who do not fulfill the necessaryrecognised legal requirements in terms oftheir knowledge and their methods.Also, the granting of forestry exploitationrights generally give rise to a number ofirregularities which, due to their gravity andfrequency, cannot be explained by anythingother than pressure having been brought tobear or financial inducements having beenmade.A World Bank report raises one elementof the situation, ‘Finally the Government hasstarted the auction cutting rights, but in theventes de coupe and especially in theOctober 1997 allocation of concessions, thespecified allocation criteria have not beenfully respected [...]. Concessions wereawarded to the highest bidder in only 10 ofthe 25 cases [...]. In some cases, the awardswere politically motivated.’ 4Another strategy of access to forestryresources is through the granting of smallscaleexploitation concessions(recouperations or ventes de coupe loggingpermits) which serve as pretexts for theextraction of unlimited amounts of wood. In ajoint MINEF/World Bank report, it was notedthat ‘illegal exploitation is public knowledgein the urban centres, including of the officialsof the administration who are based there’. 5The control of exploitation activities followa similar pattern. A study recently carried outin the forestry area of East province showedthat 21 % of the civil proceedings taken byforestry officials against illegal activities in theshady forestry sector were ‘stopped by theintervention of someone from high-up’. 6The law has also played a role in the neopatrimonialsituation in the forestry sector.Two examples are sufficient to illustrate this:§ it is possible to make a deal with theforestry administration which isrecognized by the law; this is a greenlight to corruption. It would be preferableto force the administration to hand casesover to a judge;§ regarding the legal situation over forestryroyalties - there is no adequate protectionagainst their embezzlement by localofficials. Local people do not have thenecessary skills to bring an action againstthose responsible for themisappropriation of public funds.Transparency in the management of theforestry sector in Cameroon – an essentialcondition for the promotion of the social andecological sustainability of the forestry sector– can only be attained if the neo-patrimonialsystem is challenged. Yet, it appears that nosuch challenge is currently envisaged.

CAMEROON 15transition phase to implementation (five years) has led to confusion and, as a result, thecurrent legal status of some concessions is difficult to determine. 6 The World Bank hasrequested that the government revoke all contracts for concessions granted contrary to the1994 law, such as those of the French-based Coron and Thanry (see Part III – CompanyProfiles) which were granted by presidential decree, but little progress has been made.The ministry responsible for the sector is the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, knownas MINEF (Ministère de l’Environnement et des Forêts). The 1994 forestry law, essentially aframework for industrialisation, divides the forests into permanent and non-permanent forestareas. The permanent forest domain is formed by state forests and communal forests. The lawsets out six different types of logging permits: 7Ventes de coupes (Sales of Standing Volume) are no longer issued and should not cover morethan 2,500 hectares and last for a limited period of time (Section 55).Permis d’exploitation (Exploitation permits) which are for the extraction of not more then 500cubic metres of timber (Section 56).Autorization personnelle de coupe (Individual Felling Authorisation) for the extraction of notmore then 30 cubic meteres of wood for non-commercial use (section 57).Conventions d’exploitation (Concessions), which can include one or more Unités forestièresd’aménagement (UFAs) or Forest Management Unit (FMUs). The Concession will be reviewedevery three years and is for a specified volume of timber. (Section 46).Exploitation en régie (State exploitation) via sale of standing volume or exploitation contract(Section 44).Autorization de récupération (Wood recovery permit)Récupération licences are not a normal logging permit but are used as such. Récupérations areusually issued only when a forest is going to be cleared for industrial purposes, such as theestablishment of a palm plantation, where the trees would be destroyed anyway. Thusrécupération permits do not require trees of a minimum diameter to be left nor a forestinventory. Unsurprisingly, they are open to wide abuse. Their potential may be a reason fortheir inappropriate allocation.Of these six types of logging permits, concessions (UFAs) are the only ones that requiremanagement plans and which are allocated through a competitive bidding process. Thisprocess over-emphasises the price component of the bid compared to its technical quality: a70/30 split in the weighting respectively. Industry representatives have complained that theprocess pushes them to put too high a price on the concessions they are bidding for; if theyobtain the concession, they invariably feel under pressure to recover their costs more quicklythan they otherwise would have to. Logging illegally is an easy route. Companies interested insustainability are simply being driven out of business. Pressure by creditors to follow the dueprocess and spirit of the law during the allocation of UFAs may be one of the driving forcesbehind the increasingarea of forest beingallocated instead asvente de coupes whichdo not require amanagement plan and inwhich logging can besubcontracted, possiblyto the same companieslogging the concessions(UFAs).The total area offorest exploited as ventesde coupe has beenincreasing in recentyears. Logging areasallocated under the ventede coupe system cannotlegally exceed 2,500hectares and/or a givenvolume of logs over oneyear; the permit can berenewed twice. In spiteof these limitations,however, logging with avente de coupe permitLogs in the port of Douala,Cameroon© MORGAN/GREENPEACE

16SOLD DOWN THE RIVERIt seems to becommon practicethat, for every titrede récupération orvente de coupe,logging companiesexploit more thanfive or six timesthe area legallyallocated andenter otherconcessions(UFAs) in theprocess.has advantages for those wishing to exploit the forest as much as possible. First, they do notrequire a management plan, as concessions (UFAs) do. Second, they are not reserved forCameroonian nationals, as exploitation permits are. Third, they can be sub-contracted which,like the practice of fermage in Gabon (see page 46), diminishes responsibility andaccountability for forest exploitation. It seems to be common practice that, for every titre derécupération or vente de coupe, logging companies exploit more than five or six times the arealegally allocated and enter other concessions (UFAs) in the process. Companies are well awareof monitoring deficiencies. MINEF, the Cameroonian state agency in charge of monitoringcompliance with the forestry legislation, says that it does not have the means to monitor theactivities of the logging companies. Critics, however, say that it does not have the motivation.Provision for a Community Forest Unit was made in the 1994 Forest Law, with theobjective of giving greater self determination over the “development” process to communitiesthan the industrial model of forest exploitation allows. The operations of the Unit withinMINEF have been stifled, however, and for a long time the processing of applications forCommunity Forest Permits has been slow. In theory, the state should provide free technicaladvice for the establishment of community forests. 8 In the meantime, areas of forest for whichcommunity applications were pending have been logged by large-scale operators, dashing anyhopes of establishing small-scale operations. Even when established, Community Forests havebeen illegally logged by others.Monitoring and enforcement of legislation is weak, with critics arguing that there is littlepolitical will at the top to tackle the high levels of illegal logging and trade that characterisethe Cameroonian forestry sector; corruption within the sector greatly hinders implementationof the law. Whether through lack of funding or lack of will, resources are scarce. In the EastProvince, where logging companies based in Europe are dominant, there is on average onepoorly-resourced government monitor for each 20,000 hectares of concession.The job of the Chef de Poste is to monitor what is happening in the forest and report onany infractions of the law on a regular basis. These officials are given few resources to do theirjob, a motorbike perhaps but no fuel or support. Even if a Chef de Poste does provide reportson infractions, they are likely to hear nothing more of the outcome, even though the Chef dePoste is supposed to receive a proportion of the fines levied as a result of the infractionreports. There is therefore no motivation for the monitoring system to work at even groundlevel. Many of these infraction reports “disappear” within MINEF either in exchange forbribes paid to officials in the Ministry or higher, or the reports are held in a file by officials toextort money from companies that would otherwise be fined. The Chef de Poste, however, seesno return for doing his job and receives no signal of support from his colleagues. This leavesthose who are keen to see improvement in forestry practices exposed in towns where thelogging company may be the major employer, vulnerable to threats of violence or open tobribes given the absence of other sources of income.MINEF has indicated that it is willing to take action against companies that operateillegally by, for instance, issuing fines and disqualifying them from participating in concession(UFA) licence auctions. These measures are, however, often ineffective or no more than tokengestures: fines are relatively small and often the companies disqualified are not interested inbidding for any of the UFAs in that particular round of the auction process.Illegality is one part of the lack of sustainability of the forestry sector. The 1994 law hasresulted in the phasing out of log exports from 1999, in order to promote downstreamprocessing within Cameroon and thus increase revenues to the country. This potentiallypositive move is undermined by two factors. Firstly, the most heavily exported species, Ayous,can still be exported in log form, albeit subject to higher rates of duty. 9 Secondly, as a result ofthe legislation, companies have invested in downstream processing facilities but there arestrong indications of over-capacity which is fuelling the demand for logs. Production levels areconsiderably higher than official estimates of sustainable harvest levels (see production and EUtrade, below). 10 This is increasing the pressure on the forest and there are clear indications thatadditional production is being derived in part from companies logging outside their legalconcession areas. It has been predicted that logging at this rate means that the forests inCameroon will run out of commercial timber within 15 years.Building sustainable forest management capacity is not helped by the fact that the lawforbids companies to conduct forest inventories themselves. Instead, they have to go throughaccredited companies (societé agréées), such as National Office for the Development of Forests– Office National de Développment des Forêts (ONADEF), which is linked to MINEF civilservants. ONADEF has conducted socio-economic studies covering 30 villages in the Lomiéarea in just three days, including two days’ travelling time from Yaoundé and back. ONADEFhas provided the official paperwork for 10 to 15 concessions (UFAs). The law and theoperations of some accredited companies may be one of the main reasons why competentinventory/management planning in the private sector has not emerged. Logging companies arecomplicit in this: they accept the inventories and get their licences without apparently askingmany questions or protesting about the system.

CAMEROON 17As well as operating their own concessions, European companies increasingly work assubcontractors to, or buy timber from, concessions allocated to Cameroonian nationals. Inaddition, a number of European companies no longer hold concessions themselves, partly as aresult of the bidding process (see above) but they do have downstream processing facilities andact as sub-contractors to concession-holders. These companies still own the bulldozers andcontrol the day-to-day operations of logging but it is not clear to what extent they are willingor able to put into practice sustainable forest management even if they would be prepared todo so in their own concessions.Forestry taxes in Cameroon are generally low. The cutting tax (taxe d’abbatage) is 2.5% ofthe value of production while the concession tax (redevance de superficie) is approximately 5-10% of the value of production. When logging an area of forest for the first time, a companymay falsify its tax declarations to conceal illegal logging. The company, ETD, operating inUFA 10-047, for instance, logged an area of 12,300 hectares instead of the 2,500 hectares itwas legally allowed. The total loss of tax revenue, based on area cut and estimated timberharvested, may be more than CFA Fr 2 billion (US$ 2.6 million). Given the frequency of illegallogging, the forestry sector is not contributing as much as it should economically to thecountry.As well asoperating theirown concessions,Europeancompaniesincreasingly workas subcontractorsto, or buy timberfrom, concessionsallocated toCamerooniannationals.Production and EU tradeThe European timber trade and European consumers are currently major beneficiaries ofillegal logging in Cameroon. Illegal logging and the processing and export of illegal logsinvolve major industrial operations moving hundreds of thousands of cubic metres of wood. Inthe major logging region of eastern Cameroon it has been suggested that as much as 50% oflogs may be extracted illegally. 11Many of the large processing plants show little concern for the source of the timber theyare processing; in fact, the over-capacity of value-added processing in the country is likely tobe driving illegal logging. Official government estimates suggest that sustainable logproduction levels are around 3.5 million cubic metres per annum, 12 although this figure iscriticised as being an over-estimate given the scale of exploitation currently taking place.Actual log production is estimated to be between 4.5 million cubic metres and 5.1 millioncubic metres. 13Much of Cameroon’s timber production arrives on the shores of Europe. In 1998, the EUaccounted for over 61% of log exports documented by the Swiss monitoring company SGS,with Italy and France being the two main destinations, receiving 230,687 cubic metres and207,347 cubic metres of logs respectively. 14 Although China was the primary destination forexports in 1997, it slipped to third place in 1998 (184,535 cubic metres), followed by Spain(152,276 cubic metres) and Portugal (146,845 cubic metres). Germany received 72,018 cubicmetres, the Netherlands received 53,499 cubic metres and the UK received 52,700 cubicmetres. 15 Without a verifiable chain of custody no timber trader in Europe can declare withany certainty that the logs or timber in their yard from Cameroon are from legal sources. As aresult, the environmental NGO Greepeace have blockaded boats bringing timber ofCameroonian origin to Europe. 16International financial assistanceThe EU and a number of member countries have programmes in Cameroon, ranging fromfield projects to implement conservation to sustainable development projects, from incomestabilisation funds related to commodity prices to grant funding for specific projects. The EUforest conservation and sustainable development programme ECOFAC has a project in the DjaReserve. There is also direct pressure from outside Cameroon to reform the forest sectorthrough a programme of capacity-building within MINEF so that it can carry out its controlfunction and through establishing an Independent Observer of the forestry sector to tacklecorruption. This project could be a major step forward in increasing the transparency andaccountability of the companies in the sector. The World Bank has threatened to stop fundingCameroon’s large foreign debt unless the 1994 forestry law is respected. 17There are already some signs of change: the European Union has, through intense pressure,obliged President Biya to withdraw a dictat which overruled and prohibited the setting upwithin government of a Community Forestry Unit. Moreover, several senior officials in theMinistry of Forests have been replaced. 18 Such moves, however, have been undermined by theallocation of other logging permits in areas of potential community forest in order to extractthe timber before the local people have a chance at managing legally their own resources.Environmental impactsUnsustainable logging has meant that, as concessions become exhausted, companies aremoving ever further into primary forest areas and logging operations have moved eastwardsfrom the coast over time. To log only the best trees of a few high value species, companies

18SOLD DOWN THE RIVER© FORESTS MONITORCFC’s logging activitiesresult in blocked rivers andthe creation of stagnantpools of water whichcannot be used for drinkingand which are damagingfor fish and plankton.drive roads into large areas of previously inaccessibleforest, thereby facilitating an influx of people seekingemployment and opening the forest up to other activitiessuch as commercial bushmeat hunting and agriculturalencroachment. The logging industry has directly andindirectly facilitated a large increase in commercialbushmeat hunting, with wildlife being decimated in manyareas. Logging activities threaten the Dja Reserve whileconcessions have been allocated inside the Campo Reserve(see Concessions map, page 34).Social impactsProvision of social services such as clinics and schools inlogging concessions are not necessarily part of the formallogging agreement, although logging companies, in theory,pay a local tax which contributes towards developmentprojects. It has been noted, however, that “Money from thelogging company rarely materialises in the locality wherethe logging operations are undertaken.” 19 Also, keyindividuals have been implicated in having appropriated“gifts” pledged to the village. 20 The lack of any real choicein their development options may be why, in reality, someforest-dependent people prefer illicit operations, in thehope that they will receive at least some cash directly asopposed to the royalties that are collected officially fromcompanies logging legally and which are not likely to bedistributed to those entitled to it. 21 Fieldwork undertaken inApril 2000 in the East Province revealed a number of localenvironmental and social impacts as a result of loggingoperations (see Box page 19).The extent to which the cash economy has enteredCameroon’s forests has been nigh on impossible forPygmies to accommodate in their traditionally close-tonaturelives. They are often the ones who capture bushmeaton behalf of commercial traders who follow the loggingroads and the ones who find commercially-exploitable treesfor loggers, thereby accelerating the end of their traditional way of life and the loss of a wealthof learning about forest products and nature. 22, 23 Projects in regions where Pygmies remainsemi-nomadic, such as the French government-sponsored API forestry project at Dimako, setout to sedentarise Pygmy groups. 24Intimidation of local people, NGOs and government officials by company employees canbe severe if operations are questioned. Also, logging companies, sensitive to criticism andusually the dominant employer in many towns, are well placed to encourage the transmissionof information about, for example, newly-arrived strangers and the movement of individualsconcerned with forest law enforcement. This includes the intimidation of local andinternational NGOs and other community groups.Companies logging the forests of CameroonEuropean companies have dominated the forest industry in Cameroon since the industry cameinto being several decades ago. The situation remains largely unchanged with a few notableexceptions, such as the reported sale of the Thanry interests (see Part III – Company Profiles)to a China-based group, Vicwood International, the operations of SFH and the briefoperations of Rimbunan Hijau, a Malaysian-based company, in the late 1990s. Many of theUFAs, other logging operations, processing facilities and transport infrastructure are owned byEuropean-based companies. The products of the industry also largely end up in Europe.Even when concessions are owned by Cameroonian nationals, European-based companiesare frequently contracted to undertake the actual extraction of the timber from the forest. Thesame contracting company will also be likely to buy the timber for processing or export.See Map page 34 and Appendix for further details of concession ownership in Cameroon.

CAMEROON 19Summary of anEnvironmental and SocialImpact Assessment of CFCoperations, April 2000by Sandrine Lapuyade iThe Cameroon Forestry Company (CFC) isa subsidiary of the Thanry France group.CFC was established in 1990 and operatesin Cameroon’s Eastern Province. Over thelast five years, CFC has received numerousfavours from the government incontravention of existing laws.The granting of logging permitsand the overriding of agreedregulationsThe forestry permits which the CFC hasprofited from have been granted without theagreed regulations, as laid down in law,being followed. For example, four shorttermlogging permits were granted withoutthe advice of a competent technicalcommittee being sought. Similarly theallotted concession (UFA) permits 10-001,10-002, 10-003 and 10-004 in theYokadouma arrondissement were granted in1996, in a decree actually signed by thePresident, without these having been putout to tender.This latter concession, granted for 15years, has the CFC operating within theframework of a final agreement, as opposedto a temporary agreement as is laid down inlaw and as is understood in several publicadministration practices. Under this finalagreement, the company should havedrawn up an inventory, a development planand a five-year management plan within sixmonths of signing the agreement. Themanagement plan was not produced until1999, and four years after the granting ofthe concession, the company has still notproduced its five-year plan. In addition tothis reprehensible behaviour, we may addthe delay in the implementation ofparticipative management measures: thecompany has never drawn up nor suppliedto the government the technical informationnecessary to negotiate the boundaries ofthe allotted concession and the usage rightswith the local population or theimplementation of its social programme, thelatter of which should be included in theconditions of the agreement.The guide drawn up by the forestryauthorities has also not been followed onseveral points:§ the boundaries of the UFAs and theannual sub-division of the loggingconcessions are disregarded;§ the minimum tree diameters for loggingappear to have been completelyignored;§ the sub-division of concession no. 6 inUFA 10-001, which was never authorisedas a concession by the government, hasbeen exploited illegally.These practices demonstrate CFC’s lack ofconsideration towards the environmentaland economic sustainability of its activities.CFC has never been fined for loggingoutside the boundaries of concession subdivisions,although this represents aconsiderable loss of earnings to the nationaltreasury. Sanctions on CFC should beproportional to the turnover generated bythis illegal logging, estimated at more than$US 4 million from 2,500 ha.While recognising these practices to beillegal, CFC’s management says it is obligedto operate this way as it waits for itsmanagement plan to be approved. Thereseems little foundation to this argumentsince the company has received at least onesub-division of a logging concession eachyear. This includes, since the production ofthe management plan, the sub-division oflogging concession No. 10 in UFA 10-001for 1999/2000. The ambiguous status of theCFC’s concession allows the company tonot only continue with activities that are notcompliant with existing law but also topossibly benefit from a final agreement of 18years.Finally, the total area to be granted to aconcession-holder should not exceed200,000 ha. However, the area of the CFC’sfour UFAs amounts to 215,680 ha.Furthermore, the Thanry France groupBuilt without the advice of an expert, the well water is very cloudy and unfit forconsumption© FORESTS MONITORi The E&SIA was undertaken by Sandrine Lapuyade,Louis Djomo, Honoré Ndoumbe Nkotto, ThéophileNdjodo and Pierre Titi Nwel. The full version of thereport is available at www.forestsmonitor.org

20SOLD DOWN THE RIVER© FORESTS MONITORThe clinic at Ngollaexploits almost 500,000 ha. in Cameroon.While it has no legal basis in Cameroon, ithas obtained access to far more land forlogging than that laid down by the law inCameroon, due to the creation of numeroussubsidiaries.Workers’ conditionsThe camp set up by CFC for its workersdoes not meet several required legalstandards.Camp accommodation has neither akitchen nor a bathroom. There is neitherclean water for washing in nor drinkingwater. The company has sunk a well nearthe camp; this constitutes the sole source ofwater for the camp. Built without the adviceof an expert, the well water is very cloudyand unfit for consumption; it is also lessthan appealing to wash in. Furthermore, thewater contains a number of amoeba, whichcause the workers and their families tosuffer from serious dysentery problems.In the sawmill, the workers have neithergloves nor masks. They use chainsawswithout wearing protective trousers orshoes, and few workers have protectiveearphones or safety glasses. Moreover, theworkers’ only entrance to the camp isbehind the sawmill, just a few metres fromwhere the logs are handled prior to beingcut up. This ignores the most basic rules ofhealth and safety.CFC has not built a school or a healthcentre for its workers. Consequently there isno local school for the workers’ childrenand health care is only available at Ngolla -which is at best rudimentary. Moreover, it isthe company that decides if an accident onsite is work-related. Workers then often seethe cost of their care deducted from theirwages.Environmental impactGiven the variety of species and the level ofthe vegetation’s natural regeneration in thisarea, with its rainy climate and mineral-richsoil, industrial-scale exploitation of theforests has above all an impact on thequality of the flora. The land cleared for thelogging sites is quickly taken over bysecondary forest to the detriment of primaryforest while the five tree species that aresought after become less abundant in adulttrees.More than 76 per cent of the treeslogged by CFC are threatened species. TheSapelli and Sipo, which are classified as‘vulnerable’, are likely to become extinct inthe medium term. The Assamela is classifiedas ‘endangered’, with a likelihood ofextinction in the short term. By felling thelargest trees, the forestry industry removesthose trees that produce the best seeds.These tree species thus suffer from alowering of their genetic base and thisaffects their regeneration.The damage to biodiversity can also beseen on the fauna. Hunters also use thetracks constructed by the company to reachdifferent parts of the forest and this leads tointensive hunting which is decimatinganimal species. In addition, the noise of theforestry machinery has caused mostprimates and Suidae to flee. The building ofthe roads and forestry tracks limits themovements of buffalo and elephants thusleaving them at the mercy of poachers.Birds are becoming more and more scarce.Generally the only animals to remain aresmall animals, particularly rodents.Numerous shortcomings have beenobserved regarding the environmentalimpact of CFC’s activities:§ a lack of planning regarding the locationof trees to be felled and the placementof forestry tracks;§ poor directions and informationregarding felling and forwarding areas;§ large clearings for the main roads (of25-35 m) and for the secondary roads(of 18-23 m);§ strong inclines (est. at 15 per centminimum) at frequent intervals on theroads and tracks inside the concessionarea;

CAMEROON 21§ the use of construction methods forbridge-building in the forests whichconstrict the flow of the rivers andsometimes block the river altogether.The shortcomings have the effect of:§ forestry workers not being able to locateall the logs, so some are abandoned inthe forests;§ a growing number of tracks and anexacerbation of the problem of the soilbeing compacted, along with adestruction of the undergrowth;§ more and more forestry work sites, mostof which are 100-150 m apart;§ a low yield on the forest of 10-12 m3/ha.;§ a high level of erosion, bringing moreand more silt to the rivers. By stoppingthe light penetrating, this sediment isaffecting the fish and aquatic plants;§ blocking the rivers and creatingstagnant pools of water which cannotbe used for drinking water and whichare damaging for fish and plankton.In addition, around CFC’s base area, areasof forest have been burnt in preparation foragriculture. The amount of forest taken overfor subsistence agriculture by the CFC’sworkers will increase with the rise in thenumber of employees. This matter is all themore worrying because the concession is inpermanent forestry land where the land isintended for no other use but forestry.Economic falloutA total of 230 jobs have been created, ofwhich 74 are for the people from thevillages neighbouring the concession. Thecreation of these jobs appears to be theonly positive impact of the CFC’s presence.The appeal of these jobs is such that thedisappointment is great to see that manypositions are filled by people from outsidethe area, who are often better qualified, andthat the proportion of ‘local’ peopleemployed is low.The wages are not high but the creationof 230 jobs in the area generates a sizeablesupply of money which could contributetowards local development. However, thefact that CFC has based itself 20 km fromthe closest village limits the growth ofcommercial activities in the neighbouringareas, and no new development or businesshas been seen in the villages visited.There are few opportunities for sellinggoods along the road. Foodstuffs such asplantains can take days to be sold on theroadside. Those living in the CFC campprefer to buy from Yokadouma whereproduce is cheaper. To improve themarketing and sales of their produce, thevillagers of Ngolla have asked CFC to helpthem set up a local market which theworkers could visit. However, there hasbeen no development on this.Impact on non-timber forestproductsThe CFC concession is in a part of the forestwhere the Sapelli tree is abundant. Thisspecies is the most sought after by thecompany but Sapelli leaves are also thefavourite food of a caterpillar locally called‘ossié’. These caterpillars are becomingscarcer and scarcer. Collected in August –September, they can generate an annualturnover of CFA 10,000. This means thatthese caterpillars, in addition to theirnutritional value, can represent a sizeablerevenue. The Sapelli bark is also used toheal wounds, for stomach-aches and forintestinal problems.The sawmill site used to be an importantarea for wild mangoes (irvingia gabonensis)and the neighbouring villagers say that theynow have to go much further to find wildmangoes. The fruit from this tree isimportant due to its nutritional andcommercial value. The paste made from thekernel is particularly useful because it canbe used to make sauces which last for along time. Once made into ‘cakes’ the actualkernels can be conserved for over a year. Inaddition, studies looking at non-timberproducts have shown the commercial valueof these mangoes. Harvesting wild mangoesis easily the most profitable activity amongthe non-timber activities, and if all the fruitsof a tree were sold, this would makeapproximately CFA 100,000 - 150,000 ayear.The drop in fish catches is another majorconcern for the riverside villagers. Thewomen have noticed a real drop in thecatch and they have to travel further inorder to catch sufficient quantities. In somevillages, they are travelling 20 km just to geta reasonable number of fish. The people ofNgolla 35 used to fish in the Mempoe riverwhich runs behind the CFC sawmill. Nowthey have to go to swamps far away to findthe best sources for the fish. However,given the already noticeable encroachmentby the company into these areas, some ofthe women think there will soon be no morefish left. This is causing the women a lot ofworry and they can see no solution to thisproblem.Since CFC started its operations, animalshave been displaced and this has affectedthe villagers. In addition there have beenchanges to their hunting routes which cutacross the forestry routes. This means thatthe hunters have to travel long distances tocatch sufficient quantities or they have to goto ‘professional’ hunters, whom they have topay. The difficulty in finding game animalshas a real economic impact in the area. Dueto the decline of the cash crops sector,hunting has become the most profitableeconomic activity. In addition, game – whichis cheaper than farmed animals – is themain source of animal-based protein. Theneed to buy an increasing amount of meatis affecting the household budget andpeople’s nutritional levels. The Bakapygmies often suffer from a lack of sufficientprotein during the dry season and theexploitation of the forest is exacerbating thisproblem. When demand is strong, the highprices paid in the local markets oftenencourage the hunters to sell the gamerather than eat it or sell it at a (cheaper)village-rate.There are poachers in the workers’camp and this is an important factor in thedeclining numbers of game animals.Professional poachers, or youths withnothing to do, supply the workers and theirfamilies with game meat, as there is noalternative supply of meat. When thepoachers cannot find a buyer locally, theysell in the town where the prices are higher.There are also outside forces involved, oftenpowerful figures who own the guns andwho have a crucial role in the growth ofpoaching.Exacerbation of economic andsocial inequalitiesThe increase in goods and money cominginto the region is causing a monetarizationof the economy. This sometimes leads ‘togoing without in order to buy salt, soap andother things’. This contributes to theeconomic and social marginalization ofpeople who do not have access to cash.This is particularly the case for women andthe Baka people.One of the few ways to earn money forBaka women is to work on the Bantuplantations. However, they are often paid inkind, so their income is small. Bantu womenoften have easier access to cash than Bakawomen do, yet the range of sources ofincome available is greater among men thanwomen. Non-timber based forestryproducts play an important role in women’sability to earn a cash income. Thereforewomen are particularly badly hit when theseproducts’ quality and quantity is reduced.Moreover, when the supply of meatdiminishes, the job of finding a substitute formealtimes falls on the women, who see thenumber of things they have to do rising.Also the distances which they have to coverto find fruit and fish takes time which theyneed for other tasks and for earning money.Prostitution is one way for women to earnan income and some women from the

22SOLD DOWN THE RIVERvillages around the CFC’s concession seemto engage in prostitution. This is the case forthe Bantu women, but also for the Bakawomen who are in demand due to the lowprices which they charge.Women and the Baka are least involvedin decision-making. They are the last toreceive any of the rare benefits in kindprovided by the company: compensation forthe felling of a tree on private land used bya woman is paid to a man, who alone hasthe right of land ownership; the clearing ofan area for a food market benefits theinfluential men; many women are neitherknowledgeable about the workings of CFC,nor of the existence of the ManagementCommittees, nor of the dues paid by thecompany. Some villagers have never heardof the Management Committees and haveno knowledge of what is being done withthe money from these dues. The arbitraryselection of members for the twoManagement Committees, made by localauthorities at the expense of the chiefs’authority, leads to the control of the benefitsby just a handful of people.HealthThe company’s lack of commitment toensuring the well-being of its workers andtheir families has led to the following majorproblems:§ permanent cases of amoebiasis, due tothe total lack of drinking water for itsemployees;§ frequent accidents at work;§ a proliferation of sexually transmissiblediseases, primarily due to the growth inprostitution, a lack of preventativemeasures and a lack of information onthe subject;§ large numbers of colds, due to pollutionwith the air containing particulates fromwood-treatment operations and fromthe near-permanent emission fromparticulates from the production line;§ hernias due to people carrying heavyloads.Outside the camp, there are numerouscases of malaria. It is well known thatdeforestation plays a role in thedevelopment of this disease. In addition theswirling up of dust on the roads by forestryvehicles increases the risk of transmission ofcontagious diseases, because dust is aremarkable carrier of germs. CFC is not theonly company operating in the region but itsoperations can only accentuate theseproblems.ConclusionIn spite of the current and foreseeableconsequences of its activities on the humanand natural environment and on theproblems that these bring for the localinhabitants, CFC has undertaken only alimited number of schemes aimed atdeveloping community facilities, and hasonly organised one meeting with just onegroup of neighbouring villagers. TheForestry Law of 1994 aims to integrate theneeds of the local populations but thenecessary means to enforce it are notavailable. The concerns of the people areoften disregarded because the economicand financial imperatives within which theactivities of forestry companies are basedare far removed from these considerations,though those are crucial on economic butalso ethical grounds. The interactionbetween those exploiting the forests, thevillagers and the different local actors arecomplex and difficult to deal with.Nevertheless the Thanry group hasoperated in Cameroon for many years and itshould, as a result, have acquiredexperience of dealing with social problemsand experience of working withneighbouring villagers. It should develop aneffective and fair means of communicationand negotiation with the local populationsinstead of giving out sporadic gifts offoodstuffs, wood and alcohol. A wellmanaged process of negotiation regardingthe promotion of local development and apolicy of adequate training would notovercome all of the problems or the impactof the exploitation of the forest on thepeoples’ wellbeing. However, it could offersome compensation. Obviously the Thanrygroup has chosen a different path andprofits from the weakness of theCameroonian authorities in enforcing thelaw to grow rich at the expense of the lesspowerful.Mountain of sawdust from the CFC mill in the concession© FORESTS MONITOR

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 23Central African RepublicPolitical, social and economic frameworkTHE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (CAR) is a landlocked country inthe centre of the African continent. Its population of 3.4 million is spread over623,000 square kilometres, 70% of which live in remote and isolated areas. With aper capita GNP of US$ 320 and life expectancy of 49 years, 1 CAR is one of the poorestcountries in the region. Only the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has a lower per capitaGNP but, in spite of being a country at war, its inhabitants can expect to live a few yearslonger on average than their counterparts in CAR.CAR gained independence from France in 1960, but the country’s first multi-party electionsdid not take place until 1993, over 30 years later. In the meantime, dictators ruled, includingone of the cruellest of the continent, Colonel Jean-Bedel Bokassa, who was in power from1966 to 1979. Democratic elections, however, have not ensured political stability. In 1996,three military-led mutinies caused widespread damage in the capital, Bangui. In spite ofmediation by other countries, the United Nations and the establishment in 1997 of the BanguiAccords between the CAR government and the mutineers, 2 political instability continued. TheUN peacekeeping forces, which entered the country in April 1998, were withdrawn inFebruary 2000. According to the CAR government, “peace … remains fragile, poverty iswidespread and basic social services have steadily deteriorated”. 3The government is trying to meet the conditions for debt relief under the Heavily IndebtedPoor Countries Initiative (HIPC), but it is not certain that they will qualify, despite a total debtstock of US$ 928 million and a debt-to-exports ratio of 455%. 4 Subsistence agriculture is thebackbone of the country’s economy. Diamonds are the primary source of export revenue, butthey are regularly smuggled out of the country, depriving the government of tax revenues. 5Timber is the second most important source of export revenue and seems likely to becomemore significant. Even though CAR’s economy deteriorated in 2000, partly as a result ofdisrupted oil imports because of the war in neighbouring DRC, timber exports increased, andthe government is forecasting yet more growth in 2001. 6 The forestry sector is the top privateemployer in the country, having 3,500 people on its payroll in 1999. 7 Timber exports,however, do not appear to have contributed to higher living standards and forestry companiesoperating in the country have a record of undermining traditional social structures in the areaswhere they operate.CentralAfricanRepublicAccording to theCAR government,“peace … remainsfragile, poverty iswidespread andbasic socialservices havesteadilydeteriorated”.Forest policy and practiceCompared to the other countries in the Congo region, CAR has a relatively small area offorest – around five million hectares – corresponding to 8% of the country’s territory. 8 Yet interms of commercially valuable species,such as Sapelli, Ayous and Sipo, its forests are some ofthe richest in Africa. 9 Moreover, from an ecological perspective, they represent a crossroadswhere the bio-geographic areas of Central Africa meet. 10The timber industry in CAR is the smallest, by volume, in the Congo Basin but stillaccounts for 16% of the country’s export earnings. The export of timber is hampered bytransport, CAR being landlocked, which often adds 60% to the costs of production. 11 Timberis either sent by river and rail via Brazzaville to Pointe Noire in neighbouring Congo(Brazzaville), or by road to Douala in Cameroon. The Cameroonian route accounts for mosttraffic today because of railway difficulties in Congo (Brazzaville).The country’s forests grow in two distinct areas: 12§ In the south-west, in the regions of Sangha and Lobaye, forests cover an area of 3.7 millionhectares. 13 Most logging concessions are located in this area, especially along the borderswith Cameroon and Congo. This area is also where most of the diamond mining takesplace;§ In the east, in the Bangassou area, forests cover an estimated 1.2 million hectares. Thisregion is very isolated, and little is known about its forests. They are not being exploitedcommercially because of transport difficulties.Forest concessions and other forestry matters are governed by the Forestry Code of 9 June1990 14 and by some articles of the 1995 Finance Law. 15 Despite some good provisions, theministry responsible for forests, the Ministère de l’Environnement, des Eaux, Forêts, Chasseset Pêches, lacks the resources to monitor and enforce legislation properly and planning isweak. The roles and rights of private enterprises and local communities are poorly defined. 16According to 1997 Ministry data, 2.5 million hectares of the forests in the south-west wereallocated to nine industrial permit holders, covering 68% of the forests of the Sangha andLobaye regions (see map, p.36). 17 Data from the Ministry obtained in the year 2000 indicate

24SOLD DOWN THE RIVER© T. FORSYTHThe ministry responsible forforests lacks the resources tomonitor and enforcelegislation properly andplanning is weak. The rolesand rights of privateenterprises and localcommunities are poorlydefined.that the total area under concession in the south-west has now risen to 3.2 million hectares, or86% of the region. 18Concessions are not granted for a specific number of years but for unlimited duration.Although companies do not own the areas they log, their lifelong rights allow them to obtainbank credit and to receive compensation if their rights are cancelled without reason. 19Efforts to ensure that logs are mainly processed in the country have been intensified overthe last few years. The 1990 Forestry Code established that companies must implement awood-processing unit and process 60% or more of their production from their third yearonwards. 20 The 1995 Finance Law, however, established that logging companies had totransform at least 85% of the logs into timber within CAR. A 1996 Finance Law goes further,prohibiting exports of raw logs unless companies comply with several requirements, such asmaking investments in the country of US$4 million in two years and contributing to socialinitiatives. 21 There are also tax incentives to process timber in the country: log exports aretaxed at 20% but processed timber exports at 10%. 22 Despite the legislation, however, logexports continue to dominate the sector.The government has stepped up measures to curb mislabelling of wood (from threatenedspecies) and excessive cutting. 23 But it appears unable to make more than a token gesturebecause of a lack of financial and human resources, although the recent appointment of theSwiss-based monitoring company SGS to monitor exports may help. Increased revenues fromexport taxation are expected to pay for the hiring of this private company. 24Production and EU tradeTotal log production in CAR has increased significantly during the 1990s and is set tocontinue rising in line with structural adjustment policies. In 1993, total log production was167,700 cubic metres and in 1999 it reached 552,800 cubic metres. The majority of exportsstill consist of logs rather than processed timber. In 1993, 43,400 cubic metres of logs and33,800 cubic metres of sawn wood were exported. In 1999, 153,700 cubic metres of logs and64,000 cubic metres of sawn wood were exported, a rise of 31% and a drop of 11%respectively on 1998 figures. 25 Most of the wood exported comes to the EU. 26 Export andimport statistics, however, vary according to different sources, and this can be an indication ofillegal trading in timber. 27

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 25International financial assistanceThere are serious concerns about the misuse of international financial assistance in thecountry. In May 2000, an article in the CAR press suggested that providing aid to thegovernment was a crime against the CAR people. The author was later arrested and chargedwith “insulting the head of the state”, provoking a strong reaction from two worldwide pressassociations. 28France is the largest bilateral donor to CAR; it pays the greater part of the governmentexpenses, including civil service salaries. 29 The second largest donor is Japan, whose officialassistance to the CAR averaged US$ 20 million during the period 1996 to 1998. 30In the 1980s, the French government, via the African Development Bank, funded theconstruction of a road by French contractors in the south-western part of the country, 31 whichfacilitated the entry of logging companies, poachers and bushmeat hunters into the forest.After the road’s completion in June 1989, an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) wasconducted on its potential extension to the capital, Bangui. It concluded that the road might aswell be extended because “the damage had already been done”. 32The EU forest conservation and sustainable development programme, ECOFAC, has aproject in the south-west forest of Ngotto. Covering 825,000 hectares, this forest harboursover 115 mammal species and over 320 bird species. ECOFAC support in CAR includes apilot sustainable forest management project in cooperation with a private logging company,IFB (Industrielle Forestière de Batalimo), which was granted two concessions known as Permisd’Exploitation et d’Aménagement (PEA), one in 1994 and the other in 1996. According to a1999 ECOFAC assessment of the partnership, the company has complied with all the nationalrules governing sustainable forestry in the area. 33Environmental impactsBecause of transportation difficulties and substantial costs, logging in CAR is highly selective.Only the most valuable trees are sought. But this selective targeting leads to large areas offorest being opened up as companies go deeper into the forest in search of the best timber.Sapelli, Ayous and Sipo are the main species logged but, because of the damage caused tosurrounding trees, some estimates suggest that selective logging in fact damages as much as30% of the forest in CAR. 34 Once loggers leave the area, poachers and settlers come in on theroads built by logging companies. In the western area of the country, most roads have beenbuilt by loggers to serve their interests rather than those of the local people. Roads betweenCAR and Cameroon, for example, run near concessions held by the company Thanry in bothcountries. 35 Poaching has had a considerable impact on the fauna of CAR. In the Lobayeregion where logging and mining are concentrated, little wildlife is left, especially along theBerberati/Bayanga road. 36Social impactsLogging companies come and go but their social impacts are not so transient. Informationabout the social consequences of logging in the area around Bayanga in the south west of CARis typical. 37Most people working for the logging companies which operate around Bayanga comeoriginally from outside the area, including the Savannah region in the north and fromneighbouring Congo (Brazzaville). The majority stay in the area even in the months or yearswhen one company has stopped logging but another has not yet taken over the concession.Many work in the diamond mines during these periods or go hunting. 38Logging employs just some of those who have immigrated into the area and has given themwork for only three years in the last 10 when the concession was functioning. During the yearswhen the logging concession was not worked, diamond mining and agriculture increased, asdid competition for resources, for example, fish in the streams. This has heightened stress andled to conflict between groups of people. The Bayaka Pygmies are often particularly adverselyaffected. 39To work in logging, people live in much larger villages, although many of them, includingthe Bayaka, are not used to living together in such large numbers. The result has been amarked rise in health and social problems related to a lack of sanitation, infectious diseases,alcoholism and a lack of social cohesion. Alcohol is more readily available in the villages thanin the smaller Bayaka hunting camps. The Bayaka have become more indebted to the villagers,although in the larger villages the Bayaka have more choice with whom to trade. Largervillages have also led to a rise in literacy and some health care since schools and clinics aremore available. 40 Access to health care and education, however, is not always equitablebetween groups.Roads have allowed those who do not know the forest to go into it. They have taken tokilling and selling bushmeat; as a result, there are fewer game animals in the forest,particularly fewer duikers (a kind of deer) and monkeys. This in turn has led to conflict within

26SOLD DOWN THE RIVERBayaka Pygmy communities and conflict between Bayaka and incomers. Incoming trappersaccuse the Bayaka who live in hunting camps of stealing animals from their snares – theBayaka usually hunt with nets – accusations that have led to the Bayaka being jailed, beaten orkilled. 41 Logging also destroys the Sapelli and Ayous trees where kinin caterpillars live, animportant food source for local people. 42 The Bayaka are losing many of their forest skills,including traditional hunting techniques that require time and commitment to master; trainingopportunities in such skills are also being lost. 43Table 3: Concession holdersin CAR at end of 1999Companies logging the forests of the Central African RepublicEuropean companies and capital have dominated the forestry sector in CAR. The recentarrival of WTK of Malaysia has marked a change from this pattern, although SESAM, thecompany WTK acquired in the late 1990s, retains some French capital. Concessionaires havechanged since 1997, when the map (see page 36) and accompanying concession data (seeAppendix) was produced, and the area under concession has increased. Table 3 shows themost recent data available on concessionaires.Company Source of Finance Area of Operation Size of Concession Date Concession(hectares)AllocatedIFB French Batalimo (Lobaye) Sciere 119,000 24th August 1994(Industrie Forestiere de Batalimo)IFB French Ngotto (Lobaye) 148,000 7th March 1996(Industrie Forestiere de Batalimo)SCAD Syrian-CAR Loko (Sc. + Deroul.) 296,306 7th March 1996(Société Centrafricaine de Deroulage)Lobaye / Dolobo (Scierie)LobayeSESAM Malaysian (major) Salo (Sangha-Mbaere) 106,700 21st July 1991(Société d'Exploitation de la Sangha-Mbaere) and French ScierieSESAM Malaysian (major) Nola (Sangha-Mbaere) 306,600 2nd November 1995(Société d'Exploitation de la Sangha-Mbaere) and French ScierieSEFCA Lebanese Mbaere 1 (Sciplac) Scierie 381,026 17th July 1998(Société d'Exploitation Forestiere Centrafricaine)Mambele (Sangha-Mbaere) ScierieThanry Centrafrique French Bamban 228,000 29th May 1996Scierie hautement mecaniseeColombe Foret Société Nouvelle Lebanese with CAR president Mambere-Kadei 652,221 7th July 1998Sangha-MambereSOFOKAD French – CAR Sosso Nakombo 131,200 15th January 1999(Soc. Forest. de la Kadei)Ndounga Meubles CAR Bouaca (Ombella-Mpoko) 127,013 26th June 1996Scierie MobileSBB French Bayanga 307,600 19th April 1999(Soc. Des Bois de Bayanga)SEPFC CAR Nola 275,000 5th June 1999(Soc. d'Exploit. Et de Promot. Des Forets Centraf.)PTC (Pan Africa Trading Centrafrique) - Mambere-Kadei 100,000 19th October 1999TOTAL 3,178,666Source: Ministère de l’Environnement, des Eaux, Forêts, Chasses et Pêches, Fiche Signalétique des Sociétés Forestières en Centrafrique

CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE) 27Congo (Brazzaville)Political, social and economic frameworkTHE REPUBLIC OF CONGO is often referred to as Congo (Brazzaville) inorder to avoid confusion with neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo,formerly Zaire (see page 32). The country has a small stretch of coast on the AtlanticOcean between Gabon and Angola; its inland borders are with Cameroon to the north, theCentral African Republic to the north-east and the Democratic Republic of Congo to thesouth-east. The country has a total area of 342,000 square kilometres, 60% of which iscovered by rainforests. 1 Over half the 2.7 million inhabitants of Congo (Brazzaville) live in thecities in the south of the country. 2 GNP per capita in 1997 was US$ 660 and life expectancywas 51 years. 3 Most of the rainforests are in the scarcely-populated and remote north of thecountry (which represents 57% of Congo’s territory but has just 230,500 inhabitants). 4 Formuch of the rural population here, the forest and its resources are their main source oflivelihood.Congo (Brazzaville) gained independence from France in 1960; it has had a turbulenthistory both before and after independence. Between 1958 and 1979, there were threepresidential coups and one presidential assassination. Military rule was established in 1968.Colonel Denis Sassou Nguesso assumed power in 1979 and ruled as a dictator until 1992,when President Lissouba was elected. Since then, violence and civil war have eruptedperiodically between various government and militia forces loyal either to Lissouba, SassouNguesso or a former prime minister, Kolelas. During a savage five-month civil war in 1997,thousands of unarmed civilians were killed and 700,000 displaced (over one-quarter of thepopulation), as they fled into the countryside or to neighbouring countries. Grave humanrights abuses against the civilian population were perpetrated by all sides in the conflict.Sassou Nguesso seized power again in October 1997. A new civil war broke out at the end of1998. Despite two ceasefires signed in 1999, violence continued at the end of 1999. Internallydisplaced people returning to their homes in 1999 faced serious human rights abuses,including killings, disappearances, and rape. 5 A fragile peace was restored in 2000.Congo (Brazzaville) faces the enormous task of restoring the population’s hope in the futurefollowing the traumatic events that people have endured in recent years, as well as physicallyrebuilding the country. Demobilising and disarming former militia members, many of whomwere responsible for human rights abuses, is critical to ensuring a lasting peace, and includesthe daunting challenge of reconciliation. Establishing a government based on democratic andinclusive principles will be essential for laying the foundations for sustainable developmentthat benefits all of the people. As a start, presidential, legislative and local elections arescheduled for 2001.As well as the political challenges ahead, the country also faces the escalating monetarycosts of resettling displaced persons and rebuilding infrastructure and institutions. Forexample, the railway from Brazzaville to the port of Pointe Noire is of immense importance tothe country’s economy and was a strategic target during the civil war, suffering damage whichresulted in the line’s closure for a considerable period. It is likely to be some time before it isfully operational again.Although Congo (Brazzaville) was the fourth largest oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa in1999, 6 the country remains highly indebted to international financial institutions and debtarrears continue to escalate. At the end of 1999, its total external debt amounted to CFA Fr3,357 billion (US$ 4.36 billion), equivalent to 246% of its GDP, with arrears of CFA Fr 1,279billion (US$ 1.66 billion). 7 The country does not as yet qualify for debt relief under the HIPCinitiative, although international donors met in October 2000 to discuss the situation. Theyindicated that, if the country follows stringent macro-economic policies, includingprivatisation, developing the non-oil sectors and fiscal management, as well as commencingwork on a Poverty Reduction Strategy, this would take the country one step nearer toqualification for debt relief (see page 9 for more on HIPC). 8 As part of structural adjustmentpolicies, multilateral creditors are encouraging the development of the non-oil sectors of theeconomy, including forestry, and the privatisation of state-controlled institutions, includingformer forest parastatals. Timber exports represent the country’s second major source ofexport revenues after oil and the forestry sector provides 10% of formal employment. 9Forestry’s contribution to GNP increased from 1% in 1982 to 5% in 1996. 10Congo(Brazzaville)As part ofstructuraladjustmentpolicies,multilateralcreditors areencouraging thedevelopment ofthe non-oil sectorsof the economy,including forestry.Forest policy and practiceOf the 21.5 million hectares of the country’s forests, approximately half of them (12.7 millionhectares) are classified as productive forest suitable for timber exploitation. 11 The rest areflooded or semi-flooded forests or are located in irregular terrain not amenable to commercial

28SOLD DOWN THE RIVER© FORESTS MONITORBecause of disruptions tothe railway as a result ofthe civil wars, logs fromnorthern Congo have beenleaving the country on thisroad via Cameroon.exploitation. 12 In 1995, 37% of the total forest areaof Congo was held in concessions and this hasincreased rapidly since 1996.There are two main areas of commerciallyexploitable natural forests in Congo: 13§ In the south, in the regions of Kouilou-Mayombe and Chaillu-Niari, forests cover 4.5 millionhectares of which just over 4 million hectares wereheld as concessions in 1995. 14 Forests in these regionsare relatively accessible and have been intensivelyexploited since the 1940s. 15 In 1990, over 50% of thecountry’s total production came from here. 16 The twomain tree species targeted are Okoumé and Limba.Logging operations in the south virtually ceasedbecause of the civil war;§ In the north, forests cover 17.3 millionhectares, 17 of which 8.9 million are deemedexploitable. 18 Prior to 1996, concessions had been allocated for 2.1 million hectares ofnorthern forests and forestry activities were limited because of the relative isolation of theregion; this has been changing rapidly. In 1996 alone, 3.2 million hectares were allocatedfor timber exploitation 19 and, since 1998, President Sassou Nguesso has been activelyseeking multinational logging companies to take over the exploitation of the remainingunallocated forests in the north of the country. Many of the previously unallocatedconcessions have now been allocated and former parastatals have been privatised. As aresult, the northern forests are becoming increasingly significant for timber production.The two main tree species targeted are Sapelli and Sipo.The state department responsible for the forestry sector is the Ministry of Forest Economy(Ministère de l’Economie Forestière). The forestry industry was until recently legally governedby the 1974 Forestry Code. Its revision by Parliament began in 1993, which produced a draftrevised version in June 1998 (see below). The 1974 law specified that the forest be divided intomanagement units (unités d’aménagement), each of which must have a precise plan ofmanagement and exploitation. 20 Stipulations regarding harvesting and development practiceswere set out, as well as how much concessionaires could produce per year (VMA – volumemaximum annuel). Of the 27 management units that existed in 1990, only five had amanagement plan but none observed it. 21 In northern Congo none of the active forestry unitshave a management plan, although some companies are now developing them.The June 1998 version of the Forestry Code includes the following objectives: 22§ Sustainable management of forests;§ Conservation of biological diversity;§ Reforestation, mainly through communal and industrial plantations;§ Decentralisation of the sector and international co-operation;§ Development and diversification of industries based on the local transformation of almostall log production. To attain this objective, the new code establishes that, whereas themaximum period of production concession is for 10 years, permits for the processingindustry can last up to 15 years and can be renewed.In January1998, President Sassou Nguesso announced that logging companies were forbiddento export logs 23 and that all companies had to present a plan for timber processing. 24 In March2000, however, the Congolese government finally approved the law, and it stated that 60% oftimber production must be processed locally. 25 Although the increased emphasis ondownstream processing should bring additional revenues to the government, theimplementation of this policy will not be immediate given that processing facilities have beenlittle developed in the country to date; in 1997, the country had 30 processing units but onlyfive had export capacity. Most exports are still of logs.The government often lacks the capacity to develop social infrastructure, particularly in thenorth. As a result, social development projects are often specified as part of the contractbetween government and forestry companies and are known as the cahier des charges. Projectsinclude the construction of roads, schools and clinics. In some instances, these projects areundertaken in lieu of taxes or by the company under contract to the government, and aretherefore at the government’s, and not the company’s, expense.Congo (Brazzaville)’s forestry taxes are considered to be low and substantial revenues havebeen lost because of irregularities; the government itself estimates that US$ 4 billion in timberindustry levies have been foregone as a result. 26 Logging companies still have considerableroom for negotiation about timber volumes and taxes. This has facilitated corruption in the

CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE) 29awarding and exploitation of generous concessions. 27 Tax incentives are favouring thedevelopment of forestry operations in the north of the country. In 1999, one French company,Rougier, was granted a 370,000 hectare concession near the border with the Central AfricanRepublic (CAR), reportedly on terms so generous that it could expect to recover its capitalinvestment in just two years and would pay just one-third of the normal royalties to thegovernment. 28The costs of the war are being felt by forestry companies in a number of ways: thedisruption to transport routes, especially the railway, have added considerably to transportcosts from the north; the cessation of operations in the south of the country; the kidnapping ofstaff (see Wonnemann, page 66); forestry companies are now being asked by the governmentto employ former militia members to help reintegrate them into society, even though they areunqualified. 29Because of disruptions to the railway as a result of the civil wars, logs from northern Congohave been leaving the country by road via Cameroon to Douala rather than being floateddown river to the main river port in Brazzaville, where authorities control and tax timbertraffic, and then on by rail to Pointe Noire. 30 Even prior to the war, the river and rail optionentailed lost revenues to the government; the long journey down river enabling many logs tobe stolen and informally processed before they reached Brazzaville itself. It is not always clearwhat happens to the money that is paid by logging companies in taxes. According to somereports, part of the US$ 4 million paid by one new company for its concessions paid the rebelsto come back while another part simply “evaporated”. 31Monitoring and enforcement capacity of the Ministry is weak. As with most governmentdepartments, they are virtually non-existent in the north of the country. Civil servants go forlong periods of time without pay, which not only seriously demotivates staff but also meansthat they must look for alternative sources of income. This situation facilitates corruption andinformal “taxation”, for example on commercial bushmeat. 32Production and EU tradeIn the second half of the 1980s, timber production grew consistently, attaining a total of883,000 cubic metres in 1990. But during the first half of the 1990s, timber production inCongo decreased, in contrast to the rest of the region – in 1995, production had dropped byhalf to 441,000 cubic metres. 33 In 1996, production went up to 560,000 cubic metres but inthe following year declined to its lowest level in the last 30 years, 300,000 cubic metres,because of the civil war. 34 Since then, however, log production has begun to rise again:550,000 cubic metres in 1998 35 and an estimated 800,000 cubic metres in 1999. 36 Thegovernment plans even further expansion of the industrial forestry sector, aiming to more thandouble timber production in the year 2000 up to 2 million cubic metres. 37Most timber exports are of logs rather than processed products. In 1997, total log exportsfrom Congo were 257,449 cubic metres; sawn wood exports were 37,930 cubic metres; veneerexports were 41,666 cubic metres and plywood was 2,613 cubic metres. 38 In 1999, log exportswere 203,544 cubic metres; sawn wood exports were 61,861 cubic metres; veneer exportswere 16,540 cubic metres and plywood was zero. 39 In the early 1990s, exports of pulpwoodfrom plantations were significant – 670,000 cubic metres in 1990 – but have since declinedbecause the plantations are depleted. 40 Since 1984, the Sapelli and Okoumé tree speciesrepresent 60-65% of total exports. Ayous, Bahia and Sipo are the next three most targetedcommercial species. 41The European Union continues to be the primary destination for timber exports fromCongo, with France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain being the main importers. Outside theEU, the main importer is Japan. In addition, it is believed that considerable volumes of logs arebeing smuggled out of the north of the country from some of the newly allocated concessions.International financial assistanceAs in the other countries in Central Africa (apart from the DRC), Congo (Brazzaville) receivessupport from the EU forest conservation and sustainable development programme, ECOFAC,which has a project in the 280,000 hectare National Park of Odzala in the north-west of thecountry. Odzala has an exceptional variety of different landscapes and is home to a number offorest and savannah animal species such as chimpanzees and elephants. ECOFAC isdeveloping the sustainable management of the park, including the promotion of sustainableeconomic activities in the park’s surroundings, such as eco-tourism, to provide an alternativeto bushmeat hunting. 42Logging companies appear to have received funds from multilateral organisations, althoughthe connections are not always clear. In 1990, for example, the African Development Bankgranted a loan to a French company, J. Lalanne, which only three years before had gained acontract to run a recently-established semi-state company, 43 Société Forestière Algéro-Congolaise. 44 In 1994, the French national development agency, Agence Française duDévéloppement (AFD) – or CFD (Caisse Française du Développement) as it then was – was

30SOLD DOWN THE RIVERinvolved in the negotiations for a substantial equity stake that J. Lalanne had in anotherlogging company, SNBS (Société Nouvelle des Bois de Sangha).The World Bank’s investment in Congo (Brazzaville) has been controversial. In the 1990s,for example, together with a number of African banks, it financed the construction by anotherlogging company, SCBO, of a sawmill that was never completed. 45 SCBO was a semi-statecompany, partly owned by French interests, 46 one of whose directors was Congo’s President. 47The company has recently been privatised and is now owned by the German company Danzer(see Part III – Company Profiles). 48Environmental impactsThe forests of the south and north have exhibited different levels and intensity ofenvironmental impacts as a result of forestry operations. In the south, where industrial logginghas been taking place since the 1940s, forests have been opened up by forestry companies,attracting migrant farmers who further clear the forest for agriculture. 49 In the north, the areaof logging concessions is rapidly increasing and, given the lack of effective monitoring andenforcement of these remote forests, the ecological sustainability of forestry operations is notensured. 50 Exploitation of the forests has facilitated commercial bushmeat hunting, which isdecimating wildlife in a number of areas. The loss of biodiversity which results from logginghas long-term consequences both ecologically and socially.Although the country has protected areas, the capacity to monitor them is minimal. In theNational Park of Counkouati, which is on the Atlantic coast near the country’s border withGabon, the government has granted logging concessions of 9,000 hectares in the 500,000hectare reserve, which was set up with grants from the EU, the World Bank and severalenvironmental organisations. 51 The lack of monitoring in the park – there are just 22 illequippedrangers for the entire park – has also enabled poachers to operate freely in thereserve – they have set up a vast encampment within it. The park suffers, moreover, fromoffshore oil pollution. 52Social impactsThe presence of forestry companies in the north of the country has positive and negativeimpacts. Many of the companies act as a surrogate for the state, creating islands of stability inotherwise neglected areas of the country. Nevertheless, their practices have criticalshortcomings, such as discrimination against local people in general and against Pygmies inparticular, and promotion of commercial bushmeat hunting. Forestry companies generally onlyrecognise the rights of and enter into communication with Bantu villagers, neglecting thePygmy forest dwellers. Bantu communities therefore tend to get most of the benefits from theoperations, such as cash and goods, schools and dispensaries. Roads tend to go through theirvillages. Despite some positive developments, however, logging operations have negativeimpacts to a greater or lesser degree on all local people. From local people’s perspectives, themain problems are:© JEROME LEWISMbendjele women andchildren, Sangha regionThe companies do not listen sufficiently to local people’s needs.Although villagers generally support logging companies, there tends to be profounddisagreements over specific issues. Local Congolese may want a school to be built if thecompany logs their area, or they may not want large Sapelli trees near the village to be felledas they provide large quantities of caterpillars that are eaten when there is little other foodavailable (see Sapelli Tree feature, page 7). But unless villagers take direct action, such asblocking the loggers’ roads with barricades, theirneeds are rarely listened to or respected. 53Companies tend not to provide employment forthe local people.The local population strongly resent the loggingcompanies employing so many people fromoutside the forest areas they are exploiting. The‘Front National de la Sangha’ was the mainvehicle for expressing this discontent in the midto late 1990s when violent demonstrations tookplace. Although now somewhat suppressed, theFront still has large popular support. The Frontwished to impose a quota system for employinglocal people, but since a whole generation ofnorthern Congolese has not had access to anadequate education, they do not possess theskills required by the logging companies. 54

CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE) 31Traditional rights are violated.In some areas, “eco-guards” armedwith automatic rifles patrol the bufferzone around the national parks, anactivity many local people regard as agross violation of their traditionalrights. In some cases, elephantpoachers have been hired as ecoguardsin an attempt to stop thempoaching. It has been reported in thepast that these guards oftenintimidated local people, and allowedtheir former poaching colleagues topass freely through checkpoints butconfiscated local people’s smallamounts of game. The system hascreated distrust and antagonismbetween some conservation workersand local people and, in certainplaces, has strengthened the positionof some of the best-connectedpoachers who are commissioned to hunt trophy animals.The commercial bushmeat trade is destroying the fauna of the region.As in the other countries of the Congo Basin, poachers gain access to remote areas by usinglogging roads. Some areas have now been trapped out, making subsistence hunting much moredifficult. Many Pygmy and Bantu communities who live in these areas are very distressed,especially because they are fearful of resisting the well-connected commercial meat traders. 55Pygmies are particularly negatively affected by logging operations.Logging operations often disrupt the lives of local people, but especially Pygmies, who rely onthe forest for game, other food and raw materials. Unless constrained, the demand for bushmeat to supply workers’ communities is so intense that it swiftly leads to the severeimpoverishment of forest opened up by logging roads. This has dire consequences for Pygmygroups who use these areas of forest for their subsistence activities. The majority of loggingcompany employees are Bantu because some logging companies believe that Pygmies areunreliable, although in the forest Pygmies are often used to locate the best trees. Pygmiesresent this perceived favouritism and find it difficult to obtain reasonably remuneratedemployment in logging towns. In rural areas, schools and hospitals are always built in Bantuvillages where there is strong discrimination against Pygmies, making access to these socialprovisions difficult for most Pygmies. Unless concerted efforts are made to involve Pygmypeople in the management of their forests and for them to share in the profits gained, futuregenerations are likely to feel cheated of their heritage. They will find themselves with forestsdevoid of game or commercially valuable trees surrounding inaccessible parks and otherpeople’s farms. 56Companies logging the forests of CongoAlthough a number of forestry enterprises in Congo (Brazzaville) have been parastatals,foreign capital (particularly European capital) has always played an important role in thesector. Under the macro-economic reform policies prescribed by multilateral lenders,privatisation of the former parastatals is currently taking place and is increasing thepenetration by transnational corporations in the forestry sector.In line with government plans to increase production, twelve new logging licences havebeen granted recently. 57 In February 2000, logging contracts were signed with Lebanese andMalaysian companies. The Lebanese company was granted a 15-year renewable contract for199,000 hectares in the north-eastern region of Likouala, while the Congolese-Malaysiancompany, Afri-Woods, was granted 104,000 hectares in the south-west of Congo. 58The German company Danzer (see page 55) and the French company Rougier (see page 60)have recently been awarded concessions in the north of the country. Other Europeancompanies operating in the country are the German company Feldmeyer (see page 57); aconsortium of companies operating BOPLAC (see Bruynzeel, page 55 and DLH Nordisk, page56); the German company Wonnemann (see page 66).The map on page 37 is based on 1994 Ministry data, updated as far as possible with newinformation on concession holders, see Appendix. Not all new concession holders, however,have been identified.Bantu fishing village on theSangha River© JEROME LEWIS

32SOLD DOWN THE RIVERDemocratic Republic of CongoPolitical, social and economic frameworkDemocraticRepublicof CongoAFTER 32 YEARS of “kleptocracy” under Dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, Zairewas renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1997. Hopes that itspoverty-stricken people would see more than a change of name in their countrywere, however, soon thwarted.Located on the equator, east of Congo (Brazzaville), DRC would be a landlocked countrybut for 37 kilometres of coastline. It is the largest country in the Congo Basin region. Of its2.3 million square kilometres, nearly half is forestland (1.1 million square kilometres in1993). 1 DRC contains 12.5% of the world’s remaining tropical rainforest – only Brazil andIndonesia have larger areas. As well as its immense forests, it has vast deposits of cobalt,copper and diamonds. Its network of rivers are a natural transport system and huge potentialsource of hydroelectricity. Its farming land is rich; 70% of the population is involved insubsistence farming. Many of the country’s 48 million people depend on the forests for nontimberforest products such as food, building materials and medicines. 2 In 1994, both urbanand non-urban dwellers collected fuelwood and charcoal from the forest at an estimated rateof 42.6 million cubic metres every year. 3Despite being such a large and relatively fertile country rich in natural resources, there ishunger, competition for land, and pressure on the rainforest arising from landlessness. Inlarge areas of DRC, the people with power have managed to expropriate the land fromthose less powerful than themselves. For example, although the region of Kivu, whichborders the Ituri Forest, is one of the greenest and most luxuriant parts of DRC, oneresearcher noted that food security there “is not about how lush and productive the regionis, but about access to its lushness, and to its product.” 4 Those pushed off their land moveinto forest areas to clear other land for cultivation, often making use of the roads created bylogging companies. 5The country has had decades of economic mismanagement, corruption, lack of investmentin infrastructure and widespread insecurity caused by political conflicts. Real wages, evenbefore the upheavals of the 1990s, were one-tenth of what they were at independence fromBelgium in 1960. Chronic malnutrition is rife, and 80% of people live in absolute poverty. 6The economy shrank under President Mobutu; GNP in 1996 was less than half that of 1980,while per capita GNP fell even more dramatically. 7 Per capita GNP in 1997 was US$ 110, thelowest of the six countries featured in this report and the second lowest in Africa(Mozambique being the lowest at US$ 90). 8 The total debt of DRC in 1996 was US$ 12.8billion, including nearly US$ 7 billion in arrears, the majority of which was owed to bilateralcreditors. 9 Despite its unrepayable debt and qualification for debt relief under the HeavilyIndebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC), the country has little chance of having its debtcancelled because of the ongoing political and economic upheavals.DRC has a long history of conflict. Before independence in 1960, a particularly brutalcolonial regime had dominated the country for decades. In 1965, General Mobutu Sese Sekotook over in a military coup and stayed in power for over 30 years, until Laurent Kabilaousted him in another military coup in 1997. Mobutu presided over widescale corruption,paying large amounts of money to friends and foe alike to keep himself in power. 10 He isalleged to have built up a massive personal fortune, 11 while receiving foreign assistance fromthe US, Europe and international organisations such as the World Bank. When Kabila tookpower, western nations signalled their willingness to work with the government uponcondition that it committed itself to democracy and human rights. Hopes that Kabila wouldmeet these requirements, however, soon faded. Since the assassination of Kabila in January2001 and his replacement by his 31-year-old son, the country remains unstable. 12DRC is at the centre of what has been called the “First African War” because of thenumber of countries involved – Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and, briefly, Chad on the side ofPresident Kabila’s government, Uganda and Rwanda on the side of the rebels. The war hasworsened the economic and political situation. Human rights’ abuses by all parties in theconflict have been reported. Many commercial logging companies have suspended or closedtheir operations in the country. The war has pushed refugees into the forested areas, therebyincreasing population density, and has intensified insecurity, two factors that contribute todeforestation. Amnesty International estimates that as many as one million people have beeninternally displaced, on top of the several hundred thousand who have fled to neighbouringcountries. 13

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 33Forest policy and practicePresident Laurent Kabila made many promises when he assumed power in 1997, includingpledges in 1998 to establish a genuine conservation agenda for DRC. 14 No progress has beenmade since. The civil war that started in 1998 devastated large parts of the country such as theprovince of Orientale (formerly Haute Zaire) and has halted most logging operationsthroughout the country. If logging resumes, however, it is questionable whether it willcontribute to the reconstruction and sustainable development of DRC.Logging companies operate in DRC without an institutional or legislative framework toensure the forests’ sustainable and equitable use. According to a study conducted by the WorldResources Institute, none of the concessions in DRC have been managed responsibly 15 andlittle changed under Kabila. Many concessions were still operating as they did under PresidentMobutu, that is, by indirect management through European logging companies because of alack of trained local staff. Concessions which were dormant tended not to be withdrawn,although many of them had been granted to cronies of Mobutu’s regime. 16In 1988, over 21 million hectares were designated for timber production. 17 At present,concessions cover approximately 11.8 million hectares of which 8.2 million hectares arepossibly active. The active concessions are in the provinces of Bas Congo, Bandundu,Orientale and Equateur. The most important logging company in the country is Siforco, asubsidiary of the German company, Danzer, which holds 2.9 million hectares – one quarter ofthe country’s concessions.Formally, a company must spend one year evaluating the concession area and three yearsconstructing infrastructure such as roads before it can have guaranteed use of the concessionarea. Logging concessions are allocated on a renewable 25-year lease. 18 But loggers havecommented that, in practice, the contracts can be terminated at any time. 19 Logging companiesalso report that they have to give 10% of their profits to chiefs, bureaucrats and generals. 20Tax revenues from logging are low. Concessionaires pay US$2 per hectare for each 1,000hectare block for which they have been granted a “Permit to Cut”. 21 A law from the Mobutuera mandates anyone who cuts a tree to replant one or two trees. 22 In practice, companies andindividuals do not comply with this law.Most timber exports from DRC are of logs rather than processed wood. The only measuretaken to encourage the export of processed products rather than logs is variable taxation. The“ad valorem” tax on exports is 4% for logs, 2% on sawn wood and 1.5 % for veneer sheets. 23In April 1999, log exports were briefly banned, an initiative which foreign logging companiesclaimed would lead to the end of the forestry sector in the country. They put pressure on thegovernment, and the prohibition was lifted three months later. 24Production and EU tradeIn 1995, DRC produced about 300,000 cubic metres of logs. 25 Although formal sourcessuggest that there was a substantial increase in 1996, available figures indicate that totalproduction in that year dropped to 287,000 cubic metres. 26 The war slowed production in1997 to 236,000 cubic metres and still further in 1998 to 224,000 cubic metres.In 1994, log exports totalled 118,000 cubic metres, sawn wood exports came to 41,000cubic metres and veneer sheet exports amounted to 8,000 cubic metres. 27 Data for thefollowing years show approximately the same breakdown between the three types of export,although official data vary. Just as production dropped slightly in 1997 and 1998, so didexports. In 1997, log exports were 103,000 cubic metres, sawn wood exports were 32,000cubic metres and veneer sheets were 6,000 cubic metres; In 1998, log exports totalled 97,000cubic metres, sawn wood totalled 37,000 cubic metres and veneer sheets totalled 4,000 cubicmetres. 28 The main species exported are Sapelli, Sipo, Tola and Iroko, but also Afrormosia,Tima, and Wenge. 29 The main importing countries are Portugal, Germany and France.International financial assistanceApart from humanitarian aid, other donor projects in DRC have been affected by the conflictin recent years. EU support through ECOFAC, for example, was prepared for the country, asfor other countries in the region, but none of the planned activities has been carried out. In1990, the World Bank was exerting pressure to increase timber exports to pay the country’sdebt, and to this end it provided US$ 12 million more in aid. 30Environmental impactsIn theory, logging companies who were working in the country up until the civil war broke outin 1998 would return to take a second cut. In practice, they did not, since the amount of forestdestroyed during the first cut, and the influx of shifting cultivators, have both meant that therewere not enough valuable trees left for a second cut. Logging is thus both highly selective andunsustainable. Only the best trees are taken – the average timber yield is 8.7 cubic metres (lessthan one tree) per hectare, a yield so low that it effectively quickens the pace at which more

34SOLD DOWN THE RIVERSOLD DOWN THE RIVER 35NIGERIALEGENDSea, water bodiesNon forestForestMajor townsInternational boundariesPARENT COMPANYAlpiBolloréRougierThanryOther EuropeanOther AllocatedUnallocatedProtected Areas-IUCN Categories I-VI0100kmCAMEROONCENTRAL AFRICANREPUBLICDoualaYaoundéBioko(EquatorialGuinea)LomiéYokadoumaKribiAtlanticOceanEQUATORIAL GUINEAGABONCONGOMap 1: Cameroon

36SOLD DOWN THE RIVERCAMEROONCENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLICCONGOBanguiLEGENDSea, water bodiesNon forestForestMajor townsInternational boundariesPARENT COMPANYThanryOther EuropeanOther AllocatedProtected Areas-IUCN Categories I-VI0100kmDEMOCRATICREPUBLICOF CONGOMap 2: Central African Republic

SOLD DOWN THE RIVER 37CENTRAL AFRICANREPUBLICCAMEROONGABONDEMOCRATICREPUBLICOF CONGOCONGOLEGENDSea, water bodiesNon forestForestMajor townsInternational boundariesPointe NoireCabinda(ANGOLA)BrazzavillePARENT COMPANYBruynzeel/DLH NordiskFeldmeyerDanzerRougierWonnemannOther EuropeanOther AllocatedNot knownProtected Areas-IUCN Categories I-VI0100kmANGOLAMap 3: Congo (Brazzaville)

38SOLD DOWN THE RIVERSOLD DOWN THE RIVER 39EQUATORIAL GUINEALibrevillePort GentilGABONAtlanticOceanLEGENDSea, water bodiesNon forestForestMajor townsInternational boundariesPARENT COMPANYSonaeRougierThanryOther EuropeanOther AllocatedNot knownProtected Areas-IUCN Categories I-VICONGO0100kmMap 4: Gabon

40SOLD DOWN THE RIVERIn social terms,the records oflogging companiesare mixed. On theone hand, theyprovide a certainlevel of health,education andtransportationservices tovillagers thatcannot currentlybe provided by theState. On theother, they payCongolese workersvery low wagesand feel noresponsibilitytowards them oncethey have finishedlogging andmoved away.rainforest is opened up. The massive trunks can be taken out of the forest only on feedertracks and logging routes before travelling down river; thus these selectively-logged areas arecriss-crossed with a network of roads. The heaviest logging has occurred in the province ofBas-DRC, which is relatively close to both the capital, Kinshasa, and the ports. In the wake ofthe loggers, people have moved in to clear huge areas for farming. Hardly any primaryrainforest now remains in Bas-DRC. The other rainforest areas of DRC face a similar future iflogging continues to impoverish the ecosystem, and land appropriation and lower prices foragricultural and forest produce continue to impoverish the poor. 31There are 18 protected areas covering an area of 18 million – 7.69% of the country. 32Although the percentage of formally protected areas in the country is relatively high, inpractice forests in these areas are at risk of being seriously degraded.Because of the war, the government cannot manage, let alone monitor many of the formallyprotected areas. The Maiko National Park and Okapi Wildlife Reserve, for instance, are in theeastern regions of DRC currently occupied by the rebels and their foreign allies; the VirungaNational Park is on the border with Uganda, one of the countries supporting the rebels. Evenbefore the current war, these areas had been threatened by the arrival of large numbers ofrefugees from Rwanda who had been pushed into the forest by Kabila’s rebel army, ADFL(Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo). The retreating Zairian army(fighting on the side of Mobutu) also damaged many eastern areas. 33But monitoring of protected areas outside the war zone is also deficient. The statedepartment responsible for protected areas, the Congolese Institute for Nature Conservation(ICCN), spends between 75 and 85% of its budget in Kinshasa, 34 leaving just one guard per20,000 hectares in the field. Moreover, because official pay is low, guards sometimes dependon handouts from illegal hunters and mining operations. 35It is not surprising that logging takes place in protected areas. A UNDP report estimatesthat, in 1995, between 7,000 and 10,000 cubic metres of timber were leaving the southernpart of Virunga National Park every day. 36 The destruction of these areas has serious economicconsequences, particularly for an impoverished country. In the late 1970s, tourism revenuesfrom chimpanzee viewing amounted to over US$ 1 million for the ICCN, financing themanagement of all protected areas. 37Social impactsIn social terms, the records of logging companies are mixed. On the one hand, they provide acertain level of health, education and transportation services to villagers that cannot currentlybe provided by the State. 38 On the other, they pay Congolese workers very low wages and feelno responsibility towards them once they have finished logging and moved away. This meansthat those who have moved into the forest to work for the company often have to switch toclearing the forest to grow food in order to feed their families. 39 Moreover, companies tend toignore safety requirements, such as provision of safety equipment, so accidents are frequentbut compensation is rare. 40Insecure land rights also cause deforestation. Historically, shifting cultivation, customarytenure and an abundance of land meant that land was held by groups in which the elders hadto remain responsive to the needs of the village as a whole. Conflicts were resolved by peoplemoving to establish other villages in which the chiefs or elders sought to attract people to settlerather than to exclude them. Once Belgian colonial law, enforced by European colonialcompanies, was imposed, people had to remain in the area where they were registered and togrow crops to pay as tax. The post-colonial state has continued the colonial policy of ensuringthat chiefs remain in power only if they retain control over their population in a way thatextracts wealth for the benefit of those who control the state. In this framework, all landbelongs to the state. In practice, however, land belongs to the chief to whom peasants mustpay their dues to use the land, dues which those higher up the hierarchy can then extract fromthe local chief. 41 This arrangement does not secure villagers’ access to land, since the chief canuse his connections with those higher up the hierarchy to support him in selling land toanyone he wishes to. Those pushed off their land often move into forest areas which areaccessible because of roads opened by logging companies. They clear the land, contributing todeforestation, which in turn makes forest resources such as fuelwood more scarce. In someareas of Orientale where deforestation was already occurring in 1990, women of all ages haveto walk longer and longer distances to obtain fuelwood, up to six or seven kilometres. 42The more powerful people tend to expropriate the land from those less powerful. Loggingsimply replicates on a large-scale the continual expropriation of land and resources from thepoor. This is a form of wealth accumulation by the powerful which is based not on theaccumulation and investment of capital, nor the maintenance of a strong political structure,but on the intentional creation and perpetuation of insecurity at all levels of society. Thisoccurred during Mobutu’s regime and did not appear to have changed under Kabila’sgovernment. 43

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 41As in the other countries of the Central African region, the Pygmy peoples are particularlyvulnerable to the negative impacts of logging. Their numbers are relatively high in the DRC,estimates varying between 39,000 and 154,000. They are broadly divided into the Bacwa,Batwa and the Bambuti. They face several threats, such as the destruction of their forests,malnutrition and diseases including tuberculosis and leprosy. Venereal diseases have mademany Bacwa women infertile, while in some areas the Bambuti have suffered badly fromalcoholism and violence at the hands of both rebels and regular armies. On their forest lands,the historic relationships of exchange with local farmers are being severely disrupted by theinflux of farmers from outside the area who want to grow cash crops. Pygmy rights to forestlands appear not to be recognised in customary or national law. The Pygmies are additionallyat risk through some conservation initiatives. Plans for a forest reserve to protect the centralIturi Forest, for example, includes a core area where hunter-gatherers are not permitted tohunt or gather. 44 In the 1970s and 1980s, Batwa Pygmies were expelled from the Kahuzi-Biegaforests in Kivu, without compensation or provision of alternative lands. 45Companies logging the forests of the Democratic Republic ofCongoIt is not clear which companies have suspended operations but plan to resume once theconflict has lessened, and which companies have ceased operations altogether. No map ofconcessions is available but field work undertaken in October 1999 gleaned the followinginformation on concession holders. It should be noted that most current concessions arebelieved to have suspended operations because of the war.A number of Asian companies were reportedly considering the acquisition of loggingconcessions in DRC, for example, Idris Hydraulic and Innovest, 46 but no further informationwas available during field visits in 1999. In addition, several companies are believed to haveceased operations altogether because of the political situation and/or financial difficulties.These include: Amexbois; Agrifor; La Forestiere; and Soexforco. 47 Recent unconfirmedinformation suggests that a Thai forestry company, DARA Forest, is buying timber from rebelsin eastern DRC.Table 4: Current concessionholders in DRCCompanies Ownership and/or Concessions size Location of concessions Productionnationality of capital (hectares) (Province) (cubic metres) 1998Siforco (formerly Siforzal) Danzer (Germany) 2.9 million Equateur and 1,346,100 106,000Holding company:hectares in OrientaleInterholco (Switzerland)Soforma group/ Nord Sud Timber (Switzerland), 1.138 million Bas Congo and Bandundu 37,000Sodefor/CFT/Forabolaplus dormant concessions inEquateur, Orientale and Bas CongoSokinex Belgian entrepreneur 405,000 Equateur plus dormant concessions in 29,000(previously part of the Soforma group);Equateur and Orientaleaffiliates: Sicomo and SogevaSafbois CFE (Belgium) 374,000 Equateur 17, 000Scibois French 205,000 Equateur 4,000Sicobois Not known 779,000 Equateur 25,000Agripro Indian family 360,000 Equateur Orientale 4,000BBC Bakrie Brothers (Lebanon) 876,000 Equateur Orientale No production yetSources: Field Visit (1999); AidEnvironment, 2000

42SOLD DOWN THE RIVEREquatorial GuineaPolitical, social and economic frameworkEquatorialGuineaThe rate at whichthe industrialproduction oftimber isincreasing meansthat logging isunsustainable.According to theIMF, the forestresources ofEquatorial Guineacould be severelydepleted by theyear 2012.EQUATORIAL GUINEA, the only Spanish-speaking country in the CongoBasin, consists of several small islands off the coast of Cameroon and a section ofmainland between Gabon and Cameroon. In total, the country occupies 28,000square kilometres: Rio Muni, the continental part accounts for most of this with 26,000square kilometres, while Bioko, the largest island and location of the capital, Malabo, is 2,000square kilometres in size. Some government ministries have recently moved to Bata, the majortown on the mainland.The Spanish colonial power made little attempt to provide for the development of thepeople, establishing an export-orientated plantation economy which continued afterindependence in 1968. Cocoa and coffee were the main export commodities until the mid-1980s, when timber gained in importance. Drilling for off-shore oil began in 1996 and largedeposits were discovered in 1998. Oil has transformed the country’s economy. GNP per capitain 1997 was US$ 1,050. 1 As with the other oil-producing countries in the region, however, thebulk of the population does not benefit but remains in poverty. 2 The contracts for oilproduction agreed with the government in the early 1990s are highly favourable to thetransnational corporations which operate in the sector and, as a result, government revenuehas been limited. 3 In addition, there are widespread concerns about corruption and thediversion of revenues by those in power.Between 80% and 90% of the population of 0.4 million depend directly on forestresources, 4 such as wood for fuel, medicines, food and building materials. 80% of thepopulation live on the mainland of Rio Muni, including a sizeable minority of Bakola Pygmiesin the north-west of the country. 5 The bushmeat trade is an important source of revenue forthe rural population, mainly on the island of Bioko where it has replaced revenues derivedfrom cocoa. 6 Agriculture is mainly based on shifting cultivation. Traditionally, the fallowperiods varied from 8 to 15 years, but with increasing pressure, they are becoming shorter,decreasing the soil fertility.From its independence from Spain in 1968 until the late 1970s, Equatorial Guinea wasgoverned by the brutal dictatorship of Francisco Macias. 7 In 1979, Macias’ nephew, ObiangNguema, toppled his uncle, but political repression and human rights abuses continue asbefore. Up to one-third of the people live in exile. 8 Because of international pressure, attemptshave been made since 1991 to demonstrate changes towards democracy, but little has changedin practice. One-party rule officially ended in 1992 and elections were held in 1993, 1996 and1999. The UN and the EU, however, refused to attend the electoral process because theyassessed that the conditions for fair elections had not been met. 9 Reports of human rightsabuses abound. 10 Opponents of the regime have been imprisoned for up to 28 years and, inearly 1999, in anticipation of the elections, opposition party candidates were arrested. 11 InJanuary 1998, there were large-scale arrests of the Bubi ethnic minority following unrest onBioko Island. The people were accused of belonging to an illegal movement for selfdetermination;at trials condemned by international observers, 15 people were sentenced todeath and over 100 imprisoned. In 1998, Amnesty International reported that the governmentheld dozens of tortured detainees incommunicado; many had been detained because they wereBubi. At least five died in prison. 12 There are also unconfirmed reports of mass graves ofBubis. 13Forest policy and practiceForests cover around 2.2 million hectares of Equatorial Guinea – most of the country. Ofthese, all the productive forests – approximately 1.5 million hectares – have been allocated asindustrial logging concessions. 14 Industrial timber production has rapidly increased since themid-1990s. 15 Forestry is now the second most important economic sector after oil. 16Logging operations are a cause of concern for several reasons. Firstly, a brutal dictatorshipprevents sustainable development. It is difficult for logging companies to operate in thecountry without condoning the government to a greater or lesser extent. Secondly, thenecessary mechanisms to ensure sustainable and socially equitable forestry are not in place.Thirdly, the rate at which the industrial production of timber is increasing means that loggingis unsustainable. The forests of Bioko have already been seriously damaged 17 and, according tothe IMF, the forest resources of Equatorial Guinea could be severely depleted by the year2012. 18Since January 1998, the government entity responsible for forestry matters is the Ministryof Forests and the Environment (Ministerio de Bosques y Medio Ambiente). 19 The Minister ofForests is the son of the President, who is believed to be close to the largest logging company

EQUATORIAL GUINEA 43operating in the country, the Malaysian-owned Shimmer. Forest oversight is under theresponsibility of the Forest Monitoring Body (Cuerpo de la Guarderia Forestal). 20The sector is ruled by the Law of the Forestry Sector of 18 July 1997. The forests ofEquatorial Guinea are divided into two domains, productive forests (Dominio de ProduccionForestal) and conservation forests (Dominio de Conservación). 21Production forests are classified according to three different arrangements:§ Forests plots are small areas of primary or secondary forest located within farms. Alogging permit has to be obtained from the forest administration to exploit them.§ Community forests are granted permanently to local communities because of theirtraditional rights.§ National forests belong to the state. Private companies can exploit them only inpartnership with the state which always remains the majority shareholder. 22 In practice,most of the country’s forests are held under concessions for industrial timber production.There are 80 logging concessions in the continental region of the country covering an area ofapproximately 1.5 million hectares. 23 In theory, forest concessions cannot be larger than50,000 hectares 24 and each corporate body cannot have more than one concession. 25Concessions last between 5 and 15 years and are renewable, 26 but companies cannot use theforests again commercially until after a 25-year rest period (art. 53 of the 1997 Forestry SectorLaw). 27 In practice, there is considerable flux in concession ownership and at least onecompany is believed to be operating a number of concessions.By law (art. 35), concessions must process 60% of their production 28 (a requirement ofprevious forestry codes as well), but in practice most timber from Equatorial Guinea isexported as logs. In 1994, only 4.8% of production was processed locally; 29 in 1995, thisfigure rose to 15%, still considerably below the legal requirements. 30 In 1996, the governmentordained that companies which process less than 60% of their production must pay fines of upto 10% of the value of their production. 31 Companies holding concessions of more than10,000 hectares for more than 10 years are required to have a small wood-processing unit.There are, however, only four sawmills and three secondary processing units in the country,not all of which are in operation. 32Certain operating guidelines are stipulated by the forestry legislation, such as replanting;borders of rivers, streams, roads and hills of more than 45 degrees slope should not be logged(art. 54). 33 Regarding social obligations, Article 35 of the 1997 Forestry Sector Law specifiesthat concessionaires are required to build a number of facilities for the local people, such as ahealth centre, a church, a house for the teacher and a school. 34In practice, enforcement of all the various legal requirements is virtually non-existentbecause the state does not have sufficient field staff and cannot therefore monitor loggingactivities adequately nor carry out inventories of forest resources. 35 Some producers, includingforeign-owned ones, do not respect forestry and conservation codes, particularly by loggingoutside their concession boundaries. 36Conservation forests comprise four different types of protected areas: National Parks,Scientific Reserves, Endangered Animal Refuges and Wildlife Sanctuaries. There are nineprotected areas, of which six lie in Rio Muni, two on the island of Bioko and one on the islandof Annobon. In total, they cover an area of 326,000 hectares. 37 In theory, these areas aremanaged according to the recommendations of the IUCN, as specified in article 14. 38 Inpractice, they are not actively protected and some have been commercially exploited. 39Production and EU tradeTimber production has constantly increased since the early 1990s. In 1991, total productionamounted to 169,579 cubic metres but by 1996 had gone up to 471,165 cubic metres,exceeding both the maximum estimated sustainable limit of 400,000 cubic metres per year 40and the legal limit of 450,000 cubic metres. 41 In 1997, production nearly doubled, totalling757,173 cubic metres. 42The main species targeted is Okoumé, which in 1996 represented 65% of totalproduction. 43 Other commercially important species are Ilomba (10%), Tali (2%), Azobe(2%), Fuma, Padouk, and Andouk, which is exploited mainly by a Malaysian-ownedcompany, Shimmer International. 44 Okoumé, Ilomba and Andouk represent 88% of totalproduction. 45Until 1992, Europe was the destination for 85% of log production, with Spain receiving43% of total log production. In the mid-1990s, however, after Asian companies entered themarket, Asia became the main destination for Equatorial Guinea’s log exports. 46,47 In 1994,54% of timber exports went to Asian markets, especially Japan and, to a lesser degree, China.Europe remains the main destination for processed products – 99% of processed products areexported to Europe, 48 and Spain alone imports 85% of Equatorial Guinea’s processed wood

44SOLD DOWN THE RIVERproducts. 49 In spite of the regulations aimed at ensuring that wood is processed, logs represent80% of total wood exports. 50Table 5: Companiesoperating in the EquatorialGuinea forestry sector in1997International financial assistanceEU development assistance to Equatorial Guinea is currently suspended; its resumption is tiedto improvements in human rights. 51 ECOFAC, however, funds a project in the national park ofMonte Alen, in the mountains of Niefang, which covers an area of 140,000 hectares. 52 The EUhas also provided funds to the Equatorial Guinea forestry sector to assist with thedevelopment of the 1997 forestry code.Historically, the main countries providing funds to Equatorial Guinea have been Franceand Spain. During the dictatorship of Macias, France provided export credits for theconstruction of prestige buildings by what is now called the Société Française de Dragages etTravaux Publiques. In return for this aid, French interests were allegedly given concessions inRio Muni. 53 One of the French-connected companies obtaining concessions in the region wasthe Sociedad Forestal del Rio Muni – it was owned by a Frenchman who had no experience inforestry but connections in French financial circles. The company was granted a concession of150,000 hectares for 10 years and permission to produce a total of 1.5 million tonnes oftimber. 54 Between 1995 and 1997, the French Development Agency (Agence Française duDévéloppement, AFD) provided US$ 3.3 million in aid, 55 but nothing at all in 1997. In themid-1990s, Spain provided financial assistance to Equatorial Guinea’s military to reorganiseitself into an army, navy and air force. 56Company Source of capital Volume produced in 1997(where known)cubic metresShimmer Malaysia 321,237Sofoge Lebanon 83,744ABM S.A. Spain 24,328Anisok Mongola Spain 50,826Exfosa Spain 24,450Ecuaforsa 25,319Bu Forestal 16,214Eguimasa 22,113Chilbo Korea 14,135Somavi 10,849SAFI Spain 15,365EFG France 19,428Madenco 564Tromad 9,039Mafesa 1,109Sinosa China 11,214Coguimadera 21,474Joncomba 3,995Agroforestal 2,251Ekolsas 0Matroguisa 25,889Sofona 4,308Alosa (Guiesma) 0Guiesma 15,004Foguisa 0Coteco 0Isoroy Spain/France 0CPF 2,865Pilma 127Sijifo China 31,274757,173Environmental impactsThe current law does not allow commercial loggingon Bioko Island. Logging began there in the late1980s, but donors and the international communityexerted pressure for it to stop because of itsdestructive results. Most damage occurred along theroads. The forests of the coastal areas of Rio Muniare now undergoing their second or third cut and aredegrading. 57 The same will occur in the interior partsof the country, where logging is favoured by lowertaxes.Social impactsThe law states that forestry companies should buildfacilities for local people. Field work has not beenundertaken, however, to ascertain the positive ornegative impacts of forestry companies’ operationson rural populations. National NGO capacity isweak and democratic space within the generalpolitical situation is non-existent.Companies logging the forests ofEquatorial GuineaUntil the mid-1990s, most companies were ownedby mainly Spanish capital. Since then, however,Asian companies have become dominant, andShimmer, a subsidiary of the Malaysianheadquarteredcompany Rimbunan Hijau, nowcarries out most of the logging in the country. 58Shimmer and the Minister for Forestry, the son ofthe country’s dictator, have a close workingrelationship. There have been unconfirmed reportsthat Shimmer is encroaching in Monte Alen, whereECOFAC has a sustainable development project.Table 5 presents concession data for 1997. Thosecompanies showing zero production had been activepreviously. For example, Isoroy produced 26,168cubic metres of timber in 1995 (see Sonae companyprofile, page 62). 59Source: UICN 1998 “La Conservación de los Ecosistemas Forestales de Guinea Ecuatorial enlos albores del año 2000” Oficina Regional de la UICN para Africa Central;unpublishedsources

GABON 45GabonPolitical, social and economic frameworkLOCATED ON THE West Coast of Central Africa, Gabon covers a total area of268,000 square kilometres. Forests cover an estimated 220,000 square kilometres. 1Gabon’s population of 1.2 million is mainly urban (73%) 2 and almost one-third of thepeople live in the capital, Libreville. 3 As a result, the percentage of people who depend directlyon the forests for subsistence livelihoods is relatively small. Because of its small population andlarge expanse of primary rainforests, Gabon is often described as a country where long-termsustainable timber production is a viable possibility. However, financial mismanagement of theeconomy, weaknesses within current forestry policy and practice and new evidence of negativesocial and environmental impacts at the local level associated with current logging operations(see CIAJE Report, pp 50-52) all call into question the extent to which industrial logging ascurrently practised will be ecologically sustainable and will alleviate poverty and bring longtermsustainable development to Gabon’s people.Gabon’s economy is heavily dependent on natural resource extraction for export markets.The main sectors are oil, timber and manganese, with oil predominant. This dependence leavesGabon’s economy vulnerable to external factors such as the falling price of oil on the worldmarket and the Asian economic crisis, two events that plunged the country into financial crisisin 1998, leading to higher unemployment, especially among young people, and increasedpoverty. 4Until the discovery of oil deposits in the early 1970s, Gabon’s economy was largelydependent on its forests, which contributed 75% of its export earnings. The discovery of oilsparked a rural exodus as people moved to the cities in search of jobs and money. In 1995, oilaccounted for 40% of GDP, 80% of exports and 60% of government revenues. 5 Gabon hasthe highest GNP per capita in Africa – US$ 4,230 in 1997 6 – but oil revenues are not reflectedin improved standards of living for the majority of the population, who remain in poverty,whilst only a small elite have benefited. 7 Gabon has a significant and increasing external debtburden, estimated at CFA fr 472 billion (US$ 614 million) at the end of 1999 and CFA fr 604billion (US$ 785 million) at the end of June 2000. 8 It has had considerable problems meetingrepayments to the IMF and other creditors such as France. 9 As a middle-income country,Gabon does not qualify for debt relief under the HIPC initiative, even though the country hasconsiderable unpayable debts and the World Bank admits that poverty indicators arecomparable to the rest of Africa. 10 The IMF and the World Bank are pushing macro-economicreform, central to which are the promotion of the non-oil sectors of the economy, privatisationand civil service reform.Gabon gained independence from France in 1960 but close ties with the former colonialpower were assured through a series of co-operation agreements. The country’s long-standinghead of state, President Omar Bongo, has been in power since 1967, initially as the handpickedsuccessor to the country’s first president and, since 1990, with a democratic mandate.He has continued to be a long-term friend to France and has mediated in disputes in otherAfrican countries, including Congo (Brazzaville). He has been implicated, however, in dubiousfinancial transactions. He is alleged to have received secret payments from Elf, the major oilcompany operating in the country. In 1999, evidence was presented to a US Senate subcommitteehearing on money laundering and corruption that Bongo transferred US$ 130million through a personal bank account in New York. 11Forest policy and practiceThe forestry sector is the second source of foreign exchange after oil, accounting for 15% ofexports in 1995. 12 Like its Congo Basin neighbours, the Gabonese government andinternational donors regard the exploitation of timber as central to macro-economicdevelopment. This policy is causing a rapid increase in logging.Although Gabon’s forests are often described as being relatively undamaged and offeringgreat potential for long-term sustainable timber production, it is clear that industrial forestrywithin the current policy framework threatens their future integrity and the country’sbiodiversity. Production levels are already considerably above the official sustainableproduction estimates and are set to continue rising. The contribution which forestry sectorrevenues make to the country’s population as a whole and to people living in the locality offorestry operations is questionable.The entities responsible for regulating the logging industry in Gabon are the Ministry ofWater and Forests (Ministère des Eaux et des Forêts), which has responsibility for implementand monitoring forest policy, and SNBG, Societé Nationale des Bois du Gabon (see box over).Gabon

46SOLD DOWN THE RIVERSocieté Nationale des Bois duGabonSOCIETÉ NATIONALE des Boisdu Gabon (SNBG) holds themonopoly on the commercialisation ofOkoumé and Ozigo trees and collects exporttaxes for the government. Established in 1976,SNBG is a semi-state organisation, 51%owned by the state and 49% by forestcompanies. 13Its functions include controlling the price,quality and marketing of Okoumé and Ozigo.It sets quotas for these tree species by eachcompany based on the total volume producedthe year before. SNBG buys the country’sproduction of Okoumé and Ozigo at a fixedprice, then resells it at home and abroad,earning a commission of 7-10%. Moreover, itcollects the state’s 11% export taxes (droits ettaxes de sortie). 14In 1998, as a result of the Asian economiccrisis and the corresponding drop in demandfor Gabonese logs, SNBG effectively becamebankrupt and was unable to pay loggingcompanies. It temporarily suspended itsmonopoly, allowing producers to negotiatewith buyers directly. In 1999, the Frenchnational development agency, AgenceFrançaise du Dévéloppement (AFD), wasapproached to finance the restructuring ofdebt to the producers. AFD agreed oncondition that it undertook an audit ofSNBG. 15 It was reported that, in November1999, a visit by SNBG to Asia resulted in anagreement being signed in early 2000 betweenSNBG and the Chinese company ShandongHuasheng for the delivery of 150,000 cubicmetres of Okoumé logs per month. 16 InFebruary 2000, the French Wood IndustriesUnion (UIB) questioned SNBG about declininglog quality and increased prices. The directorof SNBG identified three reasons for declininglog quality: increased direct sales of qualitylogs to Asian markets; increased domesticprocessing; and a decreasing availability ofquality logs from Gabon’s forests. 17As part of Gabon’s privatisation programmerequired by the IMF under the country’sStructural Adjustment Programme, SNBG hasbecome one of the main stakeholders in theconsortium which has taken over the runningof the Transgabonais railway. Otherconsortium members include the Germandevelopment agency, DEG, and forestrycompanies such as the French company Thanry(see page 63). The 649 kilometre-longTransgabonais railway is one of the majortransport routes in the country, running fromFranceville in the east of the country toOwendo (the port near the capital, Libreville)in the west, via Lastoursville and Ndjolé. Some28% of the freight traffic is logs. 18Gabon’s current forestry code dates from 1982. The legislation wasdesigned explicitly to facilitate commercial logging and has promotedthe dominance of overseas capital in the forestry sector. 19 But thelegislation is incomplete and ill-enforced. Nearly three-quarters of thedecrees planned for the 1982 Law were never written. The proceduresand regulations governing company management plans have not beendefined. Article 20 requires concession owners to obtain authorisationfrom the Ministry of Water and Forests before beginning any forestryactivity, but the procedures for obtaining such an authorisation werenever defined. 20The area of concessions has increased considerably in the last 40years. Whereas in 1957, less than 10% of Gabon’s forests (some twomillion hectares) were allocated as logging concessions, in 1997, eightmillion hectares were held under concession 21 and the estimate for 1999is 11.9 million hectares. 22 Logging has moved over time from the coastto the interior, and most large concessions are now in the interior of thecountry.According to the Ministry of Water and Forests, the sustainableannual harvest is 2 million cubic metres. In 1996, total exportsamounted to 2.3 million cubic metres and in 1997 to 2.7 million. 23 Thistrend is likely to continue, given national and international imperativesto diversify the economy away from its reliance on oil.Enforcement and monitoring of companies’ activities is weak, 24largely because the Ministry of Water and Forests does not havesufficient capacity. Only 40% of its agents are assigned to localinspection and offices in charge of field operations. On average, aMinistry agent oversees 86,400 hectares of logging concessions. Agentsalso lack transport – in several provinces, there is just one vehicle formore than 240,000 hectares of concession area; in the Estuarie provincearound Libreville, one vehicle is shared by 20 agents. 25 The majority oflogging companies do not have management plans; in 1999, only five ofmore than 200 logging companies operating in Gabon had started orplanned to start writing a management plan. The rate of woodprocessing within the country is currently very low at just 7% and taxesare not fully recovered by the government. 26In the coastal logging zone which is reserved for Gabonese nationals,logging is commonly sub-contracted to foreign logging companies. Thispractice, known as fermage, creates disincentives for sustainable forestmanagement because it fosters rent-seeking and involves uncertainshort-term agreements. Permit owners receive large rents withoutfeeling responsible for investing in their concessions; logging companieshave no interest in doing so either. Moreover, fermage means a loss oftax revenue to the government because the transfer of logging rights ispoorly regulated. Although the law stipulates that logging permits arestrictly personal (and thus not transferable), the decrees to regulate theprocedures for the approval of qualifications and the assignments oflogging authorisations were never written, thus the law is interpreted indifferent ways. 27 The law also stipulates the minimum means andmaterial a family must possess to obtain a household permit to log, butthe Ministry of Forests and Water does not verify this requirementwhen granting such permits. Therefore, without sufficient means toexploit their land, villagers turn to large logging companies. 28A new forestry law was drafted in 1998 under pressure from theIMF and World Bank, its costs covered by a World Bank loan, 29 but it isstill awaiting approval by the legislature. Such approval may be affectedby the run-up to legislative elections in 2001.The new law, as described by the US-based NGO Global ForestWatch in its recent review of Gabon’s forest policy and practice, 30 hasbeen designed to address some of the current technical shortcomings inforest policy and to increase domestic wood processing. Loggingpermits will be granted for between 20 and 40 years on a public auctionsystem linked to the financial and technical capacity of the company.The maximum size of permits will be for 600,000 hectares, which isconsidered more appropriate to meet technical sustainable forestmanagement objectives than the current 200,000 hectare limit.Management plans will have to be submitted and approved within threeyears for all logging operations. There are also plans for the

GABON 47© FORESTS MONITOR/CIAJEestablishment of a National Forest Fund to maintain sustainable management practices. Mostof the forest will be classified as production forests and protected areas; some forests willbecome rural forests, reserved for rural communities who can obtain revenues either bylogging them or renting them out to logging companies. 31The new forestry law promotes further industrialisation of the forests and does little toaddress the dominance of foreign capital in the industry. There are no provisions to ensurethat industrial forestry contributes to poverty alleviation other than in the broad expectationof its increased fiscal contribution. It is not clear how the new laws will tackle the underresourcedforestry department or how they will ensure that forestry operations are properlymonitored and laws enforced. If the public auction system follows the model established inCameroon, it will favour financial over technical capacity, that is, those who are the mosttechnically competent to implement long-term sustainable forest management in any oneconcession will not necessarily be the company to be awarded the concession (see Cameroonsection, page 13).Logs transported by riverOgouué to Port GentilProduction and EU tradeGabon is Africa’s second largest timber producer after Cameroon and the world’s largestsupplier of Okoumé logs, which accounted for 70% of log exports in 1997. 32 There are 60wood species exploited in Gabon, but Okoumé and, to a lesser extent, Ozigo represent thebulk of production – together they account for up to 80% of total timber production in thecountry. 33 Estimates show that Gabon’s reserves of Okoumé amount to 100 million cubicmetres – about three-quarters of world reserves. 34Total timber production increased from approximately 1.6 million cubic metres in 1991 35to 2.5 million cubic metres in 1996. 36 In 1996, Okoumé production totalled 1.9 million cubicmetres. These amounts are well above the level of production established by the Ministry ofWater and Forests as sustainable: 2 million cubic metres in total of which 1.2 million cubicmetres is Okoumé. 37In 1997, total exports increased to 2.7 million cubic metres, including 1.9 million cubicmetres of Okoumé. 38 But as a result of the Asian economic crisis and the downturn in demandfor logs, exports in 1998 dropped to a total of 1.7 million cubic metres of which 1 millioncubic metres were Okoumé. 39 1999 saw exports increase again, reaching 2.3 million cubicmetres, including 1.5 million cubic metres of Okoumé. 40Until the mid-1990s, Europe and the countries of the Mediterranean Basin (mainly Turkeyand Morocco) were the primary importers of Gabon’s timber. France was the largest single

48SOLD DOWN THE RIVERimporter of Gabonese wood. Since 1993, however, Asia has progressively become the primarydestination of Gabon’s timber, and China has replaced France as the largest single importer. 41In 1992, 62% of Gabonese logs exports went to Europe and 12% went to Asia. 42 In 1995,more than 40% of total exports went to Asia, mainly to China, Indonesia and South Korea. Inthe following year, Asia was the destination of 51% of Gabon’s timber exports, whereasEurope and the countries of the Mediterranean Basin accounted for 38% of exports. 43 In1998, largely because of the Asian economic crisis, Europe regained its position by a smallmargin as the main importer of Gabonese timber. 44In 1999 Asia once again became the largest export market, with China accounting for a totalof 906,000 cubic metres of logs, of which 835,000 cubic metres were Okoumé and Ozigo. 45France was the second largest destination country, accounting for 521,000 cubic metres of logsexported from the country, of which 373,000 cubic metres were Okoumé and Ozigo. 46International financial assistanceIn 1999, France’s AFD suspended funding of all projects in Gabon until further notice, linkingits decision to Gabon’s failure to service its debts. 47 Prior to this, AFD provided funding toenable French forestry companies to develop management plans. The EU’s ECOFAC projectcontinues to operate in the Lopé Reserve.© FORESTS MONITOR/CIAJEErosion caused by loggingEnvironmental impactsDespite the frequent assertions of the potential sustainability of Gabonese forestry, little isknown about the forest eco-systems. Systematic assessments of the impact of logging onGabon’s forests have not been undertaken. 48 Production figures exceed the Ministry of Waterand Forests’ estimates of annual sustainable harvest levels. 49Logging in Gabon is selective – only a few trees are cut down – but not sustainable.Logging causes on average a 10% canopy loss and up to 50% of canopy disturbance becauseseveral trees are usually damaged or destroyed in the process of reaching and felling the tree tobe harvested. 50 It has been argued that, as only a small number of Okoumé trees are removed,they would easily regenerate. Recent studies, however, suggest that this is not the case and thatcreaming off the best trees results in lower quality timber. 51 The director of SNBG recentlyadmitted that one of the reasons for the supply of lower quality Okoumé logs to the Frenchmarkets was the declining availability of high quality logs from Gabon’s forests. 52Commercial bushmeat hunting, which is facilitated by logging operations, has led todeclining wildlife numbers throughout the region. Recent field work undertaken by theGabonese NGO, CIAJE, found that, besides directly and indirectly increasing the levels ofbushmeat hunting, logging companies operating in Gabon cause two other environmentalproblems: soil erosion, in particular on slopes, and pollution. 53 The chemicals used to treat thewood cause water pollution while the burning of unused logs increases dust particles in the air.(see CIAJE Report, pp 50-52)Industrial logging in Gabon is also characterised by wastefulness. Companies often cutdown trees which are not used; logs are burnt and abandoned along the forest trails and in thelogging camps. During CIAJE’s recent field work, researchers found 77 abandoned logs alongone stretch of road, 47 of which had been left by FOBO, a Malaysian company, and 30 bySHM (see Interwood, page 59). 54Logging concessions have been granted in the LopéReserve, the ECOFAC conservation project in thecentre of Gabon. 55 Covering 536,000 hectares, theLopé Reserve was created in 1946 and hosts a diverserange of species. It has ancient historical sitesindicating human occupation dating back 350,000years. 56 Inconsistent and overlapping legislation meansthat logging in the reserve is legal according to one lawbut illegal according to another. This legalcontradiction, a source of tension between the variousstakeholders, was resolved in July 2000 when loggingcompanies Leroy Gabon and Rougier bothrelinquished logging rights in the heart of the LopéReserve. In return, Leroy Gabon received an Okouméricharea of forest on the eastern flank which wasexcluded from the reserve. 57Another contested area has been the IpassaMingouli region near Makokou. Identified as a criticalsite for protection because of its high biodiversity andoutstanding natural beauty, the area overlaps withlogging concessions allocated to Rougier, who startedlogging in the area in 1994. As with the Lopé Reserve,

GABON 49the company relinquished rights to part of the area and signed a “convention to declare thesite known as the falls of Mingouli a protected area” on 11 February 1998 with the Gabonesegovernment (see Rougier, p. 60). 58Social impactsGabon’s high dependency on foreign companies and the export of natural resources makes itvulnerable to global economic fluctuations. This was exemplified by the Asian economic crisisin 1997-98 which led to layoffs in Gabon. Prior to the crisis, the number of people employedby the forestry sector had been rising from 2,750 in 1992 to 6,000 in 1997. According toSNBG, the reduced quotas led to a 65% reduction in work. 59 Between July and September1998, Leroy Gabon sacked 140 workers who had been on temporary layoffs. 60 Somecommentators believe that the 1998 crisis could have been contained among the big companieshad the wood market been diversified. 61 The crisis and the reduction in the workforce led tothe abandonment of the logging villages, presumably increasing pressures in the cities.Local people do not have legally recognised rights over their lands, hence companies haveno formal obligations towards them. Because of resulting conflicts, companies tend to locatetheir operations as far as possible from villages to avoid problems. 62 But in spite of thedistances, villagers and companies cannot ignore each other completely. Logging operationshave negative and positive impacts. The European companies tend to build schools and healthcentres for the company workers and villagers, but these are of variable quality, and somecompanies make promises that are not fulfilled. (see box page 50)The social conditions for many logging company workers are less than ideal. Food isgenerally sold at very high prices, encouraging workers to turn to bushmeat hunting. Thestandard of workers’ accommodation is variable; in some camps, there is insufficientventilation. In some logging areas, only higher-level managers have access to running water;the majority of the staff have to depend on rivers which are far away and whose water is notalways potable due to pollution caused by the forestry operations. There is little provision forleisure activities, a problem because of the isolation of the logging areas. 63The operations of the logging companies have several health impacts. Logging trucks oftentransport over 50 tonnes of timber, even though this volume is illegal. Road accidents arefrequent. In 1998, for example, a log fell off a truck, killing one villager of Mibaka (nearLastoursville); in 1996, a similar accident also near Lastoursville killed four people and injuredmany others. Dust from logging operations dirties the laundry of villages near the concessions,considerably increasing women’s workload, and causes coughs in children. The servicesprovided by health centres vary. Because of the isolation of logging camps, workers cannoteasily travel to villages or cities to obtain medical services, which exacerbate the deficiencies inhealth centres. The health centre at the logging area of Mboumi, near Ndjole, has nomedicines, for instance, not even basic painkillers such as aspirin, nor the means to deal withaccidents in the processing plant. 64Companies logging the forests of GabonThere is a lack of transparent information about logging companies operating in Gabon, 65including about who is operating where, which hinders attempts to evaluate theirperformance. It is virtually impossible to assess whether these companies are contributing tothe development of the country or just taking the country’s natural resources without leavinganything positive and lasting behind. The map and data on concessionaires (see map page 38and Appendix) are taken from an official 1997 Ministry map which is not freely available andis of questionable accuracy. When researchers from the US group, Global Forests Watch, triedto obtain information about companies, the government referred them to the companies andthe companies referred them to the government. 66It is known, however, that foreign capital dominates the timber sector in Gabon. Asianlogging companies have now established an increasing presence in Gabon. Bordamur is ownedby the Malaysian company, Rimbunan Hijau, and has been described as the largest concessionholder in the country, with over one million hectares mainly in the north-west of the country. 67Another significant Malaysian-controlled operation is FOBO. But European-owned companiesremain significant concession holders, for example, Rougier (700,000 hectares), CEB-Thanry(505,000 hectares), Leroy-Sonae (654,000 hectares), SHM-Interwood (estimated 300,000hectares) and Basso Timber Industries (450,000 hectares) (see Part III – Company Profiles). 68

50SOLD DOWN THE RIVERA summary of the impactof European-ownedcompanies’ forestryactivities on the localpopulations and theenvironmentReport by CIAJE, GabonCIAJE has carried out a study on the impactof European-owned forestry companies’activities on the local population and theenvironment. In this study we have chosenthree areas of investigation, so as toproduce an overview of the problemsidentified. We went to the logging area ofMboumi of the SHM (Société de la HauteMondah) in Ndjolé, in the province ofMoyen Ogooué; to the wood depots of theLeroy Gabon and NSG companies at theLopé railway station, in the province ofOgooué-Ivindo; and to the logging area ofBambidi, of CEB (Compagnie Equatorialedes Bois) in Lastourville, Ogooué-Loloprovince. At these sites we carried out ourinvestigations, talked to the workers and thelocal people who were directly or indirectlyaffected by the forestry activities. What didwe find? The conclusions which follow are asummary of the results which we obtainedfrom our investigations.A. General ObservationsAccording to the law, the land and the areaof the forestry resources are the property ofthe State - as in decree no 192/PR/MEFCRof 4 March 1984 - the law only allows localpeople the right to exercise their customaryactivities. This expropriation of the land isnot accepted by the local people, and theyfrequently make their views known beforethe forestry companies located on theirterritory.It is this interpretation of the law whichis often a source of conflict between thelocal people and the forestry companies.The latter are not obliged to meet thepeoples’ claims because they pay theirtaxes to the national treasury. It thereforefalls to the State to distribute the gains fromthe exploitation of the forestry resources sothat the people may benefit both directlyand indirectly. This is currently hanging inthe air due to a new law on decentralisation.Almost all of the logging sites are faraway from the villages. Where they aresituated depends on the permits granted,but they have also been located so as toavoid conflict with the local people overtheir property rights - this is the case for thesites which we have visited. SHM’s Mboumisite is situated 37 km from Ndjolé; theGongué site of Leroy Gabon and theMitendi site of NSG in the Lopé reserve areat a distance of 100 km and 86 kmrespectively. Despite this, conflicts existbetween the local people and the forestrycompanies, because the former are affectedby the companies’ activities.B. Social AspectsWithout any formal obligation to help thelocal populations, the European forestrycompanies undertake actions on a voluntarybasis. This voluntary activity is aimed atestablishing their popularity among the localpeople and at avoiding any conflicts overproperty rights. Despite the law, however,the local people believe that the forestryresources belong to them.Given the poor living conditions of theworkers in the forestry companies, it wasnecessary to consider them as a groupwithin the local population. Therefore indiscussing the issue of the impact of theEuropean forestry companies on the localpopulation, we have included the localvillagers and the companies’ workers.B1 - The villagersGenerally speaking, the forestry companiesmake some efforts with the local peopleliving close to their sites. Without any formalobligations, they do not have to make anypromises to the local people. However,following a claim made by the people ofMikongo village in Lopé, the Leroy Gabonand NSG companies decided to meet theirSHM workers’ quarters© FORESTS MONITOR/CIAJE

GABON 51demands. NSG also promised to build aschool, which it did. Leroy Gabon, however,promised to provide an electricity generator- this has still not been installed.The SHM, away from Ndjolé, seemsprepared to leave things as they arebecause the road is in an appalling state.This decay is due to the frequent traffic fromthe logging vehicles whose loads exceedthose permitted in Gabon (50 tonnes).Notable efforts, however, have beenmade by CEB. It has carried out asociological study so that it can improve itsinteraction with the local people near thesite. The local peoples’ claims could disruptthe companies’ activities. According toCEB’s head of external relations, localorganisations have been allowed to developamong the people. Mr Kouya stressed thatthese organisations would allow the localpeople to benefit from the exploitation of‘their forest’. This policy of humanedevelopment is summarised in the followingsix points:§ the setting up of a fish breeding site atBambidi for the local people;§ the setting up of a villagers’ loggingscheme. What does this consist of? CEBhas removed an area from its permit forthe local people. This unit is exploited byCEB for the benefit of the local people.This ‘gift’ adds Mr Kouya, helps the localpeople raise their standard of living;§ the practice of sawing the wood intolong planks. CEB pays someone tomake these planks and these will beshared among the local people;§ allowing local children to visit the CEB’sdispensary – this is open to all of thelocal villagers;§ giving jobs to young local people. Nearlyall of the CEB’s workers in Bambidi arefrom Bambidi village or other villagesnearby;§ and, building a road to link a village fromthe Sebe canton to Lastourville.In addition, the Spanish forestry companyBESCOS should be praised for the manyactivities it has taken on behalf of localpeople. It has made many infrastructualimprovements for people in the Lambarénéarea of Moyen Ogooué province.B2 - The forestry workersWithin this category of local people, wehave focused on the following in our study:access to drinking water, surroundings andliving conditions, health, their hobbies,access to education for their children andaccess to food supplies.Drinking waterLeroy Gabon and CEB have providedpumps for drinking water for their workers,however, workers for other forestrycompanies have to use streams and riversfor their drinking water. At SHM, the(office) staff have access to drinking waterfrom a water tower, while the workers musttravel over 1 km to a river which they havecalled ‘Andza’. These workers are exposedto diseases because the water is polluted.Surroundings and living conditionsThe staff quarters are far away from those ofthe workers, and the staff’s quarters arealways better than those of the workers. AtNSG, SHM and Leroy Gabon the workers’quarters are extremely basic, with noventilation. CEB, on the other hand, hasmade an effort with its workers’ quarters.The quarters are more spacious and it plansto build lodgings from durable materials.DispensaryWhile dispensaries exist, they are notadapted to meet the peoples’ needs. InSHM, for example, the dispensary lacksmedicines and several companies’dispensaries’ staff are lacking incompetence.River Mboumi, SHM logging area© FORESTS MONITOR/CIAJE

52SOLD DOWN THE RIVERHobbiesThe workers are treated like semi-slaves.Nothing has been laid on for theirenjoyment. CEB has a room where severalgames can be played and where theworkers can listen to the news. A footballground is planned. There is no suchprovisions at NSG. At SHM, only the staffhave access to TV, while the workers haveneither TV, radio nor a room for recreation.EducationSchools have been built so that workerschildren (and others) can be educated.Gabon Leroy appears to have the best builtand the most spacious school. Thetextbooks are free and the teachers are paidby both the company and the government.At SHM, it’s a disaster. Basically, theclasses are cramped and the staff areincompetent. For the year 1998-1999 thesuccess rate did not exceed 10 %. This hasled workers to send their children to Ndjolé,37 km away.Access to food suppliesThe companies have stores for theirworkers but they charge high prices. Due tothese prices, the workers often resort topoaching.C. Impact On The EnvironmentThe impact on the environment can be seenfrom the pollution, the ravaging of resourcesand the poaching.ErosionSome of the areas where licences havebeen granted have seen exploitation of theslopes, such as Mboumi at SHM. This typeof exploitation leads to soil erosion. Erosionis further encouraged when the soilbecomes compacted and with the damagecaused by large vehicles.PollutionWater pollution has taken place. Theproduct which is used to treat the wood canbe found in the water. This is because thewood is transported to the port of Port-Gentil on the river Ogooué. The Ogoouériver is also used by the local people towash in and for drinking water.Ravaging of resourcesMany things show that the forests of Gabonare being exploited in an anarchic manner,and that conservation consideration orpractices are not being followed. Loggingcompanies engage in mining the forestinstead of managing their source of rawmaterials.Many of the blocks of wood are burnt,others are abandoned. We have seen 7such blocks from the CEB and 30 from theSHM along the road. We are not taking allof the wood abandoned into account, suchas the boards, planks or panels that we sawon site. Why is there so much wastage? Thewastage continues with the building of thedepots in the middle of the forest. Severalsites are developed, sometimes close toeach other, this leads to loss of vegetativecover. These plants are further damagedwith the development of tracks in the forestand - worse still - roads. SHM’s roads havea width of 3-4 m, it’s a real mess at Rougier-Gabon. A road can become 25 m wide.PoachingAlmost all of the forestry workers poach.Most companies have never considered thisto be a problem in their management oftheir sites. However, considerable effortsare being made by some companies suchas Leroy, CEB and BESCOS, which runawareness campaigns, and whose workersface penalties for poaching.The other side of the problem is thatsome forestry companies like Rougierfavour poaching. This is not done directlybut poachers use their sites and there areno surveillance measures in place to stopthis environmental problem.Many blocks of wood are burnt, others are abandoned© FORESTS MONITOR/CIAJE

COMPANY PROFILES 53Part IIICompany ProfilesTHE EU PARENT COMPANIES profiledin this section have been selected because they allcontrol large areas of forest in Central Africa.Not all are exclusively or even primarily timbercompanies; they are, however, all involved in processinglogs into value-added wood products, although for manytheir primary processing facilities are in Europe. Recentmoves by the producing countries to increase investmentin downstream processing has meant that many of thecompanies are only now making serious investments insuch facilities in the countries where they log. Table 1 onpage 11 summarises the EU companies and their CentralAfrican operations. The maps on pages 34-39 and thecorresponding data tables in the Appendix indicate as faras is known the location of companies’ concessions. Theinformation in the report is mainly taken from publishedreports and articles, official sources and field visits. Eachcompany profile presents a brief overview of the parentcompany, followed by a description of the forestry-relatedoperations in each Central African country where theyoperate. Every effort has been made to verify theinformation included in the report but data is oftendifficult to obtain or contradictory. We would welcomecorrections and updates and also details about EU parentcompanies whose operations are not included in thereport.ALPIAlpi Spa is one of Italy’s leading timber companies. Itspecialises in the production of wood-based panels andhas a substantial presence in the timber industries ofCameroon and the Ivory Coast. 1 Alpi’s sales turnover for1998 was US$120 million compared to US$ 69 million in1996. Although it is listed on the Milan Stock Exchange,the company is largely controlled by the Alpi family. 2CameroonAlpi has been logging in Cameroon for over 20 years andoperates through two subsidiaries, Alpicam and Grumcam(see below). The company’s primary interests are veneerand plywood, 3 and its processing facilities at Bonabéri,near Douala, are the largest and among the best equippedin Cameroon. During the season 1996-7, Alpi subsidiariesproduced 202,000 cubic metres of logs, of which 61,000cubic metres were exported. 4 According to unpublishedofficial statistics, the company exported approximately10,000 cubic metres per year of plywood and 30,000cubic metres per year of veneer sheet in the late 1990s. 5Alpi appears committed to retaining a major timberbusiness in Cameroon, particularly as a timber processor,but also as a logging company. It is expanding still furtherits large processing facilities at Bonabéri 6 and has recentlybeen awarded a large new concession, bringing its totalconcessions to over 214,261 hectares. It also buys logsfrom third parties to supply its processing facilities. 7During the early 1990s, a consultancy report for theInternational Tropical Timber Organisation found thatforest management in the concessions of Alpicam andGrumcam was unsustainable, partly as a consequence ofthe then forestry law. 8 As with most operators inCameroon, the group’s commitment to implementingsustainable forest management remains unproven.AlpicamAlpicam’s processing facilities at Bonabéri have an inputcapacity of 120,000 cubic metres per year. 9 In July 2000,the company was awarded a new concession (UFA 10-026), 10 which consists of 128,449 hectares in the EastProvince. 11GrumcamAlpi acquired Grumcam from the German company,Danzer (see Danzer, page 55) in 1992. 12 ThroughGrumcam, Alpi has processing facilities near Mindourouin the Kadey district of the East Province. This facility hasa processing capacity of 47,000 cubic metres per year. 13Grumcam has one current concession (UFA 10-051) of85,812 hectares which was awarded in 1997. Thecompany plans to log two sub-divisions of the UFA,known as assiettes de coupe, until June 2001, half theamount foreseen by the forestry law. 14 In December 1999,a field inspection by the ministry responsible for forests(MINEF) in the East Province noted that Grumcam shouldbe congratulated for being the only company inspectedwhich was managing its operations in accordance with theforestry law. 15 Although the inspection report is unclear inits findings, the MINEF team recommended that thecompany be exceptionally awarded an additional assiettede coupe so that its operations did not become illegal. 16The team also noted that Grumcam had not elaborated itsfirst management plans, although the parent companystates that its plans are ready and have been awaitingapproval for over a year. 17BASSOBasso Legnami Srl is a small, family-owned Italian timbercompany. The company has 40 employees in Italy andsales turnover for 1999 was 10 million euro (US$ 8.5million). Its main markets are the EU and USA, and itspecialises in logs, lumber and parquet flooring. 18GabonBasso Timber Industries Gabon (BTIG)Basso has a logging and processing operation in Gaboncalled Basso Timber Industries Gabon (BTIG). BTIG has484 employees and its turnover in 1999 was 9 millioneuro (US$ 7.7 million). 19 The company has concessionstotalling 450,000 hectares and has log processing capacityof 80,000 cubic metres per year. 20 It specialises in logs,sawn wood and veneer and plans to establish plywood,laminated products, parquet and electricity projects in thecountry. 21Basso used to have links with Compagnie Forestière duGabon (CFG), 22 a part Gabon-owned forestry company,but has now broken the relationship. 23

54SOLD DOWN THE RIVERBOLLORÉThe Bolloré Group is a French conglomerate quoted onthe Paris Stock Exchange. Bolloré Investissement (formerlyAlbatros Investissement) is the parent company of theBolloré Group, and Vincent Bolloré is the President andDirector General of both companies. 24 The Bolloré Groupis a powerful force in Africa with wide interests, includingfreight transportation, timber, agro-industry, and theproduction and marketing of cigarettes. Through itsacquisition of strategic industries over the past ten years,the group has become the number two French-Africanconglomerate (after oil company Elf-Total) and is linked athigh levels to French political interests in the region. 25Non-timber interests in AfricaSome 65% of Bolloré’s turnover is derived fromtransportation. 26 Its principal companies in this sector areSaga and SDV (Scac Delmas Vieljeux). Both are leaders intransportation and freight handling, particularly betweenAfrica and Europe, Africa and Asia (timber is a majorcargo on these routes) 27 and within Africa itself. Bolloré’sgrip on shipping and overland transport in Africa willbecome stronger as a result of acquiring the UK companyOT Africa Line, 28 a leader in the shipping of timber fromWest and Central Africa primarily to Europe but also toEast Asia and the USA. Bolloré also owns Bolmet Inc. inthe USA. 29 Bolloré is responsible for running the railwaysin Cameroon and Congo (Brazzaville) and the railwaybetween Abidjan in the Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso. InCAR, it manages the port of Bangui. 30Bolloré’s agro-industrial interests are concentrated in itssubsidiary, Rivaud. They include palm oil, tobacco,rubber, coffee and cocoa, primarily in Africa (particularlyCameroon) and South-East Asia. Through Rivaud, whichowns French hardwood distributor GIPAT, Bolloré isinterested in buying the recently privatised Socopalm (aformer palm oil parastatal) in Cameroon.The links between transport and timberThe synergies between Bolloré’s various interests in Africa,and the opportunities afforded by a dominant presence inthe region, are exemplified by the group’s interests intransport and logging. In 1998, as part of a US$ 90million World Bank-mandated privatisation andinvestment scheme of the railway in Cameroon – the Banklent US$ 15 million – the operation of the railway wasconceded to Bolloré’s transportation subsidiary, Saga. Therailway, Camrail, derives much of its revenue from thetransport of logs. Another Bolloré subsidiary, the loggingcompany HFC (Forestière de Campo), see below, receiveda contract for supply of timber to the railway in June2000. 31 Links between the supply of timber to the railway,World Bank funding and Bolloré’s timber companies haveall been a source of concern. 32 An agreement betweenCamrail and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) toaddress the transportation of illegal bushmeat by rail hasnot yet been concluded. 33Bolloré also owns a majority share in another formerCameroonian parastatal SEPBC (Société d’Exploitationdes Parcs à Bois du Cameroun), which runs the maindockyard in Douala, through which over 90% ofCameroon’s official timber exports pass, 34 and the port inKribi, from which timber is also exported and which hasrecently been expanded to cater for an increase in timbershipments.The Bolloré group is active in the timber trade in theCAR through warehousing and transport operations,shipping timber from Bangui to Brazzaville and PointeNoire in neighbouring Congo (Brazzaville). 35The Bolloré group is involved in running the Congo-Océan railway from Brazzaville to Pointe Noire in Congo(Brazzaville), a traditional transport route for timber. 36The railway is not only the economic axis of the country,but also of immense strategic significance in the civil war. 37Through its interests in the country, the Bolloré groupsupports the camp of President Sassou Nguesso to a highlevel. 38In Gabon, one of Bolloré’s principal transportationcompanies, SDV, owns a majority in the former Gaboneseparastatal shipping line, Sonatram (Société Nationale desTransports Maritime). 39 Bolloré manages timber handlingactivities at Gabon’s four timber ports through thecompany SEPBG. 40CameroonDuring the early 1990s, Bolloré acquired subsidiarieswhich in turn owned two timber companies in Cameroon:HFC (Forestière de Campo), whose concessions are in thesouth-west, and SIBAF (Société Industrielle des BoisAfricains), whose concessions are in the south-east (seebelow). 41 Bolloré arranged for international journalists tovisit SIBAF and HFC logging sites during the 1999Yaoundé Forest Summit promoted by WWF. 42 Bolloré isdiscussing sustainable forest management with WWF andTropenbos (the Dutch tropical forest research programme)and has recently decided to pursue Forest StewardshipCouncil (FSC) certification for both HFC and SIBAFconcessions. 43 If it does obtain FSC certification, the groupwill have made considerable progress in addressing someof the serious legal, environmental and social issuesassociated with current forest management practices inCameroon.HFC (Forestière de Campo)HFC operates in the South Province and currently holds atotal of 162,790 hectares under concession in and aroundthe Réserve de Campo and Campo Ma’an protected areas.It has two concessions: UFA 09-024 (76,002 hectares),awarded in July 2000, and UFA 09-025 (86,788 hectares).HFC produced 169,000 cubic metres of logs in 1996-7of which 82,000 cubic metres were exported. 44 It has asawmill at Campo with an annual input capacity of60,000 cubic metres. 45 Its principal timber species isAzobé. According to the company, its maximum annualproduction is usually 120,000 cubic metres of logs and15,000 cubic metres of sawn timber. 46Most of the company’s exports leave from Campo baydirect and accounted for around 5% of Cameroon’sofficial timber exports in 1995-6. 47 For decades, HFC hasbeen the only concessionaire of any consequence aroundCampo and so thetown is entirelydependent onHFC’s continuedoperations for itssurvival. Therefore,unless HFC iscommitted to longtermsustainableforest managementin the area, Campo© GREENPEACE

COMPANY PROFILES 55could collapse once the logging “boom” has finished, asother logging towns have done. In one recorded incident,HFC earned a bad reputation locally when its promise ofimproved transportation for the villagers of Nazareth andN’Koélon came to nothing. 48SIBAF (Société Industrielle des Bois Africains)SIBAF currently has control of two concessions in the EastProvince, totalling 134,765 hectares;UFA 10-063 (68,933hectares) awarded in July 2000 and UFA 10-018 (65,832hectares). These concessions are in biologically andculturally important primary forests, close to thecompany’s earlier concession at Kika, which is now part ofthe Lobéké protected area. 49 The company produced162,000 cubic metres of logs in Boumba Ngoko districtduring 1996-7, of which it exported 46,000 cubicmetres. 50 SIBAF’s sawmill at Kika has an input capacity of60,000 cubic metres. 51 The main species harvested isAyous. As with HFC, the company’s usual maximumproduction is around 120,000 cubic metres of logs and15,000 cubic metres of sawn timber. 52 In March 2000,SIBAF was fined CFA Fr 6 million (US$ 7,799) for unclearmarking of logs. 53The economy of Kika, a small village of only 25 peopleten years ago, but now a town of around 6,000, hasdeveloped as a direct result of SIBAF’s operations. 54 Manyof the townspeople were brought to the area by thecompany from other parts of the country. The influx hasadded to the disruption of the Baka and Bangando peoplewhose traditional territories are in this part of the forest. 55The construction of forestry roads and the subsequenttraffic facilitated the hunting of bushmeat, while thepopulation increase as Kika expanded provided a marketfor it. 56 A joint survey by the Cameroonian ministryresponsible for forests, MINEF, and the Germangovernment development agency, GTZ, in 1999 offirearms in the East Province found 146 illegal firearmsoriginating from Congo (Brazzaville) in the SIBAFconcession area, 57 weapons which pose a threat to localpeoples’ security as well as to the wildlife, such aselephants and lowland gorillas.The near-exhaustion of SIBAF’s former concessions leftthe town in 1999 facing collapse, dependent on SIBAFbeing awarded new concessions. 58,59 That year, half thepopulation left after operations wound down and workerswere laid off. 60 SIBAF has since been awarded twoconcessions in the area, and believes that, with new lawsand forest management practices, the concessions shouldnot become exhausted in the future, thus offering greatersecurity of employment. 61Central African Republic (CAR)SESAM (Société d’Exploitation Forestière de la Sangha-Mbaéré), one of the largest logging concessions in CAR,used to be owned by Bolloré’s subsidiary, Saga. In theearly 1990s, SESAM drew on a large loan (in effect, asubsidy) from the French government to prepare a forestmanagement plan, 62 but as it did not have sufficient inhousecapacity, the work was in fact prepared by theFrench government. It is not known whether the planaccommodates, or indeed was ever intended toaccommodate, the needs of the settled and nomadic forestpeople. SESAM has two concessions in CAR, one of107,000 hectares awarded in 1991, the other of 307,000hectares awarded in 1995, in a region where manyPygmies live. 63 Since Malaysian logging company WTK 64bought 51% of SESAM 65 in the mid-1990s, it is not clearwhether this management plan is being implemented ornot, although there remains a French interest in SESAM.Bolloré used to operate in CAR through EFBACA(Enterprise Forestière des Bois Africains Centrafrique), asubsidiary of the group’s principal logging company in theIvory Coast. It had a 200,000 hectare concession inSangha province. 66 The current status and ownership ofEFBACA is not known.BRUYNZEELBruynzeel is a Dutch group which specialises in theproduction of wood-based panels, mainly Okouméplywood, through its Bruynzeel Multipanel division and ofkitchen furniture through Bruynzeel Keukens en Kasten.The company trades in the UK as Bruynzeel Multipanel(UK) Ltd, in Belgium as Bruynzeel Multipanel NV and inGermany as Bruynzeel Multipanel GmbH.Congo (Brazzaville)BoplacDuring the 1980s, Bruynzeel jointly owned the companyPlacongo, with the Dutch government (through FMO, theDutch government development agency) and the Congogovernment. Placongo was restructured and renamed asBoplac in 1990. 67 The equity of the new company is heldby Bruynzeel (43.5%), the Danish company DLH Nordisk(43.5%) (see page 56) and the German trading companyM & P Pruchtnow (13%). 68During 1997, Boplac produced 43,000 cubic metres oflogs from its five concessions which total 500,000 hectaresin the Lékoumou region in the south of the country. 69Most of this was Okoumé. Boplac is the leading veneerproducer in Congo and in 1997 output was 23,000 cubicmetres. 70 Because of the political difficulties of operating inCongo (Brazzaville), the operation declared a loss in1998. 71GabonDuring 1999, Boplac imported logs into Congo(Brazzaville) from neighbouring Gabon to sustainthroughput at its veneer facility, which could not obtainsufficient supplies from within the country because ofmilitia activity. 72DANZERThe Danzer Group, now a global timber business, isprimarily a German operation, held through a Swissholding company, ANBE. 73 Group sales turnover for 1998was DM 900 million (US$ 392 million). 74 Danzer, one ofthe world’s leading manufacturers and suppliers ofveneers, producing around 150 million square metres peryear in the early 1990s. 75 Less than 10% of the group’ssales, however, are derived from tropical timbers. Most ofthe tropical timber used in their veneers is from Africanspecies, with a limited amount from Asian logs and nonefrom Latin America. 76Danzer’s principal operations in the European Unionare in Germany (notably Danzer Funierwerke, based inReutlingen), Austria (Karl Danzer GmbH), Belgium(Coplac), France (Jura Placages), Sweden (Fanérimporten),

56and the UK (Karl Danzer Ltd). 77, 78 Danzer’s Swiss businessis conducted through Interholco. 79 Its subsidiaries, such asCoplac in Belgium, are believed to buy timber from anumber of different sources outside the group.Danzer also has forestry operations in West andCentral Africa. The West African operations are primarilythrough SIFCI (Société Industrielle et Forestière de Côted’Ivoire) in the Ivory Coast. 80CameroonDanzer sold its interest in its main subsidiary inCameroon, Grumcam, in 1992. Italian company Alpi nowhas a majority share in it (see Alpi, page 53).Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)SIFORCO (Société Industrielle et Forestière du Congo)Danzer’s principal operating company in the DRC isSIFORCO, known during the Mobutu era as Siforzal(Société Industrielle et Forestière Zaïre-Allemande). 81 Inthe early 1990s, the company accounted for 40% of thecountry’s commercial production of logs (then totalling500,000 cubic metres per year) 82 and roughly half thecountry’s annual timber exports of 200,000 cubic metres. 83It produces the majority of the country’s veneer exports,most of which is of Sapelli. SIFORCO’s production in1996 and 1997 dropped to 140,000 cubic metres of logsper year and still further during 1998 to 105,000 cubicmetres. The company has currently ceased logging in DRCbecause of renewed fighting in the region.The German government’s investment and developmentinstitution, DEG, has a 33% stake in SIFORCO (DM15.5million / US$6.8 million). 84 DEG’s role, as an arm of theGerman Development Ministry BMZ, is to implementgovernment development policy. Its stake in a forestrycompany raises questions as to whether DEG activelyencourages Danzer to implement sustainable forestmanagement or not. DEG states that it does promoteaspects of sustainable forestry in their ongoing cooperationwith Danzer. 85SIFORCO has two processing facilities in DRC, thenewer one at Bumba and the other at Maluku near thecapital, Kinshasa, at the end of the navigable reaches ofthe Congo River. 86 Danzer also has a transport subsidiary,Cotraco, 87, 88 and has therefore been able to operateindependently of the vagaries of the state-owned rivertransport and freight handling company, ONATRA.Since 1983, SIFORCO has had access to nineconcessions in DRC totalling 2.9 million hectares; 60% isin Equateur Province near Bongondanga and Bumba andthe rest in the province of Orientale, near Aketi.SIFORCO’s largest concession (K9) is believed to be ofone million hectares between Bumba and Basoko on thenorthern bank of the Congo river near Lokoko.Danzer presents itself as a responsible company,stating: “We try not to see ecology and economy asconflicting forces” and “Our success has always allowedus to take on social responsibilities”. 89 There has, however,been no independent social and environmental audit of thegroup’s operations which would verify these claims.Evidence from the ground, such as it is, suggests a rathermore complex picture of impacts. Criticisms fromconservationists prompted the company recently toattempt to control some of the environmental impacts ofits operations, particularly with regard to the commercialhunting of bushmeat (see below).SOLD DOWN THE RIVERA 1998 investigation by a conservationist of SIFORCOoperations in the Mentole concession on the southernbank of the Congo River revealed social andenvironmental problems. Local people refuted companyclaims that it gave supplies of millet, rice and manioc to itsemployees. The company also claimed to provide freemedical care to employees and their families and freeschooling to children, but the dispensary was staffed by anurse only, no doctor was available, and parents paid forschooling, employing the teacher through a co-operative. 90As to environmental sustainability, Danzer’s loggingoperations have led directly and indirectly to a decline inthe numbers of bonobo, a rare and endangered species ofprimate unique to the DRC which is present in viablepopulations primarily in the vicinity of the Lomako andYekokora rivers. 91,92 At least one of the company’sconcessions is near a forest which used to contain highdensities of bonobo. 93 The bonobo population is estimatedto number between 10,000 to 25,000 animals. Danzersought to pre-empt the efforts of local conservationists byprocuring in advance a substantial area of forest south ofBumba which the conservationists wanted to be legallyprotected. 94 Although in 1989 Danzer returned 821,000hectares between the Lomako and Yekokora rivers to thegovernment, the company nevertheless continued to log inthis area. 95The 1998 investigations found that logging crews inone of the company’s concession areas transportedbushmeat hunters into the forest and that companyemployees used company facilities and transport tofacilitate the hunting and trade in bushmeat. 96 As a resultof these investigations, Danzer has taken steps to reduceits facilitation of the bushmeat trade by orderingemployees to halt their involvement. The company hasalso set up environmental education programmes for itsemployees, with the help of conservation organisations, toraise awareness locally of the problems caused byunsustainable and illegal wildlife hunting. 97 The companyis also involved in initiatives at the international levelregarding bushmeat.Congo (Brazzaville)IFO (Industrie Forestière d’Ouesso)Danzer has a subsidiary in northern Congo (Brazzaville)called IFO (Industrie Forestière d’Ouesso). 98SCBOIn August 1999, Danzer bought the former parastatalknown as SCBO from the Congolese government. Thisdeal included a saw and veneer mill in the north of thecountry and the UFA Est concession of 1.3 millionhectares connected to the mill. Danzer is currentlyrefurbishing the mill, which was non-operational and inbad condition, and production was planned to start inAutumn 2000. Danzer is also preparing a managementplan for the concession. 99DLH NORDISKDLH Nordisk A/S, part of the Dalhoff, Larsen andHorneman (DLH) group, is a Danish shipping and timbercompany. In January 2000, the company acquired EACTimber Ltd to form one of the world’s largest independenttimber trading companies. 100

COMPANY PROFILES 57DLH Nordisk obtains timber from Africa, EasternEurope and South America. EAC acquires it particularlyfrom East Asia, but also from Africa and South America.The sales turnovers of the timber businesses of DLH andEAC were each approximately DKr 1 billion (US$ 114million) in 1998. In 1999, gross profit for the DLH groupwas D Kr 538 million (US$ 61 million). The group hassales subsidiaries in Belgium (Indufor), France (Induboisand Nordisk Bois), The Netherlands (Indufor), the UK(DLH Timber) and the USA (DLH Nordisk). 101The enlarged DLH Nordisk company’s interests inCentral Africa include offices in Cameroon, Congo(Brazzaville) and Gabon. 102 It buys timber from exportersin the region, rather than exporting itself. DLH Nordisk isseeking to expand its sales of timber purchased from thisregion. 103DLH’s environmental policy claims that the companyaims to trade in wood and wood-based products whichhave been sustainably produced and, “at the veryminimum, the products of DLH comply with statutoryrequirements, including the provisions of environmentallaw”. 104 The company states that it is committed to FSCcertification standards, both in its own operations, forexample in Brazil and Ghana, and for its suppliers. Thegroup provides assistance to suppliers in Brazil, Polandand Russia to obtain FSC certification. 105 But given recentrevelations of large-scale and widespread illegal practicesin the forestry sector in Cameroon in particular, and thelack of forest law enforcement in the Congo Basin regionmore generally, the group’s current timber purchases fromCentral Africa cannot be proven to come from legallyproducedsources; the company faces an uphill struggle toraise standards of forestry operations in Central Africa,where it operates as a purchaser of timber and as a forestmanager.Cameroon and CARIn May 2000, DLH opened a purchasing office in Doualato cover the CAR and Cameroon. The office is buying onan FOB basis “from the most reliable exporters” and aimsto increase DLH’s turnover of hardwood from the CentralAfrican region. 106Congo (Brazzaville)DLH Nordisk SARL operates a small office in theCongolese town of Pointe Noire for the procurement ofhardwood logs, sawn timber and veneers for theEuropean, North American and Asian markets. 107 The civilwar in Congo (Brazzaville), however, has adverselyaffected operations. The Danish management werewithdrawn from the country, the Danish manager movedto the new Douala office, and in July 2000 the businesswas being run by one local employee. 108BoplacDLH Nordisk holds 43.5% of Boplac (see Bruynzeelsection, page 55) but because of the political difficulties ofoperating in Congo (Brazzaville), the operation declared aloss in 1998. 109 Because militia activity in Congo preventedlogging, Boplac imported logs from the neighbouringcountry of Gabon during 1999 in order to sustainthroughput at its veneer facility. 110FELDMEYERHinrich Feldmeyer GmbH & Co is based in Germany. 112Internationally, Feldmeyer works as a producer and traderof tropical timber from Africa (as HIF) primarily inassociation with tt Timber International (a Swisscompany), but also with tt Tropical Timber based at theport of La Rochelle in France and Tropisch HoutNederland of the Netherlands.CameroonFeldmeyer used to operate as CIFOA (CompagnieIndustrielle et Forestière de l’Ouest Africaine), a loggingcompany whose average annual output during the late1980s was 70,000 cubic metres of logs and 15,000 cubicmetres of sawn wood. 113 CIFOA harvested one tree perhectare in a felling cycle of over 25 years. 114 The companywas sold in 1988. Feldmeyer recently established a timbertransit and supplies trading company, SAT (Sociétéd’Approvisionnement et de Transit), in Douala. 115CongoCIB (Congolaise Industrielle du Bois)Feldmeyer’s subsidiary in Congo is CIB, headquartered inOuesso. 116 Feldmeyer has a majority interest in CIB, whichwas created in 1968, and tt Timber International has aminority interest. 117 The company has been the onlycommercially successful operation in the north of thecountry on a consistent basis. 118CIB has three concessions in the north of the country,totalling 1.15 million hectares - Pokola, which is its mainbase (480,000ha), Kabo (280,000ha) and Loundougou(390,000ha), the latter being held in reserve for futureexploitation. 119 The concessions are located in primaryrainforest of high biodiversity. The area has a rich culturalheritage, being home to a relatively large number of foresthunter-gatherers, such as the Mbendjele and Baka, as wellas many farming and fishing, Bantu and Ubangianlanguage speaking sedentary ethnic groups, notably theSangha Sangha, Bongili, Kabounga, Pomo and Kaka.Annual production is currently 250,000 cubic metres,with around 60% being processed in two sawmills atKabo and Pakola. 120 The company exports about 100,000cubic metres of logs and 40,000 cubic metres of sawntimber each year. 121 The two main species harvested areSapelli and Sipo. 122CIB used to float its logs down to Brazzaville and thensend them to Pointe Noire by railway. This route has© GREENPEACEGabonDLH Nordisk has an office in Libreville for theprocurement of hardwood logs for Europe and Asia. 111

58SOLD DOWN THE RIVERbecome so unreliable (due to civil war and problems withthe run-down railway) that CIB has been obliged toconstruct a 150 kilometre road from Pokola to connect tothe Cameroon road network, so it can send its logs byroad through Cameroon for export from the Cameroonianport of Douala. 123 This has enabled CIB to maintainproduction, even during the recent civil war, unlike otherEuropean operators in the country (see Congo(Brazzaville), page 27). The road also, however, facilitatedthe commercial bushmeat trade in the area. 124CIB is reported to be well regarded by most localpeople. There is some resentment among certain localgroups who feel their traditional heritage is beingexploited without adequate redistribution of the benefits.Yet the CIB is also perceived of as the local agent ofdevelopment and provider of basic services, 125 which thegovernment has had difficulty doing. Its employment andliving conditions are reported to be good and it operateswithin the law. 126 The concessions are adjacent to theNouabalé Ndoki National Park and are home to asubstantial Pygmy population – a number of whom workfor CIB rather than Bantu villagers. 127 The very success ofCIB’s venture has attracted newcomers to the locality andPokola has grown from a small fishing village of 120 in1972 to one of the largest centres in north Congo, with apopulation of around 8,000. 128 The increased activities inthe area have significantly increased pressure on naturalresources and, according to a World Bank study, wildlifehas been largely decimated in a 20 kilometre band aroundPokola. 129The company is considered to be one of the moreeconomically sustainable and well-managed operations inthe Central African region. 130 However, CIB’s operationshave not been without criticism. The facilities provided inPokola are of a high quality but are provided by thecompany primarily for employees based in the town –other local people have varying degrees of access tothem. 131 Additionally, the provision of services attractsoutsiders to come and settle in Pokola, at leasttemporarily, in order to benefit from the service provided.This increases the demand for food from the forest areasaround Pokola. A study conducted by the WorldConservation Union (IUCN) in 1996 found thattraditional tenure, resource access rights and resourcemanagement systems, particularly those of the Pygmies,were rapidly breaking down within the Pokola concession.Also, commercial bushmeat hunting was being indirectlyfacilitated by the company’s operations, with commonreports of CIB trucks and drivers transportingbushmeat. 132 The study noted that the company had noforest management plan nor did it conduct post-harvestinventories. In response to this, the company asserted thatforest management plans in the modern sense do not yetexist in West and Central Africa, and thus this could notbe considered to be a failure on the part of CIB. 133 CIBacknowledged the usefulness of the report’s assessment ofthe company’s operations against sustainable forestmanagement standards established by the ForestStewardship Council (FSC) and the International TropicalTimber Organisation (ITTO). 134 The study found that of53 criteria for sustainable forest management, CIB metonly 34 in part or whole and 16 were not met at all. 135According to the company, actions for furtherimprovements were started immediately. 136The company has great influence in the area and doesnot welcome potential critics. It invited selectedinternational conservationists to visit the pilot projects in1999, as long as the company approved the compositionof the visitors. To date this visit has not taken place. 137 In1996, the company was reported to have used its influenceto prevent a potential critic from visiting its concessionarea. 138Recent field missions to the CIB concessions by theinternational environmental NGO World Wide Fund forNature (WWF) found that the company still has some wayto go to demonstrate its commitment to achievingsustainable forest management to FSC standards. 139 Thecompany takes only the very best trees, about one perhectare, but there is considerable damage to surroundingforest. CIB was urged to take measures to conserve Sapellibecause of regeneration problems likely to occur followingthe removal of the best trees in this way. WWF alsoexpressed concern at the amount of forest opened up, thecompany driving roads into relatively large areas toextract a small number of target trees. The field missionreported that not enough effort was being made by thecompany to valorise other timber species. WWFcomplemented the company, however, on its professionalharvesting techniques and technical capacity to improve itsoperations further and praised the collaboration withWCS regarding bushmeat hunting. 140CIB has received positive attention over recent years forits activities regarding the commercial bushmeat issue,particularly a joint initiative with the US-based NGOWildlife Conservation Society (WCS) (see below). Thecompany has taken steps to discourage bushmeat huntingand to prevent the commercial exploitation of bushmeat inits concessions. It has established an education programmefor local people and issued instructions to its workers notto illegally hunt endangered species. A “Protocoled’Accord” was signed in December 1995 to this effect bymembers of the local communities of Pokola and Ndokiand by CIB.A partnership agreement between CIB, WCS and theMinistry of Forest Economy (MEF) was signed in June1999, consolidating work to establish CIB’s forestmanagement units as buffer zones to the Nouabalé NdokiNational Park and to reduce the levels of bushmeathunting in the concession areas. 141 The park is beingmanaged by WCS and is considered to be of considerableimportance because of its high biodiversity. In the twopilot areas, WCS claim that bushmeat hunting hasdeclined by 60%. 142 However, recent evidence in thenearby community of Pokola, which is the largest timberbasedsettlement in the area, suggests that hunters mayhave simply switched their activities to other parts of theforest. 143CIB is actively pursuing certification and argues that toachieve a sustainable cut they require a large concessionarea. Thus they now have three concessions totalling overone million hectares and are undertaking an extensivesurvey of the flora in the concessions in collaboration withWCS. The social aspects of sustainability may prove moreof a challenge to the company, such as offeringcompensation to local people for lost non-timber forestproducts, involving local people in management anddecision-making and securing local land rights. WCS andCIB are sceptical that local communities have the capacityto manage resources responsibly. 144 Partly in consequenceof this belief, WCS employ eco-guards armed withautomatic rifles to patrol the buffer zone and loggingroads around the national park. This is very unpopularwith local people who see this as a gross violation of theirtraditional rights. 145

COMPANY PROFILES 59In some cases, important elephant poachers are madeeco-guards in an attempt to take them out of the poachingcircuit. It has been reported in the past that these guardsoften intimidated local people, and allowed their formerpoaching colleagues to pass freely through checkpoints butconfiscated local people’s small amounts of game. Thesystem has created distrust and antagonism between someconservation workers and local people and, in certainplaces, may have strengthened the position of some of thebest-connected poachers who are commissioned to hunttrophy animals. 146 If these issues are not tackled in an openand transparent manner, based on input from local people,this potentially positive initiative may not bear the fruit itshould.Accepting the contributions that CIB has made to theprovision of local services, and its partnership approachwith WCS regarding bushmeat hunting, it appears that thecompany still has some way to go before obtainingindependent proof of sustainable forest management.Whilst the company may be better than many other timbercompanies in the region, the woeful records of many ofthese other operators does not provide an acceptable baseto which companies genuinely striving to achievesustainable forest management should comparethemselves. Independent audit and verification of theenvironmental and social benefits and impacts of the jointCIB/WCS initiative and CIB’s operations by expertsacceptable to all parties would seem to be an appropriatenext step prior to further judgements being made on themerits or shortcomings of the operations.INTERWOODGroupe Interwood SA is a French company which wasuntil recently a subsidiary of the French conglomeratePinault Printemps Redoute. 147 The principal owners arenow listed as DF Synergies (40%), Siti SteD’Investissements et de Transactions (40%) and Mr Gueit(19%). 148 The turnover figures for the company at the end1999 were US$ 28,808,000. 149 Interwood has operationsin Cameroon and Gabon.CameroonInterwood Cameroun SARLInterwood’s company in Cameroon is InterwoodCameroun SARL which carries out logging, processingand international trade in logs and sawn timber. 150According to 1999 French press reports, Interwood’slogging permit was renewed by the Minister of Forests andit was being approached by BOTAC (a Cameroonianforestry company) concerning a possible partnership. 151 Itis not clear which concessions Interwood Cameroun SARLholds.CoronInterwood has recently acquired EGTF RC Coron’sinterests in Cameroon. 152 Coron has been operating inCameroon since 1938. Until its acquisition by Interwood,it was a family-owned company with close links to theFrench establishment – its Managing Director representedFrench interests in Cameroon. 153 Since Interwood’s recentacquisition of Coron, however, the new managementstructure is unknown.Coron currently holds two concessions (UFAs 08-001and 08-002) totalling 136,760 hectares in Haute Sanagadistrict, Centre Province. It has processing facilities of48,000 cubic metres input capacity. In 1996-7, it produced40,677 cubic metres of logs of which 20,131 cubic metreswere exported. 154 Coron exports timber (from logs tosemi-finished manufactured items) primarily to Europe,both in its own right and through traders, most notably aFrench expatriate company, FCA (Forestiers CamerounaisAssociés). 155Coron acquired its concessions in 1996 through aPresidential Decree (“gré à gré”) rather than by auction, asrequired by the 1994 law, and has a contract which doesnot envisage a management plan nor a probationaryperiod. 156 Obtaining a licence in this way means thatcompanies do not have to abide by the 1994 law. 157 TheWorld Bank has requested the Cameroonian governmentto revoke all contracts for concessions that had beengranted in a manner contrary to the 1994 law, but to noavail.In December 2000, Coron was fined CFA fr16,783,308 (US$ 21,815) for exploiting unauthorisedspecies. 158GabonSociété de la Haute Mondah (SHM)Interwood owns Société de la Haute Mondah (SHM) inGabon, one of the largest operators in the country. 159 Thecompany is believed to own around 300,000 hectares ofconcessions. A field trip in June 2000 by the GaboneseNGO CIAJE to the SHM site at Mboumi found that themanagers had potable water from a specially constructedwater tower but the workers had to walk more than onekilometre to a river polluted with wood treatmentchemicals. “In effect, this river is a rubbish dump ordustbin for wood residues and other detritus”, concludedthe investigation. 160 Workers’ camps were poorlyconstructed and vulnerable to precipitation andsubsidence. 161 Field investigations found that thedispensary at the Mboumi site had no medication at all,not even basic painkillers, and a lack of qualified staff andbasic facilities. 162 Education provision is described in thefield report as “a catastrophe”, with incompetent staff. In1998-9, the success rate at the school was less than 10%.As a result, workers send their children to school inNdjolé nearly 40 kilometres away. 163 The field visit reportalso noted damage caused by heavy machinery, soilerosion on slopes, and excessive timber wastage.© GREENPEACE

60SOLD DOWN THE RIVERPASQUETPasquet is a building materials manufacturer based inFrance (annual sales US$ 40 million). 164 It has control oversome of its raw material supplies through R. Pallisco, itslogging subsidiary in Cameroon. It is known particularlyfor its range of hardwood doors and windows. 165 Pasquet’sprincipal raw material is Moabi, 166 a species that hastraditionally held great value to local people (see TheMoabi issue, page 6).CameroonR. PalliscoPasquet’s subsidiary in Cameroon, R. Pallisco, on its ownor through associates, notably SABE, has held concessionscovering over 700,000 ha in the East Province since itstarted logging in 1972. 167 Pallisco and SABE produced atotal of 79,287 cubic metres of logs of which 35,892 cubicmetres were exported during 1996-7. 168 Pallisco has asawmill at Massaména with input capacity of 45,000cubicmetres per year. 169Having failed to obtain a new concession in the July2000 allocation round, Pallisco no longer has concessionsof its own, although it logs on behalf of others, namely theCameroonian companies Assene Nkou and AVEICO.Assene Nkou has been awarded UFA 10-039, whichcovers 47,585 ha in the East Province. 170 AVEICO hasbeen awarded UFA 10-041, which covers 64,460 hectaresin Boumba and Ngoko district of East Province. For manyyears, Pallisco has been the leading exporter of Moabifrom Cameroon. 171Pallisco was seeking new concessions in recentallocation rounds on which it intended to establishsustainable forest management practices and has beenworking on a bushmeat substitution programme atMindourou. It has also expressed an interest in buyingproducts from community forest operations should any besuccessfully established (see Cameroon, page 13). Havingfailed to obtain any concessions of its own, however, itremains to be seen to what extent Pallisco can implementsustainable forest management on those concessions whereit acts as a sub-contractor.ROUGIERThe Rougier SA group is a timber company which hasbeen operating in Central Africa for 50 years and is one ofthe region’s principal loggers. 172 It is listed on the ParisStock Exchange but is still 46.3% owned by the Rougier© GREENPEACEfamily. 173 Rougier usually produces roughly 500,000 cubicmetres of timber each year in Central Africa; logs accountfor 43% of its turnover and earn some FFr 442 million(US$ 57.5 million). 174 The Rougier group is divided intothree main business divisions: forest exploitation andprocessing in Africa; international timber trade andimports to France; and timber processing in France. 175The group’s French trading and importing subsidiariesare Rougier International, Rougier Panneaux and RougierSylvaco. Rougier Panneaux distributes plywood; itsproducts include timber from a wide range of species,especially Okoumé from Gabon and Ayous fromCameroon. 176 Rougier Sylvaco is a trader and importer oftimber. 177Its French processing divisions are Marotte andCEPAM. Marotte is one of France’s leading producers ofveneer and decorative timber panels, 178, 179 while CEPAMspecialises in flooring, facings and edgings, mainly for the180, 181French market.CameroonWorking through several companies, Rougier’s business isone of the largest in Cameroon. Its companies includeSFID (Société Forestière et Industrielle de la Doumé),based in M’bang and Dimako; Cambois (SociétéCamerounaise des Bois), based in Djoum; and SID (SociétéIndustrielle de Djoum), which operates south of Dja.Rougier holds 25% equity in TIB (TransformationIntegrée de Bois); SIM (Société Industrielle de Mbang) is awholly-owned subsidiary of TIB. 182Rougier, like other European companies in Cameroon,works closely with logging companies owned byCameroonian nationals, such as Lorema and Socib. It alsosub-contracts for Cameroonian companies and buystimber from third parties for its sawmills. As well aslogging its own UFAs, the Rougier group has been loggingin smaller areas for short periods through ventes de coupesand récupérations (see Cameroon, page 13). Rougieradmits that logging in these small areas for a limitedduration does not allow the implementation of sustainableforest management. 183Rougier has been developing forest management plansfor its concessions for the past two years, but they are notyet complete. 184 In the meantime, its current operations donot indicate progress towards long-term sustainablemanagement. Group director François Rougier said in theyear 2000 in an industry journal article that loggingoperations in Africa generally had been the equivalent ofmining for the past 40 years. 185SFID (Société Forestière et Industrielle de la Doumé)Rougier SA owns 56% of SFID 186 which was established in1955 and was the first European company to start loggingin East Province. 187 It has processing facilities in M’Bang,with a production capacity of 120,000 cubic metres perannum, and in Dimako, with a production capacity of50,000 cubic metres per annum. 188 SFID has a concessionof 68,292 hectares (UFA 10-054) in Haut Nyong andKadey districts, at Lomié and M’Bang, 189 and operates insmaller, limited period licences. It also buys from thirdparties and operates as a contractor to other licenceholders. SFID’s operations have moved further east intoprimary forest as timber supplies have becomeexhausted. 190 It has logged more than 360,000 hectaressince operations began in 1955. 191

COMPANY PROFILES 61One of the consequences of this “migration” of loggingoperations is the associated increase in population density.The town of M’Bang’s population increased from 14,000in 1985 to 23,000 in 1989 because of increased loggingoperations, adding to stresses on the surrounding naturalenvironment. 192One of the timbers which SFID M’Bang processes isMoabi, 193 traditionally used by local people (see TheMoabi issue, page 6). In the area around Dimako, whereSFID has logged in the past, Moabi is now locallyextinct. 194 Villagers in M’Bang have complained about thelogging of Moabi near villages. In 1993, a SFID managerwas reported as saying “if we see a Moabi, we’ll log it, nomatter if the trees are felled in the neighbourhood ofsettlements or below the minimum diameter”. 195According to the company, Moabi accounts for just asmall percentage of SFID’s production. 196In 1991, senior villagers of M’Bang wrote to JeanChristophe Mitterand, son of the then French President,François Mitterand – Mitterand junior had opened theSFID sawmill at M’Bang in 1989 197 – to complain aboutSFID’s operations in the area and the company’s failure tofulfil its obligations to the local people. 198,199 One of theircomplaints was that SFID burnt wood waste rather thanallowing villagers to use it. 200 The company says it is notaware of this correspondence. 201SFID has benefited directly and indirectly fromsubsidies, loans and other assistance from the Frenchgovernment and the EU. A pilot sustainable forestmanagement scheme, the Aménagement Pilote Intégré(API), commenced in 1992 at Dimako, with SFID as theindustrial partner. 202 France’s government developmentagency, Caisse Francaise Développement (CFD, nowknown as Agence Française du Développement-AFD) andthe Ministry of Co-opération both contributed funds. Theproject enabled SFID to acquire a 100,000 hectareconcession area particularly rich in commercial species fora period of 30 years. 203 Rougier’s projected investment ofFFr 56 million (US$ 7.3 million) included FFr 13 million(US$ 1.7 million) borrowed from CFD. 204Although the API project was supposed to put in placelong-term sustainable forest management with due caretowards local populations, the forest was quickly logged.The project attracted much protest locally and becamehighly controversial. Villagers sent letters of protest to theCameroon government and to President Biya. 205 Peoplewithin the forestry ministry, MINEF, have been reportedas opposing the project, 206 although, as the companystates, MINEF was a co-signatory to the project. 207 Thecompany failed to fulfil its commitments to establish aforest management plan. According to a consultantassociated with the project, SFID was free to do whateverit wanted, with no forest management rules beingestablished at the local level. 208 As a result of this and thenumerous conflicts that had arisen with local people,including road blockades, the second phase of funding forthe project was frozen. 209In July 2000, an official MINEF mission found thatSFID was logging outside their récupération permit (ARB167) boundaries near Ngoro, Centre Province. Therécupération should have been only two kilometres widebut was over four kilometres wide from the westernboundary to the last log pond being operated. 210CAMBOIS (Société Camerounaise des Bois)Rougier owns 57% of CAMBOIS. 211 In the July 2000allocation of new concessions, CAMBOIS was awardedUFA 10-038, one of the largest concessions in the countryat 145,176 hectares, even though the company had thelowest score for technical merit of the four companies whobid for the concession (see Cameroon, page 15). 212,213In June 2000, MINEF started official proceedingsagainst CAMBOIS for destruction of marks used by forestadministration (Law 94/01 art. 150) and refusal to obeyinjunctions from MINEF agents (Law 94/01 art.162). 214In December 2000, CAMBOIS was fined CFA fr79,963,608 (US$ 103,940) for logging outside itsallocated area. 215SID (Société Industrielle de Djoum)SID has a processing facility at Djoum with an inputcapacity 50,000 cubic metres per year. 216 The exports ofthis company were 30,000 cubic metres in 1998-9. 217TIB (Transformation Integrée de Bois)Rougier holds 25% of TIB, which has a sawmill with anannual processing capacity of 50,000 cubic metres. 218 SIM(Société Industrielle de M’bang) is a forest subsidiary 100%owned by TIB. 219 SFID (see above) and SIM are believed toact as sub-contractors to TIB and to supply logs to thecompany. 220 SIM was fined CFA fr 10,311,122 (US$ 13,402)in December 2000 for not respecting logging norms. 221Central African Republic (CAR)Rougier used to own SCAD (Société Centrafricaine deDéroulage), 222 but sold it in 1984. 223 It is now owned by aCAR national of Syrian origin.Congo (Brazzaville)MokabiRougier has recently acquired the 370,000 hectare Mokabiconcession which it planned to be fully operational by theend of 2000. 224,225 The concession lies next to the Ndoki-Nouabalé National Park and along the border with CAR.The terms are supposed to be so generous that thecompany expects to recover its capital investment in twoyears (see Congo (Brazzaville), page 27). 226GabonRougier GabonRougier SA owns 86% of Rougier Gabon 227 which is oneof the largest timber companies operating in the country,and is estimated to hold around 700,000 hectares. 228 Itproduces 350,000 cubic metres in an average year. 229Rougier’s plywood mill at Owendo has a processingcapacity of 40,000 cubic metres per annum; the companyplans new investment in the mill to come on stream in2001. 230Rougier Gabon is currently developing two forestmanagement plans, which are due to be finished in2001. 231 Rougier’s operations in Gabon have beencriticised by conservationists because the company renegedon a 1995 agreement it had signed with IUCN to manageand conserve the pristine Ipassa-Mingouli rainforest. 232These 500,000 hectares of primary rainforest along theIvindo River in north-eastern Gabon lie between two

62SOLD DOWN THE RIVERspectacular waterfalls which act as natural barriers to theforest. Rougier has a concession which lies partly withinthe area and, despite its agreement with IUCN not to logthere, it has driven access roads into the area and startedlogging amid local and international protest. 233 Rougier issaid to have sought a presidential decree to confirm itsright to log in the area (the President’s wishes are abovethe law). 234 A flight over the area by US conservationists inSeptember 1998 revealed that Lots 12 and 13 had beenquite heavily logged, with logging in Lot 13 appearing tobe “rapid, intense, and highly destructive. It appears thatalready about 28,700 ha have already been exploited”. 235In response to criticisms, the company signed aConvention to declare the falls of Mingouli a protectedarea on 11 February 1998 with the Gabonese ministry offorests. 236 According to Rougier, the company has cededback to the Government 6,750 hectares of its concessionsto preserve the site of Mingouli and to ensure itsprotection. 237The Lopé Reserve in Gabon has also been the focus ofcontroversy (see Gabon, page 45). Because of legalconfusion, logging licences had been issued in the reserveeven though it was a protected area in which suchactivities are prohibited. Following significantinternational pressure, Rougier and Leroy Gabon (seeSonae, below) agreed in July 2000 to cease logging there.Rougier agreed to hand over 18,000 hectares of Lot 31 inthe Lopé Reserve to the government and proposed thatMont Iboundji be declared a Sanctuary. 238Both France and the European Union seemedcommitted to releasing funding during the year 2000 forthe construction of an all-weather road linking thecomparatively isolated northern region of Gabon both toCameroon and to the Transgabonais railway at Ndjolé. 239Rougier, the only major French logging company to haveoperations near the route, would benefit, along with theMalaysian company, Rimbunan Hijau. Rougier also has adirect and indirect stake (through SNBG – see SNBGfeature page 46) in the Transgabonais railway.SAFISAFI SL is a Spanish company based in Valencia. 240 It hasa logging concession and processing factory in EquatorialGuinea. The concession covers 30,000 ha, located in thedistrict of Mongomo – Welenzas, and the companyexports timber to Spain, France, Germany and theNetherlands. 241SONAEThe Sonae group, headquartered in Portugal, is the world’slargest wood board business, ahead of the US-basedGeorgia Pacific and Louisiana Pacific. 242 A diversifiedgroup of companies, Sonae includes several significanttimber businesses that are all interconnected with eachother: Tafisa of Spain, Glunz of Germany and Isoroy ofFrance. The Sonae group owns 85% of Sonae Industria,which in turn owns 87% of Tafisa (Tableros y Fibras SA)of Spain, which in turn acquired 97% of Glunz ofGermany in 1999. 243 Through Glunz, Tafisa now ownsIsoroy of France (which Glunz acquired from the Frenchcompany Pinault – now part of Pinault Printemps Redoute- in 1992). Isoroy, Europe’s largest producer of tropicalplywood, is the parent company of a number ofcompanies operating in the Congo Basin, of which LeroyGabon is the most prominent. Isoroy has long beencriticised by environmentalists. Its recent acquisition bySonae may herald a more ecologically-considerateapproach in Gabon (see below) if the new ownership putsin practice concrete actions towards achieving acceptablelong-term sustainable forest management.CameroonIsoroy and the French company Becob (now owned byPinault Printemps Redoute) had a minority share in theformer Cameroonian parastatal timber company,SOFIBEL, 244 which was privatised during 1993 afterserious mismanagement.Central African Republic (CAR)Through Leroy, Isoroy used to own a majority share inSICA Bois (Société Industrielle Centrafricaine) which helda 100,000 hectare concession in CAR. 245Equatorial GuineaSonae’s principal local subsidiary, CompañiaEcuatoguineana de Okumé, was inactive during 1998. 246Isoroy had operations in and bought timber fromEquatorial Guinea during the mid-1990s. 247 During thelate 1990s, Isoroy sought to acquire concessions which ithad previously worked, but eventually gave up, frustratedby the Malaysian company Rimbunan Hijau’s relationshipwith the Minister of Forests (see Equatorial Guinea, page42). Rimbunan Hijau’s subsidiary Shimmer eventuallygained access to these concessions for itself. 248GabonLeroy GabonIsoroy’s subsidiary, Leroy Gabon was established in1976. 249 During 1997, Leroy Gabon held 654,000 hectaresof concessions and produced 154,000 cubic metres oflogs. 250 Producing 7% of the country’s Okoumé output,Leroy Gabon is the third largest timber company inGabon. 251, 252 Until the early 1990s, Isoroy also owned amajority interest in SHM (Société de la Haute Mondah)(see Interwood, page 59).One of former French President Mitterand’scontroversial national prestige projects, the NationalLibrary in Paris, consumed huge quantities of Okoumésupplied by Leroy Gabon. 253 Leroy Gabon has tried tobrand its timber as coming from sustainably managedforests, but has gained little credibility to date. It drew upits own quality mark, “Eurokoumé label”, 254, 255 and wasgranted preliminary certification by the ForestStewardship Council (FSC), but such certification wassoon exposed as unwarranted and the certificate wasrevoked in 1997. 256Leroy and a number of foreign-owned loggingcompanies based in Gabon, notably NSG and Rougier,have held concessions for many years covering part of theLopé Reserve. 257 The Lopé Reserve, created in 1946, wasthe first protected area in Gabon. Since then, its status haschanged over time, leading to the contradictory positionwhere logging licences are valid in an area where allforestry exploitation is forbidden. 258Leroy’s concession in Lopé (Lot 32) was first assignedin 1983 to SONG (Société d’Okoumé de la Ngoumé),which had a relationship with the Spanish company Alena,

COMPANY PROFILES 63one of the principal logging companies in colonialEquatorial Guinea. 259 After several years of being dormant,the concession was acquired by Leroy in 1990.Leroy attracted international condemnation for itslogging operations inside the Lopé Reserve which is anextremely ecologically significant area of primaryrainforest. International conservation pressure led to anagreement being reached between Leroy, Rougier and thegovernment of Gabon in July 2000 to end the legalcontradictions governing the Reserve. Leroy renounced itslogging activities in 61,000 hectares of the Lopé Reserve.In return, the eastern flank, which is rich in Okoumé butof lesser biodiversity, has been excluded from the Reserveand conceded to Leroy. 260Leroy Gabon is constructing log processing facilities atOwendo, which will include plywood facilities. The plantwas due to be fully operational by January 2001. 261THANRYThe family-owned Thanry group, headquartered inFrance, specialises in logging, processing and trade intimber from Africa and is one of the principal loggers andinternational timber traders in the Congo Basin region. 262The group has logging operations in Ivory Coast andGuinea, as well as interests in Central Africa. The group’soperations in Gabon have a reputation of having higherstandards than other logging companies, but its reputationfor sustainable forest management in Cameroon is poor,an inconsistency which undermines Thanry’s credibilitywhen claiming to be a good forest manager. The Thanrygroup also operates in CAR.CameroonThanry is the largest logging group in Cameroon, andoperates a number of concessions through severalsubsidiaries: CFC; CIBC; J Prenant; Propalm; SAB andSEBC (see map pp 34-35). 263,264,265 As of July 2000, it holds767,135 hectares of concessions through its varioussubsidiaries. Section 158 of the 1994 Forestry Law inCameroon states that the “acquisition of shares or settingup of a forest exploitation company with the intention ofincreasing the total area of exploitation to more than200,000 hectares” 266 should result in a fine orimprisonment. MINEF should hold the requiredinformation to determine whether Thanry has actedillegally in this respect. It seems clear, however, that two ofits subsidiaries, SEBC and CFC (see below), havecontravened Section 49 of the 1994 law, which states that“the total forest area granted to any one licence-holder…may not exceed 200,000 hectares”, 267 even if the Thanrygroup itself has not, depending on whether “licenceholder”is interpreted as the parent company or itssubsidiary.During 1996-7, Thanry’s subsidiaries produced460,000 cubic metres 268 of logs, of which 220,000 cubicmetres 269 and 60,000 cubic metres 270 of sawn wood wereexported. The main species exploited are Ayous, Sapelliand Tali.The Thanry group and SFH (Société Forestière deHazim – the largest and one of the most controversialexpatriate Lebanese companies, see page 13) are leadingsuppliers to East Asian markets. 271 In recent years, ThanryCameroon has been working closely with Vicwood, aHong Kong-registered company, including providing logsunder contract to Vicwood for its veneer plant. 272 Thevolume of timber supplied by Thanry is of sufficientquantity to warrant the exceptional step of charteringboats directly rather than using established shippingcompanies. 273 Thanry has recently built a large log yardadjacent to the Douala-Yaoundé road and is buildinganother at Kribi for direct loading onto ships. 274 Therelationship between the companies is believed to havebeen recently formalised, with unconfirmed reports thatVicwood bought the Thanry Cameroon operations in theyear 2000.SEBC (Société d’Exploitation des Bois du Cameroun)Thanry’s largest subsidiary, SEBC was established in 1969and currently holds two concessions, (UFAs 10-007 and10-058), totalling 174,330 hectares in Boumba NgokoDistrict, East Province, and one concession of 48,800hectares (UFA 09-007) in Moloundou, bordering the DjaReserve. 275 SEBC concessions cover in total 223,130hectares, exceeding the 200,000 hectares legal maximumallowed per licence holder. SEBC has processing facilitiesat Lokomo, with an input capacity of 110,000 cubicmetres per year. 276In 1989, SEBC received French government politicaland financial support to secure a 91,378 hectareconcession (licence no.1578) near Lokomo in an areaparticularly rich in Ayous and Sapelli. CFD (CaisseFrançaise de Développement), the French government’sdevelopment agency, (now Agence Française duDéveloppement-AFD) subsidised the concessionacquisition by loaning Thanry FFr 18 million (US$ 2.3million). The concession terms envisage logging at a rateof 10,000 hectares each year for nine years and setting upa small sawmill to process the output. 277 Once it had beenawarded the concession, however, Thanry established asaw mill with almost ten times greater capacity. 278In January 1993, villagers from Atsjek (25 kilometresfrom M’bang) blockaded the road used by SEBC totransport timber because SEBC was logging illegally, hadfailed to provide promised infrastructure and had felledMoabi even within one kilometre of their village (see TheMoabi issue, page 6). The villagers wrote to President Biyaand the Provincial Governor. Twenty-four people werearrested and it is not known what happened to five people279, 280later transferred to Batouri prison.In March 2000, SEBC was fined and its operationssuspended for three months because of “anarchic”exploitation in its UFA concession and its exploitation inareas for which it did not have a licence. 281 A MINEF fieldinspection of SEBC’s concession (UFA 10-007) inDecember 1999 reported “anarchic logging of the UFAwith no respect for the assiettes de coupe” and “a flagrantexample of violation of forestry regulations”. 282 The sameteam visited another SEBC concession (UFA 10-058) andfound similar anarchic exploitation: illegal logging outsidethe concession area and illegal logging of under-sized logsboth within and outside it. 283 The field team noted that thelogging practised by this company undermined the entireforest policy and sustainable forest management promotedby the Cameroon government. 284SAB (Société Africaine des Bois)SAB is a Thanry subsidiary established in 1955. 285 It holdsone current concession of 60,838 hectares in EastProvince 286 and has a sawmill in Yaoundé with an inputcapacity of 35,000 cubic metres per year. 287

64SOLD DOWN THE RIVER© FORESTS MONITORIn March 2000, SAB was fined because it had notrespected the boundaries of its assiettes de coupe; in June2000, it was fined for logging outside the limits of its UFAconcession; and in July 2000, MINEF announced that SABwas disqualified from applying for new concessions in thatallocation round because of the serious nature of its illegalforestry activities. 288 But this disqualification was notreally significant since the concessions that the companywas interested in acquiring (UFAs 10.005 and 10.017) 289were not included in that round of allocations.J PrenantAnother Thanry subsidiary, J Prenant, was awarded a54,457 hectare concession (UFA 10-045) in East Provinceduring the July 2000 round of new UFA allocations. 290 Thecompany has a processing capacity of 38,500 cubic metresper year at Kagnol in East Province. 291CFC (Compagnie Forestière du Cameroun)In 1996, Thanry procuredthrough CFC fourcontiguous new concessions(UFAs 10-001,002,003 &004) through PresidentialDecree (“gré à gré”) ratherthan public auction asrequired by the 1994 law.The combined area of theconcessions exceeds the200,000 hectare legalmaximum for oneconcessionaire by 15,000hectares. CFC has a sawmillwith an annual inputcapacity of 50,000 cubicmetres at Yokodouma.The World Bank has requested the government torevoke all contracts for concessions which had beengranted contrary to the 1994 law, which would include thefour Thanry concessions, but nothing has been done.These concessions are located near the only properroad in the forest belt which links Cameroon with theCentral African Republic where Thanry has loggingconcessions which have reportedly increased productionrecently. But a World Bank report on the timber industryin this part of Cameroon noted the practice of creatingdocuments for Cameroonian timber indicating that thetimber originated outside the country and not thereforeliable to tax and other controls imposed on Camerooniantimber. Thanry timber could be involved, given that itsconcessions in the two countries are adjacent to each other(see map pp 34-35).As with other Thanry subsidiaries, CFC was sanctionedfor its misdemeanours in 2000. In March 2000, it wasfined for felling under-sized logs, and in June 2000, forlogging outside the limit of its assiette de coupe. 292 TheDecember 1999 MINEF inspection of its concession foundsystematic felling of under-sized logs, especially Sapelli,and logging outside the designated assiettes de coupe. 293Besides MINEF inspections, a more detailed assessmentof CFC’s operations was undertaken in April 2000 by anindependent team of Cameroonian and French experts,which not only uncovered further illegalities but alsocatalogued negative environmental and social impacts as aresult of the company’s logging operations (see E&SIAfeature, pp 19-22). These included a decline in non-timberforest products that are important sources of nutrition andlocal livelihoods; and an exacerbation of economic andsocial inequalities, including a failure to consult with alllocal villages. 294PropalmPropalm has a sawmill with an annual input capacity of40,000 cubic metres at Douala. 295 In the July 2000allocation of new UFA concessions, Propalm was awardedUFA00-004, which covers 125,490 hectares. 296CIBC (Compagnie Industrielle du Bois au Cameroun)CIBC has processing facilities with annual input capacityof 55,000 cubic metresCentral African Republic (CAR)Thanry has two subsidiaries in CAR, Thanry Centrafrique(228,000 hectares) and Sofokad (131,200 hectares). 297Thanry is expanding its business in CAR and has recentlyinstalled a saw mill. Thanry Centrafrique (which wasformerly known as PRMI) 298 has expanded its activities atits concessions around Bamban 299 near Berbérati in thewest. Roads between the Central African Republic andCameroon run near Thanry concessions in each country. 300GabonCEB (Compagnie Équatoriale des Bois)Thanry’s largest subsidiary in Gabon, CEB (CompagnieEquatoriale des Bois), is one of Gabon’s most prominenttimber companies. It has a saw mill and claims to beplanning a US$ 50 million veneer facility. CEB, establishedduring the French colonial era, had six concessions orlogging permits in 1997 covering 505,000 hectares 301 southof the Lastoursville-Okondja road in the province ofOgooué-Lolo. CEB produced 173,000 cubic metres of logsin 1997, of which 149,000 cubic metres were of Okouméand Ozigo, 302 and has processing facilities at Bambidie andOwendo. 303 The company is also logging a further 68,000hectares on behalf of others, a practice known as “fermage”which Gabon’s new forestry code tries to eliminate becauseit is associated with poor forest management. Together withother French based-companies, CEB is a minorityshareholder in SNBG, which is 51% owned by theGabonese government (see SNBG feature, page 46). CEBhas an 8% share in the company which has bought themanagement rights to the Transgabonais railway. 304CEB’s concession is being used to test indices andcriteria which can be used to determine sustainability offorest management. The test is sponsored by the AfricanTimber Organisation, funded jointly by the EU andFrance’s Ministry of Co-opération, and being carried outby the forest research institution CIFOR. The Swissmonitoring company SGS has been invited to conduct apreliminary audit of CEB’s management of thisconcession. 305 The French government has provided fundsfor Thanry and SHM (see Interwood, page 59) toundertake much of the work necessary to prepare theirbusinesses for sustainable forest management. Consultantshave, however, been recruited under a separate, Dutchfundedinitiative to prepare wildlife management plans forthem, 306 which suggests a less than holistic approach toforest management on the part of the French Government.CEB concessions are located in one of the most denselypopulated parts of Gabon. 307 CEB practices in Gabon are

COMPANY PROFILES 65said to be better than those of other logging companies inthe country, but the company’s poor record in Cameroonand its past record in Gabon place a question mark overthe company’s real commitment to sustainable forestmanagement. The company currently has a rotationperiod of 17 years which is generally considered to be tooshort for proper regeneration of the stock of commercialspecies. 308 The company also engages in fermage (see page46). 309Fieldwork undertaken in June 2000 by the GaboneseNGO CIAJE around CEB’s operations in Bambidi indicatethe extent to which CEB has tried to interact positivelywith local communities and workers. 310 In its concessionsin Lastoursville, CEB undertook a sociological study toidentify how to ensure a good relationship with villagersliving near its concessions and whose opposition to thecompany could potentially threaten CEB activities. Thefindings of the study were used to set up a programmeaimed at ensuring that local people also profit fromlogging. In the words of the CEB public relationsrepresentative in the country, these forests are “ their[local villagers’] forests”. 311 The company’s programmeincludes activities aimed at improving local people’sincome, such as the development of a fish breeding site inBambidi; setting apart one of the forest units for localpeople and financing processing of timber boards for thevillagers. Villagers living near CEB concessions can alsoattend the company health centre, while children haveaccess to a school where teachers are good (which is rarein logging areas) and they receive free reading primers.CEB employs mainly people from the villages surroundingtheir concessions. The company has built a road to breakup the isolation of a village in Sebe (near Lastoursville).CEB accommodation for its workers is better than those ofother companies. Workers also have access to recreationfacilities, considerably more than workers have in loggingcamps elsewhere in Gabon.CEB has taken several initiatives to stop bushmeathunting. Workers who engage in such activities arepenalised and the company plans to undertake a bushmeatawareness campaign. As to the use of timber, the companyseems less concerned with wasting forest resources;researchers found discarded timber lying around thelogging camp.Prior to opening its current concessions, CEB hadalmost exhausted its concessions in the south-west ofGabon, close to the Moukalaba Reserve where its loggingroads gave access to the Doudou Mountains 312 which wereonce rich in animal life. The Doudou Mountains remainone of several areas in Gabon which have beenrecommended for several years for, but not obtained, legal313, 314.protection.OthersThanry’s other subsidiaries in Gabon include EFG(Exploitation Forestière du Gabon) which has had a100,000 hectare concession near Ndjolé since 1976; SIL(Sciages Industriel de la Lowe) which operates sawmillsand was due to open at the end of 1995 a new sawmillwith an input capacity of 36,000 cubic metres per year,built for US$ 3 million; Thanry Gabon; and SAFOR whichis involved in logging, saw milling, moulding, railwaysleepers and charcoal. Thanry Gabon Industrie, a jointventure between CEB and Batave van Hout (of TheNetherlands), is to become one of the largest veneerproducers in Africa when its new 50,000 cubic metres peryear output processing facility between Owendo andLibreville is complete. 315If Thanry wants to be a credible actor in the market fortimber from sustainably managed forests, it may have todisassociate its operations in Gabon from those inCameroon. One commercial buyer of Thanry timber hasreportedly stopped buying from the company because ofits poor record in Cameroon. The easy option would be todispose of its operations in Cameroon – some of Thanry’scompetitors have particularly poor, but not necessarilyworse, records for forest resource management there.Raising the standards of its forestry operations andmanagement practices in Cameroon and CAR would,however, be a more commendable option and demonstratethe whole group’s commitment to implementingsustainable forest management.Unconfirmed reports in August 2000, however, suggestthat Thanry has taken the easy option by selling all itsoperations in Cameroon to Vicwood of Hong Kong.Thanry has apparently agreed with Vicwood that, for thepurposes of marketing timber in Europe, Vicwood willcontinue to use the Thanry brand name, potentiallycreating misunderstanding and deception as to thesustainability of timber from Cameroon.VASTO LEGNOVasto Legno is a family-owned Italian timber company. Ithas been operating for 120 years and has a modernindustrial complex in Milan specialising in sawnwood, itscore business, and in rotary and sliced veneers. 316 Thecompany produces about 5 million square metres of Ayousveneers each year and claims to be the world leader ofAyous production and one of the largest suppliers ofexotic species such as Ayous, Limba, Iroko, Sipo,Afrormosia and Moabi. 317CameroonVasto Legno has been logging in Cameroon for over 30years. 318 It operates through two companies, SEBAC(Société d’Exploitation des Bois d’Afrique Centrale) andSEFAC (Société d’Exploitation Forestière et Agricole duCameroun). 319 It currently operates on two legallyallocatedconcessions totalling 151,393 hectares as well asoperating outside its allocated concessions. During 1998-9, Vasto Legno produced 187,000 cubic metres of logs ofwhich it exported 42,000 cubic metres. 320SEBAC (Société d’Exploitation des Bois d’AfriqueCentrale)SEBAC has processing facilities at Béla with an inputcapacity of 36,000 cubic metres per year. 321 SEBACcurrently logs in East Province in a concession (UFA 10-009) which covers88,796 hectares. Ithas also beenlogging in anotherconcession (UFA 10-008) which covers60,371 hectares(even though it hasnot yet beenallocated) using arevoked licencenumber (1826). 322© GREENPEACE

66SOLD DOWN THE RIVERSEFAC (Société d’Exploitation Forestière et Agricole duCameroun)SEFAC has a current concession in East Province (UFA 10-012) of 62,597 hectares, 323 and timber processing facilitiesin Libongo with an annual input capacity of 130,000cubic metres. 324In March 1999, WWF President, Prince Philip theDuke of Edinburgh, visited SEFAC installations andreportedly welcomed the company’s actions towardssustainable forest management. 325 SEFAC had publicisedits contributions to local infrastructure, such as schools, aclinic and 250 kilometres of roads in the heart of theforest. 326 The company also stated that it had taken overresponsibility for the running of the police, post andcustoms service in Libongo, including paying staffsalaries. 327During this high-profile visit, SEFAC announced a firmcommitment to preserving the forest, stating it had been inthe “avant-garde of sustainable exploitation” for 31 years,and to complying with existing forestry regulations. 328 Thecompany has been praised for its investment in high-techprocessing facilities at Libongo, and has received positivemedia attention for its investment in infrastructure for theworkers and their families in this logging town. 329But reports from the ground suggest a more complexpicture with negative aspects, too. Local people havecomplained about the company-subsidised school, whichhas two teachers for 190 six- to seven-year olds, and thelack of scope for raising concerns about pay andconditions for fear of losing one’s job. 330 The company’sfunding of local state institutions, such as the police andcustoms service, is open to abuse and undermines anyindependence these institutions may have had. Anunderlying concern is for the long-term viability ofLibongo, given its dependence on SEFAC’s continuedaccess to timber sources. If the company does not managethe forest sustainably and ensure a long-term supply ofquality timber, Libongo could have an uncertain future.The pattern of boom-and-bust logging towns inCameroon, such as nearby Kika, does not contribute tolong-term sustainable development for rural people.Official reports from SEFAC’s concession do notalleviate these concerns. In December 1999, a MINEFmission to the SEFAC concession (UFA 10-012) found“anarchic” and illegal operations, including loggingoutside concession boundaries and cutting undersized logs,especially Sapelli. The mission noted that this concession,which the company has operated for more than 30 years,is of poor quality, 331 suggesting that SEFAC has exhaustedthe best timber, which poses problems for the supply of itslarge mill.In March 2000, SEFAC was fined and its activitiessuspended for three months. 332 It was subsequentlydisqualified from the new concession allocations in July2000 for serious wrongdoing in its forestry activities. 333WIJMAWijma Kampen BV of The Netherlands is a family firmwhich is a subsidiary of Koninklijke Houthandel G. Wijma& Zonen BV (GWZ). 334 It has been operating for over 100years and specialises in marine hardwoods and structures,such as bridges, boardwalks and floodgates. The Dutchgovernment is a significant customer. Much of thecompany’s hardwood timber comes from subsidiaries inAfrica. It also has contacts in Europe, America and Asia. 335African subsidiaries are in Cameroon, Ghana and theIvory Coast. European subsidiaries are in France,Germany, The Netherlands and the UK. 336CameroonWijma’s subsidiary in Cameroon is Wijma Douala SARL.It also has close links to CFK (Compagnie Forestière deKribi), although it is not known whether CFK is asubsidiary of the Wijma group or not. Wijma has asawmill at Kribi, with an input capacity of 50,000 cubicmetres per year, while CFK has a processing capacity of14,000 cubic metres per year. 337 In 1996-7, Wijmaproduced 64,314 cubic metres of logs of which 24,640cubic metres were exported. CFK produced 18,680 cubicmetres of logs and exported 5,433 cubic metres in thesame period. 338 Wijma is one of the main exporters ofAzobé from Cameroon.The operations of Wijma in Cameroon have changedfundamentally over the past few years. The company usedto log directly in a number of concessions totalling208,650 hectares. According to MINEF documentation,these have now expired and the company acts as acontractor to and purchaser of logs from other companies,such as COFA, a company owned by the CameroonianPresident’s nephew.In recent years, Wijma worked in partnership with theDutch tropical forest research programme, Tropenbos. InJuly 2000, Wijma bid for a new concession but wasunsuccessful, even though it had the highest technicalscore (see Cameroon, page 15). 339 Despite these indicationsof a commitment to improved forest management, giventhat the company no longer holds any concessions inCameroon, it is not known whether Wijma exerts anyinfluence over the management of concessions belongingto its suppliers or the companies to whom it acts ascontractor.A MINEF mission to the Centre and South Provinces inDecember 1999 340 reported that CFK was logging inassiette de coupe (number 10 in UFA 09-021), aconcession which belongs to COFA, without a permit todo so. The report goes on to say that Wijma managementstated that the request for the authorisation to operate inthe assiette de coupe was in process at MINEF: “Thedirector of operations for the group Wijma, M. UrbaniakFrancis stated that the request for the authorisation tooperate in the assiette de coupe was in process at MINEF.However, he refused to sign the official infractions reportattached in Annexe 1.A.”WONNEMANNThe German company Gerhard Wonnemann GmbH wasfounded in 1948 and is one of the largest operators inCongo (Brazzaville), where it operates in the south of thecountry as SOCOBOIS. 341, 342 The German developmentagency, DEG, was reported to own 30% of SOCOBOIS in1993, 343 but recent correspondence with DEG states thatthis is no longer the case. 344 SOCOBOIS has beenoperating in Congo since 1964 but ceased operations in1999 when seven foreign employees were kidnapped andlater released by the militia. 345 In March 2000, governmentsources were reported as stating that SOCOBOIS wouldsoon be restarting its activities. 346

CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 67Conclusions andRecommendationsTHE RAINFORESTS OF Central Africa provide food and livelihoods for millions offorest-dependent peoples and contain unqiue biodiversity; but they are seen increasinglysimply in terms of industrial timber production. Corporations, predominantlytransnational corporations, control most of the forests in the region. Multilateral and bilateralcreditors are encouraging the industrial exploitation of these forests with little thought for thecapacity of national governments to enforce forestry legislation, the timber industry’s response toweak enforcement of legislation, and the lack of transparency and democracy in governments. As aresult, private companies are logging illegally on a significant scale and national governments areusing logging concessions to develop and maintain their various patronage networks, a processwhich perpetuates the lack of transparency and democracy, particularly when it involves seniorpolitical and military figures.Within this context, forest-dependent peoples become even more marginalised; they areexcluded from decision-making about how forests should be used and managed; in the process,their rights are undermined and their needs ignored. Industrial forestry removes many of the treesupon which local communities depend for food, medicines and building materials. The commercialhunting of bushmeat, which is directly and indirectly facilitated by logging, has decimated wildlife,undermined subsistence hunting and increased food insecurity. The commercial hunting ofendangered species, such as primates and elephants, threatens their continued existence.If these forest industrialisation policies continue in Central Africa and these issues gounaddressed, the buyers of timber will continue to generate poverty and environmentaldegradation. Ensuring that the forests of Central Africa are managed so that they are not degradedor destroyed but provide sustainable long-term livelihoods for local people should be the primarygoal of all stakeholders. To this end, national governments, assisted by multilateral and bilateralcreditors, must provide a fundamentally improved and enforced regulatory framework withinwhich forestry companies can operate. Such a framework should address social issues, forestindustrialisation policies and environmental issues.Social issuesEnsuring that all local peoples are equally represented at the heart of decision-making and policydevelopment would be a first step towards sustainable forest management. This step would also bemore likely to ensure socially-just development that respects forest ecosystems. This would involve:§ recognising and respecting traditional tenure and use rights, including within national laws;§ recognising the right of all local communities to meaningful and equitable participation inidentifying the kind of forest management they want, including alternatives to industrial timberproduction;§ providing culturally-appropriate opportunities for local communities to identify their needs andto be involved in planning and managing development strategies and social infrastructure;§ assisting local communities and domestic civil society NGOs to build their capacity to deal withthe other, more powerful, stakeholders in forest management;§ ensuring that all members of communities, including women, the elderly and children, areinvolved in management and decision-making in ways which they feel are appropriate.Forest Industrialisation PolicyOne of the main justifications given for pursuing industrial forestry policies is poverty alleviation.The evidence presented in this report suggests that the timber industry does not contribute to thisgoal; on the contrary, the prevalence of illegal logging and inequitable income distribution meansthat industrial timber exploitation exacerbates the poverty of forest-dependent peoples.Multilateral and bilateral institutions, and national governments consistently demonstrate a lackof long-term planning and an inability to learn from experience elsewhere, both in the region andin the forestry sector, when pursuing forestry policies. For example, the wave of deforestation nowrolling across West and Central Africa is similar to that induced by forest policies in South-EastAsia, where many former timber-producing countries are now net timber importers. The lack oftransparency within governments and the industry inhibits making progress towards long-termsustainable development. The following steps would go some way towards addressing the concernsassociated with industrial forestry policy:

68SOLD DOWN THE RIVER§ multilateral and bilateral institutions should be more accountable for the policies they imposeand more responsive to national government and civil society concerns;§ debt cancellation initiatives that enable significantly increased investment in basic services suchas education and health should be pursued;§ government transparency and accountability to civil society should be ensured;§ political, military and other government figures should not gain personally from the forestrysector, either as concession holders or from concession allocation practices or as the recipientsof informal or formal financial payments;§ the benefits of forest development policies should be distributed more equitably so that all localforest-dependent peoples gain more income and are actively involved in deciding how thatincome is used;§ the capacity of governments to enforce national forestry legislation should be developed andsupported;§ registers of interests of companies operating in the forestry sector should be made both publicand accessible;§ legal avenues through which governments and civil society can pursue transnational companiesto their headquarters when criminal activity has been demonstrated should be developed andmade accessible.Illegal Timber Production and TradeCertain sections of the forestry industry are perpetrating illegal and unethical practices in the forestitself and along the trading chain, as this report demonstrates. Illegal production and trade must beaddressed as a priority by both producing and consuming countries acting together. The systematicsmuggling of large volumes of logs and processed timber does not go undetected without thecollusion of government officials. A "lack of means" to tackle the problem effectively should notprevent governments from making public statements about the problems they face. Consumercountries must acknowledge their role and act positively. Importers may be receiving stolen,fraudulently obtained or smuggled goods but to date neither importing country governments northe trade have demonstrated much concern about this. Importing and exporting governments havenot sought to tackle the issues of illegal trade or trade in illegally-produced timber either bybilateral co-operation or within international trade arenas such as the WTO. The G7 group ofcountries have made statements about the unacceptability of illegal logging, but have taken noconcrete actions to follow them up. The following actions would be a first step in demonstratinggovernments’ commitments to eradicating illegal timber production and trade:§ the monitoring of forestry companies should be rigorous, transparent and even-handed;§ stringent measures should be taken against all companies involved in illegal production andtrading practices: fines should be punitive; further courses of action, such as exclusion from theforestry sector and/or criminal proceedings, should be pursued for repeat or flagrant violationsof forestry laws;§ trade policies should be subject to an assessment of the impact on sustainable development,including addressing issues of equitable development and ecological sustainability;§ governments must support ways of distinguishing between internationally-traded timber thathas been certified by credible independent bodies such as the FSC as originating fromsustainably-managed forests, and uncertified timber. They should pursue this matter underWTO rules, among other avenues;§ support for effective, producer country initiatives to regulate the timber trade should beprovided, including support from consuming country customs departments to track illegalshipments of timber.Environmental IssuesThe implementation of current national forest- and environment-related laws, including respect forprotected area boundaries, is the minimum standard for reducing the environmental impact offorestry operations. From this base line, a number of further steps need to be taken to protect theintegrity of forests:§ the commercial hunting of bushmeat should be addressed in a culturally-sensitive way to ensurethe continued existence of the dwindling numbers of non-protected species and that of rare andendangered species;§ local environmental goods and benefits of forests as well as larger-scale environmental goodsand benefits, including potable water, food security, soil quality, and the protection ofbiodiversity, should be identified and protected;§ the long-term impacts of industrial timber extraction on the quality and extent of the region’srainforests should be mitigated.

APPENDIX 69Appendix : Key to map concession areasCameroonMap Ref No. Company Parent company/group* License1 MMG 00-0032 Unallocated 00-0023 Unallocated 00-0014 Unallocated 09-0286 Unallocated 09-0277 Unallocated 09-0268 HFC Bollore 09-0259 HFC Bollore 09-02510 HFC Bollore 09-02511 Unallocated 09-02012 Unallocated 09-02013 COFA Not known 09-02114 HFC Bollore 09-02415 Unallocated 09-02216 Bubinga Not known 09-02317 Unallocated 09-01818 Unallocated 09-01719 CUF Not known 09-01920 SOFOPETRA Not known 09-01521 Unallocated 09-01622 Unallocated 09-01323 Unallocated 09-01124 Unallocated 09-01225 Unallocated 09-01426 Unallocated 09-01427 Unallocated 10-04928 Unallocated 10-04929 Unallocated 10-04930 Unallocated 10-05031 Unallocated 10-05032 Unallocated 09-01433 Unallocated 10-05034 Unallocated 10-05035 Unallocated 10-04836 Unallocated 10-04837 Unallocated 10-04838 Unallocated 10-04839 Unallocated 10-04840 Unallocated 09-01041 Unallocated 09-01042 Unallocated 09-00943 Unallocated 09-00844 SEBC Thanry 09-00745 Mponengang Not known 10-04746 SFF Not known 09-00647 LOREMA Rougier 09-005A48 COFA Not known 09-00449 LOREMA Rougier 09-00350 Unallocated 10-03651 Unallocated 09-00251 Unallocated 10-03552 Unallocated 09-00152 Unallocated 10-03455 Unallocated 10-03356 SCTB Sarl Not known 10-04657 Unallocated 10-06058 J. Prenant Thanry 10-04559 Unallocated 10-04460 Unallocated 10-04261 AVIECO Not known 10-04162 KIEFFER Not known 10-03763 Unallocated 10-05964 SEBC Thanry 10-05865 Unallocated 10-04366 Unallocated 10-04067 ASSENE NKOU Not known 10-03968 Unallocated 10-05569 Mbeng Not known 10-05770 Unallocated 10-05671 SFID Rougier 10-05472 CAMBOIS Rougier 10-03873 Ingeniere Forestiere Not known 10-03174 Unallocated 10-03075 SFDB Not known 10-02976 Unallocated 10-02877 Unallocated 10-03278 Unallocated 10-05379 Unallocated 10-05280 AVIECO 10-05181 ALPICAM Alpi 10-02682 HFC Bollore 10-02583 Unallocated 10-02484 Green Val Not known 10-02185 SFCS Not known 10-02386 GRUMCAM Alpi 10-02087 Ingeniere Forestiere Not known 10-02288 Unallocated 10-01989 SIBAF Bollore 10-01890 Unallocated 10-01791 Unallocated 10-01692 ETMC Not known 10-01593 Unallocated 10-01494 CFC Thanry 10-00195 CFC Thanry 10-00296 CFC Thanry 10-00397 CFC Thanry 10-00498 Unallocated 10-00599 SEBC Thanry 10-007100 Unallocated 10-008101 BOTAC Not known 10-009102 Unallocated 10-010103 SAB Thanry 10-011104 Unallocated 10-013105 SEFAC Other European 10-012106 Unallocated 10-027201 Unallocated 11-001206 SFH Not known 08-003207 EFMK Not known 08-004208 Unallocated 08-005214 INC Sarl Not known 08-009216 INC Sarl Not known 08-008217 SFB Sarl Not known 08-006243 CORON European 08-002244 Panagiotis Marelis Not known 10-062246 CORON European 08-001255 SFSC Not known 10-061259 Unallocated 08-007281 CPPC Not known 07-002no polygon Propalm Thanry 00-004no polygon SOCIB Not known 09-005Bno polygon SIBAF Bollore 10-063*European=group with a European operating baseCARMap Ref No. Company Parent company/group1 SITI Not known2 RIO - RIVUMA Not known3 SEFCA Lebanese4 IFB French5 IFB French6 THANRY Centrafique Thanry/French7 SESAM - Réserve de BayangaWTK/(Malaysian/French)8 SYLVICOLE - Réserve de Bayanga Not known9 SCAD Syrian-CARCongo (Brazzaville)Map Ref No.Company Name Parent Company / Group* License11 Danzer Danzer UFA EST12 SOCALIB UFA OUEST13 CIB Feldmeyer UFA PAKOLA14 CIB Feldmeyer UFA KABO15 FNC European UFA ENYELE16 SOFORIB European UFA BETOU17 Not known UFA OLLOMBO18 Not known UFA KELLE19 SFAC UFA CENTRE20 CIB Feldmeyer UFALOUNDOUGOU21 Not known UFA LOPOLA22 Not known UFA MIMBELI23 Not known UFA LOUBONGA24 SFM European UFA MISSA25 Not known UFA BALA26 Not known UFA TSAMA27 Not known UFA EWO28 Not known UFA MAMBILI-SUD29 Not known UFA MBOMO30 Not known UFA MAMBILI-NORD32 Not known UFA IPENDJA33 Rougier Rougier UFA MOKABI35 SOCOBOIS Wonnemann UFA 736 BOPLAC Bruynzeel/DLH Nordisk UFA 737 SOCOBOIS Wonnemann UFA 638 SOBOQI39 KB UFA 740 MAB SARL UFA 741 NGCUMA, J UFA 642 COMETRAB UFA 743 COMETRAB UFA 1044 SOCOBOIS Wonnemann UFA 1045 SIBOM UFA 746 BOPLAC Bruynzeel/DLH Nordisk UFA 1047 BOPLAC Bruynzeel/DLH Nordisk UFA 1048 MOUNTOU UFA 749 CAFAN UFA 550 EFBB UFA 751 FOUTY, M UFA 752 NGAMBOUH UFA 753 QUATOR UFA 1054 SFGC UFA 1055 SOUMBOU UFA 856 MOUNGONDO UFA 1057 NGOUMA, J UFA 1158 SIBOM UFA 559 CITB UFA 560 FAUSTO C UFA 561 FORALAC UFA 7&862 ENEF UFA 763 SFGC UFA 1164 BANINA UFA 565 FORALAC UFA566 COMETRAB UFA 267 SOCOBOIS Wonnemann UFA 368 FORPLAC UFA 369 MOUNGONDO UFA 870 AUBEVILLE UFA 8&971 FORALAC UFA 272 COFIBOIS UFA 273 QUATOR UFA 274 KIMBAKALA UFA 175 FAUSTO UFA 177 LTA UFA 178 NGAMBOU UFA 176 & 79 MAV UFA 1* European=company with European operations baseGabonMap Ref No. Company name Parent company/group*1 Biloghe Amieng Jeanne Not known2 Unknown3 Unknown4 SOGASCIC Not known5 Rougier Gabon ROUGIER6 Meye Rosalie Not known8 Tondoukoue Marc A. Not known10 BSG Not known11 Abeng Marcelle Not known14 Ntchindianogo Innocent Not known15 ELLA EDZO JULES Not known16 NSG European17 CFG Not known18 CEB THANRY20 BENGA JOSEPHINE Not known21 Ayito Minko Veronique Not known22 BICT Not known23 Ngonga Mossala Not known24 Leroy Gabon SONAE25 Mba Nguema Antoine Not known26 Biteghe Laurent Not known27 GEB Not known28 AYITO MINKO VERONIQUE Not known29 Loury Benjamin Not known30 ESSOUGHE GEORGETTE Not known31 CEB THANRY33 SHM INTERWOOD34 Ekomie Bengone Andre Not known35 Koumazock Firmin Not known36 Koumba Nziengui Etienne Not known37 Ngoma Makaya Guy H Not known39 Guy Nzouba Ndam Not known41 INTER-Bois Not known42 Loury Benjamin Not known43 Ndzeri Helene Not known45 Unallocated46 Ilama Anastasie Not known48 Unallocated49 Negobois/SIL* THANRY51 Zang Sylvie Not known54 Unallocated55 Ntsame Not known56 Bingangoye Scholastique Not known57 Unallocated59 Chambrier Rahandi Eloi/FUMU* Not known61 Ndong Nze Paul Ed Not known62 Boukoubi Faustin Not known63 Djambie Helene Chantal Not known64 Unallocated65 EFN Not known66 SOFITRA Not known67 Magnaga Martin Fidele Not known68 Akendengue Albert Not known71 Brune Emile/NZE EKOMIE Not known72 SIFG Not known73 SFM/FOUDOU* Not known75 BSG/EFG* THANRY76 Nkoghe Annie Solange Not known77 CEB Rougier78 Rougier81 Obame Not known82 Enembe Obame Paul Not known83 Unallocated84 CEB/BRUNE* Thanry85 Nghoghe Daniel Not known88 Lekogho Leon Not known89 SHM Interwood90 Kouamba Jacques Not known92 Ali Ben Bongo Not known97 Ndinga Jean Martin Not known99 Angue Emilie Not known100 Moubouengo M Francoise Not known101 SFM Not known103 SAB Not known106 SGEF Not known108 Abeng Marcelle Not known109 Eyeghe Obiang A Not known110 LOURY Not known111 Nguia Vital/FOBO* Not known113 Iwenga Christine Not known114 FOBO Not known115 NEGOBOIS Not known116 FOBO Not known118 LEROY SONAE121 CFA Not known122 Nkie Nkoure Antoinette/LUTEXFO* European123 CFG Not known124 Iwenga Christine/LUTEXFO* European126 Ngoma Colette/LUTEXFO* European127 FUMU Not known128 Ndjave Ndjoye Cecilia/SICL* Not known130 Mihindou Anicet Not known131 Obame Nguema Paulin Not known133 CEB THANRY134 CBG Not known135 Lutexfo/Soforga European136 Bilane Marc Not known137 Nguema Eugene Not known138 Ella Edzo Jules Not known140 Biloghe Amieng Jeanne/EMANE AVA* Not known141 SHM INTERWOOD143 Bourdette Grace C. Not known144 SIBO Not known145 CEB THANRY146 CEB THANRY

70SOLD DOWN THE RIVER147 Akoghe Calvin/SEG* Not known148 Oberdino Charles Not known149 Obame Valentin/FOBO* Not known150 Nguema Owono Paulin Not known151 Lengangouet Rosine Not known152 KESSANY Not known153 Diecko Diea Donne/CFA* Not known156 Rougier Gabon ROUGIER157 FUMU Not known158 Reteno Ndiaye Gatien Not known159 FUMU Not known160 UFMO Not known161 Akoghe Calvin Not known163 Ngonga Mossala Not known164 Mouvagha Tchioba Not known165 SBL European166 CEB THANRY168 Lutexfo/Soforga/CEB* THANRY169 CEB THANRY170 CEB THANRY171 CEB THANRY172 Ndjave Ndjoye Cecilia Not known173 Djambie Helene Chantal/NEGOBOIS* Not known180 IBG Not known181 N'Name Obame M Not known182 Nguie Mengome Martine Not known183 INFOBOIS Not known184 Omar Bongo Not known185 CEB THANRY186 Negobois/NGOUONI* Not known188 Komba Gisele Not known189 UFMO Not known190 Adjobeliane Andre Walker Not known193 Obame Vincent Not known194 Sepha Francois/EGG* Not known195 Igowa Rerambyah Not known196 Cofma/SBNG* Not known200 Amvame Ndong Georges/UFMO* Not known202 ETENO Not known203 Ngoma Suzanne Not known204 Nze Ekekang Thimothee Not known205 Eteno Jean Bernard/CEB* THANRY206 Charbonnier Jean Georges Not known207 Wora Maurice Not known208 FROI MBENGANI Not known209 Wora Maurice Not known211 SBNG Not known212 Timber Mac/SBNG* Not known213 Leroy Gabon SONAE214 Fumu Alfred Not known219 Ndombi Faustine Not known220 Mouassa Jean/CEB* THANRY221 SIL/NGUIA* THANRY223 UFL Not known224 Nze Ekomie Jean Felix Not known225 Lutexfo/Soforga European226 Djebo Gisele Not known227 Ndong Jean Pierre Not known228 Malekou Paul Not known229 EFL Not known230 Lekogho Leon Not known232 LEROY SONAE235 LIPOBO Not known236 UFL/NGALEKU* Not known237 Ladaga Leounda Not known238 EBILA Not known240 Ngouoni Ayila Victor/UFL* Not known241 Obame Assoumo Not known242 Bilala Augustin Not known244 LEROY SONAE246 OLERY Not known247 BSG Not known251 Loury Benjamin Not known252 CEB/FCBM* THANRY253 Eurobois Not known254 CEB THANRY255 Lutexfo/Soforga European256 IBG Not known257 MORVAN Not known260 OBTG Not known263 Malaga Tendangoye Not known264 Boutitou Boutitou Jean J Not known265 Rougier Gabon/FOL* ROUGIER266 Boubanga Christian/MIGOLET* Not known268 Coye-Mambenda S.C. Not known269 CEB THANRY270 Eurobois Not known271 Eurobois Not known272 Kassa Mapsi Emile Not known273 Leroy Gabon SONAE274 Fobak Not known275 Rougier Gabon/EDL* ROUGIER277 Ayito Minko Veronique Not known278 Nguema Metoule Jean M Not known279 Loury Benjamin Not known280 Guibinga Germaine Not known283 LEFLEM284 Gnangui Leontine Not known285 Ratanga Sylvestre Not known286 BOUSSAMBA Not known287 BOUSSAMBA Not known288 BOUSSAMBA Not known290 BOUSSAMBA Not known291 BOUSSAMBA Not known293 BOUSSAMBA Not known294 BOUSSAMBA Not known295 CBG Not known297 Ndong Engone Jean Not known298 Aubame Jean Felix Not known299 Inter-Bois Not known301 Boukandou Monique Not known302 Ndzeng Elie Theophile Not known304 Ndong Nze Paul Ed. Not known305 Benga Josephine/MIHINDOU* Not known307 Mayila Louis Gaston Not known310 SOMIVAB European311 ASSE Not known312 NGUIE MENGOME Not known313 SOMIVAB European314 AYITO Not known315 EDIE MENZAH Not known316 NGUEMA Not known317 MEYO NZE Not known318 SOMIVAB European319 SFE Not known320 OBAME NZE Not known321 NZIE Not known322 OBAME MBA Not known323 ETOUGHE NKOGHE Not known324 ROG ROUGIER325 OBAME Not known326 ROG ROUGIER327 SOGASCIC Not known328 NGUEMA Not known329 Unallocated330 CFG Not known331 CFG Not known332 ROG ROUGIER333 ROG ROUGIER334 CFG Not known335 ROG ROUGIER336 ROG ROUGIER337 LEROY SONAE338 ROG ROUGIER339 ROG ROUGIER340 ROG ROUGIER341 ROG ROUGIER342 LUTEXFO European343 ROG ROUGIER344 SIL THANRY345 FOBO MALAYSIAN346 FOBO MALAYSIAN347 ROG ROUGIER348 ROG ROUGIER349 ROG ROUGIER350 CFG Not known351 SEFA Not known352 SEFA Not known353 EFG THANRY354 EFG THANRY355 EFG THANRY357 EFN Not known358 FOBO Not known359 FOBO Not known360 NZE Not known361 SICCARDI Not known362 SOMIVAB European363 EYEGHE OBIANG Not known364 SAF Not known365 NKOGUE Not known366 ROG ROUGIER367 AYITO Not known368 NZE Not known369 SITAULT Not known370 RECKATY Not known371 SEO Not known372 FOBO Not known373 BEKALE Not known374 MEFANE Not known375 FOBO Not known376 INFOBOIS Not known377 INFOBOIS Not known378 EKOMI OYE Not known379 FOBO MALAYSIAN380 EKONE Not known381 SOFORGA European382 SOFORGA European383 CFA Not known384 NSG European385 EKANG Not known386 LEROY SONAE387 LUTEXFO European388 CFG Not known389 CFG Not known390 SEEF Not known391 LUTEXFO European392 CFG Not known393 SBL European394 LUTEXFO European395 SBL European396 MALEKOU Not known397 CHARBONNIER Not known398 MENDOME Not known399 MABIKA Not known400 ROG ROUGIER401 SBNG Not known402 SBNG Not known404 NZOUBA Not known405 MANGONGO Not known406 LIGNABOU Not known407 CFG Not known408 CFG Not known409 SFM Not known410 BASSO TIMBER European411 SOFITRA Not known412 BASSO TIMBER European413 BASSO TIMBER European414 TSIBAH Not known415 ALIBALA Not known416 GFS Not known417 SIBAG European418 GFS Not known419 OSSOUAMI Not known420 COFMA Not known421 MATHA Not known422 CFG Not known423 CEB THANRY424 GFL Not known425 CFG Not known426 CEB THANRY427 CEB THANRY428 CEB THANRY429 CAGRIMO Not known430 SBNG Not known431 SBNG Not known432 CEB THANRY433 CEB THANRY434 SOGA-IMPORT Not known435 CEB THANRY436 CEB THANRY437 MOUNGUEGUI Not known438 MOUNGUEGUI Not known439 CFSG Not known440 EFIB Not known441 BOUSSAMBA Not known442 SOFOSUGA Not known443 CEB THANRY444 MBOUMBA Not known445 ROG ROUGIER446 ROG ROUGIER447 ROG ROUGIER448 CFSG Not known449 IVALA Not known450 GOMAS Not known451 CFSG Not known452 MAMADOU Not known453 FOBO MALAYSIAN454 Unallocated455 IWENGA Not known501 EFN Not known502 Ikinda Joachim Not known506 Nze Ekomie Jean Felix Not known508 SAF Not known510 Ndjave Ndjoye Albert/FOBO* Notknown/MALAYSIAN511 Nguie Mengome Martine Not known512 Ndong Ignace Not known513 Nze Julien Not known514 Lutexfo/Soforga European515 Bingangoye Scholastique Not known517 CFG Not known521 CFA Feldmeyer/ European525 Apandina Paul Marc Not known526 Kongo Michel Not known527 EGG Not known528 Ntogolo Daniel Not known529 SOFOLIB Not known534 Ndogoula Y Ndogoula Not known535 Nguema Eugene Not known539 Mbourou Geogina Not known540 Ntoutoume MeyoEVILA OREVOUNO* Not known541 Dzime MBA Pierre Not known542 Tsibah Charles Not known543 Etoughe Joseph Not known600 ROG ROUGIER601 FOMO Not known602 Leflem Maurice/ALI MBELE* Not known604 SFT Not known605 Unallocated606 Unallocated607 Omar Bongo Not known608 Emame Ava Not known608 TAKO Not known609 FORET Not known610 IWENGA Not known

REFERENCES 71ReferencesPart I Regional Overview1 Cited in Witte J, 1992, “Deforestation in Zaire:Logging and Landlessness”, The Ecologist Vol 22No 22 DFID, 2000, Report of the Preliminary Workshop onthe Contribution of the Forestry Sector to PovertyAlleviation in Cameroon, Kribi, Jan 31 to Feb 01,2000, E Hakizumwami and C. Milol eds3 Ibid4 Hardwoodmarkets.com, September 20005 Brown K and F Ekoko, 2001, “Forest Encounters:Synergy among agents of forest change in southernCameroon”, Society and Natural Resources, 14 inpress6 Ibid7 Luling V and J Kenrick, 1998, Forest Foragers ofTropical Africa, Survival International8 Colchester M, D. Jackson and J. Kenrick, 1998,“Forest Peoples of the Congo Basin: pastexploitation, present threats and future prospects”,in The Congo Basin – Human and NaturalResources, Netherlands Committee for IUCN,Amsterdam.9 WWF Belgium, 1997, La Filière Bois dans la ZoneUDEAC10 Ngoun J, 1999, “Pygmies and Industrial Logging:The Case of the Bagyeli of Southern Cameroun”,paper presented at the International Conference ofForest Ecosystems and Development in the Southand East of Cameroun, Yaoundé, 16-17 February199911 Colchester M, 1994, Slave and Enclave, WRM,Penang12 The Sunday Times (UK), 14th November 199913 Hardwoodmarkets.com, June 200014 See, for example, High Stakes, the first publicationin this report series.15 Marchés Tropicaux, 26 Mai 200016 Gerard N, 1999, “The EU and tropical forests: ona new track”, FERN newsletter17 Ibid18 Hardwoodmarkets.com, December 2000, p3.19 Ibid, p.1120 Johnson S, 2000, “Success and Responsibility inthe Tropical Timber Market”. ITTO Newsletter, v10,n321 letter to the Operations Evaluation Department ofthe World Bank from Rainforest Action Network(13/05/2000)22 Enviro-Protect, 1997, Illegal logging and timbertrade in Cameroon: background and consequences23 Ibid24 Callister D, 1999, Corrupt and Illegal Activities inthe Forestry Sector: Current understandings andimplications for World Bank forest policy. Draft.25 http://www.fern.org/Trade/acceptance_of_environmental_and_.htm. 25/01/01. For a fullerdiscussion of this issue please see the trade section ofthe Fern web site.26 PPR, 1999, Annual Report and group websitewww.pprgroup.com/uk27 ATIBT information sheet and ATIBT web site28 Pers comm. president of ATIBT, 3rd January 2001The Moabi Issue1 Schneemann J, 1995, “Exploitation of Moabi in theHumid Dense Forests of Cameroon. Harmonizationand improvement of two conflicting ways ofexploitation of the same forest resource.” In BOSNiEuWSLETTER no. 31, vol. 14 (2)2 Ibid3 Ibid4 Schneemann J, 1994, Étude sur l’utilisation del’arbre moabi dans l’est-cameroun, SNV ; LDebroux, 1998, L’aménagement des forêts tropicalesfondé sur la gestion des populations d’arbres:l’exemple du moabi (Biallonella toxisperma Pierre)dans la forêt du Dja, Cameroon Laurent Debroux,1998, PhD Dissertation, Faculté universitaire dessciences agronomiques de Gembloux5 Schneemann J, 19956 Schneemann J, 19957 Brisson, 1988, “Utilisation des plantes par lesPygmées Baka”, in J Schneemann, 19948 Schneemann J, 19949 Schneemann J 199510 Schneemann J 199511 Schneemann J12 Pers Comm Filip Verbelen13 ATIBT Newsletter July 1999 based on SGS14 Breugel van M. and T. Wanders 1995 Forestry inEquatorial Guinea , Department of Forestry,Agricultural University of Wageningen ; Wagenigen1995 and OCIPEF15 Schneemann J, 199416 Schneemann J, 199417 Schneemann J 199518 Debroux L, 199819 Schneemann J 199520 Greenpeace, 2000, Against the Law: the G8 andthe illegal timber trade ; Nantes, Maquis Tropical,La Flèche No. 34, 1999, p. 16.21 Debroux L, 199822 Debroux L, 1998 ; J Schneemann, 199523 Essama-Nssah B and James J. Gockowski, 2000,Forest sector development in a Difficult PoliticalEconomy: An evaluation of Cameroon’s ForestDevelopment and World Bank Assistance,Preliminary report, Operations EvaluationDepartment World BankIndigenous Uses For The Sapelli Tree InNorthern Congo1 Bahuchet 1972.2 Motte (1979:99) reports the use of sapelli bark andtrunk in the treatment of abscesses by the AkaPygmies of the Central African Republic.Part II Country ProfilesCameroon1 Eba’a Atyi R, 1998, Cameroon’s Logging Industry:Structure, Economic Importance and Effects ofDevaluation, Occasional Paper No 14, CIFOR2 Jubilee 2000 country profile,www.jubilee2000ukorg/profile/cameroon.html3 http://www.transparency.org/documents/cpi/1998/index.html4 WRM/FM, 1998, High Stakes5 DFID, 20006 Global Forest Watch, 2000, An overview of loggingin Cameroon7 Global Forest Watch, 2000, Cameroon8 Global Forest Watch, 20009 Hardwoodmarkets.com, june 200010 Ibid11 Ibid12 Ibid13 Ibid14 Tropical Timbers, 1999, vol 14 no 915 Ibid ; hardwoodmarkets August 200016 http://www.greenpeace.be/index_main.php3?taal=f&vx=317 A World Bank document seen during ForestMovement Europe meeting 1999 obtained byRainforest Action Network18 Pers. 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Maryvonne Bretin-Winklemolen, alsoJerome Lewis23 Kenrick J and V Luling, 199824 Marchés Tropicaux et Mediterranéens, 11/12/1992‘The goat grazes where it is tied’1 Max Weber, Economie et société, p.352.2 Ibid, p. 342.3 Ibid, p. 327.4 World Bank, 1998, Report and Recommendation ofthe President of the International DevelopmentAssociation to the Executive Directors on aproposed credit of SDR 133.5 million to theRepublic of Cameroon for a Third StructuralAdjustment Credit, p. 17.5 MINEF/Banque mondiale, Août 1999, p. 5.6 Global Forest Watch, Cameroon, 2000, p. 48.CAR1 African Development Bank, 1999, Basic Indicatorson African Countries2 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK), 1999,Central African Republic Background Briefing3 Government of CAR, 2000, Memorandum ofEconomic and Financial Policies for 2001,downloaded from www.imf.org4 Jubilee 2000, CAR Country Profile,www.jubilee2000uk.org5 Stenberg M, 1995, Rainforest of the Central AfricanRepublic, Minor Field Study, January-March 1995,Valla Folk Highschool, Linkoping, Friends of theEarth Sweden.6 Government of CAR, 20007 Ministère de l’environnement, des eaux, forêts,chasses et pêches (MEEFCP), Les Chiffres ClésSecteur Forestier8 MEEFCP communication9 WWF Belgium, 199710 Ecofac, 1999, “Initiation à la biogéographie: Suivide l’application d’un plan d’aménagement enCentrafrique”, Canopée n. 14 May 199911 Stenberg M, 199512 Stenberg M, 199513 MEEFCP, 1997, Inventaire des Forêts du sud-ouestCentrafricain, Direction des Forêts14 WWF Belgium, 199715 Ibid16 Ibid17 MEEFCP, 199718 MEEFCP, Fiche Signalétique des SociétésForestières en Centrafrique19 WWF Belgium, 199720 Ibid21 Ibid ; M Stenberg, 199522 WWF Belgium, 199723 Economist Intelligence Unit, 1999, Cameroon andCentral African Republic – Country report ,Q324 Ibid25 MEEFCP, Les Chiffres Clés Secteur Forestier26 Hardwoodmarkets.com, September 200027 ITTO newsletter v10 n328 World Association of Newspapers and the WorldEditors Forum. 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M., Brunner J, and N. Size, with C. Karrand D. Nielsen, 1998, Forests and the DemocraticRepublic of Congo: opportunity in a time of crisis,World Resources Institute3 Ibid4 Fairhead, J, 1989: 3, Food security in north andsouth Kivu. ZAK 630, Oxfam5 FPP, May 20006 George, S., 1988, A Fate Worse than Debt7 Jubilee 2000, DRC Country Profile,www.jubilee2000uk.org/profile/congo.html8 African Development Bank,19999 Jubilee 200010 Wrong M, 2000, In the footsteps of Mr Kurz11 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK), 2000,News Democratic Republic of Congo12 Forest Peoples Programme, February 200113 Amnesty International, 200014 WWF, 1998, “Kabila pledges to save environmentin the Democratic Republic of Congo”. WWF pressrelease, 2/17/199815 Wolfire et al, 199816 AIDEnvironment, 200017 Wolfire et al, 199818 AIDEnvironment, 200019 Kenrick J, 199020 Kenrick J, 199021 AIDEnvironment, 200022 Kenrick J, 199023 AIDEnvironment, 200024 WRM, 2000, “The uncertain fate of forests in theCongo Democratic Republic” World RainforestsMovement.http://www.wrm.org.uy/nuevoweb/countries/CongoDR.html ; Greenpeace España 2000,Deforestación y Pobreza en Africa Tropical, Abril200025 Wolfire et al, 199826 AIDEnvironment, 200027 Ibid28 Ibid29 Ibid30 Kenrick J, 199031 FPP, May 200032 Wolfire et al, 199833 Ecofac, 1995, Désastre écologique pour les parcsnationaux de l’est du Zaire Canopee, N. 6 ; Wolfireet al 199834 Wolfire et al, 1998.35 Ibid36 Ecofac, 199537 Ibid38 Kenrick J, 199039 FPP, May 200040 Kenrick J, 199041 Ibid42 Ibid43 FPP, May 200044 Kenrick J and V Luling, 199845 Albert Kwokwo Barume, 2000 (in press), Headingtowards Extinction? Indigenous Rights in Africa :The Case of the Twa of the Kahuzi-Biega NationalPark, Democratic Republic of Congo. Publ byIWGIA and Forest Peoples Programme.46 WRM and Forests Monitor, 1998, High Stakes47 Field visit, 1999 and AIDEnvironment, 2000Equatorial Guinea1 African Development Bank Group, 19992 World Bank, 2000, Country Review3 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK),Background Briefing4 Forindeco, 1993, “Forestry and EnvironmentalPolicy, Forest Legislation and Fiscality, forestconcession policy, mimeo (first draft for comments)”in Breugel and Wanders 1995 ; and Mr. TeodoroNguema Obiang, Minster of Forests and theEnvironment, 1998, Les Ecosystemes des ForêtsDenses et Humides d’Afrique Centrale – Actes de laDeuxième Conférence, Bata 8 Juin 19985 Kenrick J and V Luling, 19986 Breugel van M. and T. Wanders, 1995, Forestry inEquatorial Guinea, Department of Forestry,Agricultural University of Wageningen7 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK), 19998 Ibid9 Ibid10 http://www.amnestyusa.org/ailib/aireport/ar99s/afr24.htm11 http://amnesty.cupboard.org/cgi-bin/eatsoup.cgi?id=116612 http://amnesty.cupboard.org/cgi-bin/eatsoup.cgi?id=22813 Ibid14 IUCN, 1998, La Conservación de los EcosistemasForestales de Guinea Ecuatorial en los albores delaño 2000, Oficina Regional de la UICN para AfricaCentral.15 http://www.ecofac.org/Composantes/GuineeEquatMonteAlen.htm16 Greenpeace España, 2000, Deforestación y Pobrezaen África Tropical – La insostenibilidad social,ambiental y económica de la explotación forestal delos bosques tropicales de África17 Breugel van M and T Wanders, 199518 Greenpeace España, 200019 IUCN, 199820 Ibid21 Ibid22 WWF Belgium, 199723 IUCN, 199824 article 3225 article 3326 IUCN, 199827 Ibid28 Ibid29 Breugel van M and T Wanders, 199530 WWF Belgium, 199731 Ibid32 Ibid33 IUCN, 199834 WWF Belgium, 199735 Breugel van M and T Wanders, 199536 IMF, 1999, country report 99/113, p.13

72SOLD DOWN THE RIVER37 IUCN, 199838 Ibid39 Breugel van M and T Wanders, 199540 WWF Belgium, 199741 IUCN, 199842 Ibid43 WWF Belgium, 199744 Ibid45 Ibid46 IUCN, 199847 WWF Belgium, 199748 Ibid49 Ibid50 IUCN, 1998.51 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK), 2000,Background Briefing52 http://www.ecofac.org/Composantes/GuineeEquatMonteAlen.htm53 Fegley R, 1989, Equatorial Guinea: an AfricanTragedy, and Gumaz L M, 1989, Small is not alwaysbeautiful: the story of Equatorial Guinea.54 Ibid55 http://www.afd.fr/english/groupe/reseau_agences_results.cfm?id+256 http://www.britannica.com/bcom/eb/article/4/0,5716,33414+1+32840,00.html57 Breugel van M. and T. Wanders, 199558 Sizer N and Plouvier D, 200059 IUCN, 1998Gabon1 Sizer N and Plouvier D, 20002 National Implementation of Agenda 21 – Profile duGabon. www.un.org/esa/easrthsummit/gabn-cp.htm3 Ibid4 Government of Gabon, 2000, Letter of Intent andMemorandum of Economic and Financial Policies ofthe Government of Gabon, September 12, 2000,viewed at www.imf.org5 CFIE 19986 African Development Bank, 19997 CFIE, 1998 ; World Bank, 2000, Country Brief8 Government of Gabon, 20009 World Bank, Country Brief 2000 ; Reuters21/04/200010 Jubilee 2000 ; World Bank, 200011 The Sunday Times, 14/11/99 ; Le Monde 25/10/9912 WWF Belgium, 199713 CFIE 199814 CFIE 199815 La Tribune Desfosses 11/06/99 ; La Lettre duContinent 17/06/99 ; Tropical Timbers vol 14 no 9Sept. 199916 Tropical Timbers vol 15 no 3, March 200017 Ibid18 Marchés Tropicaux 15/12/99 and 31/12/9919 For a full review of the current laws, see GlobalForest Watch, 200020 Global Forest Watch, 2000, A First Look atLogging in Gabon21 WWF Belgium 199722 Global Forest Watch, 200023 CFIE 1998 ; Tropical Timbers vol 14 no 9,september 199924 Global Forest Watch, 200025 Ibid26 Ibid ; WWF Belgium, 199727 Global Forest Watch, 200028 CIAJE, 2000, Impacts des Activités desCompagnies Forestières Européennes sur lesPopulations locales et l’environnement29 Global Forest Watch, 200030 Ibid31 Ibid32 Tropical Timbers, Vol 14 no 9, september 199933 WWF Belgium, 199734 WWF Belgium, 1997 ; CFIE 199835 WWF Belgium, 199736 CFIE, 199837 CFIE, 199838 Tropical Timbers vol 14 no 9, sept 199939 Ibid40 Hardwoodmarkets.com, October 200041 Global Forest Watch, 200042 WWF Belgium, 199743 WWF Belgium, 1997 ; CFIE 199844 Global Forest Watch, 200045 Hardwoodmarkets.com, October 200046 Ibid47 Reuters 21/04/200048 Doumenge C, 1998, La gestion des écosystèmesforestiers du Cameroun, du Gabon et de GuinéeEquatoriale à l’aube de l’an 2000, IUCN49 CFIE, 199850 Global Forest Watch, 200051 Ibid52 Tropical Timbers, vol 15 no 3, March 200053 CIAJE, 200054 CIAJE, 200055 www.ecofac.org/composants/GabonLope.htm56 Ibid57 IFIA communiqué, July 18 200058 Pers comm. Rougier, November 200059 Daily Mail & Guardian, Johannesbourg, SouthAfrica, April 15,199960 Ibid61 Ibid62 CIAJE, 200063 CIAJE, 200064 CIAJE, 200065 Global Forest Watch, 200066 Ibid67 Pers comm. with DIARF representative, October199968 Global Forest Watch, 2000 ; pers comm. BassoLegnami, September 2000Part III Company ProfilesAlpi1 Http://africa-info.ihost.com/pages/2ci/eco034.htm2 Amadeus corporate database (seen 04/2000)3 Rice T & S Counsell, 19934 CED, 1999, État des lieux du secteur forestier auCameroun – données statistiques5 (manuscript) statistics prepared by the ForestryCustoms Post at Douala6 Carret J-C, 1999, Industrialisation de la filière boisau Cameroun, CERNA7 Pers comm Alpi, september 20008 Rice T & S Counsell, 19939 Carret J-C, 199910 MINEF, Juillet 2000, Rapport de Classement finaldes Soumissions pour les Concessions Forestières11 MINEF, Juin 1999, Planification de l’Attributiondes Titres d’Exploitation Forestière12 Greenpeace, 1999, Buying Destruction13 Carret J-C, 199914 Pers comm Alpi, September 200015 MINEF, décembre 1999, Rapport de la missiond’evaluation des progrès realisés sur les concessionsforestières (UFA) attribuées en 1997 dans la provincede l’Est16 MINEF, 1999, p.23: “…pour que Grumcam netombe pas dans les cas d’exploitation illicitesrencontrés ailleurs”,17 pers comm Alpi, september 2000Basso18 Pers comm Basso Legnami, september 200019 Ibid20 Ibid21 Ibid22 http://www.dree.org/gabon/francais/news/lettre.htm(loaded 27/04/2000)23 Pers comm Basso Legnami, September 2000Bolloré24 Major Companies of Europe 2000, Graham andWhiteside. p76525 Verschave F, 2000, “La résistible ascension dutandem Bolloré-Roussin”, in Noir Silence: QuiArrêtera la “Françafrique?26 Bolloré, 1998, Annual Report27 Ibid28 www.otal.com/merger.htm (seen 05/2000)29 Major Companies of Europe 2000, Graham andWhiteside. p76530 www.saga.fr (seen 02/2000)31 Letter from RAN to World Bank, july 26 200032 Letter from RAN to World Bank, 26th July 200033 Minutes of Ape Alliance meeting, October 2000,and pers comm Neil Maddison, Bristol Zoo,November 200034 Bolloré Annual report 1996 cited in Les Enterprisesfrançaise et l’exploitation des forêts tropicalesafricaines CFIE, 1998, p11035 SAGA website www.saga.fr36 S Decalo, V Thompson & R Aldorf , 1996,Historical Dictionary of Congo ; EIU, 1998,Country Report – Congo (Brazzaville),Q437 Verschave F, 200038 Ibid39 EIU, 1999, Country Profile – Cameroon andCentral African Republic40 Pers. Comm. C. Rivet, SEPBG, 10/199941 Pers comm Bolloré group, November 200042 www.panda.org/forestsummit (seen 05/2000)43 pers comm Bolloré group, November 200044 CED, 199945 Ibid46 pers comm Bolloré group, November 200047 Eba’a Atyi R, 199848 Robin des Bois, 1998, Évaluation de l’impact socialet environnemental de la filière bois au Cameroun49 MINEF, 1999, “Attributions- concessionsforestières 1998/1999”, SIGIF (Direction des Forêts)50 CED, 199951 Ibid52 Pers comm Bolloré, November 200053 MINEF Communiqué, Cameroon Tribune, 27 mars200054 www.wwf.org.hk/efeature/990801.htm(downloaded 20/06/2000)55 www.wwf.org.hk/efeature/990801.htm(downloaded 20/06/2000)56 Stromayer K & Atanga Ekobo, 1991, Biologicalsurveys of southeastern Cameroon57 MINEF/GTZ, 1999, Enqûete preliminaire sur lesarmes a feu au sud-est Cameroun58 MINEF, décembre 1999, Rapport de la Missiond’Evaluation des Progrès Réalisés sur lesConcessions Forestières (FAS) Attribuées en 1997dans la province de l’Est59 www.wwf.org.hk/efeature/990801.htm(downloaded 20/06/2000)60 Daily Mail & Guardian, Johannesburg, 04/08/9961 Pers Comm Bolloré group, November 200062 Sizer N and D Plouvier, unpublished63 WWF-Belgium, 199764 WRM/FM, 1998, High Stakes65 Sizer N and Plouvier D, unpublished66 Rice T & S Counsell, 1993Bruynzeel67 Rice T and S Counsell, 199368 Pers Comm Bruynzeel, August 2000 ; pers commPruchtnow, July 2000 ; T Rice & S Counsell, 199369 Pers comm Bruynzeel, September 200070 Decalo S, V Thompson and R Aldorf, 1996,Historical Dictionary of Congo ; pers commBruynzeel, September 200071 Dalhoff Larsen & Horneman A/S,1998, AnnualAccounts, p872 Pers comm Bruynzeel, May 1999Danzer73 http://www.veneermill.com/intro.htm74 Ibid75 Rice T and S Counsell, 199376 Pers comm Danzer, September 200077 http://www.veneermill.com/intro.htm78 Amadeus corporate database (seen 06/2000)79 http://www.veneermill.com/intro.htm80 Ibid81 Rice T and S Counsell for Friends of the Earth,199382 Kenrick J, 199083 Rice T and S Counsell, 199384 Pers comm DEG, September 200085 Pers comm DEG, September, 200086 Kenrick J, 199087 Pers. Comm. Siforco staff – Kinshasa (10/1999)88 Commonwealth Forests Review No.74 (1), 199589 http://www.veneermill.com/unternehmen.htm90 http://www.wspa.org.uk/escape/bushmeat06.html91 Rettet den Regenwald, 1998, “Regenwald ReportNr 1/98”92 http://www.wspa.org.uk/escape/bushmeat06.html(seen 06/2000)93 http://panda.org/resources/publications/species/threatened/bonobo/page2.htm94 Pers. Comm, H Luketa Shimbi (10/1999)95 http://www.goldray.com/bushmeat/bonobo398.htm96 http://www.wspa.org.uk/escape/bushmeat06.html97 Statement by Danzer, 199898 http://www.veneermill.com/intro.htm99 Pers Comm Danzer Furnierwerke, 31/07/00DLH Nordisk100 http://www.dlh-nordisk.com/profile.html(seen 07/2000)101 Ibid102 Ibid103 http://www.dlh-group.com/engelsk/nyheder-eng/dlh-news/dlhnews399/nu-i-cameroun-eng.htm(seen 07/2000)104 Dalhoff Larsen & Horneman A/S, 1998105 Pers comm DLH Nordisk, September 2000106 http://www.dlh-group.com/engelsk/nyheder-eng/dlh-news/dlhnews399/nu-i-cameroun-eng.htm107 http://www.dlh-nordisk.com/profile.html108 http://www.dlh-group.com/engelsk/nyheder-eng/dlh-news/dlhnews399/nu-i-cameroun-eng.htm109 Dalhoff Larsen & Horneman A/S, 1998110 Pers comm Bruynzeel, September 2000111 http://www.dlh-nordisk.com/profile.html(seen 07/2000)Feldmeyer112 Firmenprofile1999/2000, Kompass Deutschland113 Rice T & S Counsell, 1993114 Pers comm.Feldmeyer, 3rd January 2001115 IFIA Information Bulletin No1. p52116 Ibid, p.51117 IUCN, 1997118 IUCN, 1997, Appendix F, p.76119 IFIA Information Bulletin No1. p51120 Ibid121 Ibid122 IUCN, 1997123 IFIA Information Bulletin No1 p. 52 ; IUCN,1997124 Ape Alliance, 1998, The African Bushmeat Trade:A recipe for extinction125 Pers. Comm. J Lewis (08/1999)126 IUCN, 1997, p. ix127 IUCN, 1997128 Pers comm. Feldmeyer, 3rd January 2001129 World Bank, A Preliminary Assessment of theCollaboration between CIB and WCS and supportby the World Bank in Forest ConcessionManagement ; K Amman, “Death in the Forest –Logging Business Means Death for Thousands ofGorillas and Chimpanzees”(http://goldray.com/bushmeat/karl.htm)130 IUCN, 1997, p. xii131 Forest Peoples Programme, January 2001132 IUCN, 1997, p. x133 Ibid, Appendix F, p.80134 Ibid, Appendix F, p.82135 Ibid, p.xi136 Pers comm. Feldmeyer, 3rd January 2001137 Ape Alliance, minutes and pers comm., 1999 andAugust 2000138 Christian Science Monitor, November 26, 1996139 Correspondence from WWF Belgium, 24 May2000140 Correspondence from WWF Belgium, 24 May2000141 Agreement on the Management of the Kabo,Pokola and Loundougou Forests adjacent to theNouabale Ndoki National Park, Northern Congo,June 1999142 WSPA, 2000, Bushmeat: Africa’s ConservationCrisis, p6143 Ibid, p6144 Forest Peoples Programme, May 2000145 Ibid146 IbidInterwood147 Pinault Printemps Redoute, Annual Report, 1997,p.104148 Amadeus corporate database, viewed September2000149 Ibid150 Cameroon Tribune, 25 janvier, 2000, AnnonceLegales151 La Lettre du Continent, 18 fevrier 1999152 ATIBT, Directory, 2000153 CFIE, 1998154 CED, 1999155 CFIE, 1998156 Global Forest Watch, Cameroon, 2000157 Sizer N and Plouvier D, unpublished158 Cameroon Tribune, 28 décembre, 2000159 ATIBT Directory, 2000 ; CIAJE, 2000160 CIAJE, 2000, p.11161 Ibid162 Ibid ; p.14163 Ibid ; p.15Pasquet164 Amadeus (database) (seen 04/2000)165 Marchés Tropicaux et Mediterranéens,09/12/1994166 CFIE, 1998167 Ibid168 CED, 1999169 CED, 1999170 Cameroon Tribune, 12 juillet 2000 ; MINEF,1999171 Schneeman J, 1994Rougier172 www.rougier.fr/gest.htm173 Major Companies of Europe 2000, Graham andWhiteside, 1999174 Groupe Rougier, 1999, Rapport Annuel175 www.rougier.fr/fina.htm176 CFIE, 1998177 CFIE, 1998178 CFIE, 1998179 “Marotte – panneaux d’debanisterie” GroupeRougier180 CFIE, 1998181 “CEPAM – plus vrai que nature” Groupe Rougier182 Pers comm. Rougier, November 2000183 Marchés Tropicaux, 26 mai 2000, p974-5184 www.rougier.fr185 Marchés Tropicaux, 26 mai 2000186 Major companies of Europe 2000, Graham andWhiteside, 1999187 CFIE,1998188 www.rougier.fr/transcam.htm, downloaded03/08/00189 Cameroon Tribune, 11 janvier 2000, “Decisionno 1427/D/MINEF/DF, les titres autorisés a l’exercisedes activités en 1999/2000”190 Verhagen H & C Enthoven, 1993, Logging andConflicts in the Rainforests of Cameroon, MilieuDefensie and NC-IUCN, p.5-6191 CFIE, 1998192 Verhagen H & C Enthoven, 1993, p.6193 www.rougier.fr/transcam.htm, downloaded03/08/00194 Verhagen H & C Enthoven, 1993, p7195 Ibid196 Pers comm. Rougier, November 2000197 Verhagen H & C Enthoven, 1993, p7198 Ibid, p7199 Ibid, p7200 Verhagen H & C Enthoven, 1993201 Pers comm. Rougier, November 2000202 CFIE, 1998203 Ibid204 Ibid205 Verhagen H & C Enthoven, 1993206 Ibid207 Pers comm. Rougier, November 2000208 CFIE, 1998209 Ibid210 Rapport de Mission de Controle de la S.I.M. et dela I.N.C., 02 juillet 2000211 Groupe Rougier, Rapport Annuel, 1999212 MINEF, juin 1999, Planification de l’AttributionDes Titres D’Exploitation Forestière213 MINEF, juillet 2000, Rapport de Classement Finaldes Soumissions pour les Concessions Forestières214 MINEF, 09 juin 2000, Procès Verbal deConstation d’Infraction, no 034215 Cameroon Tribune, 28 décembre 2000216 Carret J-C, 1999217 (manuscript) statistics prepared by the ForestryCutoms Post at Douala218 www.rougier.fr/transcam.htm ; pers comm.Rougier, November 2000219 Pers comm. Rougier, November 2000220 Rapport de Mission de Controle de la S.I.M. et dela I.N.C., 02 juillet 2000221 Cameroon Tribune, 28 decembre 2000222 EIA, 1996, Corporate Power, Corruption and theDestruction of the World’s Forests ; T Rice and SCounsell, 1993223 Pers comm. Rougier, November 2000224 Marchés Tropicaux et Mediterranéens(10/03/2000)225 www.rougier.fr/com0600.htm, downloaded03/08/00226 EIU, 1999, Country Report, Q4227 www.rougier.fr/fina.htm, downloaded 03/08/00228 Global Forest Watch, 2000, Cameroon229 Greenpeace, 1999, Buying Destruction, p.41230 www.rougier.fr/com0600.htm, downloaded03/08/00231 Marchés Tropicaux, 14 juillet 2000232 www.auteri.net/ecochallenge/ and “Bushmeat:Africa’s Conservation Crisis”, WSPA, March 2000p.10233 “Eco-warrior battling to keep Gabon Rainforestsafe”, April 8, 1997, posted atwww.cnn.com/EARTH/9704/08/eco.warrior/index.html, downloaded 04/08/00234 Pers. Comm. the Gabonais representative ofAFAN/RAAF (10/1999)235 Barbara Delano Foundation et al, 1998, “One dayflight over the proposed Mingouli Reserve”236 Pers comm. Rougier, November 2000237 Pers comm. Rougier, November 2000238 IFIA communiqué, Lopé Gabon, Paris, July 18th2000239 Pers Comm officials of AFD and the EU inLibreville (10/1999)

REFERENCES/INDEX 73240 ATIBT Directory, 2000241 pers comm Safi, August 2000Sonae242 Europe Dec 99/Jan 00, p27243 Sonae Industria , 2000, Report and consolidatedaccounts 1999244 Rice T & S Counsell, 1993245 Ibid246 Tafisa, 1999, Annual Report247 Breghel van M & T Wanders, 1995248 “Pers. Comm.” a n of official of an EU-fundedproject in the region (09/1999)249 Rice T & S Counsell, 1993250 Global Forest Watch, 2000, Gabon251 Journal l’Union (01/10/1999) reported athttp://internetgabon/gabon/actu/actu %5F011099c.htm252 Marchés Tropicaux et Mediterranéens (07/1998)253 EIA, 1996254 Plouvier D, 1997, Promotion of sustainable forestmanagement and certification in timber producingCountries of West and Central Africa255 EIA, 1996256 Pers comm, AIDEnvironment, 1998257 Wilks C, 1990, La conservation des écosystèmesforestiers du Gabon258 http://www.ecofac.org/canopée/n16/n1608_GabonForet/259 Liniger Gumaz M, 1989, Small is not alwaysbeautiful: the story of Equatorial Guinea260 IFIA communiqué, July 18 2000261 http://www.internetgabon.com/gabon/actu/downloaded 27.07.00Thanry262 CFIE, 1998263 MINEF, juin 1999, Attributions – concessionsforestières (SIGIF)264 MINEF, juin 1999, Attributions – ventes de coupe(SIGIF)265 CED, 1999266 Cameroon Law No.94-01 of 20th January 1994,page 45267 Ibid, p16-17268 CED, 1999269 Ibid270 (manuscript) statistics prepared by the ForestryCutoms Post at Douala271 Unconfirmed reports state that Vicwood has nowbought Thanry’s operations in Cameroon272 Greenpeace International, 1999273 Pers. Comm. a representative of a major shippinggroup (10/1999)274 Pers comm, representative of WWF, August 1997275 MINEF, juin 1999, Planification de l’Attributiondes Titres d’Exploitation Forestière ; CameroonTribune, 11 janvier 2000 ; Cameroon Tribune, 12juillet 2000276 CERNA, 1998277 CFIE, 1998278 Ibid279 Ibid280 Verhagen H & C Enthoven, 1993281 Cameroon Tribune, 24 mars 2000282 MINEF, décembre 1999, p.16283 Ibid284 Ibid285 CFIE, 1998286 MINEF, juin 1999 ; Cameroon Tribune, 11janvier 2000 ; Cameroon Tribune, 12 juillet 2000287 Carret J-C, 1999288 Cameroon Tribune 24 mars 2000 ; MINEF PressRelease no 1966, 09 juin 2000 ; Cameroon Tribune,12 juillet 2000289 Rapport d’activites de Yann Petrucci, Jan 1999 –Jan 2000, WWF, p7290 MINEF, juin 1999291 Cerna, 1998292 Cameroon Tribune, 24 mars 2000 ; MINEF PressRelease no 1966, 09 juin 2000293 MINEF, décembre 1999294 Lapuyade et al, 2000, Etude d’Impact Social etEnvironnemental de l’Exploitation Forestière dans laConcession de la CFC295 Carret J-C, 1999296 MINEF, juin 2000, Planification de l’Attributiondes Titres D’Exploitation Forestière297 Marchés Tropicaux et Mediterranéens (11/1999)298 Pers comm WWF representative, August 1997399 Kalk P, 1993, Central African Republic300 See maps in this report301 Global Forests Watch, 2000, Gabon302 Marchés Tropicaux et Mediterranéens (25/9/1998)303 Global Forests Watch, 2000, Gabon304 Marchés Tropicaux et Mediterranéens(31/12/1999)305 Plouvier D, 1997306 Pers Comm Olivier Langrand, Libreville(10/1999)307 Pers Comm. numerous people working in thisfield, Libreville (10/1999)308 Global Forests Watch, 2000, Gabon309 Ibid310 CIAJE, 2000, Impacts des Activités descompagnies forestières européennes sur lespopulations locales et l’environnement311 Ibid312 Wilks C, 1990313 briefings Youndé Forest Summit WWF-International (1999)314 Wilks C, 1990315 Marchés Tropicaux et Mediterranéens (15/1/1999)Vasto Legno316 http://www.vastocom.clio.it/vastolegno/def-uk.html317 Ibid318 IFIA, 1999, Information Bulletin No. 1 – IFIAActivities, Q1319 Greenpeace International, 1999320 CED, 1999321 Carret J-C, 1999322 MINEF, Rapport de Mission, no 633, 27 juillet2000323 Décision no 1427/D/MINEF/DF, Liste des titresautorisés a l’exercice d’activités en 1999/2000324 Carret J-C, 1999325 IFIA, 1999, p66326 Ibid, p66327 Ibid, p67328 Ibid, p67329 see Voix d’Afrique, 30/08/00 and Daily Mail &Guardian, Johannesburg, 04/08/99330 Daily Mail & Guardian, Johannesburg, 04/08/99331 MINEF, décembre 1999332 Cameroon Tribune, 24 mars 2000333 Cameroon Tribune, 12 juillet 2000Wijma334 http://www.wijma.com/ENG/main.html335 http://www.wijma.de/e_wilkommen.htm336 http://www.wijma.com/ENG/main.html337 CED, 1999338 CED, 1999339 MINEF, Juillet 2000340 MINEF, 2000, Rapport de Mission D’Evaluationdes Progrés Réalisés dans les Concessions Forestières(UFA) Attribuées en 1997 dans les provinces duCentre et du Sud. p5Wonnemann341 Rice T and S. Counsell, 1993342 Marchés Tropicaux, 10/03/2000343 Rice T and S. Counsell, 1993344 DEG, 25/07/2000345 Marchés Tropicaux, 10/03/2000346 IbidIndexAAgence Française du Dévéloppement, 29, 44,46, 48, 61, 64Agence Française du Développement (AFD),29, 44, 46, 48, 61, 64Alpi Spa, 11, 53, 56Alpicam, 11, 53ANBE, 55Angola, 27, 32AVEICO., 60Ayous, 16, 23, 25, 29, 55, 60, 64, 66BBahia, 29Bantu, 5, 6, 21, 22, 30, 31, 57, 58Basso, 11, 53Basso Legnami Srl, 53Basso Timber Industries Gabon (BTIG), 11,53BMZ, 56Bolloré, 12, 54, 55Boplac, 11, 55, 57BOTAC, 59Bruynzeel Group of companies, 11, 31, 55,57Bushmeat, 5, 7, 9, 18, 25, 29, 30, 31, 42, 48,49, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 66, 68, 69CCameroon, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25,27, 28, 29, 31, 42, 47, 53, 54, 56, 57,58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67CAMBOIS see SociétéCamerounaise des BoisCamrail, 54Central African Republic, 3, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13,23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 54, 55, 57, 61,63, 64, 65, 66Chaillu-Niari forest, 28COFA, 67Compagnie Équatoriale des Bois (CEB), 11,49, 50, 51, 52, 65, 66Compagnie Forestière de Kribi (CFK), 67Compagnie Forestière du Cameroun (CFC),11, 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 64, 65Compagnie Forestière du Gabon, 53Compagnie Industrielle du Bois auCameroun (CIBC), 64, 65Compagnie Industrielle et Forestière del’Ouest Africaine (CIFOA), 57Congolaise Industrielle du Bois (CIB), 11,57, 58, 59Coplac, 55, 56Coron, 11, 12, 15, 59Cotraco, 56Counkouati National Park, 30DDanzer, 11, 30, 31, 33, 41, 53, 55, 56Democratic Republic of Congo, 23, 29, 32,33, 40, 41, 56Democratic Republic of Congo (formerZaire), 3, 4, 10, 11, 23, 27, 32, 56DLH, 11, 31, 55, 56, 57DLH Nordisk, 11, 31, 55, 56, 57EEAC Timber Ltd, 56, 57ECOFAC, 9, 17, 25, 29, 33, 44, 48Enterprise Forestière des Bois AfricainsCentrafrique (EFBACA), 55Equatorial Guinea, 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 11, 13, 42,43, 44, 63, 64European Union, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16,17, 24, 25, 29, 30, 33, 42, 43, 44, 47,48, 53, 55, 61, 63, 65FFanérimporten, 55Feldmeyer, 11, 31, 57Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), 54, 57,58, 63, 69Forestière de Campo, 11, 54, 55Forestiers Camerounais Associés (FCA), 59France, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 19, 23, 25,27, 29, 33, 44, 45, 47, 48, 55, 57, 60,61, 63, 64, 65, 67GGabon, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 16, 27, 30,42, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53,54, 55, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65,66Germany, 8, 11, 13, 17, 29, 33, 41, 55, 57,63, 67GIPAT, 54Glunz, 63Grumcam, 53, 56HHIPC, 9, 13, 23, 27, 32, 45IIndustrie Forestière d’Ouesso (IFO), 56Interholco, 41, 56Interwood, 11, 12, 48, 49, 59, 63, 65Isoroy, 44, 63Italy, 10, 11, 17, 29, 53Ivory Coast, 10, 53, 54, 55, 56, 64, 67JJ Prenant, 11, 64, 65J. Lalanne, 29, 30Japan, 25, 29, 43Jura Placages, 55KKolelas (former Prime Minister), 27Kouilou-Mayombe forest, 28LLeroy, 11, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 63, 64Limba, 28, 66Lissouba (President), 27MM & P Pruchtnow, 55NNguesso, Sassou, 27, 28, 54OOdzala National Park – Congo (Brazzaville),29Okoumé, 28, 29, 43, 46, 47, 48, 55, 60, 63,64, 65ONATRA, 56OT Africa Line, 54PPallisco, R, 60Pasquet, 11, 60Placongo, 55Pointe Noire, 23, 27, 29, 54, 57Portugal, 10, 11, 17, 29, 33, 63Poverty, 3, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 23, 27, 32, 42,45, 47, 68Propalm, 11, 64, 65Pygmy, 3, 5, 6, 7, 18, 25, 30, 31, 41, 42, 55,58RRepublic of Congo, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 23,25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 45, 54, 55,56, 57, 61, 67Rimbunan Hijau, 18, 44, 49, 63Rivaud, 54Rougier group companies, 9, 11, 12, 29, 31,48, 49, 52, 60, 61, 63, 64SSABE, 60SAFI, 11, 44, 63Saga, 54, 55Sapelli, 7, 20, 21, 23, 25, 28, 29, 30, 33, 56,57, 58, 64, 65, 67Scac Delmas Vieljeux (SDV), 54SCBO, 11, 30, 56Sciages Industriel de la Lowe (SIL), 66SEPBG, 54Sipo, 20, 23, 25, 28, 29, 33, 57, 66Société Africaine des Bois (SAB), 11, 12, 64,65Société Camerounaise des Bois (CAMBOIS),61Société Centrafricaine de Déroulage (SCAD),26, 61Société d’Approvisionnement et de Transit(SAT), 57Société d’Exploitation des Bois d’AfriqueCentrale (SEBAC), 11, 66Société d’Exploitation des Bois du Cameroun(SEBC), 11, 12, 64Société d’Exploitation des Parcs à Bois duCameroun, 54Société d’Exploitation Forestière de laSangha-Mbaéré (SESAM), 26, 55Société d’Exploitation Forestière et Agricoledu Cameroun (SEFAC), 11, 12, 66, 67Société de la Haute Mondah (SHM), 11, 48,49, 50, 51, 52, 59, 63, 65Société Forestière Algéro-Congolaise, 29Société Forestière et Industrielle de la Doumé(SFID), 11, 60, 61Société Industrielle Centrafricaine (SICABois), 63Société Industrielle de Djoum (SID), 60, 61Société Industrielle de Mbang (SIM), 12, 60,61Société Industrielle des Bois Africains(SIBAF), 11, 12, 54, 55Société Industrielle et Forestière de Côted’Ivoire (SIFCI), 56Société Industrielle et Forestière du Congo(SIFORCO), 56Société Industrielle et Forestière Zaïre-Allemande (Siforzal), 41, 56Société Nationale des Transports Maritime,54Société Nouvelle des Bois de Sangha, 30SOCOBOIS, 11, 67SONAE, 63Spain, 8, 10, 11, 17, 29, 42, 43, 44, 63TTafisa, 63Thanry, 11, 12, 15, 18, 19, 22, 25, 26, 46,49, 64, 65, 66Transformation Integrée de Bois (TIB), 60,61Tropenbos, 54, 67tt Timber International, 57VVASTO LEGNO, 66Vicwood, 18, 64, 66WWijma, 11, 67Wonnemann, 11, 29, 31, 67World Bank, 6, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 17, 30,32, 33, 45, 46, 54, 58, 59, 65WTK, 26, 55

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