Countering radicalisation - Real Instituto Elcano

IntroductionFrom 22 to 24 October 2007, the international conference entitled ‘Countering radicalisation:perspectives and strategies from around the globe’ was held at the Peace Palace in The Hague.Its purpose was to encourage the exchange of knowledge and experience between academics,government authorities and non-governmental actors on measures to counter radicalisation.It was also intended to help work out the details of the UN strategy on countering radicalisation.The conference brought together two hundred people from many countries, includingAustralia, Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Pakistan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco,several EU member states, Canada, and the U.S.A.. Also present were official representativesof the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, the UN, the OSCE and the EU presidency.The conference was organised by the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb) onbehalf of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Internal Affairs and Kingdom Relations.It was chaired by Mr Ruud Lubbers.The conference resulted in a number of ‘chairman’s conclusions’, which the UN will use tobenefit further elaboration and implementation of the global strategy to counter radicalisation- an essential part of the UN counterterrorism strategy launched in September 2006.During the conference, the OSCE also said that it wishes to play a role in implementing thechairman’s conclusions and combating radicalisation. The Netherlands applauds thismove and will give it every support. The OSCE itself recently held a conference to discussradicalisation and the internet.Many of the chairman’s conclusions are also to be found in the EU strategy to counterradicalisation, which prioritises the development of a media strategy, attention for terminology,integration policy in the EU member states, and the need for more intercultural dialogue.The EU will thus also play a part in implementing further the UN counterterrorism strategy.The conference confirmed that there is still plenty of scope for intensifying the exchangeof best practices between national and local authorities in different countries. We needmore systematic policy research into lessons learned, linked to analysis of the various stepsinvolved in the processes of radicalisation and de-radicalisation. We must intensify internationalresearch and the exchange of information on policy between academic researchersand implementing agencies at national and local levels.The conference also highlighted the need to invest in citizenship skills and to offer young peoplepositive prospects, for which countries will have to develop national policies of their own.

There was a call for the development of a modus vivendi at all levels with Islam. Counteringradicalisation has to be accompanied by respect for different cultures and backgrounds.Most importantly, this entails respect for diversity and minorities, a pragmatic approach todemocratic models, and above all respect for justice and the rule of law.We need to strengthen human rights, good governance, and the rule of law in order to dealwith the factors that lead to political activism and extremism, and we need to focus on anumber of fundamental problems that contribute to radicalisation.One of the main chairman’s conclusions was that no solution is possible without theinvolvement of Muslims in the various societies. Nor is any solution possible without theinvolvement of governments, thinkers and civil society in both Islamic and Western countries.We need to continue interregional dialogue and urge multilateral agencies to do the same.We also need to continue, and where necessary expand, bilateral cooperation.The main impact of the chairman’s conclusions will be intensified communications withrelevant groups nationally and internationally. The conference marked a first step in thisdirection, and I hope that it has started a trend. Signals reaching me from internationalforums appear to justify my hope. The issues that this conference addressed deserve our fullattention and close cooperation.I take pleasure in enclosing a publication that is a compendium of the contributions of theexpert speakers. It reflects the breadth of scope of the radicalisation debate, and it givesinsight into the various angles from which we can approach it. I hope that this publicationwill give you a clear idea of the issues at stake and occasion to reflect on the outcomes of theconference.Mr T.H.J. JoustraThe National Coordinator for Counterterrorism

Programme international conference22 October 2007 • St. Jacob’s Church, The Hague• Opening event: Radicalisation and the role of the mediaCo-chair, Alan Fisher, journalist, working as a correspondent in London for Al Jazeera internationalMrs Mona El-tahawy, journalist, columnist and international lecturer, U.S.A.Prof. Charles Harb, teacher social psychology at the American University in Beirut, Lebanon23 October 2007 • The Peace Palace, The Hague• Introduction by the Minister of Justice, Dr. Ernst Hirsch Ballin• Opening of the conference by Dr. Ruud Lubbers, conference chair person• International context of the fight against radicalisation EU initiatives: Manuel Pedro Cunha da Silva Perreira, Minister for the Presidency of the Councilof Ministers, PortugalOIC views: Shaykh E. Ihsanogv lu, Secretary General Organisation of Islamic ConferenceUN strategies: Robert Orr, UN Assistant Secretary General for Policy Coordination and StrategicPlanning“Countering radicalisation: perspectives andstrategies from around the globe”• Religious radicalisation in the Islamic world and intervention strategies Co-Chair, Bara Rezag, National Counterterrorism advisor to the President of AlgeriaHon’ble Justice Rajindar Sachar, former Chief Justice, High Court of Delhi, India Mrs Dr. Eleanor Doumato, visiting fellow at the Watson Institute for International Studies at theBrown University, Providence, U.S.A.Ambassador Boubacar G. Diarra, Center for the Study and Research on Terrorism, Algiers, AlgeriaTanvir A. Khan, former Foreign Secretary, Pakistan• Side event: Local approaches to radicalisation A comprehensive local approach to counter-radicalisation: interactive session of discussionson opportunities, strategies, obstacles, dilemmas and real life problem solving. Colin Mellis, policy advisor on radicalisation for the municipality of Amsterdam and lecturer onthe Arab-Israeli conflict at University College, Utrecht• Formal dinner at the Hall of Knights, The HagueMike Smith, Ambassador for Counterterrorism, AustraliaIvo Opstelten, Mayor of Rotterdam, The Netherlands• Dilemmas, effective strategies and measures to counter radicalisation in Europe Co-Chair, Sadik Harchaoui, managing Director of Forum Institute for MulticulturalDevelopment, The Netherlands Dr. Per Ranstorp, Research Director of the Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the SwedishNational Defence College, SwedenDr. Bob de Graaff, Professor Terrorism and Contra-Terrorism, Leiden University, The Netherlands Theo Bot, Deputy Director General of the General Intelligence and Security Service, TheNetherlands Prof. Dr. Tariq Ramadan, Visiting Professor in charge of the Chair “Citizenship and Identity” atthe Erasmus University Rotterdam, The NetherlandsTony Heal, Deputy Head, Prevent Unit, Home Office, London, United Kingdom24 October 2007 • The Peace Palace, The Hague• Discussion with participants: Commonalities in South and West• Reflection & outlookMarc Sageman, M.D. Ph.D., independent researcher on terrorism, founder and principal ofSageman Consulting LLC and author of “Understanding terrorist networks”, U.S.A.Prof. Ahmad Moussalli, Professor of Political Science and Islamic Studies, American Universityof BeirutDr. Fuád Jabali, Syarif Hidayatullah Islamic State University (UIN) in Jakarta, IndonesiaChairman’s conclusions by Dr. Ruud Lubbers, conference chair person• Side event: Countering radicalisation in practice A meeting with practitioners from a vocational school, that housed some young radicals:the session will address practical questions e.g. what expressions of radicalisation doteachers encounter, and which methods and counter discourses can they employ?Mrs. Jos Leenhouts, Chair of the Board of Governors of the Mondriaan educationalestablishment, The Hague, The Netherlands

TABLE OF CONTENTS6 Programme international conference “Countering radicalisation:perspectives and strategies from around the globe”10 Radicalisation and the role of the media11 Mona Eltahawy15 Charles Harb24 INTRODUCTION AND OPENING SPEECH25 Ernst Hirsch Ballin28 Ruud Lubbers30 International context of the fight against radicalisation31 José Magalhães38 Ufuk Gokcen44 Robert Orr48 Dilemmas, effective strategies and measuresto counter radicalisation in Europe49 Bob de Graaff54 Theo Bot60 Tony Heal62 Religious radicalisation in the Islamic worldand intervention strategies63 Rajindar Sachar72 Eleanor Doumato77 Boubacar G. Diarra84 Tanvir A. Khan98 Mike Smith107 Ivo Opstelten110 Reflection and outlook111 Marc Sageman117 Ahmad Moussalli121 Fu’ad Jabali124 Chairman's conclusions125 Ruud Lubbers

Radicalisation and the role of the mediaMona El TahawyJournalist, commentator and international lecturerUnited States of AmericaCompilation of the presentation “Shoot the Women First - From Prayer Circles to Mujahidaat -Recruitment of Women by Radical Groups”.History• Women long involved with terrorist movements (Mia Bloom)• Shift from mostly supportive role to more active operational, e.g. suicide bombers,more recent.• 1985 - 2006, 220 women suicide bombers, 15 percent of total.• 17 groups used suicide bombing - women operative in more than half.• Secular and religious organizations. Religious groups resisted at first.• No general patterns, no reliable profiles, and no way to explain every kind of terrorism.• Four R’s: Revenge, Redemption, Respect, Relationship.• Misleading to assume women victims or pawns of men, lacking political motivation.Pay attention to relationship to former or current terrorist.Syria• Exclusive and secret Islamic women’s society - Qubaisiate.• Women take advantage of greater freedom to form Islamic groups.• Invitation usually through relative or friend.• Distinctive way of trying headscarf. Code words for meeting times.• Daughters of wealthy and influential families; girls seen as potential leaders.• Principles of Koranic reasoning - sense of empowerment.Pakistan• Jamia Hafsa Islamic School for girls - Lal Masjid/Red Mosque.• Siege and standoff with Pakistani government forces in July.• 102 dead, 11 soldiers, 6 women. 160 arrested, 3 women. 1,000 released to families,465 women.• Koran; Hadith (sayings of the Prophet Muhammad); Islamic law; virtues of martyrdom.• Head-to-toe burqas; vigilante groups to enforce vision of a strict Islamic state• Home with mission to reform families and communities.• Rising number of women, incl. elites, participate in religious gatherings to discuss U.S.foreign policies and the call for jihad (Ali)• Women members of Pakistani jihadi groups, e.g. Laskhkar-e-Taiba, affiliated withal-Qaeda.10 11

Palestinian women• Jan. 2002: Wafa Idriss, 28, first Palestinian woman suicide bomber. Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade/secular Fatah Movement.• Jan 2002: Sheikh Ahmed Yassin says women suicide bombers only allowed if chaperonedby man.• Qaradawi: women bombers can disregard certain codes of dress and Islamic law• Feb. 2002: Dareen Abu Aysheh, 21. Hamas turned her down.• Feb. 2002: Yassin says women can launch suicide attacks alone only if doesn’t take hermore than 24 hours to be away from home.• Oct. 2003: Hanadi Jaradat, 23, Islamic Jihad. First for religious group.• Jan. 2004: Reem Riyashi, 22, Hamas. First mother.• Nov. 2006 – Fatma Omar An-Najar. Hamas. Grandmother. Oldest of the more than 100Palestinian suicide bombers previous six year.Context and society• Organisation and background society important (Clara Beyer) - Compare Turkey, Sri Lankaand Palestine.• Sri Lanka + Turkey: suicide bombing commonly imposed upon the female members of theorganizations.• Tamils + Kurds: traditional societies where women’s roles are determined and static.• LTTE + PKK: offered women opportunity that no other structure could with a background offeminism supporting their participation.• Groups commanded by charismatic, unchallenged, and non-challengeable leaders; trainedwomen, like men, to kill and die for the cause.• Palestinian female bomber new model of suicide attackers: only ones who volunteered forsuch missions.• Not trained nor were they prepared psychologically for the suicide attack.• Aren’t welcome in paramilitary terrorist factions, dominated by men.• Don’t need to be psychologically prepared because anti-Israeli sentiment already there andpersonal experience.Iraq• Historical precedent for mujahidaat (Farhana Ali)• Salafi debate over role of women: Afghanistan to Iraq, Bin Laden to Zarqawi.• Internet and radicalisation: Al Khansaa - online jihadi magazine for women - 2004• Messages on jihadi websites, chat rooms.• Since 2003, women involved in at least five suicide bombings cases in Iraq/Iraqi in Jordan.(Ali)• Women bombers and couples - greater chances of success, attract less suspicion, less liketo be flagged, generate maximum publicity.Jihadi message“We do not want you to enter the land of combat for this might lead to vulgarity andtemptation.”“The reason we address women in these pages is our observation that when a woman isconvinced of something, no one will spur a man to fulfil it like she will… The saying ‘Behindevery great man stands a woman’ was true for Muslim women at these times, for behindevery great Mujahid stood a woman…”Yusuf al-Ayiri, a former al-Qaeda leader, chief propagandist, Saudi Arabia, killed by Saudisecurity forces in May 2003. Cites Quranic verses and historical accounts of female“mujahidat” to encourage women to participate in Jihad. (SITE Institute, Feb. 22, 2005)“To You, My Muslim Sister: The Women’s Role in Jihad Against the Enemy,”Seeks to motivate Muslim women to enter jihad in physical and supporting capacities as partof a larger discussion of a sickness overwhelming the “Islamic Nation” that is hindering theirfight against the enemy.The author believes that a “disease” is ravaging the ranks of the Muslims, causing “misery andhumiliation” upon them by their enemies. The disease is considered a “weakness,” which isdefined as “love of life and hatred of death,” and is only improved through jihad and “fightingfor the sake of Allah.” Here, the message indicates, is where the Muslim women may play animportant role and raise men who are not owned by “cows, trees, crosses, and altar worshippers...”Citing examples of women taking place in jihad during the time of the Prophet Mohammad,the author asserts that these women of years past should serve as paragons for the womenof today to look upon and emulate, rather than “your idol, this dancer, prostitute who isselling her body in every place, or this singer or model.” Further, the message states that “ifyou want to know the whereabouts of the nation, look at its women and whom they follow.”(SITE Institute, June 28, 200%)Recommendations• West: (Farhana Ali).• Promote democracy and democratic institutions.• Establish more robust diplomatic relationship with countries that support terroristorganizations; put pressure on these countries with the support of the internationalcommunity.• Financial and organizational support to local groups - Muslim NGOs, think tanks, socialactivists, legitimate religious establishments - to help counter extremist and terroristelements.12 13

One of the most important lessons in social psychology is that to understand behaviour,including polarisation, you need to understand the context in which behaviours occur. Violent,vivid or exotic stories make good news headlines, but do not reflect reality or help understanddynamics in the Middle East. To understand “polarisation in the Middle East”, it is importantto consider the socio-historical context in which polarisation is occurring, and the choicespeople make in negotiating their identities.ContextualisationHistorical backgroundIt is important to realise that both conflict and identities in the Middle East have been shapedby a history of dialectical interaction between colonial designs and indigenous aspirationsfor self-determination. Western interest and meddling in Arab affairs intensified dramaticallythroughout the 19th century, leading to direct colonisation of the Arab world by French andBritish troops at the beginning of the 20th century. French and British officers planned thedismembering of the Ottoman Empire and its division along artificial lines to suit the needsof colonial powers 5 . The geo-strategic importance of the Middle East cannot be understated: itis a geographical crossing point between East and West, and the location of a large proportionof world oil reserves. Controlling this area is of strategic importance for the survival of anyworld power (French, British, or American).The post colonial legacy and the continuedimportance of the Middle East as a geostrategic area are essential to understanding thedynamics of today.Historical NarrativeEarly emancipation movements saw the emergence of popular, secular and socialist forcesacross key countries in the Arab Middle East – populations seemed to have chosen secularand nationalist ideology rather than the Islam inspired alternatives. Egypt’s Nasser and theearly phases of the Baath revolutions in Syria and Iraq are prime examples. However, themilestone 6 days war of June 1967 shattered these pan Arab movements and led to agradual calcification of regimes. Instead of ceding power to a new generation of leaders, Arabpotentates and their internal security services strengthened their grip on power.The security controlled life and “emergency rule” in some countries left little space for changeor protest. Egypt’s emergency law, in effect since 1981, prohibits any popular gathering, leavingmosques and universities as the only possible venues for dissent. While Islamic politicalmovements existed in Arab political life for over a century, they found their ranks swellingonly from the mid seventies onwards. The 1982 massacres of thousands of Muslim Brotherhoodmilitants in Hama-Syria is a case in point.Social RealityIn the meantime, social reality for individuals in the Arab world is not enviable and keepsdeteriorating. The United Nations’ Arab Human Development Reports (AHDR, 2002, 2003,2004, and 2005) highlight the high levels of illiteracy rates, gender inequality, huge disparitiesin wealth between rich and poor with a majority living in poverty, decrepit health care andeducational systems, among many others ills. The GDP of all Arab countries combined is lessthan the GDP of Spain.In addition, governance reports point to the presence of autocratic and perennial regimes,nepotism, cronyism, corruption and abuse of power by ruling elites. Foreign militaryoccupation, wars, civil strife, insecurity and torture only add to this bleak picture.In SumThe Arab world is in a seriously dangerous and precarious state. The deteriorating socialconditions and highly oppressive regimes ruling over them converge towards a truly explosiveand highly volatile situation. Direct foreign intervention in support of these regimes as well asmilitary occupation in Iraq and Palestine only contribute to exacerbating this situation. WhileWestern nations fear terrorism within their states, Arab populations fear the state terrorism ofWestern nations and their client regimes.Media images streaming across the Arab Middle EastArab news networks have a wide reach in the Middle East. In a Maryland-Zogby Internationalpoll (2007) carried in 6 Arab states, 54% of participants reported watching Al-Jazeera 6 . Thewar in Iraq, the Israeli occupation in Palestine, and the July 2006 war against Hezbollah havehad massive coverage in Arab news. In these three cases, the US, Israel and complicit EUstates have been directly blamed for the atrocities witnessed on live broadcasts.PalestinePalestine is probably the most poignant and inciting of Arab causes. Palestinians are a peoplethat have no recognised country, dispossessed and living under harsh military occupation forthe past 40 years, dehumanised and deprived of their most basic human rights. The literatureis replete with accounts of the Palestinian tragedy, the narratives of which are vividly presentin the minds of every Arab citizen. The helplessness felt in correcting the injustices imposedon the Palestinians for the past 60 years increases polarisation within Arab populationsdramatically. To understand the psychological impact the Palestinian tragedy has on Arabcitizens, one has only to imagine it happening to European citizens.IraqThe desolation that Iraq has become is notorious. Sectarian violence, bombing of shrines,terror bombings in crowded markets and dismembered bodies make the daily news. Thisdisaster is squarely blamed on the US occupation forces, which are perceived to have “come,conquered, and ruined” Iraq. The scandal of Abu Ghraib has created iconic images of the US6 The prominence of Al-Jazeera and its ability to report directly from the field have created a headache toUS forces and Arab regimes. Al-Jazeera was banned from covering within Iraq after the Fallujah phosphorusbombing scandal in 2004. President Bush reportedly wanted to bomb the network in 2004, but was16 5 Sykes-Picot agreements of 1916, and the Balfour declaration of 1917dissuaded by British PM Blair.17

occupation. The fact that “the only military officer to face trial for the abuses at Iraq’s AbuGhraib prison was acquitted of all charges of mistreatment of detainees” on August the 29th,2007 contributes to flaming animosity to the US, and provides a freer license for Arab regimesto pursue their own torture programs at home.When Iraqis are asked about their assessment of Iraq, a bleak picture emerges. In a recentBrookings Institution report (2007), Iraqis stated their dissatisfaction with all levels of lifeindices measured (see table below). Every indicator was rated negatively by a large majority ofIraqi citizens, and rated as worse compared to the previous year. It is absurd that in a countrylike Iraq that holds the second highest oil reserve in the world, 88% of Iraqi citizens findaccess to fuel for cooking and driving difficult. This downhill spiral is accompanied by highrates of support for resistance to US forces. 83% of Shia and 97% of Sunnis would like to seeUS troops out of Iraq - yet US president George Bush reiterated in his 2006 UN address that“We will not abandon you and your struggle to build a free nation”.Iraqi conditions evaluation 2005-2007Jobs Bad (>75%) WorseElectricity Bad (>75%) WorseClean Water Bad (>66%) WorseMedical Care Bad (>66%) WorseFamily’s economic situation Bad (>60%) WorseAvailability of fuel for cooking or driving Bad (>88%) NAFreedom of movement Bad (>75%) NAIraqi sentiment Support do not supportOverall 22% 78%Detail: - Shia 17% 83%- Sunni 3% 97%- Kurdish 75% 25%November 2005 32% 65%February 2004 39% 51%ContextualisationIf a region level analysis is to be provided, then perceptions in the Middle East wouldindicate that there are two main outgroups to popular forces: Western colonial forces andtheir proxies (US-Israel), and Arab dictatorships.The Arab world possesses about 60% of the world’s recoverable oil reserves (AHDR 2003),and controlling this area not only secures one’s energy supplies but also provides leverageover competing powers. Western powers are perceived to control most of the Oil SecurityGrid, with Russia and China preventing hegemony through the backing of Iran. While theinvasion of Iraq clearly served these purposes, preparations for war against Iran is often portrayedthrough that same prism.Western support for dictatorships in the Arab Middle East is widely acknowledged, and thedifference between “moderate Arab regimes” and “extremist” regimes is one of policy ratherthan practices: Tyrants that support Western powers are moderates and allies, and those thatoppose it are extremists and “evil”.Support for Arab dictatorships is quite lucrative: These regimes provide a) unrestrictedaccess to natural resources (oil - Shell, Exxon-Mobile, etc), b) territorial space through whichWestern powers can project their military might to central Asia, c) trillions of dollars worth ofreinvestment in Western economies, and c) unmitigated access to corrupt businesses. PMTony Blair’s executive intervention to stop a Serious Fraud Office investigation into corruptioncharges linking British Armament firm BAE to Saudi royals was rewarded in September 2007with a 20 billion pound rearmament deal with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It is unlikely thatdemocratically elected and accountable governments in the Middle East would cater to theinterest of foreign powers at the expense of the needs of their local constituencies.Requests for democratic elections, transparency and accountability of governance is met byfierce opposition by Arab potentates, and their Western backers. When democratic electionsare held (Algeria, Palestine, Egypt, Lebanon), Western powers actively engage in fightingthem: massive repression and civil war in Algeria (backed by France), complete boycott(and bombardment) of Hamas in Palestine (Israel- US- EU), widespread repression ofEgypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (with the approval of the US administration), and direct war onHezbollah (US - Israel).Negotiating IdentitiesMany individuals in the Arab world seem forced to choose between one of two alternatives:resistance or submission to the status quo. If the former is chosen, three main options areavailable: Takfeeri groups (e.g. Al-Qaeda, Salafi and Wahabi groups), mainstream Islamicmovements (e.g. Hezbollah, Hamas, Muslim Brotherhood), and secular-moderate groups(e.g. Keefaya, NGOs, political parties etc.).Takfeeri groups are extremely radical groups claiming affiliation to Islam, and denouncingmembers of any outgroup (including other Muslims) as heretics. These extremist groupscannot have mass appeal since their inclusiveness criteria are rigid and narrowly defined, andexclude large sections of the Muslim population. Internal divisions weaken their ideologicalappeal - in Lebanon alone, more than 400 such groups are officially in operation.Furthermore, while their methods of indiscriminate killing (Afghanistan, Iraq) make newsheadlines, they still repel ordinary citizens 7 . Their open criticism of mainstream Islamic187 See polls conducted in Arab world. Zogby international, 2005, 2006, 2007; Pew Global (2007), etc.19

parties (Hezbollah, Hamas) only contributes to weakening their appeal. But these Takfeerigroups will keep growing stronger as states disintegrate, weapon distributions continue toescalate, and security problems continue to destabilize the area. Recruitment within themost impoverished neighbourhoods continues apace and creates security islands outsidegovernment control.7. Perceived Charismatic leadership: oratory skills are very important in the Arab world.Mahmoud Darwish’s poetry recitals fill football stadium of 50,000 fans. The ability to“captivate the imagination” is important, and Nasrallah’s speeches are broadcast in fullover several pan Arab networks (including Al-Jazeera). Western “moderate” allies do notseem to hold a similar control, or have this perceived charisma.Moderate secular organizations do not have much credence either: some have no record ofachievements they can build on, their influence in shaking corrupt government is weak toinexistent, and their agenda is met with suspicion 8 . Many lack organisation, funds, andcredibility. Secular, socialist or pan Arab movements are often considered “passé”, belongingto a long gone era that yielded no positive results.Mainstream Islamic groups 9 : parties like Hezbollah have garnered an impressive record thatappeals to many in the Arab world. These groups derive their ideological platform fromreligious sources, and define themselves as resistance movements (to Western hegemony,and corrupt leaders). These movements have had a slow history of growth, and have graduallyincreased their support base over the years. The subjective appeal of Hezbollah is strengthenedby a series of factors:1. Social support and service networks: Hezbollah provides a large network of social servicesto fill the gap left by government institutions. Their constituency is thus provided withsubsidized health care, education services, etc.2. Ethical conduct: Hezbollah officials have not been implicated in financial scandals, publicplundering, deceit, theft, abuse of power, or other practices and transgressions associatedwith governing forces. These factors also strengthen their popular credibility.3. Credibility - Trustworthiness: statements made by its leadership are rarely deceitful - somuch so that Israeli citizens expressed greater trust in Hezbollah statements than thoseemanating from their leadership during the July War 2006. Credibility increases the powerof persuasion dramatically.4. Military achievements: Hezbollah leadership claims that in its 25 year history, it has nevermet military defeat, only gained in strength. This construed perception contrasts with along history of Arab defeats.5. “Pragmatic” policies: Hezbollah’s discourse has been evolving over the years, adaptingto the wants of local populations 10 . This greater openness allows for a wider circle of thepopulation to support a religion based party like Hezbollah. Such policies have enabled leftwing secular or atheist professionals to support Hezbollah in its struggle.6. Readiness for self-sacrifice: Hezbollah leadership is a high target priority for the Israeliforces which have assassinated and kidnapped previous leaders. Nasrallah’s own son waskilled in border operations between Hezbollah forces and Israeli forces, highlighting noprivileges for the leadership and their families.These mainstream parties seem to provide a serious alternative to current governance, andinfuse a positive self-image to their supporters. Furthermore, and unlike both Takfeeris andthe “moderates”, mainstream Islamic groups seem capable to achieve their clearly definedgoals, and thus offer hope to their followers. By opposing the West (US, EU, Israel etc.) inthe dialectical discourse, they engage the needs of Arab youths. It is not surprising that manyin the Arab world, secular and religious alike endorse the proposed identity and platform ofmainstream Islamic movements 11 .In a Maryland - Zogby International poll conducted after the July war of 2006, nationallyrepresentative samples from six countries (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, UAE, andMorocco) were asked to identify the world leader they admired the most: Hezbollah’s HassanNasrallah topped the list in every country surveyed and often by a very large margin.Conclusion and recommendationsThe images of the oppressive-autocratic-and biased West and the terrifying images of “theArab” are turning into a parallel crisis fuelled by long media exposure and coverage. Westernmedia view on the Arab world are often simplistic, reductionist and prejudicial. The messageof fear is prominent, often catering to the interests of security organisations and domesticpolitical objectives.MediaForeign media correspondents often lack the basic knowledge of the dynamics in the ArabMiddle East. Education is a must. Sensitivity to the cultural context and a deeper immersioninto the complexity of each Arab nation are essential for good reporting. Avoiding cognitiveshortcuts and attribution errors may help in dispelling sensationalist headlines and providefor a series of more balanced reports.Media in the Arab world focuses on the injustices perpetrated by foreign powers across theArab world: US occupation in Iraq, Israeli oppression and occupation in Palestine, Israeliaggression on Lebanon, etc. These reports fuel anger and resentment in Arab populations.However, media in the Arab world rarely if ever braodcast criticism of Arab regimes. Torture,corruption, abuse of human rights, deprivation and repression are rarely covered in themedia. Furthermore, the flaming of sectarian tension between Shia and Sunni Muslims isoften manipulated to increase loyalty to patron Arab regimes.8 Public endorsement by US administration and Bush’s Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI)do not help9 Both Hezbollah and Hamas are listed on the AIVD’s terrorist list (but not on the EU list).11 Interestingly, many in the leadership cadre of Islamic movements come from leftist-communist20 10 Hezbollah does not appear to impose its religious views or will on local populationsbackgrounds21

Policy Makers and security specialistsEuropean and American specialists are rightfully concerned about terrorism. Protection of thehomeland from terrorist acts perpetrated by local actors or foreign ones is at the center oftheir concerns. Western left wing radicals and activists as well as Muslim extremists get rousedby images streaming from the Middle East, and a fraction might take action. The strategiesfor dealing with local versus foreign threat should be different, for the processes are not thesame. The psychological processes are complex, and local expertise 12 can be quite helpful instemming the tide for the threat emanating from within Europe’s borders. However, it isuseful to keep in mind that a peaceful and stable Middle East would deprive activists fromtheir main recruiting arguments and incitment speeches.Arab activists may hit back at the sponsors of perceived injustice in the Middle East, be theyArab regimes or their Western backers. The issue of state terrorism is high on Arab populationconcerns. Western foreign policy makers need to address core issues urgently, as the petrifiedsituation in the Middle East cannot be contained within its border indefinitely. The recommendationslisted below are not presented in order of importance:1. Avoid ethnocentric, injurious 13 or colonial public statements: comments by French ForeignMinister Kouchner about the need to replace Iraqi PM (echoed by several US politicians)reinforce the colonial perception in the Middle East. how would European powers react ifArab FM publicly the need to depose the PM of a soverign European country?2. Correct perceptions of double standards: it is unreasonable to clamour for Iraq to leaveKuwait, and Syria to leave Lebanon, while at the same time not doing nearly enough toend the occupation of Palestine, the Golan heights etc.; to worry about Iran’s potentialnuclear ambition while forgetting about Israel nuclear arsenal; to criticise some Arab statesfor their violation of human rights and opression, while shield allies (including Israel)from the same.3. Allow Challenges to Arab regimes: It is very important to redress the imbalances and badgovernance that is in the arab world. Relying on heavy security services to provide “stability”is counter productive in the long run. It empowers the more radicals, and increasesradicalisation. There are many good studies produced by Arab experts on how to redressthe ills of the Arab world, these need to be seriously considered not systematically shelved.4. Differentiate between Islamic movements and Takfeeri groups: active takfeeri groups(both in the Middle East and Europe) are a threat to European security, the Arab peoplein general and Islamic movements in particular. they constitute a common enemy, andIslamic movements will be better able to dry support for takfeeri groups in the Middle East(provided the financial influx from wealthy royals is stemmed) than any of the alternativegroups.5. Engage Islamic movements: Boycott and confrontation only serves to polarise positionsand increase conflict. It also pushes open minded Muslims to polarised positions. Thesemovements have large, solid, and increasing popular support, and are willing to engage,even cooperate with Western powers. Current political engagements provide security forthe short term; islamic movements may provide a better security return for the longerterm 14 .6. Allow for accountable and democratic challenges: if Islamic movements were allowedto reach power, they will have to face the challenges of rule not to mention an incrediblychallenging internal situation to deal with: weak economies that do not generate enoughjobs (60 % of the Arab poulation are under 25 years), education, provision of food, healthcare etc are still crippling issues. If they succeed in redressing the ills of the Middle East,Western powers would gain a more stable investment. If they fail in addressing the manychallenges, people would be unlikely to vote them in power again.7. Encourage homegown initiatives: donor mentality should be replaced by a more culturallysensitive and bottom up approach to aid and reform. Current donor mentality is fosteringa narrow community of donor oriented NGOs and experts who are becoming increasinglydissociated from their societies and their concerns. Needs and priorities should be identifiedby local actors, and good/useful projects should be supported regardless of the ideologicalplatform proposing it.“Antipathy toward the U.S. and the West does not flow from cultural dissonance; it is basednot on who we are perceived to be but on what we are perceived to do.” Tessler (2003)12 Psychology experts on acculturation research as well as European Imams can be quite useful.13 Secretary of State Rice’s comments about “witnessing the birth pangs of a new Middle East”during the July 2006 war are highly offensive and inadequate. Other comments about “clash ofcivilisations” or “crusades are equally offensive. It is important that policy makers as well as media14 A so far successful example has been the coperation between Hezbollah and UNIFIL forces in22 analysts approach the Middle East, Arabs and Islam in an informed and culturally sensitive way.south Lebanon. The modalities of cooperation should be studied and enhanced.23

INTRODUCTION AND OPENING SPEECHMr Hirsch BallinMinister of JusticeThe NetherlandsEsteemed guests,I take great pleasure in welcoming you to The Hague, the city of international justice. It is anhonour for our government to organise an international conference on a theme that occupiesso many people in the world and that is so closely related to the raison d’être of this verybuilding. The Peace Palace was built at the beginning of the last century and since 1913 it hasbeen home to the Permanent Court of Arbitration and The Hague Academy for InternationalLaw. In 1946, one year after the end of World War II, it doors were opened to the InternationalCourt of Justice. This palace stands for the ideal of peace and justice in the world.To realise this ideal, we must give it our attention and our energy every day, and particularlyon account of the problem that brings us together here today: extreme radicalisation,sometimes even leading to violence. The aim of this conference is to contribute to theachievement of this ideal by sharing our insights. Insights about the strategies we developand put to use in our attempts to stop radicalisation. This brings us first of all to the questionof what we mean by radicalisation.I would choose to describe it as the process by which individuals who wish to make profoundchanges to society are increasingly willing to use extreme means to achieve their goals. Theyoften start by branding those who disagree with them as heretics, they adopt increasinglyextreme standpoints, they often seek to isolate themselves along with a limited group oflike-minded individuals who confirm them in their thinking, and they are ultimately capableof violence or terrorist actions to achieve their ideals. Ideals of many natures. From autonomyand nationalism to rigid and intolerant interpretations of religious principles.Obviously, there is nothing wrong with a critical attitude to life. Many of you in this roomare researchers, and that is what researchers do: they take a critical view of reality and askquestions about it. Moreover, social dynamics is valuable and should be cherished. We musttherefore safeguard against stigmatising idealism, a philosophy of life or religious convictions.For many people, religion is an important source of inspiration and a guideline for a rich andfruitful spiritual life. And yet we know that religion can be exploited. It can be used in a waythat leads to radicalism and ultimately to the use of violence. This is what we want to examine,the subject on which we want to share our thinking during the next few days.Today and tomorrow we will talk about how to deal with radicalisation that can lead to seriousforms of aggression against innocent citizens, violence for which there is no single justification.2425

Men and women who turn to terrorism profess to do so in the name of an ideal. They attackothers who wish to practise their beliefs in a different way. They restrict their rights andimpose on them obligations that deeply affect their personal lives. They define conflicts withpolitical and socio-economic causes in ideological terms in an attempt to legitimise theirmisdeeds and outrageous acts, and to increase the moral pressure on their followers. At thegreatest extreme, they impose on them the obligation to take the lives of people whose ideasare different.charismatic leader, others through self-study in closed circles.In the West, their hatred feeds on events taking place in parts of the world thousands ofmiles away. Events that, thanks to the rapid dissemination of news nowadays, become knownimmediately, whereas a few decades ago they would scarcely have been noticed. The internetplays a role of growing importance. Cyberspace is the battlefield. A computer and a providerare all you need to take part in the battle, the keyboard is your weapon. Radical thoughts aredisseminated, solidarity is bred, methods of combat are shared via internet.Many people in the West believe that Islamic radicalism is a recent development. But you, theexperts, know better. Radical violence has a long history. Until recently, leaders and citizens inWestern countries saw it primarily as something that happened far away, in other countries.They were scarcely aware of the large numbers of victims it claimed. With the attacks of 11September 2001, extremism burst into the House of the West. Through the front door. Onlythen did our shared problem become visible in its full magnitude. It made many peopleaware of the need to study radicalisation in all its manifestations, and made them understandthat our approach to it would have to be worldwide.Ladies and gentlemen,If the limits of the law are violated and there is the threat of violence, of course the governmentmust take firm and clear action. The use of violence, threatening to use violence and incitingviolence are unacceptable and must immediately be met by sanctions. The question is: howdo we keep matters from coming to this point?Every use of violence is preceded by radicalisation. The factors that lead to radicalisation arecomplex and varied. Many experts and policy makers in the countries you come from havewritten about this. We must share with each other our knowledge and experience about howto prevent the use of violence. At what point in a process of radicalisation can the choice touse violence still be effectively averted? What signals do we need to respond to? And what isthe most productive reaction? Isolation or dialogue? Understanding or rejection? How torespond to intolerance, to withdrawal into a private circle, to the imposition on others ofstrict rules to live by, when it is not linked to the use of violence? When people choose toisolate themselves, how do you break down the barriers? When is intolerance towards peoplewho think differently a signal for governments or other actors to take steps, and in what formare steps then effective? What measures strengthen a person’s sense of being victimised, aneed to take radical and violent action?Ladies and gentlemen,I have attempted to outline in a few words the contours of the problem that concerns you aspoliticians, policymakers, administrators and experts. This in the full awareness that reality ismuch more complex than I can sketch in a few sentences. It is up to you today and tomorrowto unravel this complexity and to arrive at clear analyses of how to deal with this problem.I call on you to concentrate your energies on strategies with which to combat radicalism, toconsider success stories alongside failures, so that you can learn from each other’s methods.I encourage you to open your hearts and minds so as to learn from one another in whateverways possible. I am convinced that, in the end, there is more that binds us than that separatesus. I wish you every success in finding the ties that bind!(Minister receives publication “Radicalisation in broader perspective” from Mr Lubbers)Thank you very much for this book. I will read it closely and attentively. And you, ladies andgentlemen, do not need to be jealous: I have heard that you too will receive a copy.Mr Lubbers will see to this personally. With him, you are in good hands: after all, he used tobe Prime Minister of the Netherlands and High Commissioner for Refugees, and to mymind, this makes him exceptionally well suited to lead this meeting as your chair.Success guaranteed.We must in any case safeguard against oversimplification in our reasoning and our statements.For example: socio-economic deprivation or the absence of political participation can leadto radicalisation, but it is going too far to view this as a causal relationship. It is striking thatpeople who have become radical have often enjoyed a good education in the West, and haveled comfortable lives. Some young people become radical in groups under the influence of a26 27

Ruud LubbersConference chairThe NetherlandsLadies and Gentlemen, dear guests.It is a pleasure to welcome you here in The Hague.You have interesting de-radicalisation experiences to share. Let’s listen to one another andshare our practices. I, therefore, like to invite you - as experts - to work together to make thisconference a success.The complexity of this problem and its underlying factors were very eloquently outlined byErnst Hirsch Ballin, the Minister of Justice. All of you are experts and well acquainted withvarious analyses of the problem of radicalisation, including its history and underlying factors.Many experts have written about why people radicalize and resort to violent means.I like to thank you for your presence, your participation and for bringing your ideas andexperience in view of countering radicalisation to this conference. We strongly rely on you,on your expertise in finding ways to effectively address the problem of radicalisation.Violent radicalisation poses our societies for serious problems and it jeopardizes thefoundations of freedom and democracy. It undermines essential elements that keep now-adays,multifaceted society together, such as tolerance, acceptance of cultural differences andof various life styles. It feeds thinking in bi-polar terms of “we” against “them”, feelings ofanti-Islam and, in turn, of anti-Western sentiments or even perceptions of Muslims worldwidebeing under attack.The problem is that this type of feelings, fears or frustration are not always addressed bydemocratic and peaceful means; are sometimes no longer discussed with one another anddo, in those cases, no longer lead to a debate. No, these feelings are translated in ideologiesthat serve to allegedly legitimize violent actions. We are not only confronted with a battleagainst those who join violent actions and attacks against innocent people. We should beaware that there is a very shrewd, underlying propaganda machinery of extremists active,mostly on Internet that aims at legitimizing these violent actions or even try to make people,often youngsters, believe that it is their duty to threaten or kill other people.Radicalisation appears to be increasing in scope, speed and intensity. The process ofradicalisation is very complex and takes various forms and stages. We need to find ways todevelop a comprehensive approach which includes preventative measures for those whomay be susceptible to radicalisation, intervention at the earliest stage possible and countermeasures for those who have internalised violent radical views and reducing their influenceon others to the extent possible.I would like to take on the challenge with you to bring our thinking further, not only to askourselves why? But to find creative and innovative ways, based on expertise, experience andbest practices of how to counter radicalisation and to overcome it by learning from eachother to develop best practices, taking into consideration the common, as well as the specificcharacteristics of our countries.I would like, together with you, to come to conclusions which may be helpful for guidance inour approaches. In this respect, we may want to think about ways to actively de-legitimize theuse of violence, to counter-balance propaganda of extremists that poisons the minds of ouryoungsters. We may also think about societal efforts towards preventative measures, includingthe promotion of respect, tolerance, participation, democratic principles and rule of law.And last, but lot least, I also would like to work towards more sustainable outcomes of thisconference. Both formally and informally. I sincerely hope that multilateral organisations,represented here today, will endeavour to take on a follow-up in view of developing strategiesfor the future, building upon lessons learned. Too often we are spending time, energy andresources to reinvent the wheel. I therefore also hope that one of the outcomes of thisconference may be the creation of networks of experts, from governments, organisations,civil society and the academic world to liaise and cooperate in countering radicalisationaround the globe.For these very reasons, it is urgent that we pool our resources and ideas to find strategiesand actions to counter radicalisation, since this is a shared problem in our societies.There are interesting results that have been attained by some of you present here today.Some of you have found direct answers and local solutions to the question of radicalisation.28 29

International context of the fightagainst radicalisationHE Secretary of State José MagalhãesOn behalf of the Portuguese Presidency of the Council of the European UnionPortugalDear Ministers, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,Allow me to start by thanking Minister Ernst Hirsch Ballin, the Netherlands NationalCoordinator against Terrorism, Mr. Tjibbe Joustra, and our chairperson, H.E. Doctor RuudLubbers, for the kind invitation extended to the Presidency of the Council of the EuropeanUnion to address this most distinguished audience on the subject of the Union’s initiativesregarding the international context in the fight against Radicalisation.As I was kindly asked to intervene in the opening session of this conference I will try, besidesexplaining EU - and to a certain extent also Portuguese policy on the subject - to leave youwith five ideas which I hope could help to feed discussion over the coming two days.As you know, Portugal currently exercises the responsibilities of Presidency of the Council ofthe European Union. Naturally, the Prevention, Preparedness, Pursuit and Response toterrorism constitute an important area of activity in our Presidency.The combat against radicalisation is of course, also for the EU, a major priority in thePrevention of Terrorism and the European Strategy on radicalisation is designated as “oncombating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism”. Before I further present the Union’spolicies and priorities in this area though, I think it is important to clarify how to perceive therelationship between the prevention of radicalisation and that of terrorism.In my view, preventing violent radicalisation should be a concern and an objective per se.I believe that Radicalisation should not be seen exclusively, or even mainly, in relation to therole it plays in facilitating the recruitment of terrorists or in providing terrorists with ideologicaland material support. Important as this relationship certainly is, I believe that violentradicalisation poses, in itself, a threat to democratic societies based on tolerance and the ruleof law. Actually, I believe that terrorism can often be understood as a process aimed at creatingfavourable conditions for radicalisation at least as much as the opposite.The first key idea I would like to leave for your consideration is therefore that we should notprevent radicalisation because of terrorism: all the important policies involved in the fightagainst radicalisation - education, integration, social solidarity and justice, developmentassistance, the promotion of international peace, etc. - they all have a long history in ourdemocracies inspired by a positive vision of the world and by a set of shared values which30 31

have oriented the development of our countries for generations. The fight againstradicalisation is a positive one: for diversity, tolerance, inclusiveness.The European Union has made significant accomplishments over the last few years in thefight against terrorism and it can today avail itself - in the Strategy and in the Action Planagainst terrorism - of a clear framework to establish policies and instruments in the differentdomains of the fight against terrorism.The EU Action Plan on the Fight Against terrorism was first established in the aftermath ofthe September 11 attacks in the United States Since. It gradually incorporated the awarenessof relationship between Radicalisation and Terrorism.This process intensified after the Madrid attacks of 11 March 2004. In June 2004, the EUHeads of State and of Government underlined “the importance of making use of the wideranginginstruments of the European Union in the context of addressing all the factors whichcontribute to terrorism”. A few months later, in October 2004, the European Commissionstarted working on its Communication on “addressing the factors contributing to violentradicalisation” adopted one year later, in October 2005.• Thirdly, I think that the chock of the July 2005 London terrorist attacks did play a majorrole, EU wide, in bringing forth to our citizens the notion that young people raised andeven born in our own countries could become to such an extent alienated that they couldin the extreme embark in a inwardly spiralling journey leading to the darkest pit of self andmutual destruction. This awareness took different paths in different EU countries: here, inthe Netherlands, the assassination of director Theo van Gogh in November 2004 was akey moment in the social understanding that tolerance does not automatically engendertolerance.The second key idea I would like to offer for debate, based on the EU experience is thatdeveloping effective policies in the fight against radicalisation requires drawing on the insightof experts and the intense work of administrations in open processes involving internationalcross-fertilisation; it is however a political process which relates to the very essence ofdemocratic societies and requires therefore political guidance at the highest level and theactive understanding and involvement of citizens.In this sense I would like to qualify my first key idea in the sense that if the prevention ofRadicalisation has much broader and deeper reasons than the prevention of terrorism,terrorism helps our societies to understand it “ad absurdum”.The adoption of the “European Union Strategy for combating Radicalisation and Recruitmentto Terrorism” and its implementing Action Plan in November 2005 built therefore bothupon the political signal given by the European Council and on one and a half year’s work byEuropean Institutions.I think however important to recall that three other elements played a major role in thedevelopment of the European Strategy on Radicalisation:• The first was the broad awareness and mobilisation on the issue of radicalisation and inparticular the intensive work accomplished in the field by academics and researchers fromaround the globe. I recall in particular the International Summit on Democracy, Securityand Terrorism which gathered in Madrid one year after the terrorist attacks. Many of theconcepts which were to be incorporated in the EU Strategy were discussed in Madrid onthe basis of documents produced by scores of the world top class academics. As oncemore we gather here today with some of the best academic minds of the moment I think itis important to tell them that “believe it or not, we do listen to what you say…”;• The second element was the cross-fertilization with policy development elsewhere: at nationallevel - in our own member states and in third countries - and globally. The EU Strategymay have been adopted a few months before the memorable address by Secretary GeneralAnnan in May 2006 and his recommendations for a Global Counter-Terrorist Strategywhose first component was “dissuading people from resorting to terrorism or supportingit”. However, EU and UN policies in this area developed in convergent interaction, areclosely intertwined and, are in my view, mutually supportive;I would not like to tire you with an exhaustive account of the European Union Strategy onRadicalisation, or thus abuse the time imparted for this address.Many of you will know that the EU Strategy while admitting that radicalisation “is notconfined to one belief system or political persuasion” focuses mainly on the mesh ofaccusations, diatribes and invectives which invoke the authority of Islam and the senseof equity of the target audience to attack fundamental rights notably those to life, integrityof person, dignity and freedom of expression.The Strategy affirms “the Union’s rejection of any justification for terrorism, religious orotherwise” welcoming the “strong stance that the people of Europe and beyond, includingMuslims, have taken to reject terrorism”. It enunciates the resolve of the Union to:• disrupt the activities of the networks and individuals who draw people into terrorism;• ensure that voices of mainstream opinion prevail over those of extremism;• promote yet more vigorously security, justice, democracy and opportunity for all.The EU Strategy focuses on specific challenges dealing for instance with radicalisationprocesses taking place through the internet, in prisons and places of education.It identifies as the core of the issue “propaganda which distorts conflicts around the world asa supposed proof of a clash between the West and Islam and which claims to give individualsboth an explanation for grievances and an outlet for their anger” identifying the need to worksimultaneously “to change the perceptions of European and Western policies particularly32 33

among Muslim Communities, and to correct unfair or inaccurate perceptions of Islam andMuslims”.The EU strategy identifies a number of conditions which contribute to creating an environmentin which people can more easily become radicalised and include “poor or autocraticgovernance; states moving from autocratic control via inadequate reform to partial democracy;rapid but unmanaged modernisation; and lack of political and economic prospects, unresolvedinternational and domestic strife; and inadequate and inappropriate education or culturalopportunities for young people”. It identifies ways and means to address those conditionswithin the EU and with regard to third countries.Our policies address reason and work best with balanced, educated, integrated, activemembers of our societies: these are the vast majority in all our countries and in themresides our strength. Better education, better integration, better prospects: yes, yes and yes.Otherwise, our policies and words need to remain firmly balanced, lucid and honest as that isthe only way we will retain the trust and respect of our societies and communities.At this point, and talking about balanced, lucid and honest policies allow me to say afew words on the way in which the Netherlands has been reflecting on its own challengesregarding Radicalisation and “Polarisation”, this one an innovative and operative concept toaddress group dynamics rather than individual ones.The EU strategy is in my view balanced, lucid and honest. It is the opposite of the propaganda itaims to fight and therefore very difficult to pursue, since countering simple lies with complextruths is never easy:• Our will to dialogue with Islam on these matters can be easily - and falsely - portrayed asmeaning that Islam is perceived as extraneous to Europe implying that millions of Muslimcitizens are somehow not “fully” Europeans;• The enunciation we make of the factors which facilitate radicalisation can be falselypresented as some sort of recognition of a justification for violent propaganda or evenviolence itself;• Our resolve to protect our citizens, notably the young, from those who want to destroythem as persons and as citizens and the need to “put in place the right legal framework toprevent individuals from inciting and legitimising violence” can be misrepresented as theprelude of autocratic “Big Brother” states meddling in everything from school, to prayer, tofamily life;• Conversely, our concern with correcting unfair or inaccurate perceptions of Islam andMuslims and with using language which is non-emotional and non offensive to Muslimscan be described by some as “white washing”, politically correct, or whimsical.The third idea I would like therefore to leave on the table for further debate - possibly alreadyin our next session which will deal with “dilemmas” - is that we must resist the temptation tofight like with like. I believe that, in spite of temptation, we should not try to fight propagandawith counter-propaganda. Propaganda thrives on feeling and works best with the mostvulnerable:• Children, ever younger ones;• Adolescents in their quest for identity and in their quest for a worthy quest;• Young adults weakened by lack of cultural and family references and by poor individualprospects;• Those living in depression or under oppression;The whole of Europe has been following with great interest the tremendous effort theNetherlands has put over the last two years or so in the development of its national Plan oncombating radicalisation and polarisation. Only the future will tell if you have found all theright answers but in my view a few things are certain: I believe from what I have read that youasked the right questions; that you did so in an honest, lucid and balanced way; that you didit the hard way - involving many ministries and authorities in the time honoured “poldering”tradition of the Dutch - and that you identified very interesting ideas, notably the involvementof local authorities in the fight against radicalisation.As a democrat, I do believe that not all intolerant opinions should be tolerated by the law andthat not all those which can be so should be politically tolerated. Stating that, loud and clear,takes political courage. So, without taking position on matters on Dutch internal policy, allowme nevertheless to express my genuine admiration for the way in which Dutch democracy isdealing with these extremely delicate matters.The extent of the effort undertaken by the Dutch authorities in developing their Plan bringsme to the forth idea which I would like to leave for further discussion. That if the identificationof the existence of radicalisation and the related problems often comes first to Governmentattention by means of police and security services and the formulation of policies to counterit often initiated by Ministries of Justice and Home Affairs, there is very little that these cando on their own to counter radicalisation, whether at national or European level. Finding waysand means to mobilise at national level inter alia the Ministries of Social Affairs, Education,Employment, Foreign Affairs and Development and at European level the correspondingCouncil formation is in my view a key challenge. Until we do so, chances are that our policieslook very good and do very little.Allow me as well at this point to show a bit a national pride which is perhaps not entirelyfitting in my capacity today as representative of the Presidency of the EU Council.It just so happens that last week was published a study on migrant integration policiesconducted in twenty eight developed countries including the Netherlands, Portugal, twenty34 35

three other EU Member States as well as Switzerland, Norway and Canada. This study lookedinto legislation and practice across six different areas: “access to the labour market”; “familyregrouping”, “long term residence”, “political participation”, “acquisition of nationality” and“non discrimination”. Belgium and The Netherlands came third and forth with practicallyidentical results.I am most proud to say that Portugal came only second to Sweden at the top of the list.Why do I bring the matter up, besides my Government’s understandable pride in theachievement? I do so for three reasons:• Firstly because while Portugal doesn’t have a policy specifically aimed at preventing andresponding against radicalisation - which is as such insignificant - my country does have, asmany others do, policies which are there because they correspond to values and needs andeffectively address many of the same concerns;• Secondly, to note that you don’t have to be very rich in order to be fair: the Portugueseknow as emigrants what migration can be at it worst and we want to treat ourimmigrants with the same respect which we wish be granted to our emigrants:“do on to others”;• Finally, because this fact may help to explain why the Portuguese Presidency of the EUdecided to invest considerably in taking forward EU work in the area of prevention andresponse against radicalisation. Why?- Firstly, because - as I previously said - I believe that you don’t have to have a radicalisationproblem for the measures required to fight radicalisation to make sense in their ownterms: for ourselves, for other countries like ourselves or for Europe as a whole. We do itbecause it’s right; because it is in accordance with our principles and our values;- Secondly, because we are all in this together. If radicalisation is a problem with which theNetherlands, the UK or other EU Member State are confronted, and the EU can help toaddress it; then the EU should help. That is the meaning of Solidarity. Furthermore, it isa problem with which our non EU neighbours or other partners are confronted and theEU can help, we believe that it should help too. Not only because in today’s worldradicalisation is “contagious” across continents, but because the policies which makesense to fight radicalisation in these countries would make sense anyway with a view tosupporting sustainable human development;- Thirdly, because now is the time to act. My Government believes that it would be amistake to be complacent - independently of the fact that radicalisation is currentlypractically unknown in Portugal and of our good performance e.g. in integration ofmigrants. To the contrary, radicalisation can spread from abroad and it can developinsidiously in our midst. A major recent judicial action in Portugal against dozens of“skinheads” testifies to our vigilance to fight violent intolerance and prejudice inwhatever guise with the full might of the law.With your indulgence I would like to end referring that, in the area of Radicalisation andRecruitment to terrorism we have proposed to focus as EU Presidency in an area where theNetherlands is today perceived as one the Member States with a greater knowledge andexpertise, that of radicalisation of youth.The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorismclearly identifies the challenge of preventing and addressing the radicalization of young peopleboth in the EU and in third countries. Furthermore, it identifies places of education as offeringvulnerabilities to those playing a role in radicalization while focusing on the importance of theliterature which propagates an extremist worldview which brings individuals to consider andjustify violence.We organized therefore in Brussels on 11 September 2007 an EU seminar on “preventingand addressing radicalization of youth”. This aimed to: seek a common understanding ofthe current trends in the radicalization of youth in the EU and third Countries, as well as thecontributing factors; to share information about responses developed at national level, todetermine good practice and work together to come up with new ideas on how to addressthis challenge;The Council will now consider the establishment of recommendations addressing action bothat Member State and EU level and including elements to be implemented as appropriate indifferent pillars and frameworks. These could include both specific initiatives as well asconcerns to be streamlined in the context of existing policies, also in bilateral relations withthird countries notably trough appropriate use of political dialogue and assistance programs.Why have we, Portugal, during our EU Presidency focussed on the radicalisation of youth?Quite simply because we think that if, in many regards, what we do today will affect theconditions we will have to contend with in ten or twenty years, in no area is this more truethan in this one. That is the last of the five ideas I would like to leave you with: tomorrow’spotential alienated youth and even terrorists are today just children: our children. It is ourduty to protect them and to offer them ways towards fulfilment, participation and citizenship.Whether these children live and grow in Lisbon, Rotterdam, Leids, Marrakesh or Jakarta - thatcertainly makes a difference as regards which government has the primary responsibilities foraddressing their needs. In a way though, it makes little difference: they are our children - all ofthem - and we are responsible - all of us.Thank you for your kind interest and attention.36 37

Ufuk GokcenAdvisor to Secretary General H.E. Prof. Ihsanoglu of the Organisation of the Islamic Conferenceimpact on the international cooperation in line with the global efforts to stem the increasingtrend of radicalization and the worldwide scourge of terrorism whose evils have plagued allsocieties without regard to nation, country, faith, or ideology. We must remember that theOIC Member States have lost the most in the face of scourge of extremism and terrorism.The text of the statement of the OIC Secretary General H.E. Prof. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu at theinaugural session of the international conference on countering radicalisation: perspectives andstrategies from around the world, The Hague, Netherlands, 23 October 2007.(The Statement was read out by His Adviser Mr. Ufuk Gokcen).Mr. Minister, Mr. Chairperson, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,I have the honour to represent the Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference(OIC) His Excellency Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu in this important conference. He deeply regrets notbeing able to attend personally but has asked me to read out his statement to the Conference.He hopes that his statement will shed light on the views of the Muslim world and particularly ofthe Organization of the Islamic Conference representing 57 member states, regarding radicalism,extremism and terrorism. Now I will read out the statement of H.E. the OIC Secretary Generaland I quote:Islam is known to have considered killing human beings as one of the most heinous crimes.Hence, Islam has penalized this horror with exceptionally harsh punishment, in consecrationof the sanctity of human life and protection of citizens from sheer terror and unjust aggression.Going one step further, we can assert that Islam has always sought to eradicate the rootcausesand possible seeds of terrorism, whether they are political, economic, or social.It is against the backdrop of these clearly-committed Islamic principles that the Organizationof the Islamic Conference has built an abidingly sensitive stance on issues related to terrorism.It has pioneered efforts to array all resources and forces at its disposal in the fight againstterrorism. That is why the OIC took steps as early as June 1987 to convene an internationalsymposium on terrorism, which was held in Geneva, under the title, “International Symposiumon Terrorism in the Modern World and its Impact on Individual Security, Political Stability,and World Peace”. Then, in December 1994, the OIC adopted the Code of Conduct onCombating Terrorism, which ushers in a binding-commitment on all its Member States.“Excellencies, Ladies Gentlemen,On behalf of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and my own, I convey my sinceregreetings and present my best wishes to the organizers and participants of this InternationalConference.It would have indeed been a matter of honour and pleasure for me to be among such adistinguished group of personalities on this auspicious occasion. However, I deeply regretmy inability to do so due to some urgent preoccupations that require my stay in Jeddah atthis time.I believe that the subject matter of this Conference is a very important one and as acontemporary challenge, lies at the heart of many current crucial issues that the internationalcommunity is trying to deal with. It has also resonances and implications for the futureand prosperity of the humanity and next generations.On this occasion, I should express my appreciation and thanks to the Dutch authorities fortaking this timely and praiseworthy initiative and for inviting my organization.I sincerely hope that this conference will contribute to the better understanding of the variousaspects and perspectives with regard to the challenge that we are facing and make a positiveThe December 1994 OIC Rabat Declaration of Principles on International Terrorism:1. Stated that under no condition is any act of terror justified,2. Committed not to financially support terrorist operations,3. Called for the improvement of cooperation within the Organization in the area of fightingterrorism,4. Underlined the necessity of promoting the correct image of Islam and5. Called for introduction of proper anti-terror ethics and morals into member-countries’educational curricula.In July 1999, OIC efforts culminated in the signing of its Convention on Combating InternationalTerrorism, which again is a binding-document on all 57 OIC States. The document itself is animpressive text of forty two articles of law addressing a variety of issues, ranging from offeringa definition of terrorism to instituting measures to prevent and combat terrorist crimes, aswell as identifying areas of cooperation and coordination among the OIC Member States onsecurity and extradition of terrorist criminals, developing expert and witness protectionprogrammes, and other details.The OIC Convention - though comprehensive in nature - has, above all, stressed the needfor the signatory states to demonstrate commitment to the provisions of twelve other internationaltreaties dedicated to the fight against terrorism, which constitute the sum-total ofall conventions adopted by the international community to that end between 1963 and 1999.38 39

Consequently, this OIC Convention was ratified by the required quorum of signatory partiesmembers of the OIC and, in November 2002, entered into force.On 7-8 December 2005, leaders of members of the Organization of Islamic Conferencemet in Makkah, Saudi Arabia, during the third OIC Extraordinary Summit. The Declarationissued at the conclusion of this OIC Summit reiterated the common will to combat terrorismand extremism. The Declaration condemned terrorism; stressed the need to criminalize allaspects of terrorism, including its financing; and rejected any justification for the deliberatekilling of innocent civilians. In addition, the OIC Declaration condemned extremism andcalled for developing school curricula that “strengthen the values of understanding, tolerance,dialogue and pluralism.”At the above-referred OIC Extraordinary Summit Conference, when the new vision of theorganization was elaborated as a reply to the challenges that the Muslim World is facing inthe 21st century, the leaders have also adopted a Ten year Program of Action in which theyreaffirmed their resolve to combat the scourge of international terrorism with special requestfor the Member States to review national legislations in order to criminalize all terroristactions and practices, that support, finance and instigate terrorism.The Makkah Summit further agreed to work for the creation of an international CounterTerrorism centre under the aegis of the United Nations.Ladies and Gentlemen,The OIC countries condemn the scourge of terrorisms in all its forms and manifestations.The OIC considers that a comprehensive definition of terrorism must draw a clear distinctionbetween the legitimate struggles for the realization of the right to self-determination andagainst foreign occupation or alien domination. We also believe that any discussion andoutcome on the issue of terrorism would remain incomplete without adequate reference toacts of terrorism perpetrated by States and occupying powers.Terrorism is defined by the New Vision of the OIC as a global phenomenon that is not relatedto any religion, race or country. It is consequently distinguishable from legitimate resistanceto foreign occupation which does not sanction the killing of innocent civilians. In condemningterrorism in all its forms and rejecting any attempts to justify or rationalize it, the New Visionalso commits the OIC to advance the introduction of comprehensive qualitative changes inthe national laws and legislations of Member States to criminalize all terrorist practicesincluding supporting, financing and instigating terrorism.The OIC General Secretariat is willing to build up capacity to play an active role in coordinatingthe efforts of Member States and assisting in the UN Counter-Terrorism strategy. The NewVision is also committed to advancing the ratification and implementation of the OICConvention on Combating Terrorism which entered into force in November 2002.However, it is our conviction that extremism and terrorism cannot be defeated only byconventions or power of arms. Instead of dealing with the consequences, first we should tryvery sincerely to properly understand and identify the environment, conditions and rootcauses that breed extremism and terrorism. Then, accordingly we can apply remedies withina comprehensive approach by addressing the root causes.From the OIC`s perspective, a comprehensive approach would probably necessitate takingsteps with a view to,• resolving the political conflicts and injustices which lie at the root of the anger, frustrationand despair which breed the foot soldiers of terrorism;• promoting socio-economic and human development including by eradicating poverty whichexacerbates conflicts and addressing gender, youth and child issues;• championing pluralism, full participation and democracy;• giving emphasize to education;• taking serious steps to diminish the growing trend of intolerance and discriminationagainst Muslims;• fostering intercultural, inter-civilisational and inter-religious cohabitation and mutualrecognition.The challenges of radicalism, extremism and terrorism are universal in nature. We all arevictims of them, irrespective of our geographic, cultural and civilisational backgrounds.Therefore only a universal effort will succeed to defeat these challenges. The tragedy ofSeptember 11 illustrated the threat from terrorism in a globalised yet unequal world. Itdemonstrated the force of fanaticism. It revealed the breeding ground for this contemporaryevil. It exposed the formidable challenge that the world must confront.Ladies and Gentlemen,Unfortunately from the perspective of the Muslim world, their religion and its values are underattack. They perceive that the tenets, values and customs of Islam have been denigrated andMuslims have been the victims of discrimination and intolerance. They consider that whentaking innocent lives is forbidden in Islam and Islam is a religion of peace and moderation,upholding the value of sanctity of human life, associating it with terrorism is an assaultagainst its most sacred principles and a gross injustice.We should try to understand that at a time when most political ideologies lost their appealand validity, Islam is being hijacked by political extremists. It is being exploited by them as anideological cover to further their political agenda. These radical elements are political forcesby nature and they do not represent Islam and 1.3 billion peaceful Muslims of the world.We should all be bold enough to speak up against misrepresentation and misuse of Islam bythe extremists and deviant forces to validate their violent agenda and recruit militants. This iswhat the OIC has been doing.40 41

At the same time, when we randomly use expressions in a way to associate Islam with violenceand terrorism through terminology such as “Islamic terrorists” or “Islamist radicals andfundamentalist”, we should be aware that we are committing an injustice to 1.3 billion peopleby fortifying their sense of victimization and giving a very wrong message to the Westernpublic opinion regarding the nature of a peaceful religion.As a matter of fact, the literal meaning of the word “Islam” is peace. Since the dawn of Islam,preached by Prophet Mohammed (Pbuh), Muslims have been working to fulfil mankind’smost cherished dream so that the sun of peace could always shine in the human worldcreated on the basis of human rights and dignity as well as supremacy of justice and equalityamong all beings. Islamic values provided the framework for a tolerant society fourteencenturies back in the shape of the covenant of Madinah and the last sermon of ProphetMuhammad (Pbuh). Its history has witnessed co-existence among followers of differentreligions, mainly with Christians and Jews. Islam demands its followers to acknowledge theProphets of Judaism and Christianity as the true messengers of God. The emphasis given onthe rights of neighbours in Islamic law makes the religion a unique example of friendship,compassion, cooperation and solidarity.building, science and technology and economic development, in line with the MillenniumDevelopment Goals of the United Nations.The OIC General Secretariat is also exerting efforts to promote human rights and goodgovernance within the Islamic world, first by developing capacity at the Secretariat in Jeddah.Studies are being conducted to establish a human rights unit to interact with the internationalactors and agencies.I believe that building a global human rights culture, which values worth of every humanbeing, diversity of cultures, religions and civilizations is of crucial importance. Respect forhuman rights and human dignity are core values of Islam. We assure the internationalcommunity of our full cooperation in promoting these values universally.I would also like to share with you that within the process of restructuring of the OICinstitutions over the past few years, we have managed to introduce major reforms. Amongthese steps, we have overhauled the International Islamic Fiqh Academy (IIFA) to emphasizeits role as an authority for jurisprudence rulings.Given the virtues strictly upheld by Islam, there should have been peaceful coexistence betweenthe West and the Islamic world and rightly so, as history tells us, it was like that for centuries.Unfortunately, the current reality does not project that rosy picture anymore. The relationshipbetween the West and Islam has now become somehow an uneasy one due to misunderstandings,misinformation, misrepresentation and surge of extremists on both sides.In order to tackle this challenge, the OIC has been endeavouring to cooperate with the internationalcommunity and particularly with the Western countries to launch a visible publiccampaign to counter this negative and derogatory projection of Islam and discriminatory actsagainst Muslims and emphasizing the importance of cooperation and engagement of thepolitical leaders by designing a roadmap which will target not only combating Islamophobiabut also Anti-Semitism, Christianophobia and anti-Western sentiments and at the same time,of reaching a historical reconciliation between the Muslim and Christian Worlds to give a realand practical meaning to all dialogue efforts.The OIC initiative to bring together senior Sunni and Shiite Iraqi religious leaders in Makkah,Saudi Arabia during the holy moth of Ramadan in October 2006 to sign and pledgecommitment to the Makkah Al Mukarramah Document on Iraq to reject violence andsectarian fighting in Iraq was one of the important preventive interventions of theInternational Islamic Fiqh Academy with a view to contribute to the peace and security inIraq. The International Islamic Fiqh Academy’s intervention when some South Koreanscitizens were kidnapped by Taliban in Afghanistan can also be cited as an example in thisregard. In addition to the calls of the OIC General Secretariat, the Academy appealed to theTaliban movement, through a religious edict, to abide by the ethics of Islam which calls forcompassion. It also reminded them that Islam prohibits kidnapping and killing and considersthem corruption on the land, which every Muslim must avoid. The Academy’s religious edictto combat polio disease in West Africa within the framework of cooperation between the OICand WHO is another important example of the endeavours to preach moderation andmodernization in the Muslim world.Ladies and Gentlemen,As the official representative in the international fora of the Muslim world, with a membershipof 57 states and of 1.3 billion of Muslims, the OIC is advocating moderation, modernizationand development in the Muslim World as opposed to underdevelopment which providesfertile ground for extremism and political conflicts. In this sense, the last extraordinary OICSummit was a historical turning point. Since then, we have embarked upon developing projectsfor combating terrorism and extremism, alleviating poverty, fighting illiteracy and diseases,as well as building up capacity for implementing projects in conflict prevention, peaceLadies and Gentlemen,In conclusion, I appeal to you not to credit those who venture to exhibit Islam as the sourceof radicalization, extremism and terrorism, whereas the real root causes of these dangeroustrends have nothing to do with Islam.Finally, I wish you all constructive deliberations and fruitful results in your proceedings.Thank you for your attention.”42 43

Robert C. OrrUnited Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Policy PlanningI would like to thank the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands for organising thisconference.Countering radicalisation is a key component of global efforts against terrorism, and theissue of radicalisation plays a significant role in the counter-terrorism program of the UnitedNations. This is reflected not only in the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, passed by theGA in September 2006, but also in the work of the UN Counter-Terrorism ImplementationTask Force.Today, I would like to discuss briefly with you three topics. First, the background and thinkingthat went into the discussion of radicalisation in the UN counter-terrorism agenda, as it isreflected in the Strategy. Second, the work of the UN Counter-Terrorism ImplementationTask Force in facilitating Member States action against radicalisation and extremism thatlead to terrorism. Finally, the question of the follow up- particularly with regard to how theUN can benefit from the conclusions and recommendations of this conference as we moveforward.Radicalisation and the UN Global Counter-Terrorism StrategyTo begin, radicalisation can be seen as a thread that runs through and thus links all fourthematic pillars of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. These are, as you are no doubtaware:• Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism;• Measures to prevent and combat terrorism;• Measures to build States’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen therole of the United Nations system in this regard; and• Measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamentalbasis of the fight against terrorism.The Strategy addresses the issues of radicalisation most directly within the first of thesepillars, conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. Conditions conducive include:“prolonged unresolved conflicts, dehumanisation of victims of terrorism in all its forms andmanifestations, lack of rule of law and violations of human rights, ethnic, national and religiousdiscrimination, political exclusion, socio-economic marginalisation, and lack of goodgovernance”.In their discussion of measures aimed at addressing such conditions, Member States includetheir resolve to “pursue and reinforce development and social inclusion agendas at everylevel as goals in themselves, recognising that success in this area, especially on youthunemployment, could reduce marginalisation and the subsequent sense of victimisation thatpropels extremism and the recruitment of terrorists”.The issue of radicalisation is also an undercurrent in the discussion of measures to preventand combat terrorism, where States resolve to deny terrorists “access to the means to carryout their attacks, to their targets and to the desired impact of their attacks”, including byexploring ways and means to use the Internet in countering the spread of terrorism. In orderto prevent and combat individual attacks, but also at the tools increasingly used to promotethe radicalisation process, such as the internet.Again, in the area of human rights and the rule of law, the issue of radicalisation is relevant,as a lack of rule of law and violations of human rights have been identified as conditionsconducive to the spread of terrorism.So one reason radicalisation is an important part of the UN counter-terrorism agenda is thatit acts as a uniting thread between the pillars of the Strategy.Second, radicalisation, like the terrorism that it can sometimes lead to, is not just a localphenomenon, but also a global one- and this requires a multi-level response. While eachterrorist may be inspired by local conditions and grievances, the process of radicalisationoften involves international links. Moreover, even when local conditions differ, the processof radicalisation is often similar, and efforts to combat it thus need to draw on experiencesand expertise from across the globe. The UN, therefore, presents an appropriate venue forresponse, and the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and appropriate took from MemberStates.Third, countering radicalisation represents a pragmatic approach to fighting terrorism. Whilelarge financial and human investments are necessary to address certain important aspectsof the fight against terrorism encompassed in the UN Strategy, such as law enforcementcooperation and infrastructure protection, the preventive nature of countering radicalisationmakes it one of the most cost-effective avenues for combating terrorism.Radicalisation and the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task ForceThe challenge for all of us is in helping States move forward from the recognition of the dangersof radicalisation toward taking action against these problems. As you are demonstrating atthis conference, and as other meetings and national approaches have confirmed, States invery different parts of the world are becoming increasingly aware of the need to addressradicalisation and related issues both domestically and abroad.44 45

Addressing radicalisation is also one of the challenges on which the UN Counter-TerrorismImplementation Task Force is working. The Task Force, established by the Secretary-Generalin 2005, serves as a forum to discuss strategic issues and ensure coherent action across theUN system in counter-terrorism. The Task Force can also serve as a natural liaison betweenthe UN, Member States, regional and sub regional organisations and civil society in facilitatingstructures cooperation on implementing the Strategy.Our approach had been to look at radicalisation and extremism in so far as they may beprecursors to terrorism. Only a very small minority of individuals may move from beingextremists to condoning or committing acts of terrorism. It is important to examine whythis line is overstepped and what should be done to prevent individuals from doing so.As the Secretary General’s April 2006 report, “Uniting against terrorism: Recommendationsfor a Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy”, notes, “we must prevent moderates from becomingmilitant extremists and militant extremists from becoming terrorists”.Although action to counter radicalisation and to implement the UN Strategy must come fromthe Member States themselves, the Task Force is ready to provide assistance, particularlythrough its working group on “Addressing Radicalisation and Extremism that Lead toTerrorism”, which is ably co-chaired by Richard Barrett - who is here with us today - as wellas the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, and the ExecutiveOffice of the UN Secretary-General. Among other things, the Task Force aims to:• Offer Member States assistance in identifying how radicalisation and extremism may leadto terrorism;• Provide a mapping and analysis of carious national and international initiatives thatattempt to understand and deal with radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism;• Elaborate a set of examples and general principles for Member States to help them addressradicalisation and extremism that lead to terrorism.The Task Force is also prepares to facilitate a discussion between the various actors involvedon the issue of the Internet and its use for terrorist purposes, including through theradicalisation and recruitment of new operatives. This would likely involve convening actorsfrom across relevant fields, including constitutional law, human rights, and counter-terrorism,as well as the Internet industry, to discuss the range of possible action. It would also includemapping out what initiatives and resources exist, nationally and internationally, in this areathus far.Further, as part of the ongoing efforts to promote inter-cultural and inter-religious dialogue,the UN is also organising, next month Tunis, with the Organsiation of the Islamic Conference(OIC) and the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (ISESCO), an internationalconference on “Terrorism: Dimensions, Threats and Counter-Measures”.Countering radicalisation: Moving forwardWith multiple countries working together toward the same purpose and sharing theirexperiences, we should be able to see great strides in our understanding of radicalisation andour ability to counter it. This conference is certainly an excellent example of progress towardthese ends and it should be linked in with existing national and international initiatives, aswell as upcoming ones.The president of the UN General Assembly has arranges for an informal meeting to discussthe implementation of the UN Strategy in December. The main objective is to highlightfurther specific opportunities for Member States involvement in the implementation of theStrategy and to mobilize Member States and the UN system for achieving tangible resultsbefore the formal review of the Strategy in 2008.In this regard, feeding a discussion of this conference and of its conclusions andrecommendations into the informal meeting could be particularly valuable for other MemberStates looking address radicalisation. I would also encourage Member States to focus onwhat they have done nationally to implement the Strategy in the area of radicalisation andwhat initiatives they have undertaken that other States might join.Because of the nature of radicalisation, countering it will require partnerships across nationaland regional lines. Your assistance in helping States - particularly those outside of Europe -to see how they can participate in and take up counter-radicalisation initiatives is importantand would facilitate the work of the Task Force and UN entities in this regard.Thank you.The Task Force will be seeking substantive input from Member States and potential partnershipswith relevant national experts, civil society, and academics in order to gather informationrelevant to its work on radicalisation, as well as to facilitate the exchange of lessons learnedwhere appropriate.46 47

Dilemmas, effective strategies and measures tocounter radicalisation in EuropeBob de GraaffProfessor Terrorism and Counter terrorism, Leiden UniversityThe NetherlandsIt used to be said that in many instances the best recruiters for terrorism were governments,as their mistaken policies forced certain groups within the state to radicalize. Nowadays,in a globalised world, external factors seem to be overriding, such as the missionary salafiactivities from especially Saudi-Arabia, the presence and conduct of foreign troops in Iraq,Afghanistan and the Palestinian areas, the war in Chechnya, or the propaganda by groupslike Al-Qaeda, which is spread out over the globe through the Internet. However, this doesnot mean that national counter radicalization and counterterrorist policies have becomeirrelevant and that their unintended effects may not hamper the fight against radicalizationand political violence. I think there is a certain tendency in Dutch counter radicalization policythat may turn it into a part of the problem rather than offering a solution. And the reason for itis that government authorities and many opinion-makers look at processes like radicalizationand polarization as a car that needs to be fixed, whereas the way different communities livetogether in one society and one state has much more to do with working on a marriage ormaintaining a good atmosphere in a family, a process that takes at least two to tango andalso a process that never ends as long as the family stays together.Because of the short speaking time that has been allotted to me I will not speak about theso-called Dutch comprehensive approach of counter radicalization and counterterrorism ingeneral. I have written a piece about that in the volume that accompanies this conference;you can read it there. Instead I will focus on just one central aspect, which has become quitedominant in the comprehensive approach, i.e. the fear of the longing by certain groups, inparticular salafi groups, for isolation from the rest of society. And the reason for addressingespecially this topic is that in my opinion the comprehensive approach has an inherentdanger to cast the nets of government interference and in particular that of intelligence andsecurity services too wide over society, since it not only encompasses political violence, butalso the pre-stage, where radical ideas, that may lead to violence, are formed. A report by theAIVD, the Dutch civil security service, which appeared just a fortnight ago, “Radicale dawa inverandering” (A new phase in the development of Islamic radicalism) takes this line of thinkingeven further, by not only taking the ultimate possibility of political violence as its startingpoint, but considering radical religious ideas as in themselves dangerous in so far as theymay have social isolation as a consequence.I have to ask for a bit of consideration and patience from our foreign guests, because I willelaborate particularly on the Dutch experience but in the end I will show that the Dutchexperience is very relevant to the global perspective and it all comes down to the way we48 49

envisage our societies. Without much underlying research it is taken for granted by someof the Dutch authorities that isolation will lead to a kind of exclusivism that may threatenthe existence of nationally shared values and identities. It is also feared that by a voluntarywithdrawal from society the claim by those who do so that people are excluded from betterpositions in the society at large will become a self-fulfilling prophecy. As far as shared nationalidentities are concerned it is hard to establish whether there is a Dutch identity at all. It hasalmost become unimaginable since The Netherlands has become so inward-looking over thepast years, but for a long time since the Second World War the Dutch took pride that theirnational identity came down to only one thing, i.e. that they had none. They more or lessconsidered themselves to be citizens of the world, cosmopolitans. They were only remindedof their national consciousness when the world turned out to be not the ideal place theyhad taken it for, e.g. when world opinion disapproved of the post-war continuation of theircolonial domination over Indonesia, when the Germans or Argentineans did not allow themto win the soccer world cup or when they felt left alone by the UN and NATO allies whenDutch blue-helmets were confronted with a Serb offensive against the so-called safe areaSrebrenica, leading to the deaths of about 8,000 Muslim men.It is only during recent years that the idea of a Dutch national identity has become prominentagain, e.g. in the form of museums or canonized histories. The reason for this is, and Iwill return to that in a while, globalization and the existence of large groups of new-comersamong the Dutch citizens. But it is still very difficult to establish what the Dutch identityis like, as was underlined by the recent controversy and misunderstandings over princessMaxima’s words about the existence or non-existence of a Dutch identity.But what about nationally shared values? Since the early twentieth century, the Dutch socialand political system was characterized by what was called pillarization. The Roman Catholics,the Protestants, the Social-Democrats and the Liberal-Neutrals had their own socialorganizations for just about everything: not only political parties, but also trade unions,schools, broadcasting corporations, sports and hobby clubs and housing corporations.Intermarriage and friendships across the pillars were quite uncommon and to a large extentthere were even geographical dividing lines. National politics could only be brought aboutby a system of backroom wheeling and dealing by the elites of the different pillars. This allchanged almost overnight in the late 1960s, although remnants of the system of pillarizationremained, especially in the fields of education and broadcasting. I dare to argue that todayThe Netherlands are still trying to find an alternative for this system of social cohesion, whichdisappeared about forty years ago.For the next twenty years Dutch politics were divided among the lines of left vs. right orprogressive against conservative. But since then a new divide has been in the making, forwhich the events of 9/11 acted as a catalyst. The values of individualism, individual selfexpression,personal development and self-fulfilment, the hedonistic ‘everything-must-be-possible’ and ‘everything-must-be-allowed’-values were more and more contested by valuesthat stressed community, bonding, belonging, togetherness, smugness, communal moralityand the right of interference by government even behind the front door. On the one hand wenow have those who still cling to the individual liberties that were gained during the 1960sand feel threatened by the new smugness, on the other we have the ones who as citizens tryto (re-)establish conservative moral values of civic life and belief in the malleability of societyby the government, but who as consumers still try to profit from all aspects of individuality.Groups of newcomers and their descendants who are searching for an identity in TheNetherlands, whether it is an ethnic identity, a religious identity or a Dutch identity of theirown making, are caught in the middle of this uncertainty among the original Dutch population.The ones among the latter who value individualism and often have become secularized donot like behaviour of individuals that stresses the longing for a community, let alone a senseof religious community. And those who value national civic norms do not approve of peoplewho are trying to maintain a separate identity, even though such behaviour used to be part ofDutch social and political life up until 40 years ago. One group does not want a return to thesituation of the 1950s from which they are glad to have liberated themselves or having beenliberated by their ancestors. Others may like the idea of a nostalgic return to such a situation,but in that case without the newcomers who started to arrive in The Netherlands from theearly 1960s on.When some of these newcomers start making use of the remnants of pillarization, e.g. byestablishing Islamic schools or using the Dutch broadcasting system for their particularpurposes, both groups feel betrayed in a way, as if history played a trick on them. E.g. almostevery time I drop the idea of the establishment of an Islamic housing corporation that wouldbuild let us say 300 houses exclusively for people of their own denomination, I see the shuddersgoing down the spines of Dutch authorities. And yet, this is what Roman Catholic andProtestant housing corporations used to do for decades. One should have read the negativecomments in both newspapers and, even worse, on the Internet when it was announced thatan Islamic hospital might be established in the city of Rotterdam. And yet, we are used to forinstance Roman Catholic hospitals; in the past some of them were almost completely runby nuns or friars. And when I go to my nearest hospital they hand me a leaflet that says thatbecause of their religious background they have stricter guidelines on abortion and euthanasiathan other hospitals and I accept it without complaining.But what was accepted once is not received now. In many instances we experience theGleichzeitigkeit der Ungleichzeitigkeiten, a concept that Ernst Bloch introduced in 1935 inhis “Erbschaft dieser Zeit”, the synchronicity of non-synchronicities, especially in the field ofnorms and values and actual conduct. We do not accept that others behave like we did untilquite recently. We live in an age - and here I am transgressing the Dutch borders - we live inan age in which the word contemporary has gained a global meaning, i.e. it may make adifference to somebody in Beirut what happens in Copenhagen and what happens in Eastern50 51

Theo BotDeputy Director, General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD)The NetherlandsA new phase in Islamic radicalism in theNetherlands and Western EuropeDear ladies and gentlemen,It is with great pleasure that I would like to share with you the most important findings of therecent publication of my service entitled ‘The radical dawa in transition. The rise of Islamicneoradicalism in the Netherlands’. This report was presented to Dutch parliament on the 9thof October and was discussed there last week. The English translation will be ready early nextweek and I will send the report to all those participants who are interested. In anticipationof this translation I would like to guide you through this report and tell something about themost important findings.This report describes a movement in transition: Dutch and European Islamic radicalism.This movement, Islamic radicalism, first reached the Netherlands in the mid-1980s, originallyestablished by Saudi Arabian missionary groups seeking to spread an ultra-orthodox religiousideology. From the outset, Salafism – one of the most radical of all currents within presentday Islam – played a prominent role within the Dutch Islamic radical movement. Elsewhere inEurope, however, other organisations took the lead. They included the Muslim Brotherhood,Tablighi Jamaat and Hizb ut-Tahrir. All are described by our service as ultra-orthodox becausethey are very rigid in their theological interpretations, are absolutely convinced of their ownrighteousness and abhor all forms of religious modernity. They also are considered radical,because they actively want to force society to reform along strict Islamic lines, therewithrejecting the Western democratic legal order. This desire for activism forms an importantdistinction with more traditional ultra orthodox groups.The AIVD has identified three phases in the development of Islamic radicalism in theNetherlands and Europe. During each of these, the movement has manifested itselfdifferently, with a new form of radicalism emerging. The third of these phases has recentlybegun, although this does not mean that the latest kind of radicalism has supplanted thetwo from earlier phases; in fact, all three continue to exist in parallel.In the first phase, which began in the mid-1980s and persists to this day, a small number ofultra-orthodox mosques and preachers receive direct ideological, logistical and financialsupport from Saudi Arabia. For instance, both the al-Tawheed mosque in Amsterdam and theal-Fourqaan mosque in Eindhoven, two prominent Salafi mosques, were established in themid eighties of the last century by the Saudi Arabian missionary organisations al-Haramainand al-Waqf al-Islami. Their message is that of the ‘radical dawa’. ‘Dawa’ literally means ‘callto Islam’; the ‘radical’ designation refers to evangelical activities by missionary groups withan extreme and ultra-orthodox message. For the most part, their targets for conversion arefellow Muslims. As well as preachers of radical dawa, this phase also saw a number of jihadiveterans of the wars in Afghanistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina establishing themselves in theNetherlands and elsewhere in Western-Europe. Their activities served violent ends and theydisplayed, at the very least, strong ideological associations with the Al-Qaeda network. Duringthis phase, the radical dawa and jihadism maintained close relationships and sometimeseven institutional links. If necessary they closed ranks and joined forces. Both the radicaldawa and the jihad also had a strong orientation towards their country of origin and theworldwide Islamic Ummah. There was little or no contact with the surrounding environment.Together, these two currents make up Islamic radicalism. For several reasons, their growthwas limited during this phase.The second phase began after the attacks of 11 September 2001 and was accelerated by anumber of other relevant events: the 2003 Madrid bombings, the 2004 murder of film-makerTheo van Gogh in Amsterdam and the 2005 London attacks. Due in part to the dismantlingof international terrorist networks after 2001, the guiding role played by certain Islamic statesgradually declined during this phase. Instead, there was a process of autonomisation, withthe focus increasingly shifting to Western Muslims’ host nations. Islamic radicals now soughtto defend their faith in the West against those perceived as its ‘enemies’ here. Islam was notonly under attack in the Western world but also in the West. Feelings of resentment became astrong motivating factor. This phase is also characterised by fragmentation, amateurism andthe rapid growth of so-called ‘cut-and-paste’ ideology, involving selective citation from Islamicsources. Rapid acceleration towards very extreme thoughts and actions is also characteristicof this phase. In the Netherlands, it was in this period that the so-called Hofstad Group andMohammed Bouyeri, the murderer of Theo van Gogh, was active.The third phase, which began in about mid-2005, is a direct reaction to the second phase andis closely associated with the activities of a new generation of radical dawa preachers which isemerging since 2005. Drawn from the second generation of Muslims in the West, they cameto realise that Islam’s expansion and reputation were being damaged by the poor organisationof its radical current in Europe, by its unclear ideological message and by its flirtations withviolence. These new preachers emphatically oppose the use of violent means in the West,as a result of which they have broken with the jihadists. Tactically, they go in search of welldefinedtarget audiences to reach with specific, tailor-made messages.With the onset of the third phase, the radical dawa in the Netherlands and several other54 55

countries in our region has become an integral part of Western society. The radical dawa isno longer, like before, highly dependent on the support of Saudi Arabia or other so-calledIslamic guide nations. Its preachers, who grew up in Europe, represent the vanguard of a newmovement. Precisely because of their background, they know exactly what issues concern thesecond generation of Muslims in the West and understand the region’s wider social andpolitical processes.The AIVD defines this process of autonomisation, professionalisation and politicisation asthe rise of Islamic neoradicalism. The new radicals behave differently from their predecessors,and they also employ different tactics in pursuit of their objectives. Rather that operating insocial isolation and seeking confrontation, for example, they focus on achieving steady butpermanent growth for radical Islam in Europe.Although the activists involved in this process are limited in number, their movement iscurrently expanding in the Netherlands and in several other countries in our region.At present we have four Salafi mosques in the Netherlands which are headed by charismaticpreachers from either Egypt, Sudan or Syria. These preachers mainly cater for first generationMuslim migrants, mainly from Morocco. For quite a while their Salafi message was ratherunsuccessful. The religious differences between the devout but moderate first generationMoroccans and the first generation Salafi preachers was too great. Since 2005 however,charismatic Salafi youth preachers, all born or raised in the Netherlands, have been travellingup and down the country to deliver their message to an audience of so-called secondgeneration Moroccans. They do this mainly at mosques catering to the Dutch Moroccancommunity and at Islamic youth centres. In general the so called first generation of Moroccanmigrants are not included. They are deemed too traditional. In the past two years, the numberof such centres and of youth preachers, as well as the number of lectures given and locationsvisited, have at least doubled. Attendances at the meetings are rising, too. Sometimes morethen one hundred young visitors do attend such a Salafist lecture. It is expected that thistrend will continue.Muslim radicalism in the Netherlands is most successful in reaching young Dutch citizensof Moroccan origin and young members of other immigrant communities with their originsin the Middle East and Somalia, as well as white converts. Especially converts seem toembrace the more radical strands within Islam quite rapidly. And not only are those who feelmarginalised being reached, but also the well-educated. The well educated are seen as thenew leaders of a radical Islamic movement in the West. For the time being, however, it isnot clear whether this group of new believers has truly and irrevocably chosen the path ofradicalisation or whether interest in the movement is more of a so-called fashion item. Butwhat is certain is that the instigators of the process are going about their work deliberately,have built up a professional cadre and can be very persuasive. All of which seems to implythat the movement has a certain staying power.Viewed from the perspective of its potential threat to the democratic legal order, Islamic neoradicalismemploys two general tactics. The first involves efforts to create ‘Islamised’ enclaveswithin society; physical areas in which Sharia law prevails over Dutch and European legislation.The purpose of these enclaves is to serve as bridgeheads for the expansion of power andsocial influence. The AIVD defines this tactic as ‘intolerant isolationism’: intolerant becauseit provides those who do not conform to the prevailing ideology with no other option than toparticipate in the life of the enclave. Intolerant also because the views held on Jews, Shi’as,Christian and so-called non-believers within the own community can be quite harsh or evenhateful. The activities of Islamic neoradicals can put the wider Muslim ‘collective’ underincreasing duress, with the result that individuals within that community may no longer beable to exercise their basic rights. Such a process is already, although on a limited scale,under way in the Netherlands. And it can have serious repercussions for those Muslimswhose identity, opinions or activities deviate from the ultra-orthodox ideal: women, homosexuals,so-called apostates, liberals and so on.Islamic neoradicalism’s second tactic is the disruption and obstruction of the democraticlegal order as a political system and a form of social organisation. The Islamic neoradicalscall democracy an unjust system because it places the authority of man above that of God.Their chosen system is one in which all political activities are subordinated to the supremacyof God and, by extension, of Islamic law. They thus reject the openness and pluriformitywhich characterise democracies. And they sometimes call for antidemocratic behaviour.In so doing, they do not shy away from adopting provocative tactics, deliberately attemptingto polarise or fostering hostility towards the supposedly anti-Islamic outside world.In the long term, this approach could undermine our society’s cohesion and mutualsolidarity.Whereas the other, earlier forms of Islamic radicalism enjoyed only limited success - in partbecause of their tendency to sympathise openly with the violent jihad - Islamic neoradicalismis different. Precisely because it rejects violence and presents a message of a specific nature,it is reaching a much bigger audience and could even evolve into a broader movement.Whether that actually happens will depend very much upon how resilient the democratic legalorder proves to be in facing up to this challenge. And that ability to resist is enhanced onceone realises that - despite their convincing modus operandi and their claim to speak for theentire Muslim community - the current generation of radicals in fact represents a minoritycurrent within European Islam. The vast majority of Muslims in the Netherlands and the restof Western Europe want to participate unconditionally in an open, plural society and areactually harmed and intimidated by the activities of the Islamic neoradical fringe. In particular,that intimidation deters many moderate Muslims from daring to oppose radical opinions andconduct. And this in turn prevents them from defusing its appeal to their younger generation.In response to this threat, only an approach which both confronts and engages has anychance of success. But that is still not being done effectively, largely because the debate in56 57

the Netherlands about how to tackle Islamic radicalism is still characterised by high levels ofboth relativism and absolutism.The relativistic view is that the problem of radicalisation represents merely a passing phasein the process of emancipation through which Dutch Muslims are passing. From an absolutistperspective, on the other hand, that process is a sure sign that the total Islamisation of theNetherlands will be completed within a few decades. But neither vision reflects the truepicture. It would be far more preferable if a more realistic approach would be adopted and sotackle the real problem in a focused way. And that entails both direct confrontation with thesmall yet influential group of instigators behind Islamic neoradicalism and the unconditionalsocial inclusion of the majority of moderate Muslims.With regard to the role the government and society should or could play in tackling this problem,I think we should first and foremost decide that not only violent Islamic radicalism canendanger our democracies. Also, as explained in our report, so called non violent forms ofIslamic radicalism can, especially in the long run, have a destabilising effect on our societies.Where the violent jihad poses a clear and present danger, the dangerous effects of non violentIslamic radicalism are not always visible. But one should ask oneself the question what wouldhappen to our democracies if a substantial part of our population no longer wants to be partof it and literally turns their back on us. This could even be more harming to the stabilityand internal cohesion of our countries then a terrorist attack, how destructive such an attackmay be. Let alone, the harmful effect the radical dawa might have on the individual positionof Western Muslims who want to integrate in our societies, but are hampered in doing so bythe radical dawa. I think our society therefore needs to be more alert on the so-called radicaldawa and the movements and individuals who play a role in it. This requires a new set ofrules as these movements don’t act against the law and cannot, as with terrorism, be counterveined by repressive legal measures. On the contrary, to rein in the growth of these movementsit is essential to learn more about the tactics and long term strategies they embrace and theallegiances they try to build up with civic society groups in our countries.society or, to be more specific, how to guard society against non violent forms of radicalismwhich might in the long run harm the quality of the democratic system we all appreciate somuch. To guard society against radicalism is deemed of the utmost importance for the Dutchgovernment. Also the National Security Strategy of 2006 and the Action Plan Polarisationand Radicalisation of 2007, both from the Ministry of Interior, are focussing on this aspect.Right now, not only my service, but also the ministries of Interior, of Justice, and of Housing,Labour and Integration as well as the NCTb and a number of other national and localpartners play an active role in this field. Together, we are learning how to deal with this newchallenge: learning to find the proper balance between dialogue and repression and betweenaccommodation and isolation, thereby showing daily what democracy is all about: to listen,to debate and to conclude publicly. This conference contributes to that purpose as well,and I therefore would like to thank the NCTB and the Ministry of Justice for organising it.In the Dutch context we have found it rather useful, when information became available, tokeep the local authorities fully informed so that they can increase the resilience against theradical dawa within their own Muslim communities, support them when they want to take astand against the radical dawa and cut of official ties with radical dawa networks in disguise.With our most recent report we also hope to inform the Dutch public about the activitiesand goals of the radical dawa. By doing so, we hope to increase awareness and therewithresilience. This is possibly the most viable option in tackling the growth of these movements.So some sort of dialogue and openness with the wider public with regard to this matterseems essential. This is all in line with present policies of the Dutch government. In 2004 theDutch government already issued a paper entitled ‘fundamental rights in a plural society’. Thispaper was focussing on how to preserve fundamental rights in an ever changing multicultural58 59

Tony HealHome Office(Compilation of the presentation by Mr Heal)United KingdomUK Situation• Muslim population of UK 1.6 million (2001 census). May now be 2 million. The vastmajority are peaceful and law abiding• Very diverse - c 70% from South Asia, (Pakistan, Bangladesh, India) Rest from just aboutevery other part of the world, plus converts• Threat to UK - 200 groups and 2000 individuals classified as a threat to national security(Director General, Security Service).• Support and sympathy - difficult to quantify and volatile but opinion polls indicate that thishard core is supported by a larger circle of sympathisersStrategic response• CONTEST - UK Counter Terrorism Strategy• Four strands: - PURSUE terrorists to catch and convict them- PROTECT people and places from terrorism- PREPARE for the consequences of terrorism- PREVENT people from becoming or supporting terrorists• The PREVENT Strategy is the counter radicalisation arm of the UK’s CONTEST strategyWhy PREVENT?• Security response is not enough• Prevention is always better than cure• Counter radicalisation is about hearts and minds, identity and belonging, perception andtruth, history and culture, ideology and belief.Radicalisation analysisA persuasive and compelling global ideology, which legitimises terrorism, distorts mainstreamIslam, and is sustained by reference to• Real or perceived grievances (international and domestic) and is actively promoted by• Ideologues (individuals/networks) promoting violent extremism, making extensive useof new media and uncontrolled spaces in key institutions; and which is attractive toindividuals who face a• Range of personal issues (e.g. identity, faith; frustrated ambition, sense of victim hood andpowerlessness, alienation, anger, etc); all of which takes place in the context of• An absence of resilience (and in some cases tacit support) in vulnerable communities andsocial networks.Counter radicalisation response• Undermine extremist ideology so that violent extremism is discredited and peaceful beliefsare supported• Effectively address grievances so that genuine grievances exploited by violent extremists areresolved and perceived grievances rebutted• Disrupt those who promote violent extremism so that radicalisers are rendered ineffectiveand institutions and ungoverned places are strengthened against radicalisation• Support individuals vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremists so that they areencouraged to follow positive alternatives• Increase the resilience of communities so that strong leadership and civic engagementisolates violent extremists and those who provide them with supportCounter radicalisation action• Research and analysis - understand what we are facing and how to tackle it• Communications - get our messages across• Mainstreaming - take CT out of the closet• Partnership - sharing responsibility and solutions• Interventions - evidence based and effectiveExample- mainstreaming• Counter radicalisation is the responsibility of society at large - not just security services• National and local government, public agencies, the private sector, the voluntary sector,communities, groups and individuals• They can be mobilised through awareness raising, information, education, training andsupport, formation of multi agency partnershipsMainstreaming frameworkNational Community Safety Plan• Annual plan implemented at local level by multi agency partnerships (CDRP)• Now includes counter terrorism and preventing extremism as strategic themes• Applies to police, local government, businesses, schools, youth & social services, etc.• Treats radicalisation as a problem to be dealt with alongside criminality, drugs, alcohol andanti-social behaviourMainstreaming-support• Training for frontline staff - neighbourhood police officers, youth workers, prison staff andothers• Additional funding for counter radicalisation in key sectors - local government, prisons,young offenders• Preventing Extremism Fund for local initiatives• Counter radicalisation advice for key sectors - e.g. to university vice chancellors60 Further information: www.homeoffice.gov.uk PREVENT1@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk61

Religious radicalisation in the Islamic worldand intervention strategiesRajindar SacharFormer Chief Justice, High Court of DelhiIndiaIt may straightaway be accepted that resort to terrorism whether within one’s country oroutside calls for strongest of condemnation. It is also no longer in depute that internationalterrorism poses one of the biggest danger to the peace and development in the world.Terrorism can be aptly described as the worst violation of Human Rights as adumbratedin universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948.The Security Council at its meeting on 14thSeptember 2005 adopted a Resolution No. 1624, which while condemning in the strongestterms all acts of terrorism irrespective of their motivation, reemphasized and called uponall States to continue international efforts to enhance dialogue and broaden understandingamong civilizations, in an effort to prevent the indiscriminate targeting of different religionsand cultures and addressing unresolved regional conflicts and the full range of global issues,will contribute to the strengthening of the international fight against terrorism. U.N. GeneralAssembly adopted on 8th September 2006, Global Counter Terrorism strategy, which clearlyreaffirmed that terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality,civilization or ethnic group. In the Report of Counter Terrorism Committee to the SecurityCouncil on implementation of resolution 1624 (2005) and which was forwarded on dated14th September 2006 the President of Security Council stated as under: “In paragraph 3 ofresolution 1624 (2005), the Council calls upon all States to continue international efforts toenhance dialogue and broaden understanding among civilizations, in an effort to prevent theindiscriminate targeting of different religions and cultures. Information provided on this elementof the resolution fell into three categories: United Nations initiatives, other internationalinitiatives and national measures.”But the controversial issue raised by some (but in my opinion without any basis) is that maybe there is some trend of terrorism to be found in the philosophy and practice of any of thereligions of the world. I submit there is none, Geo politics and energy syndrome may try topervert the understanding of causes of terrorism - but any dispassionate observer would haveto concede that to try to find a response to international terrorism by purporting to blameradicalization of any religion is to hunt for a black cat in a dark room and which is empty. Inorder to make an objective assessment, it is necessary to have a short view of main teachingsof Islam - does it differ in its spirituality, humanism from other religions. Now the meaning ofIslam is surrender and a religious call for complete submission and obedience to “God”, - it isthe same principle of surrender to ‘God’, - in the most sacred Book of Hindus “Bhagwat Gita”.“There are three poisons that will destroy humanity: Greed, anger and ignorance,” said theBuddha. Islam provides three antidotes to these poisons: Adl (Justice), ehsaan (compassion)and Ilm (knowledge).62 63

Every spiritual soul in each religion having reached the height of communion with UniversalSoul has the same message of universal love, common humanity and the acceptance thatsame divine power runs through all human beings though outwardly professing differentreligion and practices.Thus Hinduism’s “Vassdhaiva - Kutumbakam” (world is one family) is equally reciprocated inthe Quran which says, “All the created ones belong to the family of God… so, an Arab has noprecedence over a non-Arab, a White over a Black”. And Christ said succinctly, “All are childrenof God”.“U.N. Human Development Report (2004) repudiates the specific claim that tolerance isa special - and very nearly unique - feature of Western civilization, extending way back intohistory, is particularly hard to sustain. The Report says, “Political liberty and tolerance in theirfull contemporary form are not an old historical feature in any country or civilization. Forexample, Emperor Ashoka’s dedicated championing of religious and other kinds of tolerancein India in the third century BCE (arguing that “the sects of other people all deserve reverencefor one reason or another”) is certainly among the earliest political defences of toleranceanywhere.Similarly, when a later Indian emperor, Akbar, the Great Moghal, was making comparablepronouncements on religious tolerance at the end of the 16th century (such as: “no oneshould be interfered with on account of religion, and anyone is to be allowed to go over toa religion that pleases him”), the Inquisition was in full swing in Europe. To take anotherillustration, when the Jewish philosopher Maimonides was forced to emigrate from an intolerantEurope in the 12th century, he found a tolerant refuge in the Arab world and was given anhonoured and influential position in the court of Emperor Saladin in Cairo. His tolerant hostwas the same Saladin who fought hard for Islam in the Crusades.”For a thousand years, that is, for much of the period from the eighth to the eighteenth century,the leading civilization on the planet in terms of spread and creativity was Islam. A great newcultural and economic nexus came to be developed which was able to draw on the knowledgeand commodities of lands from China and India in the east to Spain and Africa in the west, aswell as those of the West Asian lands in which it was based. This new civilization commandeda substantial slice of the world’s area of cities and settled agriculture. In this region therewas shared language of religion and the law. Men could travel and do business within acommon framework of assumptions. In its high cultures they could express themselves insymbols to which all could respond. There were great achievements in scholarship andscience, in poetry and prose, and in the arts of the book, building, and spiritual insight, whichare precious legacies to all humankind.”In empirical terms, demographic data tells its own story. Eighty-five per cent Muslims of theworld live outside the Arab world and 70 per cent of the total is in non-Arab Asian countries.Evidence of the political behaviour pattern is thus to be sought principally in the latter group.Some supportive evidence for perceptions is available in the data from World Value Surveys.It show that as far as preferences go, a clear majority agree that ‘democracy may have problems,but it’s better than other forms of government’; the percentage of agreement being 98 forBangladesh, 71 for Indonesia, 69 for Iran, 82 for Pakistan and 88 for Turkey.The success of India’s democracy with a large Muslim population who are among its mostenthusiastic participants shows that it does work, because there is an emphasis on pluralismand equality, and political accountability.Elections ranging from municipal to parliamentary have occurred from time to time in severalMuslim countries. The 1990s and the early years of the 21st century have witnessed openelectoral competition for legislative seats in Bangladesh (1991,1996 and 2001); Indonesia(1999 and 2004); Malaysia (1995,1999 and 2004); Pakistan (1990, 1993 and 1997); and Turkey(1995,1999 and 2002); Saudi Arabia had its first taste of the ballot in the form of elections forlocal government in 2004. Iran had a brush with competitive party-based elections. Egypt’sfirst multi-candidate presidential election in September 2005 resulted in 30 per cent voterturnout amidst claims of fraud and intimidation, underlining the challenges that lie ahead formany Muslim countries embarking on the path of democratization. This alarmist view on theother hand finds sustenance from an unremitting focus on Arab countries that account foronly a quarter of the world’s Muslim population; yet much of the scholarship on Muslims isabout Arab lands and the efflorescence of Islamic civilization in this region, and the crisis inthe world of Islam is, therefore, also located in those parts.The Muslims of South Asia, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh included, account for 40 per centof the Muslim world. Islam in these parts is even today qualitatively different. Islam in Indiaflourished and was influenced by its exposure to many cultures and religions since its arrival onthe Malabar Coast during the lifetime of the Prophet. Both Pakistan and Bangladesh, despiteIslamisation and jihadist trends, are essentially inheritors of this legacy of moderation andsyncretism. What is generally conceived of as the ‘Islamic heartland’ in the Arabian Peninsula is,in fact, home to a minority of the Umma; even within the Middle East (broadly conceived), thelargest concentration of Muslims is in Iran and Turkey rather than the Arab world.The most populous Muslim country in the world, Indonesia, has had secular governmentssince its independence in 1949, with a religious opposition that is tiny (though now growing).As for Islam’s compatibility with capitalism, Indonesia was until recently the World Bank’smodel Third World country, having liberalized its economy and grown at 7 per cent a yearfor almost three decades. Most Muslims countries are in the Third World and share itsproblems of poverty, corruption and misgovernance. The majority of the world’s Muslimslive in electoral democracies today, albeit weak; if there is a fundamental incompatibility, thenthis would not have been so.64 65

It is frequently assumed in both the academic and popular analysis of the Muslim world thatthere is no separation between the religious and political spheres in Islam. This is a myth towhich Islamist rhetoric has contributed in considerable measure. Muslim leaders maintainedthe fiction of the indivisibility between religion and state primarily in order to legitimizeauthoritarian rule and to hide the fact that the religious establishment was actually subservientto temporal authority.The real problem is not so much in the Muslim world as such, but in the Middle East.Actually democratic deficit is an Arab rather than a Muslim democracy deficit. Of the 1.2billion Muslims in the world, only 260 million live in Arabia. The overwhelming number ofMuslims live outside Arab Region, for example150 million in India, 200 million in Indonesia,100 million or more so in China and Central Asia, not to speak of Bangladesh and Pakistan.There is East and West Africa, Russia, the Balkans. Quite apart from the Turks, Iranians, andArabs there are the large immigrant populations in Europe, the Muslims of the US, and manyother besides. Both the Arab region and the Arabic language, neither of which possessesany political dominance in the larger Muslim world, are assumed to represent a universalstandard, which is neither factually or philosophically correct.nationalized Iran’s oil resources. The Shah’s secret police then destroyed the communistsand other progressives, so that the only opposition that remained was that of the mullah ledby Ayatollah Khomeini. This strategy continued to work in Afghanistan.The clash of civilizations or the good Muslim/bad Muslim thesis stems not from the urgefor democratization, but from the overwhelming need to strategically control the Arab world(Mamdani 2005). In the event, authoritarian regimes and economic and political elite haverefused to share power with the opposition. The US-backed governments have preferred toconfront Islamic activism through the use of brute force than take the risk of confrontingand competing with them in the electoral arena. Thus, many Western governments toleratedor supported the Algerian and in some other cases military’s intervention and their abrogationof the results of the democratic electoral process. In these circumstances, Islam tends tobecome the vehicle of angry protest, because religion and the mosque are the only placespeople can organize against autocratic leaders and authoritarian regimes. And when thoseleaders are seen as being propped up by America, it also becomes the target of Muslim rage.At present, the people of the Arab world have turned against rulers unwilling to, oppose thepolicies the US is implementing in the region.The monarchies described the right to vote as subversive of Islam and, hence, ensued aphase of stagnation of power in the immediate post-colonial decades. The US allied itselfwith most such states, which were Islamic, conservative and right wing. The convergence ofWestern interests and strategically pivotal oil-rich but politically conservative states of theArab world thus blocked the potential of democracy in this region.Thus the problem of democratization in Muslim societies is not primarily of religion, but ofhistory and political and economic development, and of Western and imperial dominationof the region. The Muslim world has not been insulated from the processes of modernization,class and ethnic differentiation, and mass education that have influenced the growth ofmodern political processes all over the world. Contrary to the picture of monolithic Islam,political history reveals contradictory experiences ranging from organized Islamist movementsto currents of socialist, radical change. From North Africa to the Middle East andSoutheast Asia, the Muslim world has been the locale of some of the most powerful secular,progressive and radical movements. Though young military officers led the Revolution inEgypt in 19523, some of the new leaders were communist and the regime combinedpan-Arabism and radical socialism supported with enthusiasm by students and the urbaneducated elite. Indonesia had the largest communist party in the world, outside of the SovietUnion and China. At least half a million communists were massacred after Suharto’s coupin 1965, which had the blessings of the CIA. Sudan had the largest communist party in Africaand their leader Abdel Khaliq Mahjoub was executed after Gaafar Muhammad an-Nimiery’scoup, which again had the approval of the CIA. A CIA-sponsored coup placed the democraticgovernment of Mohammed Mossadeq with the Pehlavi dynasty, mainly because the formerThe political transformation in Asian societies would suggest that any attempt to reduceIslam to a single formula could lead to mystification. Even though competitive elections havenot been the norm, politics have pervaded professional associations, labour unions, women’sorganizations and tribal associations. Through these associations and organizations peoplehave expressed themselves from time to time to challenge the state, and at other times toavoid a direct challenge.We must not treat Muslims as belonging to single inflexible culture. The variety of culturesform Senegal and Mauritania in Africa to the Philippines, from Zanzibar to Tatarstan inRussia, from Sarajevo to China, not to speak of Berlin, Paris, Amsterdam, and Birmingham,Islam obviously covers a vast and enormously varied range of peoples. There is no centralorganization, no central authority. Each country has a somewhat unique way of handling‘official’ Islam, with its schools and legal traditions. Then there is ‘unofficial’ Islam oftentaking the form of ‘Sufi’ brotherhoods. These provide a tenuous network from one country toanother, sometimes active, often dormant, but always present.If violent militancy dominates the debates at the moment, it would appear that the westernstates have only themselves to blame i.e. occupation of Algeria? What was Italy up to inLibya? Who occupied Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq? What were Britain and the US doing inIran? What were Dutch up to in Indonesia? Who is it that is propping up anachronic regimes,remnants of the bizarre and cruel Middle Ages in the oil-rich sands of the Middle East? Whowas instrumental in the European tragedies which led to the desperate creation of Israel aswell as the subsequent destruction of the Palestinians? So, before we turn to accuse the66 67

‘religion’ of the Muslims as the ‘problem’, there are many other bones to pick of a more practicaland political nature with the so-called ‘international community’.Given all this dreadful history, it may be surprising that the quiescent spiritual strengths ofIslam are still in evidence despite the violence.We may note in this connection that the most promising aspect of Islam for the inescapablyindividualist future of the twenty-first century is the Sufi mystical tradition.The position of the Islamic Sufis in the past has always been that Islam is in the hearts andconsciousness of people. The state and the authorities have no business meddling in thismatter. One cannot know who is or is not a true Muslim; furthermore, one should not take itupon oneself to find out. Sufism, with its intense individuality, its fervent passion for individualspiritual liberation, must be seen as a metaphor for human freedom.The spiritual traditions of Sufism connect Islam with the same traditions of all the great worldreligions.These Muslims, who are popularly known as ‘fundamentalist’ in the West, are more appropriatelyknown as ‘Islamists’. For the moment it is enough to note that they represent the majoropposition to the leadership of Muslim states - many of which have relations of greater orless strength with the U.S.A. They are particularly hurt and disturbed by the partisan, ratherhostile attitude shown by U.S.A. and its allies against Palestinians in Israel - Palestine war,and now accentuated further by the brutalities by U.S.A. armed forces in unprovoked waragainst Iraq. This is an irritant which helps to radicalize Muslim populations not just in thestates concerned but also across the Muslim world. The peoples of Palestine have experiencedthe greatest injustice during these past fifty years and more. They represent symbols ofinjustice and oppression. Justice Brennan of U.S. Supreme Court put it tersely, “Nothingrankles more in the human heart than a brooding sense of injustice, illness we can put upwith. But injustice makes us want to pull things down”. Thus although there are manydifferences and distinctions amongst Muslims, there is a level at which they will unite,especially when confronted by bullying, interference, or invasion from outside.This is exemplified in the way Palestine issue since 1948 been handled by U.S.A. and its allies.In resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) the Security Council has, expressed concern about thesituation on the ground, declared null and void the measures taken by the Israeli governmentto change the status of Jerusalem, called for the cessation of Israeli settlement activity, whichit determined to have no legal validity, reaffirmed the applicability of the Fourth GenevaConvention to the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, includingJerusalem and called for the return of Palestinian deportees.I had visited Palestinian in my capacity as “U.N. Special Rapporteur on Right to adequateHousing” in 1995 - In my report I had said; “The wanton destruction of Arab homes and thetakeover of the lands where they have lived for generations to make room for Jewish settlementsdefies description”. “The Israeli Government stated that it would go ahead with theconfiscation of this area, brushing aside the advice and warnings from Arab States that thismight jeopardise the peace accord with the Palestine Liberation Organization.”Conditions continued to cause alarm all over the world. To evaluate depth an Expert conferenceon “Residency in Jerusalem and international law” was hosted by The Netherlands Institutefor Human Rights, The University of Utrecht, The Netherlands, on 9th - 11th February 1999.I was one of the participants at that conference, which was followed by a delegation visitingPalestine consisting of some of the participants. I was one of them. We found the situationsame alarmingly explosive.Again the Security Council in Resolution 1515/2003 adopted on 19th November 2003,expressed its grave concern at the continuation of the tragic and violent events in the MiddleEast, and emphasized the need to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in theMiddle East, including the Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Lebanese tracks.Unfortunately the same crises continue. In these circumstances to portray the 1,400 years ofinteraction between the Islamic world and the West as a clash of civilizations, is a deliberatelymischievously wrong premise. In fact serious scholars are emphasizing how much Christianand Islamic civilizations have fruitfully interacted through history and played a part in shapingeach other.The attainability of such approach has been adversely commented by Nobel Laureate AmartySen in his book “Identity and Violence” thus; “Civilisational partitioning is a pervasivelyintrusive phenomenon in social analysis, stifling other - richer - ways of seeing people. It laysthe foundations for misunderstanding nearly everyone in the world, even before going on tothe drumbeats of a civilisational clash”.“As a result, the “civilisation” approach to contemporary conflicts (in grander or lesser versions)serves as a major intellectual barrier to focusing more fully on prevailing politics and toinvestigating the processes and dynamics of contemporary incitements to violence”.There is one more serious aspect which calls for deeper understanding of the status and roleof the minorities and especially of Muslims in the Western world. I am somewhat disheartenedby many well informed persons suggesting that solution lies in the minorities becoming notonly part but in course of time to lose their identity and merge in the country of its adoption.Put in such a way this is a recipe for disaster.68 69

No doubt minorities who have settled outside and in the Western World have to be partof their new set up, appreciate the sentiments and way of their living; their familiarity withthe language of adopted country is a must. But that does not mean that the host countriesshould insist that the minorities give up all their customs of dress, eating, praying (all thesecan be different and yet an underlying loyalty and pride in the adopted country can flourish.)So too much irritant formalism of not permitting minorities to put on turbans in school(small mercy - the recent relaxation of U.S.A. Airport immigration authorities not to insist onSikhs taking off their turbans during security checking) or covering ones head by girl studentsare unacceptable discriminatory provocations. Differences in dress, eating does not make aminority citizen less loyal and less interested in the welfare and glory of the adopted country.In India minorities have not only been guaranteed all the fundamental Rights by theConstitution but have also been exclusively guaranteed Rights for the minorities. Thusminorities are guaranteed freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practiseand propagate religion”.discrimination, unfairness or complaints. But recognizing this is not the fallacy of the principles,but only the inadequacies of those entrusted with implementation of the philosophyenunciated above, a usual frailty in all human affairs.Of course I recognize the basic difference between minorities in India and Europe or America,- In the later minorities are immigrants and adjustments are naturally somewhat timeconsuming, while in India the largest Minority, namely Muslims, are the original residentsof India - Muslims of India constitute an integral part of the nation. Their history is a part ofIndian history and their blood has mingled with the rest of Indian blood in common causes.That difference may make somewhat of difference in easing out the creases, quickly - but thebasic philosophy and principles which should govern all nations in their relation to theminorities remains the same - because this philosophy emanates from the mandate ofHuman Rights, which are universal in application.Thank you all.Every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right• to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes;• to manage it own affairs in matters of religion;• to own and acquire movable and immovable property;• and to administer such property in accordance with law.No citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the Stateor receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any ofthem.All minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish andadminister educational institutions of their choice.The philosophy and rationale of people of India flows from their intrinsic faith in the philosophyof “Unity in Diversity”.Indian Supreme Court has emphasized that “The purpose of law in plural societies is not theprogressive assimilation of the minorities in the majoritarian milieu. This would not solvethe problem; but would vainly seek to dissolve it”, and also approved the test laid down byLord Scarman of House of Lords UK: “The purpose of the law must be not to extinguish thegroups which make the society but to devise political, social and legal means of preventingthem from falling apart and so destroying the plural society of which they are members.”I am far from suggesting that with all the safeguards, we do not have shameful incidents ofReferences from the followings;• Islam, South Asia, and the West - by Franklin Robinson• Future of Secularism - Ed. by T.N. Srinivasan70 • Democracy in Muslim Societies- Published by Oxford71

Dr. Eleanor Abdella DoumatoVisiting Fellow, Watson Institute for International StudiesUnited StatesCan Religious Education Affect Radicalization?Lessons from the Middle Eastern Experience 1Everywhere in the world, public education is seen as a panacea for society’s problems: if onlythe right kind of information is taught, by properly trained teachers using properly selectedtextbooks, young people will develop the right kind of moral values, the capacity for life-longlearning, and the skills to become productive members of society. This faith in the capacityof education to transform society makes logical sense: children are under the influence ofschools from a very young age, when they are impressionable; in schools, the ideas to whichchildren are exposed can be controlled; most important, the information presented to studentscarries the aura of authoritative knowledge because it comes packaged in textbooks, booksthat have been selected by faculty, local school boards and state commissions, and taught byteachers who have authority over students and will test them on the knowledge they aresupposed to have absorbed.So seductive is the idea of education’s capacity to transform society that everywhere, includingthe Middle East, states intervene to control what is taught in the classroom, and in publicschools in the Middle East, among required subjects controlled by the state is religion. In astudy of religion textbooks completed in 2004 2 , shows that every country in the region(including Israel) uses religion to promote the interests of the state. In every country, theprimary interest served by religious education is creating a national identity and homogenizethe state’s population, and secondarily, for Muslim-majority countries, a sense of identity withMuslims around the world. However, each country’s textbooks represent Islam in its ownunique way. Islam, in effect, gets re-invented, reformulated to fit whatever meets the interestsof individual states. In the world of textbook religious lessons, there is no such thing asnormative Islam.What kind of Islam is manufactured in textbooks? With the exception of Iran, which advocatesstate Shiism, each state curriculum invents a generic Sunni Islam, and excludes sectarianOthers. In Omani, Syrian, Jordanian, and Turkish textbooks, for example, there are no Alawi,Druze, Shia, Ismailis, or Ibadis, nor are sectarian differences even mentioned or their theologiesdiscussed. Egypt, being very eager to counter the radicalization that arose in the 1990s,1 Revised January 2008includes sections on the Copts with illustrations showing friendly relations between Christianand Muslim children. In fact tolerance of other religions is a major attribute of Islam intoday’s Egyptian textbooks. Similarly, Iran acknowledges Sunni Islam as a brotherly branch ofthe same religion, and also mentions Judaism and Christianity, and never in a negative way.Most countries, then, use Islam to homogenize their populations by ignoring those who donot fit under a generic Sunni umbrella. Saudi Arabia, however, is different. Saudi Arabia teachesthere is One Universal Islam but at the same time points out Muslim Others and labels themas apostates, hypocrites, and polytheists. Shiites are the special object of vilification, but alsotargeted are Sunnis who venerate saints, as well as magicians, fortune-tellers and sorcerers,Muslims who are friendly with the west and imitate the behavior of westerners, in additionto advocates of secularism and nationalism. Moreover, the textbooks say repeatedly that it isthe duty of good Muslims to charge these errant Muslims with apostasy, hypocrisy, andunbelief, and, in several instances in the textbooks, that the taking of their blood andproperty is lawful. This is the version of Islam that Saudi Arabia has exported through scholarshipsfor foreign students to study in the kingdoms and its donations of religious literatureabroad.What kind of cultural and moral values do we find in the textbook world of Generic Islam?In the Jordanian, Egyptian, Iranian and Syrian textbooks, Islam is a guide to every aspect oflife: when and how to pray, how to treat one’s neighbor, wife, parents and children, how todress, relate to the opposite sex, what is jihad and who must engage in it. Obedience is key.Islam has rules that everyone should follow so that Muslim society will be strong and ableto withstand assaults from the outside. In all of these textbooks, and especially in SaudiArabia’s, Muslims are always under assault, and have been historically, and thereforeobedient Muslims must always be ready to defend Islam and Muslims everywhere.Turkey, on the other hand, presents an Islam that is compatible with the state’s officialsecularism. In Turkey’s textbook world of Islam, Ataturk is compared to Muhammad, as areformer, and Turks are saviors of Islam which was in decay until the Turkish nation becameMuslim. Islam is compatible with secular values: ablution keeps us clean; daily prayers teachus discipline; fasting is good for one’s health; Islamic rules calling for obedience and therights of family members become templates for productive citizenship, with factory workerscoming to work on time; civil servants being loyal and honest; fathers being good providersfor their families; Jihad offers moral authority to the state for conscription.In Oman’s textbooks, Islam is simply civic goodness: to be pious is to perform good actssuch as showing compassion, kindness, neighborliness and helping the poor, although at thehigh-school level the textbooks incorporate the principle of showing loyalty and bearingenmity toward non-Muslim Others. In the Iranian textbooks, especially at the elementarylevel, children are also taught that Islam is a religion of kindness and compassion; that one2 Eleanor Abdella Doumato and Gregory Starrett, eds., Teaching Islam: Textbooks and Religion in72 the Middle East, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 200673

should be responsible to others and to God, be just and fair, and preserve the environment.Kuwait’s textbooks incorporate similar values, and also encourage an historically un-Islamicmessage that man has free will to make moral choices. Kuwait’s textbooks also incorporategratitude toward the United States for freeing them from Saddam, and such new ideas asissues related to women wanting both career and marriage.Saudi Arabia also teaches civic goodness, but not in its religion curriculum. Its civics textbooks,taught from elementary grades through high school, encourage a work ethic and publicresponsibility, such as keeping public spaces clean and helping the less fortunate. The civicsbooks also encourage boys to help at home with domestic chores that society considerswomen’s work. A 10th grade civics book offers a lesson on the importance of good relationsbetween countries in the Islamic world and all other countries because “the world today hasbecome a single village, as God said, ‘Oh mankind! We have created you from a male andfemale, and made you nations and tribes, that you may know one another.’” “Peace,” says thelesson, “is the foundation of relations between Muslims and non-Muslims.”All religion textbooks on Islam except Iran’s incorporate a master historical narrative regardingthe Jews. The narrative exists in dialogue with the impact of the creation of modern Israel onArab people of the region, and with Israel’s own historical narrative of the Jews and Israel asrepresented in Israeli textbooks, which treats Arabs as outsiders in the land of Palestine andthe Biblical bestowing of land to Abraham as an eternal real estate contract.In a similar manner, the Islamic textbooks look back to the story in the Quran aboutMuhammad and the Jews of Yathrib, and turn the story from Islam’s past into a templatefor understanding the pain and failures of the present. The narrative, which is simplistic anddraws on Quranic passages selectively, says that a pact was formed between the Jews andthe new Muslim community, but the Jews ridiculed the Prophet, sowed doubt among theMuslims, and betrayed them by cooperating with their Quraysh enemies. Jews as a peopleare then represented as deceitful enemies of Muslims, who eternally wish Muslims harm, andMuslims therefore must cling to their faith and guard against the Jews.What lessons can be drawn from the Middle Eastern experience that might be useful inconstructing an Islamic education program to counter radicalization in Europe? First, there isa question of time. Each state curriculum assigns a value to Islamic education in terms of thenumber of hours per week of classroom time, the weight of the grade in Islamic studies to astudent’s grade point average, and the quality of the teachers who teach the subject.At one end of the value spectrum is Saudi Arabia, which allocates one-third of classroom timeto religion, and a student cannot graduate from one grade-level to the next without passingreligion. A close second is Iran, which allocates about 12 percent of classroom time, but alsorequires much more of students’ time in extracurricular religious activities such as field tripsto shrines. In Turkey, Egypt, Palestine, and Oman a grade in religion is nearly irrelevant to thegrade point average, and religion courses are disparaged by students: in Syria a pun in Arabicdescribes religious studies as “silly” studies. In other words, the seriousness with which theschool treats a subject will condition the seriousness of the students in studying it.Second, those who select textbooks for classroom use may control the content of the books,but cannot control how they will be taught. Teachers have their own viewpoints, and willinterpret textbooks as they see them. In Egypt, for example, the newest version of the curriculumis geared toward promoting tolerance, but close observers say they think it is a losing battlewhen within the schools teachers are already radicalized. Saudi Arabia has fired hundreds ofteachers deemed “extremist”, but then all of its teachers have been brought up on the Saudireligion curriculum, which some may think is itself extremist. Turkey puts such little stockin teaching religion that students are reported have little respect for what their teachers say,believing that only the least competent and least sophisticated persons would become religionteachers.Third, what is taught in classrooms faces competition from other sources of Islamic information:what is presented on television, the internet and in newspapers, or spoken at the mosqueand the coffee shop; or the family environment.Finally, for information in textbooks to have credibility, it must be compatible with whatstudents experience in their daily lives. The new Palestinian textbooks attempt to develop aspirit of tolerance, especially in the civics textbooks, where students are encouraged to takean inclusive approach regarding religious identity. Illustrations address the Israeli occupationdispassionately: in one book, an Israeli settlement sits perched on a hilltop overlooking aPalestinian village, and no conflict is implied and no explanation is given. A religious educationtextbook incorporates the master narrative of Muslim-Jewish relations at the dawn of Islam,instructing that Jews broke early agreements with Muslims, but emphasizes not a supposedperfidy of Jews but the obligation of Muslims to keep agreements as long as the other sideobserves them as well. A following question asks students to think of incidents of violencethat “our people” have been exposed to, and how occupiers have dealt with the inhabitantsof occupied countries, and then asks students to think about how Muslims dealt with peoplein countries that Islam had conquered, according to Nathan Brown, “implicitly condemningIsraeli and European imperial practices but still holding up tolerance and coexistence as anIslamic norm (I6 part II:84). Yet, given the daily life experiences of Palestinian youth, how isan Islamic norm of tolerance and coexistence to be taken as a value to be prized my Muslimstudents?With these caveats in mind, what can be said about the potential impact of religious education?The answer is that religious education is risky, and there is no correlation between a particularcurriculum and hoped-for outcome. Turkish secularist theory has been accompanied by risingIslamism, and at the same time, Iran’s heavy dosage of Shiism in schools with its venerationof clerical rulers did not prevent a revolt of students against clerical rule and the social74 75

conservatism they demand. Saudi Arabia’s version of Islam has no doubt been the mostmeasurably successful in propagating itself at home and abroad, if by no other measure thanthe adoption of Islamic head-coverings by women in Malaysia and other places in the wake ofSaudi missionary activity, and possibly by the incitement to jihad, as we see a preponderanceof Saudis going off to fight in Iraq.Boubacar G. DiarraAmbassador Centre for the Study and Research on TerrorismAlgeriaThe attempt to homogenize diverse populations through a generic Islam is also produce aneffect opposite to what was intended: as our study and others have shown, the propagationof a generic Islam has instead produced interest in defining sectarian differences amongsectarian populations. Shiites in Saudi Arabia are more intensely aware than ever of theirShiite identity by virtue of the insults and exclusions they experience because of it; yet amongthose who can conform to the prescriptions of Saudi Islam, the goal of producing citizensubjectswho identify with the state and Islamic nation has been wildly successful.Still, there can be one very positive aspect to teaching Islam in schools. A school-book versionof Islam can offer an alternative version to which students can turn in the face of radicalism,a version that will empower young people to question voices of radicalism, to say, “No, thatis not the Islam I know. My religion calls for tolerance, peace, reconciliation, education,respect for society and all its members, and the rights of men and women alike to participatein society.”One incontrovertible lesson from the Middle Eastern experience with teaching Islam in thepublic schools is this: since Education Ministries in every Muslim country invent their ownbrands of Islam for internal consumption, they are a model of legitimacy for Europe’s doingthe same.For many observers and political analysts, the nineteen seventies were the start of the periodof religious extremism.Extreme is by definition anything that is excessive, outrageous or disproportionate. A definitionof this kind is a call for a consensus on a well-defined standard. However, it turns out thatany such norm will differ from culture to culture; after all, each culture, automatically takingitself as the central, natural and legitimate reference point, perceives its own standards asbeing universal and self-justifying.Extremism destroys socio-cultural normality, both reassuring and calming, and introduces toall interactions with “others” a conflict-based dimension giving rise to their rejection from thehuman fold, under the pretext of their being different.Also revealing a degree of narcissism and ethno-centricity, such extremism is not theprerogative of any civilisation or nationality, taking on as it does a dimension that is a threatto public order wherever it prospers, in particular in the field of religion.As a violent attempt to impose on others a certain way of life and a certain way of thinking,over the past few years, extremism has been coming together in various countries and inmany societies, with the emergence of spiritual and cultural renewal.Raising religion to the level of a symbol of their personal identity in society, and drawingstrength from the vast reserve of spiritual nourishment in Islam, supporters of this tendency,renewing the commitment to the faith of their ancestors and also desirous of affirming theirposition in the field of social and political action, are calling for the revitalisation of theircommunity on the basis of religion, itself henceforth considered a source of spiritual but alsopolitical and ideological inspiration.Surpassing the level of the comtemplative mysticism, non-violent proselytism and evenpeaceful political activism, the supporters of such radicalism, hostile as they are to anycompromise, as a consequence oppose all ‘others’ head-on who advocate attitudes compatiblewith ‘modernity’ (flexibility) and the evolutionary nature of Islamic law recognised as elementsof adaptation and progress of religion 1 .1 “The best means of combating the crisis of religious extremism: lecture given by Sheikh AhmadKuftaro during the 5th conference of the Senior Council of Islamic Affairs held in Cairo, Egypt, onthe theme ‘ideological conflicts and their influence on the stability of the Muslim community and76 its future”77

In following this absolute quest, the eventual goal of which is identified as being a ‘fusion ofpolitical and religious absolutes’, the adepts of this radicalism far from being satisfied withmerely objecting, in fact aim to take the place of the ‘pharaoh at the head of an oppressiveand closed system’ 2 , by fighting for the establishment of a new political regime and a newsystem of values unfortunately incompatible with the normal exercise of democratic liberties.By introducing to secularised societies an element of disorder and disruption, the supportersof this rigorous religious movement offer specifically to young people and to the weakermindedwho join them ‘a place of substitution’ 3 to replace the political, economic and socialspace in which they are currently evolving, whereby, having broadly passed the threshold ofthe merely religious, they enter into conflict with the secular authorities capable of guaranteeingrepublican neutrality.In this way, extremism can feed numerous centres of violence and confrontation in the worldand can nurture international terrorism, as a consequence therefore threatening the peaceand security of the world. Many countries are currently faced by the threat of salafist, jihadistideologies and terrorist acts which are truly shocking to the human conscience.The emergence followed by the rise of this phenomenon, finds its origins in a wide range ofcauses. We will examine the causes via the development of the processes of radicalisationtaken in a global dimension, in other words mainly via the processes that take into account aseries of political and social events, the importance of which is beyond doubt.The processes of radicalisationBeyond its manifestations and symptoms, understanding of the processes of radicalisationmust include a study of the fundamental motivations which result in both the active playersin the process, and their passive victims.Undoubtedly in the beginning there was a purely religious discussion which called for a practiceof religion complying with the pious practices of the Ancient (Salafism), and the doing awaywith of all the blameful innovations in religion, and to preserve the land of Islam (Dar AlIslam) from damnable morals.The major crises and conflicts that have plagued the Middle East region will provide apolitical substrata for the processes of radicalisation and offer the Jihadist movement a mostuseful training ground.The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 attracted to that country many thousands ofmujaheddin fighters ready to defend their Community against the invader.The establishment by Bin Laden of Al-Qaïda, a database used by him to bring together theorigins, profiles and competences of all mujaheddin, further focused the movement bycontinuing the Jihad against the Arab leaders who refused to impose Sharia law.The arrival of 500,000 American soldiers in Saudi Arabia then offered the founder of Al-Quaïdathe necessary structural elements for a radical theory that brought together the ingredientsof religious Salafism and an ideology based on the struggle for the purification of the land ofIslam from all foreign elements.On the international scene, other events, most notably the Iranian revolution in 1979, themassacre of Muslims by the Serbs in Bosnia, the Israeli-Palestine crisis, the war that brokeout in Iraq in March 2003, all represented moments of ‘identity spasm’ that helped toreinforce the salafist ideology and brought about amongst various layers of the population,in particular amongst numerous students of theology, either empathy or rebellion, whichcreated amongst them a strong feeling of solidarity with the local protagonists, thus acting asa catalyst for the jihad syndrome.The ideas calling for the reestablishment of the dignity of the Muslim community alsoflourished in response to other confrontations and points of tension fed by poverty, the poorsharing of wealth, social exclusion, the absence of democracy, restricted participation byentire divisions of society and the management of public affairs.These failures and shortcomings in the system of government created an explosive meltingpot that gave rise to an active reception by numerous underprivileged young people to theradical speeches given by religious leaders, past masters in the art of manipulation.This logic of missionaries and preachers which related merely to the correction of belief andreligious practices (see the thesis by the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia Ibn Baz) was rapidly setaside by a ‘revolutionary’ movement (Al Mawdudi the Pakistani and the Egypt Sayed Kotb)that suggested that Muslim societies must be ‘Islamified’ if necessary through Jihad, on thisoccasion a grand ‘Jihad’ that outweighed merely personal undertaking and which in order tobe successful could call upon violence.Effectively, these religious fundamentalists, bitter defenders of the pre-eminence of religionover the state, stand up as a credible political alternative to the populations in disarray,prayed upon by doubt, faced with considerable social distress and without any politicalperspective for a solution to the conflict affecting them at the highest point in their search foridentity and belonging to the Arab nation.Excited to boiling point by symbolic references from doctrine, many young people thusindoctrinated found themselves fired up with a mission and were willing to sacrifice their2 Sebastien Fath, “The Prophet and the Pharaoh” Colloquium “Radical Religion” organised by ElieBarnavi, University of Tel Aviv (09-10 May 2007).78 3 What education can face up to religious radicalism, headed up by Dounia Bouzar (Dundo 2006).79

lives, with recourse to suicide attacks being raised to the level of means of the rehabilitationof the individual and the re-attainment of their dignity; they are all the more willing to undertakesuch attacks based on the belief that they will then immediately enter paradise. 4Strategies for responseThe attacks on 11 September 2001 and the subsequent attacks in Madrid, London and in thecountries of the Magreb region are incontestable proof that international terrorism is feedingoff the madness of religious extremism.The objective must be to remove from the radical movements the arguments that allow themto make their calls credible.We have seen that social and economic distress, in particular poverty and unemploymentamongst young people, are able to feed the growing sense of discontent created by thepolitical and social status quo. Against that background, tackling the resultant misery with aview to reducing the growing disparity between rich and poor must be a vital mission for allthose in power.At present, the leading minds behind this radical ideology are making full use of the latestmeans of communication, in particular the Internet, to broadcast their ideas, recruit newmembers and teach the techniques of producing explosives, etc.In face of the multiple risks threatening peace and security in the world, identifying andcombatting the factors contributing to violent radicalisation, wherever they arise, are amongstthe key priorities in prevention and the international war on terrorism.But what is the nature of these threats? What indicators can be used to differentiate betweenthose whose goal is freedom of conscience and those reliant on dysfunction and radicalism?Under what guise does is radicalism hide its face? Why is it that at a given moment in aspecific country particular forms of violence take the lead over those who call for dialogue,the meeting of minds, and a peaceful resolution to conflict? And how can we face up to thesechallenges? Such are some of the priorities for intervention imposed upon the services responsiblefor the war on terrorism.On a global scale, we have seen the impact of the conflict taking place in the Near andMiddle East in exacerbating radicalism as a result of the rejection of external intervention.Recognising this fact makes clear the necessity of establishing other forms of behaviour,discussion and methods for managing international relations, to face up to the radical calls ofthe numerous political and military movements present in this part of the world.These policies above all represent a call for the changes to be made in these internationalrelations, in respect of solutions to be provided for the major crises currently threateninginternational peace.As concerns the internal situation in these States, the relationship between citizens and theauthorities and the position of the citizens in cities, must remain key considerations in termsof sound political and social governance.We must therefore admit that the inability of the States to provide basic social services isleading to a reintroduction of traditional religious authorities and of political-militarymovements in the field of social action, and investing them with the mission of providing thedisadvantaged population groups with adequate education, health and housing programmes(examples Hezbollah movement in the Lebanon and other similar movements in the region).In respect of political governance, we must recognise that the events of 11 September 2001have cast a new light onto the very powerful links established since that time between safetyand democracy in the world.The wave of democratisation which has spread across the world has had little impact in theMiddle Eastern regions.Under this heading, the establishment of the rule of law and the primacy of human rightsmust seem like major challenges in this region of the world that has been placed in theforefront of the international political arena.It is not a question of heedlessly bringing about the forced modernisation of the system inplace. Nor is it a question of creating a sense of fighting Islam as a religion, whilst opposingIslam and democracy.Encouraging the moderate religious leaders to participate in this process of modernisationcould turn out to be more productive than demonising Islam.Promoting a culture of tolerance and pluralism must be raised to the level of a fundamentalpolitical goal in the framework of dialogue between civilisations. In this respect, we mustensure that encouragement is given to a tolerant and illuminated form of Islam, open to theworld, far distanced from the obscure corner we are trying to force it into at present.Scientists, intellectuals and leading associative supporters of this tolerant Islam open to theworld must occupy the field of dialogue between cultures and civilisations.4 “If you die or if you are killed fighting in the service of God, the indulgence and compassion of Godwill await you. This is worth more than all the riches you can amass (III, 151)” “Do not believe thatthose who have succumbed in fighting in the service of their Lord are dead; they live close to God,80 and receive their nourishment from Him (III, 163)”81

• Projects bringing together the lay players and Islamists must be established with a view toachieving togetherness through dialogue and comprehension; equally, women and youngpeople must be integrated in the process of general social reform;• Access to justice for all population groups, access to civil society, non-governmentorganisations and diasporas established abroad must be promoted by government in thestruggle against radicalism.The process of deradicalisation is calling for interdisciplinary and institutional cross vision,to analyse the different situations.Faced with the complexity of the causes which play a role in the crystallisation of radicalism,it is entirely apparent that to be efficient, the response strategies must integrate in turn all thevarious disciplines that bring about the role of all the players involved in the struggle.By way of example, imams at mosques, supervisors at sports halls, social workers and prisonchaplains can play a vital role thanks to which the personal radicalisation of radical youngpeople can be more easily brought to a halt; after all, the factors indicating attitudes anddetecting psychological profiles are many and varied right from the start of the process, and canjust as easily represent vulnerability; these specialists can then treat that vulnerability with theright measures, with a view to bringing to an end the processes of advancing radicalisation.This approach offers dual advantages:• Stopping those individuals tempted to take up extremism from covering up their crimes inthe mantle of religion;• Going beyond the screen of religion in order to arrive at contact with vulnerable individualsand establishing a relationship of trust and thereby establishing a weakness in the visionthey project of the world. 5Real work must be made of monitoring at State level. This international watching brief, a trueObservatory of Integration, must make it possible to foresee high-risk behaviour amongst theplayers and to identify weaknesses likely to be established amongst potential targets, etc.ConclusionBased on the developments just discussed, it must be concluded that religious radicalismis currently constituting a major threat to international peace and security. Furthermore, thehigh loss of human life caused in the name of religion and which will forever be deplored,represents a phenomenon that forms an intolerable attack on human freedom which itself isso much a factor of dignity in society.In this respect, the international community will have to develop prevention and counterterrorism policy of considerable audacity if there is any hope of overcoming the threats thatradicalism brings with it.In a world characterised by a huge variety of cultures, education in citizenship must everywherebe accompanied by multicultural education, the goal of which is to promote the cultures,civilisations, religions and traditions of other communities.The dialogue between cultures and civilisations, based on the principles, values and behaviourpatterns that respect the equal dignity of all cultures, awareness of the ideals and values ofall stands out like a royal highway for holding back radicalism in its hardest and most violentforms.To achieve this end, we will have to go beyond words and establish constructive policies inthe fields of political, economic and social governance.Other specialists could intervene to identify the most accepted ideas and value systems in asociety.Services responsible for investigation and arrest operations must work closely together withthe world of university researchers. Such an approach, which will prevent the costly duplicationof work already undertaken, will make it possible to establish common goals and to adopta plan of analysis and research methods that take account of all the players and targetsinvolved in the processes of radicalisation (influence of Internet on young people, on politicalviolence and general violence, vulnerability of illegal immigrants, etc.).Within this dialogue, a central role will have to be specifically created for the diffusion of atolerant, open and contemporary form of Islam, taking into account the economic and socialtransformations that have taken place since the VIIth century, the marks of which have foreverbeen borne by the Sacred Book.At present, terrorism is taking on a transnational dimension. There is therefore a clear necessityfor regional and international cooperation. Knowledge must be pooled and common approachesmust be employed by all players (cf. the work carried out by CITCEN in the framework of theEuropean Union).82 5 Dounia Bouzar (quoted article).83

Tanvir Ahmad KhanFormer Foreign SecretaryPakistanReligious Radicalism in the Islamic WorldIf I am not mistaken, our hosts who have designed an informed and challenging frameworkfor this important conference, would want me to focus on problems of Islamic radicalisationin Pakistan and the region in which it occupies a sensitive geopolitical location. An undercurrentof concern, of gravitas, about the larger political and civilisation space embracingboth sides of the Atlantic in which the host country, Netherlands, is located and, indeed, aboutglobal peace and stability understandably runs through the entire agenda. It is a concern thatunites us all irrespective of faith and diversity of political systems. It should bring all of uswho are committed to democracy even closer.Understandably too, this concern has a special salience in relation to the geographical parametersof my conversation today. Soldiers of some European nations, including Netherlands,are in harm’s way in Afghanistan. The war they are embroiled in has divided European opinionas few issues in contemporary history have done. There is a three- decade old nexus betweenMuslim activism in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The hope that Pakistan could somehow ward offthe inter-connectedness of events in the two neighbouring countries - what in the semantics ofour times is often called a “blowback” - has turned out to be illusory and nearly one hundredthousand Pakistani troops are stretched hard along a 2500 kilometre border to contain a“twilight struggle against a network of non-state actors” waging a holy war. 1The region also includes Iran where one of the great revolutions of the 20th century overturnedan existing internal and regional order. This revolution which established the term ‘politicalIslam’ in contemporary discourse has not run its full course nor has it found a modus vivendiespecially with powerful states seeking its reversal now for nearly twenty eight years. A stateof siege is still a cause for rekindling the fires of the Iranian revolution as, indeed, for Iranto create a sympathetic defensive space around the heartland of the revolution. In much ofCentral Asia, the successor states of the Soviet Union have not been able to accommodateeven mild Muslim revivalism and thus contributed to its unexpected radicalisation. Since1989, Muslim militants have challenged Indian control of Kashmir. India has almost as manyMuslims as either Pakistan or Bangladesh whose nationalism as citizens of India does notmake them indifferent to the predicament of Muslims elsewhere in the world. In fact, both inIndia and Pakistan a legacy of anti-colonialism that cuts across religious segmentation fuseswith a more particular Muslim resentment against what is widely perceived as a resurgenceof imperial attitudes. After a long and reassuring period of decline, the framing of issues asBefore one turns to the question whether Muslim activism in a country like Pakistan hasbecome part of a seamless global Islamic war against the West and if so to what extent andwhy, it is salutary to recall briefly the dynamics of Muslim revival in South Asia. There wasa long period of political, economic and cultural decline before Great Britain delivered thecoup de grace and destroyed Muslim power from one end of the sub-continent to the other.Initially, the Muslims bore the brunt of British reprisals against the forces that tried to drivethem out of India in 1857. As they recovered from the initial shock, their responses to thetragedy of their fall varied significantly. There was the refuge offered by a quietist interpretationof Islam that side-stepped questions of sovereignty and resistance. Sensing a danger fromevangelical proselytising Christian missions, which initially flocked to India, the Muslimsturned some of the madrassas (religious seminaries) like the famous Deoband into fortressesfor the defence of faith and doctrine. A section of the community concluded their introspectionby seeking a creative encounter with the New Age thus initiating an unfinished dialecticaltussle between tradition and modernity. The Regensburg address of His Holiness the Popehad differentiated between Islam and Christianity on the grounds that the Judeo-Christiancivilisation had created a synthesis of Faith and Reason through an interaction with the Greekphilosophy. For the reformists in the Indian sub-continent and in many other Muslim countrieswhich were reacting to the colonial dominance with a robust intellectual revival, Islam hashad its Hellenic moment long before the Christian world. Both in Cordoba and Baghdad theyhad arrived at a self-confident synthesis of faith and reason, at least in the short run.The new Islamic modernists in India attributed the Muslim decline in no small a measure to theUlema clinging to ‘an atrophied and skeletal tradition’ that caused stagnation. By abandoningcritical thought and innovation, they had left Islam ‘devoid of its erstwhile depth, diversity,and critical apertures”. 2 They argued that there was no contradiction between Revelation andReason. They went back to the Quran to substantiate their view that ‘revelation emanatedfrom a divine and transcendent source within history and is understood by the human mind. 3As his editor put it, the Pakistani Islamic scholar Fazalur Rahman had ‘attempted to providea complex theory of revelation that linked philosophical and psychological arguments witha sociology and anthropology of history’. The flux of time demanded that Muslims discoveronce again the ability to grasp the kinesis at work in a dynamic tradition. “The process ofquestioning and changing a tradition - in the interest of preserving or restoring its normativequality in the case of its normative elements”, maintained Fazalur Rahman “can continueindefinitely and that there is no fixed or privileged point at which the predetermining effectivehistory is immune from such questioning and being consciously confirmed or consciouslychanged”. 4Though scholars like Fazalur Rahman were unpopular with the conservative Ulema, they weredeveloping their radical interpretation of Islam - the word radical being used in an entirelydifferent sense from the sense implicit in the organisation of this conference - not in responseWest versus Non-West has gained fresh strength.2 Fazalur Rahaman; Revival and Reform in Islam; One world, Oxford; 2006 p.73 ibid; p.1384 1 Mazarr, Michael; Extremism, Terror, and the Future of Conflict, March 6, 20064 ibid; p.2185

to Western orientalists, but by way of reconnecting with a lost tradition within the Islamiccanon. It is important to recall their seminal work because of a tendency, particularly sincethe catastrophic events of and since 9/11 to bury Islam under utterly untenable allegationsagainst its very essence with the help of popular media. At the practical level, the modernistsplayed an important role in reconstituting Muslim societies in a manner that enabled them toaccelerate decolonisation and the emergence of independent Muslim nation states, includingPakistan.deployment of strategic forces for the New Century. In the Muslim perception, it needed asmuch anthropology as politics to grasp what was being allegedly done. Every piece fitted into agiant jigsaw puzzle. Iraq’s 7000-year old cultural heritage was ravaged and almost 3.5 millionsIraqis displaced internally and externally to demonstrate that the only history that matteredwas that of the West. The world, it was argued, was being returned to the era when it wasdivided between central, metropolitan people and the peripheral people bound to them bytributary relations.It is often said that Islam is a religion of laws. This is meant to be a derogatory perceptionof the last of the three great monotheistic religions; it is designed to underline the preoccupationwith Sharia on the part of the extremist movements that threaten to supplant themodernists in many Muslim states and communities. This perception, however, is fallacious.Islam’s pristine emphasis is on justice (‘adal’) and compassion (‘ihsan’). The distinctivefeature of Islam is the yearning for an egalitarian, equitable and democratic social order; thedenial of such an order has been the cause of much strife within Islam. The poet-philosopherMuhammad Iqbal who envisioned an independent Muslim state in post-colonial South Asiawas not a revolutionary in the usual 20th century sense but when it came to the new andstrange gods of his times - Capitalism, Fascism and Communism , he was an iconoclast.As a matter of fact when lights were going out one after the other all over Europe, the mainindependent movements in the colonised world were guided by democratic forces. Why Chinadiscarded a similar nationalist movement in favour of an armed struggle by the CommunistParty is a different story that needs to be understood in its own particular context.In fact, a major fountainhead of Muslim rage that has spawned the other kind of radicalisation -the one that this conference is addressing - is a pervasive sense of injustice and the resultantvictim hood amongst the Muslims. This sense of injustice and the contingent outrage aredirected as much towards the Muslim rulers as towards major powers. The modernistmovements helped usher the era of freedom from direct alien rule but failed to deliver progressand security for all partly because of intrinsic factors and partly because of continued foreigninterventions. Palestine, Kashmir, CIA’s successful operation to bring down Mossadegh, theinvasion of Egypt by Israel, France and the United Kingdom became symbols of perpetualinjustice to which the modernists and reformers of Muslim thought had no answer. Over aperiod of time, the local grievance became a global narrative of rejection and denial.Huntington’s clash of civilisation thesis owes its central motif to Bernard Lewis. In much ofthe Muslim world, Bernard Lewis is synonymous with long standing plans to fragment theworld of Islam into small ethnically-based compliant states. Huntington is retrospectivelyseen as having written not an academic dissertation but a manifesto, a virtual scheme thatthe neoconservatives were to implement as soon as they seized power in the United States.It was a scheme for the re-conquest of the broader Middle East. It went far beyond the controlof the energy resources and the establishment of military bases to fill the gaps in a globalWhat turned apprehensions into a barbaric spiral of mindless violence by Iraqi resistanceand terrifying reprisals by western armies - Fallujha epitomising the gory drama for history- was partly the result of the ever shifting grounds for invading Iraq. By the time the rationalecrystallised into a declaration of intent to reconfigure and reconstitute the broader MiddleEast, it had connected with layers of fears accumulated over centuries. Islam has a longand proud history of its own and nothing could have been more provocative than to applythe 18th century concept of a civilising mission. The menu offered to the region was notonly liberty and democracy but also a transformation of its dominant faith. In his 1988 bookIslamic Liberalism, Leonard Binder made the following trenchant observation to make thepoint out that the world of Islam believes that it can progress without paying such a heavycultural price: “From the time of the Napoleonic invasion, from the time of the massacre of theJanissaries, from the time of the Sepoy mutiny, at least the west has been trying to tell Islamwhat must be the price of progress in the coin of the tradition which is to be surrendered.”In 1992, after witnessing murder and mayhem in Bosnia Herzegovina, the western-educatedand - if I may say, westernised Arab intellectual - Rana Kabbani wrote: “How are we to tackleour problems rationally, handicapped as we are by an overpowering sense of grievance?Both towards a West that has long colonised, manipulated and despised us, and towards ourown governments, which are shamefully silent, corrupt and castrated. We have yet to earn ourindependence as Muslims: the rich nations amongst us are mere vassals, the poor ones, fullvictims.”The Muslim mind should have no difficulty in differentiating between jihad and martyrdomon the one hand and terrorism on the other and if this distinction has got blurred today,then there is something gravely wrong with the Muslim imagination and the powers that aretrying to bend it to their will. The difference is so clearly embedded in the historical memoryof Islam that a true Muslim should instinctively know when there is resort to illegitimate andimpermissible violence in the name of Islam. There is the haunting memory of Ibn Muljamassassinating the pious fourth Caliph Hazrat Ali. Here is the immutable difference betweenthe terrorist and the martyr. Then there is the awesome moment of the grandson of theProphet of Islam sacrificing his life at Karbala. This is the Muslim individual redeeming anentire culture by standing up to the state terrorism of a usurper. Islam refuses to resign itselfto perpetual injustice and repression. Drawing upon Ali Shariati’s “Iqbal, Ma’mar TajdidBanaye Taffokar-I Islami” (Iqbal, the architect of the reconstruction of Islamic thought) and86 87

his seminal Shahadat (Martyrdom), Mannochehr Dorraj makes the following observationabout Shariati and, by implication, about Iqbal whom every Kashmiri freedom fighter knowsin his very pulse: “For Shariati, one of the greatest and most revolutionary contributions ofIslam to human society has been to instil a sense of devotion and sacrifice in the pursuitof justice. Through martyrdom a society refines itself. By sacrificing the most preciouspossession (one’s life) the individual also affirms his/her faith in the ideals of the collectivityand adds to the credibility and sanctity of this ideal.”The Muslim world does not deny that a high degree of natural cosmopolitanism is inherentin economic globalisation. But it is a delusion to think that by applying overwhelmingmilitary force, local cultures hallowed by thousands of years can be bludgeoned into totalhomogeneity. It is a recipe for conflicts lasting generations. Justifying this project as a post-Enlightenment civilisation dragging a pre-Enlightenment culture into a creative transformativeencounter with modernity is fraught with great dangers as it plays into the hands of terroristswho have put themselves outside the pale of law.The western failure to distinguish between lawful resistance to foreign occupation andmindless terrorism that stalks the world of Islam today is the root cause of the rapidlygrowing mutual incomprehension.Millions of Muslims have denounced the outrage in East Africa in 1998, the World TradeCentre attack in 1993, the ghastly tragedy of Twin Towers, the outrage in Madrid, the bombsof Bali, the terrorist attack in London and every other atrocity committed in some twisted logicof defending Islam in unequivocal terms. But what they get in return is the indiscriminatetarnishing of their faith as Islamofascism. The best of minds are succumbing to this temptingindustry. The immensely gited British Novelist Martin Amis began his long three-part essay“The age of horrorism” in the prestigious Sunday observer by making a distinction betweenIslam and “Islamism” but soon retreated into a polemic based on a bizarre reading of history.“Over the past five years”, he wrote, “what we have been witnessing, apart from a moral slumpor bust, is a death agony of imperial Islam. Islamism is the last wave - the last convulsion.”For Muslims, imperial Islam is a distant memory and the violent forms of “Islamism” apainful aberration in the effort to stop the Western re-conquest of the Muslim heartland.For the vast majority of Muslims all over the world the real challenge is not Martin Amis’fictional struggle for a pan-Islamic Caliphate but the discovery of means by which sovereignMuslim states 5 could, in all their diversity, co-exist and cooperate with the West. 6 (Observer,September 10, 2006).In a remarkable essay entitled ‘Muslims and Democracy’ (Journal of Democracy, July 1999),Abdou Filali-Ansary sought avenues of better mutual understanding and co-existence. Heconceded that Muslim confrontation with European colonial powers in the nineteenth centurygave birth to some great and lasting misunderstandings, as a result of which Muslims haverejected key aspects of modernity as alienation and a surrender of the historical self to the“Other”. But then he also reminded us that ‘the rule of law is a notion that expresses somethingthat Muslims have longed for since the early phases of their history, and have felt tobe part of the message of Islam”. The Muslims seek higher universalism for the concept ofthe rule of law in the conduct of international relations and will not accept another century ofdominance, subjugation, humiliation and exploitation by the West or its new surrogates.Events of 9/11 were a manifestation of pure primordial evil which does not fit into any rationalanalysis. But they signalled a new stage in a kind of warfare which has actually been exacerbatedby the retribution extracted from the people of Afghanistan for the crimes of Al-Qaeda andits hard core Taliban supporters who had seized power temporarily without the assent of thepeople. The consequences of the invasion of Iraq have been far more egregious and longlasting. Professor Michael Mazarr speaks of ‘twilight struggles against non-state networksof evildoers”. 7 The new conflicts are not wars waged by regular, organised armies, howeverlethally armed, across vast swathes of European or Asian land mass. They do not belongeven to the tradition in which less powerful peoples made hit and run raids to prosecute theclassical anti-colonial and national liberation movements of the nineteenth and twentiethcenturies. “We are not fighting proto-Bismarcks”, writes Professor Mazarr “who want nothingmore than to seize power and start operating as realpolitikers”. It is a fight against a ‘fantasyideology”, a mind set and ‘the central route to war in such psychological dramas is nationalhumiliation and society-wide alienation”. For a battle for the society, for its mindsets andpsychologies, (and) to address sources of grievance and anxiety, to shore up institutions ofgovernance’, Mazarr proposes a theory of “psychopolitik” resting on three pillars of statecraft:restraint, compassion, and fiscal responsibility. He is aware of the danger that the West wouldinstead persist in its faith that traditional conventional conflict is the dominant mode. Wereit to do things differently, he would offer a different recipe for at least mitigating the threatof new radicalism: attend to identity; attend to the global economy; practise the greatestrestraint possible in foreign policy; avoid humiliating others; do not become the focus ofalienation. Needless to say that this recipe would not be acceptable to the hardcore Al-Qaedathat is already beyond reverence for life, beyond the insights of the three monotheistic religions,beyond the fruits of settled civilisations and beyond the four walls of international law. But itcould still make a profound impact on thousands of radicalised young men and women whoare engaged in battles of alienation and mutual incomprehension.As stated in the beginning of this paper, Muslim activism in the Indian sub-continent aimedprimarily at reviving a vanquished community. In reconstructing Muslim thought its mainproponents tried to cut through cobwebs of ritualism and esoteric practices that induced apassive acceptance of life under foreign domination. Even when they successfully mobilisedMuslim separatist sentiment and demanded a “Muslim homeland” in South Asia, theemphasis was on constitutionalism and democratic assertion in Muslim majority areas.5 Ra’ana Kabbani made this comment while surveying the destruction of a highly secularised Muslimcommunity in Bosnia.88 6 Amis , Martin; Sunday Observer, London; September 10, 2006 7 Mazarr, Michael ( see note 6)89

The Indian Muslims steered clear of all anti- British movements that embraced political violenceas a legitimate tool of the independence struggle.Pakistan’s emergence as an independent state, however, created a new dynamic. The foundingfathers believed that they would be able to accommodate Islamic aspirations in a largelysecular state structure of an elected parliament, independent Judiciary and modernisingbureaucracy. This was challenged by Islamic parties not so much by rejecting the basicorganisation of the state as by demanding that it should be the instrument of creating an Islamicpolity. The principal parties like Jam’ati Islami which was established by the internationallyrenowned scholar Abul Ala Maududi in British India in 1941 and Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam tookup the banner of Islamisation engaging the state peacefully through established democraticinstitutions. Since the early years of Pakistan’s history were marked by a vocal, if small,Marxist movement that opposed military alliances and propagated a leftist revolution, muchof the energy of the Islamic parties was expended on combating communist radicalism. Thereis a parallel to this phenomenon in the Turkish history of the same era. In Pakistan, the fearof an ideology alien to Islam also created a largely apolitical movement - the Tablighi Jamaat- that concentrated on reviving the basic knowledge of Islam amongst the masses throughlow key frictionless contact with individuals and target groups such as students. In 1950’s and1960’s, most of the Islamic parties in Pakistan received western support.By and large, the Islamic parties have garnered very limited electoral support except in2002 when they were able to gain significant representation in the National Assembly andtwo provinces by exploiting the anti-American wave unleashed by the American invasion ofAfghanistan. They may find it difficult to repeat that performance in future elections partlybecause they did not deliver good governance in the two provinces that they dominated andpartly because a segment of their traditional constituency has become more radicalised andis dissatisfied with the support given by the religious parties to President General PervezMusharraf, a principal regional ally of the United States, at crucial junctures of time. Partsof Pakistan’s North Western Frontier Province and the adjacent tribal lands have witnessedthe rise of the “local Taliban” who are sympathetic to the Afghan Taliban and opposed to thePakistan government.Historically, the state responded to demands for Islamisation by a gradualist policy ofincorporating elements that did not alter its basic structure. Pakistan’s Constitution forbidsparliament to enact a law that is repugnant to Islam. First a state-funded Institute of IslamicResearch and then a Council of Islamic Ideology emerged as forums for study and researchon how Islam could interface with the modern world. Pakistan also created a Sharia Courtwith a parallel existence to the established system of traditional courts inherited from theBritish Raj. At the apex of the Pakistani legal system is a modernist Supreme Court linked tothe national Constitution and not Sharia.The subsequent drift towards radicalisation was caused by chronic socio-economic crisesas well as by momentous changes in Pakistan’s strategic environment. First and foremost,Pakistan experienced along with several other Arab-Islamic countries the failure of thenationalist secular elites that had emerged during decolonisation to provide political stabilityand sufficient economic growth. In Pakistan’s specific case there were periods of high economicgrowth usually when the armed forces ruled but they were marred by an accentuation of classand income disparities. Disillusionment with the post-colonial modern state fuelled the urgefor a return to the pristine values and true tenets of Islam. The failure of the state to provideuniversal education led to a rapid expansion of the traditional seminaries, the religiousmadrassas, that now have an enrolment of nearly a million young people and account for asignificant percentage of literacy in a certain age group.The external developments that radicalised Muslim politics in Pakistan and the neighbourhoodinclude several seminal events: the Soviet Union’s direct military intervention in Afghanistanin 1979 to save a tottering Marxist regime; the Islamic revolution in Iran; the refusal of Israelto withdraw from Arab territories occupied during the 1967 war and their uninterruptedcolonisation by Jewish settlers; the suppression of Palestinian intifada; the Iran-Iraq war;the eventual American interventions to liberate Kuwait; the occupation of Iraq in 2003 foran indefinite period of time. The collapse of the Soviet Union that brought freedom topredominantly Muslim Central Asian states was another major event. The emancipation ofCentral Asia played an important role in radicalising the Kashmiri movement against Indiawith attendant consequences for Pakistan’s polity; it was taken as affirmation of the view thata local armed struggle could change the status quo. It happened at a time when India andPakistan were moving slowly towards a sub-continental détente based on nuclear deterrencestability.In Afghanistan Islamist politics emerged because of the country’s brief experiment with parliamentarydemocracy in 1960s. It was also a distinct reaction to the growing Marxist trendsamongst the educated classes. Pakistan’s Islamic parties kept contact with Afghan partiessuch as Hizbe Islami because they were never enthusiastic about the irredentist claims ofAfghan leaders typified by Sardar Mohammad Daoud who was to lose his life in the Marxistledmilitary putsch on 27 April, 1978. Ironically, Daoud had looked for support from the sameleftist elements in 1960s and early 1970s in his disputes with Pakistan over the so-calledPushtunistan issue. The links between Afghan and Pakistani Islamic parties played an importantpart in forging a formidable front against the Marxist regime and then in organising the greatAfghan Jihad against the Soviet Union. The Jihad was largely outsourced to Pakistan’sintelligence services which with strong American assistance radicalised the AfghanMujahidden and their Pakistani partners. The madrassas that had imparted a conservativeSunni education based upon a centuries old curriculum became a special focus of anti-Sovietmilitancy. In mid-1990s the madrassa students on both sides of the border constituted theTaliban who intervened strongly in a fierce power struggle amongst the Mujahideen leaders90 91

after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces. The Taliban had much of Afghanistan under theirmedievalist control when they were overthrown by the American attack in October 2001.The Afghan Jihad brought thousands of Muslims, mostly Arabs, to Afghanistan and theneighbouring districts of Pakistan. Amongst them were Sheikhs who commanded venerationfor their knowledge of fundamentalist Islam and who raised the awareness of the Pakistaniand Afghan Islamists from the local to the global. People of both the countries had alwaystaken a strong interest in Muslim causes all over the world especially in Palestine. But the Arabcomponent of the Afghan Jihad provided them with a conceptual framework for a perpetualstruggle against powers that continued to humiliate the Muslims and usurp their landsdirectly or through indigenous surrogates. Unwilling to leave the field to Sunni Mujahideenbacked strongly by Saudi Arabia, Iran promoted Shiite militias thereby creating a quasipermanentsalient of its influence in the beleaguered land.Pakistan’s reversal of policy on Afghanistan in 2001 and the wholehearted participation of thePakistani army in the project to build a new democratic Afghanistan aroused great hostilityamongst this ideological enclave of the erstwhile Afghan Jihad. Pakistan has ended upimporting the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, where the Taliban have re-surfaced as the mainresistance group, into Pakistan. Its tribal belt now has militants called local Taliban and thelosses suffered by the Pakistan’s security forces are many times more than the aggregate ofAmerican and NATO losses since 2001. The Pakistan government has not carried convictionthat the country needs to fight the militants for its own security and prosperity. The armedforces are currently engaged in re-establishing the writ of the government in Waziristan wherethe Jihadis have created a virtual rival authority. It is a costly enterprise in military losses andgovernment’s popularity ratings. The ever widening perception in the country that thegovernment is fighting America’s war in Afghanistan by itself has become a factor in theradicalisation of Islamists in the country. Direct aerial attacks by US troops on targets insidePakistani territory and relentless American pressure on Pakistan’s military ruler, presidentPervez Musharraf, have had a negative political fall-out. The former has been seen as aviolation of national sovereignty and the latter, with high Pakistani casualties in poorlyplanned operations under external pressure as a sacrifice of national interest. The expatriateLondon-based Iranian academic, Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, has recently observed that “it isone of the many ironies of contemporary US foreign policy in the Muslim world that theBush administration has implicitly contributed to the radicalisation of Pakistani society”.Most Pakistani analysts share that assessment.European ConcernComing from a country from where considerable emigration to Europe especially to theUnited Kingdom has taken place and having served in a senior capacity in eight Europeanstates including Czechoslovakia and the post-Soviet Russia n Federation, I cannot butunderstand the growing concern about the increasing inroads that Muslim activism is making;nor can I be indifferent to the reactive implications of this phenomenon for European societiesand for inter-state relations in an otherwise globalising world. If the European liberal left feelsthat Muslim activism has intensified the shift in the European political spectrum to extremeright, the Muslim world is equally anxious about irrational and highly ignorant Islamophobia.Not since the crusades and the Spanish Inquisition Islam has been vilified the way it is beingdone in this age.What are the easily recognisable aspects of the situation that need to be addressed? Firstand foremost, it is the fear of demography. Muslims tend to concentrate in urban centresfor obvious economic reasons. They have a high birth rate. According to Timothy M. Savage,there are 15.2 million Muslims in the original pre-expansion EU. France with five million,Germany with four million, UK with 1.6 million, Italy with a million, Netherlands with 886,000lead the charts. Austria, Belgium, Greece and Sweden have Muslim populations ranging from300,000 to 450,000. In the New EU member states the entire Muslim population is estimatedat 290,000 out of which Cyprus alone accounts for 200,000. 8 One estimate visualises adoubling of Muslim population in Europe as a whole by 2015. While it is possible to dramatisethe confessional situation in a particular city like Bradford in England, a situation that certainlycalls for appropriate interventionist strategies, the overall demographic profile of Europe doesnot justify paranoid reactions. Surely, the causes of resentment are more qualitative thanquantitative.Three aspects of the qualitative situation stand out. The Muslims are reluctant to shed theiridentity; in fact they are mobilising themselves more earnestly than ever before to preserve it.Even though they are not a monolithic group, European Muslims “increasingly identify firstwith Islam rather than with either their family’s country of origin or the European countryin which they reside”. 9 (How restive are Europe’s Muslims op cited by Savage). Here is anabiding conflict of values. Second, they are prone to “the seductive lure of a transnationalMuslim identity forged in foreign policy grievances, a culture of victimisation and a sense ofalienation that is only partially fed by socio-economic factors.” 10 Third, even for those whoare not unduly distressed by the new diversity produced by Muslim cultures, in the plural,there is a putative threat to the state and the society. Analysing the scene in NetherlandsProfessor Paul Sniderman 11 argues that multiculturalism encouraged an ambiguity ofcommitment; the fundamental issue, it turns out is not diversity but loyalty. Fourth, thereis anxiety that Muslim communities in Europe, aggrieved as they feel, may not be fullyforthcoming to cooperate with intelligence and law enforcement agencies in eliminatingterrorist cells.Unfortunately, Europe, like Pakistan, is reluctant to admit that an uncritical acceptance ofthe metaphor of a global war against terrorism has worked against the initiatives for greater8 Savage, Timothy; Europe and Islam; The Washington Quarterly; Summer 20049 op.cited in the above article by Mr. Savage10 Paris, Jonathan;92 11 Sniderman, Paul & Hegendoorn ‘When Ways of Life Collide’; Princeton University Press, 200793

harmony and integration. The two seminal strategies - multiculturalism adopted as a policyby the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Scandinavia etc and assimilation by France - mighthave had a better chance if Iraq had not happened the way it did and Afghanistan was notmishandled after the initial success against the Taliban. It would be unnatural to expect thatMuslims any where in the world would not be outraged by the destruction of Iraq. They wereprominent in the peace marches because of their race and religion; the demonstrations wereotherwise overwhelmingly composed of Europeans whose time-hallowed post-Enlightenmentvalues were grossly violated by the invasion and its sordid aftermath. The perception that theUS-led West was waging war against Islam was as much a product of the fevered imaginationof Muslim communities as of the reckless semantics used increasingly by Western leadersonce it became clear that the invasion had turned into a fiasco. The morally untenable oversimplificationthat any Muslim failing to show submission to the U.S grand design for thebroader Middle East must either be a terrorist or sympathetic to them has contributed greatlyto the radicalisation of Muslims all over the world.of Israel. Secular western states often show an understandable bias in favour of Christianminorities in other lands particularly when they become victims of an oppressive majority, aswas the case of East Timor under Indonesian control.The harm done by European procrastination over a ceasefire in Lebanon in August 2006 wasincalculable as every additional day provided to Israel to wreak havoc in Lebanon was beingcarried to millions of homes all over the world in real time. The recent history of Arab-Muslimpeople from Palestine to Afghanistan has regrettably highlighted how little is the impact ofthe mass of liberal people on western governmental policies. It has gravely undermined theEuropean moral authority. With its unrivalled experience of other cultures and climes spanningat least three hundred years, Europe is expected to exercise a moderating influence onAmerican policies. The popular perception in the Muslim world is not only of the insensitivityof American decision-making to honest advice but also of Europe not even tendering suchadvice forcefully.It is possible to revive both multiculturalism and assimilation provided they are subjectedto a critical reappraisal. The British are backing away from multiculturalism partly becausethey have not as yet factored into their assessment the blowback of the policies of the Blairera. France has to rethink its literalist interpretation of assimilation which overblows issueslike the wearing of scarves. Such potentially emotive matters are often a substitute for hardsolutions for the harsh realities of the banlieues. The British academic, David Drake, pertinentlyasked why so much political, intellectual and emotional energy has been spent on the issue ofa teenager wanting to wear a head scarf rather than on far more pressing issues of integrationsuch as the high rates of unemployment and a sense of deprivation in the Muslim community.The explanation that apprehensions of the French state are rooted in the memory of thebloody struggle for secularisation after the French Revolution and during the counterrevolutionarymovements seeking restoration of the old school system does not make muchimpression on Muslims who consider the scarf as an innocuous and ordinary statement ofidentity. For many Muslim analysts Islamophobia is an escape from a cluster of realities.It has an undertone of racism that the West does not want to admit. There is a touch ofimperial nostalgia that manifests itself into a hierarchical arrangement of people from formercolonies. It is also a state of denial about the fact that many western countries have lost theirdistinctive status because of globalisation, American hegemony and now a rapid shift ofeconomic power to the emerging Asian nations.An effective strategy to combat the rise of radicalism will have to address issues of foreignand security policies and those of integrating or assimilating Muslims into European societiessimultaneously. Seeking to bring about a forcible disconnect between the two has alreadybeen shown as counter-productive. At the psychological and emotional plane, it is as difficult tomake Muslims indifferent to the disastrous new wars in the Middle East as to expect Jewishcommunities in the United States and elsewhere not to concern themselves with the fortunesMuslims do not expect Europe to unleash an insurgency against what is often described asthe new global American empire. But they do think that Europe can strengthen its owninitiatives for Good Neighbourhood policies towards Muslim lands across the Mediterraneanand on its eastern rim from Turkey southwards. On issues like Palestine that fuel radicalism,Europe has not tried hard enough at least to present a differentiated profile. If Prime MinisterTony Blair was lured to the Iraq war by a subliminal desire to recapture the lost glory of theBritish Empire, then the outcome should open our eyes. Iraq has emerged as the newepicentre of radicalism and given Al-Qaeda a new lease of life.Even on its own, Europe in partnership with Arab-Muslim countries can help create acivilisation infrastructure of education, professional knowledge, economic reforms andtechnology transfer that would stop the rapid expansion of the space where deprivation andfrustration translate into radicalism. Europe can also disseminate liberal and democraticvalues by demonstrating that on the final analysis it is not on the side of local despots anddictators. Unfortunately the present evidence points to the contrary; Europe is still seen toprefer puppets that can keep the natives on a tight leash.Internally, Europe must make a distinction between those who have signed up for mindlessviolence and the rest including those given the derogatory title of “fence sitters”. If furtherrecruitment is denied the hard core will succumb before long to better law enforcement,intelligence and international cooperation. Europe needs to deconstruct myths beingpopularised by the extreme right wing and the American evangelists trying to hasten theSecond Coming. It is often said that the Muslim minority is “encroaching upon the collectiveidentity and public values of European society”. We need to sift the truth in such assertionsfrom deep seated historical prejudices which project themselves as a paranoid fear of the“other”. Thirteen European states have been listed as not recognising Islam as a religion.94 95

Many of them do not even bestow minority rights embodied in their Constitutions on Muslimsbecause they are not a recognised ethnic group. No less than 19% of Germans were reportedin a survey to favour a ban on Muslim worship altogether. Several European states createserious hurdles in the construction of mosques. Discriminated against frequently, theghettoised mind can only resist assimilation. That resistance is stronger amongst the youngis as much an indictment of the European societies as the false charisma of the radicalisedImams. Loyalty comes more easily if one has a stake in the state and society.In the Muslim history, a transnational awareness of the Ummah has never abolished localidentities. At best it was unity in diversity even at the zenith of the Caliphate, a concept leftfar behind by modernity. A great deal of the sacred has survived in all Christian sects despitethe Enlightenment and the Jacobeans. A great deal of the sacred will shape the Muslimimagination wherever the Muslims live as a community. They will imbibe modern sciencesand technology and yet retain some sense of mystery in their understanding of theGenesis and the purpose of human life. How it can threaten European values is simplyincomprehensible. Nor would it stand in the way of Muslims integrating in non-Muslimstates as loyal citizens as they have done for 1400 years.Re-nationalizing Reforming IslamThe present crisis in the West’s relations with the Muslim world emanates in no small ameasure from an inflexible hostility towards what is often referred to as ‘political Islam’.The term is becoming synonymous with terrorism. Political Islam is considered, on a prioribasis, as antithetical to modernisation, democratic choice and liberal values. Embracing anessentialist view of Islamist movements, the US-led West seems to have taken upon itself thetask of reconstituting Islamic civilisation. Since political Islam is pathology, a surgical use offorce is considered legitimate. The fact of the matter is that the major “Islamist”movementsin Morocco, Turkey, Pakistan, Malaysia and Indonesia reject neither modernity nor development.Nearly all of them are willing to stake their claim to political power through free and fairelection. What is, however, true is that they also share their opposition to conflatingmodernisation with westernisation. “History”, writes Menderes Cinar, “is narrated accordingly:the pious Muslim people reacted to the colonisation of their lands by waging a war ofindependence, but since then an alienated, Westernising elite grabbed the power of the stateand acted as internal colonisers”. Cinar recommends that Islamism be accepted as a legitimatepolitical movement, advancing a moral criticism of politics which is a sine qua non ofdemocracy. 12 This proposal to “normalise” Islamism as an alternative vision that is willing tofigure in an inclusive democratic battle of ideas resonates well with much of liberal Muslimopinion. The Muslim liberals maintain that the western pressure on Muslim rulers to excludethe Islamist tendency from the political equation altogether has played into the hands ofmilitants and terrorists. Muslim politics cannot be severed by force from assertion of aMuslim identity that is important to important segments of the polity; the balance can befound only in the adoption of democratic procedures. The West, at the moment, is seen asclearly arrayed on the side of non-democratic regimes willing to advance its agenda ofre-establishing control of physical and spiritual resources of the Muslim world. That religionis not a factor per se is seen in the readiness of most of the Islamic movements to supportincreased ties with non-Muslim or secular states such as China and India.It has been said that “the Muslim factor is adding contours to Europe’s domestic and foreignpolicy landscape”. There is little justification to take an alarmist view of this challengeparticularly in a long term perspective where the present peak in terrorism has beencontained by bold and imaginative policies both at the political plane and in cooperativelaw enforcement. We live in a time of troubles but we do not have to prolong it to spangenerations as the American neo-conservatives want. There are pragmatic reasons for theWest and the Muslim world to redefine their mutual relationships through continuousengagement and adaptability. The strategic doctrines that aimed at a unilateral globalhegemony have a short shelf life as military and economic power is undergoing an irreversibledispersal. Globalisation will survive and even flourish but will inevitably be disconnectedfrom global dominance. It will rest on a concert of nations and accommodation reached bya number of regional groupings and organisations. The European Union has the advantageof its pioneering success in integration and can be a substantial actor in that forthcomingmulti-polar world. History should enable Europe and the Muslim world to become partnersin designing the architecture of that new world order which may be nearer than imagined atpresent.12 Cinar, M; From Shadow-Boxing to Critical Understanding: Some theoretical Notes on ‘Islamism’96 as a ‘political’ Question in Totalitarian movements and Political Religions; 2002; 3.1; 35-5797

Mike SmithAmbassador for Counter terrorismAustraliaCountering Radicalisation - A Challenge ofDiscourseI am honoured and pleased to be invited to speak at this dinner tonight. The conference weare attending addresses one of the most important challenges public policy makers - indeedsocieties as a whole - are facing in these early years of the new millennium. Simply put, whyis it that certain young citizens in our midst become convinced it is right, indeed their duty, tospread terror by murdering as many people as they possibly can in as spectacular a fashionas they are able to devise?Now there are many world experts on radicalisation attending this meeting - I hasten to add,people far more erudite than me - and over the last two days there have been a number ofexcellent presentations followed by lively discussions on different aspects of the radicalisationchallenge. We have heard about the role of the media in radicalisation; we have discussedwhat strategies the UN, the OIC and the EU, are adopting to deal with the phenomenon; andwe have listened to explanations of the religious origin of radicalisation and heard ideas forcountering this through improved religious instruction. I do not intend to try to paraphrase oroffer additional commentary on those discussions and presentations.Public Information WeaknessesWhat I would rather do this evening is look at one particular dimension of this challenge.Why is it that Al Qaeda and other radical Islamist groups appear to be much more effective inpropagating to key target audiences their version of history and current events than we are.How is it that with all the public relations and mass communications machinery at our collectivedisposal - our national TV and radio networks, our press and information agencies, the greatnational newspapers that broadly represent our take on the world, from the New York Times,through Asahi Shimbun, through Le Monde to the Volkskrant here in the Hague, we aresimply not cutting it with critical segments of the population? How can it be that when wehave such a strong case against terrorist violence in both moral and utilitarian terms, we stillget an uneasy feeling that significant numbers of our own citizens, are actually swayed by theadvocates of violence - people such as Sayyed Qutb, Omar Bakri, and Abu Qutada as well asof course, Osama bin Laden, Ayman Al Zawahiri and Abu Musab al Zarqawi. What are we notgetting here? More importantly, what can we do to address this problem?Issue of CredibilityFirstly I think we need to face up to the fact that collectively, we seem to have a credibilityproblem with important audiences. By ‘we’ I mean government and authority the world over;I mean the societal status quo. The truth is significant minorities in many of our communities,and majorities in some countries, believe the world according to Bin Laden, not the worldaccording to CNN.I ask you to consider the following examples of what I am talking about. Firstly, polling showsthat many people around the world admire and trust Osama Bin Laden, a self-confessedterrorist, more than they do their own national leaders. Moreover, polling also suggests thatmany people, even a majority of the population in some countries, do not actually believeAl Qaeda carried out the attack on the World Trade Twin Towers on 11 September 2001.Secondly two years ago we saw widespread popular rioting across the Muslim world, includingthe torching of several Scandinavian Embassies, set off by the publication in Denmark of aseries of rather crude cartoons lampooning the prophet Mohamed. More recently we haveseen the Emir of the so-called ‘Islamic State of Iraq’ offer a reward of $150,000 to anyone whowould ‘slaughter like a sheep’ a Swedish cartoonist who similarly poked fun at the Prophet.Thirdly, last year we saw a wave of indignation sweep through mainstream Muslim populationswhen a world leader characterised the alleged perpetrators of the Heathrow plot to blow ninecommercial airliners out of the sky over the Atlantic Ocean as ‘islamo-fascists’. That outrageseemed to displace almost totally any popular disquiet at the evil audacity of an attack that,had it succeeded very likely would have caused the deaths of thousands of innocent travellersof all religions and plunged the world into a crisis of immense political, economic and socialdimensions.The Media Power of AQNow I am not saying that the millions of people who apparently tend to accept the extremists’line underlying some of these examples that the West is engaged in a centuries-long campaignto subdue the Islamic world, actually support Al Qaeda terrorism. The truth is the vast majorityare horrified by such terrorist attacks. But their acceptance of the populist propaganda withwhich Al Qaeda cloaks its ideology and seeks to attract people to its cause, creates a level ofambivalence and uncertainty that the terrorist groups exploit.For example, we see families that are reluctant to report to the authorities sons and cousinsthat appear to be being radicalised because they are not sure who is really right in thehistorical debate. We see communities that shy away from denouncing extremist recruitersoperating in their midst. If we cannot in the end persuade ordinary people that the ideologythese extremists propagate is a both morally wrong and deeply harmful to their community,then I fear we are going to see this phenomenon only grow in strength.98 99

It is worth recalling that Ayman Al Zawahiri wrote famously in a letter to Abu Musab AlZarqawi in July 2005, that more than 50% of AQ’s battle is in the media. The truth is AQ isevery bit as engaged in a public relations campaign as it is in a campaign of violence againstits perceived enemies. Moreover it has demonstrated how much it values PR work byenormously enhancing its capabilities in this area. The creation of Al Sahaf, the Al Qaedamedia office, has seen a quantum leap in the Organisation’s public interface with the world.Al Qaeda has come a long way from the days when it had to post or drop off tapes andvideos to Al Jazeera correspondents. Now it simply logs these straight onto the World WideWeb. Moreover the production quality of some of the videos is as good as anything Hollywoodcould produce in terms of picture quality, music and sophistication and consistency ofmessage. I fear that for the moment Al Qaeda is genuinely winning that PR campaign, evenas we collectively have our successes in disrupting their terrorist attacks.Differing Value Systems?Now Zawahiri and others would argue that the different perspectives I mentioned earlierreflect different value systems - the purity of a strict form of Islam on the one side and thedecadent West with its loose morals and free-wheeling life styles on the other. Actually I thinkthat is wrong. The truth is most people the world over and most religions the world over,share very similar basic values - values such as respect for human dignity; a recognition ofthe importance of justice and equity in human relations; the right of everyone to live peacefullywithout fear; the right of everyone to earn a living and have an opportunity to betterthemselves; and the fundamental importance of the family in society.I do not think many people would disagree with these fundamentals. Terrorists however turnthem on their head, substituting violence and intolerance and hatred for the respect for justice,tolerance and opportunity that I have just mentioned. It does not really matter what ideologythey cloak this perversion of values in - leftist, rightist, fundamentalist Christian, fundamentalistJewish or Islamist - their mentality - a mentality that allows them to take human life withouta twinge of conscience, which encourages them to stoke up hatreds and emphasise differencesbetween people rather than underlining our common humanity, genuinely differs from thementality and value systems of the vast majority of people the world over. They stand onone side of the fence and the rest of us, ordinary, tolerant, peaceful people of many differentfaiths, stand on the other. This is a point we need to register much more effectively.Filtering Values through different Cultural LensesBut if that is the case, if the extremists are genuinely on the other side of the fence, whyare they so successful in their public relations work? I think there are a few answers to that.Firstly they consistently use situations of concern to Muslims around the world - such as theplight of the Palestinians - as a prism through which to refract their radical ideas. Often thelinkages they make to their own violent agendas are tenuous or simplistic but the appeal isemotional and highly effective.With this in mind we need to listen more carefully to what the extremists are saying and workout the right response to their messages. We need to be in tune with the issues they exploit,with the nuances they make and with the appeals they craft. It is worth looking closely atOsama Bin Laden’s latest statement, released on 7 September. There is a consistency in hismessage that is impressive. It is also interesting that he repeats an appeal increasinglyfound in AQ propaganda, to non-Muslim groups that share a dislike of America such asenvironmentalists, nuclear disarmament activists and anti-globalists. At the end of the day,even when we are not in a position to resolve an issue of concern in Muslim communitiesthat the extremists are exploiting, we need at a minimum to acknowledge and respond insome way to that concern.Secondly, while as I said we could all mostly agree on a set of basic values, sometimes theseare expressed and understood differently in different cultures. For example we in the Westare inclined to argue against the extremist narrative by reference to the importance ofdemocracy, to individual rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of religion, the rightto education or to due process; and to minority rights such as the rights of women or therights of refugees. For some cultures though, these concepts are less important and lessfundamental than respect, honour, pride, religious piety and societal harmony. There may notbe much difference in the actual values being reflected, but there are significant differences inthe way these things are understood and expressed.It seems to me that Al Qaeda understands this difference of cultural perspective and exploitsit in its public relations work. We need to respond to this much more effectively - after alla car bomb in a market place is every bit a sign of gross disrespect to the victims and theirfamilies as it is a grievous breach of the individual rights of the people killed and maimed.It also brings dishonour onto the community that has harboured the bomber and those whoassisted him. We need to be aware of this and learn to cast these incidents in ways thatpeople understand and relate to.Polling in the Muslim world consistently shows that large majorities of people disapproveof and reject attacks on civilians. This is particularly so after an attack in their own country,as we saw in Jordan in 2005. People also by significant majorities support religious freedomand pluralism. These two factors constitute genuine Achilles Heels for the extremists that weshould be able to exploit more than we do currently. Terrorists kill indiscriminately and theirSalafi ideology is religiously absolutist. This characteristic of their brand of Islam, sometimescalled ‘takfiri’, discomforts many mainstream Muslims since it effectively declares them to beapostates if they do not agree totally with what the extremists believe.Politicians speaking locally but heard globallyBut challenging the extremist philosophy is not easy. One factor that complicates this sortof debate derives from the nature of globalisation and what is really the universalisation of100 101

the news cycle in the modern world. Politicians everywhere above all speak to their localconstituencies. They have to use language that is understood in their neighbourhoods wherethey come from, which they represent and where they have to maintain support. Yet thesedays the words they use locally often echo in places across the other side of the world.The use of the phrase ‘Islamo-fascist’ was heard and understood in New York and London, asdescribing individuals who were seeking to impose a totalitarian world view on others throughextreme violence. It was however heard and mis-understood in coffee shops in Cairo andBeirut and Kuala Lumpur as a comment on Islam, linking a great religion to a discreditedpolitical ideology. The same thing happens in the other direction by the way. Middle Easternleaders and commentators addressing their own audiences are often misunderstood or theirwords taken out of context, in cities on the other side of the world.Related to all of this is the challenge of selective hearing. We all suffer from this to somedegree or another. When we listen to a speech or statement, we tend to filter out and nothear the bits of it that somehow do not fit with our understanding of the way the world is.This is particularly the case if we have a preconceived notion about the person making thespeech. If it is someone we instinctively do not like and tend to disagree with, chances arewe will not hear properly or accept what is said. If however the same speech is deliveredby someone we like and admire, we may well listen more closely to the ideas and even bepersuaded by them. Who delivers ideas is therefore often as important as the ideasthemselves.Adjusting our TerminologySo given these limitations what can we do to improve communication and understandingbetween cultures without triggering Pavlovian negative reactions?First of all we can make ourselves aware of sensitivities and try to avoid the use of expressionsthat upset particular communities in our broader public messaging. For example we knowthat for many Muslims the use of the term ‘Islamic terrorism’ is offensive as it is linkssomething that is divine, Islam, with something that is profane, terrorism. So in our work weshould try to avoid this and use other terms - such as simply ‘extremist terrorism’ to explainwhat we are talking about. Or if we need to refer to the fact that a particular group is using orrather mis-using Islam as a recruitment and motivating force for its ideology, we could usethe term Islamist extremist terrorism - an expression that underlines the political rather thanreligious character of the ideology.condemnation of such attacks. When Muslim leaders appear to excuse, if not justify, particularterrorist acts by linking them with other issues of concern to their community, such as thesituation in Palestine, many people are offended. Condemnation of despicable acts cannot beconditional - such acts can never be justified and any attempt to explain them by reference toMuslim grievances runs the double risk of associating the community with the terrorism andof failing to reassure others in the country that Muslims are genuinely shocked at, and totallyrejecting of, the violence.The value of Interfaith DialogueOne way for us to understand each other better is through interfaith dialogue. Now I knowthat sometimes these dialogues are criticised as not getting to the right people - that thefanatics and those with closed minds simply do not become involved. But even if that istrue, what interfaith dialogue does do is provide an opportunity for people of goodwill on allsides to hear other perspectives and understand each other’s sensitivities. The Australian andIndonesian governments have over the last 3 years sponsored a South East Asian and Pacificregional interfaith dialogue that has provided precisely that opportunity for better mutualunderstanding between the many different religious and ethnic communities across morethan a dozen countries. More than this the Dialogue has produced useful initiativesfor improving school curricula, for teaching religion, for media literacy programs and forcommunity exchanges that hopefully will help to spread more broadly in the region themessages of tolerance and pluralism that are so critical to a peaceful and productive futurefor everyone.On the global front, it seems to me that the Alliance of Civilisations initiative launched bySpain and Turkey and now operating under UN auspices, is a brave international effort toaddress issues of mutual misunderstanding between Islamic and non-Islamic societies andhas produced some interesting practical ideas for advancing this important cause.Grassroots ApproachA related way in which we can improve communication is to broaden the range of messengers.Frankly we should not always be using politicians, or diplomats like me for that matter, to tryto convey messages as often we simply do not have the ‘street credibility’ with the groups weare trying to influence. In any case, where the message that needs to be delivered is a religiousone - that for example violence against innocents is not justified by religious texts - then itshould be a religious authority that delivers it.But how can we know all of the areas of sensitivity? Well a good first step is simply to starttalking to each other - including at conferences such as this - and understand what it is thatothers are sensitive about and why. And by the way this is not a one way street - we are notjust talking about Muslim sensitivities. One area of real concern for non-Muslims in Westerncountries where there have been terrorist attacks has been apparent ambivalence in MuslimA good example of this is the work being undertaken by Al Azhar University in Cairo, to challengeextremist interpretations of religious texts, and by Prince Ghazi bin Mohamed, PersonalEnvoy to His Majesty King Abdullah II of Jordan, who has put thousands of pages of analysisof religious text on his website with the same aim.102 103

As I said earlier, people listen to those they respect or they relate to. If we want to explain todisaffected second or third generation Muslim youths in Sydney why the extremist message iswrong, we have to find the people they admire and respect to do that. Alienated young menare unlikely to listen to someone from the government. They may be prepared to givea hearing to a religious figure from their local mosque, but it may also be that that personcannot communicate with them very well either, because, in the Australian context, he isunlikely to have been born in the country and may therefore not understand the cultural andsocial milieu within which the young men have to live and work. It may instead be a localMuslim sportsman or a singer or a successful businessman who is better placed to do this- or indeed a visitor from overseas that they particularly look up to and admire.A good example of finding the appropriate messenger was the initiative of Indonesian Vice-President Yusuf Kalla, someone with strong religious credentials, to invite a group of Muslimleaders to his house not long after the October 2005 bombing in Bali. At his place he screenedfor them the video of the bombers declaring why they carried out their attack. This had aprofound impact on the leaders watching and that in turn led to a significant change inpopular attitudes which up till then had tended not to believe that Islamists were responsiblefor the series of terrorist bombings in Indonesia.We have to try to activate potential influencers, we need to establish programs that will helpthem interact with target audiences and we have to help them craft the right messages -messages that will strike the right chord. One useful way of achieving all of these things isthrough exchanges with other countries - youth exchanges, religious exchanges, journalistexchanges, academic exchanges, something we in Australia have been doing more of inrecent years. I know that the British Government has also been promoting what it calls its‘Radical Middle Way roadshow’, a group of prominent Muslim leaders from the communitywho can communicate with young people and who understand where they are coming fromand what they are thinking.Broadening people’s perspective, giving them the chance to speak as a representative of theircountry or their community and enabling them to see and hear what life is like on the otherside of the hill can be a truly empowering experience. It can enable them to grow in confidenceand influence and become involved in ways that they had not previously contemplated.In doing this we also have to accept that the message may not be totally what we agree with- we have to cede to these influencers the freedom to get their key points through in whateverway they think is best. Sometimes that will mean criticising government policies, or expressingviews which are not mainstream community views.actions and pictures can be very much more effective as a means of communicating and weignore this at our peril. To take a negative example, the pictures that flashed around the worldof prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib probably did more to promote the cause of AQ in Iraq thanany number of written or spoken words. And we know how the extremist groups use picturesand videos, often spread through its internet websites, including of attacks on coalition vehiclesin Iraq and Afghanistan, to boost morale and recruit new members to their cause.It seems to me that we ought to be much more effective in using images against the terrorists.Terrorist attacks are horrible things. The carnage and the pain and the grievous loss arevery real and are often conveyed graphically in pictures and news videos in the immediateaftermath of an attack but then the news cycle moves on. We need to work out ways to usethese images repeatedly to remind those who are inclined to view terrorists as glamorous andheroic, exactly what the impact of their actions is. We should work out ways to counter-pointthe dramatic pictures they use with pictures of the carnage, of grieving families and perhapsof the victims themselves in hospitals. In Indonesia popular sympathy for the agenda ofJemaah Islamiyyah dropped dramatically after people saw that the victims of their bombingswere mainly ordinary Indonesians just like themselves.There is another way to convey a message through an image rather than a statement,particularly by politicians who otherwise, for reasons I have already mentioned, may havetrouble being heard and understood. This is through a public gesture. Prime Ministers andPresidents visiting mosques and meeting with Muslim dignitaries in the aftermath of aterrorist attack by an Islamist group can be immensely more effective as a way of expressingsupport for a beleaguered community at a difficult time, than a press release or a speech.Similarly visiting grieving relatives and attending memorials for victims can convey importantsense of sharing in the sadness of the occasion and sympathising with the community fromwhich the victims came.Another technique in this area is to use reformed extremists and de-radicalised terrorists tospeak out against violence and to explain why the decisions they took and the groups theybecame involved with are wrong. Such people - people like Nasir Abas in Indonesia - can alsodebunk widely held myths and misperceptions in communities either that terrorists do notexist in their midst or are not manipulating Islam. A number of countries in the Middle Eastand South East Asia have valuable programs along these lines and in the West there havebeen several fascinating books written by now disillusioned extremists exposing the techniquesand explaining the weakness of the terrorist narrative. Ed Husain’s recent book ‘The Islamist‘is an excellent example. We should work more assiduously to amplify these voices and makethem more accessible to the audiences that are vulnerable to recruitment.The Power of Pictures and ImagesI have talked quite a bit this evening about terminology and messages but actually sometimesConclusionIt will be evident from what I have been saying this evening that not only is this field immensely104 105

complex and difficult, but it is one where the whole community needs to be involved.Governments alone cannot do this - indeed it may be that governments mainly cannot do itbecause they do not have the access to, or the credibility with, the right audiences. Peoplefrom all segments of society need to be engaged in this communications effort - academics,teachers, journalists, religious leaders, business people, lawyers and judges, and communityleaders all have to understand that we are involved in a debate that will affect fundamentallyhow our societies evolve and function into the next generation. Only by understanding thisand working together can we hope to overcome the many dimensions of this challenge.Ladies and gentlemen, Mister President,It is my pleasure and honour to be here.Ivo OpsteltenMayor City of RotterdamThe NetherlandsAnd finally let me say that while each community, each society has to address these issueslocally, there is also a critical international dimension to it. The challenge is global, theenvironment in which we and our opponents are operating has no borders, and if we do notcooperate with each other, share ideas, share best practice and exchange information on howthe challenge is evolving, we risk being far less effective than otherwise we would be. At theend of the day, this is why conferences such as this are so important and why the discussionswe are conducting here in The Hague can make such a contribution to our common efforts todeal with the phenomenon of radicalisation.As mayor of Rotterdam, I would like to address you on my city’s experiences with counteringradicalisation. All of us are aware that the world changed radically after 9-11. This tragedy,six years ago, shocked us here in the Netherlands too. But still, it was something that hadhappened in far-away America. Radicalisation was thought to be something that mainlyconcerned other countries, not ours. Only six months later, our country was the scene of themurder of a politician: Pim Fortuyn. He was a resident of Rotterdam and party chairman inmy municipal council. Two years later, in 2004, the Netherlands featured the world press again,with the murder of the filmmaker Theo van Gogh. This made very clear that radicalisation wasnot something in a far-away country. In fact, the global conflict surrounding political Islamhad now hit our streets too. It made us realize that we needed a much sharper focus onradicalisation.In 2005, Rotterdam therefore launched an explicit policy about this subject. We developedan action programme, called “Meedoen of Achterblijven”, which roughly translates intoEnglish as ‘Join in, or get left behind’. This title expresses our message very well: we wantevery Rotterdammer to join in. In other words: we are striving towards an inclusive society.Inclusiveness: that means that every Rotterdammer is responsible for his or her contributiontowards the quality of life in the city. Every Rotterdammer - whatever his nationality or religion- gets the opportunity to take an active part in Rotterdam society. The great majority of themdo so. They do actively contribute towards the development of their city. However, a limitednumber of people refuse to join in. They show themselves to be radical in words and behaviour.They do not accept the rules set down in the Dutch Constitution. These people, who choosenot to join in, must be dealt with harshly. It is exactly this principle of ‘inclusion and exclusion’that is at the heart of our action programme on countering radicalisation. Join in, or get leftbehind.Our action programme comprises a package of concrete measures against radicalisation andagainst extremism. Let me briefly explain our programme.First, I would like to stress that our approach is a local approach. I am very convinced thata local focus is most effective in countering radicalisation. Besides, it is fully in line with the‘National Action Plan on Polarisation and Radicalisation’, which also stresses the importance106 107

of the local level. In our action programme we have stated which groups and individuals aresusceptible to radicalisation. And it describes which measures must be taken to improve theresistance of these groups - and of Rotterdam society in general. Three principles are crucial:Prevention, Preparation. Repression. Let me briefly explain them.Prevention in the Rotterdam situation means that every citizen must be given the opportunityto take part. He can make full use of language courses, support with parenting and welfare,sports and cultural facilities, reintegration programmes, work placements and subsidies.In short, he or she is given plenty of opportunities for self-improvement and to contributetowards society. By doing so, we improve people’s prospects. That decreases the chance for abreeding ground for radicalisation.The second principle, preparation, means that you prepare society, right down to its veryroots, to recognise the early signs of radicalisation. That begins with creating awareness.By defining what we mean by radicalisation. We try to impress upon people how careful theymust be when using this term. Not to spread panic, but to be able to identify the signs intime. For that reason, we have trained our civil servants in recognising radicalisation.We also train people who work with persons who might be vulnerable and susceptible toradicalisation. For example: youth workers, safety coordinators, police officers, schoolattendance officers, teachers, and so on. Good training of these professionals is extremelyimportant. There are examples of professionals who did spot tendencies towards radicalisation,but a well-coordinated approach to effectively tackle this, failed. That approach is now in place!We have set up a Radicalisation Information Point. Here, people can report signs of radicalisation.It has existed a little more than two years now. Until now, it has received over fifty calls.Sometimes, these reports were on organisations, but it is usually a question of individuals.Individuals who later turned out to be persons with multiple problems and few prospectsin society. The Radicalisation Information Point also has a quick scan facility. Whenever anincident of a radical-extremist nature occurs in Europe or elsewhere, the Information Pointcan quickly contact key figures in Rotterdam society. Via this up-to-date and vital network,these key figures are given a voice. It gives local authorities the possibility to quickly measurethe temperature at the neighbourhood level. And it may provide answers to questions suchas: Are there tensions? If so, what kind of tensions, in which neighbourhood exactly, who isinvolved and what can we do about it?From what I have said, you will understand that our focus is primarily on preparation. Thismeans the recognition and localisation of radical elements in our society. This is not aneasy task, but it is possible. Because radicalisation is not something that only happens inthe secrecy of someone’s attic or cellar. And no-one becomes ‘radical’ overnight. He or sheundergoes a process. It is our joint responsibility to spot the signs of such a process and todo something about it. By means of the training I referred to earlier. By using as many eyesand ears as possible in the city. And by constantly reminding all Rotterdammers of theirresponsibility.Ladies and gentlemen, I am convinced that Rotterdam is on the right track. What we haveseen in the past two years is that more and more people - citizens and professionals - areapproaching the local authority when they have questions or something to report aboutradicalisation. We have also seen that our own reports and analyses are becoming increasinglyfocused and more refined, providing ever better insight into the phenomena surroundingradicalisation. And: our knowledge is increasing. Knowledge that we share with our partners.I think this is also reflected in their attitude towards us. Perhaps the best example of this, arethe Muslin organisations in our city. At the start of our new policy on countering radicalisation,these muslin organisations were wary of our approach.Now, two years later, they share our sense of urgency. They make active efforts to preventradicalisation and to promote integration. And they are happy with the facilitating role of thecity.That, ladies and gentlemen, is in my opinion a very good result indeed! I thank you very muchfor listening and wish you a very good dinner.Ladies and gentlemen, besides Prevention and Preparation, there is a third principle in ourapproach to counter radicalisation. That is repression. Repression is a way of getting people,who are involved in a radicalisation process, back onto the right track. Repression is also ameans to temporarily exclude these people from Rotterdam society. I need say little moreabout this.108 109

Reflection and outlookMarc Sageman, M.D., Ph.D.Independent researcher on terrorism, founder and principal of Sageman Consulting LLCand author of “Understanding terrorist networks”United States of AmericaMr Sageman remarked on the contributions made by the experts and participants to the conference.The essence of his remarks was threefold:1. To study radicalization, researchers needed to define exactly what they were studying in order tobe able to compare their work. Otherwise, it would be comparing apples and oranges.2. In order to understand the effectiveness of deradicalization measures, there was a need for atheory of radicalization, in order to organize our thinking about measures to prevent thisphenomenon. The testimony I submitted is the only comprehensive theory of radicalization thatI know at present.3. In order to measure the effectiveness of any measure of radicalization, one needed to compareit to a control group, a group that did not benefit from such measure. The effectiveness was thedifference in radicalization, however measured, between the two groups.An elaboration of the contribution of Mr Sageman can be found in his testimony before the“United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs” on June 27,2007. Text is shown below.Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to present my views on the threat of violent Islamistextremists in Europe and the United States. There is a great disparity in the threat faced inthese two continents. Data on arrests for Islamist terrorism related charges indicate thatthe rate of arrest per Muslim capita in Europe is about five times that of the United States.In order to understand this discrepancy, we must analyze the process transforming normalyoung Muslims into people willing to use violence for political ends. The understanding ofthis process of “radicalization” is critical to assessing the threat facing the West and shouldbe the basis guiding our interventions to counter it. This is a complicated issue, and giventhe time constraints of this hearing, my remarks will necessarily sound too simplistic.I apologize for this, but I would like to suggest the outline of a framework that might organizeour thinking about how us to tackle this problem. These ideas are more fully developed in mynew book 1 , which I will gladly provide to the committee as soon as it is available.My continuing research into Islamist extremism 2 shows that the terrorists are idealistic youngpeople, who seek glory and thrills by trying to build a utopia. Contrary to popular belief,radicalization is not the product of poverty, various forms of brainwashing, youth, ignorance1 Marc Sageman, in press, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-first Century, Philadelphia:University of Pennsylvania Press2 See also Marc Sageman, 2004, Understanding Terror Networks, Philadelphia: University of110Pennsylvania Press111

or lack of education, lack of job, lack of social responsibility, criminality or mental illness.Their mobilization into this violent Islamist born-again social movement is based on friendshipand kinship. Lately, over 80% of arrested terrorists in Europe and the United States arepart of the Muslim Diaspora, mostly second and now third generation of immigrants. Theyare radicalized in the West, and not in the Middle East. Usually, they are small groups offriends and relatives, who spontaneously self organize into groups that later turn to terrorism.Before 9/11, they were able to travel freely and to connect with al Qaeda central, giving themovement a greater appearance of unity than it ever had. At this point, only some BritishIslamist radicals with family connections in Pakistan can physically connect with fellowtravellers of the al Qaeda terrorist organization. Otherwise, these new groups are physicallyisolated but connected through Internet forums, inspired by the extremist ideology andhoping that they will be accepted as members of al Qaeda through their terrorist operations.From my review of the literature and my field research both in Europe and in the UnitedStates, I have come to think about the process of radicalization as consisting of four prongs:a sense of moral outrage; a specific interpretation of the world; resonance with personalexperiences; and mobilization through networks. These four factors are not stages in a process,nor do they occur sequentially. They are simply four recurrent phases in this process.As mentioned earlier, this process is driven by young Muslims chasing dreams of glory byfighting for justice and fairness as they define it. They are enthusiastic volunteers, trying toimpress their friends with their heroism and sacrifice. Suicide bombers, or “shahids” as theycall themselves, have become the rock stars of young Muslim militants.1. Moral Outrage. One of the major utterances from Islamist radicals is a sense of moraloutrage, a reaction to perceived major moral violations, like killings, rapes or local policeactions. Before 2003, the major source of such outrage was the killings of Muslims inBosnia, Chechnya, the second Palestinian intifada and Kashmir. Since 2003, the war in Iraqis definitely fuelling this process of radicalization. Although the war in Iraq did not causethis social movement - after all, 9/11 occurred before the invasion of Iraq -, it has sincecaptured all the sense of moral outrage in Muslims all over the world. In all my talks withMuslims, Iraq is monopolizing the theme of any conversation about Islam and the West.The humiliations of Abu Ghraib and GITMO as well as multiple statements from Westernleaders surface in such conversations. More locally, many Muslims also cite local lawenforcement actions against Muslims, bridging the local and global in their worldview.2. Interpretation. This sense of moral outrage must be interpreted in a certain way to fosterradicalization. The common interpretation is that all these global and local moral violationsare examples of a unified Western global strategy, namely a “War against Islam”. Havingsaid this, it is important to realize that this worldview is deliberately vague and that therehas been far too much focus on ideology in trying to understand radicalization. In myobservations of Islamist terrorists, I came to the conclusion that there were not Islamicscholars. The defendants at the Madrid bombing trial, at the Operation Crevice trial inLondon, at the Operation Pendennis litigation in Australia or at the various Hofstad Grouptrials in Holland are far from being Islamic scholars. The same is true for the perpetratorsof 9/11 and those indicted in Miami, New York, New Jersey and Toronto for attemptedterrorist operations. These people are definitely not intellectuals who decide what to doafter careful deliberation. I believe that the explanation for their behaviour is not found inhow they think, but rather in how they feel. All these perpetrators dream about becomingIslamic heroes in this “War against Islam,” modelling themselves on the seventh centurywarriors that conquered half the world and the Mujahedin who defeated the Soviet Unionin Afghanistan in the 1980s. Many hope to emulate their predecessors by now fighting inIraq against coalition forces. Their interpretation, a “War against Islam”, occurs within acultural tradition, and this is where Europe and the United States differ. First, in Europe,nations are founded on the basis of the myth of a certain essence, namely Frenchness,Englishness, Germanness… In the United States and other countries built on successivemodern waves of immigration, the founding myth is that of a “melting pot”. The pointis that the myth of a national essence excludes non-European immigrants, while that ofa melting pot facilitates their inclusion into the host society. Second, the notion of theAmerican Dream, the land of opportunity, partially protects the United States from thisform of terrorism. Whether it is true or not, the important point is that people believe it.A recent poll found that 71% of Muslim Americans believe in the American Dream 3 . Thisis not the case in Europe, where Muslims complain about discrimination in the labourmarket. Third, American Individualism partially prevents the generation of a collectiveexplanation for any personal adversity. For instance, if a Muslim American is asked whyhe did not succeed at work, he or she will usually answer, “I did not try hard enough”.This individualistic answer also combines the core of the American Dream, namely equalopportunity. On the other hand, when I ask Muslim Europeans the same question, theyusually answer with a shrug, “I’m Muslim”. This is a collective explanation, which mayeventually give rise to anger against the host society. Other polls demonstrate that MuslimEuropeans answer that they feel Muslim first rather than a member of their host nation.This does not bode well for the future of European Muslim relations. Finally, U.S. traditionof local grass root voluntarism allows Muslim Americans to channel some of theirdiscontent in local politics. This is less likely in Europe. A sense of local empowermentmight be protective against a larger strike against the society in general.3. Resonance with Personal Experience. The interpretation that the West is engaged in a Waragainst Islam sticks more to Muslim Europeans than Americans because it resonates withtheir everyday personal experience. This notion of resonance brings in the social, economic,political and religious factors that constitute the infrastructure of their everyday life. Thisfactor is what scholars traditionally define as the “root causes” of terrorism. First, from ahistorical perspective, we are dealing with very different communities. The United Stateswas able to cherry pick immigrants and allowed Muslim engineers, physicians, university3 Pew Research Center, 2007, Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream, at http://112 pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-americans.pdf113

professors and businessmen to immigrate. The result is that the Muslim Americancommunity is solidly middle class, with a higher average income than the rest of society.This is not true of Europe, which imported unskilled labour to reconstruct the continentthat had been devastated by World War II. So, on a socio-economic scale, we are dealingwith very different communities: middle class in the United States and an unskilled labourpool in Europe. In terms of the labour market, Muslim Americans believe that they arefacing equal opportunity. Europeans know that this is not the case, as the male Muslimunemployment rate is much higher than the average rate in the rest of society. MuslimEuropeans strongly believe they are facing discrimination because they are Muslim.Welfare policy also distinguishes Europe from the United States, and allows Europe totolerate a high unemployment rate. Many Muslim Europeans, because they are unemployed,are on the welfare payroll. Many do not feel the urgency to get a job and a few spend theiridle moments talking about jihad. In essence, European nations are funding some youngpeople to be full time jihadi pretenders. As terrorist operations do not cost much, muchof the funding for attempted operations come from European states, from their welfarepayments. One cannot underestimate the importance of boredom in an idle population,which drives young people to seek the thrill of participating into a clandestine operation.4. Mobilization through networks. The factors described above influence some youngMuslims to become angry, and vent their frustration on the Internet. What transformsvery few to become terrorists is mobilization by networks. Up to a few years ago, thesenetworks were face-to-face networks. They were local gangs of young immigrants, membersof student associations and study groups at some radical mosques. These cliques offriends became radicalized together. The group acted as an echo chamber, which amplifiedtheir grievances, intensified the members’ bonds to each other, generated local valuesrejecting those of society and facilitated a gradual separation from their host society.These natural group dynamics resulted in a spiral of mutual encouragement and escalation,transforming a few young Muslims into dedicated terrorists, willing to follow the model oftheir heroes and sacrifice themselves for comrades and the cause. Their turn to violenceand the terrorist movement was a collective decision, rather than an individual one.Over the past two or three years, face-to-face radicalization is being replaced by onlineradicalization. It is the interactivity of the group that changes people’s beliefs, and suchinteraction is found in Islamist extremist forums on the Internet. The same support andvalidation that young people used to derive from their offline peer groups are now foundin these forums, which promote the image of terrorist heroes, link them to the virtualsocial movement, give them guidance and instruct them in tactics. These forums, virtualmarketplaces for extremist ideas, have become the virtual “invisible hand” organizingterrorist activities worldwide. The true leader of this violent social movement is thecollective discourse on half a dozen influential forums. They are transforming the terroristmovement, recruiting ever younger members and now more prominently women, who canparticipate in the discussions.Now that I have outlined my analysis of the threat, and commented on the cultural andstructural differences between Europe and the United States, what can we do about it? Fromthe driver of the process - a search for glory - it becomes obvious that we need to eliminatethe glory from this activity and reduce it to common criminality. There is nothing moreglorious than to go against men and women in uniform from the only remaining superpower.We need to demilitarize this fight against terrorists and turn it over to law enforcement.It is also important not to give too much importance to the terrorists who are arrested orkilled. We should resist the temptation to hold press conferences to publicize another “majorvictory” in the war on terror. These have the undesired effect of elevating the status of thesecriminals to that of heroes.On the first prong, it is important to remove as soon as possible U.S. troops from Iraq, whichhas become the main source of inspiration of the new generation of Islamist terrorists.In the West, the Muslim community is very sensitive to the action of local law enforcementagencies. If it perceives them to act against its members, it will assume that the state is alsoagainst it. In a sense, this is what happened in many European countries, where Caucasianpolicemen patrol immigrant neighbourhoods. Local police forces need to be seen as partof the community at large and their recruitment need to reflect the composition of theircommunities. It is not enough to have regular meetings with Muslim community leaders,whom the younger generation does not respect. Through the recruitment of young Muslims,police forces would have an ongoing everyday relationship with young people in the community.Furthermore, it is important to win the Muslim community over and explain police actionsto them. This has become a problem in England because of the legal ban on commentingon criminal cases in litigation. However, the opposite - making exaggerated claims of threatfor short term political benefits - will also alienate the Muslim community. So far, MuslimAmericans have shown themselves to be very patriotic, but this has not been well recognizedeither by the press or by our government. It is important to trust them to continue in thispath and not to alienate them.On the second prong, it is important to show that our counterterrorism efforts are not partof a war on Islam. We have made many mistakes in this arena. Most Muslim Americans donot believe that the U.S. led war on terrorism is a sincere effort to reduce terrorism. Here,it seems that actions speak louder than words. The government should actively challengethose who question the loyalty of Muslim Americans. The American Dream is alive and wellamong Muslim Americans. It should be further confirmed through the continued publicationsof some of their success stories. These stories should become sources of inspiration andhopes for young Muslims, who should be encouraged to emulate these positive role modelsrather than those of Islamist terrorists. To become successful for a young Muslim Americanshould be viewed as “cool.” I see the “war of ideas” or the search for a “counter-narrative” asgenerally misguided: terrorists are not intellectuals. They do what they do because of vagueimages of glory, not out of well thought out positions derived from any scripture. The “war of114 115

ideas” should be replaced by the inspiration of new dreams and hopes for young Muslims.We should learn our lessons from our own experience with the Civil Rights movement, whenReverent Martin Luther King inspired a generation with his speech “I Have a Dream!”.On the third prong, the United States is doing much better than Europe. We should continueto be fair and fight any discrimination in the labour market, at airports, and law enforcement.Our social internal successes should be internationally advertised through programs sendingabroad successful Muslim Americans to talk about their life in our country. Muslims shouldalso be encouraged to enter into the realm of politics and show that they can peacefullyinfluence their environment.On the fourth prong, it is of course important to disrupt the networks that threaten theUnited States, Europe or any population. We must eliminate terrorists and bring them tojustice. However, this should be done quietly, so as not to elevate common criminals to thestatus of heroes. Now, many such networks are virtual, centred in Internet forums, whereyoung Muslims share their dreams, hopes and grievances. This is an internal Muslimdiscussion. However, we can encourage some young Muslims, who reject violence, to activelyparticipate in these discussions in order to actively challenge the various calls to violenceemerging from them.The American Muslim community is relatively young, having mostly immigrated in the lasthalf century. Its young generation is searching for its identity and trying to define its role withrespect to the rest of American society. It is important for the rest of American society towelcome Muslim Americans and help them integrate better within the fabric of our nation.We are doing better than our European counterparts in this regard, but we must continue topromote core American values of justice and fairness and fight those elements in our societythat try to single out and antagonize part of our nation.Professor Ahmad S. MoussalliDepartment of Political Studies, American University of BeirutLebanonGeneral Observations and CommentsThe collapse of the Soviet Union has not led to substantial changes in the underlying doctrinesgoverning Western foreign policy in the Middle East. Western objectives have largely remainedthe same as they were during the Cold War with the substantial development of terrorism,radicalism and violence among Islamic movements and others. Since the end of the Gulf War,the West has worked for some time on two tracks: pushing for incremental successes in theArab-Israeli peace process and intensifying the containment of Iraq and Iran. However, Iraqnow is under Western occupation and the peace process has come to a standstill. In this ageof globalization, trans-nationalization of capital, and democratization, the West is well advisedto alter it policies for achieving its strategic objectives.The importance of resolving Middle Eastern conflicts in general and the Arab-Israeli one inparticular has sprung essentially from the realization by many Western strategists and policymakers that the explosive nature of these conflicts might negatively affect the interests of theWest. The West has a vested interest in a “new world order” that aims at the reactivation ofworld commerce. Its attempt to establish a new regional order in the area cannot succeedwithout first eliminating the basic obstacle in the Middle East, namely the Arab-Israeli conflict.The settlement of this crisis requires that Arabs and Israelis enter into a dialogue that willeventually lead to a peaceful resolution of the conflict as well as subsequent normalization ofrelations. However, the new enemy is being presented as Islamism - under the descriptions ofradical fundamentalism and Islamic jihadism. It along with the governments of rogue statesthat have individual regional ambitions and are capable of ‘developing’ weapons of massdestruction must pay the price.Iran, the Sudan, and Arab Islamic movements are portrayed as orchestrating the mainopposition to the on-going peace process. Now that the Palestinians and Israel have mutuallyrecognized each other’s right to exist as two peoples with basic human and political rights,the focus of the conflict seems to have shifted from the traditional lines to another level.Examples of this level includes the conflict between Hamas and the PLO and the conflictbetween Israeli Labour and Likud parties. Although this level has long existed, the foreseeablefuture is going to be plagued with Islamic and Jewish fundamentalists struggling againstrecognition of each other. In this way, the Palestinians and the Israelis have genuinely becomepart of this troubled area, the Middle East, where they are likely to experience, like Egypt orAlgeria, questions of their legitimacy by religiously-oriented movements. Claims and counterclaims will be postulated, leading to internalization of what has been largely an external116 117

problem that has helped the cohesion of Israeli and Palestinian societies. No wonder thatcivil war, civil strife, and uprising against the Palestinian and Israeli establishments cannot bediscounted. It seems that all countries of the area will share concerns such as fundamentalism,religious claims, just economic development, and proper political participation.Violence, spearheaded by radical religious groups, is expected to intensify from within andagainst both Israel and the Arab governments and their supporter, the West. The governmentsare capable of destroying the military infrastructure of such movements; however they cannotliquidate their bases or dismiss their grievances, which are the grievances of the broaderIslamic movements, nationalist movements and, above all, of the people themselves.To manage the roots of cultural animosity, priority must be given to the increasing number ofreligious movements. Terrorism and violence are a matter of fact, but every opposition,including popular opposition by fundamentalists, is not a terrorist act. Clearly, ultimateresponses to popular grievances cannot take a security nature; they have to address andresolve the underlying causes.The other and more immediate issue that the West needs to address is the occupation ofIraq. The West has a rare chance to give a rare example in nation building and democraticdevelopment. The West ability to help in setting up a representative and democratic governmentin Iraq will dispel a lot of the widely spread scepticism in the Arab and the Islamicworld about its real intentions. The declared reason for the attack on Iraq, the developmentof weapons of mass destruction, was a false claim, as suspected by the people of the areafrom the very beginning. If the West fails in building a democratic Iraq, the whole area willsuffer from a tragic setback in terms of the promises for a more democratic Middle East. Thiswill strengthen the hands of authoritarian regimes that do not want the West to win at thatdemocratic front and that do not want it to lose at the military front. The West is in a no winsituation. It should work on changing its perceptions and policies and reducing radicalism inthe Middle East through the following policy recommendations.right direction. The real cost of all of the above, the think-tank and the taskforce is negligiblein terms of the return on Western interests, security, and stability. This should be given thehighest priority.At a different level, the West needs to:• Initiate dialogue and positive engagement and better channels of communication withIslamic states and movements. Opening up to Iran will have a major impact on softeningpolitical Islam, especially its positions on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the West;• Increase research to understand the structures and ideologies of Islamism and the roleof religion in the 21st century;• Increase all kinds of educational programs that bring Muslims to the West and familiarizethem with the Western political system and society and vice versa.2. Consistent and outspoken positions on the implementation of human rights, pluralism,and democracy as well as terrorism and armaments in order to prevent misconception ofthe West in the Islamic world will serve long-terms objectives of stability and security.This will reduce antagonistic attitudes and threats of instability toward the West which isperceived to have double standards when it comes to the issues of Arab governance andthe Arab-Israeli conflict. This could be done by:• Encouraging and pressuring, or dialoguing with its allies to democratize the politicalspace and liberalize the economy;• Reducing the use of arbitrary and brutal force and upholding the rule of law;• Upholding, internationally and locally, human rights and institutes of civil society• Reducing corruption and nepotism;• Targeting certain major countries like Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey as models for interactionbetween Islamists and secularists and examples of pacifying Islamic movements;• Conditioning political participation of both Islamists and secularists on renouncing theuse of violence.Policy Recommendations1. It is in the West interest to stop postulating a cultural or religious threat or a global Islamicenemy, and instead, try to locate and solve problems within their immediate contexts.Threats to the strategic interest of the West spring from specific grievances within statesand not from a general Islamic view of the West. In real terms, the Islamists, even theradicals, cannot pose a real geo-political threat.In the short term, terrorism should be fought by counter-terrorism. But in the long term,terrorism can only be eliminated by treating the socio-economic and political conditionsthat produced it. We must eliminate terrorist groups and playing on their sectarian andregional differences. We should coordinate policies of support and pressure with majorpowers in Europe and elsewhere to fight terrorism, and the conference here is just a verygood beginning that should be followed by developing a European think-tank and a taskforceto combat terrorism. The U.N. taskforce initiative is also important and a step in the3. The West is well advised to recognize that a Middle East based primarily on its superiormilitary powers and those of its allies, the cornerstone of its Middle East policy during theCold War and beyond, cannot last and, in the long run, damages the interests of the Westand its regional allies and increases regional instability. Therefore, it is necessary to rethinkWestern strategic interests and come up with new policies.4. The West can work now on developing a consensus for a new Middle East, taking intoconsideration existing regional balances of power and their economic interests anddevelopment. In this way, the West positions itself to positively influence regional marketsand to decrease competition from Europe, Russia, China, and the Far East.On the one hand, an alliance, for instance, between Israel and Jordan and the Palestinians,in addition to the alliance between Israel and Turkey might lead to common economiccooperation projects such as regional oil pipelines that cross and benefit many states.118 119

On the other hand, Turkey also should be included in a new regional order and should notbe used only to counter the influence of Iran and Syria. Alliances such as those betweenTurkey and Israel, on the one hand, and Iran and Syria, on the other, increase security risksfor Western interests and the parties concerned.5. Iran should be a key component in future stability in the Middle East and the Gulf.Maintaining security in the Gulf is very costly, and the effectiveness of containing Iran isdoubtful.• Instead, a new regional order that includes Iran can be seriously entertained.• An Iranian-Western rapprochement would inevitably lead to drastic changes in Iranianpolicy toward the security and development of the Middle East.• Increase Western carrot policy with Iran by supporting Iran’s attempt to enter the WorldTrade Organization that has been obstructed by the West for four years. Current Westernpositions on Iran work in the hands of Iranian hard-liners who exploit Western supportfor Israel to show Western bias. The West and Israel should improve their relations withIran; an improvement in Western-Iranian relations will improve regional cooperation.• Policies that support reformist Iranians and policies that deter hard-line Iranians shouldbe pursued. Instead of containment and boycott, commercial and economic ties as wellas the promotion of democracy should be major factors in formulating a new foreignpolicy in the Middle East.• Western policy needs to stop being reactive and become proactive. For instance, theWest can engage Iran through Tehran’s shifting interests and begin to prepare for futureWestern-Iranian relations. The world is already exploring this course. The West needs tomove from old Cold-War positions to new strategic ones.• The West may forgo its policy of isolating Iran, given the fact that the main losers havebeen Western companies that have been disqualified from tapping into and benefitingfrom a huge market. European and Asian states have to a large extent filled the vacuum.Thus, it is in the West interest to have a working relationship with Iran.• Iran and the West as well as the parties of the Arab-Israeli conflict should work ondeveloping understanding of each other’s views, fears, and interests. Reinventing thewheel of history is not recommended, and an upward cooperative momentum shouldbe pursued. To do this, the West should employ second-track diplomacy and coordinatewith other countries like the U.K. to induce Iran to change its policies and to include itin regional arrangements.• A peace settlement between Arabs and Israel should be accompanied by multinationaltalks on major concerns of the area- armaments, water, oil, borders, refugees andothers. Parties involved in the conflict should be enticed to a final peace settlementwith regard to its dividends, a decrease in the armament race and an increase ineconomic, social and political benefits and security. There is a need to justly andcomprehensively resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, including creating a Palestinian stateand satisfying religious symbolism. Also, non-Israeli, non-Arab factors should beincluded in any new regional order.Reflection and outlookFuad JabaliSyarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University JakartaIndonesiaIf the suggestion is to neutralize radicals then one of the most challenging steps is how toestablish a productive dialog with them. Of course, there is no tolerance for those who useviolence. But if radicalism is still in the form of thoughts and believes then there is alwayschance to neutralize it.To prevent new radicals to emerge, or to prevent the transformation of radical thoughts andbelieves into violence by its supporters, we need to have, using Tariq Ramadan words, patienceto dialog. For the sake of establishing a productive dialogue with these radicals, we need togive benefit of doubt both to ourselves and to them. We must have willingness to say that wemight be wrong and they might be right. Only through this willingness that we can sit withthem to explore the richness of Islamic tradition and, as a result, bring them from exclusivityto inclusivity. If we condemn them right from the beginning, they will close the door for us.There is a strong tendency throughout the conference to view these radicals as bad guys andcriminals. Needless to say that I am against them, but, reading their biography and testimonyfrom their family and neighbours, we are informed that these radicals are described as good,devoted and pious person who are polite and kind to their neighbours. It took time for theseneighbours and family to believe that these pious guys were indeed responsible for killingthose innocent people. But why these nice guys did what they did?My point is that, treating them as merely bad guys and even criminals, we will never be ableto understand one of the most important factors that give birth to terrorism: religious belief.We must learn, no matter hard, to put ourselves in their position. With all their difficulties,with their life experience that has provided them with a very limited choice, they are actuallytrying to be good Muslims. To us, as Mohamed Kamel Rezag Bara put it, radicalism is falseIslam. But for them, it is our Islam that is false.I agree with Tony Heal that “Counter terrorism is about hearts and minds, … history, cultures,ideology and believe.” If so, then the real battle is the battle of interpretations: How history,cultures, ideology and belief is interpreted, or used and abused, to win the people’s mindsand hearts.Throughout the conference we have been able to identify variety of strategies to cope withthe outer aspects of radicalism, but not so much with the inner ones. We still need to explore120 121

how to deal with the abstract belief and convictions that has become the root of radicalism.As far as the Islamic radicalism is concerned, there are certain numbers of concepts that havebeen extensively used by radicals to justify their course. These include tawhid (the belief inoneness of God and his absolute authority), al-wala’ wa al-bara’ (alliance and disassociation),hakimiyya (governance only belong to God), jihad (holy war) and khilafa (caliphate).For Muslims, especially for the highly religious-oriented Muslims, it is critical to find referencein Islamic traditions if they are to accept certain values or practices. The failure to find themwill lead to resistance. Gender and Human Rights, for examples, have been accepted andrefused by different groups of Muslims, depending their success or failure to find references.So what happen if those Muslims think that there is only one reference, or that there is onlyone meaning for every thing in Islam, then the outcome will be a black and white Islam.A rigid Islam: There is only one reference that must be followed by all Muslims - even by allnon-Muslims as well - regardless of different time and space. The more able to find numberof references in Islamic traditions for every problem the more inclusive Islam.Democracy has been refused by radicals precisely because, they say, there is no referencein Islam. It is outside Islam and, therefore it is prohibited for Muslims to adopt. To acceptdemocracy means to believe that the political system established by the Prophet Muhammaddoes not work anymore. Being produced by the atheist Greeks, their argument runs, democracydoe not recognize God as the only ruler, the only owner and the regulator of the universe.This is in total contradiction with the concept of tawhid in Islam.If we believe that democracy is good for Islamic countries then we should prove that there areprinciples in Islam which are compatible with democracy. Thus, if Muslims become democratic,this is not because they are following ‘the West’ but because they are following Islamicprinciples, which happen to be similar to the principles of democracy. Indonesian Muslimshave been successful in this regard. A national wide survey done by Syarif Hidayatullah StateIslamic University in 2004 shows that 72,1% of Indonesia Muslims agreed that Islamic stateis the best for Indonesia, but 71,6% also agreed that democracy is the best. How is it thatthey agree to both Islamic state and democracy as the best for the country? One way ofreading it is that, to them, Islamic state is democratic state. In other words, being a goodMuslim is also being democratic. The success of Indonesia to hold general election in 2004seems to approve this conclusion.The idea to promote democracy in order to cope with religious radicalization is importantto follow up. Democracy not only do (using Mona Eltahawy words) provide alternatives to‘either or situation’ - either corrupt regime or radical Islamists - or (using Charles Harb’s)‘encourage challenges to the existing authoritarian regime’ but also:turn them into hero of the people who are not satisfied with the existing regime. They willget more support when they are oppressed. When we provide them space, we can negotiatewith them. But negotiation can only work if the participating parties are treated equally.None is higher or truer than the other. Bob de Graaff’s statement is important to thinkabout: Democracy allows non-conforming element to exist. To exist means to be comfortablein showing one’s belief without being permanently judged as wrong, unworthy of beingdialogued.2. ‘Secularize’ religious radicals. Participating in public sphere through democracy, religiousradicals are forced to negotiate all the time with the existing political parties or groups inorder to survive and to maintain legitimacy. (Even if their agenda is to use democracy tokill democracy). Public participation will secularize them. However, extreme secularizationwill hardly work. Turki is a case in point.3. Provide equal access to religious scripture. The existing of charismatic leaders has becomeone of the main characteristic of radicalism. Exclusive, black and white, Islam can only bemaintained if interpretation is tightly controlled by limited number of religious authority.Democratization will lead to the breakdown of traditional religious authority and oncereligious authority is widely distributed, plurality of interpretations will be there and peoplewill have choice which interpretations to follow.It was highlighted, especially by Ruud Lubbers, throughout the conference that every bodyand institution must involve in combating radicals. Institutions such as NGOs, mass media(TV, newspapers etc), government, army and political parties are instrumental in combatingradicalism, but unfortunately not all of them are trusted by the community. Each communityhas different individuals and institutions that they trust. To be effective and sustainable, onehas to work with these trusted individuals and institutions and it needs a good research orsurvey to identify them. In Indonesian context, these trusted agents include religious individualsand institutions, without whom democratization, and therefore neutralization of radicals,in Indonesia is inconceivable. Survey shows that 46% of Indonesian Muslims belong to theexisting mass Muslims organizations, the biggest of which are NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), withabout 35 million members, and Muhammadiyah with about 30 million members. The two areconsidered as the defenders of moderate Islam in Indonesia.The success of Indonesia, the biggest Muslim country in the world, to establish democracyis important in the context of combating radicalism. Through Islam, Indonesia is closelyconnected to the Islamic world and though democracy to the West. Indonesia is an importantbridge between the two worlds to establish a better relationship between them and to worktogether to combat radicalism.1. Provide space for radicals to express themselves so that we can check them out.Oppressing them will only lead them to form a dangerous underground movement and122 123

Chairman‘s conclusionsof the International ConferenceRUUD LUBBERS“Countering Radicalisation: perspectivesand strategies from around the globe”• The conference showed the urgent need for a platform for continued consultations oncountering radicalisation; also transregional.• To counter radicalisation it is key to promote the rule of law, also conducive to the“de-legitimisation” of the use of violence by (groups of) citizens. This also includescountering the instigation of violence via the internet and other media, as well as ineducational and religious institutions.• Societal efforts are needed to prevent radicalisation that may lead to the use of violenceand the threat thereof.These efforts have to be supported by authorities at the national, the regional and the locallevel. The approaches chosen have to take into account the local historical and culturalcontexts, which leads to a diversity in approaches. Useful lessons can be learned:- There is a need for a research agenda for the analyses of factors contributing toradicalisation, factors contributing to de-radicalisation and the examination of methodsfor assessments of success and failure factors with reference to historical examples;- There is a need for international exchange of knowledge and expertise on radicalisationas well as strategies and best practices for countering it. Cooperation is not only neededbetween national governments, but also between local authorities in different countriesand in different regions;- International cooperation at all levels requires a platform for a wide spectrum of voicesand ideas, facilitating an open discourse, mutual support and trust;- A broad-based approach on countering radicalisation is needed at the local level. Thisinvolves general and specific prevention and intervening at individual level as well.Building expertise and a strong information position is necessary to be effective as amunicipality;- Intervening at the local level to counter radicalisation requires a long term approachto built mutual trust. It also includes investing in citizenship skills and offering aperspective for a hopeful future;124 125

• The international community is called upon to continue to invest in conflict resolution, tocontribute to post-conflict peace building, and to work for democracy and the rule of law.This includes support to civil society organisations working for conflict resolution, tolerance,respect for human rights, and all interpretations of political and religious teaching thataims at de-escalation and a positive agenda for a common way forward.• Constructive research of Islam in modernity is needed, as well as the interrelation betweenIslam and democracy, supporting all efforts to promote the democratic interpretation ofIslam on the basis of which resistance to violent interpretations of religious teachings canbe developed and religious tolerance can be fostered. The West should not claim to be thesole to define how to put democracy into practice. Each country culture and religion hasto find the way forward to harmonize diversity with unity, respecting justice and the rule oflaw. Substantial effort need to be made to foster a mutual self-critical approach.• While acknowledging that conditions and situations may vary throughout the world wenevertheless need to underline the universality of common values (e.g.: human rights,justice, respect and good governance).• While countering radicalisation we recognize the relevance of communication throughthe media with the ambition to develop a robust media-strategy including attention forInternet.• An effective approach to countering radicalisation requires a positive agenda withperspectives for future generations.The Hague, 24 October 2007• Preventing radicalisation requires respect for different cultures and roots. Respect for basichuman rights and cultural and religious diversity are key. There is no contradiction betweenthe two. This requires respect for minorities, minority opinions and their representativesand the promotion of social processes aimed at the peaceful integration of minorities.• In this world of globalisation integration of minorities supposes the right balance betweenidentification with the place, city, country where people live (citizenship) and the rootswhere people came from; including acceptance of “trans-national” citizenship.• Globalisation also requires specific attention for the development of a modus vivendi withthe Islam at all levels including geo-political attention for the future of the relations in theMiddle-East and the position of the Arab countries in the international arena, this includesthe need to avoid (the perception of) double standards.• The conference calls on relevant multilateral institutions to support national governmentsin all the above areas by promoting research, the formulation of national and local counterradicalisation policies or action plans, international exchange, and other activities toresisting radicalisation.• The conference appreciates the activities already undertaken by the OIC, UN, and theOSCE in the field of countering incitement to terrorism including the use of the Internetfor terrorist purposes and in promoting the empowerment of positive voices as importantaspects of addressing radicalisation and would welcome a continued OIC, UN and theOSCE involvement in the follow-up to this conference and other related activities.• While addressing radicalisation we need to avoid alienation and controversies by developingterminology that fosters dialogue and mutual understanding.126127

ColophonPublishingThe National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb)March 2008TranslationJoy Maul-Phillips, MA, AmsterdamDesignRichard Sluijs, The Hague128 129

The NCTb helps make the Netherlands a safer place to liveThe task of the National Coordinatorfor Counterterrorism (NCTb) is to minimisethe risk of terrorist attacks in theNetherlands and to take prior measuresto limit the potential of terrorist acts.The NCTb is responsible for the centralcoordination of counterterrorism effortsand ensures that cooperation between allthe parties involved is and remains of ahigh standard.130