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Tragedy and Hope: A His<strong>to</strong>ry of the World <strong>in</strong> Our Time', by Carroll QuigleyTRAGEDY AND HOPE Chapters I-IVby Dr. Carroll QuigleyISBN 0913022-14-4CONTENTSI. INTRODUCTION: WESTERN CIVILIZATION IN ITS WORLD SETTINGII. WESTERN CIVILIZATION TO 1914III. THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE TO 1917IV. THE BUFFER FRINGEV. THE FIRST WORLD WARVI. THE VERSAILLES SYSTEM AND RETURN TO NORMALCY 1919-1929VII. FINANCE, COMMERCIAL POLICY AND BUSINESS ACTIVITY 1897-1947VIII. INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISM AND THE SOVIET CHALLENGEIX. GERMANY FROM KAISER TO HITLER 1913-1945X. BRITAIN: THE BACKGROUND TO APPEASEMENT 1900-1939XI. CHANGING ECONOMIC PATTERNSXII. THE POLICY OF APPEASEMENT 1931-1936XIII. THE DISRUPTION OF EUROPEXIV. WORLD WAR II: THE TIDE OF AGGRESSION 1939-1941XV. WORLD WAR II: THE EBB OF AGGRESSION 1941-1945XVI. THE NEW AGEXVII. NUCLEAR RIVALRY AND COLD WAR, AMERICAN NUCLEARSUPERIORITY 1950-1957XVIII. NUCLEAR RIVALRY AND COLD WAR, RACE FOR THE H-BOMB 1950-1957XIX. THE NEW ERAXX. TRAGEDY AND HOPE: THE FUTURE IN PERSPECTIVECONTENTSI. INTRODUCTION: WESTERN CIVILIZATION IN ITS WORLD SETTINGII. WESTERN CIVILIZATION TO 1914III. THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE TO 1917IV. THE BUFFER FRINGEBack coverTRAGEDY AND HOPE is a lively, <strong>in</strong>formed and always readable viewof our not quite One World of <strong>to</strong>day, seen <strong>in</strong> his<strong>to</strong>rical perspective.


Quigley has already shown his command of the k<strong>in</strong>d of his<strong>to</strong>ricalperspective seen <strong>in</strong> the a world like that of Toynbee and Spengler; butunlike them he does not so much concern himself with projections froma distant past <strong>to</strong> a distant future as he does with what must <strong>in</strong>terestus all much more closely - our own future and that of our immediatedescendants. He uses the <strong>in</strong>sights, but <strong>in</strong> full awareness of thelimitations of our modern social sciences, and especially those ofeconomics, sociology, and psychology. Not all readers will agree withwhat he sees ahead of us <strong>in</strong> the near future, nor with what he th<strong>in</strong>kswe should do about it. But all will f<strong>in</strong>d this provocative andsometimes provok<strong>in</strong>g book a stimulus <strong>to</strong> profitable reflection.David Br<strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong>nInside coverTRAGEDY AND HOPE shows the years 1895-1950 as a period oftransition from the world dom<strong>in</strong>ated by Europe <strong>in</strong> the n<strong>in</strong>eteenthcentury <strong>to</strong> the world of three blocs <strong>in</strong> the twentieth century. Withclarity, perspective and cumulative impact, Professor Quigley exam<strong>in</strong>esthe nature of that transition through two world wars and a worldwideeconomic depression. As an <strong>in</strong>terpretative his<strong>to</strong>rian, he tries <strong>to</strong> showeach event <strong>in</strong> the full complexity of its his<strong>to</strong>rical context. Theresult is a unique work, notable <strong>in</strong> several ways. It gives a pictureof the world <strong>in</strong> terms of the <strong>in</strong>fluence of different cultures andoutlooks upon each other; it shows, more completely than <strong>in</strong> anysimilar work, the <strong>in</strong>fluence of science and technology on human life;and it expla<strong>in</strong>s, with unprecedented clarity, how the <strong>in</strong>tricatef<strong>in</strong>ancial and commercial patterns of the West prior <strong>to</strong> 1914 <strong>in</strong>fluencedthe development of <strong>to</strong>day's world.Carroll Quigley, professor of his<strong>to</strong>ry at the Foreign ServiceSchool of George<strong>to</strong>wn University, formerly taught at Pr<strong>in</strong>ce<strong>to</strong>n and atHarvard. He has done research <strong>in</strong> the archives of France, Italy andEngland, and is the author of the widely praised "Evolution ofCivilizations." A member of the edi<strong>to</strong>rial board of the monthly CurrentHis<strong>to</strong>ry, he is a frequent lecturer and consultant for public and semipublicagencies. He is a member of the American Association for theAdvancement of Science, the American Anthropological Association, andthe American Economic Association, as well as various his<strong>to</strong>ricalassociations. He has been lecturer on Russian his<strong>to</strong>ry at theIndustrial College of the Armed Forces s<strong>in</strong>ce 1951 and on Africa at theBrook<strong>in</strong>gs Institution s<strong>in</strong>ce 1961, and has lectured at many otherplaces <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the U.S. Naval Weapons Labora<strong>to</strong>ry, the ForeignService Institute of the State Department, and the Naval College atNorfolk, Virg<strong>in</strong>ia. In 1958, he was a consultant <strong>to</strong> the CongressionalSelect Committee which set up the present national space agency. Hewas collabora<strong>to</strong>r <strong>in</strong> his<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>to</strong> the Smithsonian Institution after 1957,<strong>in</strong> connection with the establishment of its new Museum of His<strong>to</strong>ry andTechnology. In the summer of 1964 he went <strong>to</strong> the Navy Post-Graduate


School, Monterey, California, as a consultant <strong>to</strong> project Seabed, whichtried <strong>to</strong> visualize what American weapons systems would be like <strong>in</strong>twelve years.CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION: WESTERN CIVILIZATION IN ITS WORLDSETTINGPage 3Each civilization is born <strong>in</strong> some <strong>in</strong>explicable fashion and, aftera slow start, enters a period of vigorous expansion, <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g itssize and power, both <strong>in</strong>ternally and at the expense of its neighbors,until gradually a crisis of organization appears... It becomesstabilized and eventually stagnant. After a Golden Age of peace andprosperity, <strong>in</strong>ternal crises aga<strong>in</strong> arise. At this po<strong>in</strong>t, there appearsfor the first time, a moral and physical weakness.Page 5The passage from the Age of Expansion <strong>to</strong> the Age of Conflict isthe most complex, most <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g and most critical of all periods ofthe life cycle of a civilization. It is marked by four chiefcharacteristics: it is a period:a) of decl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g rate of expansion;b) of grow<strong>in</strong>g tensions and class conflicts;c) of <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly frequent and violent imperialist wars;d) of grow<strong>in</strong>g irrationality.Page 8When we consider the un<strong>to</strong>ld numbers of other societies, simplerthan civilizations, which Western Civilization has destroyed or is nowdestroy<strong>in</strong>g, the full frighten<strong>in</strong>g power of Western Civilization becomesobvious.This shift from an Age of Conflict <strong>to</strong> an Age of Expansion ismarked by a resumption of the <strong>in</strong>vestment of capital and theaccumulation of capital on a large scale.In the new Western civilization, a small number of men, equippedand tra<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>to</strong> fight, received dues and services from the overwhelm<strong>in</strong>gmajority of men who were expected <strong>to</strong> till the soil. From this<strong>in</strong>equitable but effective defensive system emerged an <strong>in</strong>equitabledistribution of political power and, <strong>in</strong> turn, an <strong>in</strong>equitabledistribution of the social economic <strong>in</strong>come. This, <strong>in</strong> time, resulted <strong>in</strong>an accumulation of capital, which, by giv<strong>in</strong>g rise <strong>to</strong> demand for luxurygoods of remote orig<strong>in</strong>, began <strong>to</strong> shift the whole economic emphasis ofthe society from its earlier organization <strong>in</strong> self-sufficient agrarianunits <strong>to</strong> commercial <strong>in</strong>terchange, economic specialization, and, abourgeois class.Page 9At the end of the first period of expansion of Western


Civilization cover<strong>in</strong>g the years 970-1270, the organization of societywas becom<strong>in</strong>g a petrified collection of vested <strong>in</strong>terests and enteredthe Age of Conflict from 1270-1420.In the new Age of Expansion, frequently called the period ofcommercial capitalism from 1440 <strong>to</strong> 1680, the real impetus <strong>to</strong> economicexpansion came from efforts <strong>to</strong> obta<strong>in</strong> profits by the <strong>in</strong>terchange ofgoods, especially semi-luxury or luxury goods, over long distances. Intime, profits were sought by impos<strong>in</strong>g restrictions on the productionor <strong>in</strong>terchange of goods rather than by encourag<strong>in</strong>g these activities.Page 10The social organization of this third Age of Expansion from 1770-1929 follow<strong>in</strong>g upon the second Age of Conflict of 1690-1815 might becalled "<strong>in</strong>dustrial capitalism." In the last of the n<strong>in</strong>eteenth century,it began <strong>to</strong> become a structure of vested <strong>in</strong>terests <strong>to</strong> which we mightgive the name "monopoly capitalism."We shall undoubtedly get a Universal Empire <strong>in</strong> which the UnitedStates will rule most of the Western Civilization. This will befollowed, as <strong>in</strong> other civilizations, by a period of decay andultimately, as the civilizations grows weaker, by <strong>in</strong>vasions and the<strong>to</strong>tal destruction of Western culture.EUROPE'S SHIFT TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURYPage 24The belief <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>nate goodness of man had its roots <strong>in</strong> theeighteenth century when it appeared <strong>to</strong> many that man was born good andfree but was everywhere dis<strong>to</strong>rted, corrupted, and enslaved by bad<strong>in</strong>stitutions and conventions. As Rousseau said, "Man is born free yeteverywhere he is <strong>in</strong> cha<strong>in</strong>s."Obviously, if man is is <strong>in</strong>nately good and needs but <strong>to</strong> be freedfrom social restrictions, he is capable of tremendous achievements <strong>in</strong>this world of time, and does not need <strong>to</strong> postpone his hopes ofpersonal salvation <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> eternity.Page 25To the n<strong>in</strong>eteenth century m<strong>in</strong>d, evil, or s<strong>in</strong>, was a negativeconception. It merely <strong>in</strong>dicated a lack or, at most, a dis<strong>to</strong>rtion ofgood. Any idea of s<strong>in</strong> or evil as a malignant force opposed <strong>to</strong> good,and capable of exist<strong>in</strong>g by its own nature, was completely lack<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>the typical n<strong>in</strong>eteenth century m<strong>in</strong>d. The only evil was frustration andthe only s<strong>in</strong>, repression.Just as the negative idea of the nature of evil flowed from thebelief that human nature was good, so the idea of liberalism flowedfrom the belief that society was bad. For, if society was bad,thestate,which was the organized coercive power of society, was doublybad, and if man was good, he should be freed, above all, from thecoercive power of the state."No government <strong>in</strong> bus<strong>in</strong>ess" was commonly called "laissez faire"


and would have left society with little power beyond that required <strong>to</strong>prevent the strong from physically oppress<strong>in</strong>g the weak.This strange, and unexam<strong>in</strong>ed, belief held that there reallyexisted, <strong>in</strong> the long run, a "community of <strong>in</strong>terests" between themembers of a society. It ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that, <strong>in</strong> the long run, what wasgood for one was bad for all. It believed that there did exist apossible social pattern <strong>in</strong> which each member would be secure, free andprosperous.Page 26Capitalism was an economic system <strong>in</strong> which the motivat<strong>in</strong>g forcewas the desire for private profit as determ<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> a price system withthe seek<strong>in</strong>g of aggrandization of profits for each <strong>in</strong>dividual.Nationalism served <strong>to</strong> b<strong>in</strong>d persons of the same nationality<strong>to</strong>gether <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> a tight, emotionally satisfy<strong>in</strong>g, unit. On the otherside, it served <strong>to</strong> divide persons of different nationalities <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong>antagonistic groups, often <strong>to</strong> the <strong>in</strong>jury of their real mutualpolitical, economic or cultural advantages.The event which destroyed the pretty dream world of 1919-1929were the s<strong>to</strong>ck market crash, the world depression, the world f<strong>in</strong>ancialcrisis.Page 28The twentieth century came <strong>to</strong> believe that human nature is, ifnot <strong>in</strong>nately bad, at least capable of be<strong>in</strong>g very evil. Left <strong>to</strong>himself, man falls very easily <strong>to</strong> the level of the jungle or evenlower and this result can be prevent only by the coercive power ofsociety. Along with this change from good men and bad society <strong>to</strong> badmen and good society has appeared a reaction from optimism <strong>to</strong>pessimism. The horrors of Hitler's concentration camps and Stal<strong>in</strong>'sslave-labor units are chiefly responsible for this change.CHAPTER II: WESTERN CIVILIZATION TO 1914WESTERN CIVILIZATION TO 1914Page 39The f<strong>in</strong>ancial capitalist sought profits from the manipulation ofclaims on money; and the monopoly capitalist sought profits frommanipulation of the market <strong>to</strong> make the market price and the amountsold such that his profits would be maximized.Page 41Karl Marx,about 1850, formed his ideas of an <strong>in</strong>evitable classstruggle <strong>in</strong> which the groups of owners would become fewer and fewerand richer and richer while the mass of workers became poorer andpoorer but more and more numerous.Mass production required less labor. But mass production requiredmass consumption.


EUROPEAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTPage 42Investments <strong>in</strong> railroads, steel mills and so on could not bef<strong>in</strong>anced from the profits and private fortunes of <strong>in</strong>dividualproprie<strong>to</strong>rs. New <strong>in</strong>struments for f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dustry came <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong>existence <strong>in</strong> the form of limited-liability corporations and <strong>in</strong>vestmentbanks. These were soon <strong>in</strong> a position <strong>to</strong> control the chief parts of the<strong>in</strong>dustrial system s<strong>in</strong>ce they provided the capital <strong>to</strong> it. This gaverise <strong>to</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ancial capitalism.Page 43Great <strong>in</strong>dustrial units, work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong>gether either directly orthrough cartels and trade associations, were <strong>in</strong> a position <strong>to</strong> exploitthe majority of the people. The result was a great economic crisiswhich soon developed <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> a struggle for control of the state - them<strong>in</strong>ority hop<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> use the state <strong>to</strong> defend their privileged position,the majority hop<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> use the state <strong>to</strong> curtail the power andprivileges of the m<strong>in</strong>ority.Capitalism, because it seems profits as its primary goal, isnever primarily seek<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> achieve prosperity, high production, highconsumption, political power, patriotic improvement, or moral uplift.Page 44Goods moved from low-price areas <strong>to</strong> high-price areas and moneymoved from high-price areas <strong>to</strong> low-price areas because goods were morevaluable where prices were high and money was more valuable whereprices were low.Thus, clearly, money and goods are not the same th<strong>in</strong>g but are, onthe contrary, exactly opposite th<strong>in</strong>gs. Most confusion <strong>in</strong> economicth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g arises from failure <strong>to</strong> recognize this fact. Goods are wealthwhich you have, while money is a claim on wealth which you do nothave. Thus goods are an asset; money is a debt. If goods are wealth;money is non-wealth, or negative wealth, or even anti-wealth.Page 45In time, some merchants turned their attention from exchange ofgoods <strong>to</strong> the monetary side of the exchange. They became concerned withthe lend<strong>in</strong>g of money <strong>to</strong> merchants <strong>to</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ance their ships and theiractivities, advanc<strong>in</strong>g money for both, at high <strong>in</strong>terest rates, securedby claims on ships or goods as collateral for repayment and made itpossible for people <strong>to</strong> concentrate on one portion of the process and,by maximiz<strong>in</strong>g that portion, <strong>to</strong> jeopardize the rest.Page 46Three parts of the system, production, transfer, and consumptionof goods were concrete and clearly visible so that almost anyone couldgrasp them simply exam<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g them while the operations of bank<strong>in</strong>g andf<strong>in</strong>ance were concealed, scattered, and abstract so that they appeared<strong>to</strong> many <strong>to</strong> be difficult. To add <strong>to</strong> this, bankers themselves dideveryth<strong>in</strong>g they could <strong>to</strong> make their activities more secret and more


esoteric. Their activities were reflected <strong>in</strong> mysterious marks <strong>in</strong>ledgers which were never opened <strong>to</strong> the curious outsider.Changes of prices, whether <strong>in</strong>flationary or deflationary, havebeen major forces <strong>in</strong> his<strong>to</strong>ry for the last six centuries at least.Page 47Hundreds of years ago, bankers began <strong>to</strong> specialize, with richerand more <strong>in</strong>fluential ones associated <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly with foreign tradeand foreign-exchange transactions. S<strong>in</strong>ce these were richer and morecosmopolitan and <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly concerned with questions of politicalsignificance, such as stability and debasement of currencies, war andpeace, dynastic marriages, and worldwide trad<strong>in</strong>g monopolies, theybecame f<strong>in</strong>anciers and f<strong>in</strong>ancial advisers of governments. Moreover,they were always obsessed with the stability of monetary exchanges andused their power and <strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>to</strong> do two th<strong>in</strong>gs:1) <strong>to</strong> get all money and debts expressed <strong>in</strong> terms of strictly limitedcommodity - ultimately gold; and2) <strong>to</strong> get all monetary matters out of the control of governments andpolitical authority, on the ground that they would be handled betterby private bank<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terests <strong>in</strong> terms of such a stable value of gold.INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM, 1770-1850Page 48Brita<strong>in</strong>'s vic<strong>to</strong>ries had many causes such as its ability <strong>to</strong>control the sea and its ability <strong>to</strong> present itself <strong>to</strong> the world as thedefender of the freedoms and rights of small nations and of diversesocial and religious groups. Also, f<strong>in</strong>ancially, England had discoveredthe secret of credit and economically, it had embarked on theIndustrial Revolution.Credit had been known <strong>to</strong> the Italians and Netherlanders longbefore it became one of the <strong>in</strong>struments of English world supremacy.Nevertheless, the found<strong>in</strong>g of the Bank of England by William Patersonand his friends <strong>in</strong> 1694 is one of the great dates <strong>in</strong> world his<strong>to</strong>ry.For generations, men had sought <strong>to</strong> avoid the one drawback of gold, itsheav<strong>in</strong>ess, by us<strong>in</strong>g pieces of paper <strong>to</strong> represent specific pieces ofgold. Today, we call such pieces of paper gold certificates whichentitles its bearer <strong>to</strong> exchange it for its piece ofgold on demand, but<strong>in</strong> view of the convenience of paper, only a small fraction ofcertificate holders ever did make such demands. It early became clearthat gold need be held on hand only <strong>to</strong> the amount needed <strong>to</strong> cover thefraction of certificates likely <strong>to</strong> be presented for payment;accord<strong>in</strong>gly, the rest of the gold could be used for bus<strong>in</strong>ess purposes,or, what amounts <strong>to</strong> the same th<strong>in</strong>g, a volume of certificates could beissued greater than the volume of gold reserved for payment of demandsaga<strong>in</strong>st them. such an excess volume of paper claims aga<strong>in</strong>st reserveswe now call bank notes.In effect, this creation of paper claims greater than thereserves available means that bankers were creat<strong>in</strong>g money out of


noth<strong>in</strong>g. The same th<strong>in</strong>g could be done <strong>in</strong> another way, not by noteissu<strong>in</strong>gbanks but by deposit banks. Deposit bankers discovered tha<strong>to</strong>rders and checks drawn aga<strong>in</strong>st deposits by deposi<strong>to</strong>rs and given <strong>to</strong>third persons were often not cashed by the latter but were deposited<strong>to</strong> their own accounts. Thus there were no actual movements of funds,and payments were made simply by bookkeep<strong>in</strong>g transactions on theaccounts. Accord<strong>in</strong>gly, it was necessary for the banker <strong>to</strong> keep on hand<strong>in</strong> actual money (gold, certificates and notes) no more than thefraction of deposits likely <strong>to</strong> be drawn upon and cashed; the restcould be used for loans and if these loans were made by creat<strong>in</strong>g adeposit for the borrower, who <strong>in</strong> turn would draw checks upon it ratherthan withdraw it <strong>in</strong> money, such "created deposits" or loans could alsobe covered adequately by reta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g reserves <strong>to</strong> only a fraction oftheir value. Such created deposits also were a creation of money ou<strong>to</strong>f noth<strong>in</strong>g, although bankers usually refused <strong>to</strong> express their actions,either note issu<strong>in</strong>g or deposit lend<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> these terms. WilliamPaterson, on obta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the charter of the Bank of England, said "theBank hath benefit of <strong>in</strong>terest on all moneys it creates out ofnoth<strong>in</strong>g." This is generally admitted <strong>to</strong>day.This organizational structure for creat<strong>in</strong>g means of payment ou<strong>to</strong>f noth<strong>in</strong>g, which we call credit, was not <strong>in</strong>vented by England but wasdeveloped by her <strong>to</strong> become one of her chief weapons <strong>in</strong> the vic<strong>to</strong>ryover Napoleon <strong>in</strong> 1815. The emperor, could not see money <strong>in</strong> any butconcrete terms, and was conv<strong>in</strong>ced that his efforts <strong>to</strong> fight wars onthe basis of "sound money" by avoid<strong>in</strong>g the creation of credit, wouldultimately w<strong>in</strong> him a vic<strong>to</strong>ry by bankrupt<strong>in</strong>g England. He was wrongalthough the lesson has had <strong>to</strong> be relearned by modern f<strong>in</strong>anciers <strong>in</strong>the twentieth century.FINANCIAL CAPITALISM 1850-1931Page 50The third stage of capitalism is of such overwhelm<strong>in</strong>gsignificance <strong>in</strong> the his<strong>to</strong>ry of the twentieth century, and itsramifications and <strong>in</strong>fluences have been so subterranean and evenoccult, that we may be excused if we devote considerate attention <strong>to</strong>this organization and methods.Essentially, what it did was <strong>to</strong> take the old disorganized andlocalized methods of handl<strong>in</strong>g money and credit and organize them <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong>an <strong>in</strong>tegrated system, on an <strong>in</strong>ternational basis, which worked with<strong>in</strong>credible and well-oiled facility for many decades. The center ofthat system was <strong>in</strong> London, with major offshoots <strong>in</strong> New York and Parisand it has left, as its greatest achievement, an <strong>in</strong>tegrated bank<strong>in</strong>gsystem and a heavily capitalized - if now largely obsolescent -framework of heavy <strong>in</strong>dustry, reflected <strong>in</strong> railroads, steel mills, coalm<strong>in</strong>es and electrical utilities.This system had its center <strong>in</strong> London for four chief reasons.


First was the great volume of sav<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> England. Second was England'soligarchic social structure which provided a very <strong>in</strong>equitabledistribution of <strong>in</strong>comes with large surpluses com<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> the control ofa small, energetic upper class. Third was that this upper class wasaris<strong>to</strong>cratic but not noble, quite will<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> recruit both money andability from lower levels and even from outside the country, welcom<strong>in</strong>gAmerican heiresses and central-European Jews <strong>to</strong> its ranks almost aswill<strong>in</strong>gly as it welcomed monied, able and conformist recruits from thelower classes of Englishmen. Fourth (and by no means last) <strong>in</strong>significance was the skill <strong>in</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ancial manipulation, especially onthe <strong>in</strong>ternational scene, which the small group of merchant bankers ofLondon had acquired.In time, they brought <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> their f<strong>in</strong>ancial network the prov<strong>in</strong>cialbank<strong>in</strong>g centers as well as <strong>in</strong>surance companies <strong>to</strong> form all of these<strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> a s<strong>in</strong>gle f<strong>in</strong>ancial system on an <strong>in</strong>ternational scale whichmanipulated the quantity and flow of money so that they were able <strong>to</strong><strong>in</strong>fluence, if not control, governments on one side and <strong>in</strong>dustries onthe other.The men who did this, look<strong>in</strong>g backward <strong>to</strong>ward the period ofdynastic monarchy <strong>in</strong> which they had their own roots, aspired <strong>to</strong>establish dynasties of <strong>in</strong>ternational bankers and were at least assuccessful at this as were many of the dynastic political rulers. Thegreatest of these dynasties, of course, were the descendants of MeyerAmschel Rothschild (1743-1812) whose male descendants for at least twogenerations, generally married first cous<strong>in</strong>s or even nieces.Rothschild's five sons, established at branches <strong>in</strong> Vienna, London,Naples and Paris as well as Frankfort, cooperated <strong>to</strong>gether <strong>in</strong> wayswhich other <strong>in</strong>ternational bank<strong>in</strong>g dynasties copied but rarelyexcelled.In concentrat<strong>in</strong>g, as we must, on the f<strong>in</strong>ancial or economicactivities of <strong>in</strong>ternational bankers, we must not <strong>to</strong>tally ignore theirother attributes. They were cosmopolitan rather than nationalistic;they were a constant, if weaken<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong>fluence for peace, a patternestablished <strong>in</strong> 1830 and 1840 when the Rothschilds threw their wholetremendous <strong>in</strong>fluence successfully aga<strong>in</strong>st European wars.They were usually highly civilized, cultured gentlemen, patronsof education and of the arts, so that <strong>to</strong>day, colleges, professorships,opera companies, symphonies, libraries, and museum collections stillreflect their munificence. For these purposes they set a pattern ofendowed foundations which still surround us <strong>to</strong>day.The names of some of these bank<strong>in</strong>g families are familiar <strong>to</strong> allof us and should be more so. They <strong>in</strong>clude Bar<strong>in</strong>g, Lazard, Erlanger,Warburg, Schroder, Seligman, Speyers, Mirabaud, Mallet, Fould andabove all Rothschild and Morgan. Even after these bank<strong>in</strong>g familiesbecame fully <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> domestic <strong>in</strong>dustry by the emergence off<strong>in</strong>ancial capitalism, they rema<strong>in</strong>ed different from ord<strong>in</strong>ary bankers <strong>in</strong>


dist<strong>in</strong>ctive ways:1) they were cosmopolitan and <strong>in</strong>ternational;2) they were close <strong>to</strong> governments and were particularly concerned withquestions of government debts, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g foreign government debts,even <strong>in</strong> areas which seemed, at first glance, poor risks, like Egypt,Persia, Ot<strong>to</strong>man Turkey, Imperial Ch<strong>in</strong>a and Lat<strong>in</strong> America;3) their <strong>in</strong>terests were almost exclusively <strong>in</strong> bonds and very rarely <strong>in</strong>goods s<strong>in</strong>ce they admired "liquidity";4) they were fanatical devotees of deflation (which they called"sound" money from its close association with high <strong>in</strong>terest rates anda high value of money) and of the gold standard;5) they were almost equally devoted <strong>to</strong> secrecy and the secret use off<strong>in</strong>ancial <strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>in</strong> political life. These bankers came <strong>to</strong> be called"<strong>in</strong>ternational bankers" and were known as "merchant bankers" <strong>in</strong>England, "private bankers" <strong>in</strong> France and "<strong>in</strong>vestment bankers" <strong>in</strong> theUnited States.Everywhere, they were sharply dist<strong>in</strong>guishable from other, moreobvious, k<strong>in</strong>ds of banks, such as sav<strong>in</strong>gs banks or commercial banks.One of their less obvious characteristics was that they rema<strong>in</strong>edas private un<strong>in</strong>corporated firms offer<strong>in</strong>g no shares, no reports, andusually no advertis<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> the public until modern <strong>in</strong>heritance taxesmade it essential <strong>to</strong> surround such family wealth with the immortalityof corporate status for tax-avoidance purposes. This persistence asprivate firms cont<strong>in</strong>ued because it ensured the maximum of anonymityand secrecy <strong>to</strong> persons of tremendous public power who dreaded publicknowledge of their activities as an evil almost as great as <strong>in</strong>flation.Page 53Firms like Morgan, like others of the <strong>in</strong>ternational bank<strong>in</strong>gfraternity, constantly operated through corporations and governments,yet rema<strong>in</strong>ed itself an obscure private partnership.The <strong>in</strong>fluence of f<strong>in</strong>ancial capitalism and the <strong>in</strong>ternationalbankers who created it was exercised both on bus<strong>in</strong>ess and ongovernments, but could have neither if it had not been able <strong>to</strong>persuade both these <strong>to</strong> accept two "axioms" of its own ideology. Bothof these were based on the assumption that politicians were <strong>to</strong>o weakand <strong>to</strong>o subject <strong>to</strong> temporary public pressures <strong>to</strong> be trusted withcontrol of the money system; accord<strong>in</strong>gly, the soundness of money mustbe protected <strong>in</strong> two ways: by bas<strong>in</strong>g the value of money on gold and byallow<strong>in</strong>g bankers <strong>to</strong> control the money supply. To do this it wasnecessary <strong>to</strong> conceal, even mislead, both governments and people aboutthe nature of money and its methods of operation.Page 54S<strong>in</strong>ce it is quite impossible <strong>to</strong> understand the his<strong>to</strong>ry of thetwentieth century without some understand<strong>in</strong>g of the role played bymoney <strong>in</strong> domestic affairs and <strong>in</strong> foreign affairs, as well as the roleplayed by bankers <strong>in</strong> economic life and <strong>in</strong> political life, we must take


a least a glance at each of these four subjects:DOMESTIC FINANCIAL PRACTICESIn each country, the supply of money <strong>to</strong>ok the form of an <strong>in</strong>vertedpyramid or cone balanced on its po<strong>in</strong>t. In the po<strong>in</strong>t was the supply ofgold and its equivalent certificates; on the <strong>in</strong>termediate levels was amuch larger supply of notes; and at the <strong>to</strong>p, with an open andexpandable upper surface, was an even greater supply of deposits. Eachlevel used the levels below it as its reserves and these lower levelshad smaller quantities of money, they were "sounder."Notes were issued by "banks of emission" or "banks of issue" andwere secured by reserves of gold or certificates held <strong>in</strong> some centralreserve. The fraction held <strong>in</strong> reserve depended upon bank<strong>in</strong>gregulations or statute law. Such banks, even central banks, wereprivate <strong>in</strong>stitutions, owned by shareholders who profited by theiroperations.Deposits on the upper level of the pyramid were called by thisname, with typical bankers' ambiguity, <strong>in</strong> spite of the fact that theyconsisted of two utterly different k<strong>in</strong>ds of relationships:1) "lodged deposits" which were real claims left by a deposi<strong>to</strong>r <strong>in</strong> abank on which a deposi<strong>to</strong>r might receive <strong>in</strong>terest; and2) "created deposits" which were claims created by the bank out ofnoth<strong>in</strong>g as loans from the bank <strong>to</strong> "deposi<strong>to</strong>rs" who had <strong>to</strong> pay <strong>in</strong>teres<strong>to</strong>n them.Both form part of the money supply. Lodged deposits as a form ofsav<strong>in</strong>gs are deflationary while created deposits, be<strong>in</strong>g an addition <strong>to</strong>the money supply, are <strong>in</strong>flationary.Page 55The volume of deposits banks can create, like the amount of notesthey can issue, depends upon the volume of reserves available <strong>to</strong> paywhatever fraction of checks are cashed rather than deposited. In theUnited States, deposits were traditionally limited <strong>to</strong> ten timesreserves notes and gold. In Brita<strong>in</strong> it was usually nearer twenty timessuch reserves. In most countries, the central bank was surroundedclosely by the almost <strong>in</strong>visible private <strong>in</strong>vestment bank<strong>in</strong>g firms.These, like the planet Mercury, could hardly be seen <strong>in</strong> the dazzleemitted by the central bank, which they, <strong>in</strong> fact, often dom<strong>in</strong>ated. Yeta lost observer could hardly fail <strong>to</strong> notice the close privateassociations between these private, <strong>in</strong>ternational bankers and thecentral bank itself. In France, <strong>in</strong> 1936, the Board of the Bank ofFrance was still dom<strong>in</strong>ated by the names of the families who hadorig<strong>in</strong>ally set it up <strong>in</strong> 1800.In England, a somewhat similar situation existed. In a secondaryr<strong>in</strong>g are the "jo<strong>in</strong>t s<strong>to</strong>ck banks." Outside this secondary r<strong>in</strong>g are thesav<strong>in</strong>gs banks, <strong>in</strong>surance firms, and trust companies.In France and England the private bankers exercised their powersthrough the central bank and had much more <strong>in</strong>fluence on the government


and foreign policy and less on <strong>in</strong>dustry. In the United States, much<strong>in</strong>dustry was f<strong>in</strong>anced by <strong>in</strong>vestment bankers directly and the power ofthese both on <strong>in</strong>dustry and government was very great.Page 57The various parts of the pyramid of money were but looselyrelated <strong>to</strong> each other. Much of this looseness arose from the fact thatthe controls were compulsive <strong>in</strong> a deflationary direction and were onlypermissive <strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>flationary direction. This last po<strong>in</strong>t can be seen<strong>in</strong> the fact that the supply of gold could be decreased but couldhardly be <strong>in</strong>creased. If an ounce of gold was added <strong>to</strong> the po<strong>in</strong>t of thepyramid, it could permit an <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> deposits equivalent <strong>to</strong> $2067on the uppermost level. If such an ounce of gold were withdrawn from afully expanded pyramid of money, this would compel a reduction ofdeposits by at least this amount, probably by a refusal <strong>to</strong> renewloans.Throughout modern his<strong>to</strong>ry, the <strong>in</strong>fluence of the gold standard hasbeen deflationary, because the natural output of gold each year,except <strong>in</strong> extraord<strong>in</strong>ary times, has not kept pace with the <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong>the output of goods. Only new supplies of gold or the development ofnew k<strong>in</strong>ds of money have saved our civilization over the last couple ofcenturies. The three great periods of war ended with an extremedeflationary crisis (1819, 1873, 1921) as the <strong>in</strong>fluential Money Powerpersuaded governments <strong>to</strong> re-establish a deflationary monetary unitwith a high gold content.The obsession of the Money Power with deflation was partly aresult of their concern with money rather than with goods but was alsofounded on other fac<strong>to</strong>rs, one of which was paradoxical. The paradoxarose from the fact that the basic economic conditions of then<strong>in</strong>eteenth century were deflationary, with a monetary system based ongold and an <strong>in</strong>dustrial system pour<strong>in</strong>g out <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g supplies of goodsbut <strong>in</strong> spite of fall<strong>in</strong>g prices, the <strong>in</strong>terest rate tended <strong>to</strong> fallrather than rise. Moreover, merchant bank<strong>in</strong>g cont<strong>in</strong>ued <strong>to</strong> emphasizebonds rather than equity securities (s<strong>to</strong>cks), <strong>to</strong> favor governmentissues rather than private offer<strong>in</strong>gs.Another paradox of bank<strong>in</strong>g practice arose from the fact thatbankers, who loved deflation, often acted <strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>flationary fashionfrom their eagerness <strong>to</strong> lend money at <strong>in</strong>terest. S<strong>in</strong>ce they make moneyout of loans, they are eager <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease the amounts of bank credit onloan. But this is <strong>in</strong>flationary. The conflict between the deflationaryideas and <strong>in</strong>flationary practices of bankers had profound repercussionson bus<strong>in</strong>ess. The bankers made loans <strong>to</strong> bus<strong>in</strong>ess so that the volume ofmoney <strong>in</strong>creased faster than the <strong>in</strong>crease of goods. The result was<strong>in</strong>flation. When this became clearly noticeable, the bankers would flee<strong>to</strong> notes or specie by curtail<strong>in</strong>g credit and rais<strong>in</strong>g discount rates.This was beneficial <strong>to</strong> the bankers <strong>in</strong> the short run (s<strong>in</strong>ce it allowedthem <strong>to</strong> foreclose on collateral for loans) but it could be disastrous


<strong>to</strong> them <strong>in</strong> the long run (by forc<strong>in</strong>g the value of the collateral belowthe amount of the loans it secured). But such bankers' deflation wasdestructive <strong>to</strong> bus<strong>in</strong>ess and <strong>in</strong>dustry <strong>in</strong> the short run as well as thelong run.Page 59The result<strong>in</strong>g fluctuation <strong>in</strong> the supply of money, chieflydeposits, was a prom<strong>in</strong>ent aspect of the "bus<strong>in</strong>ess cycle." The quantityof money could be changed by chang<strong>in</strong>g reserve requirements or discount(<strong>in</strong>terest) rates. Central banks can usually vary the amount of money<strong>in</strong> circulation by "open market operations" or by <strong>in</strong>fluenc<strong>in</strong>g thediscount rates of lesser banks. In open market operations, a centralbank buys or sells government bonds <strong>in</strong> the open market. If it buys, itreleases money <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the economic system; it if sells it reduces theamount of money <strong>in</strong> the community. If the Federal Reserve Bank buys, itpays for these by checks which are soon deposited <strong>in</strong> a bank. It thus<strong>in</strong>creases this bank's reserves with the Federal Reserve Bank. S<strong>in</strong>cebanks are permitted <strong>to</strong> issue loans for several times the value oftheir reserves with the FED, such a transaction permits them <strong>to</strong> issueloans for a much larger sum.Central banks can also change the quantity of money by rais<strong>in</strong>gthe discount rate which forces the lesser banks <strong>to</strong> raise theirdiscount rates; such a raise <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terest rates tends <strong>to</strong> reduce thedemand for credit and thus the amount of deposits (money). Lower<strong>in</strong>gthe discount rate permits an opposite result.It is noted that the control of the central bank over the creditpolicies of local banks are permissive <strong>in</strong> one direction and compulsive<strong>in</strong> the other. They can compel these local banks <strong>to</strong> curtail credit andcan only permit them <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease credit. This means that they havecontrol powers aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>in</strong>flation and not deflation - a reflection ofthe old bank<strong>in</strong>g idea that <strong>in</strong>flation was bad and deflation was good.Page 60The powers of governments over the quantity of money are:a) control over a central bank;b) control over public taxation;c) control over public spend<strong>in</strong>g;S<strong>in</strong>ce most central banks have been (technically) private<strong>in</strong>stitutions, this control is frequently based on cus<strong>to</strong>m rather thanon law.Taxation tends <strong>to</strong> reduce the amount of money <strong>in</strong> a community andis usually a deflationary force. Government spend<strong>in</strong>g is usually an<strong>in</strong>flationary force.On the whole, <strong>in</strong> the period up <strong>to</strong> 1931, bankers, especially theMoney Power controlled by the <strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>in</strong>vestment bankers, wereable <strong>to</strong> dom<strong>in</strong>ate both bus<strong>in</strong>ess and government. They could dom<strong>in</strong>atebus<strong>in</strong>ess because <strong>in</strong>vestment bankers had the ability <strong>to</strong> supply or


efuse <strong>to</strong> supply such capital. Thus Rothschild <strong>in</strong>terests came <strong>to</strong>dom<strong>in</strong>ate many of the railroads of Europe, while Morgan dom<strong>in</strong>ated atleast 26,000 miles of American railroads. Such bankers <strong>to</strong>ok seats onthe boards of direc<strong>to</strong>rs of <strong>in</strong>dustrial firms, as they had already doneon commercial banks, sav<strong>in</strong>gs banks, <strong>in</strong>surance firms, and f<strong>in</strong>ancecompanies. From these lesser <strong>in</strong>stitutions, they funneled capital <strong>to</strong>enterprises which yielded control and away from those who resisted.These firms were controlled through <strong>in</strong>terlock<strong>in</strong>g direc<strong>to</strong>rships,hold<strong>in</strong>g companies, and lesser banks.Page 61As early as 1909,Walter Rathenau said, "Three hundred men, all ofwhom know one another, direct the economic dest<strong>in</strong>y of Europe andchoose their successors from among themselves."The power of <strong>in</strong>vestment bankers over governments rests on theneed of governments <strong>to</strong> issue short-term treasury bills as well aslong-term government bonds. Just as bus<strong>in</strong>essmen go <strong>to</strong> commercial banksfor current capital advances, so a government has <strong>to</strong> go <strong>to</strong> merchantbankers <strong>to</strong> tide over the shallow places caused by irregular taxreceipts. As experts <strong>in</strong> government bonds, the <strong>in</strong>ternational bankersprovided advice <strong>to</strong> government officials and, on many occasions, placedtheir own members <strong>in</strong> official posts. This was so widely accepted even<strong>to</strong>day, that <strong>in</strong> 1961 a Republican <strong>in</strong>vestment banker became Secretary ofthe Treasury <strong>in</strong> a Democratic adm<strong>in</strong>istration <strong>in</strong> Wash<strong>in</strong>g<strong>to</strong>n withoutsignificant comment from any direction.Naturally, the <strong>in</strong>fluence of bankers over governments dur<strong>in</strong>g theage of f<strong>in</strong>ancial capitalism (roughly 1850-1931) was not someth<strong>in</strong>gabout which anyone talked about freely, but it has been admittedfreely enough by those on the <strong>in</strong>side, especially <strong>in</strong> England. In 1842,Glads<strong>to</strong>ne, chancellor of the Exchequer, declared "The h<strong>in</strong>ge of thewhole situation was this: the government itself was not <strong>to</strong> be thesubstantive power <strong>in</strong> matters of F<strong>in</strong>ance, but was <strong>to</strong> leave the MoneyPower supreme and unquestioned." On Sept. 26, 1921, the F<strong>in</strong>ancialTimes wrote, "Half a dozen men at the <strong>to</strong>p of the Big Five Banks couldupset the whole fabric of government f<strong>in</strong>ance by refra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g fromrenew<strong>in</strong>g Treasury Bills." In 1924, Sir Drummond Fraser, vice-presiden<strong>to</strong>f the Institute of Bankers, stated, "The Governor of the Bank ofEngland must be the au<strong>to</strong>crat who dictates the terms upon which alonethe Government can obta<strong>in</strong> borrowed money."Page 62In addition <strong>to</strong> their power over government based on governmentf<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g and personal <strong>in</strong>fluence, bankers could steer governments <strong>in</strong>ways they wished them <strong>to</strong> go by other pressures. S<strong>in</strong>ce most governmen<strong>to</strong>fficials felt ignorant of f<strong>in</strong>ance, they sought advice from bankerswhom they considered experts <strong>in</strong> the field. The his<strong>to</strong>ry of the lastcentury shows that the advice given <strong>to</strong> governments by bankers, likethe advice they gave <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>dustrialists, was consistently good for


ankers but was often disastrous for governments, bus<strong>in</strong>essmen and thepeople generally.Such advice could be enforced if necessary by manipulation ofexchanges, gold flows, discount rates, and even levels of bus<strong>in</strong>essactivity. Thus Morgan dom<strong>in</strong>ated Cleveland's second adm<strong>in</strong>istration bygold withdrawals, and <strong>in</strong> 1936-13 French foreign exchange manipula<strong>to</strong>rsparalyzed the Popular Front governments. The powers of these<strong>in</strong>ternational bankers reached their peak <strong>in</strong> 1919-1931 when MontaguNorman and J.P. Morgan dom<strong>in</strong>ated not only the f<strong>in</strong>ancial world but<strong>in</strong>ternational relations and other matters as well. On Nov. 11, 1927,the Wall Street Journal called Mr. Norman "the currency dicta<strong>to</strong>r ofEurope." This was admitted by Mr. Norman who said, "I hold thehegemony of the world."The conflict of <strong>in</strong>terests between bankers and <strong>in</strong>dustrialists hasresulted <strong>in</strong> the subord<strong>in</strong>ation of the bankers (after 1931) <strong>to</strong> thelatter by the adoption of "unorthodox f<strong>in</strong>ancial policies" - that is,f<strong>in</strong>ancial policies not <strong>in</strong> accordance with the short-run <strong>in</strong>terests ofthe bankers.THE UNITED STATES TO 1917Page 71The civil service reform began <strong>in</strong> the federal government with thePendle<strong>to</strong>n Bill of 1883. As a result, the government was controlledwith vary<strong>in</strong>g degrees of completeness by the forces of <strong>in</strong>vestmentbank<strong>in</strong>g and heavy <strong>in</strong>dustry from 1884 <strong>to</strong> 1933. Popularly known as"Society," or the "400," they lived a life of dazzl<strong>in</strong>g splendor.Page 72The structure of f<strong>in</strong>ancial control created by the tycoons of "BigBank<strong>in</strong>g" and "Big Bus<strong>in</strong>ess" <strong>in</strong> the period 1880-1933 was ofextraord<strong>in</strong>ary complexity, one bus<strong>in</strong>ess fief be<strong>in</strong>g built upon another,both be<strong>in</strong>g allied with semi-<strong>in</strong>dependent associates, the whole rear<strong>in</strong>gupward <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> two p<strong>in</strong>nacles of economic and f<strong>in</strong>ancial power, of whichone, centered <strong>in</strong> New York, was headed by J.P. Morgan and Company, andthe other, <strong>in</strong> Ohio, was headed by the Rockefeller family. When thesetwo cooperated, as they generally did, they could <strong>in</strong>fluence theeconomic life of the country <strong>to</strong> a large degree and could almostcontrol its political life, at least on the federal level.The <strong>in</strong>fluence of these bus<strong>in</strong>ess leaders was so great that theMorgan and Rockefeller groups act<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong>gether, or even Morgan act<strong>in</strong>galone, could have wrecked the economic system of the country merely bythrow<strong>in</strong>g securities on the s<strong>to</strong>ck market for sale, and hav<strong>in</strong>gprecipitated a s<strong>to</strong>ck market panic, could then have bought back thesecurities they had sold but at a lower price. Naturally, they werenot so foolish as <strong>to</strong> do this, although Morgan came very close <strong>to</strong> it <strong>in</strong>precipitat<strong>in</strong>g the "panic of 1907," but they did not hesitate <strong>to</strong> wreck<strong>in</strong>dividual corporations, at the expense of holders of common s<strong>to</strong>ck, bydriv<strong>in</strong>g them <strong>to</strong> bankruptcy. In this way, Morgan wrecked the New York,


election on a social and economic issue for the first time <strong>in</strong> ageneration. Though the forces of high f<strong>in</strong>ance were <strong>in</strong> a state of nearpanic, by a mighty effort <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g very large-scale spend<strong>in</strong>g theywere successful <strong>in</strong> elect<strong>in</strong>g McK<strong>in</strong>ley.Though the plu<strong>to</strong>cracy were unable <strong>to</strong> control the Democratic Partyas they controlled the Republican Party, they did not cease theirefforts <strong>to</strong> control both and <strong>in</strong> 1904 and 1924, Morgan was able <strong>to</strong> sitback with a feel<strong>in</strong>g of satisfaction <strong>to</strong> watch presidential elections <strong>in</strong>which the candidates of both parties were <strong>in</strong> his sphere of <strong>in</strong>fluence.Page 75The agrarian discontent, the growth of monopolies, the oppressionof labor, and the excesses of Wall Street f<strong>in</strong>anciers made the countryvery restless between 1890-1900. All this could have been alleviatedmerely by <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g the supply of money sufficiently <strong>to</strong> raise pricessomewhat, but the f<strong>in</strong>anciers were determ<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>to</strong> defend the goldstandard no matter what happened.In look<strong>in</strong>g for some issue <strong>to</strong> distract public discontent fromdomestic issues, what better solution than a crisis <strong>in</strong> foreignaffairs? Cleveland had stumbled upon this alternative <strong>in</strong> 1895 when hestirred up controversy with England over Venezuela. The grea<strong>to</strong>pportunity came with the Cuban revolt aga<strong>in</strong>st Spa<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> 1895. Whilethe "yellow press" roused public op<strong>in</strong>ion, Henry Cabot Lodge andTheodore Roosevelt plotted how they could best get the United States<strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the fracas. They got the excuse they needed when the Americanbattleship Ma<strong>in</strong>e was sunk by a mysterious explosion <strong>in</strong> Havana Harbor<strong>in</strong> 1898. In two months, the United States declared war on Spa<strong>in</strong> <strong>to</strong>fight for Cuban <strong>in</strong>dependence. The result<strong>in</strong>g vic<strong>to</strong>ry revealed theUnited States as a world naval power, established it as an imperialistpower with possession of Puer<strong>to</strong> Rico, Guam, and the Philipp<strong>in</strong>es.America's entrance upon the stage as a world power cont<strong>in</strong>ued withthe annexation of Hawaii <strong>in</strong> 1898, the <strong>in</strong>tervention <strong>in</strong> the Boxerupris<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> 1900, the seizure of the Panama canal <strong>in</strong> 1903, thediplomatic <strong>in</strong>tervention <strong>in</strong> the Russo-Japanese war <strong>in</strong> 1905, themilitary occupation of Nicaragua <strong>in</strong> 1912, the military <strong>in</strong>tervention <strong>in</strong>Mexico <strong>in</strong> 1916.Page 76As an example of the more idealistic impulse we might mention thecreation of various Carnegie foundations <strong>to</strong> work for universal peace.As an example of the more practical po<strong>in</strong>t of view, we might mentionthe found<strong>in</strong>g of "The New Republic," a liberal weekly paper, by anagent of Morgan f<strong>in</strong>anced with Whitney money (1914).The comb<strong>in</strong>ed forces of the liberal East and the agrarian Westwere able <strong>to</strong> capture the Presidency under Woodrow Wilson <strong>in</strong> 1912.Wilson roused a good deal of popular enthusiasm with his talk of "NewFreedom" and the rights of the underdog, but his program amounted <strong>to</strong>little more than an amateur attempt <strong>to</strong> establish on a federal basis


those reforms which agrarian and labor discontent had been seek<strong>in</strong>g ona state basis for many years. Wilson was by no means a radical andthere was a good deal of unconscious hypocrisy <strong>in</strong> many of hisresound<strong>in</strong>g public speeches. His political and adm<strong>in</strong>istrative reformswere a good deal more effective than his economic or social reforms.The establishment of an <strong>in</strong>come tax and the Federal Reserve Systemjustified the support which Progressives had given <strong>to</strong> Wilson. Wilsondid much <strong>to</strong> extend equality of opportunity <strong>to</strong> wider groups of Americanpeople.CHAPTER III: THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE TO 1917Page 88The abolition of serfdom made it necessary for the landednobility <strong>to</strong> cease <strong>to</strong> regard the peasants as private property. Peterthe Great (1689-1725) and Cather<strong>in</strong>e the Great (1762-1796) weresupporters of westernization and reform. Paul I (1796-1801) wasreactionary. Alexander I (1801-1825) and Alexander II (1855-1881) werereformers while Nicholas I (1825-1855) and Nicholas II (1855-1881)were reactionaries. By 1864, serfdom had been abolished, and a fairlymodern system of law, of justice, and of education had beenestablished; local government had been somewhat modernized; a fairlygood f<strong>in</strong>ancial and fiscal system had been established; and an armybased on universal military service (but lack<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> equipment) hadbeen created. On the other hand, the au<strong>to</strong>cracy cont<strong>in</strong>ued <strong>in</strong> the handsof weak men and the freed serfs had no adequate lands.Page 93The first Russian railroad opened <strong>in</strong> 1838 but growth was slowuntil 1857. At that time, there were only 663 miles of railroads, butthis figure went up over tenfold by 1871, doubled aga<strong>in</strong> by 1881 with14,000 miles, reached 37,000 by 1901 and 46,000 by 1915.Page 94In 1900, Russia had 48% of the <strong>to</strong>tal world production ofpetroleum products. The State Bank was made a bank of issue <strong>in</strong> 1897and was required by law <strong>to</strong> redeem its notes <strong>in</strong> gold, thus plac<strong>in</strong>gRussia on the <strong>in</strong>ternational gold standard.Page 97In 1902, a cartel created by a dozen iron and steel firms handledalmost three-fourths of all Russian sales. It was controlled by fourforeign bank<strong>in</strong>g groups.Page 100Until 1910, S<strong>to</strong>lyp<strong>in</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ued his efforts <strong>to</strong> comb<strong>in</strong>e oppressionwith reform, especially agrarian reform. Rural credit banks wereestablished; various measures were taken <strong>to</strong> place larger amounts of


land <strong>in</strong> the hands of the peasants; restrictions of immigration ofpeasants, especially <strong>to</strong> Siberia, were removed; participation <strong>in</strong> localgovernment was opened <strong>to</strong> lower social classes previously excluded;education, especially technical education, was made more accessible;and certa<strong>in</strong> provisions for social <strong>in</strong>surance were enacted <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> law. Hewas assass<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>in</strong> the presence of the Tsar <strong>in</strong> 1911.The fourth duma (1912-1916) was elected by universal suffrage.CHAPTER IV: THE BUFFER FRINGETHE NEAR EAST TO 1914Page 111The Ot<strong>to</strong>man Empire was divided <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> 21 governments and subdivided<strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> seventy vilayets, each under a pasha. The supreme ruler <strong>in</strong>Constant<strong>in</strong>ople was not only sultan (head of the empire) but was alsocaliph (defender of the Muslim creed).Page 121The Great Powers showed mild approval of the Baghdad Railwayuntil about 1900. Then, for more than ten years, Russia, Brita<strong>in</strong> andFrance showed violent disapproval and did all they could the obstructthe project. They described the Baghdad Railway as the emerg<strong>in</strong>g wedgeof German imperialist aggression seek<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> weaken and destroy theOt<strong>to</strong>man Empire and the stakes of the other powers <strong>in</strong> the area.Page 122The Germans were not only favorably <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>to</strong>ward Turkey; theirconduct seems <strong>to</strong> have been completely fair <strong>in</strong> regard theadm<strong>in</strong>istration of the railway itself. At a time when the American andother railways were practic<strong>in</strong>g wholesale discrim<strong>in</strong>ation betweencus<strong>to</strong>mers, the Germans had the same rates and same treatment for all,<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Germans and non-Germans. They worked <strong>to</strong> make the railroadefficient and profitable although their <strong>in</strong>come from it was guaranteedby the Turkish government. In consequence, the Turkish payments <strong>to</strong> therailroad steadily decl<strong>in</strong>ed, and the government was able <strong>to</strong> share <strong>in</strong>its profits <strong>to</strong> the extent of almost three million francs <strong>in</strong> 1914.Moreover, the Germans did not seek <strong>to</strong> monopolize control of therailroad, offer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> share equally with France and England andeventually with the other Powers. France accepted this offer <strong>in</strong> 1899,but Brita<strong>in</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ued <strong>to</strong> refuse and placed every obstacle <strong>in</strong> the pathof the project.When the Ot<strong>to</strong>man government sought <strong>to</strong> raise their cus<strong>to</strong>ms dutiesfrom 11% <strong>to</strong> 14% <strong>in</strong> order <strong>to</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ue construction, Brita<strong>in</strong> preventedthis. In order <strong>to</strong> carry on the project, the Germans sold theirrailroad <strong>in</strong>terests <strong>in</strong> the Balkans and gave the Ot<strong>to</strong>man build<strong>in</strong>gsubsidy of $275,000 a kilometer. In strik<strong>in</strong>g contrast, the Russiansdemanded arrears of 57 million francs under the Treaty of 1878. The


French, <strong>in</strong> spite of <strong>in</strong>vestments <strong>in</strong> Turkey, refused <strong>to</strong> allow BaghdadRailway securities <strong>to</strong> be handled on the Paris S<strong>to</strong>ck Exchange.Page 123In 1903, Brita<strong>in</strong> made an agreement for a jo<strong>in</strong>t German, French,and British control of the railroad. With<strong>in</strong> three weeks this agreementwas repudiated because of newspaper protests aga<strong>in</strong>st it. When theTurkish government tried <strong>to</strong> borrow, it was summarily rebuffed <strong>in</strong> Parisand London, but obta<strong>in</strong>ed the sum unhesitat<strong>in</strong>gly <strong>in</strong> Berl<strong>in</strong>. The growthof German prestige and the decl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> favor of the Western Powers atthe sultan's court is not surpris<strong>in</strong>g and goes far <strong>to</strong> expla<strong>in</strong> theTurkish <strong>in</strong>tervention on the side of the Central powers <strong>in</strong> the war of1914-1919.Brita<strong>in</strong> withdrew her opposition <strong>to</strong> the Baghdad Railway <strong>in</strong> returnfor promises that:1) it would not be extended <strong>to</strong> the Persian Gulf;2) British capitalists would be given a monopoly on the navigation ofthe Euphrates and Tigris rivers and exclusive control over theirirrigation projects;3) 2 British subjects would be given seats on the Board of direc<strong>to</strong>rs;4) Brita<strong>in</strong> would have exclusive control over commercial activities <strong>in</strong>Kuwait, the only good port on the upper Persian Gulf;5) a monopoly over the oil resources given <strong>to</strong> a new corporation: RoyalDutch Shell Company <strong>in</strong> which British held half <strong>in</strong>terest, the Germansand French a quarter <strong>in</strong>terest each;THE BRITISH IMPERIAL CRISIS TO 1926Page 127In England, the landed class obta<strong>in</strong>ed control of the bar and thebench and were, thus, <strong>in</strong> a position <strong>to</strong> judge all disputes about realproperty <strong>in</strong> their favor. Control of the courts and of the Parliamentmade it possible for this rul<strong>in</strong>g group <strong>to</strong> override the rights ofpeasants <strong>in</strong> land, <strong>to</strong> eject them from the land, <strong>to</strong> enclose the openfields of the medieval system, <strong>to</strong> deprive the cultiva<strong>to</strong>rs of theirmanorial rights and thus reduce them <strong>to</strong> the condition of landlessrural laborers or tenants.Page 130Until 1870, there was no professorships of F<strong>in</strong>e Arts at Oxford,but <strong>in</strong> that year, thanks <strong>to</strong> a bequest,John Rusk<strong>in</strong> was named <strong>to</strong> such achair. He hit Oxford like an earthquake, not so much because he talkedabout f<strong>in</strong>e arts but because he talked about the empire and England'sdowntrodden masses as moral issues. Until the end of the n<strong>in</strong>eteenthcentury, the poverty-stricken masses <strong>in</strong> the cities lived <strong>in</strong> want,ignorance and crime much like described by Charles Dickens. Rusk<strong>in</strong>spoke <strong>to</strong> the Oxford undergraduates as members of the privileged rul<strong>in</strong>gclass. He <strong>to</strong>ld them that they were the possessors of a magnificenttradition of education, beauty, rule of law, freedom, decency, andself-discipl<strong>in</strong>e but that this tradition could not be saved and did not


deserve <strong>to</strong> be saved, unless it could be extended <strong>to</strong> the lower classesand <strong>to</strong> the non-English masses throughout the world. If not extended <strong>to</strong>these classes, the m<strong>in</strong>ority upper-class would be submerged and thetradition lost.Rusk<strong>in</strong>'s message had a sensational impact. His <strong>in</strong>augural lecturewas copied out <strong>in</strong> longhand by one undergraduate, Cecil Rhodes. Rhodesfeverishly exploited the diamond and gold fields of South Africa, rose<strong>to</strong> be prime m<strong>in</strong>ister of Cape Colony, contributed money <strong>to</strong> politicalparties, controlled parliamentary seats both <strong>in</strong> England and SouthAfrica.With f<strong>in</strong>ancial support from Lord Rothschild, he was able <strong>to</strong>monopolize the diamond m<strong>in</strong>es as De Beers M<strong>in</strong>es and Gold Fields. In themid 1890s, Rhodes had a personal <strong>in</strong>come of a least a million pounds(then five million dollars) a year which was spent so freely for hismysterious purposes that he was usually overdrawn on his account.These purposes centered on his desire <strong>to</strong> federate the English-speak<strong>in</strong>gpeoples and <strong>to</strong> br<strong>in</strong>g all the habitable portions of the world undertheir control.Page 131Among Rusk<strong>in</strong>'s most devoted disciples at Oxford were a group of<strong>in</strong>timate friends who devoted the rest of their lives <strong>to</strong> carry<strong>in</strong>g outhis ideas. They were remarkably successful <strong>in</strong> these aims.In 1891, Rhodes organized a secret society with members <strong>in</strong> a"Circle of Initiates" and an outer circle known as the "Association ofHelpers" later organized as the Round Table organization.Page 132In 1909-1913, they organized semi-secret groups know as RoundTable Groups <strong>in</strong> the chief British dependencies and the United States.In 1919, they founded the Royal Institute of International Affairs.Similar Institutes of International Affairs were established <strong>in</strong> thechief British dom<strong>in</strong>ions and the United States where it is known as theCouncil on Foreign Relations. After 1925, the Institute of PacificRelations was set up <strong>in</strong> twelve Pacific area countries.Page 133They were constantly harp<strong>in</strong>g on the lessons <strong>to</strong> be learned fromthe failure of the American Revolution and the success of the Canadianfederation of 1867 and hoped <strong>to</strong> federate the various parts of theempire and then confederate the whole with the United K<strong>in</strong>gdomEGYPT AND THE SUDAN TO 1922Disraeli's purchase, with Rothschild money, of 176,602 shares ofSuez Canal s<strong>to</strong>ck for #3,680,000 from the Khedive of Egypt <strong>in</strong> 1875 wasmotivated by concern for communications with India just as theacquisition of the Cape of Good Hope <strong>in</strong> 1814 had resulted from thesame concern.Page 135As a result of complex and secret negotiations <strong>in</strong> which Lord


Rosebery was the chief figure, Brita<strong>in</strong> kept Uganda, Rhodes was made aprivy councilor, Rosebery replaced his father-<strong>in</strong>-law, Lord Rothschild,<strong>in</strong> Rhodes secret group and was made a trustee under Rhodes' next andlast will.Page 137By 1895, the Transvaal Republic presented an acute problem. Allpolitical control was <strong>in</strong> the hands of a rural, backward, Bibleread<strong>in</strong>g,racist m<strong>in</strong>ority of Boers while all economic wealth was <strong>in</strong> thehands of a violent, aggressive majority of foreigners, (Utlanders)most of whom lived <strong>in</strong> Johannesburg. The Utlanders, who were twice asnumerous and owned two thirds of the land and n<strong>in</strong>e-tenths of thewealth of the country, were prevented from participat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> politicallife or from becom<strong>in</strong>g citizens (except after 14 years residence) andwere irritated by President Paul Kruger's <strong>in</strong>trigu<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> obta<strong>in</strong> somek<strong>in</strong>d of German <strong>in</strong>tervention and protection.At this po<strong>in</strong>t, Rhodes made his plans <strong>to</strong> overthrow Kruger'sgovernment by an upris<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Johannesburg, f<strong>in</strong>anced by himself and ledby his brother Frank, followed by an <strong>in</strong>vasion led by Frank Jamesonfrom Rhodesia. Flora Shaw used The Times <strong>to</strong> prepare public op<strong>in</strong>ion <strong>in</strong>England while others negotiated for the official support necessary.When the revolt fizzled, Jameson raided anyway and was easilycaptured by the Boers. The public officials <strong>in</strong>volved denounced theplot, loudly proclaimed their surprise at the event, and were able <strong>to</strong>whitewash most of the participants <strong>in</strong> the subsequent parliamentary<strong>in</strong>quiry. A telegram from the German Kaiser <strong>to</strong> Kruger congratulat<strong>in</strong>ghim on his success "<strong>in</strong> preserv<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>dependence of his country,"was built up by The Times <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> an example of brazen German<strong>in</strong>terference <strong>in</strong> British affairs, and almost eclipsed Jameson'saggression.Rhodes was s<strong>to</strong>pped only temporarily. For almost two years, he andhis friends stayed quiet wait<strong>in</strong>g for the s<strong>to</strong>rm <strong>to</strong> blow over. Then theybegan <strong>to</strong> act aga<strong>in</strong>. Propaganda, most of it true about the plight ofthe Utlanders flooded England from Flora Shaw. Milner was made BritishHigh Commissioner <strong>to</strong> South Africa; his friend Brett worked his way<strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the confidence of the monarchy <strong>to</strong> become its chief politicaladvisor. Milner made provocative British troop movements on the Boerfrontiers <strong>in</strong> spite of the vigorous protests of his command<strong>in</strong>g general<strong>in</strong> South Africa, who had <strong>to</strong> be removed; and f<strong>in</strong>ally, war wasprecipitated when Smuts drew up an ultimatum <strong>in</strong>sist<strong>in</strong>g that theBritish troop movements cease and when this was rejected by Milner.Page 138The Boer War (1899-1902) was one of the most important events <strong>in</strong>British imperial his<strong>to</strong>ry. The ability of 40,000 Boer farmers <strong>to</strong> holdoff ten times as many British for three years, <strong>in</strong>flict<strong>in</strong>g a series ofdefeats on them over that period, destroyed faith <strong>in</strong> British power.Although the Boer republics were defeated and annexed <strong>in</strong> 1902,


Brita<strong>in</strong>'s confidence was so shaken that it made a treaty with Japanprovid<strong>in</strong>g that if either became engaged <strong>in</strong> war with two enemies <strong>in</strong> theFar East, the other would come <strong>to</strong> the rescue. This treaty allowedJapan <strong>to</strong> attack Russia <strong>in</strong> 1904.Page 138Milner's group, known as "Milner's K<strong>in</strong>dergarten" reorganized thegovernment. By 1914, the Smuts government passed a law exclud<strong>in</strong>gnatives from most semi-skilled or skilled work or any high-pay<strong>in</strong>gpositions.Page 139By the Land Act of 1913, 7% was reserved for purchases by nativesand the other 93% by whites. The wages of natives were about one tenthof those of whites.Page 141These natives lived on <strong>in</strong>adequate and eroded reserves or <strong>in</strong>horrible urban slums and were drastically restricted <strong>in</strong> movements,residence, or economic opportunities and had almost no political oreven civil rights. By 1950 <strong>in</strong> Johannesburg, 90,000 Africans werecrowded <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> 600 acres of shacks with no sanitation with almost norunn<strong>in</strong>g water and denied all opportunity except for animal survivaland reproduction.Page 142In 1908, the Milner Round Table group worked a scheme <strong>to</strong> reservethe tropical portions of Africa north of the Zambezi river for nativesunder such attractive conditions that the blacks south of that riverwould be enticed <strong>to</strong> migrate northward. Its policy would be <strong>to</strong> found aNegro dom<strong>in</strong>ion <strong>in</strong> which Blacks could own land, enter professions, andstand on a foot<strong>in</strong>g of equality with Whites. Although this project hasnot been achieved, it provides the key <strong>to</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong>'s native policiesfrom 1917 onward.Page 143In 1903, when Milner <strong>to</strong>ok over the Boer states, he tried <strong>to</strong>follow the policy that native could vote. This was blocked by theK<strong>in</strong>dergarten because they considered reconciliation with the Boers <strong>to</strong>be more urgent.In South Africa, the three native protec<strong>to</strong>rates of Swaziland,Bechuanaland, and Basu<strong>to</strong>land were reta<strong>in</strong>ed by the imperial authoritiesas areas where native rights were paramount and where tribal forms ofliv<strong>in</strong>g could be ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed at least partially.MAKING THE COMMONWEALTH 1910-1926Page 144Back <strong>in</strong> London, they founded the Round Table and met <strong>in</strong> conclavespresided over by Milner <strong>to</strong> decide the fate of the empire. Curtis andothers were sent around the world <strong>to</strong> organize Round Table groups <strong>in</strong>the chief British dependencies <strong>to</strong> give them, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g India and


Ireland, their complete <strong>in</strong>dependence.Page 146The creation of the Round Table groups was so secretive that,even <strong>to</strong>day, many close students of the subject are not aware of itssignificance.Page 147Curtis said, "The task of prepar<strong>in</strong>g for freedom the races whichcannot as yet govern themselves is the supreme duty of those who can.Personally, I regard this challenge <strong>to</strong> the long unquestioned claim ofthe white man <strong>to</strong> dom<strong>in</strong>ate the world as <strong>in</strong>evitable and wholesome,especially <strong>to</strong> ourselves. Our whole race has outgrown the merelynational state and will pass either <strong>to</strong> a Commonwealth of Nations orelse <strong>to</strong> an empire of slaves. And the issue of these agonies rests withus."EAST AFRICA 1910-1931Page 149Publicity for their views on civiliz<strong>in</strong>g the natives and tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>gthem for eventual self-government received wide dissem<strong>in</strong>ation.Page 150By 1950 Kenya had discontented and detribalized blacks work<strong>in</strong>gfor low wages on lands owned by whites. It had about two millionblacks and only 3,400 whites <strong>in</strong> 1910. Forty years later, it had about4 million blacks and only 30,000 whites. The healthful highlands werereserved for white ownership as early as 1908. The native reserves hadfive times as much land although they had 150 times as many people.The whites tried <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease the pressure on natives <strong>to</strong> work onwhite farms rather than <strong>to</strong> seek <strong>to</strong> make a liv<strong>in</strong>g on their own landswith<strong>in</strong> the reserves, by forc<strong>in</strong>g them <strong>to</strong> pay taxes <strong>in</strong> cash, bycurtail<strong>in</strong>g the size or quality of the reserves, by restrict<strong>in</strong>gimprovements <strong>in</strong> native agricultural techniques and by personal andpolitical pressure and compulsion.The real crux of the controversy before the Mau Mau upris<strong>in</strong>g of1948-1955 was the problem of self-government; Po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> SouthAfrica, the settlers <strong>in</strong> Kenya demanded self-rule which would allowthem <strong>to</strong> enforce restrictions on non-whites.Page 151From this controversy came a compromise which gave Kenya aLegislative Council conta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g representatives of the imperialgovernment, the white settlers, the Indians, the Arabs, and a whitemissionary <strong>to</strong> represent the blacks. Most were nom<strong>in</strong>ated rather thanelected but by 1949, only the official and Negro members werenom<strong>in</strong>ated.Page 152As a result of the 1923 cont<strong>in</strong>ued encroachment of white settlerson native preserves, the 1930 Native Land Trust Ord<strong>in</strong>ance guaranteednative reserves but these reserves rema<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong>adequate.


Page 153Efforts <strong>to</strong> extend the use of native courts, councils and <strong>to</strong> tra<strong>in</strong>natives for an adm<strong>in</strong>istrative service were met with grow<strong>in</strong>g suspicionbased on the conviction that the whites were hypocrites who taught areligion that they did not obey, were trai<strong>to</strong>rs <strong>to</strong> Christ's teach<strong>in</strong>gs,and were us<strong>in</strong>g these <strong>to</strong> control the natives and <strong>to</strong> betray their<strong>in</strong>terests under cover of religious ideas which the whites themselvesdid not observe <strong>in</strong> practice.INDIA TO 1926Although the East India Company was a commercial firm, it had <strong>to</strong><strong>in</strong>tervene aga<strong>in</strong> and aga<strong>in</strong> <strong>to</strong> res<strong>to</strong>re order, replac<strong>in</strong>g one nom<strong>in</strong>alruler by another and even tak<strong>in</strong>g over the government of those areaswhere it was more immediately concerned and <strong>to</strong> divert <strong>to</strong> their ownpockets some of the fabulous wealth they saw flow<strong>in</strong>g by. Areas underrule expanded steadily until by 1858 they covered three-fifths of thecountry.Page 154In 1857-1858, a sudden, violent <strong>in</strong>surrection of native forces,known as the Great Mut<strong>in</strong>y, resulted <strong>in</strong> the end of the Mogul empire andof the East India Company, the British government tak<strong>in</strong>g over theirpolitical activities.Page 157Numerous legislative enactments sought <strong>to</strong> improve the conditionsbut were counterbalanced... by the grow<strong>in</strong>g burden of peasant debt a<strong>to</strong>nerous terms and at high <strong>in</strong>terest rates. Although slavery wasabolished <strong>in</strong> 1843, many of the poor were reduced <strong>to</strong> peonage bycontract<strong>in</strong>g debts at unfair terms and b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g themselves and theirheirs <strong>to</strong> work for their credi<strong>to</strong>rs until the debt was paid. Such a debtcould never be paid, <strong>in</strong> many cases, because the rate at which it wasreduced was left <strong>to</strong> the credi<strong>to</strong>r and could rarely be questioned by theilliterate deb<strong>to</strong>r.Page 158In spite of India's poverty, there was a considerable volume ofsav<strong>in</strong>gs aris<strong>in</strong>g chiefly from the <strong>in</strong>equitable distribution of <strong>in</strong>come <strong>to</strong>the landlord class and <strong>to</strong> the moneylenders (if these two groups can beseparated <strong>in</strong> this way).Page 161H<strong>in</strong>duism was <strong>in</strong>fluenced by Christianity and Islam so that therevived H<strong>in</strong>duism was really a synthesis of these three religions.Played down was the old and basic H<strong>in</strong>du idea of Karma where each wouldreappeared aga<strong>in</strong> and aga<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> a different physical form and <strong>in</strong> adifferent social status, each difference be<strong>in</strong>g a reward or punishmentfor the soul's conduct <strong>in</strong> at it's previous appearance. There was noreal hope of escape from this cycle, except by a gradual improvementthrough a long series of successive appearances <strong>to</strong> the ultimate goalof complete obliteration of personality (Nirvana) by ultimate mergence


<strong>in</strong> the soul of the universe (Brahma). This release (moksha) from theendless cycle of existence could be achieved only by the suppressionof all desire, of all <strong>in</strong>dividuality and of all will <strong>to</strong> live.IRELAND TO 1939Page 173The Cromwellian conquest of Ireland <strong>in</strong> the seventeenth centuryhad transferred much Irish land, as plunder of war, <strong>to</strong> absenteeEnglish landlords. In consequence, high rents, <strong>in</strong>secure tenure, lackof improvements and legalized economic exploitation, supported byEnglish judges and English soldiers, gave rise <strong>to</strong> violent agrarianunrest and rural atrocities aga<strong>in</strong>st English lives and properties.THE FAR EAST TO WORLD WAR ITHE COLLAPSE OF CINA TO 1920Page 176The destruction of traditional Ch<strong>in</strong>ese culture under the impac<strong>to</strong>f Western Civilization was considerably later than the similardestruction of Indian culture by EuropeansThe upper-most group derived its <strong>in</strong>come as tribute and taxes fromits possession of military and political power the middle groupderived its <strong>in</strong>comes from sources such as <strong>in</strong>terest on loans, rents fromlands and the profits from commercial enterprises. Although thepeasants were clearly an exploited group, this exploitation wasimpersonal and traditional and thus more easily borne.Page 179Only <strong>in</strong> the late n<strong>in</strong>eteenth and early twentieth century didpeasants <strong>in</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>a come <strong>to</strong> regard their positions as so hopeless thatviolence became preferable <strong>to</strong> diligence or conformity. This changearose from the fact that the impact of Western culture on Ch<strong>in</strong>a did,<strong>in</strong> fact, make a peasant's position economically hopeless.Page 180Ch<strong>in</strong>ese society was <strong>to</strong>o weak <strong>to</strong> defend itself aga<strong>in</strong>st the West.When it tried <strong>to</strong> do so, as <strong>in</strong> the Opium Wars of 1840-1861 or <strong>in</strong> theBoxer upris<strong>in</strong>g of 1900, such Ch<strong>in</strong>ese resistance <strong>to</strong> Europeanpenetration was crushed by armaments of the Western Powers and allk<strong>in</strong>ds of concessions <strong>to</strong> these Powers were imposed on Ch<strong>in</strong>a.Until 1841, Can<strong>to</strong>n was the only port allowed for foreign importsand opium was illegal. As a consequence of Ch<strong>in</strong>ese destruction ofillegal Indian opium and the commercial exactions of Can<strong>to</strong>neseauthorities, Brita<strong>in</strong> imposed on Ch<strong>in</strong>a the treaties of Nank<strong>in</strong>g (1842)and of Tients<strong>in</strong> (1858). These forced Ch<strong>in</strong>a <strong>to</strong> cede Hong Kong <strong>to</strong>Brita<strong>in</strong> and <strong>to</strong> open sixteen ports <strong>to</strong> foreign trade, <strong>to</strong> impose auniform import tariff of no more than 5%, <strong>to</strong> pay an <strong>in</strong>demnity of about$100 million, <strong>to</strong> permit foreign legations <strong>in</strong> Pek<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>to</strong> allow aBritish official <strong>to</strong> act as head of the Ch<strong>in</strong>ese cus<strong>to</strong>ms service, and <strong>to</strong>legalize the import of opium. Ch<strong>in</strong>a lost Burma <strong>to</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong>, Indoch<strong>in</strong>a


<strong>to</strong> France. Also Formosa and the Pescadores <strong>to</strong> Japan, Macao <strong>to</strong>Portugal, Kiaochow <strong>to</strong> Germany, Liaotung (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Port Arthur) <strong>to</strong>Russia, France <strong>to</strong>ok Kwangchowan and Brita<strong>in</strong> <strong>to</strong>ok Kowloon andWeihaiwei. Various Powers imposed on Ch<strong>in</strong>a a system ofextraterri<strong>to</strong>rial courts under which foreigners <strong>in</strong> judicial cases couldnot be tried <strong>in</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>ese courts or under Ch<strong>in</strong>ese law.TRAGEDY AND HOPE Chapters V-VIIIby Dr. Carroll QuigleyISBN 0913022-14-4CONTENTSV. THE FIRST WORLD WARVI. THE VERSAILLES SYSTEM AND RETURN TO NORMALCY 1919-1929VII. FINANCE, COMMERCIAL POLICY AND BUSINESS ACTIVITY 1897-1947VIII. INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISM AND THE SOVIET CHALLENGECHAPTER V: THE FIRST WORLD WARTHE GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS 1871-1914Page 249Four chief reasons have been given for the <strong>in</strong>tervention of theUnited States <strong>in</strong> World War I.1) <strong>to</strong> secure "freedom of the seas" from German submar<strong>in</strong>e attacks;2)British propaganda;3) a conspiracy by <strong>in</strong>ternational bankers and munitions manufacturerseither <strong>to</strong> protect their loans <strong>to</strong> the Entente Powers or their wartimeprofits from sales <strong>to</strong> these Powers;4) Balance of Power pr<strong>in</strong>ciples <strong>to</strong> prevent Great Brita<strong>in</strong> from be<strong>in</strong>gdefeated by GermanyPage 250The fact that German submar<strong>in</strong>es were act<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> retaliation forthe illegal British blockades of the cont<strong>in</strong>ent of Europe and Britishviolations of <strong>in</strong>ternational law and neutral rights on the high seas.Brita<strong>in</strong> was close <strong>to</strong> defeat <strong>in</strong> April 1917 and on that basis theUnited States entered the war. The unconscious assumption by Americanleaders that an Entente vic<strong>to</strong>ry was <strong>in</strong>evitable was at the bot<strong>to</strong>m oftheir failure <strong>to</strong> enforce the same rules of neutrality and<strong>in</strong>ternational law aga<strong>in</strong>st Brita<strong>in</strong> as aga<strong>in</strong>st Germany. They constantlyassumed that British violations of these rules could be compensatedwith monetary damages while German violations of these rulesmust be resisted by force if necessary. S<strong>in</strong>ce they could not admit


this unconscious assumption or publicly defend the legitimate basis of<strong>in</strong>ternational power politics on which it rested, they f<strong>in</strong>ally went <strong>to</strong>war on an excuse which was legally weak, "the assertion of a right <strong>to</strong>protect belligerent ships on which Americans saw fit <strong>to</strong> travel and thetreatment of armed belligerent merchantmen as peaceful vessels. Bothassumptions were contrary <strong>to</strong> reason and <strong>to</strong> settled law and no otherprofessed neutral advanced them."The Germans at first tried <strong>to</strong> use the established rules of<strong>in</strong>ternational law regard<strong>in</strong>g destruction of merchant vessels. Thisproved so dangerous because the British <strong>in</strong>structions <strong>to</strong> merchant ships<strong>to</strong> attack submar<strong>in</strong>es. American protests reached a peak when theLusitania was sunk <strong>in</strong> 1915. The Lusitania was a British merchantvessel constructed as an auxiliary cruiser carry<strong>in</strong>g a cargo of 2,400cases of rifle cartridges and 1250 cases of shrapnel with orders <strong>to</strong>attack German submar<strong>in</strong>es whenever possible. The <strong>in</strong>competence of theact<strong>in</strong>g capta<strong>in</strong> contributed <strong>to</strong> the heavy loss of life as did also amysterious second explosion after the German <strong>to</strong>rpedo struck. Thecapta<strong>in</strong> was on course he had orders <strong>to</strong> avoid; he was runn<strong>in</strong>g atreduced speed, he had an <strong>in</strong>experienced crew; the portholes had beenleft open; the lifeboats had not been swung out; and no lifeboatdrills had been held.Page 251The propaganda agencies of the Entente Powers made full use ofthe occasion. The Times of London announced that 80% were citizens ofthe US (actually 15.6%); the British manufactured and distributed amedal which they pretended had been awarded <strong>to</strong> the submar<strong>in</strong>e crew bythe German government; a French paper published a picture of thecrowds <strong>in</strong> Berl<strong>in</strong> at the outbreak of war <strong>in</strong> 1914 as a picture ofGermans "rejoic<strong>in</strong>g" at the news of the s<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g of the Lusitania.The US protested violently aga<strong>in</strong>st the submar<strong>in</strong>e warfare whilebrush<strong>in</strong>g aside German arguments based on the British blockade. It wasso irreconcilable <strong>in</strong> these protests that Germany sent Wilson a notewhich promised that "<strong>in</strong> the future merchant vessels with<strong>in</strong> and withoutthe war zone shall not be sunk without warn<strong>in</strong>g and withoutsafeguard<strong>in</strong>g human lives unless these ships try <strong>to</strong> escape or offerresistance. In return, the German government hoped that the US wouldput pressure on Brita<strong>in</strong> <strong>to</strong> follow the established rules of<strong>in</strong>ternational law <strong>in</strong> regard <strong>to</strong> blockade and freedom of the sea. Wilsonrefused <strong>to</strong> do so. It became clear <strong>to</strong> the Germans that they would bestarved <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> defeat unless they could defeat Brita<strong>in</strong> first byunrestricted submar<strong>in</strong>e warfare. S<strong>in</strong>ce they were aware this wouldprobably br<strong>in</strong>g the US <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the war aga<strong>in</strong>st them, they made anothereffort <strong>to</strong> negotiate peace before resort<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> it. It was rejected bythe Entente Powers on Dec. 27 and unrestricted submar<strong>in</strong>e attacks wereresumed. Wilson broke off diplomatic relations and the Congressdeclared war on April 3, 1917.


Page 252Brita<strong>in</strong> was unwill<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> accept any peace which would leaveGermany supreme on the cont<strong>in</strong>ent or <strong>in</strong> a position <strong>to</strong> resume thecommercial, naval, and colonial rivalry which had existed before 1914.Page 253The Vatican, work<strong>in</strong>g through Card<strong>in</strong>al Pacelli (later Pope PiusXII) sought a negotiated peace.On Oct 5, a German note <strong>to</strong> Wilson asked for an armistice based onthe basis of the Fourteen Po<strong>in</strong>ts which promised the end of secretdiplomacy, freedom of the seas; freedom of commerce; disarmament; afair settlement of colonial claims, with the <strong>in</strong>terests of the nativepeoples receiv<strong>in</strong>g equal weight with the titles of the ImperialistPowers; the evacuation of Russia, the evacuation and res<strong>to</strong>rationof Belgium, the evacuation of France and the res<strong>to</strong>ration of herAlsace-Lorra<strong>in</strong>e as <strong>in</strong> 1870.Page 254The Entente Supreme War Council refused <strong>to</strong> accept the FourteenPo<strong>in</strong>ts as the basis for peace until Colonel House threatened that theUS would make a separate peace with Germany.Page 255Wilson had clearly promised that the peace treaty would benegotiated and based on the Fourteen Po<strong>in</strong>ts but the Treaty ofVersailles was imposed without negotiation and the Fourteen Po<strong>in</strong>tsfared very poorly <strong>in</strong> its provisions. The subsequent claim of theGerman militarists that the German Army was never defeated but was"stabbed <strong>in</strong> the back" by the home front through a comb<strong>in</strong>ation of<strong>in</strong>ternational Catholics, <strong>in</strong>ternational Jews, and <strong>in</strong>ternationalSocialists have no merit whatever.On all fronts, almost 13 million men <strong>in</strong> the various armed forcesdied and the war destroyed over $400 billion <strong>in</strong> property at a timewhen the value of every object <strong>in</strong> France and Belgium was not worthover $75 billion.Page 256In July 1914, the military men were confident that a decisionwould be reached <strong>in</strong> six months. This belief was supported by thef<strong>in</strong>ancial experts who, while greatly underestimat<strong>in</strong>g the cost offight<strong>in</strong>g, were confident f<strong>in</strong>ancial resources would be exhausted <strong>in</strong> sixmonths. By f<strong>in</strong>ancial resources, they meant "gold reserves." These wereclearly limited; all the Great Powers were on the gold standard.However each country suspended the gold standard at the outbreak ofwar. This removed the au<strong>to</strong>matic limitation on the supply of papermoney. The each country proceeded <strong>to</strong> pay for the war by borrow<strong>in</strong>g fromthe banks. The banks created the money which they lent my merelygiv<strong>in</strong>g the government a deposit of any size aga<strong>in</strong>st which thegovernment could draw checks. The banks were no longer limited <strong>in</strong> theamount of credit they could create because they no longer had <strong>to</strong> pay


out gold for checks on demand. This the creation of money <strong>in</strong> the formof credit by the banks was limited only by the demands of itsborrowers. Naturally, as governments borrowed <strong>to</strong> pay for their needs,private bus<strong>in</strong>esses borrowed <strong>to</strong> be able <strong>to</strong> fill thegovernment's orders. The percentage of outstand<strong>in</strong>g bank notes coveredby gold reserves steadily fell and the percentage of bank creditcovered by either gold or bank notes fell even further.Naturally, when the supply of money was <strong>in</strong>creased <strong>in</strong> this fashionfaster than the supply of goods, prices rose because a larger supplyof money was compet<strong>in</strong>g for a smaller supply of goods. People receivedmoney for mak<strong>in</strong>g capital goods, consumer goods and munitions but theycould spend their money only <strong>to</strong> buy consumer goods. The problem ofpublic debt became steadily worse because governments were f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>gsuch a large part of their activities by bank credit. Public debtsrose by 1000 percent.Page 259Governments began <strong>to</strong> regulate imports and exports <strong>to</strong> ensure thatnecessary materials stayed <strong>in</strong> the country and did not go <strong>to</strong> enemystates. This led <strong>to</strong> the British blockade of Europe.Page 251The results of the blockade were devastat<strong>in</strong>g. Cont<strong>in</strong>ued forn<strong>in</strong>e months after the armistice, it caused the deaths of 800,000persons, reparations <strong>to</strong>ok 108,000 horses, 205,000 cattle, 426,000sheep and 240,000 fowl.Page 262Countries engaged <strong>in</strong> a variety of activities designed <strong>to</strong>regulate the flow of <strong>in</strong>formation which <strong>in</strong>volved censorship, propagandaand curtailment of civil liberties.Page 263The War Propaganda Bureau was able <strong>to</strong> control almost all<strong>in</strong>formation go<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> the American press.The Censorship and Propaganda bureaus worked <strong>to</strong>gether. The formerconcealed all s<strong>to</strong>ries of Entente violations of the laws of war or ofthe rules of humanity while the Propaganda Bureau widely publicizedthe violations and crudities of the Central Powers. The Germanviolation of Belgian neutrality was constantly bewailed,while noth<strong>in</strong>gwas said of the Entente violation of Greek neutrality. A great dealwas made of the Austrian ultimatum <strong>to</strong> Serbia while the Russianmobilization which had precipitated the war was hardly mentioned. Inthe Central Powers a great deal was made of the Entente encirclementwhile noth<strong>in</strong>g was said of the Kaiser's demands for "a place <strong>in</strong> thesun" of the High Command's refusal <strong>to</strong> renounce annexation of any par<strong>to</strong>f Belgium.Manufacture of outright lies by propaganda agencies was<strong>in</strong>frequent and the desired picture of the enemy was built up by aprocess of selection and dis<strong>to</strong>rtion of evidence until, by 1918,many <strong>in</strong>


the West regarded the Germans as bloodthirsty and sadistic militaristswhile the Germans regarded the Russians as "subhuman monsters." Agreat deal was made, especially by the British, of "atrocity"propaganda; s<strong>to</strong>ries of German mutilation of bodies, violation ofwomen, cutt<strong>in</strong>g off a children's hands, desecration of churches, andcrucifixions of Belgians were widely believed <strong>in</strong> the West by 1916. In1917, Henry Carter is created a s<strong>to</strong>ry that the Germans were cook<strong>in</strong>ghuman bodies <strong>to</strong> extract glycer<strong>in</strong>e and produced pictures <strong>to</strong> prove it.Aga<strong>in</strong>, pho<strong>to</strong>graphs of mutilated bodies <strong>in</strong> a Russian anti-Semiticoutrage <strong>in</strong> 1905 were circulated as pictures of Belgians <strong>in</strong> 1915. Therewere several reasons for the use of such atrocity s<strong>to</strong>ries:a) <strong>to</strong> build up the fight<strong>in</strong>g spirit of the mass army;b) <strong>to</strong> stiffen civilian morale;c) <strong>to</strong> encourage enlistments;d) <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease subscriptions for war bonds;e) <strong>to</strong> justify one's own breaches of <strong>in</strong>ternational law;f) <strong>to</strong> destroy the chances of negotiat<strong>in</strong>g peace or <strong>to</strong> justify a severef<strong>in</strong>al peace;g) <strong>to</strong> w<strong>in</strong> the support of the neutrals.The relative <strong>in</strong>nocence and credulity of the average person whowas not yet immunized <strong>to</strong> propaganda assaults through mediums of masscommunication <strong>in</strong> 1914 made the use of such s<strong>to</strong>ries relativelyeffective. But the discovery <strong>in</strong> the period after 1919 that they hadbeen hoaxed gave rise <strong>to</strong> a skepticism <strong>to</strong>ward all governmentcommunications which was especially noticeable <strong>in</strong> the Second WorldWar.CHAPTER VI: THE VERSAILLES SYSTEM AND THE RETURN TO NORMALCY1919-1929THE PEACE SETTLEMENTS 1919-1923Page 267The criticisms of the peace settlements was as ardent from thevic<strong>to</strong>rs as from the vanquished aimed at the terms which were neitherunfair nor ruthless. The causes of the discontent rested on theprocedures which were used rather than the terms themselves. Aboveall, there was discontent at the contrast between the procedures whichwere used and the procedures which pretended <strong>to</strong> be used, as well asbetween the high-m<strong>in</strong>ded pr<strong>in</strong>ciples which were supposed <strong>to</strong> be appliedand those which really were applied.Page 268When it became clear that they were <strong>to</strong> be imposed rather thannegotiated, that the Fourteen Po<strong>in</strong>ts had been lost <strong>in</strong> the confusion,that the terms had been reached by a process of secret negotiationsfrom which the smaller nations had been excluded, there was a


evulsion aga<strong>in</strong>st the treaties. By 1929, most of the Western World hadfeel<strong>in</strong>gs of guilt and shame whenever they thought of the VersaillesTreaty. In England, the same groups, often the same people, who hadmade the wartime propaganda and the peace settlements were loudest <strong>in</strong>their compla<strong>in</strong>t that the latter had fallen far below the ideals of theformer while all the while their real aims were <strong>to</strong> use power politics<strong>to</strong> the benefit of Brita<strong>in</strong>.The peace settlements were made by an organization which waschaotic and by a procedure which was fraudulent. None of this wasdeliberate. It arose rather from weakness and ignorance, from afailure <strong>to</strong> decide on what pr<strong>in</strong>ciples it would be based.Page 269S<strong>in</strong>ce the Germans had been promised the right <strong>to</strong> negotiate, itbecame clear that the terms could not first be made the subject ofpublic compromise. Unfortunately, by the time the vic<strong>to</strong>rious GreatPowers realized all this and decided <strong>to</strong> make the terms by secretnegotiations among themselves, <strong>in</strong>vitations had already been sent <strong>to</strong>all the vic<strong>to</strong>rious powers <strong>to</strong> come <strong>to</strong> the conference. As a solution <strong>to</strong>this embarrass<strong>in</strong>g situation, the peace treaty was made on two levels.On one level, <strong>in</strong> the full glare of publicity, the Inter-AlliedConference became the Plenary PeaceConference and with the considerable fanfare, did noth<strong>in</strong>g. ONthe other level, the Great Powers worked out their peace terms <strong>in</strong>secret and when they were ready, imposed them simultaneously on theconference and on the Germans. This had not been <strong>in</strong>tended. It was notclear <strong>to</strong> anyone just what was be<strong>in</strong>g done.Page 271At all these meet<strong>in</strong>gs, as at the Peace Conference itself, thepolitical leaders were assisted by groups of experts and <strong>in</strong>terestedpersons. Many of the experts were members associates of the<strong>in</strong>ternational bank<strong>in</strong>g fraternity. In every case but one, where acommittee of experts submitted a unanimous report, the Supreme Councilaccepted its recommendation. The one case where a report was notaccepted was concerned with the Polish corridor, the same issue whichled <strong>to</strong> the Second World War where the experts were much harsher onGermany than the f<strong>in</strong>al decision of the politicians.Page 272The German delegation offered <strong>to</strong> accept the disarmamentsections and reparations if the Allies would withdraw any statementthat Germany had, alone, caused the war and would re-admit Germany <strong>to</strong>the world's markets.Page 273The Allies answer accused the Germans of sole guilt <strong>in</strong> caus<strong>in</strong>gthe war and of <strong>in</strong>human practices dur<strong>in</strong>g it. The Germans voted <strong>to</strong> signif the articles on war guilt and war crim<strong>in</strong>als could be struck fromthe treaty.. When the Allies refused these concessions, the Catholic


Center Party voted 64-14 not <strong>to</strong> sign. The High Command of the Germanarmy ordered the Cab<strong>in</strong>et <strong>to</strong> sign. The Treaty of Versailles was signedby all the delegations except the Ch<strong>in</strong>ese <strong>in</strong> protest aga<strong>in</strong>st thedisposition of the prewar German concessions <strong>in</strong> Shantung.Page 274No progress was possible <strong>in</strong> Hungary without some solution of theagrarian question and the peasant discontent aris<strong>in</strong>g frommonopolization of the land.The French M<strong>in</strong>istry of Foreign Affairs (act<strong>in</strong>g on behalf ofFrance's greatest <strong>in</strong>dustrialist, Eugene Schneider) made a deal withthe Hungarians that if they would sign the Treaty of Trianon and giveSchneider control of the Hungarian state railways, the port ofBudapest and the Hungarian General Credit Bank, France wouldeventually make Hungary one of the ma<strong>in</strong>stays of its anti-German bloc<strong>in</strong> Eastern Europe and, at the proper time, obta<strong>in</strong> a drastic revisionof the Treaty of Trianon. Paleologue received his reward fromSchneider. He was made direc<strong>to</strong>r of Schneider's personal hold<strong>in</strong>gcompany.The Treaty of Sevres with Turkey was never signed because of thescandal caused by the Bolsheviki publication of the secret treatiesregard<strong>in</strong>g the Ot<strong>to</strong>man Empire, s<strong>in</strong>ce these treaties contrasted sosharply with the expressed war aims of the Allies.The British felt that richer prospects were <strong>to</strong> be obta<strong>in</strong>ed fromthe Turkish sultan. In particular, the French were prepared <strong>to</strong> supportthe claims of Standard Oil <strong>to</strong> such concessions while the British wereprepared <strong>to</strong> support Royal Dutch Shell.Page 277The chief terri<strong>to</strong>rial disputes arose over the Polish corridor.France's Foch wanted <strong>to</strong> give all of East Prussia <strong>to</strong> Poland. Instead,the experts gave Poland access <strong>to</strong> the sea by sever<strong>in</strong>g East Prussiafrom the rest of Germany by creat<strong>in</strong>g a Polish corridor <strong>in</strong> the valleyof the Vistula. However, the city of Danzig was clearly a German cityand Lloyd George refused <strong>to</strong> give it <strong>to</strong> POland. Instead, it was a madea free city under the protection of the League of Nations.Page 279The most violent controversies arose <strong>in</strong> regard <strong>to</strong> the boundariesof Poland. Of these, only that with Germany was set by the Treaty ofVersailles. The Poles refused <strong>to</strong> accept their other frontiers and by1920 were at war with Lithuania over Vilna, with Russia over theeastern border, with the Ukra<strong>in</strong>ians over Galaicia, and withCzechoslovakia over Teschen.Page 280These terri<strong>to</strong>rial disputes are of importance because theycont<strong>in</strong>ued <strong>to</strong> lacerate relationships between neighbor<strong>in</strong>g states untilwell <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the period of World War II. There were 1,000,000 Germansliv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Poland, 550,000 <strong>in</strong> Hungary, 3,100,000 <strong>in</strong> Czechoslovakia,


about 700,000 <strong>in</strong> Romania, 500,000 <strong>in</strong> Yugoslavia and 250,000 <strong>in</strong> Italy.To protect these m<strong>in</strong>orities, the Allied Powers forced the new states<strong>to</strong> sign treaties grat<strong>in</strong>g a certa<strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>imum political rights guaranteedby the League of Nations with no power <strong>to</strong> enforce observation of them.Page 282The French were <strong>to</strong>rn between a desire <strong>to</strong> obta<strong>in</strong> as large afraction as possible of Germany's payments and a desire <strong>to</strong> pile onGermany such a crush<strong>in</strong>g burden of <strong>in</strong>debtedness that Germany would beru<strong>in</strong>ed beyond the po<strong>in</strong>t where it could threaten French security aga<strong>in</strong>.A compromise orig<strong>in</strong>ally suggested by John Foster Dulles wasadopted by which Germany was forced <strong>to</strong> admit an unlimited,theoretical obligation <strong>to</strong> pay but was actually bound <strong>to</strong> pay for onlya limited list of ten categories of obligations with pensions be<strong>in</strong>glarger than the preced<strong>in</strong>g n<strong>in</strong>e categories <strong>to</strong>gether. All reparationswere wiped out <strong>in</strong> the f<strong>in</strong>ancial debacle of 1931-1932.Page 283Brita<strong>in</strong> had obta<strong>in</strong>ed all her chief ambitions. The German navy wasat the bot<strong>to</strong>m of Scapa Flow scuttled by the the Germans themselves;the German merchant fleet was scattered, captured, destroyed; theGerman colonial rivalry was ended and its areas occupied; the Germancommercial rivalry was crippled by the loss of its patents and<strong>in</strong>dustrial techniques, the destruction of all its commercial outletsand bank<strong>in</strong>g connections throughout the world, and the loss of itsrapidly grow<strong>in</strong>g prewar markets. France on the other hand, had no<strong>to</strong>bta<strong>in</strong>ed the one th<strong>in</strong>g it wanted: security.SECURITY 1919-1935Page 287The British governments of the Right began <strong>to</strong> follow a doublepolicy: a public policy <strong>in</strong> which they spoke loudly <strong>in</strong> support of theforeign policy of the Left; and a secret policy <strong>in</strong> which theysupported the foreign policy of the Right. Thus the stated policy wasbased on support of the League of Nations and of disarmament yet thereal policy was quite different. While openly support<strong>in</strong>g Navaldisarmament, Brita<strong>in</strong> signed a secret agreement with France whichblocked disarmament and signed an agreement with Germany whichreleased her from her naval disarmament <strong>in</strong> 1935. After 1935, thecontrast between the public and secret policy became so sharp thatLord Halifax called it "dyarchy."Page 289The British Right forced France <strong>to</strong> give away every advantagewhich it held over Germany. Germany was allowed <strong>to</strong> rearm <strong>in</strong> 1935,allowed <strong>to</strong> remilitarize the Rh<strong>in</strong>eland <strong>in</strong> 1936. F<strong>in</strong>ally, when all hadbeen lost, public op<strong>in</strong>ion forced the British government <strong>to</strong> abandon theRight's policy of appeasement and adopt the old French policy ofresistance made on a poor issue (Poland 1939)In France, as <strong>in</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong>, there appeared a double policy. While


France cont<strong>in</strong>ued <strong>to</strong> talk of collective security, this was largely forpublic consumption for <strong>in</strong> fact she had no policy <strong>in</strong>dependent ofBrita<strong>in</strong>'s policy of appeasement.Page 290War was not outlawed but merely subjected <strong>to</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> proceduraldelays <strong>in</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g it, nor were peaceful procedures for settl<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>ternational disputes made compulsory.The Covenant had been worded by a skillful British lawyer, CivilHurst, who filled it with loopholes cleverly concealed under a massof impressive verbiage so that no state's freedom of action wasvitally restricted.Page 293The Locarno Pacts, which were presented at the time throughoutthe English-speak<strong>in</strong>g world as a sensational contribution <strong>to</strong> the peaceand stability of Europe, really formed the background for the eventsof 1938 when Czechoslovakia was destroyed at Munich. When theguarantee of Locarno became due <strong>in</strong> 1936, Brita<strong>in</strong> dishonored itsagreement, the Rh<strong>in</strong>e was remilitarized and the way was open forGermany <strong>to</strong> move eastward.Poland protested violently at the refusal <strong>to</strong> guarantee herfrontiers.Page 294France agreed <strong>to</strong> an extension of a multilateral agreement bywhich all countries could renounce the use of war as an <strong>in</strong>strument ofnational policy. The British government reserved certa<strong>in</strong> areas,notably the Middle East, where it wished <strong>to</strong> be able <strong>to</strong> wage wars whichcould not be termed self-defence <strong>in</strong> a strict sense. The US also madereservation preserv<strong>in</strong>g its right <strong>to</strong> make war under the Monroedoctr<strong>in</strong>e. The net result was that only aggressive war was <strong>to</strong> berenounced. The Kellogg-Briand Pact <strong>to</strong>ok one of the first steps <strong>to</strong>warddestroy<strong>in</strong>g the legal dist<strong>in</strong>ction between war and peace, s<strong>in</strong>ce thePowers, hav<strong>in</strong>g renounced the use of war, began <strong>to</strong>wage wars withoutdeclar<strong>in</strong>g them as was done by Japan <strong>in</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>a <strong>in</strong> 1937, by Italy <strong>in</strong>Spa<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> 1936 and by everyone <strong>in</strong> Korea <strong>in</strong> 1950.Page 296The outlawry of war was relatively mean<strong>in</strong>gless without somesanctions that could compel the use of peaceful methods. Efforts <strong>in</strong>this direction were nullified by Brita<strong>in</strong>.DISARMAMENT 1919-1935Page 303Disarmament suggestions of the Soviet representative, Litv<strong>in</strong>off,provid<strong>in</strong>g for immediate and complete disarmament of every country, wasdenounced by all. A substitute draft provided that the most heavilyarmed states would disarm by 50%, the less heavily-armed by 31% andthe lightly armed by 25%, and the disarmed by 0%. That all tanks,


planes, gas and heavy artillery be completely prohibited was alsorejected without discussion and Litv<strong>in</strong>off was beseeched <strong>to</strong> show a more"constructive spirit."Page 305Once it was recognized that security was <strong>in</strong> acute danger,f<strong>in</strong>ancial considerations were ruthlessly subord<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>to</strong> rearmamentgiv<strong>in</strong>g rise <strong>to</strong> an economic boom which showed clearly what might havebeen achieved earlier if f<strong>in</strong>ancial consideration had been subord<strong>in</strong>ated<strong>to</strong> the world's economic and social needs earlier; such action wouldhave provided prosperity and ris<strong>in</strong>g standards of liv<strong>in</strong>g which mighthave made rearm<strong>in</strong>g unnecessary.JCT: How true.REPARATIONS 1919-1932Page 305The prelim<strong>in</strong>ary payments were supposed <strong>to</strong> amount <strong>to</strong> a <strong>to</strong>tal of 20billion marks by May 1921. Although the Entente Powers contendedthat only 8 billion had been paid,the whole matter was dropped whenthe Germans were presented with a <strong>to</strong>tal reparations bill of 132billion marks. Under pressure, Germany accepted this bill and gave thevic<strong>to</strong>rs bonds of <strong>in</strong>debtedness. Of these, 82 billion were set aside andforgotten. Germany was <strong>to</strong> pay the other 50 billion at 2.5 billion ayear <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terest and .5 billion a year <strong>to</strong> reduce the <strong>to</strong>tal debt.JCT: It would only take 200 years <strong>to</strong> pay off a <strong>to</strong>tal of 500billion <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terest and 50 billion <strong>in</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>cipal.Page 306Germany could only pay if two conditions prevailed:a) if it had a budgetary surplus andb) if it sold abroad more than it bought abroad.S<strong>in</strong>ce neither of these conditions generally existed <strong>in</strong> the period1921-1931, Germany could not, <strong>in</strong> fact, pay reparations.The failure <strong>to</strong> obta<strong>in</strong> a budgetary surplus was solely theresponsibility of the government which refused <strong>to</strong> reduce its ownexpenditures or the standards of liv<strong>in</strong>g off its own people or <strong>to</strong> taxthem sufficiently heavily. The failure <strong>to</strong> obta<strong>in</strong> a favorable balanceof trade because foreign credi<strong>to</strong>rs refused <strong>to</strong> allow a free flow ofGerman goods <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> their own countries. Thus credi<strong>to</strong>rs were unwill<strong>in</strong>g<strong>to</strong> accept payment <strong>in</strong> the only way <strong>in</strong> which payments could honestly bemade, that is, by accept<strong>in</strong>g German goods and services.JCT: Notice they wanted money and not the goods they could buywith it.Germany could have paid <strong>in</strong> real goods and services if thecredi<strong>to</strong>rs had been will<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> accept such goods and services. Thegovernment made up the deficits by borrow<strong>in</strong>g from the Reichsbank. Theresult was an acute <strong>in</strong>flation which was not <strong>in</strong>jurious <strong>to</strong> the<strong>in</strong>fluential groups though it was generally ru<strong>in</strong>ous <strong>to</strong> the middleclasses and thus encouraged extremist elements.


Page 307On Jan 9,1923, the Reparations Committee voted 3 <strong>to</strong> 1 (Brita<strong>in</strong>oppos<strong>in</strong>g France, Belgium and Italy) that Germany was <strong>in</strong> default.Armed forces of the three nations began <strong>to</strong> occupy the Ruhr twodays later. Germany declared a general strike <strong>in</strong> the area, ceased allreparation payments, and adopted a program of passive resistance, thegovernment support<strong>in</strong>g the strikers by pr<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g more paper money.The area occupied was no more than 60 miles long by 30 miles widebut conta<strong>in</strong>ed 10% of Germany's population and produced 80% ofGermany's coal, iron and steel and 70% of her freight traffic. Almost150,000 Germans were deported.Page 308A compromise was reached by which Germany accepted the Dawes Planfor reparations and the Ruhr was evacuated. The Dawes Plan was largelya J.P. Morgan production drawn up by an <strong>in</strong>ternational committee off<strong>in</strong>ancial experts presided over by American banker Charles Dawes.Germany paid reparations for five years (1924-1929) and owed more atthe end than it had owed at the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g. It is worthy of note thatthis system was set up by the <strong>in</strong>ternational bankers and that thesubsequent lend<strong>in</strong>g of other people's money <strong>to</strong> Germany was veryprofitable <strong>to</strong> these bankers.Us<strong>in</strong>g these American loans, Germany's <strong>in</strong>dustry was largelyrebuilt <strong>to</strong> make it the second best <strong>in</strong> the world and <strong>to</strong> payreparations.Page 309By these loans Germany's credi<strong>to</strong>rs were able <strong>to</strong> pay their wardebts <strong>to</strong> England without send<strong>in</strong>g goods or services. Foreign exchangewent <strong>to</strong> Germany as loans, back <strong>to</strong> Italy, Belgium, France and Brita<strong>in</strong>as reparations and f<strong>in</strong>ally back <strong>to</strong> the US as payments on war debts. Inthat period, Germany paid 10.5 billion marks <strong>in</strong> reparations butborrowed 18.6 billion abroad. Noth<strong>in</strong>g was settled by all this but the<strong>in</strong>ternational bankers sat <strong>in</strong> heaven under a ra<strong>in</strong> of fees andcommissions.Page 310The Dawes Plan was replaced by the Young Plan, named after theAmerican Owen Young (a Morgan agent). A new private bank called theBank for International Settlements was established <strong>in</strong> Switzerland.Owned by the chief central banks of the world and hold<strong>in</strong>g accounts foreach of them, "a Central Bankers' Bank," it allowed payments <strong>to</strong> bemade by merely shift<strong>in</strong>g credits from one country's account <strong>to</strong> anotheron the books of the bank.The Young Plan lasted for less than 18 months. The crash of theNew York s<strong>to</strong>ck market <strong>in</strong> 1929 marked the end of the decade ofreconstruction and ended the American loans <strong>to</strong> Germany.Germans and others had begun a "flight from the mark" which


created a great dra<strong>in</strong> on the German gold reserve. As it dw<strong>in</strong>dled, thevolume of money and credit erected on that reserve had <strong>to</strong> be reducedby rais<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>terest rate. Prices fell because of the reduced moneysupply so that it became almost impossible for the banks <strong>to</strong> sellcollateral <strong>to</strong> obta<strong>in</strong> funds <strong>to</strong> meet the grow<strong>in</strong>g demand for money.JCT: Here he th<strong>in</strong>ks loans are sav<strong>in</strong>gs and has forgotten that hehad earlier <strong>to</strong>ld us it was new credit.Page 311On May 8, 1931, the largest Austrian bank, the Credit-Anstalt (aRothschild <strong>in</strong>stitution) which controlled 70% of Austria's <strong>in</strong>dustry,announced a $140 million schill<strong>in</strong>gs loss. The true loss was over abillion and the bank had been <strong>in</strong>solvent for years. The Rothschilds andthe Austrian government gave the Credit-Anstalt 160 million <strong>to</strong> coverthe loss but public confidence had been destroyed. A run began on thebank. To meet this run,the Austrian banks called <strong>in</strong> all the funds theyhad <strong>in</strong> German banks. The German banks began <strong>to</strong> collapse. These latterbegan <strong>to</strong> call <strong>in</strong> all their funds <strong>in</strong> London. The London banks began <strong>to</strong>fall and gold flowed outward. On Sept.21, England was forced off thegold standard. The Reichsbank lost 200 million marks of its goldreserve <strong>in</strong> the first week of June and a billion <strong>in</strong> the second. Thediscount rate was raised step by step <strong>to</strong> 15% without s<strong>to</strong>pp<strong>in</strong>g the lossof reserves but destroy<strong>in</strong>g the activities of the German <strong>in</strong>dustrialsystem almost completely.Germany begged for relief on her reparations payments but hercredi<strong>to</strong>rs were reluctant unless they obta<strong>in</strong>ed similar relief on thewar-debt payments <strong>to</strong> the US. The President suggested a mora<strong>to</strong>rium forone year if its deb<strong>to</strong>rs would extend the same privilege <strong>to</strong> theirdeb<strong>to</strong>rs.Page 312At the June 1932 Lausanne Conference, German reparations were cut<strong>to</strong> a <strong>to</strong>tal of only 3 billion marks but the agreement was neverratified because of the refusal of the US Congress <strong>to</strong> cut war debtsequally drastically. In 1933, Hitler repudiated all reparations.CHAPTER VII: FINANCE, COMMERCIAL POLICY, AND BUSINESS POLICY1897-1947REFLATION AND INFLATION 1897-1925page 315A real understand<strong>in</strong>g of the economic his<strong>to</strong>ry of twentieth centuryEurope is imperative <strong>to</strong> any understand<strong>in</strong>g of the events of the period.Such an understand<strong>in</strong>g will require a study of the his<strong>to</strong>ry of f<strong>in</strong>ance.Page 316The outbreak of war <strong>in</strong> 1914 showed these f<strong>in</strong>ancial capitalists <strong>in</strong>their worst, narrow <strong>in</strong> outlook, ignorant and selfish, whileproclaim<strong>in</strong>g, as usual, their <strong>to</strong>tal devotion <strong>to</strong> the social good. They


generally agreed that war could not go on for more than six <strong>to</strong> tenmonths because of the "limited f<strong>in</strong>ancial resources" of thebelligerents (by which they meant gold reserves).This idea reveals thefundamental misunderstand<strong>in</strong>g of the nature and of money on the part ofthe very persons who were reputed <strong>to</strong> be experts on the subject. Warsare not fought with gold or even with money but by proper organizationof real resources.The attitudes of bakers were revealed most clearly <strong>in</strong> England,where every move was dictated by efforts <strong>to</strong> protect their own positionand <strong>to</strong> profit from it rather than by considerations ofeconomic mobilization for war or the welfare of the British people.War found the British bank<strong>in</strong>g system <strong>in</strong>solvent <strong>in</strong> the sense that itsfunds, created by the bank<strong>in</strong>g system for profit and rented out <strong>to</strong> theeconomic system <strong>to</strong> permit it <strong>to</strong> operate, could not be covered by theexist<strong>in</strong>g volume of gold reserves or collateral which could beliquidated rapidly. Accord<strong>in</strong>gly,the bankers secretly devised a schemeby which their obligations could be met by fiat money (so-calledTreasury Notes), but as soon as the crisis was over, they ten <strong>in</strong>sistedthat the government must pay for the war without recourse <strong>to</strong> fiatmoney (which was always damned by the bankers as immoral) but bytaxation and by borrow<strong>in</strong>g at high <strong>in</strong>terest rates from the bankers. Thedecision <strong>to</strong> use Treasury Notes <strong>to</strong> fulfill the bankers' liabilities wasmade on July 25, 1915 by Sir John Bradbury. the first Treasury Noteswere run off the presses at Waterloo and Sons on July 28th. It wasannounced that the Treasury Notes, <strong>in</strong>stead of gold, would be used forbank payments. The discount rate was raised at the Bank of Englandfrom 3% <strong>to</strong> 10% <strong>to</strong> prevent <strong>in</strong>flation, a figure taken merely because thetraditional rule of the bank stated that a 10% bank rate would drawgold out of the ground itself.Page 317At the outbreak of war, most of the belligerent countriessuspended gold payments and accepted their bankers' advice that theproper way <strong>to</strong> pay for the war was by a comb<strong>in</strong>ation of bank loans andtaxation of consumption. The governments paid for the war by taxation,by fiat money, by borrow<strong>in</strong>g from banks (which created credit for thepurpose) and by borrow<strong>in</strong>g from the people by sell<strong>in</strong>g them war bonds.Each of these methods had a different effect upon the twoconsequences of the war: <strong>in</strong>flation and public debt.a) Taxation gives no <strong>in</strong>flation and no debt.b) Fiat money gives <strong>in</strong>flation and no debt.c) Bank credit gives <strong>in</strong>flation and debt.d) Sales of bonds give no <strong>in</strong>flation but give debt.It would appear from this table that the best way <strong>to</strong> pay for thewar would be by taxation and the worst way would be by bank credit.Probably the best way <strong>to</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ance war is a comb<strong>in</strong>ation of the four


methods.Page 318In the period 1914-1918, the various belligerents used a mixtureof these four methods but it was a mixture dictated by expediency andfalse theories so that at the end of the war all countries foundthemselves with both public debts and <strong>in</strong>flation.While the prices <strong>in</strong> most countries rose 200 <strong>to</strong> 300 percent andpublic debts rose 1000%, the f<strong>in</strong>ancial leaders tried <strong>to</strong> keep up thepretense that the money was as valuable as it had ever been. For thisreason, they did not openly abandon the gold standard. Instead, theysuspended certa<strong>in</strong> attributes of the gold standard. In most countries,payments <strong>in</strong> gold and export of gold were suspended but every effortwas made <strong>to</strong> keep gold reserves up <strong>to</strong> a respectable percentage ofnotes. These attributes were achieved <strong>in</strong> some cases by deceptivemethods. In Brita<strong>in</strong>, the gold reserves aga<strong>in</strong>st notes fell from 52% <strong>to</strong>18% <strong>in</strong> the month of July 1914; then the situation was concealed,partly by mov<strong>in</strong>g assets of local banks <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the Bank of England andus<strong>in</strong>g them as reserves for both, partly by issu<strong>in</strong>g a new k<strong>in</strong>d of notes(Currency Notes) which had no real reserve and little gold back<strong>in</strong>g.Page 320As soon as the war was over, governments began <strong>to</strong> turn theirattention <strong>to</strong> res<strong>to</strong>r<strong>in</strong>g the prewar f<strong>in</strong>ancial system. S<strong>in</strong>ce theessential element was believed <strong>to</strong> be the gold standard, this movementwas called "stabilization."Productive capacity <strong>in</strong> both agriculture and <strong>in</strong>dustry had been<strong>in</strong>creased by the artificial demand of the war period <strong>to</strong> a degree farbeyond the ability of normal domestic demand <strong>to</strong> buy the products.JCT: But not <strong>to</strong> eat them.The backwards areas had <strong>in</strong>creased their outputs of raw materialsand food so greatly that the <strong>to</strong>tal could hardly have been sold.JCT: But no eaten.The result was as situation where all countries were eager <strong>to</strong>sell and reluctant <strong>to</strong> buy. The only sensible solution <strong>to</strong> this problemof excessive productive capacity would have been a substantial rise <strong>in</strong>domestic standards of liv<strong>in</strong>g but this would have required afundamental reapportionment of the national <strong>in</strong>come so that claims <strong>to</strong>this product of the excess capacity would go <strong>to</strong> those masses eager <strong>to</strong>consume, rather than cont<strong>in</strong>ue <strong>to</strong> go <strong>to</strong> the m<strong>in</strong>ority desir<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> save.Such reform was rejected by the rul<strong>in</strong>g groups <strong>in</strong> both "advanced" and"backwards" countries so that this solution was reached only <strong>to</strong> asmall degree <strong>in</strong> a relatively few countries (chiefly US and Germany <strong>in</strong>1925-1929).Page 324The powers of f<strong>in</strong>ancial capitalism had another far-reach<strong>in</strong>gaim, noth<strong>in</strong>g less than <strong>to</strong> create a world system of f<strong>in</strong>ancial control


<strong>in</strong> private hands able <strong>to</strong> dom<strong>in</strong>ate the political system of each countryand the economy of the world as a whole. This system was <strong>to</strong> becontrolled <strong>in</strong> a feudalist fashion by the central banks of the worldact<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> concert, by secret agreements arrived at <strong>in</strong> frequent privatemeet<strong>in</strong>gs and conferences. The apex of the system was <strong>to</strong> be the Bankfor International Settlements <strong>in</strong> Basle, Switzerland, a private bankowned and controlled by the world's central banks which werethemselves private corporations. Each central bank sought <strong>to</strong> dom<strong>in</strong>ateits government by its ability <strong>to</strong> control Treasury loans, <strong>to</strong> manipulateforeign exchanges, <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluence the level of economic activity <strong>in</strong> thecountry, and <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluence cooperative politicians by subsequenteconomic rewards <strong>in</strong> the bus<strong>in</strong>ess world.In each country, the power of the central bank rested largely onits control of credit and money supply. In the world as a whole thepower of the central bankers rested very largely on their controlof loans and the gold flows. They made agreements on all the majorf<strong>in</strong>ancial problems of the world, as well as on many of theeconomic and political problems, especially <strong>in</strong> reference <strong>to</strong> loans,payments, and the economic future of the chief areas of the globe.The Bank of International Settlements, B.I.S. is generallyregarded as the apex of the structure of f<strong>in</strong>ancial capitalism whoseremote orig<strong>in</strong>s go back <strong>to</strong> the creation of the Bank of England <strong>in</strong> 1694.Page 325It was set up <strong>to</strong> be the world cartel of every-grow<strong>in</strong>g nationalf<strong>in</strong>ancial powers by assembl<strong>in</strong>g the nom<strong>in</strong>al heads of these nationalf<strong>in</strong>ancial centers.The commander <strong>in</strong> Chief of the world system of bank<strong>in</strong>g control wasMontagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of England, who was built up bythe private bankers <strong>to</strong> a position where he was regarded as an oracle<strong>in</strong> all matters of government and bus<strong>in</strong>ess. In government, the power ofthe Bank of England was a considerable restriction on political actionas early as 1819 but an effort <strong>to</strong> break this power by a modificationof the bank's charter <strong>in</strong>1844 failed. In 1852, Glads<strong>to</strong>ne, thenchancellor of the Exchequer and later Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister, declared,"The h<strong>in</strong>ge of the whole situation was this: the government itself wasnot <strong>to</strong> be a substantive power <strong>in</strong> matters of F<strong>in</strong>ance, but was <strong>to</strong> leavethe Money Power supreme and unquestioned."This power of the Bank of England was admitted <strong>in</strong> 1924 byReg<strong>in</strong>ald McKenna, who had been Chancellor of the Exchequer, when he,as Chairman, <strong>to</strong>ld the s<strong>to</strong>ckholders of the Midland bank, "I am afraidthe ord<strong>in</strong>ary citizen will not like <strong>to</strong> be <strong>to</strong>ld that the banks can, anddo, create money. And they who control the credit of a nation directthe policy if Governments and hold <strong>in</strong> the hollow of their hands thedest<strong>in</strong>y of the people." In that same year, Sir Drummond Fraser, vicepresiden<strong>to</strong>f the Institute of Bankers stated, "The Governor must be


the au<strong>to</strong>crat who dictates the terms upon which alone the Governmentcan obta<strong>in</strong> borrowed money." On Sep. 26, 1921,V<strong>in</strong>cent Vickers, direc<strong>to</strong>r of the bank, the F<strong>in</strong>ancial Times wrote,"Half a dozen meant the <strong>to</strong>p of the Big Five Banks could upset thewhole fabric of government by refra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g from renew<strong>in</strong>g TreasuryBills."Page 326Norman had no use for governments and feared democracy. Bothof these seemed <strong>to</strong> him <strong>to</strong> be threats <strong>to</strong> private bank<strong>in</strong>g and thus <strong>to</strong>all that was proper and precious <strong>to</strong> human life. He viewed his life asa k<strong>in</strong>d of cloak-and-dagger struggle with the forces of unsound moneywhich were <strong>in</strong> league with anarchy and Communism. When he rebuilt theBank of England,he constructed it as a fortress prepared <strong>to</strong> defenditself aga<strong>in</strong>st any popular revolt. For much of his life, herushed about the world under the assumed name of "Professor Sk<strong>in</strong>ner."Norman had a devoted colleague <strong>in</strong> Benjam<strong>in</strong> Strong, the firstgovernor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Strong owed hiscareer <strong>to</strong> the favor of the Morgan bank.In the 1920s, they were determ<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>to</strong> use the f<strong>in</strong>ancial power ofBrita<strong>in</strong> and the US <strong>to</strong> force all the major countries of the world <strong>to</strong> goon the gold standard and <strong>to</strong> operate it through central banks free fromall political control, with all questions of <strong>in</strong>ternational f<strong>in</strong>ance <strong>to</strong>be settled by agreements by such central banks without <strong>in</strong>terferencefrom governments.Page 327It must not be felt that these heads of the world's chiefcentral banks were themselves substantive powers <strong>in</strong> world f<strong>in</strong>ance.They were not. Rather, they were the technicians and agents of thedom<strong>in</strong>ant <strong>in</strong>vestment bankers of their own countries, who had raisedthem up and were perfectly capable of throw<strong>in</strong>g them down. Thesubstantive f<strong>in</strong>ancial powers of the world were <strong>in</strong> the hands of<strong>in</strong>vestment bankers (also called "<strong>in</strong>ternational" or "merchant" bankers)who rema<strong>in</strong>ed largely beh<strong>in</strong>d the scenes <strong>in</strong> their own un<strong>in</strong>corporatedprivate banks.These formed system of <strong>in</strong>ternational cooperation and nationaldom<strong>in</strong>ance which was more private,more powerful, and more secret tanthat of their agents <strong>in</strong> the central banks. This dom<strong>in</strong>ance of<strong>in</strong>vestment bankers was based on their control over the flows of creditand <strong>in</strong>vestment funds <strong>in</strong> their own countries and throughout the world.They could dom<strong>in</strong>ate the f<strong>in</strong>ancial and <strong>in</strong>dustrial systems of their owncountries by their <strong>in</strong>fluence over the flow of current funds throughbank loans,the discount rate,the rediscount<strong>in</strong>g of commercial debts;they could dom<strong>in</strong>ate governments by their control over currentgovernment loans and the play of the <strong>in</strong>ternational exchanges.Almost all of this power was exercised by the personal <strong>in</strong>fluenceand prestige men who had demonstrated their ability <strong>in</strong> the past <strong>to</strong>


<strong>in</strong>g off successful f<strong>in</strong>ancial coups, <strong>to</strong> keep their word, <strong>to</strong> rema<strong>in</strong>cool <strong>in</strong> a crisis, and <strong>to</strong> share their w<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g opportunities with theirassociates.In this system, the Rothschilds had been preem<strong>in</strong>ent dur<strong>in</strong>g muchof the n<strong>in</strong>eteenth century, but, at the end of that century, they werebe<strong>in</strong>g replaced by J.P. Morgan <strong>in</strong> New York.At the present stage, we must follow the efforts of the centralbankers <strong>to</strong> compel the world <strong>to</strong> return <strong>to</strong> the gold standard of 1914.Page 328The problem of public debts arose from the fact that as money(credit) was created, it was usually made <strong>in</strong> such a way that it wasnot <strong>in</strong> the control of the state but was <strong>in</strong> the control of privatef<strong>in</strong>ancial <strong>in</strong>stitutions which demanded real wealth at some future datefor the creation of claims on wealth <strong>in</strong> the present. The problem ofpublic debt could have been met <strong>in</strong> one or more of several fashions:a) by <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g the amount of real wealth...b) by devaluation...c) by repudiation...d) by taxation...e) by the issuance of fiat money and the payment of the debt by suchmoney.Page 329Efforts <strong>to</strong> pay the public debt by fiat money would have made the<strong>in</strong>flation problem worse.Orthodox theory rejected fiat money as solutions <strong>to</strong> the problem.Page 332In Brita<strong>in</strong>, the currency notes which had been used <strong>to</strong> supplementbank notes were retired and credit was curtailed by rais<strong>in</strong>g thediscount rate <strong>to</strong> panic level. The results were horrible. Bus<strong>in</strong>essactivity fell drastically and unemployment rose <strong>to</strong> well over a millionand a half. The outcome was a great wave of strikes and <strong>in</strong>dustrialunrest.Page 333To ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> the gold reserve at all, it was necessary <strong>to</strong> keepthe discount rate at a level so high (4.5% or more) that bus<strong>in</strong>essactivity was discouraged. As a result of this f<strong>in</strong>ancial policy,Brita<strong>in</strong> found herself faced with deflation and depression for thewhole period of 1920-1923. The number of unemployed averaged about1.75 millions for each of the thirteen years of 1921-1932 and reached3 million <strong>in</strong> 1931.Belgium, France and Italy, accepted orthodox f<strong>in</strong>ancial ideas andtried <strong>to</strong> deflate <strong>in</strong> 1920-1921 but after the depression which resulted,they gave up the task.Page 334The Dawes Plan provided the gold reserves which served <strong>to</strong> protectGermany from the accepted pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of orthodox f<strong>in</strong>ance.


Page 336F<strong>in</strong>ancial capitalism had little <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> goods at all, but wasconcerned entirely with claims on wealth - s<strong>to</strong>cks, bonds, mortgages,<strong>in</strong>surance, proxies, <strong>in</strong>terest rates, and such. It built railroads <strong>in</strong>order <strong>to</strong> sell securities, not <strong>to</strong> transport goods. Corporations werebuilt upon corporations <strong>in</strong> the form of hold<strong>in</strong>g companies so thatsecurities were issued <strong>in</strong> huge quantities br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g profitable fees andcommissions <strong>to</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ancial capitalists without any <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> economicproduction whatever. Indeed, these f<strong>in</strong>ancial capitalists discoveredthat they could not only make kill<strong>in</strong>gs out of the issu<strong>in</strong>g of suchsecurities,they could also make kill<strong>in</strong>gs out of the bankruptcy of suchcorporations through the fees and commissions of reorganization. Avery pleasant cycle of flotation, bankruptcy, flotation, bankruptcybegan <strong>to</strong> be practiced by these f<strong>in</strong>ancial capitalists. The moreexcessive the flotation, the greater the profits and the more imm<strong>in</strong>entthe bankruptcy. The more frequent the bankruptcy, the greater theprofits of reorganization and the sooner the opportunity of anotherexcessive flotation.Page 337The growth of f<strong>in</strong>ancial capitalism made possible a centralizationof world economic control and a use of this power for the directbenefit of f<strong>in</strong>anciers and the <strong>in</strong>direct <strong>in</strong>jury of all other economicgroups. F<strong>in</strong>ancial control could be exercised only imperfectly throughcredit control and <strong>in</strong>terlock<strong>in</strong>g direc<strong>to</strong>rates.Page 338The real key rested on the control of money flows which were heldby <strong>in</strong>vestment bankers <strong>in</strong> 1900.THE PERIOD OF DEFLATION, 1927-1936Page 339After 1929, deflation reached a degree which could be calledacute. In the first part of this period (1921-1925), the dangerouseconomic implications of deflation were concealed by a structure ofself-deception which pretended that a great period of economicprogress would be <strong>in</strong>augurated as soon as the task of stabilization hadbeen accomplished. This psychological optimism was completelyunwarranted by the economic facts. After 1925, when deflation becamemore deep-rooted and economic conditions worsened, the danger fromthese conditions was concealed by a cont<strong>in</strong>uation of unwarrantedoptimism.THE CRASH OF 1929Page 342When France stabilized the franc at a level at which it wasdevalued, the Bank of France sold francs <strong>in</strong> return for foreignexchange. The francs were created as credit <strong>in</strong> France thus giv<strong>in</strong>g an<strong>in</strong>flationary effect.Page 343


The f<strong>in</strong>ancial results of the s<strong>to</strong>ck market book <strong>in</strong> the US was credit diverted from production <strong>to</strong> speculation and <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gamounts of funds be<strong>in</strong>g dra<strong>in</strong>ed from the economic system <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the s<strong>to</strong>ckmarket where they circulated around and around, build<strong>in</strong>g up pricesof securities.Page 344Early <strong>in</strong> 1929, the board of governors of the Federal ReserveSystem became alarmed at the s<strong>to</strong>ck market speculations dra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g creditfrom <strong>in</strong>dustrial production. To curtail this, they called upon memberbanks <strong>to</strong> reduce their loans on s<strong>to</strong>ck collateral <strong>to</strong> reduce the amoun<strong>to</strong>f credit available for speculation. Instead, the available creditwent more and more <strong>to</strong> speculation and decreas<strong>in</strong>gly <strong>to</strong> productivebus<strong>in</strong>ess. Call money rates <strong>in</strong> New York which had reached 7% at the endof 1928 were at 13% by June 1929.Page 346To res<strong>to</strong>re confidence among the wealthy (who were caus<strong>in</strong>g thepanic) an effort was made <strong>to</strong> balance the budget by cutt<strong>in</strong>g publicexpenditures drastically. This, by reduc<strong>in</strong>g purchas<strong>in</strong>g power, had<strong>in</strong>jurious effects on bus<strong>in</strong>ess activity and <strong>in</strong>creased unrest among themasses of the people.Page 350Wash<strong>in</strong>g<strong>to</strong>n left gold <strong>in</strong> 1933 voluntarily <strong>in</strong> order <strong>to</strong> follow anunorthodox f<strong>in</strong>ancial program of <strong>in</strong>flation.Page 351The Thomas Amendment <strong>to</strong> the Agricultural Adjustment Act (1933)gave the president the power <strong>to</strong> devaluate the dollar up <strong>to</strong> 50%, <strong>to</strong>issue up <strong>to</strong> $3 billion fiat money,and <strong>to</strong> engage on an extensiveprogram of public spend<strong>in</strong>g.Page 352The economies of the different countries were so <strong>in</strong>tertw<strong>in</strong>ed withone another that any policy of self-<strong>in</strong>terest on the part of one wouldbe sure <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>jure others <strong>in</strong> the short run and the country <strong>in</strong> thelong run. The <strong>in</strong>ternational and domestic economic systems haddeveloped <strong>to</strong> the po<strong>in</strong>t where the cus<strong>to</strong>mary methods of thought andprocedure <strong>in</strong> regard <strong>to</strong> them were obsolete.page 353As a result of the crisis, regardless of the nature of itsprimary impact, all countries began <strong>to</strong> pursue policies of economicnationalism. This spread rapidly as a result of imitation andretaliation.Page 355The Bank of France raised its discount rate from 2.5% <strong>to</strong> 6% <strong>in</strong>1935 with depress<strong>in</strong>g economic results. In this way, the stra<strong>in</strong> on goldwas relieved at the cost of <strong>in</strong>creased depression. The Right discoveredthat it could ve<strong>to</strong> any actions of the Left government merely byexport<strong>in</strong>g capital from France.


Page 356The franc passed through a series of depreciations and partialdevaluations which benefited no one except the specula<strong>to</strong>rs and leftFrance <strong>to</strong>rn for years by <strong>in</strong>dustrial unrest and class struggles. Thegovernment was subjected <strong>to</strong> systematic blackmail by the well-<strong>to</strong>-doof the country because of the ability of these persons <strong>to</strong> preventsocial reform, public spend<strong>in</strong>g, arm<strong>in</strong>g, or any policy of decision bysell<strong>in</strong>g francs.Page 357The his<strong>to</strong>rical importance of the banker-engendered deflationarycrisis of 1927-1940 can hardly be overestimated. It gave a blow <strong>to</strong>democracy and <strong>to</strong> the parliamentary system and thus became a chiefcause of World War II. It so hampered the Powers which rema<strong>in</strong>eddemocratic by its orthodox economic theories that these were unable <strong>to</strong>rearm for defence. It gave rise <strong>to</strong> a conflict between the theorists oforthodox and unorthodox f<strong>in</strong>ancial methods.The bankers' formula for treat<strong>in</strong>g a depression was by cl<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong>the gold standard, by rais<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terest rates and seek<strong>in</strong>g deflation,and by <strong>in</strong>sist<strong>in</strong>g on a reduction <strong>in</strong> public spend<strong>in</strong>g, a fiscal surplusor at least a balanced budget.These ideas were rejected <strong>to</strong>tally, on a po<strong>in</strong>t by po<strong>in</strong>t basis, bythe unorthodox economists, (somewhat mistakenly called Keynesian). Thebankers' formula sought <strong>to</strong> encourage economic recovery by "res<strong>to</strong>r<strong>in</strong>gconfidence <strong>in</strong> the value of money," that is, their own confidence <strong>in</strong>what was the primary concern of bankers.The unorthodox theorists sought <strong>to</strong> res<strong>to</strong>re purchas<strong>in</strong>g power by<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong>stead of reduc<strong>in</strong>g, the money supply and by plac<strong>in</strong>g it <strong>in</strong>the hands of potential consumers rather than <strong>in</strong> the banks or <strong>in</strong> thehands of <strong>in</strong>ves<strong>to</strong>rs.page 358The whole relationship of money and resources rema<strong>in</strong>ed a puzzle<strong>to</strong> many and was still a subject of debate <strong>in</strong> the 1950s but at least agreat vic<strong>to</strong>ry had been won by man <strong>in</strong> his control of his own dest<strong>in</strong>ywhen the myths of orthodox f<strong>in</strong>ancial theory were f<strong>in</strong>ally challenged <strong>in</strong>the 1930s.REFLATION AND INFLATION 1933-1947Page 360Except for Germany and Russia, most countries <strong>in</strong> the latter halfof 1937 experienced sharp recession.Page 361As a result of the failure of most countries (except<strong>in</strong>g Germanyand Russia) <strong>to</strong> achieve full utilization of resources, it was possible<strong>to</strong> devote <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g percentages of resources <strong>to</strong> armaments withoutsuffer<strong>in</strong>g any decl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> the standards of liv<strong>in</strong>g.Page 366It was discovered by Germany <strong>in</strong> 1932, by Italy <strong>in</strong> 1934, by Japan


<strong>in</strong> 1936 and by the United States <strong>in</strong> 1938 that deflation could beprevented by rearm<strong>in</strong>g.Page 368Brita<strong>in</strong> made barter agreements with various countries, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>gone direct swap of rubber for wheat with the US.Page 369The period of reflation after 1933 was caused by <strong>in</strong>creases <strong>in</strong>public spend<strong>in</strong>g on armaments. In most countries,the transition fromreflation <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>flation did not occur until after they had entered thewar. Germany was the chief exception and possibly also Italy andRussia, s<strong>in</strong>ce all of these were mak<strong>in</strong>g fairly full utilization oftheir resources. In France and the other countries overrun byGermany, such full mobilization of resources was not achieved beforethey were defeated.Page 370The use of orthodox f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the First World War had left aterrible burden of <strong>in</strong>tergovernmental debts and ill-feel<strong>in</strong>g...Page 371The Post Second World War economy was entirely different <strong>in</strong>character from that of the 1920s follow<strong>in</strong>g the First World War. Thiswas most notable <strong>in</strong> the absence of a post-war depression which waswidely expected but which did not arrive because there was no effort<strong>to</strong> stabilize on a gold standard. The major difference was the eclipseof the bankers who have been largely reduced <strong>in</strong> status from themasters <strong>to</strong> the servants of the economic system. This has been broughtabout by the new concern with real economic fac<strong>to</strong>rs <strong>in</strong>stead of withf<strong>in</strong>ancial counters, as previously. As part of this program, there hasbeen a great reduction <strong>in</strong> the economic role of gold.CHAPTER VIII: INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISM AND THE SOVIET CHALLENGEPage 375Industrialism, especially <strong>in</strong> its early years, brought with itsocial and economic conditions which were admittedly horrible. Humanbe<strong>in</strong>gs were brought <strong>to</strong>gether around fac<strong>to</strong>ries <strong>to</strong> form great new citieswhich were sordid and unsanitary. In many cases, these persons werereduced <strong>to</strong> conditions of animality, which shock the imag<strong>in</strong>ation.<strong>Crow</strong>ded <strong>to</strong>gether <strong>in</strong> want and disease, with no leisure and no security,completely dependent on weekly wage which was less than a pittance,they worked twelve <strong>to</strong> fifteen hours a day for six days <strong>in</strong> the weekamong dusty and dangerous mach<strong>in</strong>es with no protection aga<strong>in</strong>st<strong>in</strong>evitable accidents, disease, or old age, and returned at night <strong>to</strong>crowded rooms without adequate food and lack<strong>in</strong>g light, fresh air,heat, pure water, or sanitation. These conditions have been describedfor us <strong>in</strong> the writ<strong>in</strong>gs of novelists such as Dickens <strong>in</strong> England, Hugoor Zola <strong>in</strong> France.Page 376


The Socialist movement was a reaction aga<strong>in</strong>st these deplorableconditions <strong>to</strong> the work<strong>in</strong>g masses. It has been cus<strong>to</strong>mary <strong>to</strong> divide thismovement <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> two parts at the year 1848, the publication of theCommunist Manifes<strong>to</strong> of Karl Marx. This work began with the om<strong>in</strong>oussentence, "A specter is haunt<strong>in</strong>g Europe - the specter of Communism,"and ended with the trumpet blast "Workers of the world, unite."In general, the former division believed that man was <strong>in</strong>natelygood and that all coercive power was bad, with public authority theworst form of such coercive power. All the world's evils, accord<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong>the anarchists, arose because man's <strong>in</strong>nate goodness was corrupted anddis<strong>to</strong>rted by coercive power. The remedy, they felt, was <strong>to</strong> destroy thestate. The simplest way <strong>to</strong> destroy the state would be <strong>to</strong> assass<strong>in</strong>atethe chief of the state <strong>to</strong> ignite a wholesale upris<strong>in</strong>g of oppressedhumanity.Page 377Syndicalism was a somewhat more realistic and later version ofanarchism. It was equally determ<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>to</strong> abolish all public authority.The state would be destroyed by a general strike and replaced by aflexible federation of free associations of workers.The second group of radical social theorists wished <strong>to</strong> widen thepower and scope of governments by giv<strong>in</strong>g them a dom<strong>in</strong>ant role <strong>in</strong>economic life. The group divided <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong>0 two chief schools: TheSocialists and the Communists.Page 378From Ricardo, Marx derived the theory that the value of economicgoods was based on the amount of labor put <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> them.Page 379Marx built up a complicated theory which believed that allhis<strong>to</strong>ry is the his<strong>to</strong>ry of class struggles.The money which the bourgeoisie <strong>to</strong>ok from the proletariat <strong>in</strong> theeconomic system made it possible for them <strong>to</strong> dom<strong>in</strong>ate the politicalsystem, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the police and the army. From such exploitation, thebourgeoisie would become richer and richer and fewer and fewer <strong>in</strong>numbers and acquire ownership of all property <strong>in</strong> the society while theproletariat would become poorer and poorer and more and more numerousand be driven closer and closer <strong>to</strong> desperation. Eventually, the latterwould rise up and take over.Page 381In fact, what occurred was could be pictured as cooperativeeffort by unionized workers and monopolized <strong>in</strong>dustry <strong>to</strong> exploitunorganized consumers by rais<strong>in</strong>g prices higher and higher, quitecontrary <strong>to</strong> the expectations of Marx. Where he had expectedimpoverishment of the masses and concentration of ownership withgradual elim<strong>in</strong>ation of the middle classes, there occurred <strong>in</strong>steadris<strong>in</strong>g standards of liv<strong>in</strong>g, dispersal of ownership , a relativedecrease <strong>in</strong> the numbers of laborers, and a great <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> the


middle classes. Due <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>come and <strong>in</strong>heritance taxes, the rich becamepoorer and poorer, relatively speak<strong>in</strong>g.THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION TO 1924Page 385The new government forced the abdication of the czar. The moreradical Socialists had been released from prison or had been returnedfrom exile (<strong>in</strong> some cases, such as Len<strong>in</strong>, by German assistance)JCT: And Rockefeller and Mackenzie K<strong>in</strong>g.Page 386Len<strong>in</strong> campaigned <strong>to</strong> replace the Provisional Government with asystem of Soviets and <strong>to</strong> adopt an immediate program of peace and landdistribution. The Bolshevik group seized the centers of government <strong>in</strong>St. Petersburg and with<strong>in</strong> 24 hours, issued a series of decrees whichabolished the Provisional government, ordered the end of the war withGermany and the distribution of large land hold<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>to</strong> the peasants.Page 387By 1920 <strong>in</strong>dustrial production <strong>in</strong> general was about 13% of the1913 figure. At the same time, paper money was pr<strong>in</strong>ted so freely <strong>to</strong>pay for the costs of war, civil war, and the operation of thegovernment that prices rose rapidly and the ruble became almostworthless.The secret police (Cheka) systematically murdered all real orpotential opponents.Page 388Various outsider Powers also <strong>in</strong>tervened <strong>in</strong> the Russian chaos.An allied expeditionary force <strong>in</strong>vaded northern Russia from Murmanskand Archangel, while a force of Japanese and another of Americanslanded at Vladivos<strong>to</strong>k and pushed westward for hundreds of miles. TheBritish seized the oil fields of the Caspian region (late 1918) whilethe French occupied parts of the Ukra<strong>in</strong>e about Odessa (March 1919).By 1920, Russia was <strong>in</strong> complete confusion. Poland <strong>in</strong>vaded Russiaoccupy<strong>in</strong>g much of the Ukra<strong>in</strong>e.Page 389As part of this system, not only were all agricultural cropsconsidered <strong>to</strong> be government property but all private trade andcommerce were also forbidden; the banks were nationalized while all<strong>in</strong>dustrial plants of over five workers and all craft enterprises ofover ten workers were nationalized. This culm<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>in</strong> peasantupris<strong>in</strong>gs and urban riots. With<strong>in</strong> a week, peasant requisition<strong>in</strong>g wasabandoned <strong>in</strong> favor of a "New Economic Policy" of free commercialactivity <strong>in</strong> agriculture and other commodities, with there-establishment of the profit motive and of private ownership <strong>in</strong>small <strong>in</strong>dustries and <strong>in</strong> small landhold<strong>in</strong>g.Page 395


The Bolsheviks <strong>in</strong>sisted that the distribution of <strong>in</strong>come <strong>in</strong> acapitalistic society would become so <strong>in</strong>equitable that the masses ofthe people would not obta<strong>in</strong> sufficient <strong>in</strong>come <strong>to</strong> buy the goods be<strong>in</strong>gproduced by the <strong>in</strong>dustrial plants. As such unsold goods accumulatedwith decreas<strong>in</strong>g profits and deepen<strong>in</strong>g depression, there would be ashift <strong>to</strong>ward the production of armaments <strong>to</strong> provide profits andproduce goods which could be sold and there would be an <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>glyaggressive foreign policy <strong>in</strong> order <strong>to</strong> obta<strong>in</strong> markets for unsold goods<strong>in</strong> backward and undeveloped countries. Such aggressive imperialismwould <strong>in</strong>evitably make Russia a target of aggression <strong>in</strong> order <strong>to</strong>prevent a successful Communist system there from becom<strong>in</strong>g anattractive model for the discontented proletariat <strong>in</strong> capitalisticcountries.Page 396Communism <strong>in</strong> Russia alone required that the country must be<strong>in</strong>dustrialized with breakneck speed and must emphasize heavy <strong>in</strong>dustryand armaments rather than ris<strong>in</strong>g standards of liv<strong>in</strong>g. This meant thatgoods produced by the peasants must be taken from them by politicalduress, without any economic return, and that the ultimate <strong>in</strong>authoritarian terror must be used <strong>to</strong> prevent the peasants from reduc<strong>in</strong>gtheir level of production. It was necessary <strong>to</strong> crush all k<strong>in</strong>ds offoreign espionage, resistance <strong>to</strong> the Bolshevik state, <strong>in</strong>dependentthought, or public discontent.Page 397Stal<strong>in</strong> forced the peasants off their land. In the space of sixweeks, (Feb-Mar 1930) collective farms <strong>in</strong>creased from 59,400 with 4.4million families <strong>to</strong> 110,200 farms with 14.3 million families. Allpeasants who resisted were treated with violence; their property wasconfiscated, they were beaten or sent <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> exile <strong>in</strong> remote areas; manywere killed. This process, known as "the liquidation of the kulaks"affected five million kulak families. Rather than give up theiranimals, many peasants killed them. The number of cattle was reducedfrom 30.7 million <strong>in</strong> 1928 <strong>to</strong> 19.6 million <strong>in</strong> 1933. The plant<strong>in</strong>gseason of 1930 was entirely disrupted. Three million peasantsstarved <strong>in</strong> 1931-1933. Stal<strong>in</strong> <strong>to</strong>ld Churchill that 12 million died <strong>in</strong>this reorganization of agriculture.Page 401The privileged rulers and their favorites had the best ofeveryth<strong>in</strong>g obta<strong>in</strong>ed, however at a terrible price, at the cost ofcomplete <strong>in</strong>security for even the highest party officials were underconstant surveillance and would be <strong>in</strong>evitably purged <strong>to</strong> exile ordeath.The growth of <strong>in</strong>equality was embodied <strong>in</strong> law. All restrictions onmaximum salaries were removed. Special s<strong>to</strong>res were established wherethe privileged could obta<strong>in</strong> scarce goods at low prices; restaurantswith different menus were set up <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dustrial plants for different


levels of employees; hous<strong>in</strong>g discrim<strong>in</strong>ation became steadily wider.Page 402As public discontent and social tensions grew, the use of spy<strong>in</strong>g,purges, <strong>to</strong>rture and murder <strong>in</strong>creased out of all proportion. Every waveof discontent resulted <strong>in</strong> new waves of police activity. Hundreds ofthousands were killed while millions were arrested and exiled <strong>to</strong>Siberia or put <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> huge slave-labor camps. Estimates vary from twomillion as high as twenty million.Page 403For every leader who was publicly elim<strong>in</strong>ated, thousands wereelim<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>in</strong> secret. By 1939, all the leaders of Bolshivism had beendriven from public life and most had died violent deaths.There were two networks of secret-police spies, unknown <strong>to</strong> eachother, one serv<strong>in</strong>g the special department of the fac<strong>to</strong>ry while theother reported <strong>to</strong> a high level of the secret police outside.Page 404Whenever the secret police needed more money it could sweep largenumbers of persons, without trial or notice, <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> its wage deductionsystem or <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> its labor camps <strong>to</strong> be hired out. It would seem that thesecret police were the real rulers of Russia. This was true except atthe very <strong>to</strong>p where Stal<strong>in</strong> could always liquidate the head by hav<strong>in</strong>ghim arrested by his second <strong>in</strong> command <strong>in</strong> return for Stal<strong>in</strong>'s promise<strong>to</strong> promote the arrester <strong>to</strong> the <strong>to</strong>p position. In this way, the chiefsof the secret police were successively elim<strong>in</strong>ated.TRAGEDY AND HOPE Chapters IX-XIby Dr. Carroll QuigleyISBN 0913022-14-4CONTENTSIX. GERMANY FROM KAISER TO HITLER 1913-1945X. BRITAIN: THE BACKGROUND TO APPEASEMENT 1900-1939XI. CHANGING ECONOMIC PATTERNSCHAPTER IX: GERMANY FROM THE KAISER TO HITLER 1913-1945Page 411The German thirst for the coz<strong>in</strong>ess of a <strong>to</strong>talitarian way of lifeis the key <strong>to</strong> German national character. Decision, which requires theevaluation of alternatives, drives man <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividualism, self-reliance


and rationalism, all hateful qualities <strong>to</strong> Germanism.Page 413They wanted a cozy society which would so absorb the <strong>in</strong>dividual<strong>in</strong> its structure that he would never need <strong>to</strong> make significantdecisions for himself. Held with<strong>in</strong> a framework of known, satisfy<strong>in</strong>gpersonal relationships, such an <strong>in</strong>dividual would be safe because hewould be surrounded by fellows equally satisfied with their ownpositions, each feel<strong>in</strong>g important from his membership <strong>in</strong> the greaterwhole.Page 414The German abhors the need <strong>to</strong> make decisions. He feels itnecessary <strong>to</strong> proclaim his position by verbal loudness which may seemboastful <strong>to</strong> outsiders.Page 415Germans are ill-at-ease with equality, democracy, <strong>in</strong>dividualism,freedom, and other features of modern life. Their neurological systemswere a consequence of the coz<strong>in</strong>ess of German childhood, which,contrary <strong>to</strong> popular impression, was not a condition of misery andpersonal cruelty (as it often is <strong>in</strong> England) but a warm, affectionateand externally discipl<strong>in</strong>ed situation of secure relationships.The Englishman is discipl<strong>in</strong>ed from with<strong>in</strong> so that he takes hisself-discipl<strong>in</strong>e, embedded <strong>in</strong> his neurological system, with himwherever he goes. The Englishman is the most socialized of Europeans,as the Frenchman is the most civilized, the Italian most completelygregarious, or the Spaniard most completely <strong>in</strong>dividualistic. But theGerman, by seek<strong>in</strong>g external discipl<strong>in</strong>e, shows his unconscious desire<strong>to</strong> recapture the externally discipl<strong>in</strong>ed world of his childhood. Withsuch discipl<strong>in</strong>e he may be the best behaved of citizens, but withoutit, he may be a beast.He sees no need <strong>to</strong> make any effort <strong>to</strong> see anyth<strong>in</strong>g from any po<strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong>f view other than his own. The consequence is a most damag<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>ability <strong>to</strong> do this. His union, his neighborhood are the best and allothers may be denigrated. His myopic or narrow-angled vision of theuniverse must be universalized.Page 417The precarious structure left by Bismarck was not managed butmerely hidden from public view by a facade of nationalistic,anti foreign, anti-Semitic, imperialistic, and chauv<strong>in</strong>istic propagandaof which the emperor was the center.The monarchy represented the body, which was supported by fourlegs: the army, the landlords, the bureaucracy and the <strong>in</strong>dustrialists.The revolution of 1918 was not really a revolution at all because itremoved the monarchy but it left the quartet of legs.Page 426The German <strong>in</strong>flation, which was a great benefit <strong>to</strong> the Quartet,destroyed the economic position of the middle classes and lower middle


classes and permanently alienated them from the republic.Page 427The Nationalist Party built up a pervasive propaganda campaign <strong>to</strong>show that all Germany's problems were caused by the democratic andlabor<strong>in</strong>g groups, by the <strong>in</strong>ternationalists, and by the Jews.Page 428The Centre and Left shared this nationalistic poison sufficiently<strong>to</strong> absta<strong>in</strong> from any effort <strong>to</strong> give the German people the true s<strong>to</strong>ry ofGermany's responsibility for the war and for her own hardships. Thusthe Right was able <strong>to</strong> spread its own s<strong>to</strong>ry of the war, that Germanyhad been overcome by a "stab <strong>in</strong> the back" from "the threeInternationals": the "Gold" International of the Jews, the "Red"International of the Socialists, and the "Black" International of theCatholics, an unholy triple alliance which was symbolized <strong>in</strong> the gold,red, and black flag of the Weimar Republic. Every effort was made <strong>to</strong>divert popular animosity at the defeat of 1918 and the Versaillessettlement from those who were really responsible <strong>to</strong> the democraticand republican groups. At the same time, German animosity aga<strong>in</strong>steconomic exploitation was directed away from the landlords and<strong>in</strong>dustrialists by racist doctr<strong>in</strong>es which blamed all such problems onbad Jewish <strong>in</strong>ternational bankers and department s<strong>to</strong>re owners.Page 429The Nazi drive <strong>to</strong> build up a mass follow<strong>in</strong>g was kept alive by thef<strong>in</strong>ancial contributions of the Quartet. The Nazis were f<strong>in</strong>anced by theBlack Reichswehr from 1919-1923, then this support ceased but wascompensated for by the support of the <strong>in</strong>dustrialists, who f<strong>in</strong>anced theNazis from Hitler's exit from prison <strong>in</strong> 1924 <strong>to</strong> the end of 1932.The destruction of the Weimar Republic has five stages:1) Brun<strong>in</strong>g: March 24 1930 - May 30 19322) Von Papen: May 31 1932 - November 14 19323) Schleicher: December 2 1932 - January 28 19334) Hitler: January 30 1933 - March 5 19335) Gleichschaltung: March 6 1933 - August 2 1934When the economic crisis began <strong>in</strong> 1929, Germany had a democraticgovernment of the Center and Social Democratic parties. The crisisresulted <strong>in</strong> a decrease <strong>in</strong> tax receipts and a parallel <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong>demands for government welfare services. This brought <strong>to</strong> a head thelatent dispute over orthodox and unorthodox f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g of a depression.Big bus<strong>in</strong>ess and big f<strong>in</strong>ance were determ<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>to</strong> place the burden ofthe depression on the work<strong>in</strong>g classes by forc<strong>in</strong>g the government <strong>to</strong>adopt a policy of deflation - that is, by wage reductions andcurtailment of government expenditures. The Social Democrats wavered<strong>in</strong> their attitude but <strong>in</strong> general were opposed <strong>to</strong> this policy. Schacht,as president of the Reichsbank, was able <strong>to</strong> force the Socialist RudolfHilferd<strong>in</strong>g out of the position of m<strong>in</strong>ister of f<strong>in</strong>ance by refus<strong>in</strong>g bank


credit <strong>to</strong> the government until this was done.In March 1930, the Center broke the coalition on the issue ofreduction of unemployment benefits, the Socialists were thrown out ofthe government, and He<strong>in</strong>rich Brun<strong>in</strong>g, leader of the Center Party, came<strong>in</strong> as chancellor. Because he did not have a majority, he had <strong>to</strong> putthe deflationary policy <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> effect by the use of presidential decree.This marked the end of the Weimar Republic.The Socialists permitted Brun<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> office by refus<strong>in</strong>g<strong>to</strong> vote on a motion of no confidence. Left <strong>in</strong> office, Brun<strong>in</strong>gcont<strong>in</strong>ued the deflationary policy by decrees.Page 431Brun<strong>in</strong>g's policy of deflation was a disaster. The suffer<strong>in</strong>g ofthe people was terrible with almost eight million unemployed out oftwenty-five million employable.Page 433President H<strong>in</strong>denburg had no lik<strong>in</strong>g for any unorthodox economicschemes.The Quartet, especially the <strong>in</strong>dustrialists, decided that Hitlerhad learned a lesson and could safely be put <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> office as thefigurehead of a Right government because he was grow<strong>in</strong>g weaker. Thewhole deal was arranged by Papen and was sealed <strong>in</strong> an agreement madeat the home of Cologne banker Baron Kurt Von Schroder <strong>in</strong> 1933.THE NAZI REGIME 1933-1934Adolf Hitler's life had been a succession of failures, the sevenyears 1907-1914 be<strong>in</strong>g passed as a social derelict <strong>in</strong> Vienna andMunich. There he had become a fanatical Pan-German anti-semite,attribut<strong>in</strong>g his own failures <strong>to</strong> the "<strong>in</strong>trigues of <strong>in</strong>ternationalJewry."Page 434Dur<strong>in</strong>g the Great War, he was an excellent soldier alwaysvolunteer<strong>in</strong>g for the most dangerous tasks. Although he was decoratedwith the Iron Cross first class <strong>in</strong> 1918, he was never promoted beyondPrivate First Class. His regiment of 3,500 suffered 3,260 killed andHitler himself was wounded twice.After the war, he stayed with the army and eventually became apolitical spy for the Reichswehr. In the course of spy<strong>in</strong>g on thenumerous political groups, Hitler became fasc<strong>in</strong>ated by the rant<strong>in</strong>gs ofGottfried Feder aga<strong>in</strong>st the "<strong>in</strong>terest slavery of the Jews."Hitler jo<strong>in</strong>ed the National Socialist German Worker's Party whichdrew up a Twenty-five Po<strong>in</strong>t Program.Page 435These <strong>in</strong>cluded:4) all Jews and other aliens elim<strong>in</strong>ated;5) all unearned <strong>in</strong>comes <strong>to</strong> be abolished;6) <strong>to</strong> punish all war profiteers and usurers with death.Page 446


Prices were set at a level sufficient <strong>to</strong> give a profit <strong>to</strong> mostparticipants and quotas were based on assessments estimated by thefarmers themselves. The autarky program gave them a stable market forthe products, shield<strong>in</strong>g them from the vicissitudes which they hadsuffered under liberalism with its unstable markets and fluctuat<strong>in</strong>gprices. The prices fixed under Nazism were not high but were adequate,especially <strong>in</strong> comb<strong>in</strong>ation with other advantages.Payments for <strong>in</strong>terest and taxes were both reduced.All farms of over family size were made secure <strong>in</strong> possession oftheir owner's family, with no possibility of alienation, by <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gthe use of entail on great estates and by the Hereditary Farms Act forlesser units.Page 447A law of December 28, 1939 stated, what had always beenunders<strong>to</strong>od, that <strong>in</strong> his civil service work a party member was notsubject <strong>to</strong> party orders but only <strong>to</strong> the orders of the civil servicesuperior.Page 448There was a statu<strong>to</strong>ry provision which made it illegal for membersof the armed services <strong>to</strong> be simultaneously members of the party.Page 452Maximum wage rates were set <strong>in</strong> June 1938. In return forexploitation of labor, the worker received certa<strong>in</strong> compensationsof which the chief was the fact that he was no longer threatened withthe danger of mass unemployment. Increased economic activity went <strong>to</strong>nonconsumers' goods.Page 454The threat <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>dustry from depression was elim<strong>in</strong>ated.CHAPTER X: BRITAIN: THE BACKGROUND TO APPEASEMENT, 1900-1939Page 463It is the Government that controls the House of Commons. Thiscontrol is exercised through the Cab<strong>in</strong>et's control of the politicalmach<strong>in</strong>ery. This power over the party mach<strong>in</strong>ery is exercised throughcontrol of party funds and of nom<strong>in</strong>ations <strong>to</strong> constituencies. The factparty candidates are named by an <strong>in</strong>ner clique is of tremendousimportance and is the key <strong>to</strong> the control which the <strong>in</strong>ner cliqueexercises over the House of Commons, yet it is rarely mentioned <strong>in</strong>books on the English political system. The party control is almostcompletely centralized <strong>in</strong> the hands of a largely self-perpetuat<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>ner clique which has power of approval over all candidates. Cab<strong>in</strong>etcan force the majority by us<strong>in</strong>g party discipl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>to</strong> pass bills.Page 464Brita<strong>in</strong> can be divided <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> two groups, the "classes" and the"masses." The "classes" were the ones who had leisure. This meant that


they had property and <strong>in</strong>come and did not need <strong>to</strong> work for a liv<strong>in</strong>g;they obta<strong>in</strong>ed an education <strong>in</strong> a separate and expensive system; theymarried with<strong>in</strong> their own class; they had a dist<strong>in</strong>ctive accent; andthey had a dist<strong>in</strong>ctive attitude based on the tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g provided <strong>in</strong> thespecial educational system of the "classes."Page 465This educational system was based on three great negatives:a) education must not be vocational, not aimed at assist<strong>in</strong>g one <strong>to</strong>make a liv<strong>in</strong>g;b) education is not aimed directly at creat<strong>in</strong>g or tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>telligence;c) education is not aimed at f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g the "Truth."It is aimed at develop<strong>in</strong>g a moral outlook, a respect fortraditions, qualities of leadership and cooperation, and that abilityfor cooperation <strong>in</strong> competition summed up <strong>in</strong> the English idea of"sport" and "play<strong>in</strong>g the game." Because of the restricted numbers ofthe upper class, these attitudes applied chiefly <strong>to</strong> one another, anddid not necessarily apply <strong>to</strong> foreigners or even <strong>to</strong> the masses. Theyapplied <strong>to</strong> people who "belonged" and not <strong>to</strong> all human be<strong>in</strong>gs.Page 469House members are expected <strong>to</strong> vote as their party whips tell them<strong>to</strong> and are not expected <strong>to</strong> understand the contents of the bills forwhich they are vot<strong>in</strong>g. Legislation orig<strong>in</strong>ates <strong>in</strong> the meet<strong>in</strong>gs of theclique of the party, act<strong>in</strong>g as first chamber. If accepted by theCab<strong>in</strong>et, it passes the House of Commons almost au<strong>to</strong>matically. Thissituation is sometimes called "Cab<strong>in</strong>et dicta<strong>to</strong>rship."Page 470There have been restrictions on democracy <strong>in</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong> almost allbased on one criterion, the possession of wealth. Brita<strong>in</strong>, until 1945,was the world's greatest plu<strong>to</strong>cracy.In political life, local government had a restricted suffrage.Elected members were unpaid thus restrict<strong>in</strong>g these posts <strong>to</strong> those whohad leisure (that is, wealth).Page 471Members of Parliament were, for years, restricted <strong>to</strong> the well-<strong>to</strong>doby the fact that Members were unpaid. In 1938, each candidate mustpost a deposit of #150 amount<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> more than the <strong>to</strong>tal annual <strong>in</strong>comeof about three-quarters of all English families which is forfeited ifhe does not receive over one-eighth of the <strong>to</strong>tal vote. As a result ofthese monetary barriers, the overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g mass of Englishmen could notparticipate actively <strong>in</strong> politics unless they could f<strong>in</strong>d an outsidesource of funds.Until 1915, the two parties represented the same social class,the small group known as "society." Both Conservatives and Liberalswere controlled by the same small clique consist<strong>in</strong>g of no more thanhalf-a-dozen chief families, their relatives and allies.


Page 472At the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the 20th century, the <strong>in</strong>ner clique of theConservative Party was made up almost completely of the Cecil familyand their relatives.This is quite different from the US where both major parties aremiddle-class parties and where geographic, religious and traditional<strong>in</strong>fluences are more important than class <strong>in</strong>fluences <strong>in</strong> determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>gparty membership.Page 474In eight years (1931-1939) thirteen direc<strong>to</strong>rs of the "Big FiveBanks" and two direc<strong>to</strong>rs of the Bank of England were raised <strong>to</strong> thepeerage by the Conservative government. Of n<strong>in</strong>ety peers created,thirty five were direc<strong>to</strong>rs of <strong>in</strong>surance companies. In 1935, WalterRunciman, as president of the Board of Trade, <strong>in</strong>troduced a bill <strong>to</strong>grant a subsidy of #2 million <strong>to</strong> tramp merchant vessels and gave#92,000 <strong>to</strong> his father's company <strong>in</strong> which he held 21,000 shares. Thereis relatively little objection <strong>to</strong> activities of this k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>in</strong> England.Page 475The Labour Party arose because of the discovery by the masses ofthe people that their vote did not avail them much so long as the onlychoice of candidates was "Which of two rich people will you choose?"Page 476The radio, the second most important <strong>in</strong>strument of publicity, issometimes run very unfairly. In the election of 1931, the governmentallowed 15 period on the BBC for political campaign<strong>in</strong>g, it <strong>to</strong>ok 11,gave 3 <strong>to</strong> Labour and 1 <strong>to</strong> the Liberals.Page 478France is <strong>in</strong> sharp contrast where the amount of education by astudent is limited only by his ability and will<strong>in</strong>gness <strong>to</strong> work; andpositions of importance <strong>in</strong> the civil service, the professions, andeven bus<strong>in</strong>ess are available <strong>to</strong> those who do best <strong>in</strong> the system. InBrita<strong>in</strong>, it is based largely on the ability <strong>to</strong> pay.Page 479For admission <strong>to</strong> the bar <strong>in</strong> England, a man had <strong>to</strong> be a member ofone of the four Inns of Court. These are private clubs <strong>to</strong> whichadmission was by nom<strong>in</strong>ation with large admission fees. Sons of wageearners formed less than 1% of the admissions and members of the barare almost entirely from the well-<strong>to</strong>-do classes. S<strong>in</strong>ce judges areappo<strong>in</strong>ted exclusively from barristers, the judicial system has alsobeen monopolized by the upper classes. Obta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g justice has beencomplex, slow and above all, expensive. As a result, only the fairlywell-<strong>to</strong>-do can defend their rights <strong>in</strong> a civil suit and if the lesswell-<strong>to</strong>-do go <strong>to</strong> court at all, they f<strong>in</strong>d themselves <strong>in</strong> an atmospherecompletely dom<strong>in</strong>ated by members of the upper classes. Accord<strong>in</strong>gly, theord<strong>in</strong>ary Englishman avoids litigation even when he has right on hisside.


Page 483The 1909 Liberal budget was aimed directly at Conservativesupporters by its taxation of unearned <strong>in</strong>comes, especially from landedproperties. Its rejection by the House of Lords was denounced byAsquith as a breach of the constitution which gave control over moneybills <strong>to</strong> the House of Commons. The Lords refused <strong>to</strong> yield untilAsquith threatened <strong>to</strong> create enough new peers <strong>to</strong> carry his bill. Thisbill provided that the Lords could not ve<strong>to</strong> a money bill and could notprevent any other bill from becom<strong>in</strong>g law if it was passed <strong>in</strong> threesessions of the Commons over a period of at least two years.Page 485Liberal Lloyd George's effort <strong>to</strong> deflate prices after the GreatWar <strong>in</strong> order <strong>to</strong> go back on<strong>to</strong> the gold standard was fatal <strong>to</strong> prosperityand domestic order. Unemployment and strikes <strong>in</strong>creased.The Conservatives prevented any realistic attack on theseproblems and passed the Emergency Power Act of 1920 which for thefirst time gave a peace-time government the right <strong>to</strong> proclaim a stateof siege (as was done <strong>in</strong> 1920, 1921, 1926).Page 486In 1924, W<strong>in</strong>s<strong>to</strong>n Churchill, as chancellor of the Exchequer,carried out a stabilization policy which put England on the goldstandard. This policy of deflation drove Brita<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> an economicdepression and a period of labour conflict and the policy was sobungled <strong>in</strong> its execution that Brita<strong>in</strong> was doomed <strong>to</strong> semi-depressionsfor almost a decade, <strong>to</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ancial subjugation <strong>to</strong> France until 1931 andwas driven closer <strong>to</strong> domestic rebellion than she had been at any times<strong>in</strong>ce the Chartist movement of 1848.The deflation of 1926 hit the m<strong>in</strong>es with special impact s<strong>in</strong>ceprices could only be cut if wages were cut. The government <strong>in</strong>voked theEmergency Powers Act and the Trade Unions Congress ordered a GeneralStrike but soon ended it leav<strong>in</strong>g the strik<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>in</strong>ers <strong>to</strong> shift forthemselves. The m<strong>in</strong>ers stayed out for six months and then began <strong>to</strong>drift back <strong>to</strong> work <strong>to</strong> escape starvation.Page 489In 1931, the Macmillan Committee reported that the wholef<strong>in</strong>ancial structure was unsound and should be remedied by a managedcurrency, controlled by the Bank of England. The crisis revealed the<strong>in</strong>capacity of the Labour Party and the power of the bankers. Labourmembers had no understand<strong>in</strong>g of economics. Snowden, the economicexpert" of the Cab<strong>in</strong>et, had f<strong>in</strong>ancial views about the same as MontaguNorman of the Bank of England.Page 490As for the bankers, they were <strong>in</strong> control throughout the crisis.While publicly they <strong>in</strong>sisted on a balanced budget, privately, theyrefused <strong>to</strong> accept balanc<strong>in</strong>g by taxation and <strong>in</strong>sisted on balanc<strong>in</strong>g bycuts <strong>in</strong> relief payments. Work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> close cooperation with American


ankers, they were <strong>in</strong> a position <strong>to</strong> overthrow any government which wasnot will<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> crush them completely. While they refused cooperation<strong>to</strong> the Labour government, they were able <strong>to</strong> obta<strong>in</strong> a loan of #80million from the US and France for the National Government when itwas only four days old.The National government at once attacked the f<strong>in</strong>ancial crisiswith a typical bankers' weapon: deflation. It offered a budget<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g higher taxes and drastic cuts <strong>in</strong> unemployment benefits andpublic salaries. Riots, protests, and mut<strong>in</strong>y <strong>in</strong> the navy were theresults.The domestic program of the National Government was <strong>to</strong> curtailthe personal freedom of <strong>in</strong>dividuals. On this, there was no realprotest for the Labour opposition had a program which, <strong>in</strong> fact if not<strong>in</strong> theory, tended <strong>in</strong> the same direction.Page 491The police of London were reorganized <strong>in</strong> 1933 <strong>to</strong> destroy theirobvious sympathy with the work<strong>in</strong>g classes by restrict<strong>in</strong>g all ranksabove <strong>in</strong>spec<strong>to</strong>r <strong>to</strong> persons with an upper-class education.A severe Incitement <strong>to</strong> Disaffection Act <strong>in</strong> 1934 threatened <strong>to</strong>destroy the personal freedoms built up over centuries by mak<strong>in</strong>gpolice searches of homes less restricted and mak<strong>in</strong>g the simplepossession of material likely <strong>to</strong> disaffect the armed forces a crime.For the first time <strong>in</strong> three generations, personal freedom and civilrights were restricted <strong>in</strong> time of peace. The Prevention of ViolenceAct of 1939 empowered a secretary of state <strong>to</strong> arrest without warrantand <strong>to</strong> deport without trial.Page 492Neville Chamberla<strong>in</strong> was chiefly responsible for the Nationalgovernment's fiscal policies. For the first time <strong>in</strong> almost a century,there was an <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> the proportion of <strong>to</strong>tal tax paid by thework<strong>in</strong>g class. For the first time s<strong>in</strong>ce 1846, there was a tax on food.There was a reversal <strong>in</strong> the trend <strong>to</strong> more education for the people.The budget was kept balanced by at a considerable price <strong>in</strong> humansuffer<strong>in</strong>g and <strong>in</strong> wastage of Brita<strong>in</strong>'s irreplaceable human resources.Hundreds of thousands had been unemployed for years and had theirmoral fiber completely destroyed by years of liv<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>in</strong>adequatedole. The capitalists of these areas were supported either bygovernment subsidy or were bought out by cartels and tradeassociations from funds assessed on the more active members of the<strong>in</strong>dustry.Chamberla<strong>in</strong>'s Derat<strong>in</strong>g Act of 1929 exempted <strong>in</strong>dustry from paymen<strong>to</strong>f three quarters of its taxes while many unemployed were allowed <strong>to</strong>starve.CHAPTER XI: CHANGING ECONOMIC PATTERNS


Page 497The economic system itself has become organized for expansion andif it does not expand, it tends <strong>to</strong> collapse. The basic reason for thismaladjustment is that <strong>in</strong>vestment has become an essential part of thesystem and if <strong>in</strong>vestment falls off, consumers have <strong>in</strong>sufficient<strong>in</strong>comes <strong>to</strong> buy the consumers' goods which are be<strong>in</strong>g produced <strong>in</strong>another part of the system because part of the flow of purchas<strong>in</strong>gpower created by the production of goods was diverted from purchas<strong>in</strong>ggoods it had produced <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> sav<strong>in</strong>gs, and all the goods produced couldnot be sold until those sav<strong>in</strong>gs came back <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the market by be<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>vested.Page 498If the groups <strong>in</strong> society who control the sav<strong>in</strong>gs which arenecessary for progress are the same vested <strong>in</strong>terests who benefit bythe exist<strong>in</strong>g way of do<strong>in</strong>g th<strong>in</strong>gs, they are <strong>in</strong> a position <strong>to</strong> defendthese vested <strong>in</strong>terests and prevent progress merely by prevent<strong>in</strong>g theuse of surpluses <strong>to</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ance new <strong>in</strong>ventions. The 20th century'seconomic crisis was a situation of this type.GREAT BRITAINPage 499The element of secrecy is one of the outstand<strong>in</strong>g features ofEnglish bus<strong>in</strong>ess and f<strong>in</strong>ancial life. The <strong>in</strong>ner circle of Englishf<strong>in</strong>ancial life rema<strong>in</strong>s a matter of "whom one knows," rather than "wha<strong>to</strong>ne knows." Jobs are still obta<strong>in</strong>ed by family, marriage, or schoolconnections and important positions are given <strong>to</strong> men who have notra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, experience or knowledge <strong>to</strong> qualify them.Page 500At the core of English f<strong>in</strong>ancial life have been seventeen privatefirms of "merchant bankers" with a <strong>to</strong>tal of less than a hundred activepartners <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Bar<strong>in</strong>g Brothers, N.M. Rothschild, J. HenrySchroder, Morgan Grenfell, Hambros and Lazard Brothers. These merchantbankers had a dom<strong>in</strong>ant position with the Bank of England and,strangely enough, still have reta<strong>in</strong>ed some of this, despite thenationalization of the Bank by the Labour government <strong>in</strong> 1946.Page 501F<strong>in</strong>ancial capitalism was marked not only by a grow<strong>in</strong>g f<strong>in</strong>ancialcontrol of <strong>in</strong>dustry but also by an <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g concentration of thiscontrol and by an <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g bank<strong>in</strong>g control of government.The control of the Bank of England over bus<strong>in</strong>ess was exercised<strong>in</strong>directly through the jo<strong>in</strong>t-s<strong>to</strong>ck banks. This growth of a "moneytrust" led <strong>to</strong> an <strong>in</strong>vestigation. A bill was drawn up <strong>to</strong> prevent furtherconcentration but was withdrawn when the bankers made a "gentlemen'sagreement" <strong>to</strong> ask Treasury permission for future amalgamations.Page 502In 1931, f<strong>in</strong>anciers led by Montagu Norman and J.P. Morgan forcedthe resignation of the British Labour government. But the handwrit<strong>in</strong>g


was already on the wall. The deflationary f<strong>in</strong>ancial policy of thebankers had alienated politicians and <strong>in</strong>dustrialists and drivenmonopolist trade unions <strong>to</strong> form a united front aga<strong>in</strong>st the bankers.Labour and <strong>in</strong>dustry were united <strong>in</strong> opposition <strong>to</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>uance <strong>to</strong> thebankers' economic policy with its low prices and high unemployment.The decisive fac<strong>to</strong>r which caused the end of f<strong>in</strong>ancial capitalism <strong>in</strong>Brita<strong>in</strong> was the revolt of the British fleet <strong>in</strong> 1931 and not theabandonment of gold six days later. The mut<strong>in</strong>y made it clear that thepolicy of deflations must be ended. As a result, no effort was made <strong>to</strong>defend the gold standard.Page 503The Coal M<strong>in</strong>es Act of 1930 allowed the National ShipbuildersSecurity <strong>to</strong> buy up and destroy shipyards. By 1934, one quarter ofBrita<strong>in</strong>'s shipbuild<strong>in</strong>g capacity had been elim<strong>in</strong>ated. The PurchaseF<strong>in</strong>ance Company was set up <strong>to</strong> buy up and destroy flour mills. By 1933,over one-sixth of the flour mills <strong>in</strong> England had been elim<strong>in</strong>ated.GERMANYPage 507In Germany, capital was scarce when <strong>in</strong>dustrialism arrived and<strong>in</strong>dustry found itself dependent upon banks almost at once. The chiefcredit banks floated securities for <strong>in</strong>dustry by grant<strong>in</strong>g credit <strong>to</strong> thefirm, tak<strong>in</strong>g securities <strong>in</strong> return. These securities were slowly sold<strong>to</strong> the public with the bank reta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g enough s<strong>to</strong>ck <strong>to</strong> give it controland appo<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g its men as direc<strong>to</strong>rs <strong>to</strong> give that control f<strong>in</strong>al form.The importance of <strong>in</strong>terlock<strong>in</strong>g direc<strong>to</strong>rships can be seen from thefact that the same Dresdner Bank had its direc<strong>to</strong>rs on the boards ofover two hundred <strong>in</strong>dustrial concerns <strong>in</strong> 1913.This bank<strong>in</strong>g control of <strong>in</strong>dustry was made even closer s<strong>in</strong>ce most<strong>in</strong>ves<strong>to</strong>rs left their securities on deposit with the banks which votedall this s<strong>to</strong>ck for direc<strong>to</strong>rships and other control measures, unlessthe s<strong>to</strong>ck-owners expressly forbade it. The banks also voted the s<strong>to</strong>ckleft as collateral for loans and all s<strong>to</strong>ck bought on marg<strong>in</strong>.Page 509The control of German f<strong>in</strong>ancial capitalism rested <strong>in</strong> the creditbanks. It was largely beyond the control of the government and rested<strong>in</strong> private hands. Of the hundreds of German credit banks, the eightso-called "Great Banks" were the masters of the German economy from1865 <strong>to</strong> 1915 and controlled 74% of the capital assets of all 421banks.Page 512I.G. Farben<strong>in</strong>dustrie made many <strong>in</strong>dividual cartel agreements withDu Pont and other American corporations.Page 514In France, Brita<strong>in</strong> and the US, the war played a significant role<strong>in</strong> demonstrat<strong>in</strong>g conclusively that economic stagnation andunderemployment of resources were not necessary and could be avoided


if the f<strong>in</strong>ancial system were subord<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>to</strong> the economic system. InGermany, this was not necessary s<strong>in</strong>ce the Nazis had already made thisdiscovery <strong>in</strong> the 1930s.Thus a surplus of labor, low wages, experience <strong>in</strong> unorthodoxf<strong>in</strong>ancial operations and an immense task <strong>to</strong> be done all contributed <strong>to</strong>the German revival.FRANCEPage 515With the found<strong>in</strong>g of the Bank of France <strong>in</strong> 1800, f<strong>in</strong>ancial powerwas <strong>in</strong> the hands of about ten or fifteen bank<strong>in</strong>g houses whosefounders, <strong>in</strong> most cases, had come from Switzerland. These bankers, allProtestant, were deeply <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the agitations lead<strong>in</strong>g up <strong>to</strong> theFrench Revolution. When it got out of the hand, they were the chiefforces beh<strong>in</strong>d the rise of Napoleon. As a reward for this support,Napoleon gave these bankers a monopoly over French f<strong>in</strong>ancial life bygiv<strong>in</strong>g them control of the new Bank of France.Page 516By 1811, most of these bankers had gone over <strong>to</strong> the oppositionand survived the change <strong>in</strong> regime <strong>in</strong> 1815. As a result, the Protestantbankers who had controlled f<strong>in</strong>ancial life under the First Empire werestill the ma<strong>in</strong> figures on the board of regents of the Bank of Franceuntil 1936. The chief names were Mirabaud, Mallet, Neuflize, andHott<strong>in</strong>ger.In the course of the n<strong>in</strong>eteenth century, a second group was added<strong>to</strong> French bank<strong>in</strong>g circles. This second group, largely Jewish, was alsonon-French orig<strong>in</strong>, the majority Germanic (like Rothschild, He<strong>in</strong>e,Fould, Stern and Worms). A rivalry soon grew up between the olderProtestant bankers and the newer Jewish bankers, largely alongpolitical rather than religious l<strong>in</strong>es which grew confused as some ofthe Jewish group gave up their religion and moved over <strong>to</strong> theProtestant group.The leadership of the Protestant group was exercised by Mirabaud,the leadership of the Jewish group was held by Rothschild. These twow<strong>in</strong>gs were so close that Mirabaud and Rothschild <strong>to</strong>gether dom<strong>in</strong>atedthe whole f<strong>in</strong>ancial system and frequently cooperated <strong>to</strong>gether evenwhen their groups as a whole were <strong>in</strong> competition.After 1838, this simple picture was complicated by the slow riseof a third group of bankers who were Catholics which soon split <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong>two halves and jo<strong>in</strong>ed the other two groups.Page 517The rivalry of these two great powers fills the pages of Frenchhis<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>in</strong> the period 1884-1940. It paralyzed the French politicalsystem and economic system prevent<strong>in</strong>g economic recovery from thedepression <strong>in</strong> 1935-1940.From 1880-1925, the private bankers cont<strong>in</strong>ued <strong>to</strong> exist and grow


<strong>in</strong> power. They were at first chiefly <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> governmen<strong>to</strong>bligations and the greatest bankers, like Mirabaud and Rothschild,had <strong>in</strong>timate connections with governments and weak connections withthe economic life of the country.Page 518To f<strong>in</strong>ance railroads, the small sav<strong>in</strong>gs of many were gathered andmade available <strong>to</strong> the private banker <strong>to</strong> direct wherever he thoughtfitt<strong>in</strong>g. Thus the private banker became a manager of other persons'funds rather than lender of his own. The private banker became muchmore <strong>in</strong>fluential and much less noticeable. He now controlled billionswhere he formerly controlled millions and he did it unobtrusively,act<strong>in</strong>g from the background, concealed from public view. The public didnot notice that the names of private bankers and their agents stillgraced the list of direc<strong>to</strong>rs of new f<strong>in</strong>ancial enterprises.Page 520The centre of the French economic system <strong>in</strong> the 20th century wasnot <strong>to</strong> be found, as some have believed, <strong>in</strong> the Bank of France, but,<strong>in</strong>stead, resided <strong>in</strong> a group of almost unknown <strong>in</strong>stitutions - theprivate banks. There were over a hundred of these private banks andtwo (Rothschild and Mirabaud) were more powerful than all the otherscomb<strong>in</strong>ed. These private banks acted as the High Command of the Frencheconomic system. Their s<strong>to</strong>ck was closely held <strong>in</strong> the hands of aboutforty families. They were the same private banks which had set up theBank of France divided <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> a group of seven Jewish banks, a group ofseven Protestant banks and a group of five Catholic banks. The variousgroups cont<strong>in</strong>ued <strong>to</strong> cooperate <strong>in</strong> the management of the Bank of Francewhich was controlled until 1936, as it had been <strong>in</strong> 1813, by thehandful of private banks which created it.Page 521The state was <strong>in</strong>fluenced by the Treasury's need for funds fromthe Bank of France.These <strong>in</strong>vestment banks supplied long-term capital <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>dustry and<strong>to</strong>ok s<strong>to</strong>ck and direc<strong>to</strong>rships <strong>in</strong> return. In 1931, Paribas heldthe securities of 357 corporations and its own direc<strong>to</strong>rs and <strong>to</strong>pmanagers held 180 direc<strong>to</strong>rships <strong>in</strong> 120 of the more important of these.Page 522The Jewish bankers were allied <strong>to</strong> Standard Oil and Rockefellerwhile the Catholic-Protestant bankers were allied <strong>to</strong> Royal Dutch Shelland Deterd<strong>in</strong>g.Page 524In 1936, there were about 800 important firms. Of these 800, theParibas bloc controlled almost 400 and the Union-Comite bloc about300.Page 525The whole Paribas system <strong>in</strong> the 20th century was headed by Baron


Edouard de Rothschild with the chief center of operation <strong>in</strong> the Banquede Paris which controlled communications companies such as Havas.Havas was a great monopolistic news agency. It could, and did,suppress or spread both news and advertis<strong>in</strong>g. It received secretsubsidies from the government for almost a century. The monopoly ondistribution of periodicals and books could be used <strong>to</strong> kill paperswhich were regarded as objectionable.After 1937, the Paribas bloc was badly split by the controversyover orthodox and unorthodox f<strong>in</strong>ancial methods for deal<strong>in</strong>g withdepression. The Rothschild desire <strong>to</strong> form an alliance with Russia andadopt a policy of resistance <strong>to</strong> Hitler, cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g orthodox f<strong>in</strong>ancialpolicies, collapsed from its own <strong>in</strong>ternal contradictions, their ownlack of faith <strong>in</strong> it, and the pressure of Great Brita<strong>in</strong>.Page 528The three prewar blocs have played no significant role <strong>in</strong> Frances<strong>in</strong>ce 1945 although Rene Mayer, active head of the Rothschild family<strong>in</strong>terests was m<strong>in</strong>ister of f<strong>in</strong>ance <strong>in</strong> the early postwar government.Later <strong>in</strong> 1962, De Gaulle made the direc<strong>to</strong>r of the Rothschild bank,George Pompidou, prime m<strong>in</strong>ister.UNITED STATES OF AMERICAPage 529By the 1880s, the techniques of f<strong>in</strong>ancial capitalism reachedlevels of corruption which were never approached <strong>in</strong> Europe. Thiscorruption sought <strong>to</strong> cheat the ord<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>in</strong>ves<strong>to</strong>r by flotations andmanipulations of securities for the benefit of <strong>in</strong>siders. Thepractitioners of these dishonesties were as socially acceptable astheir wealth entitled them <strong>to</strong> be without animadversions on how thatwealth was obta<strong>in</strong>ed.Page 530Corrupt techniques associated with the names Daniel Drew and JayGould were also practiced by Morgan and others who became respectablefrom longer susta<strong>in</strong>ed success.Any reform of Wall Street practices came from pressure from thefarm<strong>in</strong>g West and was long delayed by the close alliance of Wall Streetwith the two major political parties. By 1900, the <strong>in</strong>fluence of Morgan<strong>in</strong> the Republican party was dom<strong>in</strong>ant, his chief rivalry com<strong>in</strong>g fromRockefeller of Ohio.From 1880 <strong>to</strong> 1930, f<strong>in</strong>ancial capitalism approximated a feudalstructure <strong>in</strong> which two great powers, centered <strong>in</strong> New York, dom<strong>in</strong>ated anumber of lesser powers. No description of this structure as itexisted <strong>in</strong> the 1920s can be given <strong>in</strong> a brief compass, s<strong>in</strong>ce it<strong>in</strong>filtrated all aspects of American life and especially all branchesof economic life.At the center were a group of less than dozen <strong>in</strong>vestment bankswhich were still un<strong>in</strong>corporated partnerships at the height of theirpowers. These <strong>in</strong>cluded J.P. Morgan, the Rockefeller family, Kuhn,


Loeb, Dillon, Read, Brown Brothers and Harriman, and others. Each ofthese was l<strong>in</strong>ked <strong>in</strong> organizational or personal relationships withvarious banks, <strong>in</strong>surance companies, railroads, utilities and<strong>in</strong>dustrial firms. The result was <strong>to</strong> form a number of webs of economicpower.J.P. Morgan worked <strong>in</strong> close relationship with a group of banksand <strong>in</strong>surance companies. The whole nexus dom<strong>in</strong>ated a network ofbus<strong>in</strong>ess firms which <strong>in</strong>cluded at least one-sixth of the two hundredlargest non-f<strong>in</strong>ancial corporations.Page 531The Rockefeller group, <strong>in</strong>vest<strong>in</strong>g only its own profits, functionedas a capitalist unit <strong>in</strong> close cooperation with Morgan and controlledover half the assets of the oil <strong>in</strong>dustry.Page 532The economic power represented by these figures is almost beyondimag<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>to</strong> grasp. Morgan and Rockefeller <strong>to</strong>gether frequentlydom<strong>in</strong>ated the national Republican Party while Morgan occasionally hadextensive <strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>in</strong> the national Democratic Party. These two werealso powerful on the state level, especially Morgan <strong>in</strong> New Yorkand Rockefeller <strong>in</strong> Ohio. Mellon was a power <strong>in</strong> Pennsylvania and DuPont <strong>in</strong> Delaware.In the 1920s, this system of economic and political power formeda hierarchy headed by the Morgan <strong>in</strong>terests and played a pr<strong>in</strong>cipal roleboth <strong>in</strong> political and bus<strong>in</strong>ess life. Morgan, operat<strong>in</strong>g on the<strong>in</strong>ternational level <strong>in</strong> cooperation with his allies abroad, especially<strong>in</strong> England, <strong>in</strong>fluenced the events of his<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>to</strong> a degree which cannotbe specified <strong>in</strong> detail but which certa<strong>in</strong>ly was tremendous. Thedeflationary f<strong>in</strong>ancial policies on which these bankers <strong>in</strong>sisted werelay<strong>in</strong>g the foundations of the economic collapse <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> general socialdisaster by 1940. Unemployment which had reached 13 million persons <strong>in</strong>1933 was still at 10 million <strong>in</strong> 1940Page 533The deflationary policies of the bankers were acceptable <strong>to</strong> heavy<strong>in</strong>dustry chiefly because it was not unionized. With assembly-l<strong>in</strong>etechniques f<strong>in</strong>anced by the bankers and unorganized labor, theemployers could rearrange, curtail, or term<strong>in</strong>ate labor without noticeon a daily basis and could thus reduce labor costs <strong>to</strong> meet falls <strong>in</strong>prices from bankers' deflation.The fact that reductions <strong>in</strong> wages and large lay-offs also reducedthe volume of purchas<strong>in</strong>g power as a whole, <strong>to</strong> the <strong>in</strong>jury of the groupssell<strong>in</strong>g consumers' goods, was ignored by the makers of heavyproducers' goods. In this way, farmers and other segments of thesociety were <strong>in</strong>jured by the deflationary policies of the bankers andby the employment policies of heavy <strong>in</strong>dustry, closely allied <strong>to</strong> thebankers.When these policies became unbearable <strong>in</strong> the depression of 1929-


1933, these other <strong>in</strong>terest blocs deserted the Republican party whichrema<strong>in</strong>ed subservient <strong>to</strong> high f<strong>in</strong>ance and heavy <strong>in</strong>dustry. The shift ofthe farm bloc <strong>to</strong> the Democratic Party <strong>in</strong> 1932 resulted <strong>in</strong> the electionof Frankl<strong>in</strong> D. Roosevelt and the New Deal.Page 534The New Deal's actions aga<strong>in</strong>st f<strong>in</strong>ance did not represent anyvic<strong>to</strong>ry for unorthodox f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g, the real key <strong>to</strong> either monopolycapitalism or <strong>to</strong> a managed pluralist society. The reason for this wasthat the New Deal was fundamentally orthodox <strong>in</strong> its ideas on thenature of money. Roosevelt was quite will<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> unbalance the budgetand <strong>to</strong> spend <strong>in</strong> a depression <strong>in</strong> an unorthodox fashion because he hadgrasped the idea that lack of purchas<strong>in</strong>g power was the cause of thelack of demand which made unsold goods and unemployment, but he had noidea of the causes of the depression and had quite orthodox ideas onthe nature of money. As a result, his adm<strong>in</strong>istration treated thesymp<strong>to</strong>ms rather than the causes of the depression and, while spend<strong>in</strong>gunorthodoxly <strong>to</strong> treat these symp<strong>to</strong>ms, did so with money borrowed fromthe banks <strong>in</strong> the accepted fashion. The New Deal allowed bankers <strong>to</strong>create the money, borrowed it from the banks,and spent it. This meantthat the New Deal ran up the national debt <strong>to</strong> the credit of the banks,and spent money <strong>in</strong> such a limited fashion that no drastic reemploymen<strong>to</strong>f idle resources was possible.One of the most significant facts about the New Deal was itsorthodoxy on money. For the whole 12 years he was <strong>in</strong> the White House,Roosevelt had statu<strong>to</strong>ry power <strong>to</strong> issue fiat money <strong>in</strong> the form ofgreenbacks pr<strong>in</strong>ted by the government without recourse <strong>to</strong> the banks.This authority was never used. As a result of such orthodoxy, thedepression's symp<strong>to</strong>ms of idle resources were overcome only when theemergency of the war <strong>in</strong> 1942 made it possible <strong>to</strong> justify a limitless<strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> the national debt by limitless borrow<strong>in</strong>g from privatepersons and the banks. But the whole episode showed a failure <strong>to</strong> graspthe nature of money and the function of the monetary system, of whichconsiderable traces rema<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> the postwar period.Page 535One reason for the New Deal's read<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>to</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ue with anorthodox theory of the nature of money, along with an unorthodoxpractice <strong>in</strong> its use, arose from the failure of the Rooseveltadm<strong>in</strong>istration <strong>to</strong> recognize the nature of the economic crisis itself.This failure can be seen <strong>in</strong> Roosevelt's theory of "pump prim<strong>in</strong>g." Hes<strong>in</strong>cerely believed, as did his Secretary of the Treasury, that therewas noth<strong>in</strong>g structurally wrong with the economy, that it wastemporarily stalled, and would keep go<strong>in</strong>g of its own powers if itcould be restarted...The <strong>in</strong>adequacy of this theory of the depression was shown <strong>in</strong> 1937when the New Deal, after four years of pump prim<strong>in</strong>g and a vic<strong>to</strong>riouselection <strong>in</strong> 1936, s<strong>to</strong>pped its spend<strong>in</strong>g. Instead of tak<strong>in</strong>g off, the


economy collapsed <strong>in</strong> the steepest recession <strong>in</strong> his<strong>to</strong>ry. The New Dealhad <strong>to</strong> resume its treatment of symp<strong>to</strong>ms but now without hope that thespend<strong>in</strong>g program could ever be ended, a hopeless prospect s<strong>in</strong>ce theadm<strong>in</strong>istration lacked the knowledge of how <strong>to</strong> reform the system oreven how <strong>to</strong> escape from borrow<strong>in</strong>g bank credit with its mount<strong>in</strong>g publicdebt, and the adm<strong>in</strong>istration lacked the courage <strong>to</strong> adopt the reallylarge-scale spend<strong>in</strong>g necessary <strong>to</strong> give full employment of resources.The adm<strong>in</strong>istration was saved from this impasse by the need for therearmament program followed by the war. S<strong>in</strong>ce 1947 the Cold War andthe space program have allowed the same situation <strong>to</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ue, so thateven <strong>to</strong>day, prosperity is not the result of a properly organizedeconomic system but of government spend<strong>in</strong>g, and any drastic reduction<strong>in</strong> such spend<strong>in</strong>g would give rise <strong>to</strong> an acute depression.THE ECONOMIC FACTORSPage 540There are a number of important elements <strong>in</strong> the economicsituation of the 20th century.8. The <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g disparity <strong>in</strong> the distribution of <strong>in</strong>come is themost controversial and least well-established characteristic of thesystem. It would appear that the disparity <strong>in</strong> national <strong>in</strong>come has beengett<strong>in</strong>g wider.In the US, the richest one-fifth receive 46% of the <strong>in</strong>come <strong>in</strong>1910, 51% <strong>in</strong> 1929 and 48% <strong>in</strong> 1937. In the same three years, the shareof the poorest one-fifth fell from 8% <strong>to</strong> 5.4% <strong>to</strong> 3.6%If <strong>in</strong>stead of one-fifth, we exam<strong>in</strong>e the richest and poorest onetenth,<strong>in</strong> 1910 the ratio was 10, <strong>in</strong> 1929 it was 21.7, <strong>in</strong> 1937, it was34.4. This means that the rich were gett<strong>in</strong>g richer relatively andprobably absolutely while the poor were gett<strong>in</strong>g poorer both relativelyand absolutely.Page 542The progressives who <strong>in</strong>sisted that the lack of <strong>in</strong>vestment wascaused by lack of consumer purchas<strong>in</strong>g power were correct. But theconservatives who <strong>in</strong>sisted that the lack of <strong>in</strong>vestment was caused bylack of confidence were also correct. Each was look<strong>in</strong>g at the oppositeside of a s<strong>in</strong>gle cont<strong>in</strong>uous cycle:a) purchas<strong>in</strong>g power creates demand for goods;b) demand for goods creates confidence <strong>in</strong> the m<strong>in</strong>ds of <strong>in</strong>ves<strong>to</strong>rs;c) confidence creates new <strong>in</strong>vestment;d) new <strong>in</strong>vestment creates purchas<strong>in</strong>g power which then creates demand.It would appear that the economic fac<strong>to</strong>rs alone affected thedistribution of <strong>in</strong>comes <strong>in</strong> the direction of <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g disparity.Page 543In Germany, Hitler's 1934 adoption of an unorthodox f<strong>in</strong>ancialpolicy which raised the standards of liv<strong>in</strong>g of the lower-<strong>in</strong>come levelseven more drastically (by shift<strong>in</strong>g them from unemployment with <strong>in</strong>comesclose <strong>to</strong> noth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> wage-earn<strong>in</strong>g positions <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dustry) was not


acceptable <strong>to</strong> the high-<strong>in</strong>come classes because it s<strong>to</strong>pped the threat ofrevolution by the discontented masses and because it was obviously oflong-run benefit <strong>to</strong> them. This long-run benefit began <strong>to</strong> appear whencapacity employment of capital and labor was achieved <strong>in</strong> 1937.Page 546In the modern economic community, the sum <strong>to</strong>tal of goods andservices appear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the market is at one and the same time the<strong>in</strong>come of the community and the aggregate cost of produc<strong>in</strong>g goods andservices <strong>in</strong> question. Aggregate costs, aggregate <strong>in</strong>comes and aggregateprices are the same s<strong>in</strong>ce they are merely opposite sides of theidentical expenditures.The purchas<strong>in</strong>g power available <strong>in</strong> the community is equal <strong>to</strong><strong>in</strong>come m<strong>in</strong>us sav<strong>in</strong>gs. If there are any sav<strong>in</strong>gs, the availablepurchas<strong>in</strong>g power will be less than the aggregate prices be<strong>in</strong>g askedfor the products for sale and the amount of the sav<strong>in</strong>gs. Thus, all thegoods and services produced cannot be sold as long as sav<strong>in</strong>gs are heldback. In order for al the goods <strong>to</strong> be sold, it is necessary for thesav<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>to</strong> reappear <strong>in</strong> the market as purchas<strong>in</strong>g power. Thedisequilibrium between purchas<strong>in</strong>g power and prices which are createdby the act of sav<strong>in</strong>g is res<strong>to</strong>red completely by the act of <strong>in</strong>vestment,and all the goods can be sold at the prices asked. But whenever<strong>in</strong>vestment is less than sav<strong>in</strong>gs, the available supply of purchas<strong>in</strong>gpower is <strong>in</strong>adequate by the same amount <strong>to</strong> by the goods be<strong>in</strong>g offered.This marg<strong>in</strong> by which purchas<strong>in</strong>g power is <strong>in</strong>adequate because of anexcess of sav<strong>in</strong>gs over <strong>in</strong>vestment may be called the "deflationarygap."This "deflationary gap" is the key <strong>to</strong> the twentieth centuryeconomic crisis and one of the three central cores of the wholetragedy of the century.THE RESULTS OF THE ECONOMIC DEPRESSIONPage 547The deflationary gap aris<strong>in</strong>g from a failure of <strong>in</strong>vestment <strong>to</strong>reach the level of sav<strong>in</strong>gs can be closed either by lower<strong>in</strong>g the supplyof goods <strong>to</strong> the level of available purchas<strong>in</strong>g power or by rais<strong>in</strong>g thesupply of purchas<strong>in</strong>g power <strong>to</strong> a level able <strong>to</strong> absorb the exist<strong>in</strong>gsupply of goods, or a comb<strong>in</strong>ation of both. The first solution willgive a stabilized economy on a low level of activity; the second willgive a stabilized economy on a high level of activity. Left <strong>to</strong> itself,the economic system under modern conditions would adopt the formerprocedure work<strong>in</strong>g as follows: The deflationary gap will result <strong>in</strong>fall<strong>in</strong>g prices, decl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g economic activity and ris<strong>in</strong>g unemployment.This will result <strong>in</strong> a fall <strong>in</strong> national <strong>in</strong>come result<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> an evenmore rapid decl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> the volume of sav<strong>in</strong>gs. This decl<strong>in</strong>e cont<strong>in</strong>uesuntil the volume of sav<strong>in</strong>gs reaches the level of <strong>in</strong>vestment at whichpo<strong>in</strong>t the fall is arrested and the economy becomes stabilized at a lowlevel.This process did not work itself out <strong>in</strong> any <strong>in</strong>dustrial country


dur<strong>in</strong>g the great depression because the disparity <strong>in</strong> national <strong>in</strong>comewas so great that a considerable portion of the population would havebeen driven <strong>to</strong> zero <strong>in</strong>comes and absolute want before sav<strong>in</strong>gs of thericher segment fell <strong>to</strong> the level of <strong>in</strong>vestment. Under such conditions,the masses of population would have been driven <strong>to</strong> revolution and thestabilization, if reached, would have been on a level so low that aconsiderable portion of the population would have been <strong>in</strong> absolutewant. Because of this, governments <strong>to</strong>ok steps <strong>to</strong> arrest the course ofthe depression before their citizens were driven <strong>to</strong> desperation.The methods used <strong>to</strong> deal with the depression and close thedeflationary gap were all reducible <strong>to</strong> two fundamental types:a) those which destroy goods, andb) those which produce goods which do not enter the market.The destruction of goods will close the deflationary gap byreduc<strong>in</strong>g the supply of unsold goods through lower<strong>in</strong>g the supply ofgoods <strong>to</strong> the level of the supply of purchas<strong>in</strong>g power. It is notgenerally realized that this method is one of the chief ways <strong>in</strong> whichthe gap is closed <strong>in</strong> a normal bus<strong>in</strong>ess cycle where goods are destroyedby the simple expedient of not produc<strong>in</strong>g the goods which the system iscapable of produc<strong>in</strong>g. The failure <strong>to</strong> use full level of 1929 outputrepresented a loss of $100 billion <strong>in</strong> the US, Brita<strong>in</strong> and Germanyalone. This loss was equivalent <strong>to</strong> the destruction of such goods.Destruction of goods by failure <strong>to</strong> gather the harvest is a commonphenomenon under modern conditions. When a farmer leaves his cropunharvested because the price is <strong>to</strong>o low <strong>to</strong> cover the expense ofharvest<strong>in</strong>g, he is destroy<strong>in</strong>g the goods. Outright destruction of goodsalready produced is not common and occurred for the first time as amethod of combat<strong>in</strong>g depression <strong>in</strong> the years 1930-1934. Dur<strong>in</strong>g thisperiod, s<strong>to</strong>res of coffee, sugar, and bananas were destroyed, corn wasplowed under, and young lives<strong>to</strong>ck was slaughtered <strong>to</strong> reduce the supplyon the market. The destruction of goods <strong>in</strong> warfare is another exampleof this method of overcom<strong>in</strong>g deflationary conditions <strong>in</strong> the economicsystem.Page 548The second method of fill<strong>in</strong>g the deflationary gap, namely, byproduc<strong>in</strong>g goods which do not enter the market, accomplishes itspurpose by provid<strong>in</strong>g purchas<strong>in</strong>g power <strong>in</strong> the market, s<strong>in</strong>ce the costsof production of such goods do enter the market as purchas<strong>in</strong>g power,while the goods themselves do not dra<strong>in</strong> funds from the system if theyare not offered for sale. New <strong>in</strong>vestment was the usual way <strong>in</strong> whichthis was accomplished <strong>in</strong> the normal bus<strong>in</strong>ess cycle but it is not thenormal way of fill<strong>in</strong>g the gap under modern conditions of depression.We have already seen the grow<strong>in</strong>g reluctance <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>vest and the unlikelychance that the purchas<strong>in</strong>g power necessary for prosperity will beprovided by a constant stream of private <strong>in</strong>vestment. It this is so,the funds for produc<strong>in</strong>g goods which do not enter the market must be


sought <strong>in</strong> a program of public spend<strong>in</strong>g.Any program of public spend<strong>in</strong>g at once runs <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the problems of<strong>in</strong>flation and public debt. These are the same two problems mentioned<strong>in</strong> connection with the efforts of government <strong>to</strong> pay for the FirstWorld War. The methods of pay<strong>in</strong>g for a depression are exactly the sameas the methods of pay<strong>in</strong>g for a war, except that the comb<strong>in</strong>ation ofmethods used may be somewhat different because the goals are somewhatdifferent. In f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g a war, we should seek <strong>to</strong> achieve a methodwhich will provide a maximum of output with a m<strong>in</strong>imum of <strong>in</strong>flation andpublic debt. In deal<strong>in</strong>g with a depression, s<strong>in</strong>ce a chief aim is <strong>to</strong>close the deflationary gap, the goal will be <strong>to</strong> provide a maximum ofoutput with a necessary degree of <strong>in</strong>flation and a m<strong>in</strong>imum of publicdebt. Thus the use of fiat money is more justifiable <strong>in</strong> f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g adepression than <strong>in</strong> f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g a war. Moreover the sell<strong>in</strong>g of bonds <strong>to</strong>private persons <strong>in</strong> wartime might well be aimed at the lower-<strong>in</strong>comegroups <strong>in</strong> order <strong>to</strong> reduce consumption and release facilities for warproduction, while <strong>in</strong> a depression (where low consumption is the chiefproblem) such sales of bonds <strong>to</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ance public spend<strong>in</strong>g would have <strong>to</strong>be aimed at the sav<strong>in</strong>gs of the upper-<strong>in</strong>come groups.These ideas on the role of government spend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> combat<strong>in</strong>gdepression have been formally organized <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the "theory of thecompensa<strong>to</strong>ry economy." This theory advocates that government spend<strong>in</strong>gand fiscal policies be organized so that they work exactly contrary <strong>to</strong>the bus<strong>in</strong>ess cycle, with lower taxes and larger spend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>deflationary period and higher taxes with reduced spend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a boomperiod, the fiscal deficits of the down cycle be<strong>in</strong>g counterbalanced <strong>in</strong>the national budget by the surpluses of the up cycle.Page 549This compensa<strong>to</strong>ry economy has not been applied with much success<strong>in</strong> any European country except Sweden. In a democratic country, itwould take the control of tax<strong>in</strong>g and spend<strong>in</strong>g away from the electedrepresentatives of the people and place this precious "power of thepurse" at the control of the au<strong>to</strong>matic processes of the bus<strong>in</strong>ess cycleas <strong>in</strong>terpreted by bureaucratic (and representative) experts. Moreover,all these programs of deficit spend<strong>in</strong>g are <strong>in</strong> jeopardy <strong>in</strong> a countrywith a private bank<strong>in</strong>g system. In such a system, the creation of money(or credit) is usually reserved for the private bank<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>stitutionsand is deprecated as a government action. The argument that thecreation of f<strong>in</strong>ds by the government is bad while creation of funds bythe banks is salutary is very persuasive <strong>in</strong> a system based ontraditional laissez faire and <strong>in</strong> which the usual avenues ofcommunications (such as newspapers and radio) are under private, oreven banker, control.Public spend<strong>in</strong>g as a method of counteract<strong>in</strong>g depression can varyvery greatly <strong>in</strong> character, depend<strong>in</strong>g on the purposes of the spend<strong>in</strong>g.


Spend<strong>in</strong>g for destruction of goods or for restriction of output, asunder the New Deal agricultural program, cannot be justified easily<strong>in</strong> a democratic country with freedom of communications because i<strong>to</strong>bviously results <strong>in</strong> a decl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> national <strong>in</strong>come and liv<strong>in</strong>gstandards.Spend<strong>in</strong>g for non-productive monuments is somewhat easier <strong>to</strong>justify but is hardly a long-run solution.Spend<strong>in</strong>g for <strong>in</strong>vestment <strong>in</strong> productive equipment (like theTennessee Valley Authority Dam) is obviously the best solution s<strong>in</strong>ceit leads <strong>to</strong> an <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> national wealth and standards of liv<strong>in</strong>g andis a long-run solution but it marks a permanent departure from asystem of private capitalism and can be easily attacked <strong>in</strong> a countrywith a capitalistic ideology and a private bank<strong>in</strong>g system.Spend<strong>in</strong>g on armaments and national defence is the last method offight<strong>in</strong>g depression and is the one most readily and most widelyadopted <strong>in</strong> the twentieth century.A program of public expenditure on armaments is a method forfill<strong>in</strong>g the deflationary gap and overcom<strong>in</strong>g depression because it addspurchas<strong>in</strong>g power <strong>to</strong> the market without draw<strong>in</strong>g it out aga<strong>in</strong> later(s<strong>in</strong>ce the armaments, once produced, are not put up for sale). From aneconomic po<strong>in</strong>t of view, this method of combat<strong>in</strong>g depression is notmuch different from the method listed earlier under destruction ofgoods, for, <strong>in</strong> this case also, economic resources are diverted fromconstructive activities or idleness <strong>to</strong> production for destruction. Theappeal of this method for cop<strong>in</strong>g with the problem of depression doesnot rest on economic grounds at all, for, on such grounds, there isno justification. It's appeal is rather <strong>to</strong> be found on other,especially political, grounds.Page 550The adoption of rearmament as a method of combat<strong>in</strong>g depressiondoes not have <strong>to</strong> be conscious. The country which adopts it mayhonestly feel that it is adopt<strong>in</strong>g the policy for good reasons, that itis threatened by aggression, and that a program of re-armament isnecessary for political protection. It is very rare for a countryconsciously <strong>to</strong> adopt a program of aggression, for, <strong>in</strong> most wars, bothsides are conv<strong>in</strong>ced that their actions are defensive. It is almostequally rare for a country <strong>to</strong> adopt a policy of re-armament as asolution for depression. If a country adopts re-armament because offear of another's arms and these last are the result of efforts <strong>to</strong>fill a deflationary gap, it can also be said that the re-armament ofthe former has a basic economic cause.In the 20th century, the vested <strong>in</strong>terests usually sought <strong>to</strong>prevent the reform of the economic system (a reform whose need wasmade evident by the long-drawn-out depression) by adopt<strong>in</strong>g an economicprogram whose chief element was the effort <strong>to</strong> fill the deflationarygap by re-armament.


THE PLURALIST ECONOMY AND WORLD BLOCSThe economic disasters of two wars, a world depression, and thepost-war fluctuations showed clearly by 1960 that a new economicorganization of society was both needed and available. The laissezfairecompetitive system had destroyed itself and almost destroyedcivilization as well by its <strong>in</strong>ability <strong>to</strong> distribute the goods it couldproduce. The system of monopoly capitalism had helped <strong>in</strong> thisdisaster.Page 551The almost simultaneous failure of laissez-faire, Fascism, and ofCommunism <strong>to</strong> satisfy the grow<strong>in</strong>g popular demand both for ris<strong>in</strong>gstandards of liv<strong>in</strong>g and for spiritual liberty had forced the mid-20thcentury <strong>to</strong> seek some new economic organization.Underdeveloped peoples have been struck by the conflict<strong>in</strong>g claimsof the two great super-Powers.. The former offered the goods the newpeoples wanted (ris<strong>in</strong>g standards of liv<strong>in</strong>g and freedom) while thelatter seemed <strong>to</strong> offer methods of gett<strong>in</strong>g these goods (by stateaccumulation of capital, government direction of resources) whichmight tend <strong>to</strong> smother these goals. The net result has been aconvergence <strong>to</strong>ward a common, if remote, system of the future whoseultimate nature is not yet clear but which we might call the"pluralist economy."CHAPTER XII: THE POLICY OF APPEASEMENT 1931-1936Page 559The structure of collective security was destroyed completelyunder the assaults of Japan, Italy and Germany who were attack<strong>in</strong>g thewhole n<strong>in</strong>eteenth century way of life and some of the most fundamentalattributes of Western Civilization itself. They were <strong>in</strong> revolt aga<strong>in</strong>stdemocracy, aga<strong>in</strong>st the parliamentary system, aga<strong>in</strong>st laissez-faire andthe liberal outlook, aga<strong>in</strong>st nationalism (although <strong>in</strong> the name ofnationalism), aga<strong>in</strong>st humanitarianism, aga<strong>in</strong>st science and aga<strong>in</strong>st allrespect for human dignity and human decency. It was recruited from thedregs of society.Page 560Dur<strong>in</strong>g the n<strong>in</strong>eteenth century, goals were completely lost or werereduced <strong>to</strong> the most primitive level of obta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g more power and morewealth. But the constant acquisition of power or wealth, like anarcotic for which the need grows as its use <strong>in</strong>creases without <strong>in</strong> anyway satisfy<strong>in</strong>g the user, left man's "higher" nature unsatisfied.Page 561Germany could have made no aggression without the acquiescenceand even <strong>in</strong> some cases the actual encouragement of the "satisfied"Powers, especially Brita<strong>in</strong>.THE JAPANESE ASSAULT, 1931-1941


The similarity between Germany and Japan was strik<strong>in</strong>g: each had acompletely cartelized <strong>in</strong>dustry, a militaristic tradition, a hardwork<strong>in</strong>gpopulation which respected authority and loved order, a facadeof parliamentary constitutionalism which barely concealed the realityof power wielded by an alliance of army, landlords, and <strong>in</strong>dustry.Page 562The steady rise <strong>in</strong> tariffs aga<strong>in</strong>st Japanese manufactured goodsafter 1897 led by America served <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease the difficulties ofJapan's position. The world depression and the f<strong>in</strong>ancial crisis hitJapan a terrible blow. Under this impact, the reactionary andaggressive forces were able <strong>to</strong> solidify their control and embark onthat adventure of aggression and destruction that ultimately led <strong>to</strong>the disasters of 1945.Page 563Separate from the armed forces were the forces of monopolycapitalism, the eight great economic complexes controlled as familyunits knows as "zaibatsu" which controlled 75% of the nation's wealth.By 1930, the militarists and zaibatsu came <strong>to</strong>gether <strong>in</strong> their lastfateful alliance.Page 569Japan's unfavorable balance of trade was reflected <strong>in</strong> a heavyoutflow of gold <strong>in</strong> 1937-1938. It was clear that Japan was los<strong>in</strong>g itsf<strong>in</strong>ancial and commercial ability <strong>to</strong> buy necessary materials of foreignorig<strong>in</strong>. The steps taken by America, Australia, and others <strong>to</strong> restrictexport of strategic or military materials <strong>to</strong> Japan made this problemeven more acute. The attack on Ch<strong>in</strong>a had been <strong>in</strong>tended <strong>to</strong> remedy thissituation by remov<strong>in</strong>g the Ch<strong>in</strong>ese boycott on Japanese goods.Page 570Under the pressure of the grow<strong>in</strong>g reluctance of neutral countries<strong>to</strong> supply Japan with necessary strategic goods, the most vital be<strong>in</strong>gpetroleum products and rubber, it seemed that the occupation of theDutch Indies and Malaya could do much <strong>to</strong> alleviate these shortages butwhich would lead <strong>to</strong> an American war on Japan. They decided <strong>to</strong> attackthe United States first.THE ITALIAN ASSAULT, 1934-1936Page 571In 1922, the Fascists came <strong>to</strong> power <strong>in</strong> a parliamentary system; <strong>in</strong>1925 it was replaced by a political dicta<strong>to</strong>rship while the economicsystem rema<strong>in</strong>ed that of orthodox f<strong>in</strong>ancial capitalism; <strong>in</strong> 1927 anorthodox and restrictive stabilization of the lira on the<strong>in</strong>ternational gold standard led <strong>to</strong> such depressed economic conditionsthat Mussol<strong>in</strong>i adopted a much more active foreign policy; <strong>in</strong> 1934Italy replaced orthodox economic measures by a <strong>to</strong>talitarian economyfunction<strong>in</strong>g beneath a fraudulent corporate facade.Italy was dissatisfied over its lack of colonial ga<strong>in</strong>s atVersailles and the refusal of the League <strong>to</strong> accede <strong>to</strong> Tit<strong>to</strong>ni's


equest for a redistribution of the world's resources <strong>in</strong> accordancewith population needs made <strong>in</strong> 1920.In a series of agreements with Austria and Hungary known as the"Rome Pro<strong>to</strong>cols," the Austrian government under Engelbert Dollfussdestroyed the democratic <strong>in</strong>stitutions of Austria, wiped out allSocialist and work<strong>in</strong>g-class organizations, and established a one-partydicta<strong>to</strong>rial corporate state at Mussol<strong>in</strong>i's behest <strong>in</strong> 1934. Hitler <strong>to</strong>okadvantage of this <strong>to</strong> attempt a Nazi coup <strong>in</strong> Austria, murder<strong>in</strong>gDollfuss <strong>in</strong> July 1934 but he was prevented by the quick mobilizationof Italian troops on the Brenner frontier and a stern warn<strong>in</strong>g fromMussol<strong>in</strong>i.Page 572Hitler's ascension <strong>to</strong> office <strong>in</strong> Germany <strong>in</strong> 1933 found Frenchforeign policy paralyzed by British opposition <strong>to</strong> any efforts <strong>to</strong>support collective security or <strong>to</strong> enforce German observation of itstreaty obligations by force. As a result, a suggestion from Poland <strong>in</strong>1933 for jo<strong>in</strong>t armed <strong>in</strong>tervention <strong>in</strong> Germany <strong>to</strong> remove Hitler fromoffice was rejected by France. Poland at once made an non-aggressionpact with Germany and extended a previous one with the Soviet Union.In 1934, France under Jean Louis Bathou, began <strong>to</strong> adopt a moreactive policy aga<strong>in</strong>st Hitler seek<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> encircle Germany by br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>gthe Soviet Union and Italy <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> a revived alignment of France, Poland,the Little Entente, Greece and Turkey.Page 573France's Laval was conv<strong>in</strong>ced that Italy could be brought <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> theanti-German front only if its long-stand<strong>in</strong>g grievances and unfulfilledambitions <strong>in</strong> Africa could be met. Accord<strong>in</strong>gly, he gave Mussol<strong>in</strong>i 7% ofthe s<strong>to</strong>ck <strong>in</strong> the Djibouti-Addis Ababa Railway, a stretch of desert114,000 square miles <strong>in</strong> extent but conta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g only a few hundredpersons (sixty-two accord<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> Mussol<strong>in</strong>i) on the border of Libya, asmall wedge of terri<strong>to</strong>ry between French Somaliland and ItalianEritrea, and the right <strong>to</strong> ask for concessions throughout Ethiopia.While Laval <strong>in</strong>sisted that he had made no agreement whichjeopardized Ethiopia's <strong>in</strong>dependence or terri<strong>to</strong>rial <strong>in</strong>tegrity, he madeit equally clear that Italian support aga<strong>in</strong>st Germany was moreimportant than the <strong>in</strong>tegrity of Ethiopia <strong>in</strong> his eyes. France had beenEthiopia's only friend and had brought it <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the League of Nations.Italy had been prevented from conquer<strong>in</strong>g Ethiopia <strong>in</strong> 1896 only by adecisive defeat of her <strong>in</strong>vad<strong>in</strong>g forces at the hands of the Ethiopiansthemselves, while <strong>in</strong> 1925, Brita<strong>in</strong> and Italy had cut her up <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong>economic spheres by an agreement which was annulled by a French appeal<strong>to</strong> the League. Laval's renunciation of France's traditional support ofEthiopian <strong>in</strong>dependence brought Italy, Brita<strong>in</strong> and France <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong>agreement on this issue.Page 574This po<strong>in</strong>t of view was not shared by public op<strong>in</strong>ion <strong>in</strong> these


three countries. Stanley Baldw<strong>in</strong> (party leader and prime m<strong>in</strong>ister)erected one of the most as<strong>to</strong>nish<strong>in</strong>g examples of British "dual" policy<strong>in</strong> the appeasement period. While publicly support<strong>in</strong>g collectivesecurity and sanctions aga<strong>in</strong>st Italian aggression, the governmentprivately negotiated <strong>to</strong> destroy the League and <strong>to</strong> yield Ethiopia <strong>to</strong>Italy. They were completely successful <strong>in</strong> this secret policy.The Italian <strong>in</strong>vaders had no real fear of British militarysanctions when they put a major part of their forces <strong>in</strong> the Red Seaseparated from home by the British-controlled Suez canal. The Britishgovernment's position was clearly stated <strong>in</strong> a secret report by SirJohn Maffey which declared that Italian control of Ethiopia would be a"matter of <strong>in</strong>difference" <strong>to</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong>. This op<strong>in</strong>ion was shared by theFrench government <strong>to</strong>o.Unfortunately, public op<strong>in</strong>ion was <strong>in</strong>sist<strong>in</strong>g on collectivesanctions aga<strong>in</strong>st the aggressor. To meet this demand, both governmentsengaged <strong>in</strong> a public policy of unenforced or partially enforcedsanctions at wide variance with their real <strong>in</strong>tentions.Foreign Secretary Samuel Hoare delivered a smash<strong>in</strong>g speech <strong>to</strong>support sanctions aga<strong>in</strong>st Italy. The day previously he and AnthonyEden had secretly agreed with Pierre Laval <strong>to</strong> impose only partialeconomic sanctions avoid<strong>in</strong>g all actions such as blockade of the Suezcanal.Page 575A number of governments <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Franceand Brita<strong>in</strong> had s<strong>to</strong>pped all exports of munitions <strong>to</strong> Ethiopia as earlyas May 1935 although Ethiopia's appeal <strong>to</strong> the League for help had beenmade on March 17th while the Italian attack did not come untilOc<strong>to</strong>ber. The net result was that Ethiopia was left defenceless and herappeal <strong>to</strong> the US for support was at once rejected.Hoare's speech evoked such applause from the British public thatBaldw<strong>in</strong> decided <strong>to</strong> hold a general election on that issue. Accord<strong>in</strong>gly,with r<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g pledge <strong>to</strong> support collective security, the Nationalgovernment won an amaz<strong>in</strong>g vic<strong>to</strong>ry and stayed <strong>in</strong> power until the nextgeneral election ten years later (1945).Although Article 16 of the League Covenant bound the signers <strong>to</strong>break off all trade with an aggressor, France and Brita<strong>in</strong> comb<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>to</strong>keep their economic sanctions partial and <strong>in</strong>effective. The impositionof oil sanctions was put off aga<strong>in</strong> and aga<strong>in</strong> until the conquest ofEthiopia was complete. The refusal <strong>to</strong> establish this sanction resultedfrom a jo<strong>in</strong>t British-French refusal on the grounds that an oilsanction would be so effective that Italy would be compelled <strong>to</strong> breakof its was with Ethiopia and would, <strong>in</strong> desperation, make war onBrita<strong>in</strong> and France. This, at least, was the amaz<strong>in</strong>g logic offered bythe British government later.Page 576Hoare and Laval worked out a secret deal which would have given


Italy outright about one-sixth of Ethiopia. When news of this deal wasbroken <strong>to</strong> the public, there was a roar of protest on the groundsthat this violated the election pledge made but a month previously. Tosave his government, Baldw<strong>in</strong> had <strong>to</strong> sacrifice Hoare who resigned onDecember 19 but returned <strong>to</strong> Cab<strong>in</strong>et on June 5 as soon as Ethiopia wasdecently buried. Laval fell from office and was succeeded by PierreFland<strong>in</strong> who pursued the same policy.Ethiopia was conquered on May 2 1936. Sanctions were removed <strong>in</strong>the next two months just as they were beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> take effect. Theconsequences of the Ethiopian fiasco were of the greatest importance.The Conservative Party <strong>in</strong> England was entrenched <strong>in</strong> office for adecade dur<strong>in</strong>g which it carried out its policy of appeasement and wagedthe result<strong>in</strong>g war. The US passed a "Neutrality Act" which encouragedaggression, at the outbreak of war, by cutt<strong>in</strong>g off supplies <strong>to</strong> bothsides, <strong>to</strong> the aggressor who had armed at his leisure and <strong>to</strong> the victimas yet unarmed. Above all, it destroyed French efforts <strong>to</strong> encircleGermany.CIRCLES AND COUNTERCIRCLES, 1935-1939Page 577The remilitarization of the Rh<strong>in</strong>eland <strong>in</strong> violation of theVersailles Treaty was the most important result of the Ethiopiancrisis.Page 578In order <strong>to</strong> destroy the French and Soviet alliances withCzechoslovakia, Brita<strong>in</strong> and Germany sought <strong>to</strong> encircle France and theSoviet Union <strong>in</strong> order <strong>to</strong> dissuade France from honor<strong>in</strong>g its allianceswith either Czechoslovakia or the Soviet Union and France, f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gitself encircled, dishonored its alliance with Czechoslovakia when itcame due <strong>in</strong> 1938.Page 579The British attitude <strong>to</strong>wards eastern Europe was made perfectlyclear when Sir John Simon demanded arms equality for Germany. Add<strong>in</strong>g<strong>to</strong> the encirclement of France was the Anglo-German Naval Agreement ofJune 1935.Page 580Parallel with the encirclement of France went the encirclement ofthe Soviet Union known as the anti-Com<strong>in</strong>tern Pact, the union ofGermany and Japan aga<strong>in</strong>st Communism.The last encirclement was that aga<strong>in</strong>st Czechoslovakia. Hungaryand Germany were both opposed <strong>to</strong> Czechoslovakia as an "artificial"creation of the Versailles Conference. The Polish-German agreement of1934 opened a campaign until the Polish <strong>in</strong>vasion <strong>in</strong> 1938.An analysis of the motivations of Brita<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> 1938-1939 is bound<strong>to</strong> be difficult because the motives of government were clearly not thesame as the motives of the people and <strong>in</strong> no country has secrecy andanonymity been carried so has been been so well preserved as <strong>in</strong>


Brita<strong>in</strong>. In general, motives become vaguer and less secret as we moveour attention from the <strong>in</strong>nermost circles of the government outward. Asif we were look<strong>in</strong>g at the layers of an onion, we may discern fourpo<strong>in</strong>ts of view:1) the anti-Bolsheviks at the center;2) the "three-bloc-world" supporters close <strong>to</strong> the center;3) the supporters of "appeasement" and4) the "peace at any price" group <strong>in</strong> peripheral position.Page 581The chief figures <strong>in</strong> the anti-Bolshevik group were LordCurzon, Lord D'Abernon and General Smuts. They did what they could <strong>to</strong>destroy reparations and permit German re-armament.This po<strong>in</strong>t of view was supported by the second group, the RoundTable Group, and came later <strong>to</strong> be called the Clivenden Set which<strong>in</strong>cluded Lord Milner, Lord Brand (manag<strong>in</strong>g direc<strong>to</strong>r of LazardBrothers, <strong>in</strong>ternational bankers). This group wielded great <strong>in</strong>fluencebecause it controlled the Rhodes Trust and dom<strong>in</strong>ated the RoyalInstitute of International Affairs. They sought <strong>to</strong> conta<strong>in</strong> the SovietUnion rather than destroy it as the anti-Bolsheviks wanted. Theyadvocated a secret alliance of Brita<strong>in</strong> with the German militaryleaders aga<strong>in</strong>st the Soviet.Page 583Abandon<strong>in</strong>g Austria, Czechoslovakia and the Polish Corridor <strong>to</strong>Germany was the aim of both the anti-Bolsheviks and the "three-bloc"people.Page 584From August 1935 <strong>to</strong> March 1939, the government built upon thefears of the "peace at any price" group by steadily exaggerat<strong>in</strong>gGermany's armed might and belittl<strong>in</strong>g their own, by calculated<strong>in</strong>discretions like the statement that there were no real anti-aircraftguns <strong>in</strong> London, by constant hammer<strong>in</strong>g at the danger of air attackwithout warn<strong>in</strong>g, by build<strong>in</strong>g ostentatious and quite useless air-raidtrenches <strong>in</strong> the streets and parks of London, and by <strong>in</strong>sist<strong>in</strong>g throughdaily warn<strong>in</strong>gs that everyone must be fitted with a gas maskimmediately (although the danger of a gas attack was nil). In thisway, the government put London <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> a panic <strong>in</strong> 1938 and by this panic,Chamberla<strong>in</strong> was able <strong>to</strong> get the people <strong>to</strong> accept the destruction ofCzechoslovakia. S<strong>in</strong>ce he could not openly appeal on the anti-Bolshevik basis, he had <strong>to</strong> adopt the expedient of pretend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong>resist (<strong>in</strong> order <strong>to</strong> satisfy the British public) while reallycont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> make every possible concession <strong>to</strong> Hitler which wouldbr<strong>in</strong>g Germany <strong>to</strong> a common frontier with the Soviet Union.Page 585Chamberla<strong>in</strong>'s motives were not really bad ones; he wanted peaceso he could devote Brita<strong>in</strong>'s limited resources <strong>to</strong> social welfare; but


he was narrow and <strong>to</strong>tally ignorant of the realities of power,conv<strong>in</strong>ced that <strong>in</strong>ternational politics could be conducted <strong>in</strong> terms ofsecret deals, as bus<strong>in</strong>ess was, and he was quite ruthless <strong>in</strong> carry<strong>in</strong>gout his aims, especially <strong>in</strong> his read<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>to</strong> sacrifice non-Englishpersons who, <strong>in</strong> his eyes, did not count.THE SPANISH TRAGEDY, 1931-1939Page 587From the <strong>in</strong>vasion of the Arabs <strong>in</strong> 711 <strong>to</strong> their f<strong>in</strong>al ejection <strong>in</strong>1492, Spanish life has been dom<strong>in</strong>ated by the struggle aga<strong>in</strong>st foreign<strong>in</strong>truders. As a result of more than a thousand years of suchstruggles, almost all elements of Spanish society have developed afanatical <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong>lerance, an uncompromis<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dividualism, and a fatalbelief that physical force is a solution <strong>to</strong> all problems, howeverspiritual.Page 588The war of 1898, by depriv<strong>in</strong>g Spa<strong>in</strong> of much of its empire, leftits over-sized army with little <strong>to</strong> do and with a reduced area on which<strong>to</strong> batten. Like a vampire oc<strong>to</strong>pus, the Spanish Army settled down <strong>to</strong>dra<strong>in</strong> the life-blood of Spa<strong>in</strong> and, above all, Morocco. This broughtthe army officers <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> alignment with conservative forces consist<strong>in</strong>gof the Church (upper clergy), the landlords, and the monarchists. Theforces of the proletariat discontent consisted of the urban workersand the much larger mass of exploited peasants.Page 591In 1923, while most of Spa<strong>in</strong> was suffer<strong>in</strong>g from malnutrition,most of the land was untilled and the owners refused <strong>to</strong> use irrigationfacilities which had built by government. As a result, agriculturalyields were the poorest <strong>in</strong> western Europe. While 15 men owned about amillion acres and 15,000 men owned about the of all taxed land, almost2 million owned the other half, frequently <strong>in</strong> plots <strong>to</strong>o small forsubsistence. About 2 million more, who were completely landless,worked 10 <strong>to</strong> 14 hours a day for about 2.5 pesetas (35 cents) a day foronly six months <strong>in</strong> the year and paid exorbitant rents without anysecurity of tenure.In the Church, while the ord<strong>in</strong>ary priests share the poverty andtribulations of the people, the upper clergy were closely allied withgovernment and supported by an annual grant. They had seats <strong>in</strong> theupper chamber, control of education, censorship, marriage. Inconsequence of this alliance of the upper clergy with government andthe forces of reaction, all animosities built aga<strong>in</strong>st the latter came<strong>to</strong> be directed aga<strong>in</strong>st the former also. Although the people rema<strong>in</strong>eduniversally and profoundly catholic, they also became <strong>in</strong>crediblyanticlerical reflected <strong>in</strong> the proclivity for burn<strong>in</strong>g churches.All these groups, landlords, officers, upper clergy, andmonarchists, were <strong>in</strong>terest groups seek<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> utilize Spa<strong>in</strong> for theirown power and profit.


Page 592Alfonso XIII ordered municipal elections but <strong>in</strong> 46 out of 50prov<strong>in</strong>cial capitals, the anti-monarchial forces were vic<strong>to</strong>rious.Alfonso fled <strong>to</strong> France on April 14, 1931.The republicans at once began <strong>to</strong> organize their vic<strong>to</strong>ry, elect<strong>in</strong>ga Constituent Assembly <strong>in</strong> June and establish<strong>in</strong>g an ultramodern unicameral,parliamentary government with universal suffrage, separationof Church and State, secularization of education, local au<strong>to</strong>nomy forseparatist areas and power <strong>to</strong> socialize the great estates or thepublic utilities.The republic lasted only five years before Civil War began <strong>in</strong>1936 after be<strong>in</strong>g challenged constantly from the Right and the extremeLeft. Because of shift<strong>in</strong>g governments, the liberal program which wasenacted <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> law <strong>in</strong> 1931 was annulled or unenforced.Page 593In an effort <strong>to</strong> reduce illiteracy (over 45% <strong>in</strong> 1930), therepublic created thousands of new schools and new teachers, raisedteachers' salaries, founded over a thousand libraries.Army officers were reduced with the surplus be<strong>in</strong>g retired on fullpay. The republican officers tended <strong>to</strong> retire, the monarchists <strong>to</strong> stayon.To assist the peasants and workers, mixed juries were established<strong>to</strong> hear rural rent disputes, importation of labor for wage-break<strong>in</strong>gpurposes was forbidden; and credit was provided for peasants <strong>to</strong>obta<strong>in</strong> land, seed, or fertilizers on favorable terms. Cus<strong>to</strong>marilyuncultivated lands were expropriated with compensation <strong>to</strong> providefarms for a new class of peasant proprie<strong>to</strong>rs.Most of these reforms went <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> effect only partially. Few of theabandoned estates could be expropriated because of the lack of moneyfor compensation.Page 594The conservative groups reacted violently. Three plots began <strong>to</strong>be formed aga<strong>in</strong>st the new republic, the one monarchist led by Sotelo<strong>in</strong> parliament and by Goicoechea beh<strong>in</strong>d the scenes; the second aparliamentary alliance of landlords and clericals under Robles; andthe last a conspiracy of officers under Generals Barrera and Sanjurjo.In the meantime, the monarchist conspiracy was organized byformer K<strong>in</strong>g Alfonso from abroad. Goicoechea performed his task withgreat skill under the eyes of a government which refused <strong>to</strong> takepreventative action because of its own liberal and legalisticscruples. He organized an alliance of the officers, the Carlists, andhis own Alfonsist party. Four men from these three groups then signedan agreement with Mussol<strong>in</strong>i <strong>in</strong> 1934 who promised arms, money,diplomatic support and 1.5 million pesetas, 10,000 rifles,10,000grenades, and 200 mach<strong>in</strong>e guns. In return, the signers promised <strong>to</strong>sign a jo<strong>in</strong>t export policy with Italy.


Page 595The Robles coalition of Right parties with the clerical party andagrarian party of landlords was able <strong>to</strong> replace the Left RepublicanAzana by the Right Republican Lerroux as prime m<strong>in</strong>ister. It thencalled new elections, won vic<strong>to</strong>ry and revoked many of the 1931 reformswhile allow<strong>in</strong>g most of the rest <strong>to</strong> go unenforced and res<strong>to</strong>redexpropriated estates.This led <strong>to</strong> a violent agitation which burst <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> open revolt <strong>in</strong>the two separatist centers of the Basque country and Catalonia. Theupris<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Asturias spearheaded by anarchist m<strong>in</strong>ers hurl<strong>in</strong>g dynamitefrom sl<strong>in</strong>gs, lasted for n<strong>in</strong>e days. The government used the ForeignLegion and Moors, brought <strong>to</strong> Morocco by sea, and crushed the rebelswithout mercy. The latter suffered at 5,000 casualties. After theupris<strong>in</strong>g, 25,000 suspects were thrown <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> prison.The upris<strong>in</strong>g of Oc<strong>to</strong>ber 1934, although crushed, split theoligarchy. The demands of the army, monarchists and the biggestlandlords for a ruthless dicta<strong>to</strong>rship alarmed the leaders of theChurch and president of the republic Zamora. Robles as m<strong>in</strong>ister of warencouraged reactionary control of the army and even put General Franco<strong>in</strong> as his undersecretary of war.Page 596For the 1936 elections, the parties of the Left formed thePopular Front with a published program promis<strong>in</strong>g a full res<strong>to</strong>ration ofthe constitution, amnesty for political crimes committed after 1933,civil liberties, an <strong>in</strong>dependent judiciary, m<strong>in</strong>imum wages, protectionfor tenants, reform of taxation, credit, bank<strong>in</strong>g. It repudiated theSocialist program for nationalization of the land, the banks, and<strong>in</strong>dustry.While all the Popular Front parties would support the government,only the bourgeois parties would hold seats <strong>in</strong> the Cab<strong>in</strong>et while theworkers parties such as the Socialists would rema<strong>in</strong> outside.The Popular Front captured 266 of 473 seats while the Right had153, the Center 54, CEDA 96, Socialists 87, Republic Left 81,Communists 14.The defeated forces of the Right refused <strong>to</strong> accept the electionresults and tried <strong>to</strong> persuade Valladeres <strong>to</strong> hand over the government<strong>to</strong> General Franco. That was rebuffed. On Feb. 20, the conspira<strong>to</strong>rs metand decided the time was not yet ripe. The new government heard ofthis meet<strong>in</strong>g and transferred Franco <strong>to</strong> the Canary Islands. The daybefore he left Madrid, Franco met with the chief conspira<strong>to</strong>rs and theycompleted their plans for a military revolt but fixed no date.In the meantime, provocation, assass<strong>in</strong>ation, and retaliation grewsteadily with the verbal encouragement of the Right. Property wasseized or destroyed and churches were burned on all sides. The mobretaliated by assaults on monarchists and by burn<strong>in</strong>g churches.Page 597


Italian Air Force planes were pa<strong>in</strong>ted over and went <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> action<strong>in</strong> support of the revolt which was a failure when the navy rema<strong>in</strong>edloyal because the crews overthrew their officers; the Air Forcerema<strong>in</strong>ed loyal; the army revolted with much of the police but wereovercome. At the first news of the revolt, the people, led by laborunions, demanded arms. Because arms were lack<strong>in</strong>g, orders were sent a<strong>to</strong>nce <strong>to</strong> France. The recognized government <strong>in</strong> Madrid had the right <strong>to</strong>buy arms abroad and was even bound <strong>to</strong> do so by treaty with France.As a result of the failure of the revolt, the generals foundthemselves isolated <strong>in</strong> several different parts of Spa<strong>in</strong> with no masspopular support.Page 598The rebels held the extreme northwest, the north and the south aswell as Morocco and the islands. They had the unlimited support ofItaly and Portugal and tentative support from Germany.The French suggested an agreement not <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>tervene <strong>in</strong> Spa<strong>in</strong> s<strong>in</strong>ceit was clear that if there was no <strong>in</strong>tervention, the Spanish governmentcould suppress the rebels. Brita<strong>in</strong> accept the French offer at once butefforts <strong>to</strong> get Portugal, Italy, Germany and Russia <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the agreementwere difficult because Portugal and Italy were both help<strong>in</strong>g therebels. By August, all six Powers had agreed.Efforts <strong>to</strong> establish some k<strong>in</strong>d of supervision were rejected bythe rebels and by Portugal while Brita<strong>in</strong> refused <strong>to</strong> permit anyrestrictions <strong>to</strong> be placed on war material go<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> Portugal at thevery moment when it was putt<strong>in</strong>g all k<strong>in</strong>ds of pressure on France <strong>to</strong>restrict any flow of supplies <strong>to</strong> the recognized government of Spa<strong>in</strong>.Portugal had delayed jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the agreement until it would hurt theLoyalist forces more than the rebels. Even then, there was no<strong>in</strong>tention of observ<strong>in</strong>g the agreements.Page 599France did little <strong>to</strong> help the Madrid government while Brita<strong>in</strong> waspositively hostile <strong>to</strong> it. Both governments s<strong>to</strong>pped all shipments ofwar material <strong>to</strong> Spa<strong>in</strong>. By its <strong>in</strong>sistence on enforc<strong>in</strong>g non-<strong>in</strong>terventionaga<strong>in</strong>st the Loyalists, while ignor<strong>in</strong>g the systematic and large-scaleevasions of the agreement <strong>in</strong> behalf of the rebels, Brita<strong>in</strong> was neitherfair nor neutral, and had <strong>to</strong> engage <strong>in</strong> large-scale violations of<strong>in</strong>ternational law. Brita<strong>in</strong> refuse <strong>to</strong> permit any restrictions <strong>to</strong> beplaced on war material go<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> Portugal (<strong>to</strong> the rebels). It refused<strong>to</strong> allow the Loyalist Spanish Navy <strong>to</strong> blockade the seaports held bythe rebels, and <strong>to</strong>ok immediate action aga<strong>in</strong>st efforts by the Madridgovernment <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>terfere with any k<strong>in</strong>d of shipments <strong>to</strong> rebel areas,while wholesale assaults by the rebels on British and other neutralships go<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> Loyalist areas drew little more than feeble protestsfrom Brita<strong>in</strong>.Brita<strong>in</strong> was clearly seek<strong>in</strong>g a rebel vic<strong>to</strong>ry and <strong>in</strong>stead of try<strong>in</strong>g<strong>to</strong> enforce non<strong>in</strong>tervention, was actively support<strong>in</strong>g the rebel blockade


of Loyalist Spa<strong>in</strong> when the British Navy began, <strong>in</strong> 1937, <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>terceptBritish ships headed for Loyalist ports and on some pretext, or simplyby force, made them go elsewhere.The rebel forces were fewer than the Loyalists but wereeventually successful because of their great superiority <strong>in</strong> artillery,aviation, and tanks as a result of the one-sided enforcement of thenon-<strong>in</strong>tervention agreement.Page 600The failure of Franco <strong>to</strong> capture Madrid led <strong>to</strong> a jo<strong>in</strong>t Italian-German meet<strong>in</strong>g where it was decided <strong>to</strong> recognize the Franco governmentand withdraw their recognition from Madrid on Nov. 18, 1936. Japanrecognized the Franco regime <strong>in</strong> December.As a result, Franco received the full support of the aggressorstates while the Loyalist government was obstructed <strong>in</strong> every way bythe "peace-lov<strong>in</strong>g" Powers. Italy sent 100,000 men and suffered 50,000casualties, Germany sent 20,000 men. On the other side, the Loyalistswere cut off from foreign supplies almost at once because of theembargoes of the Great Powers and obta<strong>in</strong>ed only limited amounts,chiefly from Mexico, Russia and the US until the Non-<strong>in</strong>terventionagreement cut these off. On Jan. 18, 1937, the American Neutrality Actwas revised <strong>to</strong> apply <strong>to</strong> civil as well as <strong>in</strong>ternational wars and was<strong>in</strong>voked aga<strong>in</strong>st Spa<strong>in</strong> immediately but unofficial pressure from theAmerican government prevented such exports <strong>to</strong> Spa<strong>in</strong> even earlier.The Madrid government made violent protests aga<strong>in</strong>st the Axis<strong>in</strong>tervention both before the Non-<strong>in</strong>tervention Committee <strong>in</strong> London andbefore the League of Nations. These were denied by the Axis Powers. An<strong>in</strong>vestigation of these charges was made under Soviet pressure but theCommittee reported that these charges were unproved. Anthony Eden wentso far <strong>to</strong> say that so far as non-<strong>in</strong>tervention was concerned, "therewere other governments more <strong>to</strong> blame tan either Germany or Italy."Page 601Soviet <strong>in</strong>tervention began Oct 7,1936, three and a half yearsafter Italian <strong>in</strong>tervention and almost three months after both Italianand German units were fight<strong>in</strong>g with the rebels. The ThirdInternational recruited volunteers throughout the world <strong>to</strong> fight <strong>in</strong>Spa<strong>in</strong>. This Soviet <strong>in</strong>tervention <strong>in</strong> support of the Madrid government ata time when it could f<strong>in</strong>d support almost nowhere else served <strong>to</strong><strong>in</strong>crease Communist <strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>in</strong> the government very greatly.Page 602The Italian submar<strong>in</strong>e fleet was wait<strong>in</strong>g for Russian shipp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>the Mediterranean and did not hesitate <strong>to</strong> s<strong>in</strong>k it <strong>in</strong> the last fewmonths of 1936.Although the evidence for Axis <strong>in</strong>tervention <strong>in</strong> Spa<strong>in</strong> wasoverwhelm<strong>in</strong>g and was admitted by the Powers themselves early <strong>in</strong> 1937,the British refused <strong>to</strong> admit it and refused <strong>to</strong> modify the non<strong>in</strong>terventionpolicy. Brita<strong>in</strong>'s attitude was so devious that it can


hardly be untangled although the results were clear enough. The realsympathy of the London government clearly favored the rebels althoughit had <strong>to</strong> conceal the fact from public op<strong>in</strong>ion s<strong>in</strong>ce this op<strong>in</strong>ionfavored the Loyalists over Franco by 57% <strong>to</strong> 7% accord<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> a 1938op<strong>in</strong>ion poll.Page 603On December 18, 1936, Eden admitted that the government hadexaggerated the danger of war four months earlier <strong>to</strong> get the non<strong>in</strong>terventionagreement accepted, and when Brita<strong>in</strong> wanted <strong>to</strong> use force<strong>to</strong> achieve its aims, as it did <strong>in</strong> the piracy of Italian submar<strong>in</strong>es <strong>in</strong>1937, it did so without risk of war. The non-<strong>in</strong>tervention agreement,as practiced, was neither an aid <strong>to</strong> peace nor an example ofneutrality, but was clearly enforced <strong>in</strong> such a way as <strong>to</strong> give aid <strong>to</strong>the rebels and place all possible obstacles <strong>in</strong> the way of the Loyalistgovernment suppress<strong>in</strong>g the rebellion.The attitude of the British government could not be admittedpublicly and every effort was made <strong>to</strong> picture the actions of the Non<strong>in</strong>terventionCommittee as one of even-handed neutrality. In fact, itwas used <strong>to</strong> throw dust <strong>in</strong> the eyes of the world, especially theBritish public. For months, the mean<strong>in</strong>gless debates of this committeewere reported <strong>in</strong> detail <strong>to</strong> the world and charges, countercharges,proposals, counterproposals, <strong>in</strong>vestigations and <strong>in</strong>conclusiveconclusions were offered <strong>to</strong> the a confused world, thus successfully<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g its confusion. While debat<strong>in</strong>g and quibbl<strong>in</strong>g on about issueslike belligerence, patrols, volunteers, etc., before the Committee <strong>in</strong>London, the Franco forces, with their foreign cont<strong>in</strong>gents, slowlycrushed the Loyalist forces.Page 604The Loyalist forces surrendered on March 28th 1939. England andFrance had recognized the Franco government on February 17 and theAxis troops were evacuated from Spa<strong>in</strong> after a triumphal march throughMadrid <strong>in</strong> June.When the war ended, much of Spa<strong>in</strong> was wrecked, at least 450,000Spaniards had been killed and an unpopular military dicta<strong>to</strong>rship hadbeen imposed as a result of the actions of non-Spanish forces. Atleast 400,000 Spaniards were <strong>in</strong> prison and large numbers were hungryand destitute. Germany recognized this problem and tried <strong>to</strong> get France<strong>to</strong> follow a path of conciliation, humanitarian reform, and social,agricultural, and economic reform. This advice was rejected, with theresult that Spa<strong>in</strong> has rema<strong>in</strong>ed weak, apathetic, war-weary, anddiscontented ever s<strong>in</strong>ce.TRAGEDY AND HOPE Chapters XIII-XVI


y Dr. Carroll QuigleyISBN 0913022-14-4CONTENTSXII. THE POLICY OF APPEASEMENT 1931-1936XIII. THE DISRUPTION OF EUROPEXIV. WORLD WAR II: THE TIDE OF AGGRESSION 1939-1941XV. WORLD WAR II: THE EBB OF AGGRESSION 1941-1945XVI. THE NEW AGECHAPTER XIII: THE DISRUPTION OF EUROPE, 1937-1939AUSTRIA INFELIX, 1933-1938Page 607The Austria which was left after the Treaty of St. Germa<strong>in</strong>consisted of little more than the great city of Vienna surrounded by ahuge but <strong>in</strong>adequate suburb whose population had been reduced from 52<strong>to</strong> 6.6 million.Page 608The Social Democrats were unable <strong>to</strong> reconcile their desire forunion with Germany (called Anschluss) with the need for f<strong>in</strong>ancial aidfrom the Entente Powers who opposed this.The Social Democrats embarked on an amaz<strong>in</strong>g program of socialwelfare by a system of direct taxes which bore heavily on the well-<strong>to</strong>do.Page 609Before 1914, the liv<strong>in</strong>g conditions of the poor had beenma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed by a very undemocratic political system under which only83,000 persons, on a property basis, were allowed <strong>to</strong> vote and 5,500 ofthe richest were allowed <strong>to</strong> choose one-third of all seats on citycouncil. By 1933, the Social Democrats had built almost 60,000dwell<strong>in</strong>gs so efficiently that the average cost per apartment was onlyabout $1,650 each with average rent of $2 per month. Thus the poor ofVienna had all k<strong>in</strong>ds of free or cheap medical care, dental care,education, libraries, amusements, sports, school lunches and maternitycare provided by the city.While this was go<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>in</strong> Vienna, the Christian Socialist-Pan-German federal government of Catholic priest Monsignor Ignaz Seipelwas s<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g deeper <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> corruption, The diversion of public funds <strong>to</strong>banks and <strong>in</strong>dustries controlled by Seipel's supporters was revealed byparliamentary <strong>in</strong>vestigations <strong>in</strong> spite of the government's efforts <strong>to</strong>conceal the facts.Seipel formed a "Unity List" of all the anti-Socialist parties hecould muster but the election gave his party only 73 seats compared <strong>to</strong>71 for the Social Democrats, 12 for the pan-Germans, 9 for the


Agrarian League. He sought <strong>to</strong> change the Austrian constitution <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> apresidential dicta<strong>to</strong>rship which required a two-thirds vote. It becamenecessary <strong>to</strong> use illegal methods.Page 610The secret documents published s<strong>in</strong>ce 1945 make it quite clearthat Germany had no carefully laid plans <strong>to</strong> annex Austria and was notencourag<strong>in</strong>g violence by the Nazis <strong>in</strong> Austria. Instead, every effortwas made <strong>to</strong> restrict the Austrian Nazis <strong>to</strong> propaganda <strong>in</strong> order <strong>to</strong> w<strong>in</strong>a gradual peaceful extension of Nazi <strong>in</strong>fluence.Page 611The <strong>in</strong>vasion of Austria <strong>in</strong> 1938 was a pleasant surprise even forthe Nazi leaders and arose from several unexpected favorablecircumstances. Secret documents now make it clear that <strong>in</strong> 1937 theGerman and British governments made secret decisions which sealed thefate of Austria and Czechoslovakia. It is evident from some ofHitler's statements that he had already received certa<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>formationabout the secret decisions be<strong>in</strong>g made by Chamberla<strong>in</strong> on the Britishside.Page 612The British government group controll<strong>in</strong>g foreign policy hadreached a seven po<strong>in</strong>t decision regard<strong>in</strong>g Germany:1. Hitler's Germany was the front-l<strong>in</strong>e bulwark aga<strong>in</strong>st the spread ofCommunism <strong>in</strong> Europe.2. The aim was a four power pact <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Brita<strong>in</strong>, France, Italy andGermany <strong>to</strong> exclude all Russian <strong>in</strong>fluence from Europe.3. Brita<strong>in</strong> had no objection <strong>to</strong> German acquisition of Austria,Czechoslovakia, and Danzig.4. Germany must not use force <strong>to</strong> achieve its aims as this wouldprecipitate a war <strong>in</strong> which Brita<strong>in</strong> would have <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>tervene.Page 622For years before June 1938, the government <strong>in</strong>sisted that Britishrearm<strong>in</strong>g was progress<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a satisfac<strong>to</strong>ry fashion. Churchillquestioned this and produced figures on German rearmament <strong>to</strong> provethat Brita<strong>in</strong>'s own progress <strong>in</strong> this field was <strong>in</strong>adequate. Thesefigures (which were not correct) were denied by the government. Aslate as March 1938, Chamberla<strong>in</strong> said that British rearmament were suchas <strong>to</strong> make Brita<strong>in</strong> an "almost terrify<strong>in</strong>g power." But as the year wen<strong>to</strong>n, the government adopted a quite different attitude. In order <strong>to</strong>persuade public op<strong>in</strong>ion that it was necessary <strong>to</strong> yield <strong>to</strong> Germany, thegovernment pretended that its armaments were quite <strong>in</strong>adequate.Page 623We now know that this was a gross exaggeration. Brita<strong>in</strong> producedalmost 3000 "military" planes <strong>in</strong> 1938 and about 8,000 <strong>in</strong> 1939 compared<strong>to</strong> 3350 "combat" planes produced <strong>in</strong> Germany <strong>in</strong> 1938 and 4,733 <strong>in</strong> 1939.It is quite clear that Brita<strong>in</strong> did not yield <strong>to</strong> superior force <strong>in</strong>


1938, as was stated at the time and has been stated s<strong>in</strong>ce by manywriters <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Churchill. We have evidence that Chamberla<strong>in</strong> knewthese facts but consistently gave a contrary impression and that LordHalifax went so far as <strong>to</strong> call forth protests from the Britishmilitary attaches <strong>in</strong> Prague and Paris.The British government made it clear <strong>to</strong> Germany both publicly andprivately that they would not oppose Germany's projects. Dirksen wrote<strong>to</strong> Ribbentrop on June 3 1928 "Anyth<strong>in</strong>g which could be got withoutfir<strong>in</strong>g a shot can count upon the agreement of the British."THE CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS, 1937-1938Page 626The economic discontent became stronger after the onset of theworld depression <strong>in</strong> 1929 and especially after Hitler demonstrated thathis policies could br<strong>in</strong>g prosperity <strong>to</strong> Germany.Page 627With<strong>in</strong> two weeks of Hitler's annexation of Austria, Brita<strong>in</strong> putpressure on the Czechs <strong>to</strong> make concessions <strong>to</strong> the Germans; <strong>to</strong>encourage France and Germany <strong>to</strong> do the same. All this was justified bythe argument that Germany would be satisfied if it obta<strong>in</strong>ed theSudetenland and the Polish Corridor. All these assumptions weredubious.Page 628Czechoslovakia was elim<strong>in</strong>ated with the help of German aggression,French <strong>in</strong>decision and war-wear<strong>in</strong>ess, and British public appeasementand merciless secret pressure.Page 629Five days after Anschluss, the Soviet government call forcollective actions <strong>to</strong> s<strong>to</strong>p aggression and <strong>to</strong> elim<strong>in</strong>ate the <strong>in</strong>creaseddanger of a new world slaughter was rejected by Lord Halifax.Page 633It was necessary <strong>to</strong> impose the plan for Czechoslovakia on publicop<strong>in</strong>ion of the world by means of the slowly mount<strong>in</strong>g war scare whichreached the level of absolute panic on September 28th. The mount<strong>in</strong>ghorror of the relentless German mobilization was built up day by daywhile Brita<strong>in</strong> and France ordered the Czechs not <strong>to</strong> mobilize <strong>in</strong> order"not <strong>to</strong> provoke Germany."We now know that all these statements and rumors were not trueand that the British government knew that they were not true at thetime.Page 634The Chamberla<strong>in</strong> government knew these facts but consistently gavea contrary impression. Lord Halifax particularly dis<strong>to</strong>rted the facts.Just as the crisis was reach<strong>in</strong>g the boil<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> September1938, the British ambassador <strong>in</strong> Paris reported <strong>to</strong> London that ColonelL<strong>in</strong>dbergh had just emerged from Germany with a report that Germany had8,000 military planes and could manufacture 1,500 a month. We now know


that Germany had about 1,500 planes, manufactured 280 a month.Page 635L<strong>in</strong>dbergh repeated his tale of woe daily both <strong>in</strong> Paris and <strong>in</strong>London dur<strong>in</strong>g the crisis. The British government began <strong>to</strong> fit thepeople of London with gas masks, the prime m<strong>in</strong>ister and the k<strong>in</strong>gcalled on the people <strong>to</strong> dig trenches <strong>in</strong> the parks, schoolchildrenbegan <strong>to</strong> be evacuated. In general, every report or rumor which couldadd <strong>to</strong> the panic and defeatism was played up, and everyth<strong>in</strong>g thatmight contribute <strong>to</strong> a strong or a united resistance <strong>to</strong> Germany wasplayed down.Page 636The Anglo-French decision was presented <strong>to</strong> the Czechoslovakgovernment at 2a.m. on September 19 <strong>to</strong> be accepted at once. TheCzechoslovak government accepted at 5p.m. on September 21st. LordHalifax at once ordered the Czech police <strong>to</strong> be withdrawn from theSudeten districts, and expressed the wish that the German troops move<strong>in</strong> at once.Page 638At Munich, Hitler, Chamberla<strong>in</strong>, Mussol<strong>in</strong>i and Daladier carved upCzechoslovakia without consult<strong>in</strong>g anyone, least of all the Czechs.Germany was supreme <strong>in</strong> Europe. S<strong>in</strong>ce this was exactly what Chamberla<strong>in</strong>and his friends had wanted, they should have been satisfied.THE YEAR OF DUPES, 1939Page 642Concessions <strong>to</strong> Germany cont<strong>in</strong>ued but now parallel withconcessions went a real effort <strong>to</strong> build up a strong front aga<strong>in</strong>stHitler.Page 643The anti-Bolshevik and "three-bloc-world" groups had expectedHitler would get the Sudetenland, Danzig, and perhaps the PolishCorridor and that he would then be stabilized between the "oceanicbloc" and the Soviet Union.As a result of these hidden and conflict<strong>in</strong>g forces, the his<strong>to</strong>ryof <strong>in</strong>ternational relations from September 1938 and September 1939 oreven later is neither simple nor consistent. In general, the key <strong>to</strong>everyth<strong>in</strong>g was the position of Brita<strong>in</strong>. As a result of Lord Halifax's"dyarchic" policy, there were not only two policies but two groupscarry<strong>in</strong>g them out. Lord Halifax tried <strong>to</strong> satisfy the public demand foran end <strong>to</strong> appeasement while Chamberla<strong>in</strong>, Wilson, Simon and Hoaresought <strong>to</strong> make secret concessions <strong>to</strong> Hitler <strong>in</strong> order <strong>to</strong> achieve ageneral Anglo-German settlement. The one policy was public; the otherwas secret. S<strong>in</strong>ce the Foreign Office knew of both, it tried <strong>to</strong> buildup the "peace front" aga<strong>in</strong>st Germany so that it would looksufficiently impos<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> satisfy public op<strong>in</strong>ion and <strong>to</strong> drive Hitler <strong>to</strong>seek his desires by negotiation rather than by force so that publicop<strong>in</strong>ion <strong>in</strong> England would not force the government <strong>to</strong> declare a war


that they did not want <strong>in</strong> order <strong>to</strong> rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> office. This complex planbroke down because Hitler was determ<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>to</strong> have a war merely for thepersonal emotional thrill of wield<strong>in</strong>g great power, while the effort <strong>to</strong>make a "peace front" sufficiently collapsible so that it could be caseaside if Hitler either obta<strong>in</strong>ed his goals by negotiation or made ageneral settlement with Chamberla<strong>in</strong> merely resulted <strong>in</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g a "peacefront" which was so weak it could neither ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> peace by threat offorce nor w<strong>in</strong> a war when peace was lost.Page 644On March 15th, Chamberla<strong>in</strong> <strong>to</strong>ld the Commons that he accepted theseizure of Czechoslovakia and refused <strong>to</strong> accuse Hitler of bad faith.But two days later, when the howls of rage from the British publicshowed that he had misjudged the elec<strong>to</strong>rate, he denounced the seizure.However, noth<strong>in</strong>g was done other than <strong>to</strong> recall Henderson from Berl<strong>in</strong>for consultations and cancel a visit <strong>to</strong> Berl<strong>in</strong> by the president of theBoard of Trade. The seizure was declared illegal but was recognized <strong>in</strong>fact at once. Moreover, #6 million <strong>in</strong> Czech gold reserves <strong>in</strong> Londonwere turned over <strong>to</strong> Germany with the puny and untrue excuse that theBritish government could not give orders <strong>to</strong> the Bank of England.Page 647Germany opened its negotiations with Poland <strong>in</strong> a fairly friendlyway on Oc<strong>to</strong>ber 24, 1938. It asked for Danzig and a strip a kilometerwide across the Polish Corridor <strong>to</strong> provide a highway and four-trackrailroad under German sovereignty. Poland's economic and harbor rights<strong>in</strong> Danzig were <strong>to</strong> be guaranteed and the "corridor across the Corridor"was <strong>to</strong> be isolated from Polish communications facilities by bridg<strong>in</strong>gor tunnel<strong>in</strong>g. Germany also wanted Poland <strong>to</strong> jo<strong>in</strong> an anti-Russian bloc.Germany was prepared <strong>to</strong> guarantee the country's exist<strong>in</strong>g frontiers, <strong>to</strong>extend the Non-aggression Pact of 1934 for 25 years, <strong>to</strong> guarantee the<strong>in</strong>dependence of Slovakia and <strong>to</strong> dispose of Ruthenia as Poland wished.These suggestions were rejected by Poland. About the same time, theGermans were us<strong>in</strong>g pressure on Romania <strong>to</strong> obta<strong>in</strong> an economic agreementwhich was signed on March 23rd.On March 17, London received a false report of a German ultimatum<strong>to</strong> Romania. Lord Halifax lost his head and, without check<strong>in</strong>g his<strong>in</strong>formation, sent telegrams <strong>to</strong> Greece, Turkey, Poland, Bulgaria,Soviet Union ask<strong>in</strong>g what each country was prepared <strong>to</strong> do <strong>in</strong> the even<strong>to</strong>f a German aggression aga<strong>in</strong>st Romania. Four replied by ask<strong>in</strong>g Londonwhat it was prepared <strong>to</strong> do but Moscow suggested and immediateconference which Halifax rebuffed, want<strong>in</strong>g noth<strong>in</strong>g more than anagreement <strong>to</strong> consult <strong>in</strong> a crisis. Poland was reluctant <strong>to</strong> sign anyagreement <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g Russia. However, when news reached London ofHitler's demands on Poland, Brita<strong>in</strong> suddenly issued a unilateralguarantee of the latter state (March 31st).Page 648


"In the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish<strong>in</strong>dependence and which the Polish government accord<strong>in</strong>gly considered itvital <strong>to</strong> resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Governmentwould feel themselves bound at once <strong>to</strong> lend the Polish Government allsupport <strong>in</strong> their power."This was an extraord<strong>in</strong>ary assurance. The British governments<strong>in</strong>ce 1918 had resolutely refused any bilateral agreement guarantee<strong>in</strong>gany state <strong>in</strong> western Europe. Now they were mak<strong>in</strong>g a "unilateral"declaration <strong>in</strong> "eastern" Europe and they were giv<strong>in</strong>g that state theresponsibility of decid<strong>in</strong>g when that guarantee would take effect,someth<strong>in</strong>g quite unprecedented. If Germany used force <strong>in</strong> Poland, publicop<strong>in</strong>ion <strong>in</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong> would force Brita<strong>in</strong> <strong>to</strong> declare war whether therewas a guarantee or not.If the chief purpose of the unilateral guarantee <strong>to</strong> Poland was <strong>to</strong>frighten Germany, it had precisely the opposite effect.Page 649Hitler announced that the terms he had offered Poland had beenrejected, negotiations broken off. The crisis was <strong>in</strong>tensified byprovocative acts on both sides.Page 650In 1939, there was talk of a British loan <strong>to</strong> Poland of #100million <strong>in</strong> May; On August 1 Poland f<strong>in</strong>ally got a credit for $8 millionat a time when all London was buzz<strong>in</strong>g about a secret loan of #1billion from Brita<strong>in</strong> <strong>to</strong> Germany.In 1936, Poland was given 2 billion francs as a rearmament longand on May 19, 1939, an agreement was signed by which France promisedfull air support <strong>to</strong> Poland on the first day of war, local skirmish<strong>in</strong>gby the third day, and a full-scale offensive on the sixteenth day. OnAug. 23, General Gamel<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>formed his government that no militarysupport could be given <strong>to</strong> Poland until the spr<strong>in</strong>g of 1940 and that afull-scale offensive could not be made before 1941-1942. Poland wasnever <strong>in</strong>formed of this change and seems <strong>to</strong> have entered the war onSeptember 1st <strong>in</strong> the belief that a full-scale offensive would be madeaga<strong>in</strong>st Germany dur<strong>in</strong>g September.The failure <strong>to</strong> support Poland was probably deliberate <strong>in</strong> thehope that this would force Poland <strong>to</strong> negotiate with Hitler. If so, itwas a complete failure. Poland was so encouraged by the Britishguarantee that it not only refused <strong>to</strong> make concessions but alsoprevented the reopen<strong>in</strong>g of negotiations by one excuse after anotheruntil the last day of peace.Page 651In light of these facts, the British efforts <strong>to</strong> reach asettlement with Hitler and their reluctance <strong>to</strong> make an alliance withRussia, were very unrealistic. Nevertheless, they cont<strong>in</strong>ued <strong>to</strong> exhortthe Poles <strong>to</strong> reopen negotiations with Hitler, and cont<strong>in</strong>ued <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>form


the German government that the justice of their claims <strong>to</strong> Danzig andthe Corridor were recognized but that these claims must be fulfilledby peaceful means and that force would <strong>in</strong>evitably be met with force.The British cont<strong>in</strong>ued <strong>to</strong> emphasize that the controversy was overDanzig when everyone else knew that Danzig was merely a detail, and analmost <strong>in</strong>defensible detail. Danzig was no issue on which <strong>to</strong> fight aworld war, but it was an issue on which negotiation was almostmanda<strong>to</strong>ry. This may have been why Brita<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>sisted that it was thechief issue. But because it was not the chief issue, Poland refused <strong>to</strong>negotiate because it feared it would lead <strong>to</strong> partition of Poland.Danzig was a free city under supervision of the League of Nationsand while it was with<strong>in</strong> the Polish cus<strong>to</strong>ms and under Polish economiccontrol, it was already controlled politically under a GermanGauleiter and would at any moment vote <strong>to</strong> jo<strong>in</strong> Germany if Hitlerconsented.Page 654Lord Halifax's report reads: "Herr Hitler asked whether Englandwould be will<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> accept an alliance with Germany. I said I did notexclude such a possibility provided the development of eventsjustified it."The theory that Russia learned of these British approaches <strong>to</strong>Germany <strong>in</strong> July 1939 is supported by the fact that the obstacles anddelays <strong>in</strong> the path of a British-Russian agreement were made by Brita<strong>in</strong>from the middle of April <strong>to</strong> the second week of July but were made byRussia from the second week <strong>in</strong> July <strong>to</strong> the end on August 21st.The Russians probably regarded the first British suggestionthat the Soviet Union should give unilateral guarantees <strong>to</strong> Polandsimilar <strong>to</strong> those of Brita<strong>in</strong> as a trap <strong>to</strong> get them <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> a war withGermany <strong>in</strong> which Brita<strong>in</strong> would do little or noth<strong>in</strong>g or even give aid<strong>to</strong> Germany. That this last possibility was not completely beyondreality is clear from the fact that Brita<strong>in</strong> did prepare anexpeditionary force <strong>to</strong> attack Russia <strong>in</strong> March 1940 when Brita<strong>in</strong> wastechnically at war with Germany but was do<strong>in</strong>g noth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> fight her.Russia offered the guarantee if it were extended <strong>to</strong> all states ontheir western frontier <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g F<strong>in</strong>land, Es<strong>to</strong>nia, Latvia, Lithuania,Poland and Romania. This offer meant that Russia was guarantee<strong>in</strong>g itsrenunciation of all the terri<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>in</strong> these six states which it hadlost <strong>to</strong> them s<strong>in</strong>ce 1917.Instead of accept<strong>in</strong>g the offer, the British began <strong>to</strong> quibble.They refused <strong>to</strong> guarantee the Baltic States on the ground that thesestates did not want <strong>to</strong> be guaranteed although they had guaranteedPoland on March 31st when Jozef Beck did not want it and had justasked the Soviet Union <strong>to</strong> guarantee Poland and Romania, neither ofwhom wanted a Soviet guarantee. When the Russians <strong>in</strong>sisted, theBritish countered by <strong>in</strong>sist<strong>in</strong>g that Greece, Turkey, Holland, Belgium,and Switzerland must also be guaranteed.


Page 655France and Russia were both push<strong>in</strong>g Brita<strong>in</strong> <strong>to</strong> form a TripleAlliance but Brita<strong>in</strong> was reluctant and delayed the discussions <strong>to</strong> thegreat irritation of the Soviet leaders. To show its displeasure, theSoviet Union on May 3rd replaced Litv<strong>in</strong>ov with Molo<strong>to</strong>v as foreignm<strong>in</strong>ister. This would have been a warn<strong>in</strong>g, Litv<strong>in</strong>ov knew the West andwas favorable <strong>to</strong> democracy and <strong>to</strong> the Western Powers. As a Jew, he wasanti-Hitler. Molo<strong>to</strong>v was a contrast from every po<strong>in</strong>t of view.On May 19th, Chamberla<strong>in</strong> refused an alliance and po<strong>in</strong>ted withsatisfaction <strong>to</strong> "that great virile nation on the borders of Germanywhich under this agreement (of April 6th) is bound <strong>to</strong> give us all theaid and assistance it can." He was talk<strong>in</strong>g about Poland!Page 656The members of the military mission <strong>to</strong>ok a slow ship (speedthirteen knots) and did not reach Moscow until August 11th. They wereaga<strong>in</strong> negotia<strong>to</strong>rs of second rank. In London, accord<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong>rumor, neither side wanted an agreement. Consider<strong>in</strong>g Chamberla<strong>in</strong>'ssecret efforts <strong>to</strong> make a settlement with Germany, there is no reason<strong>to</strong> believe that he wanted an agreement with Russia.The Russians demanded an exact military commitment as <strong>to</strong> whatforces would be used aga<strong>in</strong>st Germany; they wanted guarantees whetherthe states concerned accepted or not; they wanted specific permission<strong>to</strong> fight across a terri<strong>to</strong>ry such as Poland. These demands were flatlyrejected by Poland on August 19th. On the same day, Russia signed acommercial treaty with Germany. Two days later, France ordered itsnegotia<strong>to</strong>rs <strong>to</strong> sign the right <strong>to</strong> cross Poland but Russia refused <strong>to</strong>accept this until Poland consented as well.Page 657On Aug. 23, Ribbentrop and Molo<strong>to</strong>v signed an agreement whichprovided that neither signer would take any aggressive action aga<strong>in</strong>stthe other signer or give any support <strong>to</strong> a third Power <strong>in</strong> such action.The secret pro<strong>to</strong>col delimited spheres of <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> eastern Europe.The l<strong>in</strong>e followed the northern boundary of Lithuania and the Narew,Vistula, and San rivers <strong>in</strong> Poland and Germany gave Russia a free hand<strong>in</strong> Bessarabia. This agreement was greeted as a stunn<strong>in</strong>g surprise <strong>in</strong>the Entente countries. There was no reason why it should have been.The British begged the Poles and the Germans <strong>to</strong> negotiate; theItalians tried <strong>to</strong> arrange another four-Power conference; variousoutsiders issued public and private appeals for peace; secretemissaries flew back and forth between London and Germany.All this was <strong>in</strong> va<strong>in</strong> because Hitler was determ<strong>in</strong>ed on war andhis attention was devoted <strong>to</strong> manufactur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>cidents <strong>to</strong> justify hisapproach<strong>in</strong>g attack. Political prisoners were taken from concentrationcamps, dressed <strong>in</strong> German uniforms, and killed on the Polish frontieras "evidence" of Polish aggression. A fraudulent ultimatum withsixteen superficially reasonable demands on Poland was presented <strong>to</strong>


the British ambassador when the time limit had elapsed. It was notpresented <strong>to</strong> the Poles because the Polish ambassador <strong>in</strong> Berl<strong>in</strong> hadbeen ordered by Beck not <strong>to</strong> accept any document from the Germans.Page 658The German <strong>in</strong>vasion of Poland at 4:45a.m. on September 1, 1939,did not end the negotiations <strong>to</strong> make peace, nor did the completecollapse of Polish resistance on September 16. S<strong>in</strong>ce these effortswere futile, little need be said of them except that France andBrita<strong>in</strong> did not declare war on Germany until more than two days hadelapsed. Dur<strong>in</strong>g this time, no ultimatums were sent <strong>to</strong> Germany. OnSeptember 3 at 9a.m., Brita<strong>in</strong> presented an ultimatum which expired at11a.m. In a similar fashion, France entered the war at 6p.m. onSeptember 3.CHAPTER XIV: WORLD WAR II: THE TIDE OF AGGRESSION, 1939-1941Page 661The Second World War lasted exactly six years. It was fought onevery cont<strong>in</strong>ent and on every sea. Deaths of civilians exceeded deathsof combatants and many of both were killed without any militaryjustification as victims of sheer brutality, largely through coldbloodedsavagery by Germans, and <strong>to</strong> a lesser extent by Japanese andRussians, although British and American attacks from the air oncivilian populations and on non-military targets contributed <strong>to</strong> the<strong>to</strong>tal. The dist<strong>in</strong>ctions between civilians and military personnel andbetween neutrals and combatants which had been blurred <strong>in</strong> the FirstWorld War were almost completely lost <strong>in</strong> the second. Civilians killedreached 17 millions.The armies had no new weapons which had not been possessed <strong>in</strong>1918 but the proportions of these and the ways <strong>in</strong> which theycooperated with one another had been greatly modified.Page 662The chief reason the Germans had sufficient military resourceswas not based, as is so often believed, on the fact that Germany washighly mobilized for war, but on other fac<strong>to</strong>rs. In the first place,Hitler's economic revolution <strong>in</strong> Germany had reduced f<strong>in</strong>ancialconsiderations <strong>to</strong> a po<strong>in</strong>t where they played no role <strong>in</strong> economic orpolitical decisions. When decisions were made, on other grounds, moneywas provided through completely unorthodox methods of f<strong>in</strong>ance, <strong>to</strong>carry them out. In France and England, on the other hand, orthodoxf<strong>in</strong>ancial pr<strong>in</strong>ciples, especially balanced budgets and stable exchangerates, played a major role <strong>in</strong> all decisions and was one of the chiefreasons why these countries did not mobilize or why, hav<strong>in</strong>g mobilized,they had <strong>to</strong>tally <strong>in</strong>adequate numbers of airplanes, tanks, etc.Page 665Strategic bomb<strong>in</strong>g used long-range planes aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>in</strong>dustrialtargets and other civilian objectives. The upholders of strategic


omb<strong>in</strong>g received little encouragement <strong>in</strong> Germany, <strong>in</strong> Russia, or even<strong>in</strong> France.THE BATTLE OF POLAND, SEPTEMBER 1939Page 667Although Brita<strong>in</strong> and France declared war on Germany on September3rd 1939, it cannot be said that they made war dur<strong>in</strong>g the next twoweeks <strong>in</strong> which fight<strong>in</strong>g raged <strong>in</strong> Poland. British airplanes roamed overGermany, dropp<strong>in</strong>g leaflets for propaganda purposes but no support wasgiven <strong>to</strong> Poland. No attack was made by France and strict orders wereissued <strong>to</strong> the British Air Force not <strong>to</strong> bomb any German land forcesuntil April 1940. Similar orders <strong>to</strong> the Luftwaffe by Hitler werema<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed for part of this same period. When some British Members ofParliament put pressure <strong>to</strong> drop bombs on German munition s<strong>to</strong>res <strong>in</strong> theBlack Forest, Sir K<strong>in</strong>gsley Wood rejected the suggestion declar<strong>in</strong>g:"Are you aware it is private property? Why, you will be ask<strong>in</strong>g me <strong>to</strong>bomb Essen next." Essen was the home of Krupp Munitions fac<strong>to</strong>ries.Blockade of Germany was established <strong>in</strong> such a perfunc<strong>to</strong>ry fashionthat large quantities of French iron ore cont<strong>in</strong>ued <strong>to</strong> go <strong>to</strong> Germanythrough the neutral Low Countries <strong>in</strong> return for German coal com<strong>in</strong>g bythe same route. Hitler issued orders <strong>to</strong> his air force not <strong>to</strong> cross theWestern frontier except for reconnaissance, <strong>to</strong> his navy not <strong>to</strong> fightthe French, and <strong>to</strong> his submar<strong>in</strong>es not <strong>to</strong> molest passenger vessels and<strong>to</strong> treat unarmed merchant ships accord<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> established rules of<strong>in</strong>ternational prize law. In open disobedience of these orders, aGerman submar<strong>in</strong>e sank the l<strong>in</strong>er Athenia on September 3rd.The Soviet Union was <strong>in</strong>vited by Hitler <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>vade Poland from theeast and occupy the areas which had been granted <strong>to</strong> it <strong>in</strong> the Soviet-German agreement of August 23rd. The Russians were afraid the WesternPowers might declare war on Russia <strong>in</strong> support of their guarantee <strong>to</strong>Poland.When the Polish government moved <strong>to</strong> Romania, the Soviet Unionfelt that it could not be accused of aggression aga<strong>in</strong>st Poland if noPolish state still existed on Polish soil and justified their advancewith the excuse that they must res<strong>to</strong>re order. On September 28, thedivided Poland between them.THE SITZKRIEG, September 1939 - May 1940Page 668The period from the end of the Polish campaign <strong>to</strong> the Germanattack on Denmark and Norway on April 9, 1940 is frequently called theSitzkrieg (sitt<strong>in</strong>g war) or even "phony war" because Western powersmade no real effort <strong>to</strong> fight Germany, eager <strong>to</strong> use the slow process ofeconomic blockade.Early <strong>in</strong> Oc<strong>to</strong>ber, Hitler made a tentative offer <strong>to</strong> negotiatepeace with the Western Powers on the grounds that the cause offight<strong>in</strong>g for Poland no longer existed. This offer was rejected by theWestern Powers with the public declaration that they were determ<strong>in</strong>ed


<strong>to</strong> destroy Hitler's regime. This meant that war must cont<strong>in</strong>ue. TheBritish and French answers were not based on a desire <strong>to</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ue warbut more on the belief that Hitler's rule <strong>in</strong> Germany was <strong>in</strong>secure andthat the best way <strong>to</strong> reach peace would be <strong>to</strong> encourage some anti-Hitler movement with<strong>in</strong> Germany itself.Page 669Germany was vulnerable <strong>to</strong> a blockade but there was no real effort<strong>to</strong>ward economic mobilization by Germany before 1943. Contrary <strong>to</strong>general op<strong>in</strong>ion, Germany was neither armed <strong>to</strong> the teeth nor fullymobilized <strong>in</strong> this period. In each of the four years 1939-1942,Brita<strong>in</strong>'s production of tanks, self-propelled guns, and planes washigher tan Germany's. As late as September 1941, Hitler issued anorder for substantial reduction <strong>in</strong> armaments production. In 1944, only33% of Germany's output went for direct war purposes compared <strong>to</strong> 40%<strong>in</strong> the U.S. and almost 45% <strong>in</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong>.Page 671In order <strong>to</strong> reduce the enemy's ability <strong>to</strong> buy abroad, f<strong>in</strong>ancialconnections were cut, his funds abroad were frozen, and his exportswere blocked. The U.S. cooperated as well, freez<strong>in</strong>g the f<strong>in</strong>ancialassets of various nations as they were conquered by the aggressorPowers and f<strong>in</strong>ally the assets of the aggressors themselves <strong>in</strong> June1941.At the same time, pre-emptive buy<strong>in</strong>g of vital commodities attheir source <strong>to</strong> prevent Germany and its allies from obta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g thembegan. Because of limited British funds, most of this task ofpre-emptive buy<strong>in</strong>g was taken over by the U.S., almost completely byFeb. 1941.The blockade was enforced by Brita<strong>in</strong> with little regard for<strong>in</strong>ternational law or for neutral rights there was relatively test fromthe neutrals. The U.S. openly favored Brita<strong>in</strong> while Italy and Japanequally openly favored Germany. On the whole, the blockade had nodecisive effect on Germany's ability <strong>to</strong> wage war until 1945. Germany'sfood supply was at the pre-war level until the very last months of thewar by starv<strong>in</strong>g the enslaved peoples of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Russiaand other countries.Page 674Dur<strong>in</strong>g the "phony war" there were persons <strong>in</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong>, France andGermany who were eager <strong>to</strong> make war or peace. Such persons engaged <strong>in</strong>extensive <strong>in</strong>trigues <strong>in</strong> order <strong>to</strong> negotiate peace or <strong>to</strong> prevent it.There were a number of unsuccessful efforts <strong>to</strong> make peace between theWestern Powers and Germany <strong>in</strong> the six months follow<strong>in</strong>g the defeat ofPoland.Page 677Hitler had no political ambition with respect <strong>to</strong> the Balkans orthe Soviet Union. From both he wanted noth<strong>in</strong>g more than the maximumsupply of raw materials and a political peace which would permit these


goods <strong>to</strong> flow.Page 679It is not yet clear why F<strong>in</strong>land rejected the Russian demands ofOc<strong>to</strong>ber 1939. The Germans and Russians believed that it was done underBritish <strong>in</strong>fluence. For some unexpla<strong>in</strong>ed reason the F<strong>in</strong>ns seem <strong>to</strong> havefelt that the Russians would not attack their country but the Sovietsattacked at several po<strong>in</strong>ts November 29th.Page 680In early 1939, the Anglo-French leaders now prepared <strong>to</strong> attackthe Soviet Union both from F<strong>in</strong>land and from Syria. On February 5,1940, the Supreme War Council decided <strong>to</strong> send <strong>to</strong> F<strong>in</strong>land anexpeditionary force of 100,000 heavily armed troops <strong>to</strong> fight theSoviet hordes. Germany at once warned Norway and Sweden that it wouldtake action aga<strong>in</strong>st them if the two Scand<strong>in</strong>avian countries permittedpassage of this force. Germany feared the Anglo-French forces would beable <strong>to</strong> s<strong>to</strong>p shipments of Swedish iron ore across Norway <strong>to</strong> Germany.The evidence supports these fears because the high quality of Swedishiron ore was essential <strong>to</strong> the German steel <strong>in</strong>dustry. As early asSeptember 1939, the British were discuss<strong>in</strong>g a project <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>terrupt theSwedish shipments either by an <strong>in</strong>vasion of Norway of by m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>gNorwegian terri<strong>to</strong>rial waters. When Germany heard of the Anglo-Frenchexpeditionary force, it began <strong>to</strong> prepare its own plans <strong>to</strong> seize Norwayfirst.THE FALL OF FRANCE (MAY-JUNE 1940) AND THE VICHY REGIME.Page 690Hitler was so conv<strong>in</strong>ced that Brita<strong>in</strong> would also make peace thathe gave lenient terms <strong>to</strong> France. France did not give up any overseasterri<strong>to</strong>ries or any ports on the Mediterranean, no naval vessels or anyairplanes or armaments. Northern France and all the western coast <strong>to</strong>the Pyrenees came under occupation but the rest was left unoccupied,ruled by a government free from direct German control.Page 698Operation Barbarossa was based on the consideration that only bydestroy<strong>in</strong>g Russia and all Brita<strong>in</strong>'s hopes based on Russia couldBrita<strong>in</strong> be forced <strong>to</strong> ask for peace.AMERICAN NEUTRALITY AND AID TO BRITAINPage 707In buy<strong>in</strong>g supplies, chiefly from the U.S., Brita<strong>in</strong> had used up,by June 1941, almost two-thirds of its dollars assets, gold s<strong>to</strong>cks,and marketable U.S. certificates.When the war began, American public op<strong>in</strong>ion was united <strong>in</strong> itsdeterm<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>to</strong> stay out. The isolationist reaction follow<strong>in</strong>gAmerican <strong>in</strong>tervention <strong>in</strong> the First World War had become stronger <strong>in</strong>the 1930s. His<strong>to</strong>rian were writ<strong>in</strong>g extensively <strong>to</strong> show that Germany hadnot been solely guilty of beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g the war <strong>in</strong> 1914 and that the


Entente Powers had made more than their share of secret treatiesseek<strong>in</strong>g selfish terri<strong>to</strong>rialism, both before the war and dur<strong>in</strong>g thefight<strong>in</strong>g.In 1934, a committee of the U.S. Senate <strong>in</strong>vestigated the roleplayed by foreign loans and munition sales <strong>to</strong> belligerents <strong>in</strong> gett<strong>in</strong>gthe U.S. <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> World War I. Through the carelessness of theRoosevelt adm<strong>in</strong>istration, this committee fell under the control ofisolationists led by Republican Sena<strong>to</strong>r Gerald Nye. As a result, theevidence was mobilized <strong>to</strong> show that American <strong>in</strong>tervention <strong>in</strong> WWI hadbeen pushed by bankers and munitions manufacturers ("merchants ofdeath") <strong>to</strong> protect their profits and their <strong>in</strong>terests <strong>in</strong> an Ententevic<strong>to</strong>ry. American public op<strong>in</strong>ion had the uncomfortable feel<strong>in</strong>g thatAmerican youths had been sent <strong>to</strong> die for selfish purposes concealedbeh<strong>in</strong>d propaganda slogans about "the rights of small nations,""freedom of the seas," or "mak<strong>in</strong>g the world safe for democracy." Allthis created a widespread determ<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>to</strong> keep out of Europe'sconstant quarrels and avoid what was regarded as the "error of 1917."Page 708The isolationist po<strong>in</strong>t of view had been enacted <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the socalledNeutrality Act curtail<strong>in</strong>g loans and munitions sales <strong>to</strong>belligerent countries. Materials had <strong>to</strong> be sold on a "cash and carry"basis and had <strong>to</strong> be transported on foreign ships. Also, loans <strong>to</strong>belligerents were forbidden.These laws gave a great advantage <strong>to</strong> a state like Italy which hadships <strong>to</strong> carry supplies from the U.S. or which had cash <strong>to</strong> buy themhere <strong>in</strong> contrast <strong>to</strong> a country like Ethiopia which had no ships andlittle cash.Page 709Roosevelt called a special session of Congress <strong>to</strong> revise theneutrality laws so that the Entente powers could obta<strong>in</strong> supplies <strong>in</strong>the U.S. The embargo on munitions was repealed. American ships werenot <strong>to</strong> be armed, <strong>to</strong> carry munitions, or <strong>to</strong> go <strong>to</strong> any areas thePresident had proclaimed as combat zones.The extremes ranged from the advocates of immediate <strong>in</strong>tervention<strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the war on the side of Brita<strong>in</strong> <strong>to</strong> the defenders of extremeisolation. Most American op<strong>in</strong>ion was somewhere between the twoextremes.In order <strong>to</strong> unify America's political front, Roosevelt <strong>to</strong>ok two<strong>in</strong>terventionists <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> his cab<strong>in</strong>et as Secretaries of War and the Navy.Roosevelt himself was sympathetic <strong>to</strong> this po<strong>in</strong>t of view.Page 710Wendell Wilkie assured the American people that Roosevelt's reelection<strong>in</strong> 1940 meant that "we will be at war." Roosevelt repliedwith assurances that "We will not sent our army, navy, or air forces<strong>to</strong> fight <strong>in</strong> foreign lands except <strong>in</strong> case of attack. Your boys are notgo<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> be sent <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> any foreign wars." This campaign ora<strong>to</strong>ry was


ased on the general recognition that the overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g majority weredeterm<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>to</strong> stay out of war.Page 711Strategic plans were drawn up decid<strong>in</strong>g that Germany was the majordanger, with Japan of secondary importance, and that every effort,<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g actual warfare, should be used. Germany's declaration of waron the U.S. four days after Pearl Harbor saved the U.S. from the need<strong>to</strong> attempt someth<strong>in</strong>g which American public op<strong>in</strong>ion would have nevercondoned, an attack on Germany after we had been attacked by Japan.Page 714Roosevelt improvised a policy which consisted <strong>in</strong> almost equalmeasure of propagandist public statements, tactical subterfuges, andhesitant half-steps. In September 1940, Roosevelt gave fifty old WWIdestroyers <strong>to</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> return for 99 year leases of naval and airbases <strong>in</strong> this hemisphere.Page 715Loans were forbidden by the Neutrality Act. To Roosevelt, itseemed foolish <strong>to</strong> allow monetary considerations <strong>to</strong> stand as anobstacle <strong>in</strong> the way of self-defence (as he regarded the survival ofGreat Brita<strong>in</strong>).Page 716Opponents argued that Brita<strong>in</strong> had tens of billions <strong>in</strong> concealedassets and that Lend-Lease was merely a clever trick for foist<strong>in</strong>g thecosts of Brita<strong>in</strong>'s war on<strong>to</strong> the backs of American tax-payers. Stillothers <strong>in</strong>sisted that Lend-Lease was an unneutral act which wouldarouse German rage and eventually <strong>in</strong>volved the American people <strong>in</strong> awar they had no need <strong>to</strong> get <strong>in</strong>. The bill passed and provided that thepresident could "sell, transfer title <strong>to</strong>, exchange, lease, lend, ordispose of any defence article" <strong>to</strong> any nation whose defence he foundvital <strong>to</strong> the defence of the U.S.Page 717Beh<strong>in</strong>d this whole effort <strong>to</strong>ward economic mobilization was asecret decision of Roosevelt's military advisers <strong>in</strong> 1941 that the warcould not be won unless the U.S. planned eventually <strong>to</strong> raise thenumber of men <strong>in</strong> its armed forces <strong>to</strong> eight million. At once,isolationists were <strong>in</strong> full cry and an ACt extend<strong>in</strong>g selective-servicetra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g passed 203-202.Page 718The British had no plans for an <strong>in</strong>vasion of Europe and hoped thatGermany could be worn down by blockade. No one po<strong>in</strong>ted out that aGermany defeat by British methods would leave the Soviet armiessupreme <strong>in</strong> all Europe with no forces <strong>to</strong> oppose them.Page 719At the same time he gave Brita<strong>in</strong> ten coast-guard cutters,Roosevelt seized possession of 65 Axis and Danish ships <strong>in</strong> Americanharbors. The f<strong>in</strong>ancial assets of the Axis Powers were frozen. American


fly<strong>in</strong>g schools were made available <strong>to</strong> tra<strong>in</strong> British avia<strong>to</strong>rs. Bypresidential proclamation, the American Neutrality Zone was extended<strong>to</strong> Iceland. The U.S. navy was ordered <strong>to</strong> follow all Axis raiders orsubmar<strong>in</strong>es west of this meridian broadcast<strong>in</strong>g their positions <strong>to</strong> theBritish.Page 720American naval escort of British convoys could not fail <strong>to</strong> lead<strong>to</strong> a "shoot<strong>in</strong>g war" with Germany. The Roosevelt adm<strong>in</strong>istration did notshr<strong>in</strong>k from this possibility. Fortunately for the Adm<strong>in</strong>istration'splans, Hitler played right <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> its hands by declar<strong>in</strong>g war on theU.S. By that date, <strong>in</strong>cidents were becom<strong>in</strong>g more frequent.On Oct. 17, the U.S. destroyer Kearney was <strong>to</strong>rpedoed; two weekslater, the destroyer Rueben James was blown <strong>to</strong> pieces. On Nov. 10, anAmerican escort of 11 vessels picked up a convoy of six vessels<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g America's three largest ocean l<strong>in</strong>ers with 20,000 Britishtroops and guarded them from Halifax <strong>to</strong> India and S<strong>in</strong>gapore.Many of the activities of the American Navy <strong>in</strong> the summer of 1941were known not at all or were known only very imperfectly <strong>to</strong> theyAmerican public but it would seem that public op<strong>in</strong>ion generallysupported the Adm<strong>in</strong>istration's actions. In September, Roosevelt sought<strong>to</strong> repeal the Neutrality Act forbidd<strong>in</strong>g the arm<strong>in</strong>g of merchant vesselswhich was done on Oct. 17. Two weeks later, all the essential po<strong>in</strong>tsof the Neutrality Act were repealed. This meant that open warfare withGermany was <strong>in</strong> the immediate future.THE NAZI ATTACK ON SOVIET RUSSIA 1941-1942Page 725Large numbers of anti-Stal<strong>in</strong>ist Russians began <strong>to</strong> surrender <strong>to</strong>the Nazis. Most of these were Ukranians and eager <strong>to</strong> fight with theNazis aga<strong>in</strong>st the Stal<strong>in</strong>ist regime. Anti-Stal<strong>in</strong>ist deserters serv<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong> the Nazi forces reached 900,000 <strong>in</strong> June 1944 under Soviet generalA. A. Vlasov. At the end of the war, hundreds of thousands of Vlasov'ssupporters fled westward <strong>to</strong> the American and British armies for refugefrom Stal<strong>in</strong>'s vengeance but were handed over <strong>to</strong> the Soviet Union <strong>to</strong> bemurdered out of and or sent <strong>to</strong> slave-labor camps <strong>in</strong> Siberia. Thedimensions of the human suffer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> this whole situation isbeyond the human imag<strong>in</strong>ation.CHAPTER XV: WORLD WAR II: THE EBB OF AGGRESSION,1941-1945THE RISING SUN IN THE PACIFIC, TO 1942PAGE 732Japanese aggressions of 1941 which culm<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>in</strong> the attack onPearl Harbor were based on fear and weakness and not on arrogance andstrength.By 1939, the Japanese economy was beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> <strong>to</strong>tter under thegrow<strong>in</strong>g restrictions on Japanese trade imposed by Western countries


and acute material shortages. Problems such as these might have drivenmany nations, even the West, <strong>to</strong> desperate action.The world depression made it very difficult <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease Japaneseexports. The excessively high American tariff, although no so<strong>in</strong>tended, seemed <strong>to</strong> the Japanese <strong>to</strong> be an aggressive restrictionon their ability <strong>to</strong> live. The "imperial preference" regulations of theBritish Commonwealth had a similar consequence. S<strong>in</strong>ce Japan could notdefend itself aga<strong>in</strong>st such economic measures, it resorted <strong>to</strong> politicalmeasures and the Western Powers would <strong>in</strong>evitably defend themselveswith even greater economic restrictions driv<strong>in</strong>g Japan <strong>to</strong> open war.Page 735The American government began <strong>to</strong> tighten the economic p<strong>in</strong>cers onJapan just as Japan was seek<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> tighten its military p<strong>in</strong>cers onCh<strong>in</strong>a. Japan was able <strong>to</strong> close all routes <strong>to</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>a. The Americangovernment retaliated with economic warfare. In 1938, it established a"moral embargo" on the shipment of aircraft or their parts and bombs<strong>to</strong> Japan. In 1939, large U.S. and British loans <strong>to</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>a sought <strong>to</strong>strengthen its collaps<strong>in</strong>g f<strong>in</strong>ancial system and Wash<strong>in</strong>g<strong>to</strong>n gavenotice <strong>to</strong> cancel the 1911 commercial treaty with Japan open<strong>in</strong>g thedoor <strong>to</strong> all k<strong>in</strong>ds of economic pressure. The "moral embargo" wasextended <strong>to</strong> cover light metals and all mach<strong>in</strong>ery or plans for mak<strong>in</strong>gaviation gasol<strong>in</strong>e.Such a policy was opposed by isolationists <strong>in</strong>sist<strong>in</strong>g sucheconomic sanctions could only be enforced, <strong>in</strong> the long run, by war. IfJapan could not get petroleum, bauxite, rubber and t<strong>in</strong> by trade, itcould be prevented from seiz<strong>in</strong>g these areas produc<strong>in</strong>g these productsonly by force. To avoid this obvious <strong>in</strong>ference,l Cordell Hull sought<strong>to</strong> make America's economic policy ambiguous so that Japan might bedeterred by fear of sanctions not yet imposed and won by hopes ofconcessions not yet granted. Such a policy was a mistake but i<strong>to</strong>bta<strong>in</strong>ed Roosevelt's explicit approval s<strong>in</strong>ce it allowed moreaggressive elements of Japanese <strong>to</strong> take control and any drastic actionseek<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> end the stra<strong>in</strong> became welcome.Page 736The ambiguity of American commercial policy slowly resolved <strong>in</strong>the direction of <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g economic sanctions. There was a steady<strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> America's economic pressure by the growth of f<strong>in</strong>ancialobstacles and by <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g purchas<strong>in</strong>g difficulties.From Hull's doctr<strong>in</strong>aire refusal <strong>to</strong> encourage any Japanese hopethat they could w<strong>in</strong> worthwhile American concessions, the advocates ofextremism ga<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong>fluence.The President ordered the embargo of many goods which Japanneeded, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g alum<strong>in</strong>um, airplane parts, all arms and munitions,optical supplies, and various "strategic" materials but left petroleumand scrap iron unh<strong>in</strong>dered.Page 737


American diplomatic pressure on Japan must be timed <strong>to</strong> avoidpush<strong>in</strong>g Japan <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> desperate action before American-German relationshad passed the break<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t.Page 739On July 26, 1941, the U.S. froze all Japanese f<strong>in</strong>ancial assets <strong>in</strong>the U.S. virtually end<strong>in</strong>g trade between the two countries. Members ofthe British Commonwealth issued similar orders. As a result of thesepressures, Japan found itself <strong>in</strong> a position where its oil reserveswould be exhausted <strong>in</strong> two years, its alum<strong>in</strong>um reserves <strong>in</strong> sevenmonths. The chief of the Navy <strong>to</strong>ld the emperor that if Japan resorted<strong>to</strong> war, it would be very doubtful that it could w<strong>in</strong>. It was also clearthat if war came, economic pressure was <strong>to</strong>o damag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> allow Japan <strong>to</strong>postpone such operations until 1942. The decision was made <strong>to</strong>negotiate until late Oc<strong>to</strong>ber. If an agreement could be reached, thepreparations for war could be suspended, otherwise the negotiationswould be ended and the advance <strong>to</strong> open war cont<strong>in</strong>ued. The Cab<strong>in</strong>etsought desperately <strong>to</strong> reach an agreement <strong>in</strong> Wash<strong>in</strong>g<strong>to</strong>n.Page 741The Japanese misjudged American psychology. Nomura found itimpossible <strong>to</strong> reach an agreement because Hull's demands were extreme.The Americans had broken the secret Japanese codes and knew that warwould beg<strong>in</strong> if Nomura failed <strong>to</strong> obta<strong>in</strong> relaxation of the economicembargo. They did not however have the plans for the attack on PearlHarbor.Page 742On November 27th, a war warn<strong>in</strong>g was sent from Wash<strong>in</strong>g<strong>to</strong>n <strong>to</strong> PearlHarbor but no <strong>in</strong>creased precautions were made. On December 7, an armyenlisted man, us<strong>in</strong>g radar, detected a group of strange planescom<strong>in</strong>g down from the north 132 miles away but his report wasdisregarded. The American losses <strong>in</strong>cluded 2,400 killed, 1,200 <strong>in</strong>jured.Japanese losses amounted <strong>to</strong> a couple of dozen planes.TURNING THE TIDE, 1942-1943Page 751At Casablanca, the political decision of Roosevelt and Churchillon unconditional surrender was published with great fanfare, and a<strong>to</strong>nce <strong>in</strong>itiated a controversy which still cont<strong>in</strong>ues based on the beliefthat it had an adverse <strong>in</strong>fluence by discourag<strong>in</strong>g any hopes with<strong>in</strong> Axiscountries that they could f<strong>in</strong>d a way out by slacken<strong>in</strong>g their efforts,by revolt<strong>in</strong>g aga<strong>in</strong>st their governments, or by negotiations seek<strong>in</strong>gsome k<strong>in</strong>d of of "conditional" surrender. There seems little doubt thatit solidified our enemies and prolonged their resistance whereopposition <strong>to</strong> the war was widespread and active.Page 754In May 1943, Sicily was overrun and <strong>in</strong> September,Italysurrendered and the German armies were pushed backward from easternEurope. Major decisions were made <strong>in</strong> 1943 which played a major role <strong>in</strong>


determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the nature of the postwar world.Page 757Although Soviet demands were clearly <strong>in</strong> conflict with the highpurposes of the Atlantic charter, Churchill was not averse <strong>to</strong>accept<strong>in</strong>g them on the grounds of physical necessity but Americanobjections <strong>to</strong> discussions of terri<strong>to</strong>rial questions while the war wasstill go<strong>in</strong>g on forced him <strong>to</strong> refuse Stal<strong>in</strong>'s requests. The Britishfound themselves between the high and proclaimed pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of theAmericans and the low and secret <strong>in</strong>terests of the Russians.At the American centers of power, there was complete conviction<strong>in</strong> the value of unrestricted aid <strong>to</strong> Russia. These aims were embracedby men like Harry Hopk<strong>in</strong>s, General Marshall, and Roosevelt himself.Page 760The Americans decided <strong>to</strong> choke off the Italian offensive <strong>in</strong> order<strong>to</strong> concentrate on the cross-channel attack. The attack on North Africawas a substitute for an attack on Germany from Italy.Page 762Once ashore, the Sicilian campaign was <strong>in</strong>eptly carried on becauseoccupation of terri<strong>to</strong>ry was given precedence over destruction of theenemy. No efforts were made <strong>to</strong> close the Straits of Mess<strong>in</strong>a so theGermans were able <strong>to</strong> send almost two divisions as re<strong>in</strong>forcements fromItaly and later, when the island had <strong>to</strong> be abandoned, they wereequally free <strong>to</strong> evacuate it <strong>in</strong> seven days without the loss a man.Page 763The his<strong>to</strong>ry of Italy <strong>in</strong> 1943 is a his<strong>to</strong>ry of lost opportunities.Italy might have got out <strong>in</strong> the summer and the Germans might have beenejected shortly afterward. Instead, Italy was <strong>to</strong>rn <strong>to</strong> pieces and go<strong>to</strong>ut of the war so slowly that Germans were still fight<strong>in</strong>g on Italiansoil at the f<strong>in</strong>al surrender <strong>in</strong> 1945.These great misfortunes were the result of a number of forces:1) weakness of Italy relative <strong>to</strong> Germany;2) weakness of Allies after diversion of power <strong>to</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong>;3) mistrust of Italians by Allies;4) the <strong>in</strong>flexible Allied <strong>in</strong>sistence on unconditional surrender whichleft the Italians helpless <strong>to</strong> resist the Germans.Page 764When the Italian government offered the jo<strong>in</strong> the Allies <strong>in</strong>fight<strong>in</strong>g the Germans, they <strong>in</strong>sisted that the publication of thearmistice and a tentative paratrooper drop <strong>in</strong> Rome be put off untilsufficient Allied forces were with<strong>in</strong> strik<strong>in</strong>g distance <strong>to</strong> protect thecity from the German troops nearby. Eisenhower refused and publishedthe Italian surrender one day before the American Army landed atSalerno. The Germans reacted <strong>to</strong> the news of the Italian "betrayal"with characteristic speed. Available forces converged on the Salernobeachhead, an armored division fought its way <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> Rome, Italiantroops were disarmed everywhere, and the Italian government had <strong>to</strong>


flee. Numerous vessels were sunk by the Germans.Page 765As Allied forces slowly recovered Italian terri<strong>to</strong>ry from thetenacious grasp of the Germans, the royal government rema<strong>in</strong>edsubservient <strong>to</strong> its conquerors. Civilian affairs were completely <strong>in</strong>military hands under and organization known as Allied MilitaryGovernment of Occupied Terri<strong>to</strong>ries. The creation of theseorganizations on a purely Anglo-American basis,<strong>to</strong> rule the first Axisterri<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>to</strong> be "liberated" became a very important precedent forSoviet behavior wen their armies began <strong>to</strong> occupy enemy terri<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>in</strong>eastern Europe who were able <strong>to</strong> argue that they could excludeAnglo-Americans from active participation <strong>in</strong> military government <strong>in</strong>the east s<strong>in</strong>ce they had earlier been excluded <strong>in</strong> the west.While these political events were tak<strong>in</strong>g place, the militaryadvance was mov<strong>in</strong>g like a snail. The Allied <strong>in</strong>vasion of Italy wasgiven very limited resources for a very large task.. It was only undersuch limitations of resources, explicitly stated, that the Americansaccepted the British suggestion for an <strong>in</strong>vasion of Italy at all.Page 767It was suggested that German success <strong>in</strong> hold<strong>in</strong>g the Rapido wasdue <strong>to</strong> the accuracy of their artillery fire and that this was wasbe<strong>in</strong>g spotted from the ancient monastery founded by St. Benedict <strong>in</strong>529 A.D. on the <strong>to</strong>p of Monte Cass<strong>in</strong>o. It was further suggested thatGeneral Clark should have obliterated the monastery with aerialbombardment but had failed <strong>to</strong> do so because he was a Roman Catholic.After Feb. 15, 1944, General Clark did destroy the site completelywithout help<strong>in</strong>g the situation a bit. We now know that the Germans hadnot been us<strong>in</strong>g the monastery; but once it was destroyed by us, theydug <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the rubble <strong>to</strong> make a stronger defence.On May 16th, a Polish Division captured Monte Cass<strong>in</strong>o.Page 770Efforts <strong>to</strong> create a new Polish army were hampered by the factthat about 10,000 POlish officers along with 5,000 <strong>in</strong>tellectuals andprofessional persons, all of whom had been held <strong>in</strong> three camps <strong>in</strong>western Russia, could not be found. At least 100,000 Polish prisonersof war, out of 320,000 captured <strong>in</strong> 1939, had been exterm<strong>in</strong>ated.The German radio suddenly announced on April 13, 1943, thatGerman forces <strong>in</strong> occupied Russia had discovered, at Katyn, nearSmolensk, Russia, mass graves conta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the bodies of 5,000 Polishofficers who had been murdered by the Soviet authorities <strong>in</strong> 1940.Moscow called this a Nazi propaganda trick and declared that thePolish officers had been murdered and buried by the Nazis themselveswhen they captured the officers and this Soviet terri<strong>to</strong>ry.Page 772The strategic decision of September 1943 <strong>to</strong> reject Churchill'splans for a Balkan campaign <strong>in</strong> order <strong>to</strong> concentrate on a cross-Channel


offensive <strong>in</strong> 1944 were of vital importance <strong>in</strong> sett<strong>in</strong>g the form thatpostwar Europe would take. If it had been decided <strong>to</strong> postpone thecross-Channel attack and concentrate on an assault from the Aegeanacross Bulgaria and Romania <strong>to</strong>ward Poland and Slovakia, the postwarsituation would have been quite different.It has been argued that failure <strong>to</strong> reach agreement on theterri<strong>to</strong>rial settlement of eastern Europe while the war was still <strong>in</strong>progress meant that Soviet armies would undoubtedly dom<strong>in</strong>ate onceGermany was defeated. This assumption implies that America should havethreatened <strong>to</strong> reduce of <strong>to</strong> cut off Lend-Lease supplies go<strong>in</strong>g unlesswe could obta<strong>in</strong> Soviet agreement <strong>to</strong> the k<strong>in</strong>d of eastern Europeansettlement we wanted.Page 790The Soviet advance became a race with the Western Powers eventhough Eisenhower's orders held back their advance at many po<strong>in</strong>ts(such as Prague) <strong>to</strong> allow the Russians <strong>to</strong> occupy areas the Americanscould easily have taken first.Page 791Roosevelt's sense of the realities of power were quite as acuteas Churchill's or Stal<strong>in</strong>'s but he concealed that sense much moredeliberately and much more completely under a screen of high-sound<strong>in</strong>gmoral pr<strong>in</strong>ciples.Page 795Polish m<strong>in</strong>isters rushed from London <strong>to</strong> Moscow <strong>to</strong> negotiate. Whilethey were still talk<strong>in</strong>g and when the Soviet army was only six milesfrom Warsaw, the Polish underground forces <strong>in</strong> the city, at a Soviet<strong>in</strong>vitation, rose up aga<strong>in</strong>st the Germans. A force of 40,000 responded<strong>to</strong> the suggestion but the Russian armies s<strong>to</strong>pped their advance andobstructed supplies <strong>to</strong> the rebels <strong>in</strong> spite of appeals from all partsof the world. After sixty-three days of hopeless fight<strong>in</strong>g, the PolishHome Army had <strong>to</strong> surrender <strong>to</strong> the Germans. This Soviet treacheryremoved their chief obstacle <strong>to</strong> Communist rule <strong>in</strong> Poland and theLondon government <strong>in</strong> London was accord<strong>in</strong>gly ignored.Page 797When vic<strong>to</strong>rious armies broke <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> Germany, late <strong>in</strong> 1944, theNazis were still hold<strong>in</strong>g the survivors of 8 million enslaved workers,10 million Jews, 6 million Russian prisoners of war and millions ofprisoners from other armies. Over half of the Jews and Russians,possibly 12 million, were killed before f<strong>in</strong>al vic<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>in</strong> 1945.Page 799The ideas that strategic air attacks must be directed atcivilians <strong>in</strong> enemy cities were almost wholly ignored <strong>in</strong> the SovietUnion, largely rejected <strong>in</strong> Germany, created great controversy <strong>in</strong>France, but were accepted <strong>to</strong> a large extent among airmen <strong>in</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong>and the U.S.Page 800


The contribution by strategic bomb<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> the defeat of Germanywas relatively <strong>in</strong>cidental, <strong>in</strong> spite of the terrible losses suffered <strong>in</strong>the effort. The shift <strong>to</strong> city bomb<strong>in</strong>g was more or less accidental. Inspite of the erroneous ideas of Chamberla<strong>in</strong>, Baldw<strong>in</strong>, Churchill, thewar opened and cont<strong>in</strong>ued for months with no city bomb<strong>in</strong>g at all, forthe simple reason that the Germans had no <strong>in</strong>tentions, no planes, andno equipment for strategic bomb<strong>in</strong>g.The attack on cities began by accident when a group of Germanplanes which were lost dumped their bomb loads, contrary <strong>to</strong> orders, onLondon on August 1940. The RAF retaliated by bomb<strong>in</strong>g Berl<strong>in</strong> the nextnight. Gor<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> counter-retaliation. British efforts <strong>to</strong> counterattackby daylight raids on military objectives resulted <strong>in</strong> such losses thatthe air offensive was shifted <strong>to</strong> night attacks. This entailed a shiftfrom <strong>in</strong>dustrial targets <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>discrim<strong>in</strong>ate bomb<strong>in</strong>g of urban areas. Thiswas justified with the wholly mistaken argument that civilian moralewas a German weak po<strong>in</strong>t and that the destruction of workers' hous<strong>in</strong>gwould break this morale. The evidence shows that the German war effortwas not weakened <strong>in</strong> any way by lower<strong>in</strong>g civilian morale <strong>in</strong> spite ofthe horrors heaped on it.Page 802The most extraord<strong>in</strong>ary example of this suffer<strong>in</strong>g occurred <strong>in</strong> theBritish fire raids on Hamburg <strong>in</strong> 1943 which was attacked for more thana week with a mixture of high-explosive and <strong>in</strong>cendiary bombs sopersistently that fire-s<strong>to</strong>rms appeared. The air <strong>in</strong> the city heated <strong>to</strong>over a thousand degrees began <strong>to</strong> rise rapidly with the result thatw<strong>in</strong>ds of hurricane force rushed <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the city. The water supply wasdestroyed and the flames were <strong>to</strong>o hot for water <strong>to</strong> be effective. F<strong>in</strong>alfigures for the destruction were set at 40,000 dead, 250,000 housesdestroyed with over a million made homeless. This as the greatestdestruction by air attacks on a city until the fire raid on Tokyo onMarch 9 1945 which still stands <strong>to</strong>day as the most devastat<strong>in</strong>g airattack <strong>in</strong> human his<strong>to</strong>ry.Page 806General Eisenhower ignored Berl<strong>in</strong> and drove directly eastward<strong>to</strong>ward Dresden. Eisenhower's decisions permitted the Soviet forces <strong>to</strong>"liberate" all the capital cities of central Europe. As late as May4th, when the American forces were sixty miles from Prague and theSoviet armies more than a hundred, an effort by the former <strong>to</strong> advance<strong>to</strong> the city was s<strong>to</strong>pped at the request of the Soviet commander,despite a va<strong>in</strong> message from Churchill <strong>to</strong> Eisenhower <strong>to</strong> take the Czechcapital for political barga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g purposes.Page 807Soon the names Buchenwald, Dachau, and Belsen were repeated withhorror throughout the world. At Belsen, 35,000 dead bodies and 30,000still breath<strong>in</strong>g were found. The world was surprised and shocked. Therewas no reason for the world's press <strong>to</strong> be surprised at Nazi bestiality


<strong>in</strong> 1945 s<strong>in</strong>ce the evidence had been fully available <strong>in</strong> 1938.CLOSING IN ON JAPAN, 1943-1945When Germany surrendered on May 8, 1945, Japan was alreadydefeated but could not make itself accept unconditional surrender.Page 808Even American strategic bomb<strong>in</strong>g was different <strong>in</strong> the Pacificus<strong>in</strong>g B-29s, unknown <strong>in</strong> Europe, for area bomb<strong>in</strong>g of civilians <strong>in</strong>cities, someth<strong>in</strong>g we disapproved <strong>in</strong> Europe.Page 815279 B-29s carry<strong>in</strong>g 1,900 <strong>to</strong>ns of fire bombs were sent on a lowlevelattack on Tokyo. The result was the most devastat<strong>in</strong>g air attack<strong>in</strong> all his<strong>to</strong>ry. With the loss of only 3 planes, 16 square miles ofcentral Tokyo were burned out; 250,000 houses were destroyed, over amillion persons were made homeless and 84,793 were killed. This wasmore destructive than the first a<strong>to</strong>mic bomb over Hiroshima five monthslater.Page 817American leaders shuddered <strong>to</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k of the results if suchKamikaze attacks were hurled at troop transports and Americanestimates of casualties were over half a million. These considerationsform the background <strong>to</strong> the Yalta and Potsdam conferences and thedecision <strong>to</strong> use <strong>to</strong> a<strong>to</strong>m bomb on Japan.The nature and decisions taken at the conference of Roosevelt,Churchill and Stal<strong>in</strong> held at Yalta <strong>in</strong> February 1945 has been so muchdis<strong>to</strong>rted by partisan propaganda that it is difficult for anyhis<strong>to</strong>rian <strong>to</strong> reconstruct the situation as it seemed at the time.Page 819In Ch<strong>in</strong>a,90%of the railroads were out of operation. The dom<strong>in</strong>antKuom<strong>in</strong>tang Party's chief aim seemed <strong>to</strong> be <strong>to</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> its armedblockade of the Communist forces operat<strong>in</strong>g out of Yenan <strong>in</strong>northwestern Ch<strong>in</strong>a where the highly-discipl<strong>in</strong>ed Communist armies hadga<strong>in</strong>ed some degree of local support.American hopes of fus<strong>in</strong>g the two parties <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> a common Ch<strong>in</strong>esegovernment broke down on the refusals of the Kuom<strong>in</strong>tang and theremoteness of the Communists. In September 1944, Roosevelt suggestthat General Stillwell be given command of all Ch<strong>in</strong>ese forces fight<strong>in</strong>gthe Japanese. General Chiang answered with a demand that Stilwell beremoved from Ch<strong>in</strong>a.Page 823It is extremely likely that the frantic and otherwise<strong>in</strong>explicable haste <strong>to</strong> use the second and third bombs, 21 and 24 daysafter Alamagordo arose from the desire <strong>to</strong> force the Japanese surrenderbefore any effective Soviet <strong>in</strong>tervention.Page 824On the economic side was a somewhat modified version of the


Morgenthau scheme (which had sought the complete ruralization ofGerman economic life <strong>to</strong> an agrarian basis) which was modified almostat once by a number of fac<strong>to</strong>rs.The first modify<strong>in</strong>g fac<strong>to</strong>r was a desire for reparations. TheAmericans <strong>in</strong>sisted that reparations betaken from exist<strong>in</strong>g s<strong>to</strong>cks andplants rather than from future production <strong>in</strong> order <strong>to</strong> avoid the errorof the 1919-1933 period, the overbuild<strong>in</strong>g of German capital equipmentand American f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g of reparations <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the <strong>in</strong>def<strong>in</strong>ite future. Itwas provided that all reparations come from Germany as a whole and becredited <strong>to</strong> the vic<strong>to</strong>rs on a percentage basis.Page 828On August 10th, a message accept<strong>in</strong>g the Potsdam terms was sent.Thus ended six years of world war <strong>in</strong> which 70 million men had beenmobilized and 17 million killed <strong>in</strong> battle. At least 18 millioncivilians had been killed. The Soviet Union had lost 6.1 millionsoldiers and 14 million wounded and over 10 million civilians dead.Germany lost 6.6 million servicemen with 7.2 million wounded and 1.3million miss<strong>in</strong>g. Japan had 1.9 million dead. Brita<strong>in</strong> war dead were357,000 and America's were 294,000.All this personal tragedy and material damage of un<strong>to</strong>ld billionswas needed <strong>to</strong> demonstrate that Germany could not establish and Nazicont<strong>in</strong>ental bloc <strong>in</strong> Europe nor could Japan dom<strong>in</strong>ate an East-Asian co-Prosperity Sphere. This is the chief function of war: <strong>to</strong> demonstrateas conclusively as possible <strong>to</strong> mistaken m<strong>in</strong>ds that they are mistaken<strong>in</strong> regard <strong>to</strong> power relationships. But as we shall see, war alsochanges most drastically the objective facts themselves.CHAPTER XVI: THE NEW AGEINTRODUCTION.Page 831World War II transformed a system where man's greatest problemswere the material ones of man's helplessness <strong>in</strong> the face of naturalthreats of disease, starvation, and natural catastrophes <strong>to</strong> the<strong>to</strong>tally different system of the 1960s and 1970s where the greatestthreat <strong>to</strong> man is man himself and where his greatest problems are thesocial (and non-material) ones of what his true goals of existence areand what use he should make of his immense power of the universe, hisfellow men.For thousands of years, some men had viewed themselves ascreatures a little lower than angels, or even God, and a little higherthan the beasts. Now, <strong>in</strong> the 20th century, man has acquired almostdiv<strong>in</strong>e powers and it has become <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly clear that he can nolonger regard himself as an animal but must regard himself as at leasta man if not obligated <strong>to</strong> act like an angel or even a god.Page 832The whole trend of the 19th century had been <strong>to</strong> emphasize man's


animal nature and seek <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease his supply of material necessities.Page 833The great achievements of the 19th century and the great crisisof the 20th century are both related <strong>to</strong> the Puritan tradition of the17th century which regarded the body and the material as s<strong>in</strong>ful anddangerous and someth<strong>in</strong>g which must be sternly controlled.Page 837These methods appeared <strong>in</strong> a number of ways, notably <strong>in</strong> anemphasis on self-discipl<strong>in</strong>e for future benefits, on restrictedconsumption and on sav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a devotion <strong>to</strong> work, and <strong>in</strong> a postponemen<strong>to</strong>f enjoyment <strong>to</strong> a future which never arrived. A typical example mightbe John D. Rockefeller: great saver, great worker, and great postponerof any self-centered action, even death. To such people, the mostadverse comments which could be made about a failure <strong>to</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>guishfrom a "successful" man were that he was a "saltrel," a "loafer," a"sensualist," and "self-<strong>in</strong>dulgent." These terms reflected the valuethat the middle classes placed on work, sav<strong>in</strong>g, self-denial and socialconformity.Page 838The n<strong>in</strong>eteenth century's emphasis on acquisitive behavior, onachievement, and on <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>itely expansible demand is equally associatedwith the middle-class outlook. These basic features are <strong>in</strong>evitablylack<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> backward, tribal, underdeveloped peasant societies andgroups, not only <strong>in</strong> Africa and Asia but also <strong>in</strong> much of theMediterranean, Lat<strong>in</strong> America, central France, <strong>in</strong> the Mennonitecommunities of Pennsylvania and elsewhere. The lack of futurepreference and expansible material demands <strong>in</strong> other areas areessential features of the 20th century crisis.George Sorel (Reflections on Violence, 1908) sought a solution <strong>to</strong>this crisis <strong>in</strong> irrationalism, <strong>in</strong> action for its own sake. The othertendency sought a solution <strong>in</strong> rationalization, science, universality,cosmopolitanism and the cont<strong>in</strong>ued pursuit of truth. The war became astruggle between the forces of irrationality represented by Fascismand the forces of Western science and rationalization represented bythe Allied nations.RATIONALIZATION AND SCIENCEPage 838Rationalization gradually spread <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the more dom<strong>in</strong>ant problemof bus<strong>in</strong>ess. From maximiz<strong>in</strong>g production, it shifted <strong>to</strong> maximiz<strong>in</strong>gprofits.The <strong>in</strong>troduction of rationalization <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> war was attributed <strong>to</strong>the efforts of Professor P.M.S. Blackett (Nobel Prize 1948) <strong>to</strong> applyradar <strong>to</strong> antiaircraft guns. From there, Blackett <strong>to</strong>ok the technique<strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> antisubmar<strong>in</strong>e defence whence it spread under the name"Operational Research" (OP).Operational research, unlike science, made its greatest


contribution <strong>in</strong> regard <strong>to</strong> the use of exist<strong>in</strong>g equipment rather thanthe effort <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>vent new equipment. It often game specificrecommendations, reached through techniques of mathematicalprobability, which directly contradicted the established militaryprocedures. A simple case concerned the problem of air attack on enemysubmar<strong>in</strong>es: For what depth should the bomb fuse be set? In 1940, RAFset its fuses at 100 feet. based on three fac<strong>to</strong>rs:1) the time <strong>in</strong>terval between the moments when the submar<strong>in</strong>e sightedthe plane and the plane sighted the submar<strong>in</strong>e;2) the speed of approach of the plane; and3) the speed of submergence of the submar<strong>in</strong>e.The submar<strong>in</strong>e was unlikely <strong>to</strong> be sunk if the bomb exploded morethan 20 feet away. Operational Research added an additional fac<strong>to</strong>r:Hownear was the bomber <strong>to</strong> judg<strong>in</strong>g the exact spot where the submar<strong>in</strong>e wentdown? s<strong>in</strong>ce this error <strong>in</strong>creased rapidly with the distance of theorig<strong>in</strong>al sight<strong>in</strong>g, a submar<strong>in</strong>e which had time <strong>to</strong> submerge deeply wouldalmost <strong>in</strong>evitably be missed by the bomb <strong>in</strong> position if not <strong>in</strong> depth;but with 100 foot fuses, submar<strong>in</strong>es which had little time <strong>to</strong> submergewere missed because the fuse was <strong>to</strong>o deep even when the position wascorrect. OP recommended sett<strong>in</strong>g fuses at 25 feet <strong>to</strong> s<strong>in</strong>k the nearsight<strong>in</strong>gs and practically conceded the escape of all distantsight<strong>in</strong>gs. When fuses were set at 35 feet, successful attacks onsubmar<strong>in</strong>es <strong>in</strong>creased 400 percent with the same equipment.Page 839The British applied OP <strong>to</strong> many similar problems.1) With an <strong>in</strong>adequate3 number of A.A. guns, is it better <strong>to</strong>concentrate them <strong>to</strong> protect part of a city thoroughly or <strong>to</strong> dispersethem <strong>to</strong> protect all of the city <strong>in</strong>adequately? (The former is better)2) Repa<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g night bombers from black <strong>to</strong> white when used on submar<strong>in</strong>epatrol <strong>in</strong>creased sight<strong>in</strong>gs of submar<strong>in</strong>es 30%.3) Are small convoys safer for merchant ships than large ones (No by alarge marg<strong>in</strong>.)4) With an <strong>in</strong>adequate number of patrol planes, was it better <strong>to</strong> searchthe whole patrol area some days (as was the practice) or <strong>to</strong> searchpart of it ever day with whatever planes were available? (the latterwas better).OP calculated the number of people killed per <strong>to</strong>n of bombsdropped show<strong>in</strong>g that the casualties <strong>in</strong>flicted on Germany were about400 civilians killed per month - about half the German au<strong>to</strong>mobileaccident death rate - while 200 RAF crewmen were killed per month <strong>in</strong>do<strong>in</strong>g the bomb<strong>in</strong>g. Later it was discovered the raids were actuallykill<strong>in</strong>g 200 German civilians contribut<strong>in</strong>g little <strong>to</strong> the war effort atthe cost of the 200 RAF men each month and thus were a contribution <strong>to</strong>the German vic<strong>to</strong>ry. These estimates made it advisable <strong>to</strong> shift planes<strong>to</strong> U-boat patrol. A bomber <strong>in</strong> its average life of 30 missions, dropped100 <strong>to</strong>ns of bombs kill<strong>in</strong>g 20 Germans and destroy<strong>in</strong>g a few houses. The


same plane <strong>in</strong> 30 missions of submar<strong>in</strong>e patrol saved 6 loaded merchantships and their crews from submar<strong>in</strong>es. This discovery was violentlyresisted by the head of the RAF, Sir Arthur (Bomber) Harris.Page 840In 1938, Vannevar Bush, professor of electrical eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g andvice-president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology persuadedRoosevelt <strong>to</strong> create the National Defence Research Committee with Bushas Chairman. When money ran short, they obta<strong>in</strong>ed half from MIT and anequal sum from John D. Rockefeller.Page 842First news of the success of Operations Research <strong>in</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong> wasbrought <strong>to</strong> the U.S. by Conant <strong>in</strong> 1940 and was formally <strong>in</strong>troduced byBush. With the arrival of peace, it became an established civilianprofession.The rationaliz<strong>in</strong>g of society used the tremendous advances <strong>in</strong>mathematics of the 19th century but a good deal came from newdevelopments. Amlong these have been applications of game theory,<strong>in</strong>formation theory, symbolic logic, cybernetics, and electroniccomput<strong>in</strong>g. The newest of these was probably game theory, worked out bya Hungarian refugee mathematician, John von Neumann, at the Institutefor Advanced Study. This applied mathematical techniques <strong>to</strong> situations<strong>in</strong> which persons sought conflict<strong>in</strong>g goals <strong>in</strong> a nexus of relationshipsgoverned by rules. The basic work was "Theory of Games and EconomicBehavior" by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (Pr<strong>in</strong>ce<strong>to</strong>n 1944).Page 843A flood of books all sought <strong>to</strong> apply mathematical methods <strong>to</strong><strong>in</strong>formation, communications, and control systems.THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY PATTERNPage 862The decision <strong>to</strong> use the bomb aga<strong>in</strong>st Japan marks one of theturn<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> his<strong>to</strong>ry of our times. The scientists who wereconsulted had no <strong>in</strong>formation on the status of the war itself, had noidea how close <strong>to</strong> the end Japan already was. Some people like GeneralGroves wanted it <strong>to</strong> be used <strong>to</strong> justify the two billion they had spent.After it was all over, Direc<strong>to</strong>r of Military Intelligence for thePacific theatre of War Alfred McCormack, who was probably <strong>in</strong> as goodposition as anyone <strong>to</strong> for judg<strong>in</strong>g the situation, felt that theJapanese surrender could have been obta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> a few weeks by blockadealone. "The Japanese had no longer enough food <strong>in</strong> s<strong>to</strong>ck, and theirfuel reserves were practically exhausted. We were m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g all theirharbors and if we had brought this operation <strong>to</strong> its logicalconclusion, the destruction of Japanese cities with <strong>in</strong>cendiary andother bombs would have been quite unnecessary. But General Norstaddeclared at Wash<strong>in</strong>g<strong>to</strong>n that this blockad<strong>in</strong>g action was a cowardlyproceed<strong>in</strong>g unworthy of the Air Force. It was therefore discont<strong>in</strong>ued."Page 863


IT was equally clear that the defeat of Japan did not require theA-bomb just as it did not require the Russian entry <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the war or anAmerican <strong>in</strong>vasion of the Japanese home islands. But aga<strong>in</strong>, otherfac<strong>to</strong>rs <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terests and nonrational considerations were <strong>to</strong>opowerful. However, if the U.S. had not f<strong>in</strong>ished the bomb project orhad not used it, it seems most unlikely that the Soviet Union wouldhave made its postwar efforts <strong>to</strong> get the bomb.Page 864The Russian leaders would almost certa<strong>in</strong>ly not have made theeffort <strong>to</strong> get the bomb if we had not used it on Japan. On the otherhand, if we had not used the bomb on Japan, we would have been quite<strong>in</strong>capable of prevent<strong>in</strong>g the Soviet forces from expand<strong>in</strong>g wherever theywere ordered <strong>in</strong> Eurasia <strong>in</strong> 1946.Page 865The growth of the army of specialists destroys one of the threebasic foundations of political democracy. These three bases are:1) that men are relatively equal <strong>in</strong> factual power;2) that men have relatively equal access <strong>to</strong> the <strong>in</strong>formation needed <strong>to</strong>make a government's decisions;3) that men have a psychological read<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>to</strong> accept majority rule <strong>in</strong>return for those civil rights which will allow any m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>to</strong> work <strong>to</strong>build itself up <strong>to</strong> become a majority.Page 866It is <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly clear that <strong>in</strong> the 20th century, the expertwill replace the <strong>in</strong>dustrial tycoon <strong>in</strong> control of the economic systemeven as he will replace the democratic voter <strong>in</strong> control of thepolitical system. This is because plann<strong>in</strong>g will <strong>in</strong>evitably replacelaissez-faire <strong>in</strong> the relationships between the two systems.Hopefully, the elements of choice and freedom may survive for theord<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>in</strong>dividual <strong>in</strong> that he may be free <strong>to</strong> make a choice betweentwo oppos<strong>in</strong>g political groups (even if these groups have little policychoice with<strong>in</strong> the parameters of policy established by the experts) andhe may have the choice <strong>to</strong> switch his economic support from one largeunit <strong>to</strong> another. But <strong>in</strong> general, his freedom and choice will becontrolled with<strong>in</strong> very narrow alternatives by the fact that he will benumbered from birth and followed, as a number, through his educationaltra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, his required military and other public service, his taxcontributions, his health and medical requirements, and his f<strong>in</strong>alretirement and death benefits.Page 867One consequence of the nuclear rivalry has been the almost <strong>to</strong>taldestruction of <strong>in</strong>ternational law as existed from the middle of the17th century <strong>to</strong> the end of the 19th. That old <strong>in</strong>ternational law wasbased on dist<strong>in</strong>ctions which no longer exist <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the dist<strong>in</strong>ctionbetween war and peace, the rights of neutrals, the dist<strong>in</strong>ction betweenpublic and private authority. These are now destroyed or <strong>in</strong> great


confusion.The post-war balance of terror reached its peak of <strong>to</strong>taldisregard both of noncombatants and of neutrals <strong>in</strong> the policies ofJohn Foster Dulles who comb<strong>in</strong>ed sanctimonious religion with "massiveretaliation wherever and whenever we judge fit" <strong>to</strong> the completedestruction of any non-combatant or neutral status.Page 868As a result, all k<strong>in</strong>ds of groups could destroy law and order withoutsuffer<strong>in</strong>g retaliation by ord<strong>in</strong>ary powers and could become recognizedas states when they were <strong>to</strong>tally lack<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the traditional attributesof statehood. For example, the Leopoldville group were recognized asthe real government of the whole Congo <strong>in</strong> spite of the fact that theywere <strong>in</strong>capable of ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g law and order over the area. Similarly,a gang of rebels <strong>in</strong> Yemen <strong>in</strong> 1962 were <strong>in</strong>stantly recognized beforethey gave any evidence whatever of ability <strong>to</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> control or ofread<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>to</strong> assume the exist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>ternational obligations of theYemen state and before it was established that their claims <strong>to</strong> havekilled the k<strong>in</strong>g were true.Page 869Under the umbrella of nuclear stalemate, outside governmentssubsidize murders or revolts as the Russians did <strong>in</strong> Iraq and as theAmerican CIA did <strong>in</strong> several places, successfully <strong>in</strong> Iran <strong>in</strong> 1953, and<strong>in</strong> Guatemala <strong>in</strong> 1954 or very unsuccessfully as <strong>in</strong> the Cuban <strong>in</strong>vasionof 1961. Under the Cold War umbrella, small groups can obta<strong>in</strong>recognition as states by secur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>tervention (usually secret) ofsome outside Power.TRAGEDY AND HOPE Chapters XVII-XVIIIby Dr. Carroll QuigleyISBN 0913022-14-4CONTENTSXVII. NUCLEAR RIVALRY AND COLD WAR, AMERICAN NUCLEARSUPERIORITY 1950-1957XVIII. NUCLEAR RIVALRY AND COLD WAR, RACE FOR THE H-BOMB 1950-1957CHAPTER XVII: NUCLEAR RIVALRY AND THE COLD WAR:


AMERICAN ATOMIC SUPREMACY 1945-1950THE FACTORSPage 873The period 1945 <strong>to</strong> early 1963 forms a unity dur<strong>in</strong>g which a numberof fac<strong>to</strong>rs <strong>in</strong>teracted upon one another <strong>to</strong> present a very complicatedand extraord<strong>in</strong>arily dangerous series of events. That mank<strong>in</strong>d andcivilized life got through the period may be attributed <strong>to</strong> a number oflucky chances rather than <strong>to</strong> any particular skill among the twooppos<strong>in</strong>g political blocs.The Cold War is almost always described <strong>in</strong> terms which put m<strong>in</strong>oremphasis or even neglect the role of technological rivalry becausemost his<strong>to</strong>rians do not feel competent <strong>to</strong> discuss it but chieflybecause much of the evidence is secret. Because of such secrecy, thes<strong>to</strong>ry of this rivalry falls <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> two quite dist<strong>in</strong>ct and evencontradic<strong>to</strong>ry parts:1) what the real situation was; and2) what prevalent public op<strong>in</strong>ion believed the situation <strong>to</strong> be.For example, the Soviet Union had an H-bomb many months before wedid when public op<strong>in</strong>ion believed the opposite; the 1960 believethroughout the world of a so-called "missile gap" or American<strong>in</strong>feriority <strong>in</strong> nuclear missiles when no such <strong>in</strong>feriority existed.Page 875The balance of nuclear weapons was the central fac<strong>to</strong>r <strong>in</strong> the ColdWar. Cessation on nuclear test<strong>in</strong>g came close <strong>to</strong> achievement <strong>in</strong> 1950when both sides had a<strong>to</strong>mic weapons but was destroyed at that time byPresident Truman's order <strong>to</strong> proceed with the development of thehydrogen bomb. By 1963, both sides had these weapons and the balanceof terror had been achieved.Page 879The party struggle <strong>in</strong> the U.S. found the <strong>in</strong>tellectuals (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>gscientists), the <strong>in</strong>ternationalists, the m<strong>in</strong>orities and thecosmopolitans <strong>in</strong> the Democratic Party with the bus<strong>in</strong>essmen, bankersand clerks <strong>in</strong> the Republican Party. The Republicans had fallen <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong>the control (represented by Sena<strong>to</strong>rs Taft, Wherry, Bridges and Jenner)of those who were most ignorant of the real issues and were mostremote from any conceptions of national political responsibility.Page 880This group, <strong>to</strong> whom we often give the name "neo-isolationist,"knew noth<strong>in</strong>g of the world outside the U.S., and generally despised it.Thus, they gave no consideration <strong>to</strong> our allies or neutrals, and saw noreason <strong>to</strong> know or <strong>to</strong> study Russia, s<strong>in</strong>ce it could be hated completelywithout need for accurate knowledge. All foreigners were regarded asunpr<strong>in</strong>cipled, weak, poor, ignorant and evil, with only one aim <strong>in</strong>life, namely, <strong>to</strong> prey on the United States. These neo-isolationistsand unilateralists were equally filled with suspicion or hatred of any


American <strong>in</strong>tellectuals, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g scientists, because they had noconception of any man who placed objective truth higher thansubjective <strong>in</strong>terests s<strong>in</strong>ce such an attitude was a complete challenge<strong>to</strong> the American bus<strong>in</strong>essman's assumption that all men are and shouldbe concerned with the pursuit of self-<strong>in</strong>terest and profit.Neo-isolationism had a series of assumptions which could not beheld by anyone who had any knowledge of the world outside U.S. middleclassbus<strong>in</strong>ess circles. These beliefs were seven <strong>in</strong> number:1) Unilateralism: that the U.S. should and could act by itself withoutneed <strong>to</strong> consider allies, neutrals or the Soviet Union;2) National omnipotence: that the U.S. is so rich and powerful that noone else counts and that there is no need <strong>to</strong> study foreign areas,cus<strong>to</strong>ms, policies;Page 8813) Unlimited goals (or u<strong>to</strong>pianism): the belief that there are f<strong>in</strong>alsolutions <strong>to</strong> the world's problems. Upholders of this view refused <strong>to</strong>accept that constant danger and constant problems were a perpetualcondition of human life except <strong>in</strong> brief and unusual circumstances.Dulles <strong>in</strong>sisted that the Truman policy of conta<strong>in</strong>ment must be replacedby a policy of "liberation." These policies were not designed <strong>to</strong> w<strong>in</strong>conclusively and did not seek <strong>to</strong> solve the problem of the Soviet Unionbut <strong>to</strong> live with it, "presumably forever." He did accept preventivewar <strong>in</strong> the form of massive retaliation if the Communists made anyfurther advances.4) The neo-isolationist belief that cont<strong>in</strong>uance of the Soviet threatarose from <strong>in</strong>ternal treason with<strong>in</strong> America.Page 8825) S<strong>in</strong>ce the chief "high moral pr<strong>in</strong>ciple" which motivated the neoisolationists<strong>in</strong>sisted that Soviet Russia and Democrats were engaged<strong>in</strong> a jo<strong>in</strong>t tacit conspiracy <strong>to</strong> destroy America by high taxes by us<strong>in</strong>gthe Cold War <strong>to</strong> tax America <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> bankruptcy6) S<strong>in</strong>ce neo-isolationists rejected all partial solutions, there waslittle they could do but talk loudly and sign anti-communist pacts.7) The unrealistic and unhis<strong>to</strong>ric nature of neo-isolationism meantthat it could not actually be pursued as a policy. It was pursued byJohn Foster Dulles with permanent <strong>in</strong>jury <strong>to</strong> our allies. When Sena<strong>to</strong>rMcCarthy turned his extravagant charges of subversion and treason fromthe State Department <strong>to</strong> the army, his downfall began. The neoisolationistforces still cont<strong>in</strong>ue <strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly irresponsibleform under a variety of names <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g John Birch Society members ormore generally as the "Radical Right."Page 885Robert Oppenheimer was on a <strong>to</strong>tal of thirty five governmentcommittees. There was a shadow on Oppenheimer's past. In his youngerand more naive days, he had been closely associated with Communists.Certa<strong>in</strong>ly never a Communist himself, and never, at any time, disloyal


<strong>to</strong> the U.S., he had nonetheless associated with Communists. Hisbrother Frank and his wife were Communist Party workers whileOppenheimer's own wife was an ex-Communist, widow of a Communist whohad been killed fight<strong>in</strong>g Fascism <strong>in</strong> Spa<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> 1937. The Oppenheimerscont<strong>in</strong>ued <strong>to</strong> have friends who were Communists and contributed moneyuntil the end of 1941.Page 886All this deroga<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>in</strong>formation was known <strong>to</strong> General Groves and<strong>to</strong> Army Intelligence and used <strong>in</strong> 1953-1954 <strong>to</strong> destroy his reputation.It was an essential element <strong>in</strong> the neo-isolationist McCarthyite,Dulles <strong>in</strong>terregnum of 1953-1957.THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR, 1945-1949Page 891IN the Soviet system, while most Russians lived <strong>in</strong> poverty, aprivileged m<strong>in</strong>ority, buy<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> special s<strong>to</strong>res with special funds andspecial ration cards, had access <strong>to</strong> luxuries undreamed of by theord<strong>in</strong>ary person.Page 900In 1944, Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau <strong>to</strong>ok advantage ofhis close personal friendship with Roosevelt <strong>to</strong> push forward his ownpet scheme <strong>to</strong> reduce Germany <strong>to</strong> a purely agricultural state by almost<strong>to</strong>tal destruction of her <strong>in</strong>dustry, the millions of surplus population<strong>to</strong> be, if necessary, deported <strong>to</strong> Africa. The secretary, supported byhis assistant secretary, Harry Dexter White, was deeply disturbed byGermany's his<strong>to</strong>ry of aggression. The only way <strong>to</strong> prevent it was <strong>to</strong>reduce Germany's <strong>in</strong>dustry and thus her warmak<strong>in</strong>g capacity as close <strong>to</strong>noth<strong>in</strong>g as possible. The result<strong>in</strong>g chaos, <strong>in</strong>flation, and misery wouldbe but slight repayment for the horrors Germany had <strong>in</strong>flicted onothers over many years.By personal <strong>in</strong>fluence, Morgenthau obta<strong>in</strong>ed acceptance of asomewhat modified version of this plan by both Roosevelt and Churchillat the Quebec conference of September 1944. The error at Quebec wasquickly repudiated but no real plann<strong>in</strong>g was done and the MorgenthauPlan played a considerable role <strong>in</strong> the JCS 1067, the directive set up<strong>to</strong> guide the American military occupation of Germany. It proposedreparations be obta<strong>in</strong>ed by dismantl<strong>in</strong>g Germany <strong>in</strong>dustry. The JCS 1067directive ordered that Germany be treated as a defeated enemy and notas a liberated country. No steps were taken <strong>to</strong> secure its economicrecovery.Page 901At the Potsdam conference, it was agreed that the German economyshould not be permitted should not be permitted <strong>to</strong> recover higher thanthe standard of liv<strong>in</strong>g of 1932, at the bot<strong>to</strong>m of the depression, thelevel, <strong>in</strong> fact, which had brought Hitler <strong>to</strong> power <strong>in</strong> 1933.It <strong>to</strong>ok more than two years of misery for Germany <strong>to</strong> secure anychanges <strong>in</strong> these American objectives. Hunger and cold <strong>to</strong>ok a


considerable <strong>to</strong>ll, and the Germans, for two years, experienced some ofthe misery they had <strong>in</strong>flicted on others <strong>in</strong> the preced<strong>in</strong>g dozen years.The Germany currency reform of 1948 is the fiscal miracle of thepost-war world. From it came(1) an explosion of <strong>in</strong>dustrial expansion and economic prosperity forWest Germany;(2) they ty<strong>in</strong>g of the West Germany economy <strong>to</strong> the West;(3) an example for other western European <strong>in</strong> economic expansion; and(4) a wave of prosperity for western Europe as a whole.AMERICAN CONFUSIONS, 1945-1950Page 909The American response <strong>to</strong> the Soviet refusal of postwarcooperation was confused and tentative.W<strong>in</strong>s<strong>to</strong>n Churchill <strong>in</strong> June 1946 spoke of the "Iron Curta<strong>in</strong>" whichStal<strong>in</strong>g was lower<strong>in</strong>g between the Soviet bloc and the West.Last<strong>in</strong>g from 1947-1953, the chief characteristics of"conta<strong>in</strong>ment" were economic and f<strong>in</strong>ancial aid <strong>to</strong> other nations <strong>to</strong>elim<strong>in</strong>ate the misery and ignorance which fosters communism.Page 910Americans, when goals are established as they are <strong>in</strong> war, work<strong>to</strong>gether very effectively, but political work <strong>in</strong> peacetime, with itsambiguous goals, is relegated <strong>to</strong> rivalry, bicker<strong>in</strong>g, and <strong>to</strong>tal<strong>in</strong>ability <strong>to</strong> relate means <strong>to</strong> goals. As a result, the means themselvestend <strong>to</strong> become goals.Page 911Each service has alliances with the <strong>in</strong>dustrial complexes whichsupply their equipment. These complexes not only supply funds for eachservice <strong>to</strong> carry its message <strong>to</strong> the Congress but also exert every<strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>to</strong> reta<strong>in</strong> equipment by dangl<strong>in</strong>g before the high officers whocan <strong>in</strong>fluence contracts, offers of future well-pay<strong>in</strong>g consultantpositions with the <strong>in</strong>dustrial firms concerned. Most high officersretired and then <strong>to</strong>ok consultant jobs with those firms.Page 912Four-star general Somervell retired on a disability salary of$16,000 <strong>to</strong> jo<strong>in</strong> a number of firms which paid him R$125,000 a year;three-star general Campbell retired on a disability salary of $9,000and became an executive at $50,000 a year of firms from whom he hadpreviously purchased $3 billion <strong>in</strong> armaments; four-star general Clayretired on $16,000 a year but signed up at over $100,000 a year.These are but a few of more than a hundred general officers whosepost retirement alliances with <strong>in</strong>dustrial firms encouraged theirsuccessors, still on active service, <strong>to</strong> rema<strong>in</strong> on friendly terms withsuch appreciative bus<strong>in</strong>ess corporations.Page 919Pearl Harbor was a <strong>to</strong>tal surprise. This last po<strong>in</strong>t was so hard <strong>to</strong>


elieve, once the evidence was available, that the same groups whowere howl<strong>in</strong>g about Soviet espionage <strong>in</strong> 1948-1955 were also claim<strong>in</strong>gthat Roosevelt expected and wanted Pearl Harbor. Both these beliefs,if they were believed, were based on gigantic ignorance andmisconceptions about the nature of <strong>in</strong>telligence.Page 921A great deal of nuclear <strong>in</strong>formation (whether secret or not isunknown) as well as uranium metal, went <strong>to</strong> the Soviet Union as part ofLend-Lease <strong>in</strong> 1943. Major George Racey Jordan, USAAF, tried <strong>in</strong> va<strong>in</strong> <strong>to</strong>disrupt these shipments at the time. While most of Jordan's evidenceis unreliable, the shipment of uranium <strong>to</strong> Russia is corroborated fromother sources. The export licenses for such shipments were granted atthe request of General Groves. Jordan's other evidence, most of whichwas very discreditable <strong>to</strong> the New Deal (s<strong>in</strong>ce he testified that he,Groves, and others were under direct pressure from Harry Hopk<strong>in</strong>s <strong>to</strong>allow export of nuclear materials) was subsequently shown <strong>to</strong> be false.Page 923Much of the evidence on the Communist movement came from ex-Communists such as Elizabeth Bentley, Louis Budenz, WhittakerChambers, John Lautner and others. The first three names mentioned areknown because they dramatized, dis<strong>to</strong>rted and manipulated evidence fortheir own private purposes. This is particularly true of ElizabethBentley who exaggerated her role.Page 925The House Un-American Committee was aimed more at partisanadvantage than ascerta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the nature of the Communist conspiracy.the truth cannot now be ascerta<strong>in</strong>ed. Numerous other accusedCommunists, both <strong>in</strong> government and out, whose names were given <strong>to</strong> thecommittee <strong>in</strong> the same breath as Hiss or Lattimore were almost <strong>to</strong>tallyignored.Page 927Others called before the committee who refused <strong>to</strong> give evidenceunder the Fifth Amendment which protects aga<strong>in</strong>st self-<strong>in</strong>crim<strong>in</strong>ationwere <strong>in</strong> fact Communists and Bentley and Chambers knew them as such.Page 938The revelation of Communist <strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>in</strong> the U.S. was undoubtedlyvaluable but the cost <strong>in</strong> damage <strong>to</strong> reputations of <strong>in</strong>nocent persons wasvery high. Much of this damage came from the efforts of Sena<strong>to</strong>r JosephMcCarthy, Republican, of Wiscons<strong>in</strong> <strong>to</strong> prove that the State Departmentand the army were widely <strong>in</strong>filtrated with Communists.Page 939McCarthy was not a conservative, still less a reactionary. He wasa fragment of elemental force, a throwback <strong>to</strong> primeval chaos. He wasthe enemy of all order and all authority, with no respect, or evenunderstand<strong>in</strong>g, for pr<strong>in</strong>ciples, laws, regulations, or rules. As such,he had noth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> do with rationality or generality. Concepts, logic,


dist<strong>in</strong>ctions of categories were completely outside his world. It isclear he did not have any idea what a Communist was, still lessCommunism itself, and he did not care. This was simply a term he used<strong>in</strong> his game of personal power. Most of the terms which have beenapplied <strong>to</strong> him, such as "truculent," "brutal," "ignorant," "sadistic,""foul-mouthed," "brash," are quite correct but not quite <strong>in</strong> the sensethat his enemies applied them, because they assumed that thesequalities and dist<strong>in</strong>ctions had mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> his world as they did <strong>in</strong>their own. They did not, because his behavior was all an act, theth<strong>in</strong>gs he did <strong>to</strong> ga<strong>in</strong> the experience he wanted, that is, the feel<strong>in</strong>gof power, of creat<strong>in</strong>g fear, of destroy<strong>in</strong>g the rules, and of w<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>gattention and admiration for do<strong>in</strong>g so. His act was that of Peck's BadBoy but on a colossal scale. He sought fame and acclaim by show<strong>in</strong>g anadmir<strong>in</strong>g world of schoolmates what a <strong>to</strong>ugh guy he was, defy<strong>in</strong>g all therules, even the rules of decency and ord<strong>in</strong>ary civilized behavior. Butlike the bad boy of the schoolyard, he had no conception of time oranyth<strong>in</strong>g established, and once he had found his act, it was necessary<strong>to</strong> demonstrate it every day. His thirst for power, the power of massacclaim and publicity, reached the public scene at the same moment astelevision, and he was the first <strong>to</strong> realize what could be done byus<strong>in</strong>g the new <strong>in</strong>strument for reach<strong>in</strong>g millions.His thirst for power was <strong>in</strong>satiable because like hunger, it was adaily need. It had noth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> do with the power of authority orregulated discipl<strong>in</strong>e, but the personal power of a sadist. All hisdestructive <strong>in</strong>st<strong>in</strong>cts were aga<strong>in</strong>st anyth<strong>in</strong>g established, the wealthy,the educated, the well-mannered, the rules of the Senate, the Americanparty system, the rules of fair play. As such, he had no conception oftruth or the dist<strong>in</strong>ction between it and falsehood, just as he had noconception of yesterday, <strong>to</strong>day, <strong>to</strong>morrow as dist<strong>in</strong>ct entities. Hesimply said whatever would satisfy, momentarily, his yearn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> bethe center of the stage surrounded by admir<strong>in</strong>g, fearful, shocked,amazed people. He did not even care if their reaction was admiration,fear, shock, or amazement and he did not care if they, as persons, hadthe same reaction or a different one the next day or even a momentlater. He was exactly like an ac<strong>to</strong>r <strong>in</strong> a drama, one <strong>in</strong> which he hadmade the script as he went along, full of falsehoods and<strong>in</strong>consistencies, and he was genu<strong>in</strong>ely surprised and hurt if a personwhom he had abused and <strong>in</strong>sulted for hours at a hear<strong>in</strong>g did not walkout with him <strong>to</strong> a bar or even <strong>to</strong> d<strong>in</strong>ner the moment the hear<strong>in</strong>g sessionwas over. He knew it was an act; he expected you <strong>to</strong> know it was anact. There was really no hypocrisy <strong>in</strong> it, no cynicism, no falsehood,as far as he was concerned, because he was conv<strong>in</strong>ced that this was theway the world was. Everyone he was conv<strong>in</strong>ced, had a racket; this justhappened <strong>to</strong> be his, and he expected people <strong>to</strong> realize this and <strong>to</strong>understand it.Page 930


Of course, <strong>to</strong> the observant outsider who did not share his <strong>to</strong>talamorality, it was all false, <strong>in</strong>vented as he went along, and constantlychanged, everyth<strong>in</strong>g substantiated by documents pulled from hisbriefcase and waved about <strong>to</strong>o rapidly <strong>to</strong> be read. Mostly thesedocuments had noth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> do with what he was say<strong>in</strong>g; mostly he hadnever looked at them himself; they were merely props for theperformance, and <strong>to</strong> him, it was as silly for his audience <strong>to</strong> expectsuch documents <strong>to</strong> be relevant as it would be for the audience <strong>in</strong> atheater <strong>to</strong> expect the food that is be<strong>in</strong>g eaten, the whiskey that isbe<strong>in</strong>g drunk, or the documents which are read <strong>in</strong> that play <strong>to</strong> berelevant <strong>to</strong> what the ac<strong>to</strong>r is say<strong>in</strong>g.Every time he spoke, with each version he became a larger morenonchalant hero. In 1952, he <strong>in</strong>timidated the Air Force <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> award<strong>in</strong>ghim the Dist<strong>in</strong>guished Fly<strong>in</strong>g (given for twenty five combat missions)although he had been a grounded <strong>in</strong>telligence officer who <strong>to</strong>okoccasional rides <strong>in</strong> planes.S<strong>in</strong>ce laws and regulations were, for McCarthy, nonexistent, hisbus<strong>in</strong>ess and f<strong>in</strong>ancial affairs are, like his life, a chaos ofillegalities.Page 931He seized upon Communism. "That's it," he said. "The governmentis full of communists. We can hammer away at them." Without any realconception of what he was do<strong>in</strong>g, and without any research or knowledgeof the subject, on February 9, McCarthy waved a piece of paper andsaid "I have here <strong>in</strong> my hand a list of 205 members of the CommunistParty still work<strong>in</strong>g and shap<strong>in</strong>g the policy of the State Department.Page 932On Feb 20th, <strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>coherent speech <strong>in</strong> the Senate was six hoursof bedlam, as case after case was presented filled with contradictionsand irrelevancies. Accord<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> Senate Republican Leader Taft, "It wasa perfectly reckless performance." Nevertheless, Taft and hiscolleagues determ<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>to</strong> accept and support these charges s<strong>in</strong>ce theywould <strong>in</strong>jure the Adm<strong>in</strong>istration. Few people realize that <strong>in</strong> five yearsof accusations, McCarthy never turned up a Communist <strong>in</strong> the StateDepartment although undoubtedly there must have been some.Page 933He claimed that "the <strong>to</strong>p Russian espionage agent" <strong>in</strong> the U.S.,Alger Hiss's boss <strong>in</strong> the State Department, "the chief architect of ourFar Eastern policy" was Professor Owen Lattimore. The trouble wasLattimore was not a Communist, not a spy, and not employed by theState department.In July, the Tyd<strong>in</strong>gs subcommittee condemned McCarthy for a "fraudand a hoax." McCarthy had the power of an <strong>in</strong>flamed and misled publicop<strong>in</strong>ion. Tyd<strong>in</strong>gs was beaten <strong>in</strong> Maryland <strong>in</strong> 1950. Ben<strong>to</strong>n fromConnecticut who <strong>in</strong>troduced the resolution <strong>to</strong> expel McCarthy from theSenate <strong>in</strong> 1951 and whose charges were fully supported by the Senate's


<strong>in</strong>vestigation of McCarthy's private f<strong>in</strong>ances, was defeated <strong>in</strong> 1952.Dur<strong>in</strong>g this period, McCarthy violated more laws and regulations thanany previous sena<strong>to</strong>r <strong>in</strong> his<strong>to</strong>ry. When a reporter once said "Isn't thata classified document?" McCarthy said, "It was. I just declassifiedit."Page 934Eisenhower was soon boast<strong>in</strong>g that 1,456 Federal workers had been"separated" <strong>in</strong> the first four months of the Eisenhower securityprogram. 2,200 at the end of the first year. Nixon said "We're kick<strong>in</strong>gthe Communists and fellow travellers and security risks out of theGovernment by the thousands." It was soon clear that no Communistswere kicked out and that security risks <strong>in</strong>cluded all k<strong>in</strong>ds of persons.For a while, the Adm<strong>in</strong>istration tried <strong>to</strong> outdo McCarthy bydemonstrat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>gs that Ch<strong>in</strong>a had been "lost" <strong>to</strong> the Communistsbecause of the careful plann<strong>in</strong>g and <strong>in</strong>trigue of Communists <strong>in</strong> theState Department. But they failed <strong>to</strong> prove their contention.Page 935There is considerable truth <strong>in</strong> the Ch<strong>in</strong>a Lobby's contention thatthe American experts on Ch<strong>in</strong>a were organized <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> a s<strong>in</strong>gle<strong>in</strong>terlock<strong>in</strong>g group which had a general consensus of a Leftishcharacter. It is also true that this group, from its control of funds,academic recommendations, and research of publication opportunities,could favor persons who accepted the established consensus and could<strong>in</strong>jure, f<strong>in</strong>ancial or <strong>in</strong> professional advancement, persons who did notaccept it. It is also true that the established group, by its<strong>in</strong>fluence on book review<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the New York Times, the Herald Tribuneand the Saturday Review, a few magaz<strong>in</strong>es <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the "liberalweeklies" and <strong>in</strong> the professional journals, could advance or hamperany specialist's career. It is also true that these th<strong>in</strong>gs were done<strong>in</strong> the United States by the Institute of Pacific Relations, that thisorganization had been <strong>in</strong>filtrated by Communists, and by Communistsympathizers, and that much of this group's <strong>in</strong>fluence arose from itsaccess <strong>to</strong> and control over the flow of funds from f<strong>in</strong>ancialfoundations <strong>to</strong> scholarly activities. All these th<strong>in</strong>gs were true, butthey would have been true of many other areas of American scholarlyresearch and academic adm<strong>in</strong>istration.On the other hand, the charges of the Ch<strong>in</strong>a Lobby that Ch<strong>in</strong>a was"lost" because of this group is not true. Yet the whole subject is ofmajor importance <strong>in</strong> understand<strong>in</strong>g the twentieth century.Page 936Lattimore, because he knew Mongolian, tended <strong>to</strong> becomeeverybody's expert. Many of these experts which were favored by theFar East "establishment" <strong>in</strong> the Institute of Pacific RElations werecaptured by Communist ideology. Under its <strong>in</strong>fluence, theypropagandized, as experts, erroneous ideas and sought <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluencepolicy <strong>in</strong> mistaken directions.


Beh<strong>in</strong>d this unfortunate situation lies another, more profound,relationship, which <strong>in</strong>fluences matters much broader than Far Easternpolicy. It <strong>in</strong>volves the organization of tax-exempt fortunes of<strong>in</strong>ternational f<strong>in</strong>anciers <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> foundations <strong>to</strong> be used for educational,scientific, and "other public purposes." Sixty or more years ago,public life <strong>in</strong> the East was dom<strong>in</strong>ated by the <strong>in</strong>fluence of "WallStreet" referr<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational f<strong>in</strong>ancial capitalism deeply<strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the gold standard, foreign exchange fluctuations,float<strong>in</strong>gof fixed-<strong>in</strong>terest securities and shares for s<strong>to</strong>ck-exchange markets.Page 937This group, which <strong>in</strong> the United States, was completely dom<strong>in</strong>atedby J.P. Morgan and Company from the 1880s <strong>to</strong> the 1930s wascosmopolitan, Anglophile, <strong>in</strong>ternationalist, Ivy League, easternseaboard, high Episcopalian and European-culture conscious. Theirconnection with the Ivy League colleges rested on the fact that largeendowments of these <strong>in</strong>stitutions required constant consultation withthe f<strong>in</strong>anciers of Wall Street and was reflected <strong>in</strong> the fact that theseendowments were largely <strong>in</strong> bonds rather than <strong>in</strong> real estate or commons<strong>to</strong>cks. As a consequence of these <strong>in</strong>fluences, J.P. Morgan and hisassociates were the most significant figures <strong>in</strong> policy mak<strong>in</strong>g atHarvard, Columbia and Yale while the Whitneys and Prudential InsuranceCompany dom<strong>in</strong>ated Pr<strong>in</strong>ce<strong>to</strong>n. The chief officials of these universitieswere beholden <strong>to</strong> these f<strong>in</strong>ancial powers and usually owed their jobs <strong>to</strong>them.The significant <strong>in</strong>fluence of "Wall Street" (mean<strong>in</strong>g Morgan) both<strong>in</strong> the Ivy League and <strong>in</strong> Wash<strong>in</strong>g<strong>to</strong>n expla<strong>in</strong>s the constant <strong>in</strong>terchangebetween the Ivy League and the Federal Government, and <strong>in</strong>terchangewhich undoubtedly aroused a good deal of resentment <strong>in</strong> less-favoredcircles who were more than satiated with the accents, tweeds, and HighEpiscopal Anglophilia of these peoples. Poor Dean Acheson, <strong>in</strong> spite of(or perhaps because of) his remarkable qualities of <strong>in</strong>tellect andcharacter, <strong>to</strong>ok the full brunt of this resentment from McCarthy andhis allies. The same feel<strong>in</strong>g did no good <strong>to</strong> pseudo-Ivy League figureslike Alger Hiss.Page 938In spite of the great <strong>in</strong>fluence of this "Wall Street" alignment,an <strong>in</strong>fluence great enough <strong>to</strong> merit the name of the "AmericanEstablishment," this group could not control the Federal Governmentand, <strong>in</strong> consequence, had <strong>to</strong> adjust <strong>to</strong> a good many government actionsthoroughly distasteful <strong>to</strong> the group. The chief of these were <strong>in</strong>taxation law, beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g with the graduated <strong>in</strong>come tax <strong>in</strong> 1913, butculm<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g above all else with the <strong>in</strong>heritance tax. These tax lawsdrove the great private fortunes dom<strong>in</strong>ated by Wall Street <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> taxexemptfoundations which became the major l<strong>in</strong>k <strong>in</strong> the Establishmentnetwork between Wall Street, the Ivy League and the Federalgovernment. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State after 1961, formerly


president of the Rockefeller Foundations, is as much a member of thisnexus as Alger Hiss, the Dulles brothers, Jerome Green, etc.More than fifty years ago, the Morgan firm decided <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>filtratethe Left-w<strong>in</strong>g political movements of the United States. This wasrelatively easy <strong>to</strong> do s<strong>in</strong>ce these groups were starved for funds andeager for a voice <strong>to</strong> reach the people. Wall Street supplied both. Thepurpose was not <strong>to</strong> destroy, dom<strong>in</strong>ate, or take over but was reallythree-fold:1) <strong>to</strong> keep <strong>in</strong>formed about the Left-w<strong>in</strong>g or liberal groups;2) <strong>to</strong> provide them with a mouthpiece so they could blow off steam;3) <strong>to</strong> have a f<strong>in</strong>al "ve<strong>to</strong>" on their actions if they ever went radical.There was noth<strong>in</strong>g really new about this decision, s<strong>in</strong>ce otherf<strong>in</strong>anciers had talked about it and even attempted it earlier.The best example of the alliance of Wall Street and Left-w<strong>in</strong>gpublication was "The New Republic" a magaz<strong>in</strong>e founded <strong>in</strong> 1914 byWillard Straight us<strong>in</strong>g Payne Whitney money. The orig<strong>in</strong>al purpose forestablish<strong>in</strong>g the paper was <strong>to</strong> provide an outlet for the progressiveLeft and <strong>to</strong> guide it <strong>in</strong> an Anglophile direction. This latter task wasentrusted <strong>to</strong> Walter Lippmann.Willard Straight, like many Morgan agents, was present at theParis Peace Conference <strong>in</strong> 1919.Page 940The first New Republic edi<strong>to</strong>r,Herbert Croly wrote, "Of course,the Straights could always withdraw their f<strong>in</strong>ancial support if theyceased <strong>to</strong> approve of the policy of the paper;and <strong>in</strong> that event, itwould go out of existence as a consequence of their disapproval." Thechief achievement of The New Republic <strong>in</strong> 1914-1918 and aga<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> 1938-1948 was for <strong>in</strong>terventionism <strong>in</strong> Europe.Page 942Straight allowed the Communists <strong>to</strong> come <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the New Republic.The first <strong>to</strong> arrive was Lew Frank.Page 944Frank jo<strong>in</strong>ed a "Communist Research Group" which met <strong>in</strong> theManhattan home of the wealthy "Wall Street Red," Frederick VanderbiltField.Page 945To Morgan, all political parties were simply organizations <strong>to</strong> beused, and the firm always was careful <strong>to</strong> keep a foot <strong>in</strong> all camps.Like the Morgan <strong>in</strong>terest libraries, museums and art, itsrecognition of the need for social work among the poor went back <strong>to</strong>the orig<strong>in</strong>al founder of the firm, George Peabody. To this same figuremay be attributed the use of tax-exempt foundations for controll<strong>in</strong>gthese activities as <strong>in</strong> the use of Peabody foundations <strong>to</strong> supportPeabody libraries and museums. Unfortunately, we do not have spacehere for this great and un<strong>to</strong>ld s<strong>to</strong>ry, but it must be remembered that


what we do say is part of a much larger picture.Our concern at the moment is with the l<strong>in</strong>ks between Wall Streetand the Left, especially the Communists. Here the chief l<strong>in</strong>k was theThomas W. Lamont family. Tom Lamont was brought <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the Morgan firm,as Straight several years later, by Henry P. Davison, a Morganpartner. Each had a wife who became a patroness of Leftish causes andtwo sons, of which the elder was a conventional banker, and theyoungest was a Left-w<strong>in</strong>g sympathizer and sponsor.HUAC files show Tom Lamont, his wife Flora, and his son Corlissas sponsors and f<strong>in</strong>ancial angels <strong>to</strong> almost twenty extreme Lef<strong>to</strong>rganizations, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the Communist Party itself.Page 946In 1951, the McCarran Committee sought <strong>to</strong> show that Ch<strong>in</strong>a had notbeen lost <strong>to</strong> the Communists by the deliberate actions of a group ofacademic experts on the Far East and Communist fellow travellers whosework <strong>in</strong> that direction was controlled and coord<strong>in</strong>ated by the Instituteof Pacific Relations (IPR). The <strong>in</strong>fluence of the Communists <strong>in</strong> the IPRis well established but the patronage of Wall Street is less wellknown.The IPR was a private association of ten <strong>in</strong>dependent nationalcouncils <strong>in</strong> ten countries concerned with affairs <strong>in</strong> the Pacific. Moneyfor the American Council of the IPR came from the Carnegie Foundationand the Rockefeller Foundation. The f<strong>in</strong>ancial deficits which occurredeach year were picked up by f<strong>in</strong>ancial angels, almost all with closeWall Street connections. There can be little doubt that the IPR l<strong>in</strong>ehad many po<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> common both with the Kreml<strong>in</strong>'s party l<strong>in</strong>e on theFar East and with the State Department's police l<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> the same area.Clearly there were some Communists, even party members, <strong>in</strong>volved butit is much less clear that there was any disloyalty <strong>to</strong> the U.S. Therewas a great deal of <strong>in</strong>trigue both <strong>to</strong> help those who agreed with theIPR l<strong>in</strong>e and <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluence U.S. government policy <strong>in</strong> this direction,but there is no evidence of which I am aware of any explicit plot orconspiracy <strong>to</strong> direct American policy <strong>in</strong> a direction favorable either<strong>to</strong> the Soviet Union or <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational Communism.Page 948It must be confessed that the IPR had many of the marks of afellow traveller or Communist "captive" organization. But this doesnot mean that the Radical Right version of these events is accurate.For example, Elizabeth Bentley testified on the IPR and identifiedalmost every person associated with the organization as a Communist.Page 949This Radical Right fairy tale, which is not an accepted folk myth<strong>in</strong> many groups <strong>in</strong> America, pictured the recent his<strong>to</strong>ry of the UnitedStates as a well-organized plot of extreme Left-w<strong>in</strong>g elements,operat<strong>in</strong>g from the White House itself and controll<strong>in</strong>g all the chiefavenues of publicity <strong>in</strong> the United States. This plot, if we are <strong>to</strong>


elieve the myth, worked through such avenues as the New York Times,Herald Tribute, Christian Science Moni<strong>to</strong>r, Wash<strong>in</strong>g<strong>to</strong>n Post, AtlanticMonthly, and Harper's Magaz<strong>in</strong>e and had at its core the wild-eyed andbushy-haired theoreticians of Socialist Harvard and the London Schoolof Economics. It was determ<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>to</strong> br<strong>in</strong>g the U.S. <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> World War II onthe side of England (Roosevelt's first love) and Soviet Russia (hissecond love) and, as part of this consciously planned scheme, <strong>in</strong>vitedJapan <strong>to</strong> attack Pearl Harbor all the while underm<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g America's realstrength by excessive spend<strong>in</strong>g and unbalanced budgets.Page 950This myth, like all fables, does <strong>in</strong> fact have a modicum of truth.There does exist and has existed for a generation, an <strong>in</strong>ternationalAnglophile network which operates <strong>to</strong> some extent <strong>in</strong> the way theRadical Right believes the Communists act. In fact, this network,which we may identify as the Round Table Groups, has no aversion <strong>to</strong>cooperat<strong>in</strong>g with the Communists, or any other groups, and frequentlydoes so. I know of the operations of this network because I havestudied it for twenty years and was permitted for two years, <strong>in</strong> theearly 1960s, <strong>to</strong> exam<strong>in</strong>e its papers and secret records. I have noaversion <strong>to</strong> it or <strong>to</strong> most of its aims and have, for much of my life,been close <strong>to</strong> it and <strong>to</strong> many of its <strong>in</strong>struments. I have objected, both<strong>in</strong> the past and recently, <strong>to</strong> a few of its policies but <strong>in</strong> general mychief difference of op<strong>in</strong>ion is that it wishes <strong>to</strong> rema<strong>in</strong> unknown, and Ibelieve its role <strong>in</strong> his<strong>to</strong>ry is significant enough <strong>to</strong> be known.The Round Table Groups have already been mentioned several times.At the risk of some repetition, the s<strong>to</strong>ry will be summarized herebecause the American branch of this organization (sometimes called the"Eastern Establishment) has played a very significant role <strong>in</strong> thehis<strong>to</strong>ry of the United States <strong>in</strong> the last generation.The Round Table Groups were semi-secret discussion and lobby<strong>in</strong>ggroups whose orig<strong>in</strong>al purpose was <strong>to</strong> federate the English-speak<strong>in</strong>gworld along l<strong>in</strong>es laid down by Cecil Rhodes. By 1915, Round Tablegroups existed <strong>in</strong> seven countries <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g England, South Africa,Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India and the United States.Page 951Money for their activities orig<strong>in</strong>ally came from Cecil Rhodes,J.P. Morgan, the Rockefeller and Whitney families and associates ofbankers Lazard Brothers and Morgan, Grenfell and Company.The chief backbone of this organization grew up along the alreadyexist<strong>in</strong>g f<strong>in</strong>ancial cooperation runn<strong>in</strong>g from the Morgan Bank <strong>in</strong> NewYork <strong>to</strong> a group of <strong>in</strong>ternational f<strong>in</strong>anciers <strong>in</strong> London led by LazardBrothers.Lionel Curtis established <strong>in</strong> England and each dom<strong>in</strong>ion a fron<strong>to</strong>rganization <strong>to</strong> the exist<strong>in</strong>g local Round Table Group. This fron<strong>to</strong>rganization called the Royal Institute of Public Affairs, had as itsnucleus <strong>in</strong> each area the exist<strong>in</strong>g submerged Round Table Group.


Page 952In New York, it was known as the Council on Foreign Relations andwas a front for J.P. Morgan and Company <strong>in</strong> association with the verysmall American Round Table Group. The American organizers weredom<strong>in</strong>ated by the large number of Morgan "experts" <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Lamont andBeer, who had gone <strong>to</strong> the Paris Peace Conference and there becameclose friends with the similar group of English "experts" which hadbeen recruited by the Milner group. In fact, the orig<strong>in</strong>al plans forthe Royal Institute and the Council on Foreign Relations.In 1928, the Council on Foreign Relations was dom<strong>in</strong>ated by theassociates of the Morgan bank. Closely allied with this Morgan<strong>in</strong>fluence were a small group of Wall Street lawyers whose chieffigures were Elihu Root, John W. Davis, the Dulles Brothers, John J.McCloy.Page 953On this basis, there grew up <strong>in</strong> the 20th century a powerstructure between London and New York which penetrated deeply <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong>university life, the press, and the practice of foreign policy.The American branch of this "English Establishment" exerted muchof its <strong>in</strong>fluence through five American newspapers (New York Times andHerald Tribune, Christian Science Moni<strong>to</strong>r, Wash<strong>in</strong>g<strong>to</strong>n Post, Bos<strong>to</strong>nEven<strong>in</strong>g Transcript). It might be po<strong>in</strong>ted out that the existence ofthis Wall Street Anglo-American axis is quite obvious once it ispo<strong>in</strong>ted out. It is reflected by the fact that such Wall Streetlum<strong>in</strong>aries such as John W. Davis, Lewis Douglas, Jock Whitney andDouglas Dillon were appo<strong>in</strong>ted <strong>to</strong> be American ambassadors <strong>in</strong> London.This double <strong>in</strong>ternational network <strong>in</strong> which the Round Table groupsformed the semi-secret or secret nuclei of the Institutes ofInternational Affairs was extended <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> a third network for PacificAffairs <strong>in</strong> 1925 by the same people for the same motives.Page 954The chief aims of this elaborate, semi-secret organization werelargely commendable: <strong>to</strong> coord<strong>in</strong>ate the <strong>in</strong>ternational activities andoutlooks of all the English-speak<strong>in</strong>g world <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> one; <strong>to</strong> work <strong>to</strong>ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> peace; <strong>to</strong> help backward, colonial, and underdeveloped areas<strong>to</strong>ward prosperity along the l<strong>in</strong>es somewhat similar <strong>to</strong> those taught atOxford and the University of London.These organizations and their f<strong>in</strong>ancial backers were <strong>in</strong> no sensereactionary or Fascistic persons, as Communist propaganda would like<strong>to</strong> depict them. Quite the contrary, they were gracious and culturedgentlemen who were much concerned with the freedom of expression ofm<strong>in</strong>orities and the rule of law for all and who were conv<strong>in</strong>ced thatthey could forcefully civilize the Boers, the Irish, the Arabs, andthe H<strong>in</strong>dus, and who are largely responsible for the partitions ofIreland, Palest<strong>in</strong>e, and India. If their failures now loom larger thantheir successes, this should not be allowed <strong>to</strong> conceal the high


motives with which they attempted both.It was this group of people, whose wealth and <strong>in</strong>fluence soexceeded their experience and understand<strong>in</strong>g, who provided much of theframework of <strong>in</strong>fluence which the Communist sympathizers and fellowtravellers <strong>to</strong>ok over <strong>in</strong> the United States <strong>in</strong> the 1930s. It must berecognized that the power of these energetic Left-w<strong>in</strong>gers exercisedwas never their own power or Communist power but was ultimately thepower of the <strong>in</strong>ternational f<strong>in</strong>ancial coterie, and, once the anger andsuspicions of the American people were aroused as they were <strong>in</strong> the1950s, it was a fairly simple matter <strong>to</strong> get rid of the Redsympathizers. Before this could be done, however, a congressionalcommittee, follow<strong>in</strong>g backward <strong>to</strong> their source the threads which ledfrom the admitted Communists like Whittaker Chambers, through AlgerHiss, and the Carnegie Endowment <strong>to</strong> Thomas Lamont and the Morgan Bank,fell <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the whole complicated network of the <strong>in</strong>terlock<strong>in</strong>g tax-exemptfoundations. The Eighty-third Congress set up <strong>in</strong> 1953 a Special ReeceCommittee <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestigate Tax-Exempt Foundations. It soon became clearthat people of immense wealth would be unhappy if the <strong>in</strong>vestigationwent <strong>to</strong>o far and that the "most respected" newspapers <strong>in</strong> the country,closely allied with these men of wealth, would not get excited enoughabout any revelations <strong>to</strong> make the publicity worthwhile. An <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>greport show<strong>in</strong>g the Left-w<strong>in</strong>g associations of <strong>in</strong>terlock<strong>in</strong>g nexus oftax-exempt foundations was issued <strong>in</strong> 1954 rather quietly.. Four yearslater, the Reece Committee's general counsel, Rene A Wormser, wrote ashocked, but not shock<strong>in</strong>g, book on the subject called "Foundations:Their Power and Influence."Page 956Jerome Green is a symbol of much more than the Wall Street<strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>in</strong> the IPR. He is also a symbol of the relationship betweenthe f<strong>in</strong>ancial circles of London and those of the eastern U.S. whichreflects one of the most powerful <strong>in</strong>fluences <strong>in</strong> 20th century Americanand world his<strong>to</strong>ry. The two ends of this English-speak<strong>in</strong>g axis havesometimes been called, perhaps facetiously, the English and AmericanEstablishments. There is, however, a considerable degree of truthbeh<strong>in</strong>d the joke, a truth which reflects a very real power structure.It is this power structure which the Radical Right <strong>in</strong> the U.S. hasbeen attack<strong>in</strong>g for years <strong>in</strong> the belief they are attack<strong>in</strong>g theCommunists. These misdirected attacks did much <strong>to</strong> confuse the Americanpeople <strong>in</strong> 1948-1955. By 1953 most of these attacks had run theircourse. The American people, thoroughly bewildered at the widespreadcharges of twenty years of treason and subversion, had rejected theDemocrats and put <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the White House a war hero, Eisenhower. At thetime,two events, one public and one secret, were still <strong>in</strong> process. Thepublic one was the Korean War; the secret one was the race for thethermonuclear bomb.


CHAPTER XVIII: NUCLEAR RIVALRY AND COLD WAR,RACE FOR THE H-BOMB 1950-1957Page 965On March 1, 1954, we exploded our first real thermonuclear bombat Bik<strong>in</strong>i a<strong>to</strong>ll. It was a horrify<strong>in</strong>g device which spread death-deal<strong>in</strong>gradioactive contam<strong>in</strong>ation over more than 8,000 square miles and<strong>in</strong>jurious radiation over much of the world.Page 968To prepare public op<strong>in</strong>ion <strong>to</strong> accept use of the H-bomb, if itbecame necessary, Strauss sponsored a study of radioactive falloutwhose conclusion was prejudged by call<strong>in</strong>g it "Project Sunsh<strong>in</strong>e." Byselective release of some evidence and strict secrecy of other<strong>in</strong>formation, they tried <strong>to</strong> establish <strong>in</strong> public op<strong>in</strong>ion that there wasno real danger <strong>to</strong> anyone from nuclear fallout even <strong>in</strong> all-out nuclearwar. This gave rise <strong>to</strong> controversy between the scientists and theAdm<strong>in</strong>istration on the danger of fallout.The Eisenhower through the Dulles doctr<strong>in</strong>e of "massiveretaliation" was so deeply committed <strong>to</strong> nuclear war that it could notpermit the growth of public op<strong>in</strong>ion which would refuse <strong>to</strong> accept theuse of nuclear weapons because of objections <strong>to</strong> the danger of fallout<strong>to</strong> neutrals and non-combatants. By 1953, this struggle became so<strong>in</strong>tense that supporters of massive retaliation decided they mustdestroy the public image and public career of Oppenheimer.THE KOREAN WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH, 1950-1954Page 970The emphasis on nuclear retaliation <strong>to</strong> Communist aggressionanywhere <strong>in</strong> the world made it necessary <strong>to</strong> draw a defence perimeterover which such aggression would trigger retaliation. At the<strong>in</strong>sistence of MacArthur, that perimeter was drawn <strong>to</strong> exclude Korea,Formosa and Ma<strong>in</strong>land Ch<strong>in</strong>a; accord<strong>in</strong>gly, all American forces had beenevacuated from South Korea <strong>in</strong> June 1949.Page 971The Soviet Union <strong>in</strong>terpreted this <strong>to</strong> mean that the U.S. wouldallow South Korea <strong>to</strong> be conquered by the North. Instead, when Russia,through its satellite North Korea, sought <strong>to</strong> take Korea, this gamerise <strong>to</strong> an American counteraction.Page 972For forty-eight hours after the Korean attack, the worldhesitated, await<strong>in</strong>g America's reaction. Truman immediately committedAmerican air and sea forces <strong>in</strong> the area south of 38 degrees anddemanded a UN condemnation of the aggression. Thus, for the first time<strong>in</strong> his<strong>to</strong>ry, a world organization voted <strong>to</strong> use collective force <strong>to</strong> s<strong>to</strong>parmed aggression. This was possible because the North Korean attackoccurred at a time when the Soviet delegation was absent from the UN


Security Council, boycott<strong>in</strong>g it as a protest at the presence of thedelegation from Nationalist Ch<strong>in</strong>a. Accord<strong>in</strong>gly, the much-used Sovietve<strong>to</strong> was unavailable.Page 974The frontier was reached by UN forces as the month ended. The RedCh<strong>in</strong>ese decision <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>tervene was made n<strong>in</strong>e days after American troopscrossed the 38th parallel <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> North Korea. It was <strong>in</strong>evitable as RedCh<strong>in</strong>a could hardly be expected <strong>to</strong> allow the buffer North Korean state<strong>to</strong> be destroyed and American troops <strong>to</strong> occupy the l<strong>in</strong>e of the Yalu. Assoon as it became clear that American forces would cont<strong>in</strong>ue past the38th parallel <strong>to</strong> the Yalu, the Ch<strong>in</strong>ese <strong>in</strong>tervened, not <strong>to</strong> res<strong>to</strong>re the38th parallel frontier but <strong>to</strong> clear the U.N. forces from Asiacompletely.Page 975The Truman Adm<strong>in</strong>istration, after the vic<strong>to</strong>ry at Inchon, did not<strong>in</strong>tend <strong>to</strong> s<strong>to</strong>p at the 38th parallel and hoped <strong>to</strong> reunite the countryunder the Seoul government. It is probable that this alone triggeredthe Ch<strong>in</strong>ese <strong>in</strong>tervention.On Oc<strong>to</strong>ber 9, 1950, two of MacArthur's planes attacked a Russianair base sixty-two miles <strong>in</strong>side Russian terri<strong>to</strong>ry.Page 977After Truman removed MacArthur, Republican leaders spoke publiclyof impeach<strong>in</strong>g the President. Sena<strong>to</strong>r William Jenner said: This country<strong>to</strong>day is <strong>in</strong> the hands of a secret <strong>in</strong>ner coterie which is directed byagents of the Soviet Union. We must cut this whole cancerousconspiracy out at once. Our only choice is <strong>to</strong> impeach the presidentand f<strong>in</strong>d out who is the secret <strong>in</strong>visible government which has socleverly led our country down the road <strong>to</strong> destruction."Page 979On the whole, neo-isolationist discontent was a revolt of theignorant aga<strong>in</strong>st the <strong>in</strong>formed or educated, of the n<strong>in</strong>eteenth centuryaga<strong>in</strong>st the <strong>in</strong>soluble problems of the twentieth, of the Midwest of TomSawyer aga<strong>in</strong>st the cosmopolitan East of J.P. Morgan and Company, ofold Siwash aga<strong>in</strong>st Harvard, of the Chicago Tribune aga<strong>in</strong>st theWash<strong>in</strong>g<strong>to</strong>n Post or New York Times, of simple absolutes aga<strong>in</strong>st complexrelativisms, of immediate f<strong>in</strong>al solutions aga<strong>in</strong>st long-range partialalleviations, of frontier activism aga<strong>in</strong>st European though, arejection, out of hand, of all the complexities of life which hadarisen s<strong>in</strong>ce 1915 <strong>in</strong> favor of a nostalgic return <strong>to</strong> the simplicitiesof 1905, and above all a desire <strong>to</strong> get back <strong>to</strong> the <strong>in</strong>expensive,thoughtless, and irresponsible <strong>in</strong>ternational security of 1880.Page 980This neurotic impulse swept over the U.S. <strong>in</strong> a great wave <strong>in</strong> theyears 1948-1955, supported by hundreds of thousands of self-seek<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>dividuals, especially peddlers of publicity and propaganda, andf<strong>in</strong>anced no longer by the relatively tied-up funds of decl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Wall


Street <strong>in</strong>ternational f<strong>in</strong>ance, but by its successors, the freelyavailable w<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>gs of self-f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dustrial profits from such new<strong>in</strong>dustrial activities as air power, electronics, chemicals, whichpretended <strong>to</strong> themselves that their affluence was entirely due <strong>to</strong> theirown cleverness. At the head of this list were the new millionaires ledby the Texas oil pluggers whose fortunes were based on tricky taxprovisions and government-subsidized transportation systems.Page 982The Kreml<strong>in</strong> was quite wil<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> keep America's men, money, andattention tied down <strong>in</strong> Korea.Page 985Dur<strong>in</strong>g Truman's last four budgets, expenditures on nationalsecurity <strong>in</strong>creased from $13 billion <strong>in</strong> 1950 <strong>to</strong> $50 billion <strong>in</strong> 1953.THE EISENHOWER TEAM, 1952-1956Page 986The Korean War disrupted the pleasures of the postwar economicboom with military service, shortages, restrictions and cost-of-liv<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>flation which could not help but breed discontent. And through it,all the mobilized wealth of the country, <strong>in</strong> alliance with most of thepress, kept up a constant barrage of "Communists <strong>in</strong> Wash<strong>in</strong>g<strong>to</strong>n,""twenty years of treason." In creat<strong>in</strong>g this picture, the leaders ofthe Republican Party <strong>to</strong>tally committed themselves <strong>to</strong> the myths of theneo-isolationists and of the Radical Right.In June 1951, Sena<strong>to</strong>r McCarthy delivered a speech <strong>in</strong> the Senateof 60,000 words attack<strong>in</strong>g General Marshall as a man "steeped <strong>in</strong>falsehood" who has "recourse <strong>to</strong> the lie whenever it suits hisconvenience," one of the architects of America's foreign policy madeby "men high <strong>in</strong> Government who are concert<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> deliver us <strong>to</strong>disaster, a conspiracy so black that when it is f<strong>in</strong>ally exposed, itspr<strong>in</strong>cipals shall be forever deserv<strong>in</strong>g of the maledictions of allhonest men."Page 987Eisenhower had no particular assets except a bland and amiabledisposition comb<strong>in</strong>ed with his reputation as a vic<strong>to</strong>rious general. Healso had a weakness, one which is frequently found <strong>in</strong> his profession,the conviction that anyone who has become a millionaire, even by<strong>in</strong>heritance, is an authoritative person on almost any subject.Page 988If elected, he would go <strong>to</strong> Korea <strong>to</strong> make peace. Although himselfnot a neo-isolationist or a reactionary, Eisenhower had few deeppersonal convictions and was eager <strong>to</strong> be president. When his advisers<strong>to</strong>ld him that he must collaborate with the Radical Right, he went allthe way, even <strong>to</strong> the extent of condon<strong>in</strong>g McCarthy's attack on GeneralMarshall when he, under McCarthy's pressure, removed a favorablereference <strong>to</strong> Marshall from a Wiscons<strong>in</strong> speech.Eisenhower allotted the functions of government <strong>to</strong> his Cab<strong>in</strong>et


members ("eight millionaires and a plumber").Page 991At<strong>to</strong>rney General Herbert Brownell confided <strong>to</strong> a bus<strong>in</strong>essmen'sluncheon <strong>in</strong> Chicago that President Truman, know<strong>in</strong>g that Harry DexterWhite was a Russian spy, had promoted him from assistant secretary ofthe treasury <strong>to</strong> executive direc<strong>to</strong>r of the U.S. Mission <strong>to</strong> theInternational Monetary Fund <strong>in</strong> 1946. The House Committee on Un-American activities at once issued a subpoena <strong>to</strong> the ex-President <strong>to</strong>testify which was ignored.McCarthy's attacks on the U.S. Information Agency overseaslibraries led <strong>to</strong> burn<strong>in</strong>g of books like Tom Sawyer and Rob<strong>in</strong> Hood assubversive (Rob<strong>in</strong> Hood s<strong>to</strong>le from the rich and gave <strong>to</strong> the poor,clearly a Communist tactic).Page 992Dulles publicly announced the conception of "massive retaliation"before the Council on Foreign Relations on January 12, 1954.Page 995W.L. Borden wrote a letter <strong>to</strong> J. Edgar Hoover stat<strong>in</strong>g that "J.Robert Oppenheimer is an agent of the Soviet Union." This charge wassupported by a biased rehash of all the deroga<strong>to</strong>ry s<strong>to</strong>ries aboutOppenheimer and was made up of wild charges which no responsibleperson has ever been will<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> defend." On the basis of this letterand at the direct order of President Eisenhower, Chairman Strausssuspended Oppenheimer's security clearance.Page 998Broadest of the three narrow<strong>in</strong>g circles of outlook was a violentneurotic rebellion of harassed middle-class persons aga<strong>in</strong>st a longtimechallenge <strong>to</strong> middle-class values aris<strong>in</strong>g from depression, war,<strong>in</strong>security, science, foreigners, and m<strong>in</strong>ority groups of all k<strong>in</strong>ds.Public op<strong>in</strong>ion always supported large defence forces.Public op<strong>in</strong>ion gave much less support <strong>to</strong> foreign aid.These statements based on public op<strong>in</strong>ion polls.THE RISE OF KHRUSHCHEV, 1953-1958Page 1009Immediately after Stal<strong>in</strong>'s death, the "collective leadership" washeaded by Malenkov, Beria and Molo<strong>to</strong>v. Malenkov supported a policy ofrelaxation with <strong>in</strong>creased emphasis on production of consumers goodsand ris<strong>in</strong>g standards of liv<strong>in</strong>g, as well as <strong>in</strong>creased efforts <strong>to</strong> avoidany <strong>in</strong>ternational crises which might lead <strong>to</strong> war; Beria supported a"thaw" <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternal matters, with large-scale amnesties for politicalprisoners as well as rehabilitation of those already liquidated;Molo<strong>to</strong>v cont<strong>in</strong>ued <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>sist on the "hard" policies of Stal<strong>in</strong> with norelaxation of domestic tyranny.Page 1010Wild rumors and and some relaxation, at Beria's behest, <strong>in</strong> East


Germany, gave rise <strong>to</strong> false hopes and on June 16, 1953, these workersrose up aga<strong>in</strong>st the Communist government. These upris<strong>in</strong>g were crushedwith the full power of the Soviet occupation armored divisions. Us<strong>in</strong>gthis as an excuse, the Kreml<strong>in</strong> leaders suddenly arrested Beria andshot him.The overthrow of the master of terror was followed by anextensive curtailment of the secret police and its powers. Secretcourts were abolished.Page 1011The gradual elim<strong>in</strong>ation of Molo<strong>to</strong>v found Khrushchev as thechampion of "thaw" <strong>in</strong> the Cold War.Page 1012Khrushchev's six-day visit <strong>to</strong> Ti<strong>to</strong> is of great importance becauseit showed Russia <strong>in</strong> an apologetic role for a major past error andbecause it reversed Stal<strong>in</strong>'s rule that all Communist partieseverywhere must follow the Kreml<strong>in</strong>'s leadership such that "differences<strong>in</strong> the concrete application of Socialism are the exclusive concern of<strong>in</strong>dividual countries." En route home, he s<strong>to</strong>pped <strong>in</strong> Sofia and placethe fuse <strong>in</strong> another, even larger, stick of dynamite, by a secretdenunciation of Stal<strong>in</strong> personally as a bloodthirsty tyrant. Back <strong>in</strong>Moscow, Khrushchev won over the majority by argu<strong>in</strong>g that the loyaltyof the satellites, and especially their vital economic cooperation,could be ensured better by a loose leash than by a club.Page 1013The Russians spoke favorably about disarmament which, <strong>to</strong> them,meant <strong>to</strong>tal renunciation of nuclear weapons and drastic cuts <strong>in</strong> groundforces, a comb<strong>in</strong>ation which would make the United States very weakaga<strong>in</strong>st Russia while leav<strong>in</strong>g Russia still dom<strong>in</strong>ant <strong>in</strong> Europe.Page 1012The Geneva Conference discussions were conducted <strong>in</strong> anunprecedented atmosphere of friendly cooperation which came <strong>to</strong> beknown as the "Geneva spirit" and cont<strong>in</strong>ued for several years and wasnever completely overcome even when matters were at their worstfollow<strong>in</strong>g the U-2 <strong>in</strong>cident of 1960 and the Cuban crisis of 1962.Page 1016At the Twentieth Party Congress <strong>in</strong> February 1956, the firstspeech of 50,000 words delivered by Khrushchev over seven hours urgedthe need for coexistence with the West and references <strong>to</strong> thepossibility of peaceful rather than revolutionary change fromcapitalism <strong>to</strong> Socialism.The real explosion came at a secret all-night session on July 24<strong>in</strong> a 30,000 word speech where Khrushchev made a horrify<strong>in</strong>g attack onStal<strong>in</strong> as a bloodthirsty and demented tyrant who had destroyed tens ofthousands of loyal party members on falsified evidence. The fullnightmare of the Soviet system was revealed.Page 1017


A few passages from this speech:"This concept "enemy of the people" elim<strong>in</strong>ated any possibility ofrebuttal. Usually, the only evidence used, aga<strong>in</strong>st all the rules ofmodern legal science, was the confession of the accused, and assubsequent <strong>in</strong>vestigation showed, such "confessions" were obta<strong>in</strong>ed byphysical pressure on the accused. The formula "enemy of the people"was specifically <strong>in</strong>troduced for the purpose of physically annihilat<strong>in</strong>gthese persons.How is it that a person confesses <strong>to</strong> crimes that he has notcommitted? Only <strong>in</strong> one way - by application of physical pressure,<strong>to</strong>rtures, tak<strong>in</strong>g away of his human dignity.Page 1019The "secret speech" also destroyed Stal<strong>in</strong>'s reputation as amilitary genius:"Stal<strong>in</strong> said that the tragedy of the war resulted from theunexpected attack by the Germans. This is completely untrue. Churchillwarned Stal<strong>in</strong> that the Germans were go<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> attack. Stal<strong>in</strong> <strong>to</strong>ok nohad and warned that no credence be given <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation of this sortnot <strong>to</strong> provoke a German <strong>in</strong>vasion. Had our <strong>in</strong>dustry been mobilizedproperly and <strong>in</strong> time <strong>to</strong> supply the army, our wartime losses would havebeen decidedly smaller.Very grievous consequences followed Stal<strong>in</strong>'s destruction of manymilitary commanders dur<strong>in</strong>g 1937-1941 because of his suspiciousness andfalse accusations. Dur<strong>in</strong>g that time, leaders who had ga<strong>in</strong>ed militaryexperience <strong>in</strong> Spa<strong>in</strong> and the Far East were almost completelyliquidated.Page 1021Stal<strong>in</strong>'s 1948 "Short Biography" is an expression of mostdissolute flattery, mak<strong>in</strong>g a man <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> a god, transform<strong>in</strong>g him <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> an<strong>in</strong>fallible sage, "the greatest leader and most sublime strategist ofall times and nations." We need not give examples of the loathsomeadulation fill<strong>in</strong>g this book. They were all approved and edited byStal<strong>in</strong> personally. He added "Although he performed his task of leaderof the people with consummate skill and enjoyed the unreserved suppor<strong>to</strong>f the whole Soviet people, Stal<strong>in</strong> never allowed his work <strong>to</strong> be marredby the slightest h<strong>in</strong>t of vanity, conceit, or self-adulation." I'llcite one more <strong>in</strong>sertion by Stal<strong>in</strong>: "Comrade Stal<strong>in</strong>'s genius enabledhim <strong>to</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e the enemy's plans and defeat them. The battles <strong>in</strong> whichComrade Stal<strong>in</strong> directed the Soviet armies are brilliant examples ofoperational military skill." "Page 1022By direct<strong>in</strong>g all the criticism of Stal<strong>in</strong> personally, heexculpated himself and the other Bolshevik survivors who were fully asguilty as Stal<strong>in</strong> was - guilty not merely because they acquiesced <strong>in</strong>Stal<strong>in</strong>'s atrocities from fear, as admitted <strong>in</strong> Khrushchev's speech, butbecause they fully cooperated with him.


A study of Khrushchev's life shows that he defended Stal<strong>in</strong>'s actswhich caused the deaths of millions. The fault was not merely withStal<strong>in</strong>; it was with the system, it was with Russia.The more completely <strong>to</strong>tal and irresponsible power is concentrated<strong>in</strong> one man's hands, the more frequently will a monster of sadism beproduced.The very structure of Russian life drove Khrushchev, as it haddriven Stal<strong>in</strong>, <strong>to</strong> concentrate all power <strong>in</strong> his own hands. Neither mancould relax halfway <strong>to</strong> power for fear that someone else would cont<strong>in</strong>ueon, seek<strong>in</strong>g the peak of power. The basis of the whole system was fearand like all neurotic drives <strong>in</strong> a neurotic system, such fear could notbe overcome even by achievement of <strong>to</strong>tal power. That is why it grows<strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> paranoia as it did with Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, PaulI, Stal<strong>in</strong> and others.Page 1031Hav<strong>in</strong>g failed <strong>to</strong> block Khrushchev's economic plans, his rivals <strong>in</strong>the Presidium were reduced <strong>to</strong> a last resort, they had <strong>to</strong> get rid ofthe man himself. At a Presidium meet<strong>in</strong>g on June 18, 1957, the motionwas made <strong>to</strong> remove Khrushchev as the first party secretary. Thediscussion grew violent with Malenkov and Molo<strong>to</strong>v attach<strong>in</strong>g andKhrushchev defend<strong>in</strong>g himself. He was accused of practic<strong>in</strong>g a "cult ofpersonality" and of economic mismanagement. The vote was 7-4 aga<strong>in</strong>sthim with Mikoyan, Kirichenko and Suslov his only supporters. He wasoffered the reduced position of m<strong>in</strong>ister of agriculture.Page 1032Khrushchev refused <strong>to</strong> accept the result, deny<strong>in</strong>g that thePresidium had the authority <strong>to</strong> remove a first secretary, and appeal<strong>in</strong>g<strong>to</strong> the Central Committee. The members of this larger group jo<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong>the discussions as they arrived while Khrushchev's supporters sought<strong>to</strong> delay the vote until his men could come <strong>in</strong> from the prov<strong>in</strong>ces.Marshall Zhukov provided planes <strong>to</strong> br<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the more distant ones. Thediscussion became bitter when Zhukov threatened <strong>to</strong> produce evidencethat Malenkov and Molo<strong>to</strong>v had been deeply <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the bloodypurges of 1937. Madame Furtseva, an alternate member of the Presidium,filibustered with a speech for six hours. Eventually, there were 309members present. When the vote was f<strong>in</strong>ally taken, Khrushchev'ssupporters voted for him solidly and his removal, already voted by thePresidium, was reversed. Khrushchev at once counterattacked. He movedand carried the expulsion from the Presidium of Malenkov, Molo<strong>to</strong>v,Kaganovich and Shepilov for "anti-party" activities. Then came theelection of a new Presidium with fifteen full members <strong>in</strong>stead than theprevious eleven, and n<strong>in</strong>e alternates <strong>in</strong>stead of the previous six.This change was Khrushchev's most smash<strong>in</strong>g personal vic<strong>to</strong>ry andthe most significant event <strong>in</strong> Russia's <strong>in</strong>ternal his<strong>to</strong>ry. It ledKhrushchev <strong>to</strong> a position of political power more complete than


Stal<strong>in</strong>'s had been although it was clear that Khrushchev would never beallowed <strong>to</strong> abuse his power the way Stal<strong>in</strong> had done.Page 1033Khrushchev did not rest on his oars. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the summer of 1957,he made notable concessions <strong>to</strong> the peasants (end<strong>in</strong>g compulsorydeliveries from products of their personal plots), slammed down thelid on freedom of writers and artists, pushed vigorously both the"virg<strong>in</strong> lands" scheme and the decentralization of <strong>in</strong>dustry, and worked<strong>to</strong> curtail the grow<strong>in</strong>g au<strong>to</strong>nomy of the armed forces and revived tradeunions <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the new regional economic councils.Page 1034Russian objection <strong>to</strong> city-bomb<strong>in</strong>g or <strong>to</strong> strategic terror of theV-2 k<strong>in</strong>d as <strong>in</strong>effective and a waste of resources was undoubtedlys<strong>in</strong>cere.The Soviet Union has no idea of be<strong>in</strong>g able <strong>to</strong> achieve militaryvic<strong>to</strong>ry over the United States simply because they have no method ofoccupy<strong>in</strong>g the terri<strong>to</strong>ry of the United States at any stage <strong>in</strong> a war.Page 1035They are unlikely <strong>to</strong> use nuclear weapons first although fullyprepared <strong>to</strong> resort <strong>to</strong> them once they are used by an enemy.Page 1036However such a war is regarded by the Soviet leaders as highlyundesirable while they, <strong>in</strong> a period of almost endless cold war, canseek <strong>to</strong> destroy capitalist society by nonviolent means. This theory of"nibbl<strong>in</strong>g" the capitalist world <strong>to</strong> death is comb<strong>in</strong>ed with a tacticwhich would resist "capitalist imperialism" by encourag<strong>in</strong>g "anticolonialism."Stal<strong>in</strong> and Dulles saw the world largely <strong>in</strong> black-and-white terms:who was not with them was obviously aga<strong>in</strong>st them.Page 1037Stal<strong>in</strong> did not see the possibility of colonial areas becom<strong>in</strong>gnon-Communist and non-colonial <strong>in</strong>dependent states and rebuffed thelocal native groups. Khrushchev did the opposite.Page 1038This shift <strong>in</strong> the Soviet attitude <strong>to</strong>ward neutralism was helped byDulles' refusal <strong>to</strong> accept the existence of neutralism. His rebuffstended <strong>to</strong> drive those areas which wanted <strong>to</strong> be neutral <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the armsof Russian because the new nations of the develop<strong>in</strong>g Buffer Fr<strong>in</strong>gevalued their <strong>in</strong>dependence above all else. The Russian acceptance ofneutralism may be dated about 1954 while Dulles still felt stronglyadverse <strong>to</strong> neutralism four or five years later. This gave the SovietUnion a chronological advantage <strong>to</strong> compensate for its manydisadvantages <strong>in</strong> the basic struggle <strong>to</strong> w<strong>in</strong> the favor of the neutrals.THE COLD WAR IN EASTERN AND SOUTHERN ASIA, 1950-1957Page 1039By 1939, there was only one <strong>in</strong>dependent state <strong>in</strong> southeast Asia:


Siam. Thus all southeast Asia, except Thailand, was under the colonialdom<strong>in</strong>ation of five Western states <strong>in</strong> 1939.French Indoch<strong>in</strong>a emerged from Japanese occupation as the threestates of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, each claim<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dependence.Efforts by the European Powers <strong>to</strong> res<strong>to</strong>re their prewar rule led <strong>to</strong>violent clashes with the supporters of <strong>in</strong>dependence. These struggleswere brief and successful <strong>in</strong> Burma and Indonesia but were veryprotracted <strong>in</strong> Indoch<strong>in</strong>a.Page 1042In all these areas, native nationalists were <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>to</strong> thepolitical Left, if for no other reason than the fact that thedifficulties of capital accumulation and <strong>in</strong>vestment <strong>to</strong> f<strong>in</strong>anceeconomic improvements could be achieved only under state control. Insome cases, such Communism may have been ideological but <strong>in</strong>most cases,it <strong>in</strong>volved little more than the desire <strong>to</strong> play off the Soviet Unionand Ch<strong>in</strong>a aga<strong>in</strong>st the Western imperialist Powers.Page 1042A communist revolt <strong>in</strong> the Philipp<strong>in</strong>es had already begun and wasjo<strong>in</strong>ed by similar upris<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> Burma, Indonesia, and Malaya. Most ofthese revolts <strong>to</strong>ok the form of agrarian agitations and armed raids byCommunist guerrilla jungle fighters. S<strong>in</strong>ce the operated on a hit-andrunbasis and had <strong>to</strong> live off the local peasantry, their exploitationof peasant life eventually made them decreas<strong>in</strong>gly welcome <strong>to</strong> this verygroup for whom they pretended <strong>to</strong> be fight<strong>in</strong>g.In the Philipp<strong>in</strong>es, the rebels were smashed <strong>in</strong> 1953. InIndonesia, Sukarno repressed the <strong>in</strong>surrection and executed itsleaders. In Malaya, the Communists were systematically hunted down anddestroyed by British troops. In Burma, they weren't elim<strong>in</strong>ated until1960.The real problem was Indoch<strong>in</strong>a. There, the French Army wasuncompromis<strong>in</strong>g and Communist leadership was skillful. As a result, thestruggle became part of the Cold War. The Malay pen<strong>in</strong>sula is dom<strong>in</strong>atedby a series of mounta<strong>in</strong> ranges with their <strong>in</strong>terven<strong>in</strong>g rivers runn<strong>in</strong>gsouthward from Ch<strong>in</strong>ese Yunnan. These rivers fan out <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> fertilealluvial deltas which produce surplus foods for undemand<strong>in</strong>g peoples.Page 1043Indoch<strong>in</strong>a brought considerable wealth <strong>to</strong> France. After theJapanese withdrawal, the Paris government was reluctant <strong>to</strong> see thiswealth, chiefly from the t<strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>es, fall <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> native groups and by1949, decided <strong>to</strong> use force <strong>to</strong> recover the area.Opposed <strong>to</strong> the French effort was Ho Chi M<strong>in</strong>h, a member of theFrench Communist Party. Ho had set up a coalition government under hisViet M<strong>in</strong>h Party and proclaimed <strong>in</strong>dependence for Vietnam (chieflyTonk<strong>in</strong> and Annam) <strong>in</strong> 1945, while French troops, <strong>in</strong> a surprise coup,seized Saigon <strong>in</strong> the south. Ho received no support from the Kreml<strong>in</strong>.At first, Ho sought support from the United States but after the


establishment of Red Ch<strong>in</strong>a <strong>in</strong> 1949, he turned <strong>to</strong> that new Communiststate for help. Mao's government was the first state <strong>to</strong> give Vietnamdiplomatic recognition (January 1950) and at once began <strong>to</strong> sendmilitary supplies and guidance. S<strong>in</strong>ce the U.S. was grant<strong>in</strong>g extensiveaid <strong>to</strong> France, the struggle <strong>in</strong> Vietnam became, through surrogates, astruggle between the United States and Ch<strong>in</strong>a. In world op<strong>in</strong>ion, thismade the U.S. the defender of European imperialism aga<strong>in</strong>st anticolonialnative nationalism.Dur<strong>in</strong>g this turmoil, <strong>in</strong>dependent neutralist governments came <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong>existence <strong>in</strong> Laos and Cambodia. Both states accepted aid from whoeverwould give it and both were ruled by an unstable balance of pro-Communists, neutralists, and pro-Westerners, all with armedsupporters. On the whole, the neutralist group was largest and thepro-Western was the smallest but could obta<strong>in</strong> support from America'swealth. The decisive <strong>in</strong>fluence was that the Communists were prepared<strong>to</strong> accept and support neutralism years before Dulles would condone it.Page 1044The read<strong>in</strong>ess of Dulles and the French Army <strong>to</strong> force a showdown<strong>in</strong> Vietnam was unacceptable <strong>to</strong> the British and many <strong>in</strong> France. Out ofthis came a Soviet suggestion for a conference on Indoch<strong>in</strong>a <strong>in</strong> Geneva.By early 1954, the Communist guerrillas were <strong>in</strong> control of mos<strong>to</strong>f northern Indoch<strong>in</strong>a, were threaten<strong>in</strong>g Laos, and were plagu<strong>in</strong>gvillages as far south as Saigon. About 200,000 French troops and300,000 Vietnamese militia were tied <strong>in</strong> knots by about 335,000 VietM<strong>in</strong>h guerrillas. France was be<strong>in</strong>g bled <strong>to</strong> death with noth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> showfor it.By the end of March 1953, the outer defences of the French strongpo<strong>in</strong>t at Dien Bien Phu were crumbl<strong>in</strong>g. The French chief of staff foundDulles ready <strong>to</strong> risk all-out war with Red Ch<strong>in</strong>a by authoriz<strong>in</strong>g directAmerican <strong>in</strong>tervention <strong>in</strong> Indoch<strong>in</strong>a. As usual, Dulles thought thatwonders could be achieved by air strikes alone aga<strong>in</strong>st the besiegersof Dien Bien Phu and for a few day, at Dulles' prodd<strong>in</strong>g, the UnitedStates <strong>to</strong>ttered "on the br<strong>in</strong>k of war." Dulles proposed "a unitedaction policy:" "If Brita<strong>in</strong> would jo<strong>in</strong> the United States and Francewould agree <strong>to</strong> stand firm, the three Western states could comb<strong>in</strong>e withfriendly asian nations <strong>to</strong> oppose communist forces.Page 1045President Eisenhower agreed but his calls <strong>to</strong> Churchill and Edenfound the British government opposed <strong>to</strong> the adventure because theS<strong>in</strong>o-Soviet Treaty of 1950 bound Russia <strong>to</strong> come <strong>to</strong> the assistance ofCh<strong>in</strong>a if it were attacked by the United States as Dulles contemplated.Dur<strong>in</strong>g the 1954 Far Eastern Geneva Conference, two Americanaircraft carriers, loaded with a<strong>to</strong>mic weapons, were cruis<strong>in</strong>g the SouthCh<strong>in</strong>a Sea, await<strong>in</strong>g orders from Wash<strong>in</strong>g<strong>to</strong>n <strong>to</strong> hurl their deadly bombsat the Communist forces besieg<strong>in</strong>g the 15,000 exhausted troops trappedat Dien Bien Phu. In Wash<strong>in</strong>g<strong>to</strong>n, Admiral Radford was vigorously


advocat<strong>in</strong>g such aggressive action on a generally reluctant government.In Paris, public outrage was ris<strong>in</strong>g over Indoch<strong>in</strong>a where the Frenchhad expended 19,000 lives and $8 billion without improv<strong>in</strong>g matters aparticle. The fall of Dien Bien Phy on May 7th led <strong>to</strong> the fall of theFrench government. The new prime m<strong>in</strong>ister promised a cease-fire or hisown retirement with<strong>in</strong> 30 days. He barely met the deadl<strong>in</strong>e.The Indoch<strong>in</strong>ese settlement of July 20, 1954 was basically acompromise, some of whose elements did not appear <strong>in</strong> the agreementitself. A Communist North Vietnam state was recognized north of the17th parallel and the rest was left <strong>in</strong> three states: Laos, Cambodiaand South Vietnam.The new state system was brought with<strong>in</strong> the Dulles network oftrip-wire pacts on September 8, 1954 when Brita<strong>in</strong>, France, Australia,New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, Philipp<strong>in</strong>es and the U.S. formed theSouth-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and extended theirprotection <strong>to</strong> Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam.The Geneva agreement was <strong>to</strong> neutralize the Indoch<strong>in</strong>a states butwas apparently not acceptable <strong>to</strong> the Dulles brothers and any possiblestability <strong>in</strong> the area was soon destroyed by their activities,especially through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) seek<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong>subvert the neutrality of Laos and South Vietnam by channel<strong>in</strong>gmillions <strong>in</strong> American funds <strong>to</strong> Right-w<strong>in</strong>g army officers, build<strong>in</strong>g uplarge military forces, rigg<strong>in</strong>g elections, and back<strong>in</strong>g reactionarycoups d'etat.Page 1046These techniques might have been justified <strong>in</strong> the eyes of the CIAif they had been successful but, on the contrary, they alienated themass of the natives <strong>in</strong> the area, brought numerous recruits <strong>to</strong> theLeft, gave justification for Communist <strong>in</strong>tervention from NorthVietnam, disgusted our allies <strong>in</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong>, France, Burma, India andelsewhere, and by 1962 had almost destroyed the American image andposition <strong>in</strong> the area.In Laos, the chief political figure was Pr<strong>in</strong>ce Phouma, leader ofthe neutralist group, who tried <strong>to</strong> keep a balance between theCommunist Pathet Lao on his Left and the American-subsidizedpoliticians and militarists led by General Nosavan on his Right.American aid was about $40 million a year of which about $36 millionwent <strong>to</strong> the army. This was used, under American <strong>in</strong>fluence, as an ant<strong>in</strong>eutralistrather than an anti-Leftist <strong>in</strong>fluence culm<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> abungled army attack on two Pathet Lao battalions <strong>in</strong> 1959 and openlyrigged elections <strong>in</strong> which all the Assembly seats were won by Rightw<strong>in</strong>gcandidates <strong>in</strong> 1960. In August 1960, an open revolt <strong>in</strong> behalf ofthe neutralist Phouma game rise <strong>to</strong> a Right-w<strong>in</strong>g revolution led byGeneral Nosavan. This drove the neutralists <strong>in</strong> the arms of the PathetLao.The SEATO Council refused <strong>to</strong> support the American position, the


Laotian army was reluctant <strong>to</strong> fight, and the American military missionwas soon <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the confused fight<strong>in</strong>g directly.The American bungle <strong>in</strong> Laos was repeated, with variations,elsewhere <strong>in</strong> southern and southeastern Asia. In South Vietnam,American aid, largely military, amounted <strong>to</strong> about two thirds of thecountry's budget, and by 1962, it had reached $2 billion. Such aid,which provided little benefit for the people, corrupted thegovernment, weakened the swollen defense forces, and set up a chasmbetween the rulers and people which drove the best of the latterLeftward, <strong>in</strong> spite of the exploitative violence of the Communistguerrillas. A plebiscite <strong>in</strong> 1955 was so rigged that the Americansupportedcandidate won over 98% of the vote. The election of 1960 wassimilarly managed, except <strong>in</strong> Saigon, the capital, where many peoplerefused <strong>to</strong> vote. As might have been expected, denial of a fair ballotled <strong>to</strong> efforts <strong>to</strong> assass<strong>in</strong>ate the American-sponsored President, Diem,and gave rise <strong>to</strong> widespread discontent which made it possible for theCommunist guerrillas <strong>to</strong> operate throughout the country. The Americansponsoredmilitary response drove casualties <strong>to</strong> a high susta<strong>in</strong>edfigure by 1962 and was uproot<strong>in</strong>g peasantry throughout the country <strong>in</strong>an effort <strong>to</strong> establish fortified villages which the British had<strong>in</strong>troduced with success <strong>in</strong> Malaya.Page 1047These errors of American policy, which were repeated <strong>in</strong> otherplaces, arose very largely from two fac<strong>to</strong>rs:1) American ignorance of local conditions which were passed over <strong>in</strong>animosity aga<strong>in</strong>st Russia and Ch<strong>in</strong>a;2) American <strong>in</strong>sistence on us<strong>in</strong>g military force <strong>to</strong> overcome localneutralism which the mass of Asiatic people wanted.The American militarization of both Thailand and South Vietnamwas used <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease pressure on Cambodia which was driven <strong>to</strong> seeksupport for its <strong>in</strong>dependence from Ch<strong>in</strong>a and Russia.North Vietnam had a deficiency of food while South Vietnam, likeall delta areas, is a zone of rice surplus and thus a sh<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g targetfor North Vietnamese aggression.The collapse of the world price of rice at the end of the KoreanWar left Burma with an unsellable surplus of almost two million <strong>to</strong>ns.With<strong>in</strong> the next three years, Burma signed barter agreements with RedCh<strong>in</strong>a and Soviet Europe by which Burma got rid of a third of itssurplus each year <strong>in</strong> return for Communist goods and technicalassistance. These returns were so poor <strong>in</strong> quality, high <strong>in</strong> price andpoorly shipped that Burma refused <strong>to</strong> renew the agreements <strong>in</strong> 1958.SOUTHERN ASIAFarther west, <strong>in</strong> southern Asia (correctly called the Middle Eastfrom the Persian Gulf <strong>to</strong> Burma) American bungl<strong>in</strong>g also opened mayopportunities for Soviet penetration which the Soviets failed <strong>to</strong>exploit.


Page 1048India was determ<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>to</strong> be neutral; Pakistan was will<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> be anally of the United States.Page 1049The partition of India before <strong>in</strong>dependence <strong>in</strong> 1947, as <strong>in</strong>Palest<strong>in</strong>e and earlier <strong>in</strong> Ireland, received strong impetus from theRound Table Group, and <strong>in</strong> all three cases, it led <strong>to</strong> horrors ofviolence. In India's case, the partition was a butchery rather than asurgical process. Imposed by the British, it cut off two areas <strong>in</strong>northwestern and northeastern India <strong>to</strong> form a new Muslim state ofPakistan (cutt<strong>in</strong>g right through the Sikhs <strong>in</strong> the process). The two newnations began under two new leaders. In the post-partition confusion,m<strong>in</strong>orities on the wrong sides of the l<strong>in</strong>es sought <strong>to</strong> flee, asrefugees, <strong>to</strong> India or Pakistan, while the Sikhs sought <strong>to</strong> establish anew homeland by exterm<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g Muslims <strong>in</strong> East Punjab. In a few weeks,almost 200,000 were killed and twelve million were forced <strong>to</strong> flee asrefugees.The two sections of Pakistan were separated from each other by1,100 miles of India terri<strong>to</strong>ry, its boundaries irrational, itseconomic foundations <strong>to</strong>rn <strong>to</strong> shreds by the partition.Page 1050In 1958, martial law was established and General Khan becamepresident. Under military rule, a sweep<strong>in</strong>g land-reform programrestricted owners <strong>to</strong> 500 irrigated or 1000 non-irrigated acres withthe surplus distributed <strong>to</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g tenants or other peasants. Formerlandlords received compensation <strong>in</strong> long-term bonds.Page 1052The American <strong>in</strong>sistence on the non-committed nations adopt<strong>in</strong>ganti-Soviet l<strong>in</strong>es opened the way for the Soviet <strong>to</strong> pose as the friendof such nations by support<strong>in</strong>g their neutralism.Page 1053At the end of World War II, about 80 percent of Iran's populationwere peasants. Four fifths of the land was almost entirely useless,be<strong>in</strong>g either mounta<strong>in</strong>ous or arid. Moreover, the peasants who tilledthe land were much oppressed by heavy rents <strong>to</strong> absentee landlords whoalso controlled, as separate rights, essential access <strong>to</strong> water. Onlyabout a seventh of the land was owned by peasants who worked it.Peasants reta<strong>in</strong>ed little more than a fifth of what they produced.The shah has shifted the basis of his support from the elitelanded group <strong>to</strong> this grow<strong>in</strong>g middle class.Before 1914, the shah sought <strong>to</strong> raise funds for his personal useby sell<strong>in</strong>g concessions and monopolies <strong>to</strong> foreign groups. Most of thesewere exploitive of the Iranian peoples. Of these, the most importantwas the concession for petroleum which came <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> possession of the newAnglo-Persian Oil Company which came <strong>to</strong> be controlled, through secrets<strong>to</strong>ck ownership, by the British government.


Page 1054At the end of World War I, Iran was a battleground betweenRussian and British armed forces. By 1920, the withdrawal of Britishforces left the anti-Bolshevik Russian Cossack Brigade as the onlysignificant military force <strong>in</strong> the country. The chief Iranian officer<strong>in</strong> that force, Reza Pahlavi, <strong>in</strong> the course of 1921-1925 gradually <strong>to</strong>okover control of the government and eventually deposed the <strong>in</strong>competent28-year-old Shah Ahmad.Pahlavi's chief aim was <strong>to</strong> break down tribalism and localism. Tothis end, he defeated the au<strong>to</strong>nomous tribes, settled nomadic groups <strong>in</strong>villages, shifted prov<strong>in</strong>cial boundaries <strong>to</strong> break up local loyalties,created a national civil service and police force, establishednational registration with identity cards for all, and used universalconscription <strong>to</strong> m<strong>in</strong>gle various groups <strong>in</strong> a national army.All these projects needed money and the chief resource, oil, wastied up completely <strong>in</strong> the concession held by the AIOC with the<strong>in</strong>evitable result that it became the target of the Iranian nationalistdesire for traditional development funds. The older Iranian elitewould have been satisfied with a renegotiated deal but the newer urbangroups demanded the complete removal of foreign economic <strong>in</strong>fluence bynationalization of the petroleum <strong>in</strong>dustry.Page 1056By 1950, the Shah put his prime m<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>in</strong> <strong>to</strong> force through thesupplemental agreement. Oppos<strong>in</strong>g groups <strong>in</strong>troduced nationalizationbills. Gradually, the nationalization forces began <strong>to</strong> coalesce about astrange figure, Mr. Muhammad Mossadegh, with a doc<strong>to</strong>rate <strong>in</strong> Economics.Politically, he was a moderate but his strong emotional appeal <strong>to</strong>Iranian nationalism encouraged extreme reactions among his followers.The company <strong>in</strong>sisted that its status was based on a contractualagreement which could not be modified without its consent. The Britishgovernment ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed the agreement was a matter of <strong>in</strong>ternationalpublic law which it had a right <strong>to</strong> enforce. The Iranian governmentdeclared it had the right <strong>to</strong> nationalize an Iranian corporationoperat<strong>in</strong>g under its law on its terri<strong>to</strong>ry, subject only <strong>to</strong> adequatecompensation.The nationalist arguments aga<strong>in</strong>st the company were numerous:1) It had promised <strong>to</strong> tra<strong>in</strong> Iranians for all positions possible buthad only used them <strong>in</strong> menial tasks, tra<strong>in</strong>ed few natives and employedmany foreigners.2) The company had reduced its payments <strong>to</strong> Iran, which were based onprofits, by reduc<strong>in</strong>g the amount of its profits by bookkeep<strong>in</strong>g tricks.It sold oil at very low prices <strong>to</strong> wholly-owned subsidiaries outsideIran or <strong>to</strong> the British Navy, allow<strong>in</strong>g the former <strong>to</strong> resell at worldprices so that AIOC made small profits, while the subsidiaries madelarge profits not subject <strong>to</strong> the Iranian royalty obligations. Iranbelieve that all profits should fall under the obligations. but as


late as 1950, AIOC admitted that the accounts of 59 such dummycorporations were not <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> AIOC accounts.3) AIOC generally refused <strong>to</strong> pay Iranian taxes, especially <strong>in</strong>come taxbut paid such taxes <strong>to</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong>; at the same time, it calculated theIranian profit royalties after such taxes so that the higher Britishtaxes went, the less the Iranian payment became. Thus, Iran paid<strong>in</strong>come tax <strong>to</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong>. In 1933, AIOC paid #305,000 <strong>in</strong> British taxationand #274,000 <strong>in</strong> Iranian taxes. In 1948, the two figures were #28.3million <strong>to</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong> and #1.4 million <strong>to</strong> Iran.Page 10574) The payment <strong>to</strong> Iran was also reduced by putt<strong>in</strong>g profits <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong>reserves or <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> company <strong>in</strong>vestments outside Iran, often <strong>in</strong>subsidiaries, and calculat<strong>in</strong>g the Iranian share only on the profitsdistributed as dividends. Thus <strong>in</strong> 1947, when profits were really #40.5million, almost #15 million went <strong>to</strong> British <strong>in</strong>come taxes, over #7million <strong>to</strong> s<strong>to</strong>ckholders, and only #7 million <strong>to</strong> Iran. If the payment<strong>to</strong> Iran had been calculated before taxes and reserves, it would havereceived at least #6 million more that year.5) AIOC's exemption from Iranian cus<strong>to</strong>ms deprived Iran of about #6million a year.6) The company drew many persons <strong>to</strong> arid and un<strong>in</strong>habited areas andthen provided very little of the costs of hous<strong>in</strong>g, education, orhealth.7) AIOC as a member of the <strong>in</strong>ternational oil cartel reduced its oilproduction and thus reduced Iran's royalties.8) AIOC cont<strong>in</strong>ued <strong>to</strong> calculate its payments <strong>to</strong> Iran <strong>in</strong> gold at #8.1per ounce for years after the world gold price had risen <strong>to</strong> #13 anounce while the American Aramco <strong>in</strong> Saudi Arabia raised its gold priceon demand.9) AIOC's monopoly prevented Iran develop<strong>in</strong>g other Iranian oil fields.As a consequence of all these activities, the Iraniannationalists of 1952 felt angered <strong>to</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k that Iran had given up 300million <strong>to</strong>ns of oil over fifty years and obta<strong>in</strong>ed about #800 million<strong>in</strong> profits.The Iranian opposition <strong>to</strong> nationalization was broken <strong>in</strong> 1951 whenthe prime m<strong>in</strong>ister was assass<strong>in</strong>ated. The nationalization bill waspassed and at the request of the Majlis, the shah appo<strong>in</strong>ted Mossadeghprime m<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>to</strong> carry it out. This was done with considerableturmoil which <strong>in</strong>cluded strikes by AIOC workers aga<strong>in</strong>st mistimedBritish wage cuts, anti-British street riots and the arrival ofBritish gun-boats at the head of the Persian Gulf. Rather than give upthe enterprise or operate it for the Iranian government, AIOC began <strong>to</strong>curtail operations and ship home its eng<strong>in</strong>eers. In May 1951, itappealed <strong>to</strong> the International Court of Justice <strong>in</strong> spite of Iranianprotests that the case was a domestic one, not <strong>in</strong>ternational. Only <strong>in</strong>July, 1952, did the court's decision uphold Iran's contention by


efus<strong>in</strong>g jurisdiction.Page 1058At first, the U.S. supported Iran's position fear<strong>in</strong>g Britishrecalcitrance would push Iran <strong>to</strong>ward Russia. However it soon becameapparent that the Soviet Union, while support<strong>in</strong>g Iran's position, wasnot go<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>terfere. The American position then became <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>glypro-British and anti-Mossadegh. This was <strong>in</strong>tensified by pressure fromthe <strong>in</strong>ternational petroleum cartel compris<strong>in</strong>g the seven greatest oilcompanies <strong>in</strong> the world.As soon as Brita<strong>in</strong> lost its case <strong>in</strong> the International Court ofJustice, it put <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> effect a series of reprisals aga<strong>in</strong>st Iran whichrapidly crippled the country. Iranian funds were blocked; itspurchases <strong>in</strong> British controlled markets were <strong>in</strong>terrupted; its efforts<strong>to</strong> sell oil abroad were frustrated by a comb<strong>in</strong>ation of the BritishNavy and the world oil cartel (which closed sales and distributionfacilities <strong>to</strong> Iranian oil). These cut off a substantial portion of theIranian government's revenues and forced a drastic curtailment ofgovernment expenditures.Page 1059Mossadegh broke off diplomatic relations with the British,deported various economic and cultural groups, and dismissed both theSenate and the Iranian Supreme Court which were beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> questionhis actions.By that time, almost irresistible forces were build<strong>in</strong>g up aga<strong>in</strong>stMossadegh, s<strong>in</strong>ce lack of Soviet <strong>in</strong>terference gave the West fullfreedom of action. The British, the AIOC, the world petroleum cartel,the American government and the older Iranian elite led by the shahcomb<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>to</strong> crush Mossadegh. The chief effort came from the CIA underthe personal direction of Allen Dulles, brother of the Secretary ofState. Dulles, a former direc<strong>to</strong>r of the Schroeder Bank <strong>in</strong> New York. Itwill be remembered that the Schroeder Bank <strong>in</strong> Cologne helped <strong>to</strong>arrange Hitler's accession <strong>to</strong> power as chancellor <strong>in</strong> January 1933.In the Near East, the mobs are easily roused and directed bythose who are will<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> pay and Dulles had the unlimited secret fundsof the CIA. From these he gave $10 million <strong>to</strong> Colonel H. NormanSchwartzkopf who was <strong>in</strong> charge of tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the Imperial IranianGendarmerie and this was judiciously applied <strong>in</strong> ways which changed themobs tune. The whole operation was directed personally by Dulles fromSwitzerland.In August Mossadegh held a plebiscite <strong>to</strong> approve his policies.The official vote was about two million approvals aga<strong>in</strong>st twelvehundred disapprovals but his days were numbered. On August 13th, theShah precipitated the planned anti-Mossadegh coup by nam<strong>in</strong>g GeneralZahedi as prime m<strong>in</strong>ister and sent a messenger dismiss<strong>in</strong>g Mossadegh.The latter refused <strong>to</strong> yield and called his supporters <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the streetswhere they rioted aga<strong>in</strong>st the Shah who fled with his family <strong>to</strong> Rome.


Two days later, anti-Mossadegh mobs, supported by the army, defeatedMossadegh supporters. He was forced out of office and replaced byGeneral Sahedi. The shah returned from Italy on August 22nd.Page 1060The fall of Mossadegh ended the period of confusion. From 1953on, the shah and the army, backed by the conservative elite,controlled the country and the docile Majlis. Two weeks after theshah's countercoup, the U.S. gave Iran an emergency grant of $45million, <strong>in</strong>creased its economic aid payment <strong>to</strong> $23 million and began<strong>to</strong> pay $5 million a month <strong>in</strong> Mutual Security funds. In return, Iranbecame a firm member of the Western bloc. The Communist Tudeh Partywas relentlessly pursued after 1953.By 1960, the shah tried a program of agrarian reform which sought<strong>to</strong> restrict each landlord's hold<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>to</strong> a s<strong>in</strong>gle village, tak<strong>in</strong>g allexcess lands for payments spread over 10 years and grant<strong>in</strong>g the lands<strong>to</strong> the peasants who worked them for payments over 15 years. The shah'sown estates were among the first <strong>to</strong> be distributed but by the end of1962 over 5000 villages had been granted <strong>to</strong> their peasants.In the meantime, the oil dispute was settled and the <strong>in</strong>comes <strong>to</strong>Iran were considerably <strong>in</strong>creased averag<strong>in</strong>g about $250 million or morea year.TRAGEDY AND HOPE Chapters XIX-XXby Dr. Carroll QuigleyISBN 0913022-14-4CONTENTSXIX. THE NEW ERAXX. TRAGEDY AND HOPE: THE FUTURE IN PERSPECTIVECHAPTER XIX: THE NEW ERA, 1957-1964THE GROWTH OF NUCLEAR STALEMATEPage 1088Dulles refused <strong>to</strong> recognize the right of anyone <strong>to</strong> be neutral andtried <strong>to</strong> force all states <strong>to</strong> jo<strong>in</strong> the American side of the Cold War orbe condemned <strong>to</strong> exterior darkness.Page 1090The so-called "missile gap" was a mistaken idea for the U.S. was<strong>in</strong> a condition of "nuclear plenty" and of "overkill capacity" thatposed a serious problem for the Soviet Union. It was, strangely


enough, just at that time (end of 1957) that two American studies (theGaither Report and the Special Studies Project of the RockefellerBrothers Fund) suggested the existence of a missile gap or <strong>in</strong>feriority<strong>in</strong> missile capacity of the United States compared <strong>to</strong> the Soviet Unionbased on the overemphasis on the "size" of Soviet rocket boosters. Inthis pleasant period of self-deception, the Soviet Union entered uponan unofficial <strong>in</strong>ternational suspension of nuclear bomb test<strong>in</strong>g from1958 until 1961.Page 1097As a result of NASA's $5 billion budget, the educational systemwas brought <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the tempestuous atmosphere of the frantic Americanmarketplace and was be<strong>in</strong>g ransacked from the highest levels down <strong>to</strong>high school and even below for talented, tra<strong>in</strong>ed, or merely eagerpeople. As the demands for such people grew and their remunerationsand opportunities <strong>in</strong>creased, the substantial m<strong>in</strong>ority who were nottalented, tra<strong>in</strong>ed or eager found fewer and fewer opportunities <strong>to</strong> makea liv<strong>in</strong>g and began <strong>to</strong> s<strong>in</strong>k downward <strong>to</strong>ward a steadily grow<strong>in</strong>g lowerclass of social outcasts and underprivileged, the socially selfperpetuat<strong>in</strong>ggroup of the impoverished.Page 1098In 1959, Red Ch<strong>in</strong>a began mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly unfavorable commentsabout Khrushchev's doctr<strong>in</strong>es of "peaceful coexistence with capitalism"and the "<strong>in</strong>evitable vic<strong>to</strong>ry of Socialism without war." He ruled outthe need for war and the Soviet Union was will<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> reach completedisarmament supervised by mutual controls <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g aerialpho<strong>to</strong>graphy.Page 1101As late as 1960, only 38,000 man-days of labor were lost bystrikes and lockouts <strong>in</strong> West Germany compared <strong>to</strong> almost half a million<strong>in</strong> the Netherlands, 3 million <strong>in</strong> the U.K. and 19 million <strong>in</strong> the U.S.In Germany <strong>in</strong> 1958, eight great trusts still controlled 75percent of crude steel production, 80 percent of raw iron, 60 percen<strong>to</strong>f rolled steel, and 36 percent of coal output.The ten percent <strong>in</strong>crease each year <strong>in</strong> the West German grossnational product was someth<strong>in</strong>g that could not be denied ordisbelieved.Page 1102In East Germany <strong>in</strong> 1960, almost a million farmers were forced<strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> less than 20,000 collective farms by methods of violence andsocial pressure similar <strong>to</strong> those Stal<strong>in</strong> had used. And the consequenceswere similar: agricultural production collapsed. Shortages of foodwere soon followed by other shortages.Page 1103Khrushchev's talk about "peaceful co-existence" was s<strong>in</strong>cere andhe s<strong>in</strong>cerely wished <strong>to</strong> divert the Communist-Capitalist struggle <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong>non-violent areas. Thus he was s<strong>in</strong>cere <strong>in</strong> his disarmament suggestions.


Page 1105Metternich said, "A diplomat is a man who never allows himselfthe pleasure of a triumph," and does so simply because it is <strong>to</strong> the<strong>in</strong>terest of the stronger that an opponent who recognizes the vic<strong>to</strong>r'sstrength and is reasonable <strong>in</strong> yield<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> it not be overthrown orreplaced by another ruler who is <strong>to</strong>o ignorant or <strong>to</strong>o unreasonable <strong>to</strong>do so.Page 1108After Russia backed down on the Cuban missile crisis, the WhiteHouse received a long and confused letter from Khrushchev whose <strong>to</strong>neclearly showed his personal panic and, <strong>to</strong> save his reputation, it wasnot released <strong>to</strong> the public. The next morn<strong>in</strong>g, the Soviet ForeignOffice published a quite different text, suggest<strong>in</strong>g that a deal bemade dismantl<strong>in</strong>g both the American missile sites <strong>in</strong> Turkey and theSoviet missile sites <strong>in</strong> Cuba. To those <strong>in</strong>side both governments, thiswas recognized as a Soviet surrender s<strong>in</strong>ce they knew that the Turkishsites were obsolete and were already scheduled <strong>to</strong> be dismantled. Itwas rejected by the White House because it would have represented <strong>to</strong>the world a surrender of Turkey. Instead, the White House replied <strong>to</strong>an offer <strong>to</strong> remove the Russian missiles if we would lift the blockadeand promise not <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>vade Cuba.THE DISINTEGRATING SUPERBLOCSLATIN AMERICA: A RACE BETWEEN DISASTER AND REFORMPage 1109The Brazilian cost of liv<strong>in</strong>g rose 40% <strong>in</strong> 1961, 50% <strong>in</strong> 1962, and70% <strong>in</strong> 1963.Page 1110Lat<strong>in</strong> America is not only poverty-ridden but the distribution ofwealth and <strong>in</strong>come is so unequal that the most ostentatious luxuryexists for a small group side by side with the most degrad<strong>in</strong>g povertyfor the overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g majority. Four fifths of the population of Lat<strong>in</strong>America get about $53 a year, while a mere 100 families own 90% of thenative-owned wealth of the whole area and only 30 families own 72% ofthat wealth. In Brazil, half of all and is owned by 2.6% of thelandowners while 22.5% is owned by only 1/2% of the owners. In Lat<strong>in</strong>America, at least two thirds of the land is owned by 10% of thefamilies.Page 1111As th<strong>in</strong>gs s<strong>to</strong>od <strong>in</strong> 1960, <strong>in</strong>fant mortality varied between 20% and35% <strong>in</strong> different countries.Page 1112While such conditions may rouse North American <strong>to</strong> outrage orhumanitarian sympathy, no solution can be found by emotion orsentimentality. The problems are not based on lack of anyth<strong>in</strong>g but onstructural weaknesses. Solutions will not rest on anyth<strong>in</strong>g that can bedone <strong>to</strong> or for <strong>in</strong>dividual people but on the arrangements of peoples.


Lat<strong>in</strong> American lacks the outlook that will mobilize its resources <strong>in</strong>constructive rather than destructive directions.Obviously, the birthrate must decrease or the food supply must be<strong>in</strong>creased faster than the population. And some provision must be made<strong>to</strong> provide peasants with capital and know-how before the great landedestates are divided up among them. A more productive organization ofresources should have priority over any effort <strong>to</strong> raise standards ofliv<strong>in</strong>g.Page 1113We hear a great deal about Lat<strong>in</strong> America's need for Americancapital and American know-how, when <strong>in</strong> fact the need for these is muchless than the need for utilization of Lat<strong>in</strong> America's own capital andknow-how. The wealth and <strong>in</strong>come of Lat<strong>in</strong> America, <strong>in</strong> absolutequantities, is so great and it is so <strong>in</strong>equitably controlled anddistributed that there is an enormous accumulation of <strong>in</strong>comes, farbeyond their consumption needs, <strong>in</strong> the hands of a small percentage ofLat<strong>in</strong> Americans. Much of these excess <strong>in</strong>comes are wasted, hoarded, ormerely used for wasteful competition <strong>in</strong> ostentatious social displaylargely due <strong>to</strong> the deficiencies of Lat<strong>in</strong> American personalities andcharacter.The solution is not <strong>to</strong> redistribute <strong>in</strong>comes but <strong>to</strong> change thepatterns of character and of personality formation so that excess<strong>in</strong>comes will be used constructively and not wasted.Page 1114At least half the value of American aid has been wiped away bythe worsen<strong>in</strong>g of Lat<strong>in</strong> America's terms of trade which made itnecessary for it <strong>to</strong> pay more and more for its imports at the same timethat it got less and less for its exports made worse by much of theavailable supply of foreign exchange spent for self-<strong>in</strong>dulgent and nonconstructive spend<strong>in</strong>g abroad or simply <strong>to</strong> hoard their money <strong>in</strong> NewYork, London or Switzerland. The solution must be found <strong>in</strong> moreresponsible, more public-spirited, and more constructive patterns ofoutlook, of money flows, and of political and social security. Asimilar solution must be found for social deficiencies like <strong>in</strong>adequatehous<strong>in</strong>g, education, and social stability.Page 1115An Asian despotism is a two-class society <strong>in</strong> which a lower classconsist<strong>in</strong>g of n<strong>in</strong>e tenths of the population supports an upper rul<strong>in</strong>gclass consist<strong>in</strong>g of a govern<strong>in</strong>g bureaucracy of scribes and priestsassociated with army leaders, landlords, and moneylenders. Theessential character of an Asian despotism rests on the fact that therul<strong>in</strong>g class has legal claim on the work<strong>in</strong>g masses and possesses thepower <strong>to</strong> enforce these claims.Page 1119Arabic boys grow up egocentric, self-<strong>in</strong>dulgent, undiscipl<strong>in</strong>ed,immature, spoiled, subject <strong>to</strong> waves of emotionalism, whims, passion,


and pett<strong>in</strong>ess. Another aspect of Arabic society is its scorn ofhonest, steady manual work, especially agricultural work. There is alack of respect for manual work that is so characteristic of thePakistani-Peruvian axis. The Bedou<strong>in</strong> outlook <strong>in</strong>clude lack of respectfor the soil, for vegetation, for most animals, and for outsiders.These attitudes are <strong>to</strong> be seen constantly as erosion, destruction ofvegetation and wild life, personal cruelty and callousness <strong>to</strong> mostliv<strong>in</strong>g th<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g one's fellow man, and a general harshness and<strong>in</strong>difference <strong>to</strong> God's creation.Page 1120The ethical sides of Judaism, Christianity and Islam sought <strong>to</strong>counteract harshness, egocentricity, tribalism, cruelty, scorn of workand one's fellow creatures but these efforts have met with littlesuccess.Page 1122The method for the reform of Lat<strong>in</strong> America rest <strong>in</strong> the upperclass of that society. Such reform can come about only when thesurpluses that accumulate <strong>in</strong> the hands of the Lat<strong>in</strong> American oligarchyare used <strong>to</strong> establish more progressive utilization of Lat<strong>in</strong> Americanresources.Page 1123The whole system is full of paradox and contradiction. Theobstacle <strong>to</strong> progress and hope rests <strong>in</strong> the oligarchy because itcontrols wealth and power, and also because there is no hope at allunless it changes its ideology.Page 1124World War II, by <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g demand for Lat<strong>in</strong> America's m<strong>in</strong>eraland agricultural products, pushed starvation and controversy away fromthe immediate present. Lat<strong>in</strong> American boomed: the rich got richer; thepoor had more children. A few poor became rich, or at least richer.But noth<strong>in</strong>g was done <strong>to</strong> modify the basic pattern of Lat<strong>in</strong> Americanpower, wealth, and outlook.Page 1127Until the 1952 revolution, the Bolivians, mostly of Indiandescent, who were treated as second-class persons work<strong>in</strong>g assemislaves <strong>in</strong> the m<strong>in</strong>es or as serfs on the large estates, had a percapita annual outcome of about $100. As might be expected, themajority were illiterate, sullen and discouraged.Page 1128The Junta was overthrown <strong>in</strong> 1952. Paz Estenssoro returned fromexile <strong>to</strong> become president. Pressure from the t<strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ers and from thepeasants forced the new regime <strong>to</strong> nationalize the m<strong>in</strong>es and <strong>to</strong> breakup many of the large estates. Production costs of t<strong>in</strong> rose abovemarket price thus wip<strong>in</strong>g out their foreign exchange earn<strong>in</strong>gs. Worse,the world price of t<strong>in</strong> collapsed <strong>in</strong> 1957.The problems could hardly be handled because of popular pressures


<strong>in</strong> a democratic country <strong>to</strong> live beyond the country's <strong>in</strong>come. The f<strong>in</strong>alcollapse did not occur because of the efforts of President Siles andassistance from the United States.Page 1129If any proof were needed that radical reform for shar<strong>in</strong>g thewealth of the few among the many poor is not an easy, or feasiblemethod, Bolivia's hard-work<strong>in</strong>g Indians, once hopelessly dull, morose,and sullen, are not bright, hopeful, and self-reliant. Even theircloth<strong>in</strong>g is gradually shift<strong>in</strong>g from the older funereal black <strong>to</strong>brighter colors and variety.Few contrasts could be more dramatic than that between theBolivian revolutionary government (<strong>in</strong> which a moderate regime waspushed <strong>to</strong>ward radicalism by popular pressures and survived, year afteryear, with American assistance) and the Guatemala revolution where aCommunist-<strong>in</strong>spired regime tried <strong>to</strong> lead a rather <strong>in</strong>ert population <strong>in</strong>the direction of <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g radicalism but was overthrown by directAmerican action with<strong>in</strong> three years (1951-1954).Guatemala is one of the "banana republics." The retail value ofLat<strong>in</strong> America's part of the world's trade <strong>in</strong> bananas is severalbillion dollars a year but Lat<strong>in</strong> America's gets less than 7% of thatvalue. One reason for this is the existence of the United FruitCompany which owns two million acres of plantations <strong>in</strong> six countriesand handles about a third of the world's banana sales. It pays about$145 million a year <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the six countries and claims <strong>to</strong> earn about$26 million profits on its $159 million <strong>in</strong>vestment but this profitfigure of about 16.6% is undoubtedly far below the true figure. In1970, 95% of the land held by United Fruit was uncultivated.Page 1130Guatemala, like Bolivia, has a population that consists largelyof impoverished Indians and mixed bloods (mestizos). From 1931 <strong>to</strong> 1944it was ruled by the dicta<strong>to</strong>r Jorge Ubico, the last of a long l<strong>in</strong>e ofcorrupt and ruthless tyrants. When he retired <strong>to</strong> New Orleans <strong>in</strong> 1944,free elections chose Juan Jose Arevalo (1945-1950) and Jacobo ArbenzGuzman (1950-1954) as presidents. Reform was long overdue and thesetwo adm<strong>in</strong>istrations tried <strong>to</strong> provide it, becom<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly anti-American and pro-Communist over their n<strong>in</strong>e-year rule. When they began,civil or political rights were almost <strong>to</strong>tally unknown and 142 persons(<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g corporations) owned 98% of the arable land. Free speech andpress, legalized unions, and free elections preceded the work ofreform but opposition from the United States began as soon as itbecame clear that the Land Reform Act of June 1952 would be applied <strong>to</strong>the United Fruit Company. This act called for redistribution ofuncultivated hold<strong>in</strong>gs above a fixed acreage or lands of absenteeowners, with compensation from the twenty year 3 percent bonds equal<strong>to</strong> the tax value of the lands. About 400,000 acres of United Fruitlands fell under this law and were distributed by the Arbenz Guzman


government <strong>to</strong> 180,000 peasants. This was declared <strong>to</strong> be a Communistpenetration by Allen Dulles, Direc<strong>to</strong>r of the CIA, which soon found anAmerican-tra<strong>in</strong>ed and American-f<strong>in</strong>anced Guatemalan Colonel, CarlosCastillo Armas, who was prepared <strong>to</strong> lead a revolt aga<strong>in</strong>st Arbenz. WithAmerican money and equipment, and even some American "volunteers" <strong>to</strong>fly "surplus" American planes, Armas mounted an attack of Guatemalanexiles from bases <strong>in</strong> two adjacent dicta<strong>to</strong>rships, Honduras andNicaragua." Both these countries are horrible examples of everyth<strong>in</strong>g aLat<strong>in</strong> American government should not be, corrupt, tyrannical, cruel,and reactionary, but they won the favor of the United States StateDepartment by echo<strong>in</strong>g American foreign policy at every turn.Nicaragua, often a target of American <strong>in</strong>tervention <strong>in</strong> the past, wasdecayed, dirty, and diseased under the twenty-year tyranny ofAnastasio Somoza (1936-1956). His assass<strong>in</strong>ation handed the countryover <strong>to</strong> be looted by his two sons, one of whom became president whilethe other served as commander of the National Guard.Page 1131From these despotic bases, the CIA-directed assault of ColonelArmas overthrew Arbenz Guzman <strong>in</strong> 1954 and established <strong>in</strong> Guatemala aregime similar <strong>to</strong> that of the Somozas. All civil and politicalfreedoms were overthrown, the land reforms were undone, and corruptionreigned. When Armas was assass<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>in</strong> 1957 and a moderate elected ashis successor, the army annulled those elections and held new ones <strong>in</strong>which one of their own, General Fuentes, was "elected." He liquidatedwhat rema<strong>in</strong>ed of Guatemala's Socialist experiments by grant<strong>in</strong>g theseenterprises, at very reasonable prices, <strong>to</strong> his friends whilecollect<strong>in</strong>g his own pay of a $1 million a year. Discontent from hisassociates led <strong>to</strong> a conservative army revolt but American pressuresecured his position. The U.S. could not afford a change of regimes<strong>in</strong>ce that country was the chief aggressive base for the Cuban exiles'attack on Cuba at the Bay of Pigs <strong>in</strong> April 1962.The CIA success <strong>in</strong> attack<strong>in</strong>g "Communist" Guatemala fromdicta<strong>to</strong>rial Nicaragua <strong>in</strong> 1954 was not repeated <strong>in</strong> its more elaborateattack on "Communist" Cuba from dicta<strong>to</strong>rial Guatemala <strong>in</strong> 1962. Infact, the Bay of Pigs must stand as the most shameful event <strong>in</strong> U.S.his<strong>to</strong>ry s<strong>in</strong>ce the end of World War II.The causes of the Cuban disaster, if we oversimplify, may beorganized <strong>in</strong> terms of two <strong>in</strong>tersect<strong>in</strong>g fac<strong>to</strong>rs:1) the personality deficiencies of the Cubans themselves such as theirlack of rationality and self-discipl<strong>in</strong>e, their emotionalism andcorruptibility;2) the ignorance and <strong>in</strong>eptitude of the American State Department whichseems <strong>in</strong>capable of deal<strong>in</strong>g with Lat<strong>in</strong> America <strong>in</strong> terms of the realproblems of the area but <strong>in</strong>stead <strong>in</strong>sists on treat<strong>in</strong>g it <strong>in</strong> terms ofAmerica's vision of the world, which is <strong>to</strong> day, America's politicalpreconceptions and economic <strong>in</strong>terests.


Cuba is more Spanish than much of Lat<strong>in</strong> America and only obta<strong>in</strong>edits <strong>in</strong>dependence <strong>in</strong> 1898, two generations later than the rest of Lat<strong>in</strong>America. Then, for over thirty years, until the abrogation of thePlatt Amendment <strong>in</strong> 1934, Cuba was under American occupation or thethreat of direct American <strong>in</strong>tervention. It fell under Americaneconomic dom<strong>in</strong>ation by American <strong>in</strong>vestments on the island and bybecom<strong>in</strong>g deeply <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the american market, especially for sugar.A local oligarchy of Cubas was built up <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g an exploitativelandlord group that had not existed previously.With the establishment of the Good Neighbor Policy <strong>in</strong> 1933 andend<strong>in</strong>g the threat of American direct <strong>in</strong>tervention, it became possiblefor the Cubans <strong>to</strong> overthrow the tyrannical and bloody rule of GeneralMachado which had lasted for eight years (1925-1933).Page 1132The opportunity <strong>to</strong> beg<strong>in</strong> a series of urgently needed and widelydemanded social reforms under Machado's successor, San Mart<strong>in</strong>, waslost when the United States refused <strong>to</strong> recognize or <strong>to</strong> assist the newregime. As a result, a ruthless Cuban army sergeant, FuegencioBatista, was able <strong>to</strong> overthrow San Mart<strong>in</strong> and beg<strong>in</strong> a ten-year rulethrough civilian puppets chosen <strong>in</strong> fraudulent elections, and thendirectly as president himself. When San Mart<strong>in</strong> was elected president<strong>in</strong> 1944, he abandoned his earlier reformist ideas and became the firs<strong>to</strong>f a series of <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly corrupt elected regimes over the nexteight years. The fourth such election for 1953 was prevented whenBatista seized power once aga<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> 1952.The next seven years were filled with Batista's efforts <strong>to</strong> holdhis position by violence and corruption aga<strong>in</strong>st the ris<strong>in</strong>g tide ofdiscontent aga<strong>in</strong>st his rule.One of the earliest episodes <strong>in</strong> that tide was an attempted revoltby a handful of youths, led by 26-year-old Fidel Castro <strong>in</strong> easternCuba on July 26, 1953. The failure of the ris<strong>in</strong>g gave Castro two yearsof imprisonment and more than a year of exile but at the end of 1956,he landed with a handful of men <strong>to</strong> beg<strong>in</strong> guerrilla operations.Batista's regime was so corrupt that many segments of the army andmiddle class were neutral or favorable <strong>to</strong> Castro's operations. Thenecessary arms and f<strong>in</strong>ancial support came from these groups althoughthe core of the movement was made up of peasants and workers led byyoung middle-class university students.This Castro upris<strong>in</strong>g was not typical because of Castro'sfanatical thirst for power, his ruthless will<strong>in</strong>gness <strong>to</strong> destroyproperty or lives <strong>in</strong> order <strong>to</strong> weaken the Batista regime, and hisdouble method of operation, from with<strong>in</strong> Cuba rather than from abroadand from a rural base, the peasants, rather than the usual urban base,the army, used by most Lat<strong>in</strong> American rebels.On New Year's day of 1959, Castro marched <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> Havana. With<strong>in</strong> twoweeks, the supporters of the Batista regime and dissident elements <strong>in</strong>


Castro's movement began <strong>to</strong> be executed by fir<strong>in</strong>g squad.For a year, Castro's government carried on reforms aimed atsatisfy<strong>in</strong>g the more obvious demands of the dispossessed groups.Military barracks were converted <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> schools; the militia waspermanently established <strong>to</strong> replace the regular army; rural healthcenters were set up; a full-scale attack was made on illiteracy; newschools were constructed; urban rents were cut <strong>in</strong> half; utility rateswere slashed; taxes were imposed on the upper classes; the beaches,once reserved for the rich, were opened <strong>to</strong> all; and a drastic landreform was launched.Page 1133These actions were not <strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> any viable economicprogram but they did spread a sense of well-be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the countrysidealthough they curtailed the build<strong>in</strong>g boom <strong>in</strong> the cities, largelyrooted <strong>in</strong> American <strong>in</strong>vestment, and they <strong>in</strong>stigated a flight of therich from the island <strong>to</strong> refuge <strong>in</strong> the U.S.Castro sought <strong>to</strong> export revolution <strong>to</strong> the rest of Lat<strong>in</strong> America.Arms and guerrilla fighters were sent, and lost, <strong>in</strong> unsuccessfulefforts <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>vade Panama, Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dom<strong>in</strong>icanRepublic. Failure of these turned him <strong>to</strong> methods of more subtlepenetration, largely worked by propaganda and the arm<strong>in</strong>g and tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>gof small subversive groups, especially where democratic or progressiveregimes seemed <strong>to</strong> be develop<strong>in</strong>g as <strong>in</strong> Venezuela or Colombia. At thesame time, an unsuccessful effort was made <strong>to</strong> persuade all Lat<strong>in</strong>America <strong>to</strong> form an anti-Yankee front.Although the U.S. had promised <strong>in</strong> 1959 <strong>to</strong> follow a policy of non<strong>in</strong>tervention<strong>to</strong>ward Cuba, these changes with<strong>in</strong> the island and a visi<strong>to</strong>f Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan <strong>in</strong> February 1960 forced areconsideration of this policy. The Mikoyan agreement promised Cubapetroleum, arms and other needs for its sugar followed byestablishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union <strong>in</strong> May andwith Red Ch<strong>in</strong>a later <strong>in</strong> the year. The Soviet embassy <strong>in</strong> Havana becamea source of Communist subversion for all Lat<strong>in</strong> America almost at once,while <strong>in</strong> September Khrushchev and Castro jo<strong>in</strong>tly dom<strong>in</strong>ated the annualsession of the General Assembly of the U.N. <strong>in</strong> New York.Castro obta<strong>in</strong>ed petroleum for Cuban sugar. When he <strong>in</strong>sisted thatAmerican-owned ref<strong>in</strong>eries <strong>in</strong> Cuba process this oil, they refused andwere at once seized by Castro.Page 1134The U.S. struck back by reduc<strong>in</strong>g the Cuban sugar quota <strong>in</strong> theAmerican market which led, step by step, <strong>to</strong> Castro's sweep<strong>in</strong>gnationalization of foreign-owned fac<strong>to</strong>ries on the island. The UnitedStates retaliated by establish<strong>in</strong>g a series of embargoes on Cubanexports <strong>to</strong> the U.S. These controversies led Castro <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> an economictrap similar <strong>to</strong> that <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> which Nasser had fallen with Egypt's cot<strong>to</strong>n.Each nationalist leader committed his chief foreign-exchange-earn<strong>in</strong>g


product (sugar and cot<strong>to</strong>n) <strong>to</strong> the Soviet Union as payment forCommunist (often Czech) arms. This tied these countries <strong>to</strong> the SovietUnion and deprived them of the chance <strong>to</strong> use their own source offoreign money for equipment so urgently needed for economicimprovement. By December when American diplomatic relations with Cubawere broken off, the Cuban economic decl<strong>in</strong>e had begun and soon reacheda po<strong>in</strong>t where standards of liv<strong>in</strong>g were at least a third below theBatista level except for some previously submerged groups.At the end of 1960, the Eisenhower Adm<strong>in</strong>istration decided <strong>to</strong> useforce <strong>to</strong> remove Castro. This decision was a major error and led <strong>to</strong> a<strong>to</strong>tally shameful fiasco. The error apparently arose <strong>in</strong> the CIA and wasbased on a complete misjudgment of the apparent east with which thatagency had overthrown the Arbenz regime <strong>in</strong> Guatemala <strong>in</strong> 1954 byorganiz<strong>in</strong>g a raid of exiles, armed and f<strong>in</strong>anced by the CIA, <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong>Guatemala from Nicaragua. The CIA analyzed this apparently successfulcoup quite <strong>in</strong>correctly,s<strong>in</strong>ce it assumed that Arbenz had beenoverthrown by the raid<strong>in</strong>g exiles when he had really been destroyed byhis own army which used the raid as an excuse and occasion <strong>to</strong> get ridof him. But on this mistaken basis, the CIA decided <strong>to</strong> get rid ofCastro by a similar raid of Cuban exiles from Guatemala.This decision was worse than a crime; it was stupid. Aunilateral, violent attack on a neighbor<strong>in</strong>g state with which we werenot at war, <strong>in</strong> an area where we were committed <strong>to</strong> multilateral andpeaceful procedures for settl<strong>in</strong>g disputes, was a repudiation of allour idealistic talk about the rights of small nations and our devotion<strong>to</strong> peaceful procedures that we had been pontificat<strong>in</strong>g around the worlds<strong>in</strong>ce 1914. It was a violation of our commitment <strong>to</strong> non-<strong>in</strong>tervention<strong>in</strong> the Americas and specifically <strong>in</strong> Cuba. In sequence <strong>to</strong> our CIA<strong>in</strong>tervention <strong>in</strong> Guatemala, it strengthened Lat<strong>in</strong> American picture ofthe U.S. as <strong>in</strong>different <strong>to</strong> Lat<strong>in</strong> America's grow<strong>in</strong>g demand for socialreform.The whole operation, patterned on Hitler's operations <strong>to</strong> subvertAustria and Czechoslovakia <strong>in</strong> 1938 was bungled as Hitler could neverhave bungled anyth<strong>in</strong>g. The project was very much a Dulles brothers'job and its execution was largely <strong>in</strong> the hands of the CIA.Page 1135The plan of <strong>in</strong>vasion of Cuba seems <strong>to</strong> have been drawn on typicalHitler l<strong>in</strong>es: the expeditionary force was <strong>to</strong> establish a beachhead <strong>in</strong>Cuba, set up a government on the island, be recognized by the U.S. asthe actual government of Cuba, and ask Wash<strong>in</strong>g<strong>to</strong>n for aid <strong>to</strong> res<strong>to</strong>reorder <strong>in</strong> the rest of the island which it did not yet control. The CIAassured President Kennedy that if matters were allowed <strong>to</strong> go on asthey were, Castro would be strengthened <strong>in</strong> power (which was untrue)and that the <strong>in</strong>vasion would be success because of the Cuban people,led by the anti-Castro underground, would rise aga<strong>in</strong>st him as soon asthey heard of the land<strong>in</strong>g.


The executive committee of Cuban refugees <strong>in</strong> the U.S., mostlyrepresentatives of the older rul<strong>in</strong>g groups <strong>in</strong> Cuba, were eager <strong>to</strong>res<strong>to</strong>re the <strong>in</strong>equitable economic and social system that had existedbefore Castro. They were alienated from the most vigorous anti-Castrogroups <strong>in</strong> the Cuban underground who had no desire <strong>to</strong> turn back theclock <strong>to</strong> the Batista era. The CIA would not cooperate with the anti-Castro underground because it was opposed <strong>to</strong> their wish for social andeconomic reform. Accord<strong>in</strong>gly, the CIA launched the <strong>in</strong>vasion withoutnotify<strong>in</strong>g the Cuban underground. Then the attack was bungled.Page 1136This greatly strengthened Castro's prestige <strong>in</strong> Lat<strong>in</strong> Americanmore than <strong>in</strong> Cuba itself. This <strong>in</strong> turn permitted him <strong>to</strong> survive adeepen<strong>in</strong>g wave of passive resistance and sabotage with<strong>in</strong> Cuba itself,chiefly from the peasants <strong>to</strong> recapture control of the Cubanrevolutionary movement.Page 1138In May 1961, Castro proclaimed that Cuba would be a socialiststate but despite his statements, he was not <strong>in</strong> any way a conv<strong>in</strong>cedCommunist or a conv<strong>in</strong>ced anyth<strong>in</strong>g else, but was a power-hungry andemotionally unstable <strong>in</strong>dividual, filled with hatred of authorityhimself, and restless unless he had constant change and megalomaniacsatisfactions. His tactical skill, especially <strong>in</strong> foreign affairs, isremarkable, and shows similarity <strong>to</strong> Hitler's.Page 1139On the whole, the role of the U.S. <strong>in</strong> Lat<strong>in</strong> America has not beensuch as <strong>to</strong> help either patterns or priorities, largely because ourconcern has been with what seems <strong>to</strong> be useful or better for us ratherthan with what would be most helpful <strong>to</strong> them.Page 1140Despite the enthusiasm and energy that make it possible for them<strong>to</strong> overthrow corrupt and tyrannical regimes,it soon becomes clear thatthey have little idea what <strong>to</strong> do once they get <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> power. As aresult, they fall under the personal <strong>in</strong>fluence of unstable andignorant men, the Nassers, the Perons, and the Castros who fall backon emotionally charged programs of hatreds and spectacular displays ofunconstructive nationalism that waste time and use up resources whilethe real problems go unsolved.A heavy responsibility rests with the United States for thiswidespread failure <strong>to</strong> f<strong>in</strong>d solutions <strong>to</strong> problems all the way fromPakistan <strong>to</strong> Peru. The basic reason for this is that our policies <strong>in</strong>this great area have been based on efforts <strong>to</strong> f<strong>in</strong>d solutions <strong>to</strong> ourown problems rather than theirs; <strong>to</strong> make profits, <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease suppliesof necessary raw materials, <strong>to</strong> fight Hitler, <strong>to</strong> keep out Communism andprevent the spread of neutralism. The net result is that we are nowmore hated than the Soviet Union and neutralism reveals itself asclearly as it dares through the whole area.


Page 1141The sole consequence of the Dulles efforts <strong>to</strong> do the wrong th<strong>in</strong>galong the Pakistani-Peruvian axis has been <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease what he wasseek<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> reduce: local political <strong>in</strong>stability, <strong>in</strong>creased Communistand Soviet <strong>in</strong>fluence, neutralism, and hatred of the U.S.Although the Dulles period shows most clearly the failures ofAmerican foreign policy <strong>in</strong> Lat<strong>in</strong> America, the situation was the same,both before and s<strong>in</strong>ce Dulles. American policy has been determ<strong>in</strong>ed byAmerican needs and desires and not by the problems of Lat<strong>in</strong> Americans.There are four chief periods <strong>in</strong> U.S. policy <strong>in</strong> Lat<strong>in</strong> America <strong>in</strong> the20th century:1) a period of <strong>in</strong>vestment and <strong>in</strong>terventionism (until 1933) and wasbasically a period of American imperialism. American money came as<strong>in</strong>vestments seek<strong>in</strong>g profits out of the exploitation of the areasresources. There was little respect for the people themselves and<strong>in</strong>tervention by American military and diplomatic forces was alwaysclose at hand as a protection for American profits and <strong>in</strong>vestments.2) the Good Neighbor Policy <strong>in</strong> 1933 reduced <strong>in</strong>tervention whilereta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>vestment.3) from 1940 until 1947, our efforts <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>volved the are <strong>in</strong> ourforeign policy aga<strong>in</strong>st Hitler and Japan;4) s<strong>in</strong>ce 1947, aga<strong>in</strong>st the Soviet Union.Both these efforts have been mistakes.Page 1142That this failure cont<strong>in</strong>ued <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the 1960s was clear <strong>in</strong>Wash<strong>in</strong>g<strong>to</strong>n's joy at the military coup that ejected the left-of-centerGoulart government from Brazil <strong>in</strong> 1964 for that government, howevermisdirected and <strong>in</strong>competent, at least recognized that there wereurgent social and economic problems <strong>in</strong> Brazil demand<strong>in</strong>g treatment. Noreal recognition that such problems existed was achieved <strong>in</strong> Wash<strong>in</strong>g<strong>to</strong>nuntil Castro's revolution forced the realization.The formal agreement for the Alliance for Progress aims andattitudes were admirable but required implementation features thatwere not covered <strong>in</strong> the Charter itself."We, the American Republics, hereby proclaim our decision <strong>to</strong>unite <strong>in</strong> a common effort <strong>to</strong> br<strong>in</strong>g our people accelerated economicprogress and broader social justice with<strong>in</strong> the framework of personaldignity and personal liberty. Almost two hundred years ago we began <strong>in</strong>this hemisphere the long struggle for freedom which now <strong>in</strong>spirespeople <strong>in</strong> all parts of the world. Now we must give a new mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong>that revolutionary heritage. For America stands at a turn<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong>his<strong>to</strong>ry. The men and women of this hemisphere are reach<strong>in</strong>g for thebetter life which <strong>to</strong>day's skills have placed with<strong>in</strong> their grasp. Theyare determ<strong>in</strong>ed for themselves and their children <strong>to</strong> have decent andever more abundant lives, <strong>to</strong> ga<strong>in</strong> access <strong>to</strong> knowledge and equalopportunity for all, <strong>to</strong> end those conditions which benefit the few at


the expense of the needs and dignity of the many."Page 1144These were f<strong>in</strong>e words but the methods for achiev<strong>in</strong>g thesedesirable goals were only <strong>in</strong>cidentally established <strong>in</strong> the Charter. Onthe whole, it cannot be said that it has been a success. It'sachievement has been ameliorative rather than structural, and thisalone <strong>in</strong>dicates that it has not been a success. For unless there arestructural reforms, its economic development will not become selfsusta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>gor even manage <strong>to</strong> keep up with the growth of population onthe basis of <strong>in</strong>come per capita.Page 1145The failure of the Alliance for Progress <strong>to</strong> achieve what it was<strong>to</strong>uted <strong>to</strong> achieve was a result that it was not <strong>in</strong>tended primarily <strong>to</strong>be a method for achiev<strong>in</strong>g a better life for Lat<strong>in</strong> Americans but was<strong>in</strong>tended <strong>to</strong> be a means of implement<strong>in</strong>g American policy <strong>in</strong> the ColdWar. This became clearly evident at the second Punta del EsteConference <strong>in</strong> 1962 where Wash<strong>in</strong>g<strong>to</strong>n's exclusive control over thegrant<strong>in</strong>g of funds was used as a club <strong>to</strong> force the Lat<strong>in</strong> Americanstates <strong>to</strong> exclude Cuba from the Organization of American States. Theorig<strong>in</strong>al plan was <strong>to</strong> cut off Cuba's trade with all Western Hemispherecountries. A two-thirds vote was obta<strong>in</strong>ed only after the most <strong>in</strong>tenseAmerican "diplomatic" pressure and bribery <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g the grant<strong>in</strong>g andwithhold<strong>in</strong>g of American aid <strong>to</strong> the Alliance. Even at that, sixcountries, Brazil, Mexico, Argent<strong>in</strong>a, Chile, Bolivia, and Ecuador,represent<strong>in</strong>g 70% of Lat<strong>in</strong> America's population refused <strong>to</strong> vote for theAmerican motions.The aid takes the form not of money which can be used <strong>to</strong> buy thebest goods <strong>in</strong> the cheapest market but as credits which can be usedonly <strong>in</strong> the U.S. Much of these credits goes either <strong>to</strong> fill the gaps <strong>in</strong>the budgets or the foreign-exchange balances which provides themaximum of leverage <strong>in</strong> gett<strong>in</strong>g these governments <strong>to</strong> follow America'slead but provides little or no benefit <strong>to</strong> the impoverished peoples ofthe hemisphere.THE JAPANESE MIRACLEPage 1148The post-war agrarian reform redistributed the ownership of landby the government tak<strong>in</strong>g all <strong>in</strong>dividual land hold<strong>in</strong>gs beyond 7.5acres, all rented land over 2.5 acres, and the land of absenteelandlords. The former owners were paid with long-term bonds. In turn,peasants without land or with less than the maximum permitted amountwere allowed <strong>to</strong> buy land from the state on a long-term low-<strong>in</strong>terestratebasis. Cash rents for land were also lowered. As a result, Japanbecame a land of peasant owners with about 90% of the cultivated landworked by its owners.Page 1151Agrarian reform has driven Communism out of the rural areas and


estricted it <strong>to</strong> the cities, chiefly <strong>to</strong> student groups.Page 1153Under the Czar, Russia produced great surpluses, especially offood.COMMUNIST CHINAPage 1159Previous <strong>to</strong> the Land Reform Law of 1950, 10% of families owned53% farm land while 32% owned 78% of the land. This left over twothirds of such families with only 22% of the land. The first stage <strong>in</strong>agrarian reform had been the "elim<strong>in</strong>ation of landlordism." Thelandlords were elim<strong>in</strong>ated with great brutality <strong>in</strong> a series ofspectacular public trials <strong>in</strong> which landlords were accused of everycrime <strong>in</strong> the book. At least 3 million were executed and several timesthat number were imprisoned but the <strong>to</strong>tals may have been much higher.The land thus obta<strong>in</strong>ed was distributed <strong>to</strong> poor peasant families witheach obta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g about one-third of an acre.The second stage sought <strong>to</strong> establish cooperative farm<strong>in</strong>g. Ineffect, it <strong>to</strong>ok away from the peasants the lands they had jus<strong>to</strong>bta<strong>in</strong>ed. The third stage constitut<strong>in</strong>g the basic feature of the "GreatLeap Forward" merged the 750,000 collective farms <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> about 26,000agrarian communes of about 5,000 families each. This was a socialrather than simply an agrarian revolution s<strong>in</strong>ce its aims <strong>in</strong>cluded thedestruction of the family household and the peasant village. Allactivities of the members, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g child rear<strong>in</strong>g, came under thecontrol of the commune.Page 1160The Communist government was not <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> corruption, selfenrichment,and calculated <strong>in</strong>efficiency as earlier Ch<strong>in</strong>ese governmentswere and had both greater power and greater desire <strong>to</strong> operate a fairration<strong>in</strong>g system but the fact rema<strong>in</strong>s that the <strong>in</strong>ability of communizedagricultural system <strong>to</strong> produce sufficient food surpluses <strong>to</strong> support acommunized <strong>in</strong>dustrial system at a high rate of expansion is nowconfirmed and the need for all Communist regimes <strong>to</strong> purchase gra<strong>in</strong>from the Western countries confirms that there is someth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> theWestern pattern of liv<strong>in</strong>g which does provide a bountiful agriculturalsystem.Page 1164A source of alienation between Moscow and Pek<strong>in</strong>g is concernedwith the grow<strong>in</strong>g recognition that the Kreml<strong>in</strong> was be<strong>in</strong>g driven <strong>to</strong>warda policy of peaceful coexistence with the U.S. not as a temporarytactical maneuver (which would have been acceptable <strong>to</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>a) but as asemipermanent policy s<strong>in</strong>ce Marxist-Len<strong>in</strong>ist theory envisioned theadvanced capitalist states as approach<strong>in</strong>g a condition of economiccollapse from "the <strong>in</strong>ternal contradictions of capitalism itself." Thiscrisis would be reflected <strong>in</strong> two aspects: the cont<strong>in</strong>ued impoverishmen<strong>to</strong>f the work<strong>in</strong>g class with the consequent growth of the violence of the


class struggle <strong>in</strong> such countries and <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g violence of theimperialist aggressions of such countries <strong>to</strong>ward each other <strong>in</strong>struggles <strong>to</strong> control more backward areas as markets for the <strong>in</strong>dustrialproducts that the cont<strong>in</strong>ued impoverishment of their own workers madeimpossible <strong>to</strong> sell <strong>in</strong> domestic market. The falseness of these theorieswas fully evident <strong>in</strong> the ris<strong>in</strong>g standards of liv<strong>in</strong>g of the advanced<strong>in</strong>dustrial countries. This evidence of the errors of Marxist-Len<strong>in</strong>isttheories was <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly clear <strong>to</strong> the Kreml<strong>in</strong>, although it could notbe admitted, but it was quite unclear <strong>to</strong> Pek<strong>in</strong>g.Page 1165Mao Tse-tung, son of a peasant who became wealthy on speculationand moneylend<strong>in</strong>g was born <strong>in</strong> 1893 <strong>in</strong> Hunan prov<strong>in</strong>ce.Page 1168There are at least half a dozen legal, m<strong>in</strong>or political parties <strong>in</strong>Red Ch<strong>in</strong>a <strong>to</strong>day (1966). These not only exist and are permitted <strong>to</strong>participate <strong>in</strong> the govern<strong>in</strong>g process <strong>in</strong> a very m<strong>in</strong>or way, but they aresubject <strong>to</strong> no real efforts at forcible suppression, although they aresubject <strong>to</strong> persistent, rather gentle, efforts at conversion.Page 1170French expenditure of $7 billion and about 100,000 lives dur<strong>in</strong>gthe eight-year struggle ended at Geneva <strong>in</strong> 1954. The Geneva agreementsprovided that all foreign military forces, except a French tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>ggroup, be withdrawn from Laos. When the Pathet Lao showed <strong>in</strong>creasedstrength <strong>in</strong> the elections of May 1958, the anti-Communist groupcomb<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>to</strong> oust Premier Phouma and put <strong>in</strong> the pro-Western Sananikone.This government was then ejected and replaced by a Right-w<strong>in</strong>g militaryjunta led by General Nosavan <strong>in</strong> 1960; but with<strong>in</strong> seven months a newcoup led by Kong Le brought Phouma back <strong>to</strong> office. Four months later,Nosavan once aga<strong>in</strong> replaced Phouma by military force. The Communistcountries refused <strong>to</strong> recognize this change and <strong>in</strong>creased theirsupplies <strong>to</strong> the Pathet Lao by Soviet airlift.Page 1172The Geneva agreement of 1954 had recognized the Communistgovernment of North Vietnam divid<strong>in</strong>g the country at the 17th parallelbut this imag<strong>in</strong>ary l<strong>in</strong>e could not keep discontent or Communistguerrillas out of South Vietnam so long as the American-sponsoredsouthern government carried on its tasks with corruption, favoritismand arbitrary despotism. These grow<strong>in</strong>g characteristics of the SouthVietnam government centered around the antics of the Diem family.President Diem's brother Nhu was the actual power <strong>in</strong> the governmenthead<strong>in</strong>g up a semi-secret political organization that controlled allmilitary and civil appo<strong>in</strong>tments. On the Diem family team were threeother brothers, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the Catholic Archbishop of Vietnam, thecountry's ambassador <strong>to</strong> London, and the political boss of centralVietnam who had his own police force.While the country was <strong>in</strong> its relentless struggle with the


Vietcong Communist guerrillas who lurked <strong>in</strong> jungle areas, strik<strong>in</strong>gwithout warn<strong>in</strong>g at peasant villages that submitted <strong>to</strong> the establishedgovernment or did not cooperate with the rebels, the Diem familytyranny was engaged <strong>in</strong> such po<strong>in</strong>tless tasks as crush<strong>in</strong>g Saigon highschool agitations by secret police raids or efforts <strong>to</strong> persecute theoverwhelm<strong>in</strong>g Buddhist majority and <strong>to</strong> extend favors <strong>to</strong> the RomanCatholics who were less than 10% of the population.When Diem became president <strong>in</strong> 1955, after the deposition of thepro-French Emperor Bao Dai, the country had just received 800,000refugees from North Vietnam which the Geneva conference had yielded <strong>to</strong>Ho Chi M<strong>in</strong>h's communists, the overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g majority of which wereRoman Catholics, rais<strong>in</strong>g their number <strong>to</strong> over a million <strong>in</strong> apopulation of 14 million. Nevertheless, Diem made these Catholics thechief basis of his power, chiefly recruit<strong>in</strong>g the refugees <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> variouspolice forces dom<strong>in</strong>ated by the Diem family.Page 1173By 1955, these were already beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> persecute the Buddhistmajority, at first by harass<strong>in</strong>g their religious festivals and paradesbut later with brutal assaults on their meet<strong>in</strong>gs. An attempted coup byarmy units was crushed and the Diem rule became <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>glyarbitrary.American military assistance tried <strong>to</strong> curtail the depredations ofthe Communist guerrillas. The <strong>in</strong>tensity of the guerrilla attackssteadily <strong>in</strong>creased follow<strong>in</strong>g Diem's re-election with 88% of the vote.American <strong>in</strong>tervention was also stepped up and gradually began <strong>to</strong> shiftfrom a purely advisory and tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g role <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly directparticipation <strong>in</strong> the conflict. From 1961 onward, American casualtiesaveraged about one dead a week, year after year. The Communistguerrilla casualties were reported <strong>to</strong> be about 500 per week but thisdid not seem <strong>to</strong> dim<strong>in</strong>ish their <strong>to</strong>tal number or relax their attacks.These guerrilla attacks consisted of rather purposelessdestruction of peasant homes and villages, apparently designed <strong>to</strong>conv<strong>in</strong>ce the natives of the impotence of the government and theadvisability of cooperat<strong>in</strong>g with the rebels. To s<strong>to</strong>p thesedepredations, the government under<strong>to</strong>ok the gigantic task of organiz<strong>in</strong>gthe peasants <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> "agrovilles" or "strategic hamlets" which were <strong>to</strong> bestrongly defended residential centers entirely enclosed beh<strong>in</strong>dbarricades. The process, it was said, would also improve the economicand social welfare of the people <strong>to</strong> give them a greater <strong>in</strong>centive <strong>to</strong>resist the rebels. There was considerable doubt about theeffectiveness of the reform aspect of this process and some doubtabout the defence possibilities of the scheme as a whole. Mos<strong>to</strong>bservers felt that very little American economic aid ever reached thevillage level but <strong>in</strong>stead was lost on much higher levels. By thesummer of 1963, guerrillas were stag<strong>in</strong>g successful attacks on thestrategic hamlets and the need for a more active policy became acute.


Page 1175This f<strong>in</strong>al crisis <strong>in</strong> the s<strong>to</strong>ry of the Diem family and itshenchmen arose from religious persecution of the Buddhists under theguise of ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g political order. On November 1, 1963, anAmerican-encouraged military coup led by General M<strong>in</strong>h overthrew theDiem family. A new government with a Buddhist premier calmed down thedomestic crisis but was no more able <strong>to</strong> suppress guerrilla activities.THE ECLIPSE OF COLONIALISMPage 1178The massive economic mobilization for World War II showed clearlythat there could be an equally massive post-war mobilization ofresources for prosperity.Page 1184It is usually not recognized that the whole economic expansion ofWestern society rests upon a number of psychological attitudes thatare prerequisites <strong>to</strong> the system as we have it but are not often statedexplicitly. Two of these may be identified as:1) future preference and2) <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>itely expandable material demand.In a sense, these are contradic<strong>to</strong>ry s<strong>in</strong>ce the former implies thatWestern economic man will make almost any sacrifice <strong>in</strong> the present forthe same of some hypothetical benefit <strong>in</strong> the future while the latterimplies almost <strong>in</strong>satiable demand <strong>in</strong> the present. Nonetheless, both areessential features of the overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g Western economic system.Future preference came out of the Christian outlook andespecially the Puritan tradition which was prepared <strong>to</strong> accept almostany k<strong>in</strong>d of sacrifice <strong>in</strong> the temporal world for the sake of futureeternal salvation, will<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> restrict their enjoyment of <strong>in</strong>come forthe sake of capital accumulation.The mass production of this new <strong>in</strong>dustrial system was able <strong>to</strong>cont<strong>in</strong>ue and <strong>to</strong> accelerate <strong>to</strong> the fantastic rate of the 20th centuryso that <strong>to</strong>day, the average middle-class family of suburbia has aschedule of future material demands which is limitless.Without these two psychological assumptions, the Western economywould break down or would never have started. At present, futurepreference may be break<strong>in</strong>g down and <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>itely expand<strong>in</strong>g materialdemand may soon follow it <strong>in</strong> the weaken<strong>in</strong>g process. If so, theAmerican economy will collapse unless it f<strong>in</strong>ds new psychologicalfoundations.Page 1187In Asia, as is traditional along the Pakistani-Peruvian axis, thestructure of societies had been one <strong>in</strong> which a coalition of army,bureaucracy, landlords, and moneylenders have exploited a great massof peasants by ex<strong>to</strong>rtion of taxes, rents, low wages, and high <strong>in</strong>terestrates <strong>in</strong> a system of such persistence that its basic structure goesback <strong>to</strong> the Bronze Age empires before 1000 B.C.


CHAPTER XX: TRAGEDY AND HOPE, THE FUTURE IN PERSPECTIVETHE UNFOLDING OF TIMEPage 1200Weapons will cont<strong>in</strong>ue <strong>to</strong> be expensive and complex. This meansthat they will <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly be the <strong>to</strong>ols of professionalized, if notmercenary, forces. All of past his<strong>to</strong>ry shows that the shift from amass army of citizen-soldiers <strong>to</strong> a smaller army of professionalfighters leads, <strong>in</strong> the long run, <strong>to</strong> a decl<strong>in</strong>e of democracy.Page 1204When Khrushchev renounced the use of both nuclear war andconventional violence, and promised <strong>to</strong> defeat the West by peacefulcompetition, he was conv<strong>in</strong>ced that the Soviet Union could out-performthe U.S. because it could, <strong>in</strong> his op<strong>in</strong>ion, overcome the American lead<strong>in</strong> the race for economic development that the Socialist way of lifewould become the model for emulation by the uncommitted nations.Page 1213In other economies, when additional demands are presented <strong>to</strong> theeconomy, less resources are available for alternative uses. But <strong>in</strong> theAmerican system, as it now stands, additional new demands usually lead<strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>creased resources becom<strong>in</strong>g available for alternative purposes,notably consumption. Thus if the Soviet Union embraced a substantial<strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> space activity, the resources available for rais<strong>in</strong>gRussian levels of consumption would be reduced while <strong>in</strong> America, any<strong>in</strong>creases <strong>in</strong> the space budget makes levels of consumption also rise.Page 1214It does this because <strong>in</strong>creased space expenditures providepurchas<strong>in</strong>g power for consumption that makes available previouslyunused resources out of the unused American productive capacity.This unused capacity exists <strong>in</strong> the American economy because thestructure of our economic system is such that it channels flows offunds <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the production of additional capacity (<strong>in</strong>vestment) withoutany conscious plann<strong>in</strong>g process or any real desire by anyone <strong>to</strong><strong>in</strong>crease our productive capacity. It does this because certa<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>in</strong> our system (such as <strong>in</strong>surance, retirement funds,socialsecurity payments, undistributed corporate profits and such) andcerta<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividuals who personally profit by the flow of funds nottheirs <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestment cont<strong>in</strong>ue <strong>to</strong> operate <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong>vestment evenwhen they have no real desire <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease productive capacity (and<strong>in</strong>deed many decry it). In the Soviet Union, on the contrary, resourcesare allotted <strong>to</strong> the <strong>in</strong>crease of productive capacity by a consciousplann<strong>in</strong>g process and at the cost of reduc<strong>in</strong>g the resources available<strong>in</strong> their system for consumption or for the government (largelydefence).Thus the mean<strong>in</strong>g of "costs" and the limitations on ability <strong>to</strong>


mobilize economic resources are entirely different <strong>in</strong> our system fromthe Soviet system and most others. In the Soviet economy, "costs" arereal costs, measurable <strong>in</strong> terms of the allotment of scarce resourcesthat could have been used otherwise. In the American system, "costs"are fiscal or f<strong>in</strong>ancial limitations that have little connection withthe use of scarce resources or even with the use of available (andtherefore not scarce) resources. The reason for this is that <strong>in</strong> theAmerican economy, the fiscal or f<strong>in</strong>ancial limit is lower than thelimit established by real resources and therefore, s<strong>in</strong>ce the f<strong>in</strong>anciallimits act as the restra<strong>in</strong>t on our economic activities, we do not get<strong>to</strong> the po<strong>in</strong>t where our activities encounter the restra<strong>in</strong>ts imposed bythe limits of real resources (except rarely and briefly <strong>in</strong> terms oftechnically tra<strong>in</strong>ed manpower, which is our most limited resource).These differences between the Soviet and American economies are:1) the latter has built-<strong>in</strong>, <strong>in</strong>voluntary, <strong>in</strong>stitutionalized <strong>in</strong>vestmentwhich the former lacks;2) the latter has fiscal restra<strong>in</strong>ts at a much lower level of economicactivity which the Soviet system also lacks.Thus greater activity <strong>in</strong> defence <strong>in</strong> the USSR entails real costss<strong>in</strong>ce it puts pressure on the ceil<strong>in</strong>g established by limited realresources while greater activity <strong>in</strong> the American defence or spaceeffort releases money <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the system which presses upward on theartificial f<strong>in</strong>ancial ceil<strong>in</strong>g, press<strong>in</strong>g it upward closer <strong>to</strong> the higher,and remote, ceil<strong>in</strong>g established by the real resources limit of theAmerican economy. This makes available the unused productive capacitythat exists <strong>in</strong> our system between the f<strong>in</strong>ancial ceil<strong>in</strong>g and the realresources ceil<strong>in</strong>g; it not only makes these unused resources availablefor the government sec<strong>to</strong>r of the economy from which the expenditurewas directly made but also makes available portions of these releasedresources for consumption and additional capital <strong>in</strong>vestment.Page 1215For this reason, government expenditures <strong>in</strong> the U.S. for th<strong>in</strong>gslike defence or space may entail no real costs at all <strong>in</strong> terms of theeconomy as a whole. In fact, if the volume of unused capacity brought<strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> use by expenditures for these th<strong>in</strong>gs (that is, defence and so on)is greater than the resources necessary <strong>to</strong> satisfy the need for whichthe expenditure was made, the volume of unused resources madeavailable for consumption or <strong>in</strong>vestment will be greater than thevolume of resources used <strong>in</strong> the governmental expenditure and thisadditional government effort will cost noth<strong>in</strong>g at all <strong>in</strong> real terms,but will entail "negative" real costs. (Our wealth will be <strong>in</strong>creasedby mak<strong>in</strong>g the effort).The basis for this strange, and virtually unique, situation is <strong>to</strong>be found <strong>in</strong> the large amount of unused productive capacity <strong>in</strong> the U.S.even <strong>in</strong> our most productive years. In the second quarter of 1962, our


productive system was runn<strong>in</strong>g at a very high level of prosperity, yetit was function<strong>in</strong>g about 12% below capacity, which represented a lossof $73 billion annually. In this way, <strong>in</strong> the whole period from thebeg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of 1953 <strong>to</strong> the middle of 1962, our productive systemoperated at $387 billion below capacity. Thus if the system hadoperated near capacity, our defence effort over the n<strong>in</strong>e years wouldhave cost us noth<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> terms of loss of goods or capacity.This unique character <strong>in</strong> the American economy rests on the factthat the utilization of resources follows flow l<strong>in</strong>es <strong>in</strong> the economythat are not everywhere reflected by correspond<strong>in</strong>g flow l<strong>in</strong>es ofclaims on wealth (that is, money). In general, <strong>in</strong> our economy thel<strong>in</strong>es of flow of claims on wealth are such that they provide a verylarge volume of sav<strong>in</strong>gs and a rather large volume of <strong>in</strong>vestment, evenwhen no one really wants new productive capacity; they also provide an<strong>in</strong>adequate flow of consumer purchas<strong>in</strong>g power, <strong>in</strong> terms of flows, orpotential flows, of consumer goods; but they provide very limited,sharply scrut<strong>in</strong>ized and often misdirected flows of funds for the useof resources <strong>to</strong> fulfill the needs of the government sec<strong>to</strong>r of ourtrisec<strong>to</strong>red economy. As a result, we have our economy dis<strong>to</strong>rtedresource-utilization patterns, with over<strong>in</strong>vestment <strong>in</strong> many areas,overstuffed consumers <strong>in</strong> one place and impoverished consumers <strong>in</strong>another place, a drastic undersupply of social services, andwidespread social needs for which public funds are lack<strong>in</strong>g.In the Soviet Union, money flows follow fairly well the flows ofreal goods and resources, but, as as result, pressures are directly onresources. These pressures mean that sav<strong>in</strong>g and <strong>in</strong>vestment conflictdirectly with consumption and government services (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g defence),putt<strong>in</strong>g the government under severe direct stra<strong>in</strong>s, as the demands forhigher standards of liv<strong>in</strong>g cannot be satisfied except by curtail<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>vestment, defence, space, or other government expenditures.Page 1216Many countries of the world are worse off the Soviet Unionbecause their efforts <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease consumers' goods may well require<strong>in</strong>vestment based on sav<strong>in</strong>gs that must be accumulated at the expense ofconsumption.As a chief consequence of these conditions, the contrast betweenthe "have" nations and the "have-not" nations will become even wider.This would be of little great importance <strong>to</strong> the rest of the world wereit not that the peoples of the backward areas, rid<strong>in</strong>g the "crisis ofris<strong>in</strong>g expectations" are <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly unwill<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> be ground down <strong>in</strong>poverty as their predecessors were. At the same time, the Superpowerstalemate <strong>in</strong>creases the abilities of these nations <strong>to</strong> be neutral, <strong>to</strong>exercise <strong>in</strong>fluence out of all relationship <strong>to</strong> their actual powers, and<strong>to</strong> act, sometimes, <strong>in</strong> an irresponsible fashion.These neutrals and other peoples of backward areas have acute


problems. Solutions do exist but the underdeveloped nations areunlikely <strong>to</strong> f<strong>in</strong>d them.Page 1221A grow<strong>in</strong>g lowest social class of the social outcasts (theLumpenproletariat) has reappeared. This group of rejects from thebourgeois <strong>in</strong>dustrial society provide one of our most <strong>in</strong>tractablefuture problems because they are gathered <strong>in</strong> urban slums, havepolitical <strong>in</strong>fluence, and are socially dangerous.In the U.S. where these people congregate <strong>in</strong> the largest citiesand are often Negroes or Lat<strong>in</strong> Americans, they are regarded as aracial or economic problem, but they are really an educational andsocial problem for which economic or racial solutions would helplittle. This group is most numerous <strong>in</strong> the more advanced <strong>in</strong>dustrialareas and now forms more than 20% of the American population. S<strong>in</strong>cethey are a self-perpetuat<strong>in</strong>g group and have many children, they are<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> numbers faster than the rest of the population.Page 1229The pattern of outlook on which the tradition of the West isbased has six parts:1) There is truth, a reality (thus the West rejects skepticism,solipsism and nihilism)2) No person, group, or organization has the whole picture of thetruth (thus there is no absolute or f<strong>in</strong>al authority.)3) Every person of goodwill has some aspect of the truth, some visionof it from the angle of his own experience.4) Through discussion, the aspects of the truth held by many can bepooled and arranged <strong>to</strong> form a consensus closer <strong>to</strong> the truth than anyof the sources that contributed <strong>to</strong> it.5) This consensus is a temporary approximation of the truth which newexperiences make it necessary <strong>to</strong> reformulate.6) Thus Western man's picture of the truth advances closer and closer<strong>to</strong> the whole truth without ever reach<strong>in</strong>g it.This methodology of the West is basic <strong>to</strong> the success, power andwealth of Western Civilization.Page 1231To the West, <strong>in</strong> spite of all its aberrations, the greatest s<strong>in</strong>from Lucifer <strong>to</strong> Hitler, has been pride, especially <strong>in</strong> the form of<strong>in</strong>tellectual arrogance, and the greatest virtue has been humility,especially <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>tellectual form which concedes that op<strong>in</strong>ions arealways subject <strong>to</strong> modification by new experiences, new evidence, andthe op<strong>in</strong>ions of our fellow men.The most triumphant of these aspects is science, whose method isa perfect example of the Western tradition. The scientist goes eagerly<strong>to</strong> work each day because he has the humility <strong>to</strong> know that he does nothave any f<strong>in</strong>al answers and must work <strong>to</strong> modify and improve the answershe has. He publishes his op<strong>in</strong>ions and research reports or exposes


these <strong>in</strong> scientific gather<strong>in</strong>gs so that they may be subjected <strong>to</strong> thecriticism of his colleagues and thus gradually play a role <strong>in</strong>formulat<strong>in</strong>g the constantly unfold<strong>in</strong>g consensus that is science. Thatis what science is, "a consensus unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> time by a cooperativeeffort <strong>in</strong> which each works diligently seek<strong>in</strong>g the truth and submitshis work <strong>to</strong> the discussion and critique of his fellows <strong>to</strong> make a new,slightly improved, temporary consensus."THE UNITED STATES AND THE MIDDLE-CLASS CRISISPage 1234American society <strong>in</strong> the 1920s was largely middle-class. Itsvalues and aspirations were middle-class and power or <strong>in</strong>fluence with<strong>in</strong>it was <strong>in</strong> the hands of middle-class people.Most defenders of bourgeois America saw the country <strong>in</strong> middleclassterms and looked forward <strong>to</strong> a not remote future <strong>in</strong> whicheveryone would be middle-class except for a small shiftless m<strong>in</strong>orityof no importance. America was regarded as a ladder of opportunity.Wealth, power, prestige and respect were all obta<strong>in</strong>ed by the samestandard, based on money. This <strong>in</strong> turn was based on a pervasiveemotional <strong>in</strong>security that sought relief <strong>in</strong> the ownership and controlof material possessions.Page 1235Years ago <strong>in</strong> Europe, the risks (and rewards) of commercialenterprise, well reflected <strong>in</strong> the fluctuat<strong>in</strong>g fortunes of figures suchas An<strong>to</strong>nio <strong>in</strong> The Merchant of Venice were extreme. A s<strong>in</strong>gle venturecould ru<strong>in</strong> a merchant or make him rich. This <strong>in</strong>security was <strong>in</strong>creasedby the fact that the prevalent religion of the day disapproved of whathe was do<strong>in</strong>g, seek<strong>in</strong>g profits or tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terest, and he could see noway of provid<strong>in</strong>g religious services <strong>to</strong> the <strong>to</strong>wn dwellers because ofthe <strong>in</strong>timate association of the ecclesiastical system with theexist<strong>in</strong>g arrangement of rural landhold<strong>in</strong>g.Page 1236Credit became more important than <strong>in</strong>tr<strong>in</strong>sic personal qualities,and credit was based on the appearance of th<strong>in</strong>gs, especially theappearances of the external material accessories of life. Old valuessuch as future preference or self-discipl<strong>in</strong>e, rema<strong>in</strong>ed, but wereredirected. Future preference ceased <strong>to</strong> be transcendental <strong>in</strong> its aimand became secularized.Page 1237Middle-class self-discipl<strong>in</strong>e and future preference provided thesav<strong>in</strong>gs and <strong>in</strong>vestment without which any <strong>in</strong>novation - no matter howappeal<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> theory - would be set aside and neglected.The middle-class character is psychic <strong>in</strong>security founded on lackof secure social status. The cure for such <strong>in</strong>security became<strong>in</strong>satiable material acquisition. From this flowed attributes of futurepreference, self-discipl<strong>in</strong>e, social conformity, <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>itely expandablematerial demand, and a general emphasis on externalized impersonal


values. The urge <strong>to</strong> seek truth or <strong>to</strong> help others are not reallycompatible with the middle-class values.Page 1238One of the chief changes, fundamental <strong>to</strong> the survival of themiddle-class outlook, was a change <strong>in</strong> society's basic conception ofhuman nature. This had two parts <strong>to</strong> it. The traditional Christianattitude was that human nature was essentially good and that it wasformed and modified by social pressures and tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g. The "goodness"of human nature was based on the belief that it was a k<strong>in</strong>d of weakercopy of God's nature. In this Western po<strong>in</strong>t of view, evil and s<strong>in</strong> werenegative qualities; they arose from an absence of good, not from thepresence of evil. Thus s<strong>in</strong> was the failure <strong>to</strong> do the right th<strong>in</strong>g, notdo<strong>in</strong>g the wrong th<strong>in</strong>g.Opposed <strong>to</strong> this view was another which received its most explicitformulation by the Persian Zoroaster <strong>in</strong> the seventh century B.C. Itcame <strong>in</strong> through the Persian <strong>in</strong>fluence on the Hebrews, especiallydur<strong>in</strong>g the Babylonian Captivity of the Jews, <strong>in</strong> the sixth century andmore fully through the Greek rationalist tradition from Pythagoras <strong>to</strong>Pla<strong>to</strong>. The general dist<strong>in</strong>ction of this po<strong>in</strong>t of view from Zoroaster <strong>to</strong>William Gold<strong>in</strong>g (<strong>in</strong> Lord of the Flies) is that the world and the fleshare positive evils and that man, <strong>in</strong> at least this physical part of hisnature, is essentially evil. As a consequence, he must be discipl<strong>in</strong>ed<strong>to</strong>tally <strong>to</strong> prevent him from destroy<strong>in</strong>g himself and the world. In thisview, the devil is a force, or be<strong>in</strong>g, of positive malevolence and man,by himself, is <strong>in</strong>capable of good and is, accord<strong>in</strong>gly, not free. He canbe saved <strong>in</strong> eternity by God's grace alone and he can get through thistemporal world only by be<strong>in</strong>g subjected <strong>to</strong> a regime of <strong>to</strong>tal despotism.The contrasts can be summed up thus:Orthodox;Puritan.Evil is an absence of Good;Evil is a positive entity.Man is basically good;Man is basically evil.Man is free;Man is a slave of his nature.Man can contribute <strong>to</strong> his salvation by good works;Man can be saved only by God.Self-discipl<strong>in</strong>e is necessary <strong>to</strong> guide or direct;Discipl<strong>in</strong>e must be external and <strong>to</strong>tal.Truth found from experience and revelation <strong>in</strong>terpreted by tradition;Truth is found by rational deduction from revelation.Luther, Calv<strong>in</strong>, Thomas Hobbes, Blaise Pascal and others believedthat truth was <strong>to</strong> be found <strong>in</strong> rational deduction from a few basicrevealed truths <strong>in</strong> sharp contrast with the orthodox po<strong>in</strong>t of viewstill represented by the Anglican and Roman churches which saw men as


largely free <strong>in</strong> a universe whose rules were <strong>to</strong> be found by traditionand consensus.Page 1240The Puritan po<strong>in</strong>t of view led directly <strong>to</strong> mercantilism whichregarded political-economic life as a struggle <strong>to</strong> the death <strong>in</strong> a worldwhere there not sufficient wealth or space for different groups. Tothem, wealth was limited <strong>to</strong> a fixed amount and one man's ga<strong>in</strong> wassomeone else's loss. That meant that the basic struggles of this worldwere irreconcilable and must be fought <strong>to</strong> a f<strong>in</strong>ish. This as part ofthe Puritan belief that nature was evil and that a state of nature wasa jungle of violent conflicts.One large change was the Community of Interests which rejectedmercantilism's <strong>in</strong>sistence on limited wealth and the basic<strong>in</strong>compatibility of <strong>in</strong>terests for the more optimistic belief that allparties could somehow adjust their <strong>in</strong>terests with<strong>in</strong> a community <strong>in</strong>which all would benefit mutually.Above all, the middle-class which dom<strong>in</strong>ated the country <strong>in</strong> thefirst half of the 20th century were a small group of aris<strong>to</strong>crats.Below were the petty bourgeoisie who had middle-class aspirations.Below these two were two lower classes: the workers and theLumpenproletariat.Page 1242In America, as elsewhere, aris<strong>to</strong>cracy represents money andposition grown old, and is organized <strong>in</strong> terms of families rather thanof <strong>in</strong>dividuals. Traditionally it was made up of those families who hadmoney, position,and social prestige for so long that they never had <strong>to</strong>th<strong>in</strong>k about these and,above all, never had <strong>to</strong> impress any other personwith the fact that they had them. They accepted these attributes offamily membership as a right and an obligation. S<strong>in</strong>ce they had no ideathat these could be lost, they were self-assured, natural but distant.Their manners were gracious but impersonal. Their chief characteristicwas the assumption that their family position had obligations. This"noblesse oblige" led them <strong>to</strong> participate <strong>in</strong> school sports (even ifthey lacked obvious talent) <strong>to</strong> serve their university (usually afamily tradition) <strong>in</strong> any helpful way, and <strong>to</strong> offer their services <strong>to</strong>their local community, their state, and their country as anobligation.Page 1243Another good evidence of class may be seen <strong>in</strong> the treatment given<strong>to</strong> servants who work <strong>in</strong> one's home: the lower classes treat these asequals, the middle-classes treat them as <strong>in</strong>feriors, while thearis<strong>to</strong>crats treat them as equals or even superiors. On the whole, thenumber of aris<strong>to</strong>cratic families <strong>in</strong> the U.S. is very few, with a couple<strong>in</strong> each of the older states. A somewhat larger group of semiaris<strong>to</strong>cratsconsists of those like the Lodges, Rockefellers, orKennedys,who are not yet completely aris<strong>to</strong>cratic either because they


are not, <strong>in</strong> generations, far enough removed from money-mak<strong>in</strong>g, orbecause of the persistence of a commercial or bus<strong>in</strong>ess tradition <strong>in</strong>the family.The second most numerous group <strong>in</strong> the U.S. is the pettybourgeoisie, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g millions of persons who regard themselves asmiddle-class and are under all the middle-class anxieties andpressures but often earn less money than unionized laborers. As aresult of these th<strong>in</strong>gs, they are often very <strong>in</strong>secure, envious, filledwith hatreds, and are generally the chief recruits for any RadicalRight, Fascist, or hate campaigns aga<strong>in</strong>st any group that is differen<strong>to</strong>r which refuses <strong>to</strong> conform <strong>to</strong> middle-class values. Made up of clerks,shopkeepers, and vast numbers of office workers <strong>in</strong> bus<strong>in</strong>ess,government, f<strong>in</strong>ance and education, these tend <strong>to</strong> regard their whitecollar status as the chief value <strong>in</strong> life, and live <strong>in</strong> an atmosphere ofenvy, pett<strong>in</strong>ess, <strong>in</strong>security, and frustration. They form the majorportion of the Republican Party's supporters <strong>in</strong> the <strong>to</strong>wns of America,as they did for the Nazis <strong>in</strong> Germany thirty years ago.Page 1244Eisenhower himself was repelled by the Radical Right whoseimpetus had been a chief element <strong>in</strong> his election although the lowermiddle-classhad preferred Sena<strong>to</strong>r Taft as their leader. Eisenhowerhowever had been preferred by the Eastern Establishment of old WallStreet, Ivy League, semi-aris<strong>to</strong>cratic Anglophiles whose real strengthrested <strong>in</strong> their control of eastern f<strong>in</strong>ancial endowments operat<strong>in</strong>g fromfoundations, academic halls, and other tax-exempt refuges.As we have said, this Eastern Establishment was really aboveparties. They had been the dom<strong>in</strong>ant element <strong>in</strong> both parties s<strong>in</strong>ce 1900and practiced the political techniques of J.P. Morgan.Page 1245They were, as we have said, Anglophile, cosmopolitan, Ivy League,<strong>in</strong>ternationalist, as<strong>to</strong>nish<strong>in</strong>gly liberal, patrons of the arts, andrelatively humanitarian. All these th<strong>in</strong>gs made them anathema <strong>to</strong> thelower-middle-class and petty-bourgeois groups who supplied the votes<strong>in</strong> Republican elec<strong>to</strong>ral vic<strong>to</strong>ries but found it so difficult <strong>to</strong> controlnom<strong>in</strong>ations (especially <strong>in</strong> presidential elections) because the bigmoney necessary for nom<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a Republican convention was allied<strong>to</strong> Wall Street and <strong>to</strong> the Eastern Establishment. The ability of thelatter <strong>to</strong> nom<strong>in</strong>ate Eisenhower over Taft <strong>in</strong> 1952 was a bitter pill <strong>to</strong>the radical bourgeoisie.Kennedy was an Establishment figure. His <strong>in</strong>troduction <strong>to</strong> theEstablishment arose from his support <strong>in</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong>. His acceptance <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong>the English Establishment opened its American branch as well. Another<strong>in</strong>dication of this connection was the large number of Oxford-tra<strong>in</strong>edmen appo<strong>in</strong>ted <strong>to</strong> office by President Kennedy.Page 1246In the m<strong>in</strong>ds of the ill-<strong>in</strong>formed, the political struggle <strong>in</strong> the


U.S. has always been viewed as a struggle between Republicans andDemocrats at the ballot box <strong>in</strong> November. Wall Street long ago had seenthat the real struggle was <strong>in</strong> the nom<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g conventions. Thisrealization was forced upon the petty-bourgeois supporters ofRepublican candidates by their <strong>in</strong>ability <strong>to</strong> nom<strong>in</strong>ate theircongressional favorites. Just as they reached this conclusion, the newwealth appeared <strong>in</strong> the political picture, shar<strong>in</strong>g petty-bourgeoissuspicions of the East, big cities, Ivy League universities,foreigners, <strong>in</strong>tellectuals, workers and aris<strong>to</strong>crats. By the 1964election, the major political issue <strong>in</strong> the country was the f<strong>in</strong>ancialstruggle beh<strong>in</strong>d the scenes between the old wealth, civilized andcultured <strong>in</strong> foundations, and the new wealth, virile and un<strong>in</strong>formed,aris<strong>in</strong>g from the flow<strong>in</strong>g profits of government-dependent corporations<strong>in</strong> the West and Southwest.At issue here was the whole future face of America, for the olderwealth s<strong>to</strong>od for values and aims close <strong>to</strong> the Western traditions ofdiversity, <strong>to</strong>lerance, human rights and values, freedom, and the res<strong>to</strong>f it, while the newer wealth s<strong>to</strong>od for the narrow and fear-rackedaims of petty-bourgeois <strong>in</strong>security and egocentricity. The nom<strong>in</strong>alissues between them, such as that between <strong>in</strong>ternationalism andunilateral isolationism (which its supporters preferred <strong>to</strong> rename"nationalism") were less fundamental than they seemed, for the realissue was the control of the Federal government's tremendous power <strong>to</strong><strong>in</strong>fluence the future of America by spend<strong>in</strong>g of government funds. Thepetty bourgeois and new wealth groups wanted <strong>to</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ue that spend<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the <strong>in</strong>dustrial-military complex, such as defence and space, whilethe older wealth and non-bourgeois groups wanted <strong>to</strong> direct it <strong>to</strong>wardsocial diversity and social amelioration for the aged and the young,for education, for social outcasts, and for protect<strong>in</strong>g nationalresources for future use.Page 1247The outcome of this struggle, which still goes on, is one <strong>in</strong>which civilized people can afford <strong>to</strong> be optimistic. For the newerwealth is unbelievably ignorant and mis<strong>in</strong>formed.The National parties and their presidential candidates, with theEastern Establishment assiduously foster<strong>in</strong>g the process beh<strong>in</strong>d thescenes, moved closer <strong>to</strong>gether and nearly met <strong>in</strong> the center with almostidentical candidates and platforms although the process was concealed,as much as possible, by the revival of obsolescent or mean<strong>in</strong>gless warcries and slogans.Page 1248The two parties should be almost identical so that the Americanpeople can "throw the rascals out" at any election without lead<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong>any profound or extensive shifts <strong>in</strong> policy. The policies that arevital and necessary for America are no longer subjects of significantdisagreement, but are disputable only <strong>in</strong> details of procedure,


priority, or method: we must rema<strong>in</strong> strong, cont<strong>in</strong>ue <strong>to</strong> function as agreat World power <strong>in</strong> cooperation with other Powers, avoid high-levelwar, keep the economy mov<strong>in</strong>g, help other countries do the same,provide the basic social necessities for all our citizens, open upopportunities for social shifts for those will<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> work <strong>to</strong> achievethem, and defend the basic Western outlook of diversity, pluralism,cooperation,and the rest of it, as already described.Either party <strong>in</strong> office becomes <strong>in</strong> time corrupt, tired,unenterpris<strong>in</strong>g and vigorless. Then it should be possible <strong>to</strong> replace itevery four years by the other party which will be none of these th<strong>in</strong>gsbut will still pursue, with new vigor, approximately the same basicpolicies.The capture of the Republican National Party by the extremistelements of the Republican National Party <strong>in</strong> 1964 and their effort <strong>to</strong>elect Barry Goldwater with the petty-bourgeois extremists alone, wasonly a temporary aberration on the American political scene and arosefrom the fact that President Johnson had pre-empted all the issues sothat it was hardly worthwhile for the Republicans <strong>to</strong> run a realcontestant aga<strong>in</strong>st him. Thus Goldwater was able <strong>to</strong> take control of theparty by default.The virulence beh<strong>in</strong>d the Goldwater campaign, however, had noth<strong>in</strong>g<strong>to</strong> do with default or lack of <strong>in</strong>tensity. Quite the contrary. His mostardent supporters were of the extremist petty-bourgeois mentalitydriven <strong>to</strong> near hysteria by the dis<strong>in</strong>tegration of the middle-class andthe steady rise <strong>to</strong> prom<strong>in</strong>ence of everyth<strong>in</strong>g they considered anathema:Catholics, Negroes, immigrants, <strong>in</strong>tellectuals, aris<strong>to</strong>crats,scientists, and educated men generally, cosmopolitans and<strong>in</strong>ternationalists and, above all, liberals who accept diversity ad avirtue.This dis<strong>in</strong>tegration of the middle classes had a variety ofcauses, some of them <strong>in</strong>tr<strong>in</strong>sic, many of them accidental, a few of themobvious, but many of them go<strong>in</strong>g deeply <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the very depths of socialexistence. All these causes acted <strong>to</strong> destroy the middle-class byact<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> destroy the middle-class outlook.Page 1250In the earlier period, even down <strong>to</strong> 1940, literature's attack onthe middle-class outlook was direct and brutal, from such works asUp<strong>to</strong>n S<strong>in</strong>clair's "The Jungle" or Frank Norris's "The Pit," bothdeal<strong>in</strong>g with the <strong>to</strong>tal corruption of of personal <strong>in</strong>tegrity <strong>in</strong> themeatpack<strong>in</strong>g and wheat markets. These early assaults were aimed at thecommercialization of life under bourgeois <strong>in</strong>fluence and werefundamentally reformist <strong>in</strong> outlook because they assumed that the evilsof the system could somehow be removed. By the 1920s, the attack wasmuch more <strong>to</strong>tal and saw the problem <strong>in</strong> moral terms so fundamental thatno remedial action was possible. Only complete rejection of middleclassvalues could remove the corruption of human life seen by


S<strong>in</strong>clair Lewis <strong>in</strong> Babbitt or Ma<strong>in</strong> Street.Page 1252The Puritan po<strong>in</strong>t of view of man as a creature of <strong>to</strong>tal depravitywithout hope of redemption which <strong>in</strong> the period 1550-1650 justifieddespotism <strong>in</strong> a Puritan context, now may be used, with petty-bourgeoissupport, <strong>to</strong> justify a new despotism <strong>to</strong> preserve, by force <strong>in</strong>stead ofconviction, petty-bourgeois values <strong>in</strong> a system of compulsoryconformity. George Orwell's 1984 has given us the picture of thissystem as Hitler's Germany showed us its practical operation. BarryGoldwater's defeat moved the possibility so far <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> the future thatthe steady change <strong>in</strong> social conditions makes it remote <strong>in</strong>deed.Page 1253For generations, even <strong>in</strong> fairly rich families, the <strong>in</strong>doctr<strong>in</strong>ationcont<strong>in</strong>ued because of emphasis on thrift and restra<strong>in</strong>ts on consumption.By 1937, the world depression showed that the basic economic problemswere not sav<strong>in</strong>g and <strong>in</strong>vestment but distribution and consumption. Thusthere appeared a grow<strong>in</strong>g read<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>to</strong> consume, spurred on my new salestechniques, <strong>in</strong>stallment sell<strong>in</strong>g and the extension of credit from theproductive side <strong>to</strong> the consumption side of the economic process. As aresult, an entirely new phenomenon appeared <strong>in</strong> middle-class families,the practice of liv<strong>in</strong>g up <strong>to</strong>, or even beyond, their <strong>in</strong>comes - anunth<strong>in</strong>kable scandal <strong>in</strong> any 19th century bourgeois family.Page 1255Middle-class marriages were usually based on middle-class valuesof economic security and material status rather than on love. Moreaccurately, middle-class marriages were based on these materialconsiderations <strong>in</strong> fact, while everyone concerned pretended that theywere based on Romantic love. Even when the marriage becomes a success,<strong>in</strong> the sense that it persists, it is never <strong>to</strong>tal and merely means thatthe marriage becomes an enslav<strong>in</strong>g relationship <strong>to</strong> the husbands and asource of disappo<strong>in</strong>tment and frustration <strong>to</strong> the wives.EUROPEAN AMBIGUITIESPage 1300In the old days, the merchant bankers of London controlled fairlywell the funds that were needed for almost any enterprise <strong>to</strong> become asubstantial success. Today, much larger funds are available from manydiverse sources, from abroad, from government sources, from <strong>in</strong>suranceand pension funds, from profits from other enterprises. These are nolonger held under closely associated controls and are much moreimpersonal and professional <strong>in</strong> their disposal so that on the whole, anenergetic man (or a group with a good idea) can get access <strong>to</strong> largerfunds <strong>to</strong>day, and can do so without anyone much car<strong>in</strong>g if he acceptsthe established social precedents.Page 1303Lycurgus renounced social change <strong>in</strong> prehis<strong>to</strong>ric Sparta only bymilitariz<strong>in</strong>g the society.


CONCLUSIONPage 1310Tragedy and Hope? The tragedy of the period covered by this bookis obvious but the hope may seem dubious <strong>to</strong> many. Only the passage oftime will show if the hope I seem <strong>to</strong> see <strong>in</strong> the future is actuallythere or is the result of mis-observation and self-deception.The his<strong>to</strong>rian has difficulty dist<strong>in</strong>guish<strong>in</strong>g the features of thepresent and generally prefers <strong>to</strong> restrict his studies <strong>to</strong> thepast,where the evidence is more freely available and where perspectivehelps him <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpret the evidence. Thus the his<strong>to</strong>rian speaks withdecreas<strong>in</strong>g assurance about the nature and significance of events asthey approach his own day. The time covered by this book seems <strong>to</strong> thishis<strong>to</strong>rian <strong>to</strong> fall <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> three periods: the 19th century from 1814 <strong>to</strong>1895; the 20th century after World War II, and a long period oftransition from 1895 <strong>to</strong> 1950.The 20th century is utterly different from the 19th century andthe age of transition between the two was one of the most awfulperiods <strong>in</strong> all human his<strong>to</strong>ry. Two terrible wars sandwich<strong>in</strong>g a worldeconomic depression revealed man's real <strong>in</strong>ability <strong>to</strong> control his lifeby n<strong>in</strong>eteenth century techniques of laissez-faire, materialism,competition, selfishness, nationalism, violence, and imperialism.These characteristics of late n<strong>in</strong>eteenth-century life culm<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>in</strong>World War II <strong>in</strong> which more than 50 million persons were killed, mos<strong>to</strong>f them by horrible deaths.The hope of the twentieth century rests on the recognition thatwar and depression are man-made, and needless. They can be avoided <strong>in</strong>the future by turn<strong>in</strong>g from the 19th century characteristics justmentioned and go<strong>in</strong>g back <strong>to</strong> other characteristics that our Westernsociety has always regarded as virtues: generosity, compassion,cooperation, rationality, and foresight, and f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g an <strong>in</strong>creased role<strong>in</strong> human life for love, spirituality, charity, and self-discipl<strong>in</strong>e.On the whole, we do know now that we can avoid cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g thehorrors of 1914-1945 and on that basis alone we maybe optimistic overour ability <strong>to</strong> go back <strong>to</strong> the tradition of our Western society and <strong>to</strong>resume its development along its old patterns of Inclusive Diversity.Electronic edition by John Turmelhttp://www.cyberclass.net/turmel/quig00.htm

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