The Juvenile Crime Challenge: Making Prevention a Priority

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSIONRichard R. TerzianChairmanMary Anne ChalkerVice ChairmanNathan ShapellPast ChairmanMichael E. AlpertCharles G. Bakaty, Jr.Assemblyman Gil FergusonSenator Lucy KilleaAngie PapadakisSenator Alfred E. AlquistCarl D. CovitzPier A. Gherini, Jr.Assemblywoman Gwen MooreStanley R. ZaxSTAFFJeannine L. EnglishExecutive DirectorKathleen BeasleyDeputy Executive Director

State of CaliforniaLITTLE HOOVERCOMMISSIONRich.,.d R.Teni""ChaIrmanOctober 4, 1994M"")' Anne Chili

• Unfortunately, the universal agreement that prevention is vital has beensystematically undercut by a gradual but accelerating shift in spending patternsover the last two decades. That shift has seen the near elimination of earlyintervention and prevention programs and the mushrooming of "back-end"incarceration expenses. The pivotal player that is well positioned to make adifference in the life of juvenile delinquents is the probation officer -- but probationbudgets have been compressed and outreach efforts stripped to the point wheremany probation officers can do little more than keep track of overwhelmingcaseloads on paper. While tight fiscal constraints make it difficult to putprevention first, such a shift in priorities is crucial to halting the increasingamounts of violent juvenile crime.The Commission has explored the basis for and ramifications of these conclusions indepth in a report that is rooted in academic studies, real-world experiences and pragmaticsolutions. The report, which is being transmitted to the State's top policy-makers withthis letter, covers six issues and offers 18 recommendations. Chief among therecommendations are:1. Consolidating all juvenile anti-crime efforts in a single, high-level state agency toprovide strong leadership and accountability for results.2. Directing all government agencies to make early intervention and preventionprograms a top priority.3. Providing a continuum of options so that a range of consequences addressesmisconduct by juveniles at all levels of severity.4. Revising age, confidentiality and record-sealing laws to increase flexibility in thejuvenile justice system so that appropriate decisions can be made and toacknowledge the public's right to information.5. Increasing the ability of the California Youth Authority to provide neededtreatment, training and education for juveniles appropriately committed to statefacilities.The Commission believes it is urgent that the State begin to make the long term changesthat are needed to solve the crime problem rather than merely reacting to or containingit. The Commission looks forward to providing policy makers with active assistance inaccomplishing the necessary reforms outlined in this report.Sincerely,Richard R. TerzianChairman

The Juvenile Crime Challenge:Making Prevention a PrioritySeptember 1994

Table oj ContentsTable of ContentsSectionExecutive Summary ............................. .IntroductionBackground17Issues and RecommendationsThe State's Role . 19Issue 1: State must provide meaningful leadership .. . 23Issue 2: Goals of juvenile system unclear ......... . 45Issue 3: Prevention hard hit by budget cuts ....... . . 55System Reforms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67Issue 4: Accountability and consequences not reinforced 71Issue 5:Imbalance between public's right to know and shieldingjuveniles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91Youth Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97Issue 6:CYA is last resort, intensive-treatment option ..... 101ConclusionAppendices121129Endnotes ............................................ 153

The Juvenile Crime Challenge

ChartTable of IllustrationsTable of IllustrationChart 1 - Juvenile Arrests in California ........................ 11Chart 1 - Arrest Rate for Juveniles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Chart 3 - Juvenile Arrests for Assault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Chart 4 - Juvenile Arrests for Homicide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Chart 5 - Juveniles at Risk ................................. 56Chart 6 - Outcome of Juvenile Arrests ........................ 74Chart 7 - Confinement Time Adds and Cuts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108TableTable 1 - Juvenile Arrests for Violent Crimes .................... 14Table 2 - Juvenile Fitness Hearings in Six Counties ................ 80Table 3 - Sample of State Remand Restrictions .................. 82Table 4 - Releases from CYA Facilities Due to Age ................ 85Table 5 - Net Tme Added by Category of Offense ............... 109Table 6 - County-by-County Breakdown of CY A Population . . . . . . . . . 112Table 7 - CYA Ward Assaults and Batteries on Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114Table 8 CYA Ward Assaults and Batteries on Other Wards ........ 115Table 9 - CYA Staff and Ward Injuries ....................... 115Table 10 - Wards Exposed to Chemical Restraints ............... 115

The Juvenile Crime Challenge

ExecutiveSummary

The Juvenile Crime Challengeii

Executive SummaryExecutive SummaryThessue 1: While crime is localIin nature and impact, theState must providemeaningful leadership inshaping juvenile anti-violence andcrime prevention efforts.While the manycomponents that feed a risingviolent juvenile crime rate arebeyond the control of stategovernment, there are functionsthe State can perform toempower local communities andgovernments to mountaggressive anti-crime campaigns.In addition, there are steps theState can take to encourage a societal shift in attitudes aboutviolence and its pervasive use to settle conflicts. While in thepast some state programs focused on prevention activities, todaythere is no effective centralized point of authority andaccountability for anti-crime efforts -- despite the existence ofseveral bodies purportedly dedicated to that purpose.iii

The Juvenile Crime ChallengeRecommendation 1:The Governor and the Legislature shouldconsolidate juvenile anti-crime efforts in asingle agency to provide strongleadership and accountability for results.The specific mandated duties should include:• Leadership to highlight issues and concerns for the public,to set standards for local anti-crime activities, and topropose and promote legislation to further delinquencyprevention.• A clearinghouse function that would provide centralizedassessment and evaluation of programs, promotion ofmodels that work, and technical assistance for focalgovernments and communities.• A data gathering and assessment function that wouldprovide reliable statistics on a statewide basis about trendsin crime, results of programs and funds expended. Thecurrent lack of data on costs across jurisdictional levels,case outcomes and comprehensive recidivism trackingmakes it difficult to make informed and rational policydecisions.• Standardization of training for those connected withjuvenile justice, including judges, district attorneys,probation officers, parole officials and public defenders.• The identification of and dissemination of informationabout available sources of federal, state and privatefunding. When appropriate, the point of control forfunding flow to local agencies and communities and thecentral point for accountability for the successful use offunding.• Targeted information campaigns to bring about behavioralchanges, on the part of both individuals at risk andbusinesses that unwittingly glorify violence and crime.Recommendation 2:The Governor and the Legislature shouldadopt legislation directing the Board ofiv

Executive SummaryEducation in conjunction with theDepartment of Education to evaluate andpromote the use of effective conflictresolution curricula in public schools.Providing an outcome-based assessment of variousprograms would give schools the option of including conflictresolution materials in their curricula that would be suited to theirspecific needs.Recommendation 3:Law enforcement officials at all levels ofgovernment shol.Jld increase theiremphasis on enforcing existing lawsregarding firearms and alcohol.Continuing fiscal crises at all levels of government make itimpossible to fully fund all programs at desirable levels. Butbecause of the huge long-range cost of juvenile, crime and theclear links between guns, alcohol and juvenile violence, policymakers should place a priority on enforcing existing laws thatkeep guns out of the hands of juveniles and existing laws thatprohibit alcoholic consumption by juveniles.Issue 2: As the nature of juvenile crime has changed, public.'~.:.' .••.•... support for a separate juvenile justice system has erodedand goals for the system have become unclear.While the juvenile justice system was established with theunderlying concept that most children can be salvaged andturned from a life of crime and thus should be handled differentlythan adult criminals, there is steady pressure to blur thedistinction between juvenile and adult court. Some of thepressure has come from court decisions that have broughtincreasing due-process protection to juveniles. Other pressurecomes from the public, where the reality of increasingly violentcrime perpetrated by juveniles has created a groundswell fortreating children as adults. Still other pressure comes from thosewho work within the juvenile justice system and see that it haslost its ability to clearly link consequences to actions. Since thesystem involves the discretionary action of many of the partiesinvolved (police officers, probation officers, judges and districtattorneys), an overarching policy statement that resolvesv

The Juvenile Crime Challengeconflicting pressures and philosophies is critical to achievingconsistency and equity.Recommendation 4:The Governor and the Legislature shoulddirect the new juvenile crime preventionagency to draft a clear statement ofphilosophy, purpose and function thatfocuses on deterrence as the cornerstonefor the juvenile criminal justice system ..Setting aside the polarizing debate over whetherrehabilitation or retribution should have the premier role in thejuvenile justice system, the State's policy should be outcomebased.Society's primary goal in dealing with troubled juvenilesis to deter repeat offenders and act to deter non-offenders fromentering the system as first-time offenders. The State's policy,therefore, should focus on the most effective way to achievedeterrence and recognize that, in each case, a sophisticatedanalysis is required to determine the appropriate balance oftreatment and punishment. The concepts that should be statedin the policy include:• The reiteration that the basic premise of the presentseparate system still holds true, especially for statusoffenders and minor criminals: that generally children aresalvageable and extra efforts should be made, by the Statein plac~ of their families when necessary, to influence theirlives in positive, non-crime directions.• The overriding need to ensure public safety and the right ofthe public to an open accountable system.• A system that reinforces accountability for actions,personal responsibility for decisions made andconsequences linked to deeds.• The importance of individual assessment upon which tobase appropriate treatment and/or punishment.• In pursuit of deterrence, an appropriate balance betweenrehabilitation (treatment, training and education) andpunishment, with competency development that canvi

Executive Summaryreasonably be expected to lead to productive citizenship asa key goal.• Sensitivity to the needs, concerns and perspectives ofvictims.• Family preservation when possible or beneficial.Issue3: Funding cutbacks have disproportionately impactedthe programs with the highest potential for success in. diverting juveniles from crime.Despite the universal belief among experts that the onlyhope of halting or diminishing juvenile crime is in takingappropriate steps before a youth is entrenched in a delinquencypattern, early-intervention programs have all but disappeared asfiscally strapped county and state departments have madeselective budget cuts in the past decade. Front-line workersdecry their inability to cope with the minor juvenile delinquentbecause of the pressing demands on their time and resources bychronic, violent offenders. This situation is especially distressingsince these worst-case juveniles not only soak up resourcesbecause of the high cost of their treatment but also are the leastlikely to be deterred from a life of crime regardless of thetreatment options undertaken. Placing a high priority on "frontend"programs is difficult without new funding but is critical toany successful crime prevention effort.Recommendation 5:The Governor and the Legislature shoulddirect all state agencies involved in anticrimeefforts to make early interventionand prevention programs a top priority.Early identification, assessment and intervention isessential if at-risk children are going to be helped and divertedfrom criminal activity. Funding constraints and traditionaldivisions of turf should not be allowed to preclude local intraagency,multi-disciplinary efforts among the key juvenile justicesystem players: law enforcement, probation, social services,schools, juvenile courts, public defenders, district attorneys andcommunity leaders. Key elements of any model can be expectedto include:vii

The Juvenile Crime Challenge• A structure that is multi-disciplinary and intra-agency.• A focus that is neighborhood or community-based.• Multiple points of entry (Le., children can be referred byschools, parents, organizations, social services l etc.)• An emphasis on attacking truancy 1 often a first sign ofmovement toward delinquency.• A mechanism for providing access to parenting skillsresources since delinquency often arises in homes withpoor parenting practices.• A system that is sensitive to cultural diversity withoutaltering the expectations of society about the standard ofrequired behavior. This includes the availability ofappropriate services with culturally targeted accessibility.Recommendation 6:The Governor and the Legislature shouldadopt legislation that eliminates barriersto inter- and intra-agency sharing ofinformation that is necessary for earlyidentification of and intervention with atriskchildren.Current state statutes that are designed to protect theprivacy of families and children are too restrictive to allow earlyidentification and assessment ofpeople in need of services.I· ssue 4: Personalaccountability and timely,appropriate consequencesS.ystemfor actions are elements thatshould be reinforced by thejuvenile justice system.The message thatindividuals are responsible for thedecisions they make and thatillegal actions are accompaniedviii

Executive Summaryby consequences is often lost in today's juvenile justice system.A child may face little more than a lecture for the .first half-dozenoffenses, tactics that are the hallmark of the adult system areemployed to get the youth n off the hook," and long delaysseparate deed from outcome. The stark reality of the impact ofthe juveniles' actions on their victims and other members ofsociety is also lost in a system that has little room for victiminput.In addition, appropriate consequences are not alwaysachieved because of the way the juvenile justice systemapproaches chronological age. The disturbing trend for youngerand younger juveniles to commit violent and heinous crimeswithout receiving the perceived harsher treatment accordedadults with similar records has brought the juvenile system's agespecifications under scrutiny by policy makers. At the sametime, age restrictions on juvenile jurisdiction force the release ofwards from state facilities even when they are evaluated as stillbeing a threat to society -- with no parole oversight and noability of a court to order further treatment or confinement. Inboth cases, simple solutions that merely address changing agelimits will not necessarily ensure the results that juvenile justiceexperts believe are warranted and that the public wants.Recommendation 7:Working together, the State and thecounties should ensure that a continuumof options exist so that a range ofconsequences addresses misconduct byjuveniles at all levels of severity.From the point of first contact with the juvenile justicesystem, a youth should be made aware that he is accountablefor his actions and that illegal activity brings consequences. Foreach juvenile who comes in contact with the juvenile justicesystem, the first step should be a thorough assessment of hisneeds for treatment and services. Options after the assessmentwill fall into one of three categories: 1) diversion; 2) localtreatment; and 3) state incarceration. Diversion out of thesystem for youths with low-level needs and non-serious crimescan provide consequences through enforced participation incommunity or teen court programs. At the other end of thespectrum, juveniles who have committed multiple and seriousix

The Juvenile Crime Challengecrimes and who have intensive-treatment needs should be sentto the California Youth Authority. Community-based treatmentprograms, including day treatment, intensive supervision andresidential care when needed, should provide appropriateconsequences for the mid-range of offenders.Recommendation 8:The Governor and the Legislature shouldadopt legislation that allows victims oraffected family members to presenttestimony during the juvenile adjudicationprocess.In criminal court, victims or their relatives may offertestimony about the impact of the crime on their lives duringpenalty phases of trials. No such input is provided for in thejuvenile system. In addition to acknowledging the needs ofvictims for a voice in the system, providing a role for victims inthe juvenile court process would confront juveniles with thereality of their actions and the consequences to others.Recommendation 9:The Governor and the Legislature shouldadopt legislation that restructures theremand process to maximize judicialflexibility to make appropriatedispositions of juvenile cases.The current remand process should be restructured in twoways: 1) The criteria on which judges base their decision to sendjuveniles to adult court should be revised and better defined; and2) a narrow and procedurally difficult process should be .established for addressing the rare, very young offender who isbeyond hope of rehabilitation or whose crime is so severe thatthe balance of consequences, even while focused on deterrence,favors a severe penalty.Recommendation 10:The Governor and the Legislature shouldadopt legislation that returns a juvenile tojuvenile court jurisdiction if an adultcriminal court trial results in a convictionof a crime that is not listed in Welfareand Institutions Code Section 707b.x

Executive SummaryUnder existing law I a juvenile may be remanded to adultcourt for any of the many serious and violent crimes listed inSection 707b. Once in adult court, however, his case may beplea-bargained down to a lesser offense or he may be foundguilty by a jury of a lesser offense. Although the outcome inthese cases indicates he should not be handled as an adult, thereis no mechanism currently for returning him to the jurisdiction ofthe juvenile court for sentencing or disposition. Creating such amechanism would provide for more appropriate treatment and/orincarceration.Recommendation 11:The Governor and the Legislature shouldadopt legislation that creates a systemthat allows judicial scrutiny and newdisposition of cases where juvenilesreach the maximum age in state custodyand are still considered to be a threat tosociety based on their commitmentoffense, their conduct while incarceratedand the nature and circumstances oftheir crime.Under existing law l a juvenile who "maxes out" in a eVAfacility at age 21 or 25 (depending on the crime and situationunder which the juvenile was sent to eVA) may not be retainedor placed on probation but must simply be released. The sole,narrow exception allows the State to seek further confinementbased on the argument that treatable physical or mental damageexists. A trial can then be held if the juvenile does notvoluntarily agree to the extension of incarceration and treatment.A similar mechanism should be created for those wardswho are sentenced to CV A but refuse to take advantage of theopportunity for reform and rehabilitation because they know theywill be set free at a certain age regardless of their actions. Whilethe Commission is concerned about constitutional issues,including double jeopardy, the need to protect the public fromdangerous criminals is strong; therefore, the creation of a systemto address these small numbers of offenders should beconsidered.xi

The Juvenile Crime ChallengeIssue5: The desire to shield juveniles from publicity to.. enhance the chances of rehabilitation in many cases should" not outweigh the public's right to know about juvenilecrime.Specific policies that were adopted to shield juveniles frompublic exposure for youthful mistakes and to enhance prospectsfor rehabilitation have weakened the credibility of the entiresystem in the eyes of the public and ignore the need of thepublic to be aware of community occurrences. In addition, thenormal checks and balances provided by having openness in ajudicial system are non-existent in the juvenile system.Recommendation 12:The Governor and the Legislature shouldadopt legislation to eliminateconfidentiality for all juvenile adjudicationand disposition processes involvingserious crimes for those 14 and older.The desire to shield youths from the public spotlight whenthey have committed petty crimes or are extremely young can bemet by continuing to hold arrest, adjudication and dispositionrecords confidential for those under 14 whose offenses areminor. But both the adjudication and disposition processes forserious crimes -- which represents stages that are reached onlyafter the evidence has been weighed and formal charges havebeen filed -- would benefit from public scrutiny and the sunshineof openness.Recommendation 13:The Governor and the Legislature shouldadopt legislation to reform and restrictthe present sealed record laws whenthose who are 14 and older havecommitted serious crimes.While there may be a compelling public interest in allowinga productive young adult to put his juvenile record behind him,the present laws are too broad and allow protective cover for toomany youths who later continue a life of crime. In particular,laws should be modified to make the record sealing a justifiabledecision rather than the default mode and to forbid sealing incases where death was the result of the crime, predatory sexualxii

abuse is involved and when an insufficient amount of time haspassed to establish a crime-free pattern of life.Executive Summary-Y:ollthIssue 6: The CaliforniaYouth Authority can be most, effective and productive as, the last-resort, intensivetreatment option for serious andchronic juvenile criminals.While the structure of theCalifornia Youth Authority -- bothin physical dimension and ininternal workings ~- is criticizedby juvenile advocates, the CY Asystem has many of theattributes that have beenrecommended by the Little Hoover Commission as importantreforms for the state prison system, including rehabilitativeprograms and case-by-case scrutiny before release. Problems doplague the CY A, however, and almost all of them are related tobudgetary issues. Among the areas of concern are:• The CY A has long waiting lists for programs that wardsmust complete before the Youthful Offender Parole Boardwill consider them for parole. When wards cannot enterand complete a required program within their originalcommitment time frame, their sentence is increased. As aresult, some juveniles serve -- at a high state cost -- timethat is non-productive (while waiting for a program) orunnecessarily long.• The CY A accepts youths from counties that have fewtreatment resources even though the juveniles may not bein need of the costly and intensive treatment optionprovided by CY A. The result is a higher-than-necessarycost to the State and the undesirable exposure ofunsophisticated youths to more criminally matureindividuals.• The physical design of and overcrowding at CY Ainstitutions contribute to violence and threaten ward andxiii

The Juvenile Crime Challengestaff safety. In addition to hampering the State's ability tomeet its obligation to provide a violence-free environment,the costly result is longer periods of incarceration due topenalties for incidents and non-productive lockdownperiods when rehabilitation efforts are minimal.Recommendation 14:The Governor and the Legislature shouldresist efforts to create a determinatesentencing structure for juveniles or toremove ward assessment and releaseauthorization from an independent body.Were it not for the particular policies of recent YouthfulOffender Parole Boards that have lengthened commitment times,it is difficult to believe that juvenile advocates -- who pushindividualized assessment and understand the need to deal withjuvenile rehabilitation on a case-by-case basis -- would prefer asystem that simply sets a date and releases a ward regardless ofhis progress. While the Little Hoover Commission rarely takes astance against specific proposals, its perspective of determinatesentencing structures and their negative affect as seen in theadult criminal sentencing system is one of firm disapproval.While specific policies may come and go as the membership ofthe Youthful Offender Parole Board changes, the structure that itrepresents is a rational one in light of the rehabilitative goals ofthe juvenile justice system.Recommendation 15:The Governor and the Legislature shouldlink increased funding for CY A juveniletreatment programs to the adoption oflegislation precluding the YouthfulOffender Parole Board from adding timeto a ward's commitment stay solelybecause programming has beenunavailable.If a ward's misbehavior or refusal to cooperate keeps himfrom completing Board-ordered programming, then it is a rationalconsequence to extend the time the ward must stay in CY Afacilities. The present system is not oniy irrational but alsoinherently unfair when a ward, through no fault of his own, isrequired to remain in state custody simply because he has notxiv

Executive Summarybeen able to move to the head of the long waiting lists for somerequired programs. Clearly the programs should be expanded, oralternative treatment that satisfies Board requirements should bedeveloped and offered to the ward. After these steps are taken,if the problem of wards not being able to get into requiredprograms persists, then the State should simply concede it mustrelease the ward unrehabilitated because it does not have theresources to meet the needs rather than continuing theexpensive and inequitable practice of retaining the wards in CY Afacilities.Recommendation 16:The Governor and the Legislature shouldadopt legislation that provides theCalifornia Youth Authority withmechanisms for more aggressivelyscreening .... and rejecting whenappropriate -- admissions to statefacilities.When the sole reason a ward ends up in the CaliforniaYouth Authority is that he lives in a county with few treatmentoptions, no one benefits. State law should be modified so thatCY A examines and assesses a youth not only to determine if theyouth can benefit from the placement but also to determine ifother options available in more juvenile-service-oriented countiesmight be more appropriate. Funds saved by divertingcommitments should be used in two ways: to increase servicesto existing wards and to stimulate the development of localoptions, as outlined in Recommendation 17 below.Recommendation 17:The Governor and the Legislature shouldcreate a new mechanism to reward andunderwrite the efforts of counties thatdevelop alternative options that reducecommitments to the California YouthAuthority.The State I s efforts to divert commitments through financialincentives have worked in the past, improving local options andproviding more suitable treatment for less serious offenders.Such a system should be created again, particularly targetingcounties that now have few options and encouraging thexv

The Juvenile Crime Challengeformation of regional alternatives where rural counties are unableto support programs unilaterally.Recommendation 18:The California Youth Authority shouldcontinue to focus its efforts on reducingviolence and injuries in its facilities.eVA's ability to run violence-free institutions is constrainedby several factors, including type of youths dealt with, chronicovercrowded conditions and the physical design of agingbuildings. But the State has a special obligation to provide asafe environment when it legitimately deprives an individual offreedom.xvi

Introduction

The Juvenile Crime Challenge2

IntroductionIntroductionCalifornia's prisons, jails and youth institutions areoverflowing, violent crime has risen alarmingly andcitizens feel increasingly vulnerable in their homes,schools and job sites. The academic commentators whostudy the convergence of statistics, trends and policiessee no relief in the future despite tough-on-crime rhetoricand reality, Crime will continue to be a major concern asthe State's population growth persists, the economyremains stagnant and a swelling, alienated underclassrejects societal standards of behavior,A significant, disproportionate and increasing shareof California's crime problem is made up of juveniles. Inaddition, many of the adults in prison today began theircriminal careers as youths and teenagers. Thus, anysystematic attempt to reduce crime and the societal costsassociated with it needs to place a high priority onaddressing juveniles.Having completed a prison-focused review of theadult criminal justice system, the Little HooverCommission early in 1994 turned its attention to thejuvenile justice system. The Commission's investigationsled to several overriding conclusions that form thefoundation for the Commission's approach to the juvenilejustice system. Those conclusions include:• The root causes of crime are many and diverse.Any hope of addressing those causes successfully3

The Juvenile Crime Challengerequires multi-faceted strategies, bits and pieces ofwhich can be implemented by neighborhoods,communities and various levels of government.There is no silver bullet no simple, expedientanswer that can be imposed from above.• Any solution to juvenile crime must be bipartisanand involve all sectors of society: individuals,families, schools, churches, community groups,governments and businesses. While the scope ofeffort involved should be as broad as all of society,the Commission believes its report also must serveas a wake-up call to individuals. Individualinitiative at the most local level and personalacceptance of responsibility for bringing aboutchange is the key to reform. As one popularmaxim puts it, "Think globally, act locally."• The State has no particular "ownership" of thejuvenile crime problem. The inclination towardcrime often arises from factors at home; theimpact of crime is felt in neighborhoods; thearrests, prosecutions and, in most cases,dispositions are city and county operations. Only2 percent of juveniles arrested eventually areplaced in state institutions. While the State is a bitplayer in the day~to-day staging of the juvenilejustice system, it has the ability and responsibilityto carve out a powerful role as a policy leader andfacilitator for local solutions.• Prevention works better and is cheaper thantreatment. The sobering reality is that improvingto the optimum extent how juvenile criminals aretreated once they are apprehended will only reducerecidivism by at most 10 percent, experts agree.'While keeping that 10 percent from continuallyrecycling through the juvenile justice system -- andultimately, the adult system -- would freesignificant resources, the fact is that preventionand early intervention hold far more promise thangood rehabilitation programs for actually reducingcrime. Children are much harder to "fix" once theyhave become criminals than they are when theyfirst show signs of deviant or anti-social behavior.• Personal accountability for actions and decisions isthe cornerstone of a civilized society. Childrenshould be taught both at home and in schoolsinformed decision-making processes. And theyshould learn that, in theory and in practice, there4

are swift consequences Tor poor decisions andboth tangible and intangible rewards for gooddecisions. To reinforce these lessons, all of theactors within the juvenile justice system, from thepoliceman on the beat to the judge in juvenilecourt, must strive to make the system work moreeffectively in providing consequences at all levelsof criminal severity.• The state, local governments and communitiesshould approach juvenile crime from theperspective of outcome-based goals, chief ofwhich should be deterring first-time offenses andreducing recidivism. The collection of reliable dataand its systematic, validated analysis is crucial forgood decision-making about policy and programs.• Private enterprise involvement at many levels andin multiple modes is critical to successfullyaddressing root causes of crime. This ranges frompartnerships with schools to improve educationand mentoring roles with at-risk children toproviding opportunities through programs such asthe Free Venture enterprises in California YouthAuthority facilities and creating targeted hiringpractices.Based on these concepts, the Commissiondeveloped a report to reform and improve the juvenilejustice system that 1) does not rely on a single solution;2) focuses on the appropriate role for the State whilerecognizing that responsibility -- and the best chance forsuccess -- lies at the local level; and 3) places a priority onprevention.In conducting its study, the Commission convenedan advisory group of more than 70 experts (please seeAppendix A for a listing of participants) drawn from across-section of perspectives that included lawenforcement representatives, probation and paroleinterests, prosecuting and defense attorneys, judges,victims, juvenile advocates, members of the Legislature,state officials, community-based service organizations,academia and others. More than two dozen of themembers participated in 36 hours of working-groupsessions to develop key concepts and potentialrecommendations for the Commission to consider (pleasesee Appendix B for a summary of the working groups Iefforts).Introduction5

The Juvenile Crime ChallengeThe Commission also conducted two publichearings, one in Sacramento in March 1994 and one inLos Angeles in May 1994, that were designed to exploreissues spanning the entire spectrum of juvenile justice,from the roots of crime, early intervention concepts andcrime prevention methods to the role of probation, thejuvenile court system and the California Youth Authority(please see Appendix C for an agenda of witnesses). Inaddition, the Commission's study involved an extensivereview of juvenile crime literature, interviews withacknowledged experts in the field of juvenile justice andthe tracking of current legislative reform proposals.The result is the Commission's report, whichbegins with a transmittal letter, an Executive Summaryand this Introduction, followed by a Background section.Six issues and 18 recommendations are presented in threechapters: The State's Role, System Reforms and theCalifornia Youth Authority. The report ends with aConclusion, Appendices and Endnotes.6

Background• Teenage boys commit adisproportionately high share ofall crime -- a trend that remainstrue over time and geography.• Of California's 3.5 millionyouths, about 250,000 arearrested annually.• Violent crime by juvenilesincreased dramatically during the80s, stabilizing at a high rateduring the early 90s. Almosttwice as many youths werearrested for violent crimes in1992 as in 1983.• More that $1 billion annually isspent on the juvenile justicesystem, which involves both stateand local agencies.

The Juvenile Crime Challenge8

BackgroundBackgroundThe juvenile justice system is a complex web ofpeople and agencies that processes about a quarterof a million youths annually at a cost exceeding $1billion. To understand the system requires a baselineknowledge of the statistical trends during the past decadethat have shaped the system I s ability to function and theroles played by the various components of the system.Academic experts have long recognized that crimeis a young man' s game. The typical criminal is a malewho begins his career at 14 or 15, continues through hismid-20s and then tapers off into retirement. Threestatistics demonstrate the disproportionate impact ofthose under the age of 18 on criminal activity: Whilecomprising roughly one-sixth of the nation's population,they make up a full one-quarter of all people arrested andaccount for nearly one-third of the arrests for the sevencrimes in the Uniform Crime Index (homicide, forciblerape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, vehicle theftand larceny). 2This perspective is echoed by RAND's leadingjuvenile justice expert, Dr. Peter W. Greenwood:Somewhere between 30 and 40 percent of all boys growing up in an urbanized area in theUnited States will be arrested before their 18th birthday .... Although juveniles account for onlya small proportion of the total population, older juvenJ1es have the highest arrest rates of anyage group. Furthermore, studies of criminal careers have demonstrated that one of the best9

The Juvenile Crime Challengepredictors of sustained and serious adult criminality is the age of initiation and seriousness ofthe delinquent career. 3Greenwood also notes that 16 and 17 are the peakyears for crime in all countries and all states,regardless of culture and geography. He says thefact that a disproportionate share of crime is committedby 10- through 17-year-olds remains true as thepopulation fluctuates: Nationally in 1981, that age groupmade up 16 percent of the total population and wereinvolved in 34 percent of the arrests, while in 1991 theage group was 13 percent of the population and 28percent of the arrests.There is no reliable measurement of how many ofCalifornia's 3.5 million 10- through 17-year-old youths areinvolved in criminal activities. Arrest statistics tend torise as law enforcement ranks increase, decline whenminor crime arrests are perceived as a low priority or afutile effort, and fluctuate according to shifts in populationage groups. In addition, arrests fall far short of reportedcrimes (let alone crimes that victims choose not to report).For instance, in 1993 the California Department of Justicerecorded a total of 564,307 arrests of adults and juvenilesfor felonies compared to the more than 2 million felonycrimes that were reported as occurring.Nonetheless, arrest statistics are usually cited todocument trends in juvenile criminal activity. The graphon the next page reflects juvenile arrests formisdemeanors and felonies for the past 11 years (pleasesee Appendix D for detailed raw data from the CaliforniaDepartment of Justice).10

BackgroundCHART 1250,000 -200,000Juvenile Arrests in California1983-1993Total Arrests195,609198,281231,012150,000 -100,000 -50,00083 84 8S 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93Source: California Department of JusticeAs the graph indicates, about 230,000 juvenileswere arrested in 1993 (not including 24,000arrested for so-called status offenses, such asrunning away or truancy), a figure that continues a slowbut steady climbing trend since 1987. Sincemisdemeanor arrests remained fairly flat (only risingsteeply in 1993~, the rise has been driven largely byincreased felony arrests (except for a drop in 1993).At least part of the increasing number of arrests isdue to the population growth of 10- through 17-year-olds.The number of youths in this age range in Californiaremained stable at around 3. 1 million from 1 983 through1990. In 1991, the population began to climb, rising from3.2 million to 3.5 million by 1993, with projectedincreases through the year 2000. The graph on the nextpage shows the results when these population figures aretaken into account and arrests are calculated as a rate per100,000 youths.11

The Juvenile Crime ChallengeCHART 27,200Arrest Rate for Juveniles1983-19937,0007,0086,7736.200Arrest Rate Per 100,000 Population85 88 87 88 89 90 91 92 93Source: California Department of JusticeAs the graph indicates, arrest rates have fluctuated,dropping sharply in 1987 and then rising steeplyuntil 1989 when the rate began dropping again.The rate leveled off in 1992 and 1993 at about 6,700arrests per 100,000 population.Both the arrest statistics and the arrest rate dataare in sharp contrast to the public perception that juvenilecrime is increasing uncontrollably. In fact, juvenileadvocates often cite the declining arrest rate and fairly flatnumber of arrests as evidence that there is no need forget-tough hysteria about juvenile crime. They believe theirargument is bolstered by general California crime statisticsthat show most crime incident categories have either heldsteady or dropped. The California Crime Index (whichincludes homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravatedassault, burglary and motor vehicle theft) dropped 3.5percent between 1992 and 1993, violent crimesdecreased 4. 1 percent and property crimes decreased 3.3percent. 4But a closer examination of the components of theraw arrest figures and the arrest rates for violent crimesindicates why juvenile crime is a focus for the public.Arrests of juveniles tor violent crimes -- particularly12

Backgroundhomicide and assaults have climbed rapidly in the pastdecade, as the graphs below indicate.CHART 3Juvenile Arrests for Assault1983-19921~-------------------------------------------11,005CHART 4Juvenile Arrests for Homicide1983-1992700--·------------------------------------==~----300200100o83 85 86 87 88 90 91 92Source: California Department of Justice13

The Juvenile Crime ChallengeAs the charts indicate, the number of juvenilearrests for assault and homicide have climbedsteeply over the past decade, although the 1990shave been fairly flat. In 10 years, arrests for both typesof crime more than doubled -- assaults from 5,902 to12,005 and homicides from 286 to 645. Linking thehomicide figure to national statistics indicates that one outof four juveniles arrested for homicide was in California ata time when the State had only 11 percent of the nation'sjuvenile population. 5Driven by the climbing assault and homicide rates,the violent crime arrests have risen sharply in the pastdecade. The total juvenile arrests for all violent crimes(homicide, forcible rape, robbery, assault and kidnapping)and the arrest rate per 100,000 for violent crimes isshown in the table below:TABLE 1Juvenile Arrests for Violent Crimes1983-1992Year Number of Arrests Rate per 100,0001983 12,321 397.71984 11,853 384.31985 12,421 401.41986 12,541 403.71987 12,336 397.31988 13,998 453.81989 17,469 568.51990 20,658 655.51991 21,158 655.41992 21,549 650.1Source; California Department of JusticeThe figures in the table demonstrate that the rate ofviolent crime by juveniles increased throughout thedecade of the 80s, only flattening in the past fewyears -- but flattening at a rate that is far higher thanCalifornians are used to. The experience in California isechoed by national figures: The U.S. Justice Departmentrecently reported that the number of juvenile court casesinvolving serious offenses -- such as murder and14

Backgroundaggravated assault -- rose 68 percent between 1988 and1992.6In addition, the perception, fed by media storiesand individual anecdotes, that juveniles are causing adisproportionate share of crime is borne out by statistics.At slightly more than 10 percent of the State'spopulation, the 10- through 17-year-olds were arrested in1992 for 14.3 percent of all violent crimes and 26.6percent of all property crimes, including:• 50.6 percent of all arson.• 36.6 percent of all motor vehicle thefts.• 31 .2 percent of all burglaries.• 26.2 percent of all robberies.• 19.0 percent of all homicides.• 16.9 percent of all thefts.• 14.0 percent of all forcible rapes. 7Violence, ratherthan numberof crimes, iskey problemWhat can be concluded from all of the statisticsabove is that California suffers not so muchfrom an ever-increasing flood of juvenilescommitting crimes (as indicated by arrests) as from agrowing number of violent juveniles. According to theLegislative Analyst's calculations, since 1987 the rate ofjuvenile arrests for violent offenses has increased 63.7percent compared to a 20.2 percent increase for adults.The increasingly violent nature of juvenile crimes is alsoreflected in California Youth Authority statistics aboutnew admissions to its facilities: While the proportion ofviolent juveniles held steady around 40 percent from 1983through 1989, the proportion of violent new admissionsrose steeply in 1990 to 47.6 percent, in 1991 to 51.3percent, in 1992 to 57.2 percent and in 1993 to 59percent. 8The changing type of juvenile crime is addressedby a system that structurally is largely the same as it waswhen it was created at the turn of the century, althoughits processes have gone through several overhauls. Thesystem is distinctly different from the system that handlesadult offenders. This is true even at the first point ofcontact: The police officer on the beat has discretion tocounsel and release a youth, take him to his parents orschool, informally refer him to a community program,issue him a citation or take him into custody and deliverhim to a probation officer. The juvenile courts require thatofficers use the option that "least restricts" the juvenile'sfreedom while at the same time protecting communitysafety.15

The Juvenile Crime ChallengeIn a vacuum I the officer might make a decisionamong these many discretionary choices based on hisbelief of what would best meet the needs of the child anddivert him from further illegal activity. But in the realworld, the officer's decision is often driven by theknowledge that the system is overloaded and the potentialresult is little more than an admonishment in all but themost serious cases of crime.If the officer cItes or arrests the juvenile: then -­unlike an adult arrest -- the matter is not immediatelyreferred to the district attorney for prosecution (althougha juvenile cannot be detained in custody without ahearing). Instead ljuvenile cases are sent to the county·sprobation department, which has wide discretion l afterperforming an investigation and assessment, to determinewhether to refer the matter to the district attorney or takeother measures, including referral to a communityprogram, informal supervision and release to homesupervision. Over the years, critics have argued that allcitations and arrests should go directly to the districtattorney, but analyses and pilot projects havedemonstrated that typically probation departments dorefer all serious matters to the district attorney, retainingand addressing only the cases that are highly unlikely tobe selected for prosecution if they were referred.Juvenile courtstoday operatemuch like adultcriminal courtsThe next component of the system is the juvenilecourt, where players include the judges, defenseattorneys or public defenders, probation officersand the district attorney. Originally created to be a swift,confidential mechanism for getting youths treatment andservices, the juvenile courts operate today much like adultcriminal courts because of changes in law, court rulingsand public attitudes (as will be examined in Issue 2). Thejuvenile court, however, remains a civil rather thancriminal system. Juveniles are not charged with crimesand prosecuted; petitions are filed seeking court action.Juveniles are not found guilty; the petition is sustained ordismissed. Juveniles are not sentenced as a punishment;their case disposition reflects the court's view of the besttreatment to meet their needs.Juvenile court judges have much wider discretionthan adult criminal court judges in ordering actions. Asthe Commission detailed in its adult criminal justicesystem study, adult court judges set sentences byselecting from various ranges prescribed in law I justifyingtheir decisions based on the facts of the case andlegislatively set priorities. Juvenile judges have no suchrigid guidelines, although they are constrained by16

constitutional considerations (not setting confinement forlonger than maximum adult terms) and Judicial Councilrules. They may decide to place a youth on probation,leaving him in his own home; make the youth a ward ofthe court and impose formal probation (including time injuvenile hall); or order placement in a private foster home,group home, county facility, private program or CaliforniaYouth Authority facility.While the judge has considerable discretion overoptions, he or she does not actually set a commitmenttime if the most serious step of sending a youth to CY Ais taken. That is determined by the California YouthfulOffender Parole Board, which works within the parametersof Board-adopted sentencing guidelines, the maximumadult sentence for similar crimes and the chronological ageat which the juvenile system loses jurisdiction over theindividual (21 or 25, depending on circumstances).At the tail end of the system is the CaliforniaYouth Authority, known as the juvenile placement of lastresort. Like county-run or county-contracted programs,the CY A facilities focus on treatment, education andvocational training rather than pure punishment. The CY Aoperates 11 institutions and provides post-institutionservices through a parole program. The department has5,187 employees and a 1994-95 budget of about $400million.BackgroundJuvenile justicesystem spendingpegged at morethan $1 billionThe CY A funding is the most easily identifiableportion of the total cost of the juvenile justicesystem, along with about $46 million in juvenilecrime prevention grants funneled to local governmentsand organizations by the state Office of Criminal JusticePlanning. County funding (boosted by federal and statesubsidies for court costs, juvenile placements, etc.)covers law enforcement, court, prosecution, publicdefense, probation and a variety of social service costs.In many cases, specific county departments -- such assheriff's and probation -- deal with both juveniles andadults, making a cost breakout solely for juvenileresponsibilities difficult. The Legislative Analyst's Officehas pegged the total cost for adult and juvenile probationservices at $770 million. 9In response to a Little Hoover Commission ~urveyof the 15 largest counties, the 10 counties that suppliedfiscal data showed combined juvenile probation spendingof more than $344 million in 1993-94. This includes LosAngeles County, which spends almost $200 million, ishome to 25 percent of the juvenile arrests statewide and17

The Juvenile Crime Challengeaccounts for close to 40 percent of new commitmentsannually to the CY A.l0 Even the most conservativeestimates of the cost for probation activities in theremaining counties and some proportionate share of lawenforcement and court costs would push the total stateand county juvenile justice system spending above $1billion.The $1 billion is an investment not just in publicsafety through the selective incapacitation of youngcriminals, but also in the concept of rehabilitation forjuveniles to divert them from a future life of crime. Howthe investment is structured and whether the outcomejustifies the structure is examined in the followingchapters.18

TheState's Role• Crime is local in nature andimpact; the State's mostimportant role is to provideleadership.• The goals of the separate juvenilejustice system are not clear.• Funding cutbacks have all buteliminated the preventive, earlyinterventionprograms that holdthe most promise for haltingcrime.Recommendations:• Consolidate state efforts ina single, accountableagency.• Vigorously enforce existingalcohol and gun laws.• Make early intervention andprevention a top priority.

The Juvenile Crime Challenge20

The State's RoleThe State's RoleFighting crime is not within the purview of any singleprogram or anyone level of government. As arecent report entitled "Confronting Violence inCalifornia" concluded:The prevention of violence and crime can never be effectively built upon only one strategybecause violence is the product of many factors. A comprehensive approach is needed thataddresses prevention, intervention and detention. 11Such a comprehensive approach to crime will crossturf and jurisdictional lines, pay little attention toartificial budgetary barriers and shift the focus from"it's not our responsibility" and "who will pay for it?" to"what will work?" and "how can we get it done?" Thereare signs that many communities already are moving inthat direction, creating coalitions, providing specializedservices and targeting localized factors that contribute tocrime. But results are erratic and success is sometimesdifficult to replicate.Any credible examination of the juvenile justicesystem must acknowledge the multi-level and multidisciplinarynature of the system, of the causes of juvenilecrime and of potential solutions. The mandate of theLittle Hoover Commission, however, is to examine stateprograms, policies and procedures and makerecommendations to improve their effectiveness andefficiency. The Commission's approach, therefore, wasto scrutinize the juvenile justice system, discern its flaws21

The Juvenile Crime Challengeand then look for the appropriate state role in addressingthose concerns.The result is this chapter, which in three issueareas addresses the need for the State to providecoordinated leadership, the fraying consensus for aseparate juvenile justice system and the consequences ofbudget priorities that have shifted spending away fromprevention and towards detention.22

The State IS RoleIssue 1: While crime is local in nature and impact, theState must provide meaningful leadership inshaping juvenile anti-violence and crimeprevention efforts.While the many components that feed a risingviolent juvenile crime rate are beyond thecontrol of state government, there arefunctions the State can perform to empower localcommunities and governments to mount aggressive anticrimecampaigns. In addition, there are steps the Statecan take to encourage a societal shift in attitudes aboutviolence and its pervasive use to settle conflicts. While inthe past some state programs focused on preventionactivities, today there is no effective centralized point ofauthority and accountability for anti-crime efforts -­despite the existence of several bodies purportedlydedicated to that purpose.Juvenile crimeis attributedto many family,societal failingsThe natural question to ask in pursuit of reducingjuvenile crime is "What is causing it?"Unfortunately, the answer is not simple. Commonsense, stereotypical conclusions and gut instinct canproduce a laundry list of causes that seem realistic:Families are breaking up and there are too many singleparents struggling to cope with demanding jobs andraising children; inner cities are blighted and the lack ofjobs and overt discrimination there create a sense ofhopelessness; no one is teaching children solid societalvalues and self-discipline; instant gratification has becomethe driving force for children because of poor parenting,too much television and rife consumerism.The list, however, ignores the fact that plenty ofchildren in single-parent homes grow up crime free; manychildren emerge from the inner cities to lead productivelives; some juveniles become criminals regardless of theirenriched upbringing, bright futures and high expectations;and despite the perceived shortcomings of modernparenting, more than 3 million Californian youths eachyear become adults without ever entering the juvenilejustice system.The generalizations, however, are on the righttrack, according to experts who have closely studiedjuvenile delinquents. Poor parenting practices and a lack23

The Juvenile Crime Challengeof parents taking responsibility for their offspring are atthe root of juvenile delinquency. Schools, where problemswith individual children first become apparent to othersthan family and friends, have no systematic, pro-activeway of addressing troubled youths. The result of inactionby parents and schools is disorder: children withoutboundaries in an environment where rules aremeaningless. Once parents and schools have failed,society reaps the bitter harvest of crime.Academic expertsfocus on familysetting, earlyschool experienceThese generalizations, however, are not specificenough to be useful in targeting at-risk children andfashioning meaningful solutions. A sampling ofconclusions from experts follows:Hill M. Walker, associate dean and professor at theCenter on Human Development at the University ofOregon, has found that initial family conditions are themajor factors that turn juveniles toward anti-socialactivities and, eventually, crime. In family settings thatare full of abuse, poor behavior modeling and deviantparenting lithe children learn how to be coercive andaversive to succeed in the family. They bring this patternto school and it works, but it causes rejection. Their bestfriends are other anti-social kids," says Walker. The resultis a peer group of social deviants who share similar antisocialvalues, activities and thought processes.Walker, who has been conducting an on-goingstudy of 40 troubled juveniles and 40 control groupyouths since 1 984, says that it is possible to predict with80 percent accuracy by the third grade those who will goon to commit crimes based on a five-minute teacher ratingof social skills, two 20-minute observations of negativeand aggressive behavior on the playground involving peersand the number of discipline contacts with the principal'soffice. But it is parenting practices that are the surestpredictor of trouble in the future, he says. Five elementsof parenting can be positive or negative influences:• Discipline -- fair and consistent or harsh andpunitive.• Monitoring watchful awareness of the child'sactions or blithe disregard.• Reinforcement positive recognition forachievements or constant negative attention foracting out.24

The State's Role• Involvement participation in activities with thechild or isolation of adult from child.• Problem-solving -- productive mechanisms forresolving issues or negative modeling of violenceand conflict.12Harvard professors Stephen Buka and Felton Earlswrite that the single strongest individual predictor ofviolence is anti-social behavior -- such as lying, stealing,aggression and dishonesty -- during late childhood andearly adolescence. Echoing Walker's assessment ofparenting practices that make a difference, the Harvardexperts found delinquency and violence linked to lack ofparental supervision, parental rejection, lack of parentalinvolvement and poor disciplinary practices. Other familyfactors that are linked to a child's delinquency are criminalbehavior by family members, child abuse or neglect, poormarital relations, parental absence and large family size.Beyond anti-social behavior, the characteristics of thechildren themselves that are linked to delinquency includelow lOs, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, learningdisabilities, poor motor-skill development, prenatal andperinatal complications, minor physical anomalies andhead injury.' 3Northeastern University professor George L. Kellingand cultural anthropoligist Catherine M. Coles cite disorder-- the elementary defiance of rules and conventionswithout incurring consequences -- as a key ingredient thatleads to crime. Quoting Wesley Skogan's Disorder andDecline, Kelling and Coles find that there is a broadconsensus on what constitutes disorderly behavior; thatdisorder is a precursor to serious crime; and that disorderfurther enables urban decay. They argue that when theNew York subway system was allowed to enforceanti-panhandling laws -- thus eliminating "disorder" -­subway robberies were cut by 52 percent and all felonieson the system by 46 percent in four years. Applying theirreasoning to the juvenile justice field highlights the needfor children to be raised with structure in their lives andrespect for authority. 14The American Psychological Association'sCommission on Violence and Youth developed lists ofdevelopmental predictors of future violent lifestyles andsocietal factors that contribute to violence.• Developmental:• Criminal history of parent.25

The State's RoleTheLittle Hoover Commission's advisory groupidentified five factors that cause, contribute to orenable violence by juveniles, including:• The glamorization of violence by media and theacceptance of violence by society.• Substance abuse, particularly alcohol.• The availability of guns.• Domestic violence, affecting both children whoobserve it in their homes and neighborhoods andchildren who are the target of it.• Gangs and their attraction for those who can findacceptance and belonging nowhere else.The Senate Office of Research says the cost ofviolence in California, including medical care and lost jobproductivity I totals $72 billion a year. Factorscontributing to violence that were identified by the officeinclude:Biological factorsEarly childhood experiencesDysfunctional familiesCultural diversityEconomic inequityLow self-esteemSubstance abuseIncarcerationEasy access to weaponsLack of opportunitiesMedia influences 18•The Commission on the Future of the CaliforniaCourts, writing in its final report about juvenile justicesaid:Today's family dysfunction is a harbinger of tomorrow's court dockets. Absent a concertedeffort to mend the social fabric, the consequences of family disintegration will continue to bea burden to the courts, the public schools and society itself ... .[JJuvenile delinquency is closelyassociated with unsatisfactory family relationships, education, neighborhoods, peer groups,socioeconomic status,. and lack of verbal and problem-solving skills. 19TheU.S. Department of Justice identifies fiveca.tegories of causes and correlates of juvenilecrime:27

The Juvenile Crime Challenge• Individual characteristics, including alienation,rebellion and lack of bonding with society.• Family influences, such as parental conflict, childabuse and a family history of problem behaviorincluding drug use and crime.• School experiences, including early failure and lackof commitment to attending.• Peer group influences, such as gangs and friendswho engage in anti-social behavior.• Neighborhood and community factors, includingeconomic deprivation, high rates of substanceabuse and crime, and low neighborhoodattachment. 2oThe Children's Advocacy Institute addressedjuvenile delinquency in its California Children's Budget1994-95, concluding that the problem is driven by a mixof factors including the breakdown of families, adegeneration of values and civility, cultural preoccupationwith physical conflict, poverty, gangs and peer pressure,and drug abuse.The Violence Research Foundation looks to dietand body chemistry as a major cause of violence. TheFoundation believes that its research demonstrates thatviolent offenders display substandard levels of essentialnutrients and high levels of substances such as zinc,cadmium, manganese and lead.The California Youth Authority identifies poorfamily attachment and poor parenting behavior, a historyof child abuse and maltreatment, and low commitment toschool as the primary correlates of delinquent behavior.Biological factors that contribute to crime include acutepsychotic states, brain injury, tumors, infections ordegenerative diseases, chronic neurotoxic brain conditions(including substance abuse) and birth defects (includingfetal alcohol syndrome). The CYA says recent studiesindicate that delinquency occurs in an orderly fashion overtime, with three major pathways:• One begins with stubborn behavior, progressing todefiance and culminating in authority avoidance.• Another begins with minor anti-social behaviorsuch as lying or shoplifting, moving to property28

The State IS Roledamage before evolving into more serious forms oftheft.• The third begins with minor aggression, progressesto physical fighting and then moves to moreviolent acts.21Root causes:cyclical familyproblems, lackof community effortThe lists by these expert sources share in commona litany of failure by families and other institutionsthat have historically established social values andset standards of behavior. The reasons are many.Parenting is a learned skill, traditionally passed on throughmodeling! observation and experience. In a mobile societywhere families are often isolated from older generations!poor parenting practices and abusive situations becomecyclical problems! passing from one generation to thenext. Schools, another traditional source of societalstability, have sidestepped teaching right from wrong andthe Golden Rule! providing little in the way of a moralcompass for their students. Churches and organizedreligion are not part of the daily lives of many people.And litigation and large jury verdicts have made itprohibitively expensive for many community organizationsto offer the types of services and programs they did in thepast.In a paper prepared for a family policy seminar,officials observed:What once were primarily family functions -- teaching children, growing food, making clothing,building housing, instilling moral values in the young, caring for elders -- have been graduallyreallocated to schools, businesses, churches and other formal institutions. Ironically, many ofthese same formal institutions now lament that their workers, students and parishioners aredeficient in motivation, discipline, cooperativeness and other traits because of the decline offamilies. 22In addition to the failure of the family structure andsocial institutions! the experts cited above and otherstend to focus on three major factors that they believedrive crime and violence: the easy availability of guns! thestrong link between alcohol abuse and violence, and thedesensitizing influence of the glamorous portrayal ofviolence in a wide array of media.Guns: The growing use of guns has increased thelikelihood that crime will be violent and deadly. The U.S.Justice Department has reported that in 1 992 the use ofguns in crime soared dramatically over averages for theprevious five years. Handgun homicides increased 24percent over the five-year average and the use of guns incrimes increased almost 50 percent. 2329

The Juvenile Crime ChallengeOther research indicates that, despite laws againstownership by minors, guns are often in the hands ofjuveniles. A National Institute of Justice survey of 835incarcerated juveniles and 758 male students in 10 innercityhigh schools found that 83 percent of the inmatesand 22 percent of the students possess guns. Fifty-fivepercent of the inmates said they carried guns all or mostof the time before being incarcerated and 1 2 percent ofthe students did so. Two-thirds of the students said itwould be easy to acquire a gun. The main reason citedfor carrying guns was self-protection. 24The National Council on Crime and Delinquency hasstated that its analysis of juvenile crime trends shows thatthe single most important factor is the increasingavailability of guns. 25 The Pacific Center for ViolencePrevention, noting that guns accelerate the severity of anyincident they are used in, found that youths use guns in59 percent of the homicides they commit and 32 percentof the suicides. In 1992, more Californians died from gunshotwounds than from car crashes, about a third of themyoung people. The Center's 1990 estimate of the cost offirearm injuries and deaths put California's share at about$2.5 billion.26State has aggressiveanti-gun laws;rigorous enforcementis neededCalifornia has been comparatively aggressive aboutlimiting juvenile access to guns through statutes.State law forbids the sale of handguns to thoseunder 21. While the law enforcement response to crimesthat are committed with guns comes from local police andsheriff departments, oversight of laws that limit access toguns falls under the jurisdiction of the state Departmentof Justice.The Department's responsibilities have increasedgreatly, according to a manager with the Department'sFirearms Program, with the passage of laws on certifyingfirearms dealers, tear gas and pepper spray owners,assault rifle owners and those who have completedfirearms safety courses. While the program's staff hasgrown, lack of resources has hindered the immediateimplementation of all the audit and processing functionsneeded to rigorously enforce laws that restrict gunaccess, the manager says. For instance, while theDepartment has had the authority for some time toinvestigate firearms dealers, there have been insufficientresources to do so routinely and on a regular basis. Themanager said by shifting priorities the Department nowexpects to institute an on-going inspection effort withinthe next six months that focuses on who firearms dealers30

The State IS Roleare selling guns to and how they are documenting requiredinformation. 27While improving enforcement of existing laws istouted by many as a major step toward decreasing accessto guns, others believe it is just a beginning. Aninstructor at the Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene andPublic Health summed up the gun factor:The recent epidemic in youth homicide is almost entirely an epidemic of gun violence.Significant reductions in the most lethal forms of youth violence cannot be expected to occurif the availability of guns to youth is not curtailed. This requires greater restrictions onhandgun sales; more controls on those licensed to sell guns; more intensive efforts to combatillegal gun trafficking by law enforcement with the cooperation of communities; and parentsremoving guns from the home. 28Alcohol: Just as guns accelerate the violence ofcrimes, alcohol is often directly linked to violentcriminal behavior, studies have found. Althoughother drugs are often the focus of public policy and lawenforcement efforts, their use tends to be linked toproperty crimes (such as burglaries to gain money to buydrugs) r according to the Pacific Center for ViolencePrevention, while alcohol use has a strong link to violentcrime. A U.S. Department of Justice study showed that54 percent of people in state prisons on convictions ofviolent crimes had used alcohol just before the offense.A variety of studies have linked alcohol use to 50 to 66percent of all homicides, 20 to 36 percent of all suicidesand 37 percent of trauma cases. 29Also similar to guns, alcohol is not merely an adultproblem despite age restrictions on its use. A nationalsurvey of students showed that 14 percent of eighthgraders r 23 percent of 10th graders and 28 percent of12th graders had consumed five or more drinks in a rowon at least one occasion in the past year. It is estimatedthat 10 percent of youths convicted of homicide usedalcohol at the time of the offense r 31 percent convictedof robbery, 25 percent convicted of assault and 9 percentconvicted of sexual assault. 30Lack of resourcesstymies toughoversight of alcoholsales to minorsWhile crimes involving alcohol are handled by locallaw enforcement agencies, the primaryregulatory body that oversees the sale of liquoris the state Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control(ABC). The chief deputy director says that while thedepartment pursues a balance of prevention andenforcement activities, it has always believed a morerigorous enforcement effort would provide a greaterdeterrence and keep alcohol out of the hands of minors.31

The Juvenile Crime ChallengeSuch an effort is difficult in an era when the ratio ofinspectors to licensees has dropped to one to 500 outlets.Twenty years ago, the department had 209 investigatorsto cover 51,565 licensed outlets. By 1993-94, thenumber had dropped to 142 covering 72,064. 31The ABC chief deputy director says that repeatedacademic studies have reached the same conclusion thatthe department has: that lack of resources is the primarystumbling block to more aggressive enforcement. TheState could also provide more effective leadership for locallaw enforcement efforts if there were more resourcesearmarked to battle illegal alcohol consumption, the ABCofficial says. He notes that a "use it, lose it" law that tiesjuvenile alcohol possession and consumption to the abilityto have a driver's license has not been very effectivebecause courts do not uniformly apply the sanction andthe Department of Motor Vehicles often is not notified ofthe violation so they can block licensing. In addition,decoy programs that would detect unlawful sales ofalcohol to minors are often not a priority for local lawenforcement, a situation that could improve with betterstate support. 32Media violencecontributes toproblem whenpropensity existsGlamorization of violence: A contentious issuethat draws less wholehearted agreement than gun andalcohol use by juveniles is the depiction in a wide varietyof media of violence as glamorous and exciting. Dr.Carole Lieberman, a nationally active critic of the media,believes that studies document that media violence is thenumber one cause of crime and acting out by juveniles.Calling media violence a drug and an addiction, she saidthat the psychological and biological reactions to viewingviolence show that a person 1 s tolerance builds up and thatthe result is the creation of more and more violentgenerations. 33Others, however, including Dr. Ed Donnerstein ofthe American Psychological Association I sCommission on Violence and Youth, see theconstant barrage of violence in the media as adding to apredisposition toward violence rather than causing it. 34Study after study has shown that youths convicted ofviolent crimes often have had a steady diet of violenttelevision, movies and video games -- but many childrenpartaking of this same diet do not commit crimes. Expertsbelieve a critical difference is the context within whichchildren are exposed to media violence. Those with solidfamily lives and healthy perspectives on the future basedon their experiences in the present seem to be littleinfluenced by viewing violence.32

The State '5 RoleMultiple causesmakes preventiona ' kid-by-kid'undenaldngThe factors driving juvenile crime are many, asindicated by all of the elements identified byexperts above, and for any single child whobecomes delinquent the specific combination of familybreakdown, school experience or negative societalinfluences may be quite different. Paraphrasing one stateofficial, prevention is a kid by kid thing. Fixing any singleaspect of the factors driving crime -- even if possible -­holds little promise of success. But providing a lifecontext where the resiliency of children will bestrengthened rather than battered has become the goal ofmany who are involved with juveniles. 35The U.S. Department of Justice says thatcommunity mobilization can be an effective weapon incombatting gangs and lowering delinquency rates:{I]nnovative and committed individuals, groups and community organizations [working}together can improve the quality of life in their communities and, if necessary, reclaim thecommunities from gangs and other criminal elements. Such groups include youth developmentorganizations, churches, tenant organizations and civic groups. 36The Department quotes a Carnegie Council studythat concluded that community-based youthprograms can provide the critical communitysupport necessary, in conjunction with family- and schoolfocusedefforts, to prevent delinquency. "The Councilfound that many adolescents are adrift during non-schoolhours and can be actively involved in community-basedprograms that provide opportunities to develop a sense ofimportance, well-being, belonging and active communitypartIcIpation. Through such programs, risks can betransformed into opportunities."In that mold, many communities and organizationsin California have begun to find creative ways to reachtroubled youth who are not learning solid values orachieving a sense of belonging and responsibilityelsewhere. The City of Sacramento and others, forinstance, are using school facilities late at night to attractteenagers with time on their hands for shared activities.The National Clearinghouse for Alcohol and DrugInformation lists no fewer than two dozen communityprograms in California working with juveniles andsubstance abuse problems. 37 The California Park andRecreation Society's Youth-at-Risk Task Force publishesa resource manual of more than 125 community programsfocusing on youth at risk and urges all park and recreationprograms to aggressively collaborate with other agenciesto provide services to and positive experiences forchildren. 38 33

The Juvenile Crime ChallengeIn addition, the League of California Cities issponsoring an "Investing in Our Youth Task Force" tofocus on crime prevention strategies for juveniles and tostockpile examples of city ordinances, programs,collaborations and other mechanisms that work as ainspiring reference source for all cities. Many localgovernment and community programs target gangs,including Los Angeles' Gang Alternative and PreventionProgram, Hayward's Community Access Team, SanDiego's Triple Crown program and Los Angeles' GangResistance Education and Training. In many locations,schools, district attorneys and city police are focusing ontruancy and cracking down on curfew violations as waysof reducing the opportunity for crime.Solutions are being tackled by foundations andcharitable organizations as well. The California WellnessFoundation has a five-year, $30 million program to raisethe visibility of violence and treat it as a public healthissue. Guns, alcohol and the lack of prevention programsare the Foundation's chief focus. The Legal CommunityAgainst Violence Fund is gathering resources to supportlegislation to curb the use of assault weapons. TheCarnegie Corporation has spent $1.5 million on violenceprevention since 1990, including $675,000 on a projectto modify media portrayals of violence. As reported byThe Chronicle of Philanthropy:Says David M. Nee, executive director of the Graustein Memorial Fund in New Haven, Conn.,"I think we are seeing the beginning of a national mobilization of grant makers againstviolence. Everybody is in a . mad as hell, can't stand it anymore' state. II Grant makers havebeen using a wide range of strategies ....[F}oundations are beginning to award sizable amountsof money to control guns and gangs, to conduct public opinion polls and public educationcampaigns, to make schools safe and train student mediators, to support community policingand ease racial tensions, and to prevent violence against children, women, the elderly andhomosexuals. 39Scattered effortsallow tailoring forlocal conditionsbut leave gapsThe advantage of the scattered efforts that arebubbling up in various communities is that theyoffer the multi-disciplinary, multiple strategyapproach that is widely acknowledged as necessary toaddress the many roots of crime. The disadvantage,however, is that there are huge gaps in services, withprograms reaching youths on only a hit-or-miss baSisdepending on where they happen to live and the energyexpended by local organizations and volunteers.A traditional role of state government has been toensure statewide standardization of programming so thatthose at one end of the State can find the same servicesto meet needs as those at the other end. Even those who34

The State /s Roleare frustrated by the uneven nature of communityprograms, however, are not suggesting that the Stateshould target juvenile crime by mandating a specific arrayof services and programs. Top-down enforcement ofsolutions that would meet the diversity of needsthroughout the State strike many as a concept that isimpossible, too authoritarian and destined to fail.Writing about the delicacy required to use the cloutof state government to empower families andcommunities, experts at Pennsylvania State Universityurged that states strive for policies that are familycentered,preventive and "decategorized," meaning thatregulations, eligibility criteria and other rules should bemore flexible to allow combined funding streams andservices. Among the principles outlined at a PennsylvaniaFamily Policy Seminar was that the "first presumption ofpolicies and programs should be to support andsupplement family functioning, rather than substituting forfamily functioning. "40Testifying to the Little Hoover Commission aboutthe proper state role, the California Youth Authority saidthat while history shows that the juvenile justice systemhas been a shared state-local responsibility, preventionactivities have been primarily local activities:The state role is limited to advising, evaluating, coordinating and providing technical assistanceand information. Indeed, the juvenile justice system in its entirety is somewhat limited in itsability to fundamentally alter the causes and correlates of juvenile crime. Rather, the YouthAuthority believes that the most effective approaches to prevention of youth crime anddelinquency are those which address the fundamental transfers of societal values to ouryoung. The values of personal self-worth, sense of community and responsibility are mostfrequently transmitted by families, by schools, by religious communities and by the society asa whole. When these instruments of society, these conduits of values communication, ceaseto function effectively, we find ourselves forced to develop corrective -- not preventivestrategies to issues such as juvenile crime. 41Several statebodie s sharerole of fightingjuvenile crimeAs the most visible state component of the juvenilejustice system, the California Youth Authority hasa statutory obligation to promote preventionactivities. But the CY A is not alone in being entrustedwith this mission at the state level. A brief description ofmandates and programmatic efforts follows:• The Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 chargedthe California Youth Authority with theresponsibility of "assisting the development,establishment and operation of comprehensivepublic and private community-based programs forcrime and delinquency prevention ... [including35

The Juvenile Crime Challengeexercising] leadership on behalf of the State .... AIIstate agencies shall cooperate with theDepartment of the Youth Authority to bring abouta statewide program for the reduction andprevention of crime and delinquency. 1142 WhileCY A provided delinquency prevention training andtechnical assistance to local governments bothbefore and after the act was adopted, budget cutsand the realignment of state funds into blockgrants to counties for these and other purposes inthe past three years sharply reduced the CYA'sinvolvement in prevention activities, CY Acontinues low-budget-impact efforts, such ashaving wards speak to schoolchildren and teachingwards good parenting skills.• The State's central planning mechanism fordelinquency prevention, however, is not the eYAbut the Office of Criminal Justice Planning (OCJP)acting with the advice and approval of theCalifornia Council on Criminal Justice. State lawprovides for a 37-member council to annuallyreview and approve "the comprehensive state planfor the improvement of criminal justice anddelinquency prevention activities throughout theState." As staff to the council, the Office ofCriminal Justice Planning is directed to prepare theplan, to tldefine, develop and correlate programsand projects for the state criminal justiceagencies," and to "cooperate with and rendertechnical assistance to the Legislature, stateagencies, units of general local government,combinations of such units, or other public orprivate agencies J organizations or institutions inmatters relating to criminal justice and delinquencyprevention." Currently, OCJP's primary activity inthe juvenile crime arena is to funnel federal andstate grants to programs that target or includeyouths, an amount totaling about $46 million ayear. (The Commission notes that how this moneyis spent and the effectiveness of the underwrittenprograms, while beyond the scope of theCommission I s current efforts, may be deserving ofattention in a future study. OCJP oversees$120.2 million in funding for a broad range ofprograms, with $55.3 million coming from thefederal government.)43• The Department of Justice, under the AttorneyGeneral, also claims a share of crime preventionactivities. It recently created a task force on36

The State's Roleviolence. The Department's Crime PreventionOffice offers community cadre training, amongother programs, and in conjunction with theDepartment of Education has developed a programcalled School/Community Violence Prevention:Focus on Gangs. In addition, the attorney generalhas urged video game businesses to restrictviolence and label their products for betterconsumer information.• The Department of Education, in addition to theanti-gang program, is home to the $20 millionHealthy Start plan, which provides earlyintervention services for at-risk children.• The Governor's 25-member State Advisory Groupon Juvenile Delinquency Prevention developspolicy and priorities for funding, with OCJPproviding staffing.• The State Commission on Juvenile Justicer Crimeand Delinquency Prevention r with 16 members,inspects CY A facilities, provides advice to CY Aabout delinquency prevention funding and acts asa liaison between the CYA and the public.According to its chairman, "Many other entities areresponsible for providing mandated services to theYouth Authority, including those related to buildingsafety and health codes. This Commission is thesole mandated body representing the publicinterest on statewide juvenile justice matters. 1144• The Governor recently created the CaliforniaCommission on Improving Life Through Service to"unite individuals in service to their communities,promote responsible citizenship and achievedemonstrable results in addressing California'spersistent unmet human, educational, public safetyand environmental needs. II The Executive Ordercreating the commission set reducing juvenilecrime as the number one priority for thecommission's efforts., Comprehensive stateplan' driven byfunding streamsrather than needsThe list above makes it impossible to accuse theState of ignoring juvenile crime and the need forprevention activities. But observers of the juvenilejustice system have criticized the many state componentsas too scattered to be effective. For instance, OCJP'sII comprehensive state plan n is not compiled in onedocument but instead is fragmented into several pieces37

The Juvenile Crime Challengethat can be found in applications for federal block grantfunds: the Children's Justice Act grant, the JuvenileJustice and Delinquency Prevention grant and theAnti-Drug Abuse Statewide Strategy Drug Control andSystem improvement grant. Regardless of the value ofeach individual plan, they apparently are driven, not by acomprehensive review of California's crime problem andan assessment of the best strategies to address thatproblem, but by the existence ot specific categories offederal funding.In addressing the issue of effective stateleadership, the Legislative Analyst's Office told the LittleHoover Commission that both the CY A and OCJP produceresearch and results from pilot projects that are neverused because there is no mechanism to transmit theinformation to local communities and governments. Whatis needed, the analyst argued, is a central point ofleadership, not as a directory body but as an advisory onethat could facilitate an exchange of useful information. 45Expertise isneither poolednor shared,hampering effortsThe Commission also heard from a communityactivist who wanted to focus on juvenile crime andwho reported making between 40 and 50 phonecalls trying to find information about programs that work.A county official said a successful program in his areagrew out of a televised report from another state ratherthan from any sharing of successful efforts by otherCalifornia communities. And a state official with OCJPacknowledged that it would be difficult for communitygroups or lay people not familiar with the juvenile justicesystem to access the State's expertise since there is nosingle point of accountability. The California YouthAuthority also recognizes the problem, not just with stateentities but also with the quality of information availableto work with:Most crime and delinquency prevention efforts are piecemeal with no clear definition or scopeof understanding of the problem they target. Little information is available that allows peoplewho want to tackle problems to see where the problems are and how best to deal with them.For example, the California Department of Justice stopped collecting juvenile probation referraland disposition data in 1989. Also, schools are no longer able to collect and forward thenecessary type and quality of data that would contribute to delinquency prevention planning.In addition, information is lacking about current programs that show promise for replication inother areas. Adequate programming can't succeed without planning. Adequate planning restson information that describes the scope of the problem. 46The general consensus, then, is that while the Stateis doing many things about juvenile crimeprevention, the efforts are neither well coordinated,accessible or effective. Critics of the present structure38

The State's Rolebelieve the State's role in crime prevention could beenhanced in three areas:• The creation of a single, powerful state body thatcan provide the leadership and accountabilityneeded to effectively combat crime. This wouldinclude the development of a multipurposeclearinghouse to gather information anddisseminate examples of best practices. Whetherlocal government officials are trying to discern howtheir experience compares with statewidestatistical trends or citizens are interested instarting grass-roots anti-crime efforts, thoselooking for information and assistance should beable to look to a single state entity. In addition,such an institutionalized source of research shouldprovide policy makers with solid information aboutcause and effect, impact and results.• The adoption of strong anti-violence primaryeducation strategies. While local communities willbe most effective in creating suitable programs tomeet specific needs, crime prevention can also beassisted by general education that strengthenscommon societal values. The State's role caninclude:• Promoting effective school-based curriculathat give children guidance for living intoday's world. Because schools alreadyhave multiple mandates for teachingspecific programs, a more effectiveapproach, experts believe, would be toprovide schools with information aboutprograms that encourage non-violentconflict resolution, responsible decisionmakingand awareness of consequences.While some analyses have reported thatsuch programs are successful in givingyouths good coping skills,47 other rigorousexaminations indicate that many of theprograms are not well-designed for targetedage groups, do not begin early enough andmay have little long-lasting effect. 48• Public informational campaigns thatheighten general awareness of societalproblems and that urge specific individualresponsibility and action. An example isthe State's anti-smoking campaign thatused increased cigarette taxes to fund39

The Juvenile Crime Challengeadvertising to focus on the link betweensmoking and death. The campaign resultedin a 28 percent decline in smoking over fiveyears, a rate three times greater than thenational decline. 49 Similar advertisingcampaigns against drug use and domesticviolence have also been used to heightenpublic awareness and shift societalattitudes from indifference and/orimpotence to knowledgeable intoleranceand disdain.• A renewed emphasis on enforcing eXisting lawsthat have the potential of reducing violence, suchas those relating to guns and alcohol. Californiahad tough anti-assault gun laws and waitingperiods for handgun purchases before federallegislation was created -- and it is beyond thescope of this report to assess whether further lawsare needed. But existing laws that should keepguns and alcohol out of the hands of minorsrequire vigorous enforcement if they are to beeffective.State IS pivotalrole: inspirationalleader andprogram facilitatorWhile the State can correctly take the stance thatjuvenile crime prevention is a job mosteffectively tackled locally, the State has apivotal role to playas a leader and facilitator ofcommunity inspiration and action. Despite this, no singlestate entity is taking the lead in promoting preventionstrategies in a way that is accessible to communitieshungry for such help. The result is that manycommunities remain locked in hopelessness or waste timeand resources reinventing the wheel to form programsthat will work.40

The State's RoleRecommendation 1:The Governor and the Legislature shouldconsolidate juvenile anti-crime efforts in asingle agency to provide strong leadership andaccountability for results.While the State has several bodies that aremandated to focus on a statewide approach tojuvenile crime prevention, there is littlecoordination and many of the most important duties thatcould be performed by the State are not. While beingcareful to avoid placing another layer of bureaucracy ontop of existing state programs, the Governor and theLegislature should create a consolidated body at thehighest level of state government that can better focusexisting juvenile anti-crime efforts and expand intoproductive areas, including providing information andidentifying successful strategies that can and should beemulated by communities. The specific mandated dutiesshould include:• Leadership to highlight issues and concerns for thepublic, to set standards for local anti-crimeactivities, and to propose and promote legislationto further delinquency prevention.• A clearinghouse function that would providecentralized assessment and evaluation ofprograms, promotion of models that work, andtechnical assistance for local governments andcommunities.• A data gathering and assessment function thatwould provide reliable statistics on a statewidebasis about trends in crime, results of programsand funds expended. The current lack of data oncosts across jurisdictional levels, case outcomesand comprehensive recidivism tracking makes itdifficult to make informed and rational policydecisions.• Standardization of training for those connectedwith juvenile justice, including judges, districtattorneys, probation officers, parole officials andpublic defenders.• The identification of and dissemination ofinformation about available sources of federal,41

The Juvenile Crime Challengestate and private funding. When appropriate, thepoint of control for funding flow to local agenciesand communities and the central point foraccountability for the successful use of funding.• Targeted information campaigns to bring aboutbehavioral changes, on the part of both individualsat risk and businesses that unwittingly glorifyviolence and crime.Recommendation 2:The Governor and the Legislature shouldadopt legislation directing the Board ofEducation in conjunction with the Departmentof Education to evaluate and promote the useof effective and conflict resolution curricula inpublic schools.Many public and private schools alreadyincorporate programs in their curricula that dealwith conflict resolution, personal responsibilityand decision-making processes because of the potentialfor reducing misbehavior, violence and crime at schools.But little credible information is available about programsthat are effective and criteria that could be used to selectappropriate programs based on a school's population andneeds. As noted earlier, schools already face manymandates that restrict their flexibility in providing studentswith daily lessons. Providing an outcome-basedassessment of various programs would give schools theoption of including conflict resolution materials in theircurricula that would be suited to their specific needs.Recommendation 3:Law enforcement officials at all levels ofgovernment shoulil increase their emphasis onenforcing existing laws regarding firearms andalcohol.Continuing fiscal crises at all levels of governmentmake it impossible to fully fund all programs atdesirable levels. But because of the huge longrangecost of juvenile crime and the clear links betweenguns, alcohol and juvenile violence, policy makers shouldplace a priority on enforcing existing laws that keep guns42

The State's Roleout of the hands of juveniles and eXisting laws thatprohibit alcoholic consumption by juveniles.43

The Juvenile Crime Challenge44

The State's RoleIssue 2: As the nature of juvenile crime has changed,public support for a separate juvenile justicesystem has eroded and goals for the systemhave become unclear.While the juvenile justice system was establishedwith the underlying concept that most childrencan be salvaged and turned from a life of crimeand thus should be handled differently than adultcriminals, there is steady pressure to blur the distinctionbetween juvenile and adult court. Some of the pressurehas come from court decisions that have broughtincreasing due-process protection to juveniles. Otherpressure comes from the public, where the reality ofincreasingly violent crime perpetrated by juveniles hascreated a groundswell for treating children as adults. Stillother pressure comes from those who work within thejuvenile justice system and see that it has lost its abilityto clearly link consequences to actions. Since the systeminvolves the discretionary action of many of the partiesinvolved (police officers, probation officers, judges anddistrict attorneys), an overarching policy statement thatresolves conflicting pressures and philosophies is criticalto achieving consistency and equity.California, like the rest of the nation, has gonethrough a variety of phases in dealing with juveniles whohave committed crimes. During much of the 1800s,juveniles were mixed in with adults, both in judicialproceedings and confinement facilities. The turn of thecentury brought the separation of juveniles into specialfacilities and special courts, but juvenile justice waslargely a county-by-county system that lacked integrationand consistency. In 1883, California adopted its firstjuvenile probation law and in 1903 the State's juvenilecourts were established. In 1941, the California YouthAuthority was created, representing a sharp move towardintegrated programs, punishments and approaches drivenfrom the state level of government and serving as a modelfor the nation as rehabilitation became the primary goal ofdealing with juvenile delinquents. soThe juvenile justice system is rooted in themedieval English doctrine of parens patriae, the conceptthat the state should step into the role of parent whenevera child's welfare is threatened. RAND's Greenwood45

The Juvenile Crime Challengedescribes the three premises underlying the juvenile courtas follows:1 . Supervision is essential during childhood, which isa time of dependency and risk.2. The family is of primary importance in thesupervision and training of children, but the stateshould intervene whenever the family setting failsto meet the child's needs.3. When a child is at risk, the state is the appropriateauthority for determining the child I s bestinterests. 51The separate juvenile justice system, then, has atits base the presumption that troubled youths can besalvaged if the State takes appropriate action. It is asystem set apart from the adult criminal justice systemwith the specific expectation that a juvenile will beassessed to determine his problems, that services will beprovided that address those needs and that, at somepoint, the juvenile will be rehabilitated to the point that hewill not commit further crimes. The separate system hadbroad acceptance when the most frequent crimescommitted by juveniles were joy-riding, shoplifting andtruancy.Protection of public safety and punishment are alsostated goals of today's juvenile justice system -- but ifthey were the only goals, then there would be no need todifferentiate between juveniles and adults or to have aseparate legal system. While the maturity of teenagersand the sophistication of the crimes they commit may bevastly different now than they were 50 years ago, thesystem remains designed to treat juveniles as individualswho are still capable of changing their behavior, theirthinking and their lives if the correct outside influence isprovided.Court rulingshave pushedjuvenile systemcloser to adultWhile the design is largely unchanged, the systemhas not remained static over the years. A basiccharacteristic of the original juvenile courtsystem was an informality in procedures and decorum. 52The concept was that courts would have wide latitudeand great discretion to assess the juvenile's behavior anddetermine the appropriate responsive action swiftly andbehind closed doors to maximize the potential for asuccessful rehabilitation. The key players were the judge,the juvenile and the probation officer.46

The State's RoleIn the mid-70s, however, federal courts determinedthat juveniles were not being accorded their constitutionaldue-process rights and were being improperly confined forperiods far in excess of adults who had committed similarcrimes. Soon the juvenile court proceedings became moreadversarial and time-consuming, with prosecuting anddefense attorneys taking part and motions and countermotionsoften replacing the previous focus on meeting theneeds of the juvenile. Today, the main remainingelements of the criminal justice system that are missingfrom the juvenile court room are a jury, bail and opennessto public scrutiny.Juvenile advocates have lauded the changes asproviding fairness and equity for juveniles who previouslyfaced the potential of being railroaded through the systemunassisted by legal expertise. But critics note that thefocus of juvenile hearings has shifted to proceduralmatters that often have little to do with guilt orinnocence. Timeliness also has gone by the wayside,with hearing delays frequent and frustrating for thoseinvolved. Others say that long delays and repeatedhearings reinforce the predisposition of youths to believethat consequences are not worth worrying about becausethey are in some distant future that may never come.Public consensuson rehabilitationgoal of systemhas erodedAt the same time youths were gaining proceduralprotections in the courts, they were losingempathy in the court of public opinion. Risingcrime rates and a backlash to perceived "coddling" ofjuvenile delinquents led to public pressure for tougherresponses to juvenile crime. This coincided with studiesduring the mid-70s that cast doubt on the effectivenessof rehabilitation programs in reducing recidivism. As onehistory concludes;The indictment of the rehabilitative model, along with growing public concern over crime,propelled a search for an alternative. Conservatives traditionally viewed the philosophy ofrehabilitation with derision because it conflicted with their notion of deterrence and reciprocitythrough punishment. Liberals, lamenting the juvenile justice system's historic emphasis oncustody and control, abandoned their traditional support for rehabilitation as impractical. Asa result of this dissension, rehabilitation experienced a precipitous decline throughout most ofthe United States during the 1980s. 53Punishment was added to the juvenile court statuteas a rationale for dispositions of cases -~ butrehabilitation was not removed as the main goaldespite sporadic efforts by some policy makers over theyears. Through the 80s and early 90s, the system movedtoward the so-called "just desserts" or accountabilitymodel without abandoning the original rehabilitative roots.47

The Juvenile Crime ChallengeThe result is clear although the proper interpretation of theaffect is less so: More juveniles than ever before areincarcerated and juvenile crime rates are fairly steady.Critics of the lock-' em-up approach say the lack of aprecipitous drop in crime means punishment-basedincarceration is not working. Its supporters point to theleveling out of the crime rate as an indication that puttingjuveniles away has kept crime from growing worse.Today the argument continues with varied voices:• The law under which we deal with youthful offenders was developed for a far lessviolent population. The philosophical base of juvenile law remains rehabilitative andfails to place accountability for a youth's action on the youth. It is time that the Stateof California revisit this issue and adopt a more balanced perspective. Juvenileoffenders must be dealt with based on their demonstrated criminal behavior rather thanfocusing on their age at the time the offense was committed.Sherman BlockLos Angeles County Sheriff 54• Much js said these days about preventing or deterring crime, but it is important tounderstand exactly what we are up against when we try. Prevention, if it can be madeto work at all, must start very early in life, perhaps as early as the first two or threeyears, and given the odds it faces -- childhood impulsivity, low verbal facility,incompetent parenting, disorderly neighborhoods -- it must also be massive in scope.Deterrence, if it can be made to work better (for surely it already works to somedegree), must be applied close to the moment of wrongful action or else thepresent-orientedness of the youthful would-be offender will discount the threat so muchthat the promise of even a small gain will outweigh its large but deferred costs. In thiscountry, however, and in most Western nations, we have profound misgivings aboutdoing anything that would give prevention or deterrence a chance to make a largedifference. The family is sacrosanct; the family preservation movement is strong; thestate is a clumsy alternative .... Prompt deterrence has much to recommend it ... But thegreater the swiftness and certainty, the less attention paid to the procedural safeguardsessential to establishing guilt.James Q. WilsonCommentary, September 1 994• [T]he Youth Authority charter ... still recommends a civilized and progressive approachto delinquency which recognizes that society will best be served if an effort is madeto bring young offenders back into the mainstream. The legislators who wrote theoriginal Youth Authority statute believed that young people, brutalized by extendedperiods under punitive conditions, would most likely take out their frustration and senseof hurt on the society that incarcerated them. They further recognized that since 95percent of a/l people institutionalized in correctional facilities are eventually released,it is in the selfish best interests of law-abiding citizens that environments be designedfor criminals that do not have this effect. ... After al/, juvenile offenders are our children.They are not aliens landed from some distant planet. They are the product of oursociety. By our policies and practices we have helped shape them. This does notexempt them from responsibility for their criminal actions. But it does leave us with the48

The State's Roleresponsibility to help rehabilitate them. This we must do, in our own self-interest aswell as theirs.Steve LernerCommonweal Research Institute 55• Many juvenile killings appear to take place without any rational cause or purpose. Itis this latter characteristic that has caused some observers to question the wholeconcept of rehabilitation upon which the juvenile justice system is presumably based.Another concern expressed by many observers is that, in the name of rehabilitation orprotecting the interests of the minor, hardened young criminals are let off much moreleniently than would be the case if they were treated as adults .... The most difficultaspect of any examination of the juvenile justice system is maintaining the perspectivethat the subjects being dealt with are both children and criminals at the same time,with all the limitations and vulnerabilities which the first label implies and all of theproblems and risks implied by the second. Reconciling these competing demands is themost difficult task confronted by juvenile justice policy makers.Peter W. GreenwoodRAND 56• Today opinion in the State is divided over the proper role of the juvenile courts. Whilemost Californians would continue to emphasize juvenile justice's rehabilitative role,almost all believe that offenders who commit violent or property crimes should bepunished. Half of all Californians surveyed for a 1992 report believe serious propertyoffenders should be tried in adult court. Nearly as many favor incarceration in adultfacilities for juveniles who commit violent crimes ....Incarceration can play an importantrole in the juvenile justice system, but juvenile facilities especially should provideoffenders with help and training. Given the high cost of crime and long-termincarceration, the State should provide every reasonable opportunity for a juvenileoffender's rehabilitation.Commission on the Futureof the California Courts 57• We've got to look at what we are doing with children in America. There is a tendencyto think a child's violent, so put him in the detention center and throw the key away;he IS committed two violent crimes, so send him to the adult system. ... Let'sunderstand what we're doing in terms of confining kids. If we confine them and dumpthem back into the community with nothing more, it's not going to make anydifference .... Let's try to develop programs within our community that understand thatin most cases if a child is properly supervised, he will not have to be detained. Therewill be rare exceptions. There is always going to be that terrible person who is theexception, but we can do so much if we understand that he is coming back to thecommunity in pretty short order anyway and that we can make a difference byproviding a coherent pattern.Janet RenoU.S. Attorney General 58• Since the late 1960s California's juvenile justice system has changed from an informalpaternalistic process which paid more attention to the needs of children than to their49

The Juvenile Crime Challengeconstitutional rights to a formalized process that often protects the rights of childrenbetter than serving their needs .... A ttempting to graft public safety concepts onto asystem designed purely for rehabilitation has resulted in a very crooked tree whichbears bitter fruit. .. .[TheJ very real need to protect the public conflicts with the corephilosophy of a court that was created to protect and rehabilitate children.Criminal Justice Legal Foundation 59• Institutions do succeed in punishing but they don 't deter. They protect the communitytemporarily, but the protection does not last. They relieve the community ofresponsibility by removing the young offender, but they make successful integrationunlikely. They change the committed offender, but the change is more likely to benegative than positive.National Advisory Commissionon Criminal Justice Standards and Goals 60• During the 19805 new evidence emerged suggesting that the demise of rehabilitationwas premature. A growing number of studies indicates that rehabilitative interventionis effective in de-escalating criminal behavior. Various weI/-designed interventionsreduce the severity and frequency of delinquency and alter the cycle that leads to adultcrime .... Although rehabilitation does not eliminate recidivism, it is more effective thancorrectional institutions in reducing the rate and seriousness of criminal behavior.Dan MacallairCenter on Juvenile and Criminal Justice 61The split in opinion on whether juveniles should betreated or punished when they commit crimes isreflected in Welfare and I nstitutions Code Section202 (Appendix E), California's statute that guides theactions of those in the juvenile justice system. Enacted in1976 and amended in 1977, 1983, 1984 and 1989 1thesection applies to both the dependency and the juveniledelinquency court. Although a careful reading of thestatute reveals most of the key elements described asdesirable by juvenile justice experts, the concepts aresometimes muddled, duplicative and contradictory in tone.Juvenile statuteloses clarity ineffort to includemany purposesFor instance l in wording that applies to both thedependency and the juvenile delinquency court, thestatute names reunifying the minor with his or herfamily as the "primary" objective of the courtl althoughthe section begins with the statement that the purpose ofthe chapter is to provide for the protection and safety ofthe public in addition to the minor. At a later point, thereunification goal is moderated from primary to"appropriate It for juvenile delinquents when the goal isconsistent with the juvenile's best interests and the bestinterests of the public.50

The State IS RoleProtection of the public and the public IS bestinterests are highlighted repeatedly in the section: in theopening words, in tandem with the juvenile's bestinterests and in a separate section that directs juvenilecourts and agencies to consider both the public' s and thejuvenile's interests in all deliberations. Punishment isincluded in the section as part of the "guidance" that isgiven to juveniles l with the definition of punishmentincluding restitution, community service and limitations onfreedom. Retribution is specifically precluded as thepurpose of such punishment. Carel treatment andguidance that is ordered by the court is supposed to beconsistent with the juvenile's best interests, hold themaccountable for their behavior and "be appropriate fortheir circumstances."The section also envisions holding parentsresponsible for the expenses incurred by the State inmaking their child a ward, subject to the financial abilityof the parents. Missing from the section is any mentionof the rights, needs or concerns of crime victims.Muddled statuteallows variedinterpretationsand practicesCritics of the juvenile justice system have noted thatmany of the system's decision makers appear toplace emphasis on different parts of the section.As a result, courts in some areas may choose to riskpublic safety to a greater degree than others by leavingjuveniles in their homes as a higher priority objective -­while in other areas of the state l incarceration is afrequently favored option regardless of the low risk topublic safety.Juvenile justice experts have distilled the keyconcepts that they believe should drive any juvenilejustice system. The federal Office of Juvenile Justice andDelinquency Prevention, for instance, says acomprehensive approach to dealing with delinquencyshould be built on:• Community protection and public safety as thefirst priority.• Accountability I preferably through a system thatcombines sanctions, treatment and rehabilitativeservices in graduated steps that match the severityof the offense.• Competency development, which requires that theyouth entering the juvenile justice system exitsequipped to be a productive and responsiblecitizen.51

The Juvenile Crime Challenge• Individualization, with assessment and treatmentkeyed to the specific circumstances of the juvenileand his crime.• Balanced representation of the interests of thecommunity, the victim and the juvenile.Reworked goalstatement couldbring greaterconsistencyAt a time when the juvenile justice system is thefocus of conflicting philosophies and contentiousdisputes about how it should operate, the Statecan bring a greater consistency to juvenile justiceprocesses by formulating a solid statement of guidingprinciples.Recommendation 4:The Governor and the legislature should directthe new juvenile crime prevention agency todraft a clear statement of philosophy, purposeand function that focuses on deterrence as thecornerstone for the juvenile criminal justicesystem.Aclear statement from policy makers about why aseparate juvenile justice system is necessary andappropriate would set the tone and appropriateatmosphere for the independent discretion that is wieldedby many players within the system. Setting aside thepolarizing debate over whether rehabilitation or retributionshould have the premier role in the juvenile justice system,the State's policy shou Id be outcome-based. Society ISprimary goal in dealing with troubled juveniles is to deterrepeat offenders and act to deter non-offenders fromentering the system as first-time offenders. The State'spolicy, therefore, should focus on the most effective wayto achieve deterrence and recognize that, in each case, asophisticated analysis is required to determine theappropriate balance of treatment and punishment.The concepts that should be stated in the policyinclude:• The reiteration that the basic premise of thepresent separate system still holds true, especiallyfor status offenders and minor criminals: thatgenerally children are salvageable and extra effortsshould be made, by the State in place of their52

The State's Rolefamilies when necessary, to influence their lives inpositive, non-crime directions.• The overriding need to ensure public safety and theright of the public to an open accountable system.• A system that reinforces accountability for actions,personal responsibility for decisions made andconsequences linked to deeds.• The importance of individual assessment uponwhich to base appropriate treatment and/orpunishment.• In pursuit of deterrence, an appropriate balancebetween rehabilitation (treatment, training andeducation) and punishment, with competencydevelopment that can reasonably be expected tolead to productive citizenship as a key goal.• Sensitivity to the needs, concerns andperspectives of victims.• Family preservation when possible or beneficial.53

The Juvenile Crime Challenge54

The State's RoleIssue 3: Funding cutbacks have disproportionatelyimpacted the programs with the highestpotential for success in diverting juveniles from•CrlDle.Despite the universal belief among experts that theonly hope of halting or diminishing juvenile crime isin taking appropriate steps before a youth isentrenched in a delinquency pattern, early-interventionprograms have all but disappeared as fiscally strappedcounty and state departments have made selective budgetcuts in the past decade. Front-line workers decry theirinability to cope with the minor juvenile delinquentbecause of the pressing demands on their time andresources by chronic, violent offenders. This situation isespecially distressing since these worst-case juveniles notonly soak up resources because of the high cost of theirtreatment but also are the least likely to be deterred froma life of crime regardless of the treatment optionsundertaken. Placing a high priority on "front-end"programs is difficult without new funding but is critical toany successful crime prevention effort.Funding totals for processes and services at anypoint on the juvenile justice system continuum are difficultto determine. The Legislative Analyst's Office hasdeveloped a schematic representation of what can happento juveniles at risk that shows the various levels at whichaction may occur. The diagram, on the next pagel isuseful, when annotated with populations and budgets, inunderstanding proportions and spending patterns:55

The Juvenile Crime ChallengeCHART 5PREVENTION ANDINTERVENTION SERVICESSchool Services•County Social Services•Community-BasedOrgan izationsJUVENILES AT -RISK• School Failure• Family Dysfunction• Substance Abuse• Mentally Disordered,~~J:liD

The State's Rolemany other county departmental costs associated withbringing juveniles into the system, including lawenforcement, court costs, prosecution and defense (if thejuvenile has a public defender),Pouring in at the top end of the funnel are someproportion of the 3.5 million youths aged 10 to 17 inCalifornia who have problems. Experts estimate that 6 to7 percent display conduct disorders in school, usually anearly tip-off to whatever risk factors are affecting aspecific child. Funding sources for prevention services tothese children are diverse. Casting the broadest possibledefinition of preventive programs, one could include citydollars devoted to after-school recreation programs,county money earmarked for libraries, school spending ontutoring programs, community organization funding foryouth activities and state subsidies for a broad array ofhealth services.Prevention fundinghas shifted fromcounties to Stateto counties againThe diversity, in terms of both type of program andjurisdictional responsibility, makes it difficult todocument funding totals, now and historically. Butthere have been shifting patterns of responsibility for thecost of preventive services. A history provided by theCalifornia Youth Authority indicates that the late 1940swere the first time the State used subsidies to localgovernment as a way to reduce the number of wards sentto state facilities. Other efforts followed in 1961, 1965and 1978, variously funding construction of countycamps, subsidizing intensive probation and underwritingthe cost of other programs, including delinquencyprevention services. 62The flow of dollars from the State down to thecounty worked well, from the State's perspective, as longas strings were attached that required counties to reducetheir commitments to CY A facilities. But the passage ofProposition 13 in the 1970s put a lid on counties' abilityto raise funds for locally provided services, includingdelinquency prevention programs, and set the stage for afiscal tug of war between the State and the counties. Atfirst, the State -- flush with a surplus of funds -- balled outcounties, even removing the strings that had requiredreduced CY A commitments in return for the juvenileservice funds.The beginning of the 1990s, however, brought theState to the brink of fiscal disaster and in year after yearof tight budgets, the State clamped down on money thecounties had begun to think of as their own. In 1990, theCounty Justice System Subvention Program was cut in57

The Juvenile Crime Challengehalt with funding dropping from $67.3 million to $34.3million. The following year, the one-time cut becamepermanent and the funds were "realigned" to countycoffers along with other monies in a move that gavecounties discretion to spend the funds based on their ownpriorities not necessarily juvenile delinquencyprevention.As one historical perspective concluded:Many probation departments received major budget reductions and often the first programsto be cut were the front-end diversion and prevention efforts. Some police agencies could nolonger fund their special juvenile bureaus and diversion programs. The situation was worsenedby the demise of the federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, which had fundedmany California juvenile justice programs. A t the local level, county agencies and communitybasedorganizations competed for increasingly scarce public funds. 63The shifts in funding and responsibility may not havesettled into any permanent pattern even yet. TheLegislative Analyst's Office has proposed a furtherrealignment that would include placing responsibility for alljuvenile justice services at the county government level.Counties would select and pay for any treatment!punishment for juveniles, including reimbursing the Statefor the full cost of incarceration if the county chose thatoption for a juvenile. Counties would be given a largershare of the state sales tax to underwrite the added costs.One of the arguments advanced by the LegislativeAnalyst's Office is that the new arrangement wouldeliminate the fiscal incentive that counties now have tosend juveniles to the California Youth Authority I whichcosts them $25 per month, rather than developing options-- at higher costs to counties but lower costs to the State-- to treat them locally.64 Legislators have introduced billsto implement the Legislative Analyst's realignment butnone have been successful.Juvenile advocatesfavor shift tocounties but criticsworry about resultsAdvocates of such a change view it as a primeopportunity to eliminate incarceration of juvenilesin large institutions in favor of treating them incommunity-based programs (a concept that will beexamined in Issue 6). They also believe that counties willquickly turn to preventive programs as a way of holdingdown costs in the long run by reducing future crime.But critics, including many of the county officialswho would be the recipients of the new responsibility,believe the plan is flawed because the funding source isunlikely to keep up with the need to deal with juvenilecrime. They also deny that fiscal incentives now drive thedecision about where to place juveniles, adversely58

The State's Roleaffecting both the juvenile and state coffers as theLegislative Analyst's Office maintains. County officialspoint out that state law requires a judge to certify that allother options have been exhausted and that only theCalifornia Youth Authority can meet the needs of thejuvenile. In addition, the State has a mechanism forcharging counties for CY A commitments if they are due toa reduction in county service options, such as the closingof county camp programs.Efforts to shiftother programsto counties havefared poorlyFinally, critics can point to several analogies thatbolster their contention that realignment holds thepotential for disaster. During the late 1960s andearly 1970s, the State embraced the concept of reducingreliance on state mental hospitals by releasing patients totheir communities and sending subsidies to counties todevelop services. The State saved money, but sufficientlocal treatment options were never developed and todaymany of the mentally ill show up among the homelesspopulation and go without needed services. Even closerto home, in 1977 status offenders (runaways, truants andincorrigible children) were taken out of the juvenileincarceration system with the goal of keeping themseparate from hardened criminals. Once again, localservices did not develop to take up the slack and todaystatus offenders receive little of the attention they needuntil they topple over the brink into delinquency.While some believe prevention programs wouldblossom under realignment, others believe that if countiesare left to make their own choices about spending,prevention will have a tough time competing with othermore popular services. In fact, even without realignment,there is little dispute that prevention programs have beenamong the first "frills" sacrificed as governmentalspending has diminished.One expert told a conference on youth violencethat the State was actually "prevention heavy 20 and 30years ago but those programs were the first to go whenthe budget cuts came. "65 Summing up the situation forthe Commission, the executive director of the CaliforniaWell ness Foundation said:There is no inherent conflict between incarceration and prevention. The two are points alonga continuum of programs to address societal ills. However, in California we have lost ourbalance and are overweight in incarceration while anemic in prevention. 6659

The Juvenile Crime ChallengeThe preventive, front-end services are not alone infeeling the budget pinch, of course. Whilespending by the California Youth Authorityincreased this year, it has endured significant cuts {1990-91 $359.4 million, 1991-92 $338.5 million, 1992-93$338.1 million and 1993-94 $394.5 million), resulting inappropriations that have kept pace with neither populationnor inflationary increases. CY A calculates that itsreductions for the past three years after adjustments forpopulation increases total $60 million. s7County probationbudgets have notkept pace withgrowing needThe most significant portion of the reductions hasnot come, however, in the so-called back-end services,the institutionalization costs, but instead in the stateallocation that subsidized early intervention and preventionservices. In 1991-92, $37.2 million that had previouslybeen reflected in CY A's budget as earmarked payments tocounties for programs to keep juveniles out of statefacilities was shifted to county control. 68 While countieshad the option of continuing to spend the funds onprevention and early intervention programs, probationdepartments were left to compete against the many otherdemands for county service -- and the results have notbeen good.The juvenile sections of county probationdepartments have seen flat budgets, decreases orin some cases only small increases that fail tobridge the service gap caused by growing caseloads,according to the Commission's survey of 15 largecounties. In Los Angeles County, for instance, this year's$193.9 million budget is a decrease from 1992-93's$199.5 million. Contra Costa County, which provided theCommission a breakdown of its field service versusjuvenile institution budgets, spent $4.9 million on fieldservices and $3. 1 million on institutionalization in 1991-92. By 1993-94, the balance had shifted, with $4.7million being spent on field services and $7.8 million onjuvenile institutions.While statewide juvenile probation figures are nolonger compiled by the state Department of Justice -- yetanother loss to squeezed budgets -- the LegislativeAnalyst's Office has documented the increasing strain oncounty probation department resources for services toboth adults and juveniles. Between 1983 and 1992, adultand juvenile probation caseloads increased 73 percentwhile the number of probation officers increased only 24percent. Between the 1984-85 budget year and 1990·91,probation departments 1 share of county funds declined 960

The State IS Rolepercent while sheriff s shares rose 1 percent and districtattorneys gained 3 percent. 69The diminishing ability of probation departments tohandle day-to-day casework has forced the disappearanceof the many efforts the departments made in the past tocoordinate, create and/or inspire preventive and earlyintervention services. Outstationing of probation officers,which placed them close to communities, schools andother services to increase their effectiveness, waseliminated to consolidate overhead costs as one of thefirst economy moves by many counties, according toprobation officers. In one county, regular meetings by themany different county departments that meet the needsof juveniles were very helpful in coordination of servicesto specific cases, according to probation workers, butthey fell by the wayside as county budgets reducedspending in all departments.Writing about the value of the cross-fertilizationthat used to occur when county service agencies hadmore discretionary funding, one former CY A parole officerdescribed an Alameda County plan that divided caseloadsalong high school district lines:Each social agency assigned their field workers by high school district, i.e. probation, welfare,recreation, health, police, eYA parole and schools. The agency field workers met monthlywithin their district and shared case records, information, plans, goals and objectives for theircommon cases. They made case decisions and agreed on strategies. For example, I, as theeYA parole agent, had 60 parolees .... 1 met with the other representatives for the district andfound that probation had the younger siblings in my families, health had the mother, etc. Itworked beautifully un til the funding was lost. 70Privacy lawshinder collaborationon providingjuvenile servicesFunding constraints are not the only factor that ledto the demise of collaborative, cross-departmentefforts, however. As courts and laws placedgreater emphasis on protecting privacy, it became difficultfor departments to share information about specific cases.The State has four pages of laws (Welfare and InstitutionsCode, Article 22, Sections 825 through 830) designed tokeep juvenile records confidential, even among agenciesthat are trying to provide service. Child protectiveagencies are allowed to look at records l but only afterfiling a declaration under penalty of perjury that they areto be used in connection with a criminal investigation ora proceeding to declare the juvenile a ward of the court.In recognition of the problems this creates, theLegislature enacted an exclusion in 1991 for "integratedchildren I s services programs" (Welfare and InstitutionsCode l Chapter 12.9, Sections 18986.40 to 18986.46).61

The Juvenile Crime ChallengeInformation sharing was still restricted, however, to caseswhere the child's parent, guardian or legal representativehad signed a release form. A pilot project allowed SanDiego County to share records, other than mental health,physical health and drug records, without release forms.As this report is being written, a measure to enact theSan Diego County pilot statewide in place of the morerestrictive program (AS 2488) is under consideration bythe Legislature.Federal laws also impede information sharing in thename of privacy. The Family Educational Rights andPrivacy Act restricts the type of information that schoolsmay release about students. The law is complex andmulti-faceted but schools often simplify the result byclaiming it means they can't give out or share anyinformation, according to an expert with the NationalSchool Safety Center. The Center's expert said the lawdoes not stop a school from sharing information orlistening to other's information in a reactive mode butproactive outreach to other agencies when schools see abehavior problem is much more difficult. 71School rolehampered butmany say theirintervention is keyThe irony of the practical barrier to schoolparticipation in collaborative service efforts is thatmany experts believe schools are perfectlypositioned to play a key role in at-risk juvenileidentification, intervention and treatment. University ofOregon expert Walker, who says that anti-social behaviorearly in a child's school career is the single best predictorof delinquency in adolescence, finds that trouble childrencan be identified very accurately in the earliest grades ofschool. His studies on the components of successfulearly intervention programs have led him to conclude thatschools should take the lead in identifying youths andcoordinating services. 72Many of those involved in the juvenile justicesystem, however, find that some schools are reluctantpartners at best in crime prevention efforts, believing thattheir main function should remain education -- eventhough education is difficult to accomplish when crime isflourishing and students are fearful. Some schoolsactively form partnerships with law enforcement in antidrugprograms such as DARE, but others are anxioussimply to embrace zero-tolerance policies that expelstudents who cause trouble but that provide no answer todealing with juvenile delinquents outside of the regularschool.62

Without cooperation among various agencies, theresult is that many juveniles fall through the cracks. TheLos Angeles County probation official who heads theGang Alternative and Prevention Program testified to theCommission that the program's assessment of youthsoften find that little or no service has been provided eventhough the family may be receiving welfare or be involvedwith the dependency court. She said her program, whichmakes families aware of community resources and hooksthem up with needed services, has worked to reducerecidivism, truancy and dropout rates. A multidisciplinary,mUlti-agency approach that is family focusedhas the most potential for success, she concluded. 73Intra-agency cooperation can also payofffinancially. San Bernardino County, for instance, takesadvantage of a federal program that pays for up to 50percent of a probation officer's salary if having theposition keeps juveniles from being placed in foster care.Officials there say they saved the county social servicesbudget $3 million and retained $1 million for probationdepartment programs under new flexibility that countieshave with AFDC/foster care funding. 74Multi-disciplinarypanels can piecetogether puzzleof child's lifeSuch multi-disciplinary, intra-agency efforts are thekey to successful early identification of troubledyouths so that services can be provided, accordingto experts and front-line workers. A school official mayknow that a child is acting out and truant; the beat copmay observe the child breaking curfew or hanging out inquestionable places; and social services may be aware offamily factors that place the child at risk for abuse orneglect. Separately the indicators may be too small tojustify any action; pieced together, the indicators add upto a picture of a youth that is headed for trouble unlessintervention occurs.In addition to allowing a more thorough assessmentof a youth's actions, multi-disciplinary bodies provide aforum that can make services more accessible, accordingto their supporters. The county or school worker whosuspects something is amiss with a juvenile may feelthere is no convenient place to share their concern shortof calling the police or the probation department. Whatthey have observed may not be strong enough either intheir own minds or legally to justify such intervention.The ability to share concerns with experts who may haveaccess to other pieces of information without invokinglegal sanctions encourages early identification of youthswho need help.63

The Juvenile Crime ChallengeThe inherent danger in the multi-disciplinary teamconcept is that children will become labeled negatively,their privacy will be trampled on and they may bepermanently side-tracked into a system that treats themas social deviants. Proponents of the concept, however,believe that the emphasis on providing services, ratherthan on punishing behavior, avoids much of the negativeconnotations. In addition, a requirement for parentalinvolvement would ensure that the child has an advocatefor his interests, besides providing a better potential forsuccessful intervention through coordinated reinforcementat home.The use of a multi-disciplinary approach tojuveniles is not a new concept. In some counties, such asVentura, children's services are integrated across countydepartment lines with great improvements in efficiencyand effectiveness, the Commission has noted in earlierstudies on other children's issues. Other counties havemade partial movements toward coordination. YouthService Bureaus used to coordinate services for juvenilesand School Attendance Review Boards are a multidisciplinaryapproach that has worked for truancyproblems. In 1989, the Criminal Justice LegalFoundation 1 S recommendations for reforming the juvenilejustice system included the creation of two groups withineach county: An Interagency Juvenile Justice Councilmade up of agency leaders to develop and adopt policiesand a Juvenile Justice Multidisciplinary Team that wouldaddress individual case problems and cooperativeprocedures. 75Turf, budgetbattles oftensty my teamapproachGrants available through the Office of CriminalJustice Planning acknowledge the powerfulpotential of collaborative approaches toprevention, in some instances requiring recipients to setup cross-jurisdictional committees. Front-line forces in thejuvenile justice system, however, report that a toofrequentoccurrence is the grant-receiving agencyspending the funding on infrastructure (such as computersand other equipment) internally and then wondering whyother agencies do not put more effort into the teamapproach. When the grant runs out, the recipient agencyhas gained new equipment but the area is still left withouta model program to provide services. True cooperation isoften stymied by turf concerns and proprietary interestsin budget matters, these observers say.Policy makers at the state level have shownsupport for encouraging local jurisdictions to create multidisciplinaryteam approaches to juvenile crime. S8 1909 r64

The State's Rolenow under consideration by the Governor, creates pilotprojects in three counties called Family AssessmentIntervention and Resource programs. The FAIR centersare described as judicially supervised, nonadversarialprograms to provide prevention and early interventionservices.Enabling local jurisdictions to create these andother innovative approaches to meeting the needs of atriskjuveniles should be a high priority for the State. At atime when prevention programs have been squeezed outof state and county budgets, there is widespreadacknowledgement that early intervention is critical toreducing crime -- and such intervention is most successfulwhen it is the result of multi-disciplinary efforts.Recommendation 5:The Governor and the Legislature shoulddirect all state agencies involved in anti-crimeefforts to make early intervention andprevention programs a top priority.Early identification, assessment and intervention isessential if at-risk children are going to be helpedand diverted from criminal activity. Fundingconstraints and traditional divisions of turf should not beallowed to preclude local intra-agency, multi-disciplinaryefforts among the key juvenile justice system players:law enforcement, probationr social services, schools,juvenile courts, public defenders, district attorneys andcommunity leaders.It is not the State's appropriate role to mandatewhat will work in each community, although the State hasa clear interest in setting enforceable standards for localefforts. Most importantlYr the State can provideleadership by stressing the concept that funds need to bere-prioritized to focus on 1} programs that have proventhey work and 2) prevention measures. The State alsocan facilitate early-intervention efforts through thehigh-level state agency envisioned in Recommendation 1.The agency can share effective models and provideguidelines to local communities, concentrating on theincreased efficiency and effectiveness that can beachieved through collaboration and cross-pollination ofinformation and expertise. The agency, as a high priority,should identify categories of at-risk childrenr assessmethods of intervening and create an effective model that65

The Juvenile Crime Challengecan be used by others. In addition, the agency shouldkeep the State's primary policy makers informed byissuing annual reports to the Legislature that detail thestatus of children at risk and trends in juvenile crime.Key elements of any model would be:• A structure that is multi-disciplinary and intraagency.• A focus that is neighborhood or community-based.• Multiple points of entry (i.e., children can bereferred by schools, parents, organizations, etc.)• An emphasis on attacking truancy, often a firstsign of movement toward delinquency.• A mechanism for providing access to parentingskills resources since delinquency often arises inhomes with poor parenting practices.• A system that is sensitive to cultural diversitywithout altering the expectations of society aboutthe standard of required behavior. This includesthe availability of appropriate services withculturally targeted accessibility.Recommendation 6:The Governor and the Legislature shouldadopt legislation that eliminates barriers tointer- and intra-agency sharing of informationthat is necessary for early identification of andintervention with at-risk children.Current state statutes that are designed to protectthe privacy of families and children are toorestrictive to allow early identification andassessment of people in need of services. Society'S longterminterest in preventing crime through earlyintervention should outweigh individual rights to privacyas long as information sharing has a positive, productivegoal rather than a negative, labeling purpose.In addition to revising state statutes, the Governorand the Legislature should urge Congress to modifyfederal laws that hinder participation by schools in proactiveefforts to help at-risk children.66

SystemReforms• Consequences that are swift andcertain are most effective asdeterrents. Neither are elementsof the juvenile justice system.• Too often concern for thejuvenile offender takesprecedence over the rights ofvictims and the public.Recommendations:• Ensure that misconduct atall levels of severity promptsappropriate consequences.• Revise current laws toaddress age appropriately_• Expand the role of victimsin courl proceedings.• Revise laws regardingconfidentiality and sealedrecords.

The Juvenile Crime Challenge68

System ReformsSystem ReformsThe basic thrust of the separate juvenile justicesystem is that children, because they are stillgrowing, developing and learning, can change andare worth society's investment in trying to make thatchange occur. Public support for that concept isunraveling under an onslaught of stories about amoral,murderous youths whose deeds are far removed from theconcept of childish pranks and youthful mistakes. Butthose severely damaged and dangerous youths are only afragment of the children who come into contact with thejuvenile justice system.Children still enter the system for shoplifting,breaking windows and brawling. They come into contactwith authorities in the early stages of drug addiction,when deviant acts at school signals problems or whenabuse at home has triggered their abusive practices onothers. They come, having taken small steps away fromacceptable behavior, when a simple push in the rightdirection can still make a major difference in the rest oftheir lives.The challenge is to have a system that functionswell for both ends of the spectrum: one that takes strongintervention measures when they are most likely to beproductive while at the same time protecting societywhen the chances of rehabilitation are dim.69

The Juvenile Crime ChallengeThe present juvenile justice system falls short atboth ends of the spectrum. The system's failures not onlyare damaging to the children it is supposed to protect butalso undermine its standing with the public, endangeringthe consensus that allows a separate juvenile system toexist. The following two issues build the case for reformsthat will improve performance and return credibility to thesystem.70

System ReformsIssue 4: Personal accountability and timely,appropriate consequences for actions areelements that should be reinforced by thejuvenile justice system.The message that individuals are responsible for thedecisions they make and that illegal actions areaccompanied by consequences is often lost intoday I s juvenile justice system. A child may face littlemore than a lecture for the first half-dozen offenses,tactics that are the hallmark of the adult system areemployed to get the youth It off the hook," and long delaysseparate deed from outcome. The stark reality of theimpact of the juveniles 1 actions on their victims and othermembers of society is also lost in a system that has littleroom for victim input.In addition, appropriate consequences are notalways achieved because of the way the juvenile justicesystem approaches chronological age. The disturbingtrend for younger and younger juveniles to commit violentand heinous crimes without receiving the perceivedharsher treatment accorded adults with similar records hasbrought the juvenile system I s age specifications underscrutiny by policy makers. At the same time, agerestrictions on juvenile jurisdiction force the release ofwards from state facilities even when they are evaluatedas still being a threat to society -- with no parole oversightand no ability of a court to order further treatment orconfinement. In both cases, simple solutions that merelyaddress changing age limits will not necessarily ensure theresults that juvenile justice experts believe are warrantedand that the public wants.In the past,even pettycrimes broughtsystem reactionAtone time when there was less stress on thejuvenile system in terms of fiscal constraints andburgeoning caseloads, juveniles faced direconsequences for their misbehavior. A boy who got intotrouble for stealing from the corner store might spend anuncomfortable, frightening or even humiliating weekend injuvenile hall. Youths who repeated their defiant illegalactivities might be sent to reform school, while thosefound to be hardened criminals were shipped off to statefacilities.71

The Juvenile Crime ChallengeToday I however, juvenile courts handle hundredsof cases rather than dozens and juvenile halls are packedwith the most serious and violent offenders, leaving noroom for small-time juvenile criminals. There is little time,attention or remedy for the novice juvenile delinquent.The consequences of the increasing numbers ripplethroughout the system. The police officer on the beat isunlikely to take tough action when he believes an arrestedjuvenile offender will merely be chastised and released -­a poor return from the officer's perspective when hours ofpaperwork may be required. The district attorney's officemay prioritize limited resources to address only the worstcases, either deferring the filing of charges for months orcompletely passing up the opportunity in the belief thatthe system will provide little response anyway.Probation officers speak of overwhelmingcase loads where juveniles are tlbanked llrather thansupervised, with little more than optimistic hope that theywill not get into trouble again. In many cases, theoptimism is not misplaced. Numerous studies have shownthat a small proportion of juveniles are responsible for adisproportionate number of crimes while many youths onlyhave a single brush with the law. The 1972 Wolfgangstudy in Philadelphia, cited throughout juvenile justiceliterature, found that chronic offenders who had five ormore police contacts constituted 6 percent of a specificage group, 18 percent of all juvenile delinquents and wereresponsible for 62 percent of all offenses.8 percent ofjuvenile offenderscycle throughsystem repeatedlyThe most current and frequently cited study, whichis ongoing, is one being conducted by OrangeCounty that has become known as "the 8 percentsolution." The county, which is trying to construct a wayto identify future chronic delinquents and intervene withpreventive services, discovered that about 70 percent offirst-time offenders do not commit further crimes and donot return to the system. Another 15 percent have asecond run-in with the system but no further involvement.Somewhere between 8 and 10 percent, however, re-enterthe system frequently I arrested four to 14 times in athree-year period. 76While other counties may find a lower or higherpercentage of juvenile repeat offenders, the resultingimpact is similar throughout the system: The worst casesare addressed while the minor offenders attract littleattention and face few consequences. One police chief,while admitting that officers on the beat who ignorejuvenile crime are at the beginning of the trail that leads to72

The back-endof the systemsoaks upmost fundinga system with few consequences, said officers will onlybegin to be more aggressive enforcers when they knowtheir actions will be meaningful. One long-time probationofficer told the Commission that the frustrating part isknowing that her time is taken up by a few serious andchronic offenders who cycle through the systemrepeatedly I keeping her from providing help to the firstandsecond-time youths who she feels are the most likelyto be rehabilitated and permanently deterred from a life ofcrime.For instance, a youth caught extorting lunch moneyfrom other students to support a developing drughabit may slip through the system until he becomesa hardened juvenile drug addict who is burglarizing homesto support his habit. Resources are much more likely tobe expended sending the entrenched drug addict to theCalifornia Youth Authority for appropriate but possiblyfutile treatment than in providing early drug treatment forthe young extortionist at the time when a cure is mostlikely to be fast and relatively inexpensive.A juvenile court judge echoed the probationofficer's concerns in testifying to the Commission:The juvenile court should bring younger, less criminally oriented children into the formal courtprocesses in some way, The system seems to focus on only the most serious offenders andallows the children with whom rehabilitation is most feasible to be essentially ignored. 77Statewide documentation on what happens to youthsin the juvenile justice system is difficult to compile.The state Department of Justice stopped collectingjuvenile disposition data after 1989 in response to tighterbudgets and the Commission could find no organizationthat has filled the data void since. The California YouthAuthority provided the estimated figures for 1 992displayed in the chart on the next page:73

The Juvenile Crime ChallengeCHART 6Outcome of Juvenile Arrests1992 (est.)247,000 Arrests! 181,000 Referralsto Probation85,000 PetitionsFiled21.000Dismissed41,600Probation2,700CVA11,300Camps !6,600 1,800Foster Care Juvenile HallSource: California Youth AuthorityAs the chart indicates, of the quarter millionjuveniles arrested, only about 181 ,000 werereferred to probation departments. While some ofthe 66,000 may have been arrested improperly or forinsufficient reason, many more undoubtedly were releasedwith a simple admonishment or to the care of theirparents.Of the 181,000 cases received by probationdepartments, only 85,000 became the subject of petitionsfiled in juvenile court requesting action. The NationalCenter for State Courts indicates California' s rate of filingsis low compared to other states -- at 1,200 per 100,000population lower than all but four reporting states. 78 Onceagain, some cases not sent to court were probably closedwith no action because of insufficient evidence and somemay have been placed on informal probation or divertedinto a community program. But many were simplyreleased with a warning.The juvenile courts dismissed 21 ,000 of the85,000 requested petitions for action. That left 64,00074

cases In which there were documented consequences inthe form of time ordered for probation, foster care, countycamps or CY A facilities. Those cases represent 26percent of the 247,000 juveniles arrested.It would be misleading to conclude that the abovestatistics mean three-quarters of arrested juveniles pay noprice for their crimes. First, an arrest is not a guaranteeof guilt and some proportion are freed because they areinnocent or evidence is lacking. Second, diversionprograms, some of which are described below, may notbe documented as an action taken but may feel verymuch like a consequence to the juvenile involved. Andthird, for some juveniles an official admonishment, thereaction of their parents or their limited experience withwhatever segments of the juvenile justice system theyencounter may actually be the only catalyst needed toencourage better behavior.Multiple ron-inswith law oftenoccur beforeaction is takenHidden among those statistics, however, are manyjuveniles who thumb their noses at the systemand know it will do little to them in return,according to many who work in the field. One probationofficer told the Commission of research she had done onyouths sent to county camp that revealed the majorityhad six and seven contacts with the system with noaction taken before they were sent to camp. TheCalifornia Youth Authority summarized:Currently, large numbers of probationers on county caseloads go essentially unsupervisedbecause available resources are no match for the multitude of cases. Minimumsupervision/service and "paper" caseloads predominate; and in general even "supervised"probationers are rarely seen by a probation officer. 79If consequences are missing in the lowest levelmatters, they are often derailed or much delayed inmore serious cases. Court rulings that have broughtdue-process rights to the juvenile courtroom have addedthe same kind of adversarial positioning and argumentsthat often tie up adult criminal courts. Where courtproceedings used to be a matter of the judge weighing theprobation department's report against input from thejuvenile, today the hearings largely resemble those incriminal courts: prosecuting attorneys and defenseattorneys with plenty of motions and counter-motions.Guilt or innocence may playa secondary role to whetherrights were explained, search warrants obtained, arrestsproperly made, etc. One public defender told theCommission he worries about the mixed message ofaccountability that is sent to juveniles when procedural75

The Juvenile Crime Challengewrong-doing by the system, rather than guilt orinnocence, determines if a youth will go free.The adversarial proceedings, as well as the numberof cases jamming into the system, have caused longdelays in a system that originally was designed to imposeswift dispositions. Probation officers say many problemsarise from repeated court hearing delays, not the least ofwhich are the feelings of youths that "pay day" is faraway, if ever.Effect of systemoverload ripplesout to policeon the streetThe perception of the system I s participants that littlecan be done about low-level offenders hasconsequences beyond the handling of an individualjuvenile' s case. Police and sheriff's deputies say theyhave become more and more reluctant to arrest juvenilesfor minor crimes that they know will result in no action,particularly since juvenile halls are too full to evenguarantee the detained youth an uncomfortable nightaway from home. Truancy and curfew violations inparticular are low on the law enforcement priority list(except in some communities that are beginning to targetthese issues), even though experts say that these are thevery first signs of a budding juvenile crime career. Districtattorneys are reluctant to file charges in cases that will gonowhere or they place such a low priority on non-seriousjuvenile crimes that the charges may not be filed untilmonths after the arrest.I n addition to concerns expressed by those whowork in the system, its vagaries affect victims and theirfamilies, as well. The victim has no role in the courtroomand the confidentiality (which will be examined in Issue 5)that cloaks the juvenile in large part keeps the victim inthe dark about the case as it proceeds. The result,according to victim rights organizations, is that citizenswho are injured or who suffer damages from the juvenileare "re-injured" by the system and are denied a feeling ofresolution. An opportunity is also lost to confront thejuvenile with the real-life impact of his actions.Under the proviSions of the Victims I Bill of Rights,adopted by the voters in 1982, victims do have the rightto request notification of juvenile and adult parole hearingsand to speak at the hearings. In addition, in adult criminalcases they may provide input during sentencing hearings-- not an option that is open to victims of juvenile crime.State officials in the Youth and Adult CorrectionalAgency have taken aggressive steps to meet the concernsof victims, conducting a statewide summit in 1 993,76

System Refonnsstandardizing parole notification processes andincorporating victim impact courses in institution curricula.But many victims told the Commission that the juvenilejustice system for the most part remains a closed andsecretive process that fails to be responsive to victim'sneeds. One mother of a child murdered by a juvenile, whoworks as a probation officer, told the Commission thateven with her inside knowledge of the system it was verydifficult for her to track the case and stay on top of whatwas happening. Hearings that were repeatedlypostponed, canceled and rescheduled left her with afeeling that her life was on hold and her grief unresolved,she said.Even without the same level of involvement asvictims or juvenile justice system participants, the publichas the perception that juveniles get off lightly, merelyslapped on the wrist all too often. And there is a strongundercurrent of belief by the public that juveniles, who areall too familiar with the powerlessness of the system, areencouraged to continue their lawless lives. While juvenileadvocates dismiss the commonly held belief that harsherpunishment would deter crime, they do concede thatstudies show consequences that are swift and sure dohave a deterrent effect.Swift, meaningfulconsequences canbe employed with'volunteer' courtsIn some areas of the State, agencies are finding waysto make consequences swift and meaningful withoutadding costs. In San Bernardino County, for instance,a volunteer teen court reviews low-level offense casesand can impose sanctions such as restitution andcommunity service. Offenders sent to the court musthave admitted their guilt and have agreed to submit to theauthority of the court of their peers in exchange foravoiding formal action. The county also uses citizenstaffed"Youth Accountability Boards" that have much thesame structure and requirements. Writing about theneeds these options meet, the chief probation officer said:We have general agreement in criminal justice that there needs to be swift and proportionateconsequences for the first-time offender; and yet this is the group left out in any case triagedue to limited resources to intervene in the minor offenses of first-time offenders. However,the existence of a Youth Accountability Board allows us to refer these cases to a board ofcommunity volunteers for a case conference and individual and community-designeddisposition. Beyond being a consequence for the youth and a support for families, it offers usand law enforcement a way to make the problems and needs of our youthful offenders "real"to the public, It creates a body of citizens intimately involved in and acutely aware of themultiple problems we deal with in every case. 8077

The Juvenile Crime ChallengeALong Beach community activist has put togethera similar neighborhood-based concept where nonseriousoffenders can be referred to a forum ofvolunteers for oversight and sanctions. She designed herprogram in response to the high rate of juvenile arrests inher area:On average, about 2,300 juvenile arrests go through the Probation Department in Long Beachevery month. This staggering volume has resulted in cases being heard far too long after thecrime has been committed. Witnesses and victims forget what happened, move or die.Courts are swamped with a backlog of cases. Youth gain the impression that theirmisbehavior will not be punished and thus lose all respect for law and order. 81In some places, special programs also target the midleveloffender who is in danger of becoming a chronicjuvenile delinquent. Redding, for instance, is one ofseveral cities that has used an OCJP grant to create aSerious Habitual Offender program. The programidentifies delinquents who have committed two offenses,warns them of the severe consequences of a third offenseand then provides intensive supervision and specialschooling for those who ignore the warning. Closecoordination by police, probation, schools, the court andother agencies enable the program to have a dramaticimpact on targeted juveniles. A key element is thatinformation sharing allows all agencies that may havecontact with the youth to have a complete picture of hisactivities. Writes the Redding police department, whichcoordinates the program:Each of our partner agencies have agreed to a zero-tolerance policy in dealing with identifiedSerious Habitual Offenders (SHOs). Those who re-offend will no longer be cited and releasedfor their wrongdoing. The Probation Department has agreed to hold all arrested SHOs incustody until they go to court. The District Attorney's Office has agreed to ... seekingmaximum penalties on any offense committed by a SHOo With this program bringing togetherinformation from so many parts of the juvenile justice system, the juvenile court will have amuch more complete picture of the SHOs activities upon which to base their dispositiondecisions should a SHO re-offend. ... Too often we have seen these same juveniles go throughthe revolving- door juvenile justice system. Our goal with the SHO program is to worktogether to shut the door on those juveniles who choose to re-offend. 82Consequences for a juvenile's actions are not onlydetermined by the level of seriousness and theoptions available to probation officers and juvenilecourts, but also are directly linked to age, both when thecrime is committed and when institutionalization may end.In both cases, policy makers have begun to examine thesystem's procedures with the goal of improving the abilityof courts to select appropriate consequences.78

System ReformsExisting lawprovides twoways to handleminors as adultsIn California, anyone under the age aT 18 whocommits a crime falls within the jurisdiction of thejuvenile court (in some states the age is 16 or 17,while others use 19 as the age of majority). Theexceptions are limited to 16- and 17 -year-aIds who arejudged to be unfit for treatment as juveniles by one of twoprocesses described in Welfare and Institutions CodeSections 707a and 707b-c. The processes involve what[s called a fitness hearing and the outcome may be toremand, or send, the juvenile into the adult court system.Once a juvenile has been remanded to adult court for onecrime, any subsequent crimes are automatically addressedin that court.Under Section 707a, a district attorney may ask ajuvenile court judge to declare a 16- or 17~year-old minorunfit for juvenile jurisdiction for any crime. It is thedistrict attorney's job to convince the court that thejuvenile has done something so heinous, or is so incapableof remorse and rehabilitation, that the juvenile should beconsidered an adult and tried in criminal court. Thejuvenile court judge then bases his decision on one or acombination of any of five criteria:• The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited bythe minor.• Whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to theexpiration of the juvenile court's jurisdiction.• The minor's previous delinquent history.• Success of previous attempts by the juvenile courtto rehabilitate the minor.• The circumstances and gravity of the offensealleged to have been committed by the minor.The process is slightly different for a list of morethan two dozen deadly, serious and violent crimesenumerated in Section 707b. For those crimes, thedistrict attorney may file a remand petition and, in what isknown as a rebuttable presumption, the juvenile isdeemed unfit unless the juvenile convinces the judge thathe should not be sent to adult criminal court. The samecriteria are used by the judge -- but the juvenile mustprove that he is fit for juvenile jurisdiction under each andeveryone of the criteria.In essence, the remand system is designed so thatthe district attorney has the burden to prove under at least79

The Juvenile Crime Challengeone criteria that a 16· or 17-year-old should be sent toadult court for garden-variety crimes. For the worstcrimes, the juvenile has the burden of proving on each ofthe five points -- a much tougher standard -- that heshould be kept in the juvenile court.The intent of the remand system is to weed outthose juveniles who are so entrenched in crime and sounlikely to be rehabilitated that there is little use insending them through the treatment/training/educationprograms of the juvenile justice system. More often!however, the remand system is viewed as a mechanismfor punishing juveniles who have been blatantly violent,vicious and unrepentant.Number ojjuveniles sentto adult courtis not clearNationally, about 3 percent of all juveniles areremanded to adult court and the federalComptroller General is expected to produce areport on the typical outcomes by the end of this year.Without statewide data on juvenile dispositions l thenumber of juveniles who are involved in fitness hearingsand who are remanded to adult court in California can onlybe estimated from other indicators. For instance, theCalifornia Youth Authority reports that, of the 3,640 newadmissions to its facilities in 1993, 1,168 came fromcrimina! courts. However, this is not an entirely accuratereflection of the number of remands since some juvenileswho are remanded are acquitted or placed on probation;also criminal courts do have the discretion to order youngadult criminals to be housed in CY A facilities forhumanitarian reasons.To try to determine patterns and results, the LittleHoover Commission surveyed the State's 15 largestcounties, but some did not have statistics on remandcases. The table below shows data from six counties thataccount for roughly one-half of the State I s population (LosAngeles, San Bernardino, Orange lSan Francisco 1 Fresnoand Kern Counties) and that provided full information forthe past three years:TABLE 2Juvenile Fitness Hearings in Six Counties1991-931993Fitness Hearings 1134Number of Remands 586Source: little Hoover Commission survey80

System ReformsWith such fragmentary data it is unwise to drawsweeping conclusions, but one thing is evident:The simple filing of a remand request by thedistrict attorney is not a guarantee that the juvenile will beswept out of the juvenile system. As the table shows,the number of juveniles remanded in the six counties hasstayed fairly steady despite the rising number of remandssought. Courts granted remands in 55 percent of thecases in 1991, 53 percent in 1992 and 52 percent in1993. Although juvenile advocates complain thatdecisions about juvenile fitness often are not made basedon proper interpretations of the criteria, clearly judges areweighing their decisions.Latest lawallows some14-year ... olds toface adult courtCriticisms of the present system come from allsides. Much of the discussion about reforming thesystem centers on lowering the age to 14 or even12 so that younger murderers may be sent to adult court.Attempts by several legislators in the 1993-94 session toadjust age provisions resulted in some changes 1 althoughnot the sweeping across-the-board reforms many hadargued for. Taking effect on January 1 is a law thatlowers the applicable age of 707a provisions to 14 (fromthe present 16) and allows the use of the 707b-c processfor 14- and 15-year-olds who are accused of committingmurder (although not for the other serious crimes listed in707b).Other states use a variety of remand ages, asindicated by the table on the next page:81

The Juvenile Crime ChallengeTABLE 3Sample of State Remand RestrictionsState Age of Possible Transfer RestrictionsMajority to Criminal CourtColorado 18 14 and older Felony crimeFlorida 18 14 and older NoneNo specific ageIf previously adjudicated for a violentcrime against a person and currentlycharged with a subsequent violentcrime; if offense is punishable by deathor life imprisonment; if demanded bychild or guardianGeorgia 17 No specific age Concurrent jurisdiction if child allegedto have committed offense punishableby death or life imprisonmentIllinois 17 13 and older None13 and older Offense punishable by death or lifeimprisonment15 and older None; mandatory waiver if childcharged with burglary on three or moreoccasions in the pastMassachusetts 17 14 and older Previous commitment to state juvenilefacility and child accused of crimepunishable by state prison if adultcommitted; if crime involves threat orinfliction of serious bodily harmPennsylvania 18 14 and older Permitted if felony I mandatory ifmurder; child may requestTexas 17 15 and older FelonyUtah 18 14 and older FelonyWashington 18 15 and older Class A felony or attempted Class AfelonySource: California Youth Authority's "Juvenile Corrections In Ten States: An Overview and Update;" data currentas of 1991.As the table indicates, several of the nation's largestates have less restrictive policies thanCalifornia's remand law in terms of age, althoughmany of the waiver laws contain specific direction aboutwhen juveniles may be remanded.82

System ReformsA common presumption underlying the push tolower the remand age in California is that it would bemore equitable or more punitive to place young violentand hardened offenders in the criminal system where theiradult counterparts are dealt with. In addition, somesupport the concept as a way of shifting the more seriousyoung criminals to the state prison system where theannual cost is less than in juvenile facilities.Outcome inadult courtnot as harshas some perceiveWhile hard data is difficult to find, many expertsand system participants say that thepresumption that sending juveniles to adult courtis a tougher response to crime is not necessarily borneout. The reality of the current system, they say I is thatyouths sent to adult court 1) sometimes are not convictedat all because a jury cannot bring themselves to findsomeone so young guilty; 2) sometimes are put on felonyprobation when the juvenile court would have incarceratedthem; 3) may benefit from a plea bargain designed toavoid the cost or uncertainty of a trial; or 4) may besentenced to a determinate period and earn half~off creditfor good behavior in the adult system when they wouldhave spent a greater time incarcerated in the CaliforniaYouth Authority.RAND expert Greenwood agrees with thisassessment. In testimony to the Commission, he saidthat several studies have found that "youth who werewaived were not, on the average, treated any moreseverely than those who were not." And he noted thatsome juvenile advocates actually believe that, with theswing to more punitive measures in juvenile courts andinstitutions, the rights of juveniles are actually betterprotected in criminal court where they will have a jurytrial. 83 Thus advocates of "harsher" treatment of youngerviolent juveniles may actually not achieve their goals byworking to send more of the youths to adult court. Butcomplaints about the remand system go beyond wherethe age line should be drawn. Critics argue that:• The hearings almost invariably focus on the crimerather than on the juvenile and his amenability torehabilitation efforts.• In the case of 707b-c procedures, the juvenilefaces a Catch 22. The process is only used forserious crimes -- yet one of the criteria underwhich the juvenile must prove he is not unfitdepends on the seriousness of the crime.83

The Juvenile Crime Challenge• A juvenile who is remanded to adult court mayeventually agree to a plea bargain or be convictedof a lesser crime that would not have made himsubject to the remand process.• Under an appellate court ruling, evidence that thejuvenile did not commit the crime -- such as analibi -- may not be considered during a fitnesshearing, even though the first and fifth criteriaboth center on an assessment of the juvenile inlight of the committed crime. 84• The criteria do not take into consideration whetherit is likely that the juvenile will be rehabilitated, butonly whether it is possible.• The criteria do not include an evaluation ofwhether the care, treatment and guidance availableto the juvenile court is the appropriate method ofholding the minor accountable for his actions.• The sections lack definitions for fitness, criminalsophistication and amenability, leading to differinginterpretations in different jurisdictions.CYA usuallyloses jurisdictionover juvenile atage 21 or 25Some juvenile justice system critics have argued thatall juveniles should be retained in juvenile court sincethey are usually housed in CY A facilities anywaywhether their commitment comes from juvenile court orthe adult court. But this ignores the issue that thejuvenile system loses jurisdiction and control overeveryone at the age of 21, 23 or 25 (if the person'ssentence maximum has not expired before then),regardless of the crime or perceived need for a longerperiod of treatment. There are three categories of wardsincarcerated in CY A facilities: 1) Those who are sent toCY A from juvenile court must be released by age 21 or25, depending on the crime; 2) those who are committedto CY A from adult court must be released at age 25 (orage 23 in the case of a misdemeanor), although one-yearenhancements are allowed for up to four parole violations;and 3) those who are sentenced by adult court to stateprison terms but who are ordered housed in CY A facilitiesmay be kept up until they turn 25, at which time they aretransferred to state prison. Law taking effective January1, 1995 will restrict the housing of some 16 and 17 yearaids at CY A, but for the most part the categories remainunchanged. The practical effect of the age restrictions isthat CY A often must release wards based on their age,rather than on how long they have served or theirbehavior.84

System ReformsThe table below shows the number of releasesfrom CY A facilities each year for the past five years dueto age limits (not including transfers to state prison):TABLE 4Releases from CY A Facilities Due To Age1989-93Year Number Percent of TotalCYA Releases1989 421 9.91990 378 9.51991 473 11.91992 338 8.71993 298Source: California Youth Authority'Maxing out'problem mayput dangerouspeople on streetAs the table indicates, releases due to agejurisdiction expiring account for between 8 and 12percent of CY A releases annually. To see thesignificance of these numbers it is important tounderstand that those committed to CY A are servingindeterminate sentences, with the maximum lengthgoverned by the crime, comparable adult sentence andchronological age of the offender. Wards entering thesystem are given an expected parole date, which can berevised according to an annual assessment of theirtreatment progress, behavior and prospects for leading acrime-free life when released. Those who IImax out" atage 25 almost invariably have been skipped over becauseof the belief by authorities that they are still a danger tothe public.Those who are released at age 25 for the mostpart cannot be placed on parole. Since parole in theoryprovides a mechanism for returning someone to custodyif set conditions are violated, the juvenile justice systemwould have to have jurisdiction past 25 to place thesereleased wards on parole. While policy makers haveconsidered extending the age to 30 or beyond, someobservers say that the system at some point has to giveup on monitoring the offender's behavior and thatincreasing the jurisdiction age only moves the problem tosome later age. Others, however, point out that there issomething faulty in the reasoning behind a system thatprovides parole oversight for those released from CY Afacilities before they turn 25 but does not provide any85

The Juvenile Crime Challengeoversight for those whose offense} institution behavior orparole prospects are so bad that officials have refused torelease them sooner.The possibility of returning the nmaxed-out" wardsto court for a new assessment and adjudication processraises due-process and constitutional questions but alimited model does exist in current law. Under presentstatutes, CY A can seek further confinement of those 25-year-old wards who they can prove are a danger tosociety because of a treatable mental or physicaldeficiency, disorder or abnormality -- a category that hasbeen narrowly restricted by court interpretations. Thisrarely used law allows CY A to return the ward to court fora trial if the ward does not voluntarily agree to remain intreatment.Rigid age limits,number of caseshinder performanceof juvenile systemAsystem that relies on rigid approaches tochronological age and is too overburdened to dealadequately with all juveniles is hard put to maintainthe concepts of personal accountability for decisions andconsequences linked to actions -- yet these concepts arecritical to the credibility and continued acceptance of aseparate juvenile court system.Recommendation 7:Working together, the State and the countiesshould ensure that a continuum of optionsexist so that a range of consequences addressesmisconduct by juveniles at all levels ofseverity.From the point of first contact with the juvenilejustice system, a youth should be made aware thathe is accountable for his actions and that illegalactivity brings consequences. Counties should constructa continuum of options, including the use of volunteer andcommunity resources, to ensure that juvenile delinquencyis addressed at all levels. The State's new juvenileagency should assist counties by providing an assessmentof their options, outlining ways to increase the range ofsanctions and, when possible and necessary, identifyingfunding to accomplish a workable continuum of programs.For each juvenile who comes in contact with thejuvenile justice system, the first step should be a thoroughassessment of his needs for treatment and services.Options after the assessment will fall into one of three86

System Reformscategories: 1) diversion; 2) local treatment and 3} stateincarceration. Diversion out of the system for youths withlow-level needs and non-serious crimes can provideconsequences through enforced participation incommunity or teen court programs. At the other end ofthe spectrum, juveniles who have committed multiple andserious crimes and who have intensive~treatment needsshould be sent to the California Youth Authority.Community-based treatment programs, including daytreatment, intensive supervision and residential care whenneeded, should provide appropriate consequences for themid-range of offenders.Recommendation 8:The Governor and the Legislature shouldajlopt legislation that allows victims or affectedfamily members to present testimony duringthe juvenile adjudication process.In criminal court, victims or their relatives may offertestimony about the impact of the crime on their livesduring penalty phases of trials. No such input isprovided for in the juvenile system. In addition toacknowledging the needs of victims for a voice in thesystem, providing a role for victims in the juvenile courtprocess would confront juveniles with the reality of theiractions and the consequences to others.Recommendation 9:The Governor and the Legislature shouldadopt legislation that restructures the remandprocess to maximize judicial flexibility to makeappropriate dispositions of juvenile cases.The current remand process should be restructuredin two ways: 1) The criteria on which judges basetheir decision to send juveniles to adult courtshould be revised and better defined; and 2) a narrow andprocedurally difficult process should be established foraddressing the rare, very young offender who is beyondhope of rehabilitation or whose crime is so severe that thebalance of consequences, even while focused ondeterrence, favors a severe penalty.87

The Juvenile Crime Challenge1 . The criteria on which judges now base theirdecisions about fitness are poorly defined and opento inconsistent interpretation. Redrafted criteriashould focus clearly on the likelihood -- rather thanmerely the possibility -- of rehabilitation occurringif the juvenile were exposed to appropriatetreatment, training and education. Possiblewording suggested to the Commission:In determining the amenability of a minor, thejuvenile court shall consider the emotional,intellectual and moral qualities of the youth asevidenced by his behavior prior to the allegedcriminal act. The juvenile court shall thoroughlyevaluate the minor's family background,psychological profile, school attendance andachievement! community involvement and anyprevious contact with the juvenile court. Thejuvenile court shall also evaluate the degree towhich the minor has involved himself in a criminallifestyle! as evidenced by the number and nature ofany prior contact with the juvenile court! and thenature and the effectiveness of previous attemptsby the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor. Thejuvenile court may also consider the manner inwhich the alleged criminal act was committed andthe extent of the youth I s participation in theplanning and conduct of the criminal act.In addition! the concepts of criminal sophistication,amenability and fitness should be defined if theyremain in the criteria.2. The Commission is not convinced that lowering theage of possible remand from the present 16-yearoldcutoff accomplishes improved public safety.However, it is possible to envision a rare -- thoughdeeply troubling -- case where a 12- 113-, 14- or15-year-old may be so psychologically damaged 1so entrenched in a life of crime and so immunefrom feelings of remorse or desire to change thatrehabilitation is futile. A new law that takeseffective in 1995 partially addresses this bylowering the age of remand in some cases to 14.The Commission believes, however, that furtherrevision is desirable. To construct a narrowwindow to address a youth of any age underappropriate conditions l the present 707a processshould be revamped, eliminating any reference toage but also increasing the threshold of proof.Under such a revision! the district attorney would88

System Reformshave to prove that the young offender was unfitfor treatment as a juvenile under each and everycriteria (either as they now exist or under theredrafted version).Recommendation 10,:The Governor and the Legislature shouldadopt legislation that returns a juvenile tojuvenile court jurisdiction if an adult criminalcourt trial results in a conviction of a crimethat is not listed in the Welfare andInstitutions Code Section 707b.Under existing law, a juvenile may be remanded toadult court for any of the many serious and violentcrimes listed in Section 707b. Once in adult court,however, his case may be plea-bargained down to a lesseroffense or he may be found guilty by a jury of a lesseroffense. Although the outcome in these cases indicateshe should not be handled as an adult, there is nomechanism currently for returning him to the jurisdictionof the juvenile court for sentencing or disposition .. Creating such a mechanism would provide for moreappropriate treatment and/or incarceration.Recommendation 11: The Governor and the Legislature shouldadopt legislation that creates a system thatallows judicial scrutiny and new disposition ofcases where juveniles reach the maximum agein state custody and are still considered to be athreat to society based on their commitmentoffense, their conduct while incarcerated andthe nature and circumstances of their crime.Under existing law l a juvenile who "maxes out" in aCY A facility at age 21 or 25 (depending on thecrime and situation under which the juvenile wassent to CY A) may not be retained or placed on probationbut must simply be released. The sole, narrow exceptionallows the State to seek further confinement based on the89

The Juvenile Crime Challengeargument that treatable physical or mental damage exists.A trial can then be held if the juvenile does not voluntarilyagree to the extension of incarceration and treatment.A similar mechanism should be created for thosewards who are sentenced to CY A but refuse to takeadvantage of the opportunity for reform and rehabilitationbecause they know they will be set free at a certain ageregardless of their actions. While the Commission isconcerned about constitutional issues, including doublejeopardy I the need to protect the public from dangerouscriminals is strong; therefore, the creation of a system toaddress these small numbers of offenders should beconsidered.90

The Juvenile Crime ChallengeRecommendation 14: The Governor and the Legislature should resistefforts to create a determinate sentencingstructure for juveniles or to remove wardassessment and release authorization from anindependent body.Were it not for the particular policies of recentYouthful Offender Parole Boards that havelengthened commitment times, it is difficult tobelieve that juvenile advocates -- who push individualizedassessment and understand the need to deal with juvenilerehabilitation on a case-by-case basis -- would prefer asystem that simply sets a date and releases a wardregardless of his progress. The irony is particularlynoticeable when the much-touted Massachusetts programuses a panel and review mechanism much like theYouthful Offender Parole Board to determine the need forsecurity, length of stay and specific program placement. 98While the Little Hoover Commission rarely takes astance against specific proposals, its perspective ofdeterminate sentencing structures and their negativeaffect as seen in the adult criminal sentencing system isone of firm disapproval. While specific policies may comeand go as the membership of the Youthful Offender ParoleBoard changes, the structure that it represents is arational one in light of the rehabilitative goals of thejuvenile justice system.Much more supportable from a theoreticalperspective would be proposals to balance Boardmembership and to upgrade expertise by settingprofessional requirements for membership.Recommendation 15: The Governor and the Legislature should linkincreased funding for CYAjuvenile treatmentprograms to the adoption of legislationprecluding the Youthful Offender ParoleBoardfrom adding time to a ward'scommitment stay solely because programminghas been unavailable.118

Youth Authority• Reduction in state operations 1991-92: $13.1million. Among the cuts were $6.2 million inadministrative and support expenses by combiningbranches and reorganizing functions; $1.5 millionby "standardizing" intensive-treatment programstaffing levels; $.8 million by reducing the numberof camp crew counselors; and $2.2 million byincreasing parole agent caseloads and reorganizingparole field offices.• Reduction in state operations 1992-93: $7.4million. Among the cuts were $1 million byeliminating inspections of juvenile halls; $.6 millionby closing two parole field offices and increasingsome supervision ratios; $2.7 million by eliminatingbranch offices and reducing the number oftreatment team supervisors, institution paroleagents and parole violator investigators; and $2.2million by deferring maintenance and eliminatingequipment and Training Academy funding.• Reduction in state operations 1993-94: $1 .5million. Among the cuts were $.4 million in furtherparole office reductions and $.8 million in reducednumbers of program administrators, parole agentsand maintenance positions in institutions.By the beginning of the 1994-95 budget year, eVAhad a total of 5 /187 staff with 4,851 assigned toinstitutions and 336 (6.5 percent) providing administrativeoversight, services and support in the central office. Thiscompares to a total of 5,071 in 1990-91 before the cutsbegan. This 2 percent growth in staff over four years canbe compared to the 11 percent increase in wards duringthe same time to explain program waiting lists and thesystem's declining ability to provide quality rehabilitationprograms.Resources arekey to CYA'sdeclining abilityto treat wardsThose who work in the institutions and those whoare critical observers believe the eVA's ability toprovide appropriate treatment, education andtraining to juveniles has decreased markedly. Budgetcuts, rather than errant philosophy, appear to be largelyresponsible. Although the State has few resourcesavailable to change the situation, the prospects forjuveniles to be rehabilitated, deterred from crime andequipped for productive lives depend on the ability ofpolicy makers to find creative reforms that can changepriorities and commitment patterns.117

The Juvenile Crime ChallengeAs the tables indicate, in 1993 there were 277assault and batteries on staff (93 with a weapon);1,090 assault and batteries by wards on otherwards (140 with a weapon); 97 staff injuries; and 410ward injuries. Chemical restraints used to break up fightsaffected 2,762 wards (the rate for the use of theseclimbed in the 1990s after CY A told staff to usechemicals rather than physical intervention as a first resortin order to reduce injuries). Rates in almost all categorieson all of the charts showed declines in 1993.While historically fairly steady, the rates still painta depressing picture of institutions where the safety ofwards cannot be assured: In 1993, 410 wards wereinjured and 2,762 were sprayed with chemicals to haltincidents. It is not unexpected that the setting forhandling the most chronic and violent juveniles in theState would be other than placid. But CY A studies haveshown that crowding institutions and placing largernumbers of wards in dormitory settings increases thenumber of incidents and assaults. 97 This not only makesthe institutions less safe for staff and wards, but alsoresults in longer confinement times (through penalty timeadds and the inability of wards to complete programmingdue to disruptions), which are costly to the State.Budget cutshave squeezedprograms, raisedcase ratiosThere is general agreement among institutionexperts that dormitory settings -- which account for 2,642beds in the 6,692-bed design capacity of the Californiasystem -- enable violence. But they also are cheaper toconstruct and staff. Critics have credited CY A withlobbying for an end to dormitory construction but budgetrealities and legislative priorities have often displacedconcern for building effective and safe programs.The physical layout of CY A facilities is not the onlyportion of the system that is affected by fiscalconstraints. In each of the three budget yearsbeginning with 1991-92, CYA ~- like most other stateagencies -- has been forced to trim expenditures as part ofthe unallocated budget cuts approved by the Legislatureand Governor each year. The department has lost nearly$60 million in funding despite annual increases in thenumber of wards committed to its care and oversight.While the cuts included $38 million that simply shiftedcounty subsidy funds from the CY A budget into countyblock grants, $22 million represented cuts that had to bemade in state operations. Steps taken to cope with thecuts each year included:116

Youth AuthontyTABLE 8eVA Ward Assaults and Batteries on Other Wards, 1989-93Type of 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993Incident No. Rate No. Rate No. Rats No. Rats No. RateAssault 55 .007 45 .006 30 .004 40 .005 32 .004wIweaponAssault, 143 .017 123 .015 111 .014 82 .010 92 .011noweaponBattery 78 .009 88 .011 92 .012 111 .014 108 .013wIweaponBattery, 990 .119 916 .115 1006 .126 1034 .127 858 .103noweaponTOTAL 1266 .153 1172 .147 1239 .155 1267 .156 1090 .131TABLE 9CVA Staff and Ward Injuries, 1989 .. 93Year Staff Injuries Ward InjuliesNo. Rate No. RateSource: California Youth Authority1989 102 .012 272 .0321990 111 .013 382 .0461991 150 .018 309 .0371992 113 .013 476 .0561993 97 .011 410 .047TABLE 10Wards Exposed to Chemical Restraints, 1989-1993Year Number Rate1989 (est.) 2,210 .2591990 2,195 .2661991 2,888 .3491992 2,740 .3231993 2,762 .318115

The Juvenile Crime ChallengeCYA facilitiesraise questionsof ward,staff safetyIn addition to believing that the wrong juveniles oftenend up in CY A facilities, critics also believe CY A'sphysical layout does not provide adequate protectionfor those who are committed to confinement there. Gangactivity and individual aggression are able to flourish incrowded dormitory settings, in contrast to the greatersafety and control that would be provided in small groupsettings and single or double cells, observers say.Statistics indicate that for most indicators, thelevel of violence and incidents in CY A facilities hasremained fairly steady over the past five years endingwith improved rates in 1993. In that time, no staff deathshave occurred because of ward activity; nine wards havedied, seven from suicide, one from drowning and one froma seizure following a ward-an-ward fight. Tables belowand on the next page show the number and type ofassaults on staff, ward-an-ward assaults, staff injuriesand ward injuries for the past five years. Rates peraverage daily population allow the statistics to becompared absent the influence of the system' s growingpopulation.TABLE 7eVA Ward Assaults and Batteries on Staff, 1989-93Type of 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993Incident No. Rate No. Rate No. Rate No. Rate No. RateAssault wi 31 .004 35 .004 32 .004 39 .005 22 .003weaponAssault, no 104 .013 73 .009 98 .012 132 .016 97 .012weaponBattery wi 39 .005 53 .007 58 .007 52 .006 71 .009weaponBattery, no 113 .014 97 .012 86 .011 96 .012 87 .010weaponTOTAL 287 .035 258 .032 274 .034 319 .039 277 .033Source: Callforma Youth Authonty114

Youth AuthorityAs the highlighted portions of the table on theprevious page indicate, there are 16 countieswhose proportion of serious commitments is 50percent or fewer of the 378 wards they send to CY A.While many of these wards may well need CY Aplacement, many more would undoubtedly be placed inother alternative programs if they lived in differentcounties.A key factor that prompts the geographicaldisparity is differing levels of resources and differing localpriorities. As discussed in Issue 3, the juvenile justicesystem competes with other priorities for discretionaryfunds at the county level. State efforts to encourage thedevelopment of local options in the past with dedicatedsubsidies, while successful, have been scrapped asbudget pressures have increased.Carefully craftedstate subsidiesto divert juvenileshave workedStudies of both the Probation Subsidy Program of the1960s and '70s and the County Justice SystemSubvention Program of the late 1970s and t80sfound that they worked well to increase local options,divert commitments and lower state costS.96 Forinstance, the Probation Subsidy Program reduced adultand juvenile commitments by 35,000 while transferring tocounties $145 million in subsidies between 1966 and1975. Because the original subsidy of $4,000 perdiverted prisoner/ward was never increased, the subsidyeventually lost its buying power -- and much of its allurefor counties -- in terms of alternative programming.The Probation Subsidy Program was replaced bythe County Justice System Subvention Program in 1978and after four years of operation was found to haveserved 35,200 adults and juveniles who were at risk ofbeing committed to state facilities. This program becamea block grant with no strings attached -- and thereafterhad very little impact on state commitments -- and waseventually given to counties permanently through a salestaxshift.Critics who want to see the present systemreplaced with more county options and more judicious useof state facilities urge reforms that fall into one of twocategories: carrots (renewed subsidies tightly constructedto ensure that new alternatives are developed rather thanexisting county expenditures being supplanted) or sticks(requiring all counties to pay the full cost of sendingyouths to state facilities). The inherent problem with bothis that they require funds, whether state or county, thatare not easily squeezed out of present revenues.113

The Juvenile Crime ChallengeTABLE 6County-By-County Breakdown of CY A PopulationCounty # to CVA % Serious County # to eVA %SeriousAlameda 302 83.4% Orange 296 66.2%Alpine Placer 6 16.7%Amador Plumas 3 66.7%Butte 16 68.8% Riverside 174 66.1 %Calaveras 2 0.0% Sacramento 257 59.5%Colusa 5 20.0% San Benito 13 46.2%Contra Costa 153 75.8% San Bernardino 197 75.0%Del Norte 4 50.0% San Diego 287 67.2%EI Dorado 10 80.0% San Francisco 72 79.2%Fresno 328 64.9% San Joaquin 206 57.3%Glenn 11 45.5% San Luis Obispo 16 56.3%Humboldt 13 61.5% San Mateo 103 75.7%Imperial 8 62.5% Santa Barbara 41 43.9%Inyo 3 66.7% Santa Clara 245 73.5%Kern 290 51.0% Santa Cruz 20 80.0%Kings 63 47.6% Shasta 34 35.3%Lake 12 75.0% SierraLassen 6 66.7% Siskyou 6 16.7%Los Angeles 2,956 73.2% Solano 68 73.5%Madera 49 49.0% Sonoma 31 51.6%Marin 8 62.5% Stanislaus 83 51.8%Mariposa 1 0.0% Sutter 12 50.0%Mendocino 12 41.7% Tehama 9 44.4%Merced 83 47.0% Trinity 6 33.3%Modoc 1 0.0% Tulare 109 53.2%Mono Tuolumne 1 0.0%Monterey 59 67.8% Ventura 112 58.9%Napa 9 44.4% Yolo 39 51.3%Nevada 5 60.0% Yuba 27 33.3%Source: Youthful Offender Parole Board Total 6,882 67.9%112

effort is wasted, resulting in overcrowding andwarehousing. 95Youth AuthorityCommonweal argued in "Reforming the CYA" thatalmost 50 percent of the juveniles in state facilities couldbe safely handled elsewhere, including those who werecommitted for:• non-violent offenses with minimal prior juvenilejustice involvement.• non-violent offenses with prior contacts only forminor offenses.• non-violent offenses with prior contacts for seriousoffenses, who would have to be vigorouslyscreened.• moderate offenses but with minimal or no priorcontact with the juvenile justice system.CY A officials, however, say that 87 percent oftheir commitments come from counties with a full rangeof services and that 25 percent of the intake populationare sent to CY A from the adult criminal court system -­both indicators that the juveniles have exhausted lesseroptions.Statistics showthat for someCYA is first -­not last -- optionSome CY A statistics do point to the possibility thatselective screening could divert some juveniles fromthe costly state program. In 1992's 3 /000-plus firstadmissions, CYA found that the records of 2,926 firstadmissions showed that 613 had no prior convictions orsustained petitions and another 452 had only one. Of2 /947 first admissions, 1,367 had no prior commitmentsto an institution.The patterns of different counties also suggest thatgeography, rather than individual crime or need l plays alarge role in who is sent to the CY A facilities. The tableon the following page takes the system's population on asingle day in 1993 and shows county of origin andpercentage who were committed based on serious crimes.111

The Juvenile Crime Challengereasons for time adds. State officials did not, however,deny that the problem of longer sentences because ofinability to program does occur. Regardless of frequency,critics point out, the inherent inequity of penalizing a wardfor something beyond his control and the added cost andnon-productiveness of time while the ward awaitsrequired programming are factors that should beaddressed in a system that holds out rehabilitation as itsmain goal.Key question:Do all wardsreally needCYA program?Afar more contentious area of criticism regarding theCalifornia Youth Authority is the issue of whetherthe high-cost, intensive-treatment focus of thefacilities is necessary for all of the wards that arecommitted there. CY A officials contend that all of thewards have records that reflect a need for secureconfinement, pointing out that a judge must make afinding that no other suitable alternative exists beforesending a youth to the state facilities. While the Statehas the ability to reject committed youth, it rarely does so-- perhaps a maximum of four or five cases a year,officials said. Writing in response to Commonwealcriticisms in this area, CY A emphasized that its decisionto accept a youth turns on whether the youth can benefitfrom the services:Under the law, before the juvenile court may commit a ward to the Youth Authority the judgemust make a finding that there are no other alternatives that will meet the ward's needs andthat it is "probable II that he or she will be benefitted by the commitment. Those issues arefully litigated in court, with counsel for both the minor and the people able to present evidenceand argument. Further, the Probation Department, which is most familiar with local alternativeand the minor's prior history and behavior, submits a report and recommendation which maybe challenged by the attorney representing the minor. The decision itself is subject to reviewby the appellate courts. In contrast, the department's intake unit sees only the probationreport and the judge's order. Under the statute, if the department concludes that the ward"may be materially benefitted, " it must accept the commitment. Under such a standard, andbased only on a paper review of the case, it should be apparent that the departmen t is in apoor position to routinely second guess the court. .. 94The CY At s argument, while persuasive, ignores thevagaries of local alternatives, as critics havepointed out. The Legislative Analyst's Office toldthe Commission that only three-quarters of those in CY Aare there for serious offenses and that some 20 countiesroutinely send less-than-serious offenders to CY A. Thisoccurs because these counties spend very little money onlocal options. Less than half the counties in the Statehave local ranches or camps and 18 do not have a juvenilehall. In these cases, the analyst's office said, juvenilesare sent to CY A on whom the intensive rehabilitation110

Youth AuthorityTABLE 5Net Time Added By Category of Offense1993CategoryTime Addedin Months1 . Murder f kidnap with death/ injury 10.62. Voluntary manslaughter, rape 4.83. Robbery, burglary with injury 6.74. Involuntary manslaughter, narcotics 5.45. Assault, battery, burglary 4.96. Firearms, bombs, arson 3.87. Auto theft, stolen property, drugs 2.9Source: California Youth AuthorityAs the table indicates, more serious commitmentoffenses usually earned greater amounts of timeadds. Many time adds are the result of wardbehavior. Wards who assault other wards or act out inother ways may be given additional time when the Boardreviews their case annually. Wards also are confinedlonger when they refuse to cooperate with treatmentplans and fail to progress through programs that the Boardhas ordered them to complete before release.Overcrowding,lack of resourcesproduce longwaiting listsAnother situation under which time is added,however I is not under the control of the ward.When the Board sets the original paroleconsideration date, it also orders a program of treatmentbased on recommendations from CY A staff. This mayinvolve a combination of services offered by CYAinstitutions, including specialized sex offender counseling,substance abuse treatment, victim awareness education,parenting skills courses and others. The snag occurswhen the ward is ordered to complete a program that hecannot gain entrance to because of overcrowding. Thespecial sex offender program has a waiting list of severalhundred (although as this is being written the program isbeing greatly expanded). Even the victim awarenessprogram, which calls for less specialized services than thesex offender counseling, has lengthy waiting lists at someinstitutions.The Youthful Offender Parole Board told theCommission it does not keep cumulative records based on109

The Juvenile Crime ChallengeCHART 720000Confmement Time Adds and Cuts1989-93------------c:---'----'-------.. ----.,---LegendAddsB Cuts1500015,484.2 I"E 10ooo---.J~II6,2895000 --: -------O--·---~~---_+==L----1989 1990 1991 1992 1993As the chart indicates, the juvenile system -- whichdoes not credit wards with 50 percent off time forgood behavior as the adult system does -- uses farmore time adds than time cuts. In 1993, the Boardordered wards to serve an additional 15,484 months. Nettime adds and cuts averaged 3.5 months per ward,according to the California Youth Authority, although thetimes varied greatly as related to commitment offense.The following table shows the net time added in 1993:108

house the wards does not allow for adequate separationof conflicting goals.Youth AuthorityIn recognizing in the Youthful Offender ParoleBoard model the very elements it has recommended forincorporation in the adult sentencing system, theCommission notes that:• Longer sentences appear to be in line with the mixof rehabilitation functions and punishment calledfor in state statutes and sought by the public.• The Board bases its decision not on case-by-casewhimsy but on publicly adopted guidelines anddocumented input from CY A experts who workwith and assess the wards.• Solving overcrowding through a policy of releasingwards sooner, irrespective of their rehabilitativestatus, would have a negative impact on publicsafety and further erode public support for theseparate juvenile justice system.Wards may beretained solelybecause treatmentnot availableThe operation of the Youthful Offender Parole Boardis not problem-free, however. Of particular concernto critics are confinement times that arelengthened, not because a ward has misbehaved orrefused to cooperate with treatment programs, butbecause space is not available in programs the Board hasordered completed before the ward will be released. Thefollowing chart displays the cumulative time adds andcuts the Board has ordered for the past five years.107

The Juvenile Crime ChallengeIn making its decisions about custody time, theBoard follows a grid that classifies wards in sevencategories based on their commitment crime. Forinstance, Category 1, which involves murder orkidnapping resulting in substantial injury or death, calls forseven years of custody time. Category 2, which involvesmanslaughter and rape, earns four years of custody time,and so on down to Category 7 for minor crimes and paroletechnical violations, which calls for a year or less inconfinement. The Board considers mitigating andaggravating circumstances involving the specificcommitment crime and the ward's past history todetermine deviations from the grid standards. The grid isadopted by the Board using the state regulatory process.Criticism of the Board centers on several aspects:• The Board has repeatedly lengthened the guidelinesfor time served, extending costly incarceration forwards beyond the time needed for treatment andrehabilitation, according to critics.• The Board mandates the treatment program foreach individual ward and assesses the ward t sprogress even though members are politicalappointees who are not required to have anyparticular expertise.• The Board is the single most important factorbehind institution overcrowding. Longer termshave kept wards from being released out the backdoor at the same time that increasing number ofcommitments are crowding in the front door.Ward releasestructure similarto recommendationfor adult systemIn calling for reform of the system, someadvocates have pushed for determinate sentences thatwould erase disparities between similar cases, whileothers have argued that CY A, which monitors the wardson a day-to-day basis, is in the best position to knowwhen a ward should be released.The calf for determinate sentencing is unimpressiveto the Little Hoover Commission, which has justcompleted a review of the impact of determinatesentencing on the adult corrections system. Turning tosuch a fixed-date system particularly flies in the face ofthe rehabilitation model of the juvenile system, whichrequires flexibility and individualized assessment andtreatment. In addition, placing the decision of whenwards are ready to be released in the hands of the sameagency that faces budgetary pressures from having to106

Youth Authoritysending larger numbers of juveniles to state prison.Writing in the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & PublicPolicy, two Florida experts noted:The closing of juvenile training schools and other residential facilities -- originally given impetusby the liberal de-institutionalization movement, later sustained by fiscal conservatism -- hasmeant that there are few opportunities for rehabilitation remaining in the juvenile system. Fewbeds are available in residential programs and lengths of stay have been cut sharply in an efforton the part of juvenile justice officials to accommodate the demand. In the face of theseconstraints -- which are not unique to Florida -- the trend toward transfer of greater numbersof youths to criminal court is likely to continue unabated. 93Floridacounts its juveniles as 17 and under, with thejurisdiction of juvenile court ending at 18. Remandto criminal court can occur as young as 14.While juvenile advocates would like to see thetreatment concepts embraced in Massachusetts and Utahput into action in California, second thoughts may be inorder in light of the Florida example -- especiallyconsidering Californials track record of deinstitutionalizingthe mentally ill for their own good, only to leave themworse off by refusing to fund the promised localtreatment. Closing California's large institutions will notadvance rehabilitation if local program options are notgreatly expanded to take on responsibility for thejuveniles.Scrapping CYAmodel may fuelunintendedconsequencesThe end result of following the Massachusetts modelalso might be less than advocates desire ifCalifornia policy makers adopt other aspects of theMassachusetts system as well, such as determining that17-year-olds are adults, 18-year-olds and above cannot behoused in state juvenile facilities and remanding juvenilesas young as 14 to criminal court. Ending juvenile courtjurisdiction at age 18 alone would push almost 6,000people out of state juvenile facilities, most likely into adultprisons, where experience has shown that very littleoccurs in the way of productive rehabilitation as reflectedby recidivism rates.Apart from their dislike of CY A institutions as avehicle for rehabilitating juveniles, Commonweal and otherjuvenile advocates also are critical of the mechanism thatdetermines how long juveniles will remain in custody. TheYouthful Offender Parole Board, seven members appointedby the Governor, sets parole consideration dates forwards, assesses the readiness of wards to leave CY Afacilities, authorizes parole and revokes parole whenconditions are violated.105

The Juvenile Crime Challengeon commitment mode and offense. Remand to criminalcourt can only occur for 16- and 17 -year-olds. Whatthese comparisons mean is that California's juvenilejustice system is required to handle both older and moreserious offenders than the Massachusetts system, bothfactors which will affect recidivism rates.Utah: Facing a class-action lawsuit filed in 1975over the conditions in its juvenile facilities and thepossibility of court-ordered control of its juvenile justicesystem, Utah abandoned its large institutions by 1983.Created in their place was a community-based systemmuch like Massachusetts', augmented by a total of 70beds in three small high-security facilities for the mostviolent and chronic offenders. In 1988, the systemhandled about 700 juveniles.Utah resultsshowed highrecidivism butfewer crimesAs in Massachusetts, recidivism results in Utah canbe read a variety of ways. A study cited byCommonweal showed that between 53 and 81percent of those released continued to be arrested forcrimes but at lesser rates in the year following theircommunity-based treatments. The study showed that the247 youths followed accounted for 1,765 arrests in the12 months prior to their commitment to the state. Oncereleased to the community after treatment, the sameyouths accounted for 593 arrests. The conclusion thatcan be drawn is that recidivism from community-basedprograms was high but the number of crimes attached tothe high recidivism rate were fewer. Another study thattracked Utah juveniles released from the small secureunits showed that 75 percent committed crimes in thefollowing year.Like California, Utah defines its juveniles as 17 andunder. But the age at which the juvenile court jurisdictionends is 20. Remand to criminal court can occur as youngas 14.Florida: A 1983 class-action lawsuit causedFlorida to close two of its four large institutions, whichtogether housed 847 delinquents. Eventually in 1987 acourt settlement was reached that required the state todrastically reduce the population in the remaining twoschools. While juvenile advocates pushed for communitybasedtreatment in Florida, Commonweal and othersources report that political sensitivities and tight budgetshave delayed the development of an adequate continuumof options. While there are some model private programsthat juveniles are sent to, by and large Florida has takenup the slack from its closed juvenile institutions by104

Youth Authorityinstitutions. In 1988, the state had 1,800 youths undercommitment with 312 (18 percent) in a secure setting andthe remainder in community programs. While juvenileadvocates tout the system as reducing recidivism andcosts, its success has not been universally acclaimed.One endorseme nt of the system change noted:Where a full continuum of care was implemented, there was a significant reduction Inrecidivism .... Perhaps most important, prior to the reforms 40 percent of the adults inMassachusetts I prisons were graduates of the juvenile justice system. Since the reform, thathas fallen to 19 percent. Massachusetts has the second lowest rate of juvenile crime in thenation. 90RAN0 expert Greenwood reviewed studies of theMassachusetts reform that were made at varioustimes and summarized:An evaluation of the Massachusetts reforms, which compared outcomes for samples of youthcommitted before and after the reforms occurred, found higher average recidivism rates for thepost-reform youth, which were partially explained by a decrease in less-serious offenders beingcommitted to {the state system}. However, in those parts of the state where the new modelswere most successfully implemented, post-reform recidivism rates appeared to be lower. 91State-to-statecomparisonsdiffiCUlt becauseof differencesWhile Massachusetts' recidivism rate -- atwhatever level is used from various studies isconsidered the lowest of many large states,Greenwood cautions that such comparisons are muddiedby differences in how state systems treat age andcharacteristics of youth (for instance, he says, Michiganhas a lower recidivism rate than California but the lack ofcounty-based programs means that the state has manylow-level offenders in its system who are less likely torecidivate). The California Youth Authority echoes thiscautionary note, saying that in general California has moreserious juvenile crime than most states, has anestablished system of both state and local institutions fordealing with the spectrum of delinquency (in contrast withsome states that place virtually all of their delinquents instate custody) I and has a juvenile system that isresponsible for treatment and services to young adults upto the age of 25.The differences are significant, for instance,between the states of Massachusetts and California. InMassachusetts, 17-year-olds are defined as adults and thejuvenile system only has jurisdiction over a youth who hasbeen sentenced as a juvenile until he turns 18. Juvenileswho are 14 through 16 can be remanded to the criminalcourt system. 92 In contrast, California youths arejuveniles until they turn 18 and the system has jurisdictionover convicted juveniles until they are 21 or 25 depending103

The Juvenile Crime Challengeexamined the California Youth Authority's structure andthe policies that drive its operation in a series of four indepthacademic critiques in 1982, 1986, 1988 and1990. 88 Overall I Commonweal labeled the State'sapproach a failure and recommended the substitution ofsmall l community-based treatment programs in place oflarge State-run facilities. The reports, while generallypositive about CYA staff in terms of high ideals and hardwork, were scathing in their denunciation of the results:high recidivism, institutional gang terrorism and highcosts.A key contention of the Commonweal reports isthat effective rehabilitation is undermined by large-scalestate-run institutions where individualized attention isdifficult to achieve and group dynamics are skewed. Theargument over the value of large juvenile institutionsversus retaining youthful offenders in the community tobe treated in small programs is not unique to California.As RAND expert Greenwood summarizes:The primary criticisms leveled against traditional training schools have been that they offeredsterile and unimaginative programs, were inappropriate places to run rehabilitative programs;and that they fostered abuse and mistreatment of their charges. At this point, the debate stillgoes on. A number of comparisons that set out to demonstrate that small community-basedprograms were more effective than traditional training schools failed to do so. Yet severalrecent meta-analyses purport to demonstrate that particular types of treatment programs,primarily those employing cognitive/behavioral techniques are more effective when run incommunity rather than institutional settings. 89Juvenile advocatespush jor small,community-basedjuvenile programsMany juvenile justice experts are convinced thatsmall community-based programs are moreeffective and less costly (though Greenwoodwarns that when they are well done they can be every bitas costly as institutionalization). In recommending arevamped approach to institutionalization in California, theCommonweal reports and writings by other juvenileadvocacy groups -- including the Center for the Study ofYouth PolicYI the Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice,the Youth Law Center and the National Council on Crimeand Delinquency -- point to states such as Massachusettsand Utah, both of which have eliminated their large stateruninstitutions. A third example is less inspiring althoughperhaps as instructive: Florida has severely curbed theuse of its large institutions but with different results. Abrief overview of these states' reforms follows:Massachusetts: In the 1970s, the state closed allof its large institutions and gradually built up a system ofunlocked residential and non-residentiat community-basedprograms, augmented by some small, state-run, locked102

Youth AuthorityIssue 6: The California Youth Authority can be mosteffective and productive as the last-resort,intensive-treatment option for serious andchronic juvenile criminals.While the structure of the California YouthAuthority -- both in physical dimension and ininternal workings -- is criticized by juvenileadvocates, the CY A system has many of the attributesthat have been recommended by the Little HooverCommission as important reforms for the state prisonsystem, including rehabilitative programs and case-bycasescrutiny before release. Problems do plague theCY A, however I and almost all of them are related tobudgetary issues. Among the areas of concern are:• The CY A has long waiting lists for programs thatwards must complete before the Youthful OffenderParole Board will consider them for parole. Whenwards cannot enter and complete a requiredprogram within their original commitmenttimeframe, their sentence is increased. As aresult, some juveniles serve -- at a high state cost-- time that is non-productive (while waiting for aprogram) or unnecessarily long.• The CY A accepts youths from counties that havefew treatment resources even though the juvenilesmay not be in need of the costly and intensivetreatment option provided by CYA. The result is ahigher-than-necessary cost to the State and theundesirable exposure of unsophisticated youths tomore criminally mature individuals.• The physical design of and overcrowding at CY Ainstitutions contribute to violence and threatenward and staff safety_ In addition to hamperingthe State's ability to meet its obligation to providea violence-free environment, the costly result islonger periods of incarceration due to penalties forincidents and non-productive lockdown periodswhen rehabilitation efforts are minimal.The Commonweal Research Institute, a branch ofa Marin County-based non-profit agency that specializesin health, environmental and youth issues, painstakingly101

The Juvenile Crime Challengepopulation was 45 percent Hispanic, 32 percentAfrican American and 15 percent white. Thefastest growing ethnicity was Asian.• The average length of stay was 23.7 months. Thelength of stay for CY A commitments (excludingstate prisoners housed at CY A) ranged from aboutsix years for murder and four-plus years for rape toalmost two years for burglary and one year formisdemeanor offenses.• First admissions to CY A in 1993 (excluding paroleviolators) totaled 3,640 wards, whose average agewas 17.5 years. Fifty-nine percent of all firstadmissions were for violent crime. The mostcommon primary commitment offenses wererobbery (26 percent) and assault (22 percent).Homicide accounted for 8 percent.• Trends in first admissions over the past 10 yearsinclude a significant drop for property offenses(from a steady 45 percent to an all-time low of27.4 percent in 1992) and drug offenses (droppingto 7.9 percent in the 90s from a peak of 19percent in 1989). Violent crimes have surgeddramatically, climbing from roughly 40 percent inthe 1980s to close to 60 percent in 1993, an alltimehigh.The California Youth Authority is the target ofcritics who object to large-scale institutionalization andbudgetary cutbacks that have hindered its mission totrain, educate and treat wards and have all but eliminatedits involvement in prevention activities. But many otherslaud CY A for its commitment to rehabilitate juveniles inspite of budgetary barriers and decisions over which it hasno control. The following issue deals with these andother concerns.100

Youth AuthorityYouth AuthorityResponsible for some 15,000 juvenile offenders ina system that involves almost 250,000 youthsannually, the California Youth Authority is the tailendof the juvenile justice system, known for dealing withthe "worst of the worst" young criminals. A statisticalprofile, using data provided by CY A, shows:• CY A has 11 institutions, four conservation campsand 18 parole offices, which it operates withalmost 5,200 employees and a budget of close to$400 million. The average cost of treating a wardis $32,000 per year (compared to an estimated$20,000 a year for housing adult inmates in stateprison).• At the end of 1993, CYA institutions and campshoused 8,610 wards, with another 6,010 wardson parole. There were 7/214 CY A wards and1,396 state prison inmates housed in CVAfacilities. Sixty-five percent of the population werecommitted for violent offenses. Among thepopulation were 1,254 convicted of homicide,1,992 robbery, 2,108 assault, 969 burglary, 636drugs and 260 rape.• In 1993, the average age of CY A wards was about19, with 1,164 who were 21 or older. Only 2,751(32 percent) were 17 and under, the statutorydefinition of a juvenile in California. The99

The Juvenile Crime Challenge98

YouthAuthority• The CYA incarcerates almost9,000 wards and tracks another6,000 on parole.• The average age at admission is17.5 years, the average stay isalmost 2 years and 65% areincarcerated for violent crimes.Recommendations:• Retain the structure ofindeterminate sentences andreview by a non-CYA body.• Enhance CYA's ability toaccept only suitable wards.• Release wards who are keptsolely because treatmentcapacity is lacking.• Fund county options thatdivert youths from CYAcommitment.

The Juvenile Crime Challengepredatory sexual abuse is involved and when aninsufficient amount of time has passed to establish acrime-free pattern of life.96

more in the form of bureaucratic barriers rather than legalbarriers.System ReformsWhile the interest in protecting minors from theirmistakes was an appealing argument when most of theseerrors ran to shop-lifting and vandalism, many believe theshifting pattern of juvenile crime to more violence hasaltered the balance between the public's right to knowand the individual's need for privacy. California's laws asyet do not reflect that shifting balance.Recommendation 12: The Governor and the Legislature shouldadopt legislation to eliminate confidentialityfor all juvenile adjudication and dispositionprocesses involving serious crimes for those 14and older.The desire to shield youths from the public spotlightwhen they have committed petty crimes or areextremely young can be met by continuing to holdarrest, adjudication and disposition records confidential forthose under 14 whose offenses are minor. But both theadjudication and disposition processes for serious crimes-- which represents stages that are reached only after theevidence has been weighed and formal charges have beenfiled -- would benefit from public scrutiny and thesu nshine of openness.Recommendation 13: The Governor and the Legislature shouldadopt legislation to reform and restrict thepresent sealed record laws when those who are14 and older have committed serious crimes.While there may be a compelling public interest inallowing a productive young adult to put hisjuvenile record behind him, the present laws aretoo broad and allow protective cover for too many youthswho later continue a life of crime. In particular, lawsshould be modified to make the record sealing a justifiabledecision rather than the default mode and to forbid sealingin cases where death was the result of the crime,95

The Juvenile Crime ChallengeIn serious and violent crime cases, the "chargingpetition, the minutes of the proceeding and the orders ofadjudication and disposition" are open to publicinspection, under Welfare and Institutions Code Section676d. But this is another area where bureaucraticprocedures often block access, according to systemobservers.The desire to shield juveniles from their mistakesonce they have repented and been rehabilitated takes theform of provisions to seal and destroy records. Thecomplicated provisions that allow records to be sealed arefound in Welfare and Institutions Code Section 826.Probation officers are allowed to destroy" all records andpapers in the proceedings concerning the minor" fiveyears after the jurisdiction of the court over the juvenilehas ended. In the case of juveniles found to bedelinquent, the juvenile court record, "which includes allrecords and papers, any minute book entries, dockets andjudgment dockets, n shall be destroyed when the personreaches the age of 38 "unless for good cause the courtdetermines that the juvenile record shall be retained ... "Record sealingoften occurs bydefault ratherthan decisionRecent policy makers who have tried to eliminatethe sealed-record provisions have cited the case of a manwho murdered three people while out on bail during a trial.His juvenile record, which was sealed in Alaska, showedhe had committed a triple homicide as a teenager,information that officials said would have caused them torefuse to release him on bail. Defenders of California'slaws have said judges have the discretion in such cases tonot seal records.Critics, however, point to the statutory language,which by default makes sealing of records thenorm. To refuse to seal the record, the judge mustmake a decision that there is cause to deny this privacyprotection to a specific individual. Probation officers withlong experience in the field say that many juveniles seekto have their records sealed at the first opportunity. Theyare particularly disturbed by a pattern they see by thosewho have been guilty of predatory sex crimes aggressivelyrequesting record sealing. State law specificallyaddresses procedures for ensuring that juveniles areinformed of their right to seal their records.Finally, critics argue that sealed records oftenhinder law enforcement who are trying to take action inother cases and block intelligent decisions by serviceagencies, although others say the stumbling blocks come94

System ReformsWhile there have been attempts by some policymakers to eliminate this provision, juvenile advocateshave fought vigorously to retain it, arguing that juvenilesare particularly prone to being rounded up in error whenthey have no connection with a crime. Wrote oneadvocate in an argument against a 1993 measure thatwould have denied privacy protection to 16- and 17 -yearaidswho have been arrested:The simple arrest of a 16- or 77-year-old as the suspected perpetrator of a violent felony is aninsufficient basis for stripping that minor of the confidentiality protections of the juvenile courtsystem. The stigma of being publicly labelled a "violent criminal" is a substantial penaltywhich will have a negative impact on a young person for years to come. Extreme caution isneeded to assure that such a label is only applied when absolutely warranted. 87The Little Hoover Commission's advisory group wasclose to unanimous in its belief that protection ofjuvenile privacy at the arrest level is a reasonablemeasure that does little harm, with very little benefitstemming from its removal.Adjudication: Welfare and Institutions CodeSection 676 bars the public from the courtroom exceptwhen a list of serious and violent crimes, similar to the707b list, have been committed. Even when the public isadmitted, however, confidentiality still reigns. Many ofthe records connected with the juvenile's hearing are notopen for public review as they are in adult criminal courtcases.While juvenile advocates argue that protection atthis point in the process is also critical since the juvenilemay still be found innocent, others say it is important toexpose the workings of the court to the public. They alsomaintain that it is to the juvenile I s advantage to be foundinnocent in a public forum rather than in secrecy.Participants in the system also said the exclusionthat allows the public to attend juvenile trials for seriouscrimes often is of little benefit because it is difficult forinterested public members to get information about whenand where hearings will occur.Disposition: The outcome of juvenile cases can bedisclosed to the victim if the victim notifies authoritiesthat he or she wants to know what has occurred. Buteven then, the victim cannot be informed of the identityof the juvenile -- only the disposition of the case. Criticshave argued that this makes it difficult for the victim totake civil action or guard against retaliation.93

The Juvenile Crime Challengewho they believe makes dispositions that are too lenient.Neither the judge I s defenders nor detractors were able toargue their cases credibly based on facts because ofconfidentiality. In the same city, a grant programintended to encourage creative prevention andrehabilitation strategies for juveniles became the object ofderision when unhappy system participants leaked wordthat a judge was mandating golfing lessons as part of hisdispositions. The overall pattern of that judge'sdispositions and the totality of his actions to takeappropriate measures with juveniles were not open forpublic assessment.In this same vein, many of the juvenile justicesystem consultants to the Little Hoover Commissionexpressed their perspective that too many deals are cutbehind closed doors in juvenile courtrooms. They believedthe system would benefit from public exposure in theform of better protection for juveniles.Criticisms ofconfidentialityflow fromvaried rationalesMuch of the discussion about confidentiality,however, sidesteps high-minded rationales likethe public's right to know and the need tomonitor court activities and goes directly to public visceralfeelings that juveniles are not being adequately punishedfor their behavior. Some people believe that becausejuveniles know they will not be identified publicly, theyneed not worry about what their friends and parents willthink. These supporters of openness also believe parentswill take a more active role in controlling their offspring iftheir is danger of negative publicity. Others, however,find this approach simplistic! saying that the actions ofminors are not influenced by such considerations -- andthat, indeed, some glory in personal identification withtheir crimes.State law prescribes different levels ofconfidentiality at three points in the juvenile justiceprocess: the arrest, adjudication and disposition.Arrest: Under state law, police are not allowed torelease information about the arrest of a juvenile.However, newspapers and other media who are able todetermine from other sources the identity of a juvenilewho has been arrested may use the information as theysee fit under the First Amendment freedom-of-the-pressprotection. By and large, however! the media follow aself-imposed policy of not using minors' names, except ona case-by-case basis depending on a variety of factors,such as use by other media.92

System ReformsIssue 5: The desire to shield. juveniles from publicity toenhance the chances of rehabilitation in manycases should not outweigh the public's right toknow about juvenile crime.Specific policies that were adopted to shield juvenilesfrom public exposure for youthful mistakes and toenhance prospects for rehabilitation have weakenedthe credibility of the entire system in the eyes of thepublic and ignore the need of the public to be aware ofcommunity occurrences. In addition, the normal checksand balances provided by having openness in a judicialsystem are non-existent in the juvenile system.The conflict confidentiality raises between publicand individual rights is recognized even by those whodefend the need of juveniles for this specialized cloak ofsecrecy. One juvenile advocate summarized:Confidentiality of juvenile proceedings has been a cornerstone of the juvenile justice systemsince its creation at the beginning of this century .... These restrictions on the release ofinformation are designed to assure that the rehabilitative efforts of the juvenile court are notundermined by carelessly stigmatizing a young person with a criminal label .... A t the same time,the public also has clear interests in being informed regarding the operation of the juvenilecourt system and law enforcement efforts to address the problem of juvenile crime. 85The Criminal Justice Legal Foundation went furtherin its analysis, arguing that public support for thegoals and operations of the separate juvenile justicesystem would be enhanced by more openness:The public currently knows very little about what occurs in juvenile court because the majorityof these cases are closed hearings. Juvenile crime, however, is of real concern to the public,as well as making sure that the courts operate fairly and efficiently for the public's benefit andprotection. It also follows that when citizens know more about the problems and issues there,they will be very likely to support needed increased funding and programming to remedy theseproblems. In the states that have opened their juvenile courts on the same basis as their adultcourts, none have experienced increased expenses due to spectators or had other negativeside effects. The individual juvenile's desire for privacy is far outweighed by the public'sdesire for information about the operation of its juvenile courts, accountability of juvenileoffenders and enhancement of public safety. 86Signals that sunshine in the juvenile courts wouldprovide needed public scrutiny were raised recentlyin Sacramento, where the district attorney's officebegan routinely disqualifying a judge from juvenile cases91

Youth AuthorityIf a ward's misbehavior or refusal to cooperate keepshim from completing Board-ordered programming,then it is a rational consequence to extend the timethe ward must stay in CY A facilities. The present systemis not only irrational but also inherently unfair when award, through no fault of his own, is required to remain instate custody simply because he has not been able tomove to the head of the long waiting lists for somerequired programs. Clearly the programs should beexpanded, or alternative treatment that satisfies Boardrequirements should be developed and offered to theward. After these steps are taken, jf the problem ofwards not being able to get into requied programspersists, then the State should simply concede it mustrelease the ward unrehabilitated because it does not havethe resources to meet the needs rather than continuingthe expensive and inequitable practice of retaining thewards in CY A facilities.Since data documenting the extent of this problemis not available, it is difficult to assess the impact of sucha law. However, if state officials are correct and theproblem is minor, the impact should be minor. If juvenileadvocates are correct and time adds for lack ofprogramming is a frequent occurrence, then the new lawshould make that evident and enable the State to correctthe situation.Recommendation 16: The Governor and the Legislature shouldadopt legislation that provides the CaliforniaYouth Authority with mechanisms for moreaggressively screening -- and rejecting whenappropriate -- admissions to state facilities.When the sole reason a ward ends up in theCalifornia Youth Authority is that he lives in acounty with few treatment options, no onebenefits. The ward is placed in a higher-security f moreintensive-treatment setting than he needs and he isexposed to criminals who may be more mature andhardened. The State incurs the cost of the excessivesecurity and treatment and faces overcrowding thatmakes it difficult to treat wards who do need the highestlevel of confinement. And the ward's county may sufferthe consequences if he returns to them a moresophisticated criminal than when he left.119

The Juvenile Crime ChallengeState law should be modified so that CY Aexamines and assesses a youth not only to determine ifthe youth can benefit from the placement but also todetermine if other options available in more juvenileservice-orientedcounties might be more appropriate. (Anewly enacted law, Chapter 452, Statutes of 1994, takesa first step in this direction, ordering CY A to create aclassification system and develop standardized criteria forcommitment suitability.) Funds saved by divertingcommitments should be used in two ways: to increaseservices to existing wards and to stimulate thedevelopment of local options, as outlined inRecommendation 17 below.Recommendation 17: The Governor and the Legislature shouldcreate a new mechanism to reward andunderwrite the efforts of counties that developalternative options that reduce commitments tothe California Youth Authority.The State's efforts to divert commitments throughfinancial incentives have worked in the past,improving local options and providing more suitabletreatment for less serious offenders. Such a systemshould be created again, particularly targeting countiesthat now have few options and encouraging the formationof regional alternatives where rural counties are unable tosupport programs unilaterally.Recommendation 18: The California Youth Authority shouldcontinue to focus its efforts on reducingviolence and injuries in its facilities.CY A' s ability to run violence-free institutions isconstrained by several factors, including type ofyouths dealt with, chronic overcrowded conditionsand the physical design of aging buildings. But the Statehas a special obligation to provide a safe environmentwhen it legitimately deprives an individual of freedom.120

Conclusion• The State can provide leadershipand structure, but anti-crimeefforts must begin at home and incommunities.• Beyond the scope of this reportremain many areas of thejuvenile justice system that aredeserving of pragmatic review.• The Commission's studies of boththe adult and juvenile justicesystems have common themes:Prevention should be a priority;punishment should not edge outrehabilitation as goals; andpolicies should flow from provendesirable outcomes.

The Juvenile Crime Challenge122

ConclusionConclusionReducing the level of crime and restoring a sense ofsafety to the public will never be a simple matterof building more institutions and locking awaylarger and larger numbers of criminals -- although thosesteps have a role in an overall, multi-strategy solution tocrime. Crime takes root in homes where there is littlecaring, in neighborhoods with bleak opportunities and incommunities that lack the tools to rise abovehopelessness. It spreads in a society that has growncareless about values and is far too accepting of violenceas a way of life .. in sports, games, entertainment,schools and streets. The result is costly t both in dollarsand in daily fear.Juveniles not only are a significant factor in illegalactivity but they are also widely acknowledged as thecritical linchpin in any effort to divert criminals fromlifelong predatory careers. The earlier a person is reachedwith rehabilitation opportunities, the more likely change isto occur and the greater the rewards in crime costavoidance. Despite this universally accepted credo lCalifornia has placed far more emphasis on dealing withthe end product of crime than on prevention and earlyintervention measures.Reforms canprovide structureto encouragelocal actionAfter examining the juvenile justice system with thegoal of increasing the system's effectiveness inreducing crime, the Little Hoover Commission hasconcluded that this is one arena where a standardized,cookie-cutter solution would maximize costs and minimize123

The Juvenile Crime Challengeresults. What works with a particular individual or in aspecific community varies too greatly. The key is toinspire an aggressive approach by local agencies andorganizations to work together on locally driven prioritiesand to invigorate communities with the concept that theyhave the responsibility and the authority to shape andimplement crime-reduction strategies. The State's roleshould be one of leadership, program assessment, modelpromotion, statistical analysis and funding facilitator.In addition, the Commission found that someaspects of the current juvenile justice system hamper thedesirable philosophical elements of accountability,appropriate consequences, victims' rights and publicprotection. The Commission has recommended creatinga more responsive system that clearly links actions withrepercussions, acknowledges the needs of victims,focuses on maturity and criminal sophistication ratherthan chronological age and broadens public access toinformation.Finally, the Commission I s examination of theCalifornia Youth Authority found a state bureaucracy that rlike so many others, has had to make budget cuts thatundoubtedly will prove costly in the long run.Nonetheless, there are steps the State can and shouldtake to improve CYA's operations and to redirect itslimited resources in productive ways.Newly createdcommission hasmany areasit can addressWhile the Commission approached its study witha comprehensive, holistic perspective, theCommission found that the juvenile justicesystem is too complex to be covered exhaustively in asingle report. By necessity I this document covers alimited number of topics that the Commission felt wereparticularly pressing or were areas where reform would bemost productive. But there are other issues that also aredeserving of review. The Commission notes that thegovernor recently signed legislation creating a multidisciplinarybody to study the juvenile justice system overan 18-month period to recommend reforms. Such a bodymay wish to review this Commission's efforts with an eyeto areas that are not touched upon. These include:• Parole: Approximately 6,000 juveniles are onparole from state institutions at anyone time.Some have suggested that there would be benefitsfrom combining parole, a State-run function, withprobation operations, a county-run function,although others see drawbacks in such aconsolidation. Also there are differing philosophies124

Conclusionabout the most constructive response to paroleviolations and the effectiveness of varying levelsof parole programming. Even the definition ofsuccess for a parole agent can be disputed: Hashe or she failed when a ward violates parole and isreturned to an institution or has he or shesucceeded by protecting the public from furthercrime? What became evident to the Commissionas this study progressed is the importance ofII after-care" to the success of efforts to haltrecidivism. While the scope of this report did notinclude after-care, the Commission believes it is atopic that should be closely examined in somefuture study.• Status offenders: In 1977, status offenders -­juveniles who have not committed crimes but whohave run away, repeatedly been truant or who arebeyond parental control -- were removed fromjuvenile criminal facilities with the laudable goal ofavoiding "contamination" of wayward children bymore hardened juvenile delinquents.Unfortunately, the supportive social programs thatwere supposed to handle the status offenders inplace of the juvenile facilities have never been fullydeveloped. The result is a cadre of youths whooften graduate to delinquency because of the lackof efforts to get them back on track to productivelives. The Commission, which in the past hasexplored this issue area in its major children t sservices report and a follow-up report on homeless/runaway youths, made a decision in February1994 to consciously exclude status offenders fromthe current study because of the anticipatedimminent release of a major state task force report.As this report was being written, however I thetask force results had yet to be issued.• Local detention: The inadequacy of many juvenilehalls to handle the type of delinquents counties arenow faced with and the severe overcrowding thatdrives policy decisions about what crimes juvenileswill be detained for are major local governmentissues. Restrictions on how 16- and 17-year-oldswho are being tried as adults may be handled inadult jails limits the options that counties have,although a new law that takes effect January',1995 gives counties more latitude when dealingwith them under some conditions.125

The Juvenile Crime Challenge• Ethnicityand cultural diversity: Numerous studieshave shown the disproportionate presence ofminorities throughout the juvenile justice system.Some experts have suggested that even whensocio-economic factors are taken intoconsideration the disparity is so great thatdiscrimination, both overt and subtle, at the manydiscretionary levels of the juvenile justice systemis the only valid explanation. Critics of the systemalso contend that it lacks the sensitivity to culturaldifferences that is necessary in a state as diversein population as California.• Disparity of treatment: Because the juvenilejustice system was designed to treat youths asindividuals and to respond to their specificbehavior and needs, discretionary action andflexibility are maximized throughout the system,from the point of the apprehending lawenforcement official all the way to the YouthfulOffender Parole Board. An unfortunate byproductof this flexibility is inconsistency in how similaryouths who have committed similar offenses arehandled, depending on local resources andphilosophies. Statewide standards would removethe disparity -- but it is difficult to envision amatrix of guidelines that would be rigid enough toensure equitable treatment yet broad enough toallow for appropriate individualized responses tojuvenile criminal behavior. In its previous report onthe adult system, the Commission concluded thatthe determinate sentences of the adult criminalsystem, which are calculated according to aregimented hierarchy of rules, have failed to yieldequity, justice or reductions in recidivism despitestatewide standardization.It should also be noted that in conjunction with itsstudy of the juvenile justice system, the Commission hasconducted a review of boot camps and other intensiveworkprograms that are now proliferating in all levels ofcorrectional systems across the country. That separatereport, anticipated for release in late 1 994, also has abearing on juvenile justice issues.Prevention andoutcome-basedpolicies are keyto reducing crimeThe Commission' s cumulative work in the adult andjuvenile criminal justice arena in 1994 has severalcommon themes: Focusing on early interventionand prevention as the key to reducing crime; couplingappropriate punishment with the rehabilitative servicesneeded to encourage former criminals to lead productive126

Conclusionlives; and basing policy decisions on desirable outcomesand proven methods for achieving them. The challenge isturning these concepts into functioning programs that willcross jurisdictional and bureaucratic lines and rise abovefiscal constraints while proving -- through outcome-basedresults -- that crime can be reduced.127

The Juvenile Crime Challenge128

Appendices

The Juvenile Crime Challenge130

APPENDIX ALittle Hoover CommissionJuvenile Justice Advisory CommitteeVera Abate, Executive DirectorAlum Rock Counseling CenterFrank Alarcon, Chief Deputy DirectorCalifornia Youth AuthorityBarbara Allman, Deputy DirectorAdministrative Services BranchCalifornia Youth AuthorityAssemblywoman Dede Alpert, ChairSelect Committee on Youth at-RiskCarlos O. Armour, ChairState Commission on Juvenile Justice,Crime and Delinquency PreventionMel Assagai, Senior Executive ofGovernmental AfffairsState Bar of CaliforniaJim Barnett, Special Assistant to theChief Deputy DirectorCalifornia Youth AuthorityRobert Blankenship, ChiefRedding Police DepartmentBarbara BloomPetaluma, CAVicki Bodhaine, Executive DirectorState Coalition of Probation OrganizationsLes Brown, Supervising District AttySacramento CountySusan B. Cohen, Executive DirectorCalifornia Probation, Parole andCorrectional AssociationRobert Denham, Chief DeputySacramento County Sheriff's Dept.R. David Dietrich, Juvenile InvestigationsLos Angeles County Sheriff's Dept.David Disco, Juvenile DivisionLos Angeles County District AttorneyPam Douglas, Parole AgentCalif. Correctional Peace Officers Assn.Dan Doyle, Chief CounselCalifornia Youth AuthorityDennis DulayCalifornia Youth AuthorityElaine DuxburyCalifornia Youth AuthorityJim Embree, ChairAdministration of Justice DepartmentSacramento City CollegeSharon English, Asst. DirectorOffice of Prevention & Victims ServicesCalifornia Youth AuthorityAssemblyman Bob Epple, ChairmanAssembly Public Safety CommitteePhil ErdmanSCOPOMarilyn Ericksen, Executive DirectorCalifornia Child, Youth and FamilyCoalitionMaryanne Gilliard, Chief Deputy DirectorOffice of Criminal Justice PlanningMaria Gladin, TreasurerState Coalition of ProbationOrganizationsElizabeth HillLegislative Analyst131

The Juvenile Crime ChallengeSteve Krahnke, CommanderAlameda County Sheriff's Dept.Barry Krisberg l PresidentNational Council on Crime & DeliquencyDr. Kimberly Garth Lewis, AdvocateCalif. Correctional Peace Officers Assn.Sue LoustalotCalifornia Youth Authority4241 Williamsbourgh DriveHan. Daniel E. LungrenAttorney GeneralDan MacallairCenter on Juvenile and Criminal JusticeDeputy Erik ManessSacramento Sheriff's DepartmentSi Mariano, Assistant SuperintendentVentura SchoolMary MarksLong Beach, CAGeorge McKinneyCalifornia Youth AuthorityJan Miller, ChairDoris Tate Crime Victims BureauJohn Monday, Deputy SecretaryYouth and Adult Correctional AgencyLinda Mutch, PresidentSCOPOBarry Nidorf, Chief Probation OfficerLos Angeles County Probation DepartmentMarcus NietoCalifornia Research BureauDon Novey, PresidentCalif. Correctional Peace Officers Assn.Jean O' Hara, Parents ofMurdered Children, Contra Costa CountyGreg Paraskou, Deputy Public DefenderJuvenile Division, Santa Clara CountyAssemblyman Richard PolancoState AssemblyWilliam Pruitt, ChairYouthful Offender Parole BoardCasey Randall, Assistant SuperintendentVentura I School, CY ALisa Rea, State DirectorJustice FellowshipJeff Reilly, Deputy Public DefenderSan Diego CountyGene Roh, Chief Probation OfficerSan Mateo CountyRich RoseCalifornia Youth AuthorityDon Saylor, Assistant Deputy DirectorCalifornia Youth AuthorityVince Schiraldi, Executive DirectorCenter on Juvenile and Criminal JusticeMichael Schumacher, Chief ProbationOfficer, Orange CountyAdrienne ShawCalifornia Youth AuthorityStephen S. SpiegelSanta Cruz County CriminalDefenses BarMark Soler, Executive DirectorYouth Law CenterJoe Spaeth, Deputy Public DefenderChief of Juvenile Unit, San FranciscoDavid Steinhart, AttorneyJuvenile Justice SpecialistMargaret Stricklin, Field RepresentativeBoard of Corrections132

AppendicesMichael Sweet, Executive OfficerYouthful Offender Parole BoardGary Tatum, ChiefCalistoga Police DepartmentDick Tillson, Deputy DirectorInstitutions and Camps BranchCalifornia Youth AuthoritySue Tobik, Assistant Exec. OfficerYouthful Offender Parole BoardLoren WarboysYouth Law CenterArlyn Webster, Legislative Vice PresidentState Coalition of Probation OrganizationsRay Wingerd, Deputy Chief ProbationOfficer, San Bernardino CountyDoug Wilhoit, PresidentCalifornia State Assn of CountiesGary Yates, Program DirectorCalifornia Wellness FoundationJewell Jones, Court CommissionerLos Angeles County Superior CourtRichard S. Piedmonte, Leg. CoordinatorCalifornia Judges AssociationNatalie AdorniIsleton, CA133

The Juvenile Crime Challenge

AppendicesAPPENDIX BJuvenile Justice Advisory CommitteeIssue AreasMore than two dozen members of the 74-member Juvenile Justice Advisory Committeecame to Sacramento for three separate 12-hour sessions during March, April and May.A cross-section of perspectives was represented, including probation, parole, CY A, lawenforcement, victims, public defenders, district attorneys, judges and citizens.There was a broad consensus that the Advisory Committee wanted to give theCommission subcommittee input in the following 10 issue areas:1. The underlying philosophy of the juvenile justice system has always been thatyouths, regardless of the crime or crimes they have committed, are salvageable.The advisory committee feels very strongly that this remains true today for allbut a very small fraction of juvenile criminals and that, therefore, continuing aseparate juvenile justice system is a necessity. The underlying purpose andfunction of the juvenile justice system needs to be stated in terms that reflecttoday's reality and expectations (Welfare and Institutions Code 202, addressesboth the juvenile dependency system and the juvenile justice system).Concepts that should be included:• Accountability, responsibility I consequences• Balance between rehabilitation (treatment, education, training) andpunishment• Need to protect public safety• Family preservation when possible• Origins of crime (sociological and societal)• Assessment (individual)• Victim awareness and servicesAs one member put it, the mission statement of juvenile justice should embracethe fact that "kids count, the public counts, victims count."2. The increasing amount of violence in our society needs to be addressedproactively by the State. Concepts that cause, add to or enable violence byjuveniles include:• Glamorization and acceptance of violence• Substance abuse, particularly alcohol• Availability of guns• Domestic violence (children observing and/or being target of)• GangsBecause the violence has multiple causes, multiple strategies will need to beused. Because the problems are pervasive, societal and local, the State's roJewill be in providing leadership, sharing information, setting standards andmonitoring effectiveness. Specific state soiutions may include:135

The Juvenile Crime Challenge• Tax on video games and violent videos to fund ad campaign (similar tono-smoking campaign)• Participation in on-going research, such as link between violent behaviorand diet• School curriculum for conflict resolution skills, anti-violence• Modeling, funding neighborhood dispute resolution centers• Conducting campaign to get businesses to police themselves3. The current juvenile justice system is not equipped (resource-wise) to reinforcefor juveniles that they are both responsible and accountable for their actions.• Sealed records -~ The group felt strongly about keeping current law,which allows a reformed juvenile to put his past behind him. They didsupport a modification that would require the court to attempt to notifythe victim and receive input from the victim before the record can besealed. There was also some level of feeling that sexual predatorsshould not easily have their records sealed, if at all.• Confidentiality -- There are three places that confidentiality does or couldoccur. The list below shows current law and how group felt aboutmodifying it:• Arrest: Report is not released to anyone. Group wants this tocontinue.• Adjudication: Now open for serious crimes (but still difficult forpublic to access). The group was split in half over whether thisprocess should be open always.• Disposition: Only the victim can find out the disposition -- buteven the victim cannot be told the name of the juvenile. Groupoverwhelmingly thought this should change.As a sub-topic, group felt there should be a mechanism for notifying thevictim if juvenile escapes from a facility.4. While the root causes of crime are not conveniently packaged as distinctproblems with solutions that fall in specific jurisdictions, the State can play anaggressive role in laying the groundwork for addressing the root causes.• Leadership to highlight issues• A clearinghouse (assess programs, promote models, track performancebased on empirical studies with statistical validity, provide statistics toidentify trends)• Set standards for inter-agency and intra-agency cooperation• Remove barriers to information sharing and collaborative action• Apply disincentives so that local agencies make a good-faith effort• Training• Identify and alert locals about federal and other funding5, Early identification, assessment and intervention is essential if at-risk childrenare going to be helped and diverted from criminal activity.136

Appendices• Multidisciplinary, intra-agency approach (emphasis on including educationsystem)• Neighborhood-based• Multiple points of entry• Truancy• Parenting skills• Cultural diversity (appropriate services, culturally sensitive access)6. Funding has played a key role in the changing nature of the juvenile justicesystem. In many instances, cutbacks have eliminated previously successful"early-warning" programs with a resulting explosion of juvenile cases requiringsignificant resources -- which in turn forces more cutbacks.• Lack of funding• Increase efficiency/effectiveness through collaboration, cross-pollinationof efforts• Flexibility in programming is needed• Need to re-prioritize funds from back-end to front-end of system(defining a continuum) I concentrating on 1) what works and 2)prevention.• LAO/Isenberg proposals The group was not enthusiastic about theseconcepts because they believe the funding is neither adequate norconcrete enough.7. The juvenile justice system must be capable of imposing consequences formisconduct at all levels of severity and the community must provide probationofficials and judges with an adequate range of options for treatment andacco u nta bi I ity .• Thorough assessment to determine juvenile's needs• Diversion for non-serious crimes, low level of need (neighborhood, teencourts)• Appropriate treatment for mid-level crimes, juveniles• Serious crimes, serious needs intensive treatment r CY A, adult court8. Age: The State's current approach to defining juvenile crime by chronologicalage needs to be refined to more adequately reflect the changing nature ofjuvenile crime.• Redefine procedure to remand juveniles to adult court• Create a system that would allow judicial review of juveniles who "maxout" at CVA because of chronological age (21, 23, 25) and appropriatejudicial disposition at that point• Send juveniles back to juvenile court if remanded to adult court and thenfound guilty of some lesser crime that is not eligible for adult courttreatment• Trying juveniles as adults does not necessarily give result its proponentsbelieve: juvenile cases often dismissed or jury refuses to find guilty;sentences tend to be shorter than in juvenile system. Need flexibility todeal with sophistication of crime, maturity of individual.137

The Juvenile Crime Challenge9. eVA: This issue area is still being defined and data is still being gathered.Overall, there seems to be consensus that:• One valuable role for CY A is to provide leadership, programdevelopment, research, technical assistance l training and networking forlocals• CY A is an appropriate alternative for those who need a locked facilitywith a solid rehabilitation component because they cannot live safelywithin the community10. The State lacks a research arm that is specifically charged with evaluatingprograms and performing outcome-based measurements of results. Theguidance that could be gained from such an endeavor would be invaluable forknowledgeably shaping policy to achieve better outcomes.• Independent, objectivity, credibility• Recidivism -- there are many ways to define this• Other indicators of success138

The Juvenile Crime Challenge94. "eYA Response to Reforming the Youth Authority," August 1988.95. Clifton Curry, op cit.96. "Probation Subsidy," University of California Davis, 1977, and "Evaluation of theCounty Justice System Subvention Program/" Arthur D. Little Inc., 1982.97. A series of studies and reviews including "Impact of Environmental Factors onCorrectional Institutions," 1985; "The Fricot Ranch Study," 1965; ITlnstitutionalViolence Reduction Project: The Impact of Changes in Living Unit Size and Staffing,"1980; "DeWitt Nelson Reduced Ward/Staff Ratio Program," 1981; and "Summary ofRecent Y A Research on Reduced Living Unit Size," 1980.98. "Restructuring Youth Corrections Systems: A Guide for Policymakers," Center for theStudy of Youth Policy, 1991/ Page 10.158

Endnotes76. "The 8 Percent Problem: Chronic Juvenile Offender Recidivism," Orange CountyProbation Department, March 1 994.77. Judge Arnold D. Rosenfeld, Sonoma County Superior Court, in testimony to the LittleHoover Commission, March 17, 1994.78. Commission on the Future of the California Courts, op cit.79. "State/Local Juvenile Corrections in California -- A Systems Perspective," CaliforniaYouth Authority, January 11,1994.80. Barbara J. Frank, Chief Probation Officer, San Bernardino County, flYouthAccountability Board," October 15, 1993.81. Mary Marks, "General Outline for a Pilot Project To Establish Citizens Committees inLong Beach, II March 1994.82. Redding Police Chief Robert Blankenship and Captain Charles Byard, "Serious HabitualOffender Program. II83. Peter W. Greenwood, op cit.84. People v. Superior Court (Rodrigo O.L supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 2320.85. Loren Warboys, Legal Services Section of the State Bar, in analysis of AB 143.86. Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, op cit.87. Loren Warboyst op cit.88. The Commonweal Research Institute material, all by Steve Lerner, is drawn from thefollowing four reports: "The CYA Report: Conditions of Life in the California YouthAuthority," 1982; "Bodily Harm: The Pattern of Fear and Violence at the CaliforniaYouth Authority," 1986; "Reforming the CY A: How to End Crowding, DiversifyTreatment and Protect the Public Without Spending More Money,lI 1988; and "TheGood News About Juvenile Justice: The Movement Away from Large Institutions andToward Community-Based Services, tr 1990.89. Peter W. Greenwood, op cit.90. Vincent Schiraldi and Dan Macallair, "Juvenile Justice Reforms Begin with Staff I" SanFrancisco Examiner, March 15, 1994.91. Peter W. Greenwood, op cit.92. Information on age characteristics of the Massachusetts, Utah and Florida system aretaken from: IIJuvenile Corrections in Ten States: An Overview and Update," CaliforniaYouth Authority, July 1993.93. Donna M. Bishop and Charles E. Frazier, "Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: ACase Study and Analysis of Prosecutorial Waiver," Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics& Public Policy, Volume 5, Issue No.2, 1991.157

The Juvenile Crime Challenge56. Peter W. Greenwood, testimony to the Little Hoover Commission, op cit.57. Commission on the Future of the California Courts, op cit.58. Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney General, "The Whole Child Approach to Crime," Spectrum,Summer 1993.59. "California Juvenile Justice: Analysis and Legislative Action," Criminal Justice LegalFoundation, January 1989.60. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, .. CorrectionalInstitutions" in Crime and the Criminal Justice Process/ 1978.61. Dan Macallair, op cit.62. "History of California's Juvenile Justice System," California Youth Authority.63. Barry A. Krisberg, "Juvenile Justice in Turmoil."64. "Making Government Make Sense: Applying the Concept in 1 993-94," LegislativeAnalyst's Office, May 4, 1993.65. David Steinhart, "What Can State Legislators Do to Curb Youth Violence," YouthViolence Meeting, Western Legislative Conference, May 21, 1994.66. Gary Yates, California Wellness Foundation, in testimony to the Little HooverCommission, May 26, 1994.67. Francisco J. Alarcon, Chief Deputy Director, California Youth Authority in May 4, 1994letter to the Little Hoover Commission.68. Ibid.69. "The State of California's Probation System," Analysis of the 1994-95 Budget Bill,Legislative Analyst's Office, March 1994.70. Jim Embree, chairman of the Administration of Justice Department, Sacramento CityCollege, in written input provided to the Little Hoover Commission.71. Bernard James, National School Safety Center, Youth Violence Meeting, WesternLegislative Conference, May 21, 1 994.72. Hill Walker and Robert Sylwester/ "Where is School Along the Path to Prison,"Educational Leadership, September 1991.73. Sandra Moss Manson/ Los Angeles County Probation Department, in testimony to theLittle Hoover Commission/ May 26/ 1994.74. Ray Wingerd, San Bernardino County Probation Department, in input provided to theLittle Hoover Commission.75. Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, op cit.156

Endnotes36. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, op cit.37. "Violence Prevention Program Excerpts from the Center for Substance AbusePrevention," National Clearinghouse for Alcohol and Drug Information.38. "At-Risk Youth and Gangs: A Resource Manual for the Parks and RecreationProfessional," California Park and Recreation Society, January 1 994.39. "A New Assault on Violence," The Chronicle of Philanthropy, September 7/ 1993.40. Pennsylvania State University, op cit.41. California Youth Authority, May 26/ 1994, op cit.42. Welfare and Institutions Code, Sections 1790 and 1791.43. Penal Code Sections 13810 et seq and 1 3820 et seq.44. Carlos O. Armour, Chairman of the State Commission on Juvenile Justice, Crime andDelinquency Prevention/ in April 6, 1994 letter to the Little Hoover Commission.45. Cliff Curry, Legislative Analyst's Office, in testimony to the Little Hoover Commission,May 26, 1994.46. California Youth Authority/ May 26, 1994, op cit.47. Renee Wilson-Brewer, Stu Cohen, Lydia O'Donnell and Irene F. Goodman, "ViolencePrevention for Young Adolescents: A Survey of the State of the Art," CarnegieCorporation, September 1991.48. Daniel W. Webster, op cit.49. "State 'sAnti-Smoking Drive Called A Triumph," Sacramento Bee/ March 21, 1 994.50. .. State/Local Juvenile Corrections in California -- A Systems Perspective," CaliforniaYouth Authority/ January 1994.51. Peter W. Greenwood, IIJuvenile Offenders: Evolution of the Juvenile Court/" NationalInstitute of Justice Crime File Study Guide.52. Ibid.53. Dan Macallair, "Reaffirming Rehabilitation in Juvenile Justice," Youth & Society,September 1993.54. Sherman Block, Los Angeles County Sheriff, in a letter to Los Angeles CountySupervisor Michael Antonovich, December 6, 1993.55. Steve Lerner, "The CYA Report: Conditions of Life at the California Youth Authority,"Commonweal Research Institute, 1 982/ and "The Good News About Juvenile Justice,"1990.155

The Juvenile Crime Challenge18. Hurdle, op cit, Page 1.19. " Justice in the Balance, t! Report of the Commission on the Future of the CaliforniaCourts, December 1, 1993, Page 120.20. "A Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent and Chronic Juvenile Offenders,"Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice,October 1 993.21. California Youth Authority in written testimony to the Little Hoover Commission, May26, 1994.22. "The Family Support Movement: Is it Time to Adopt an Intergenerational Approach?" tGraduate School of Public Policy and Administration, Pennsylvania State University,November 18, 1993.23. "Big Jump in Crimes Involving Handguns," Sacramento Bee, May 16, 1994.24. "Gun Acquisition and Possession in Selected Juvenile Samples, II National Institute ofJustice, December 1993.25. Robert DeComo, "Reinventing Juvenile Corrections," Youth Violence Meeting, WesternLegislative Conference, May 21, 1994.26. Pacific Center for Violence Prevention, "Firearm-Related Violence: Facts in Brief" and"Firearm-Related Violence: Cost."27. Michelle Dille, Manager of Firearms Information, Department of Justice, in interviewwith Commission staff.28. Daniel W. WebsteL "The Unconvincing Case for School-Based Conflict ResolutionPrograms for Adolescents," Health Affairs, Winter 1993.29. Pacific Center for Violence Prevention, "Alcohol-Related Violence."30. Ibid.31. Alcoholic Beverage Control Board staffing and budget information, 1965-1 994.32. Manny Espinoza, Chief Deputy Director, Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, ininterview with Commission staff.33. Dr. Carole Lieberman, "TV and Violence," Youth Violence Meeting, Western LegislativeConference, May 21, 1 994.34. Dr. Ed Donnerstein, "An Overview of the American Psychological Association's Reporton Violence and Youth," Youth Violence Meeting, Western Legislative Conference, May21,1994.35. Francisco J. Alarcon, Chief Deputy Director, California Youth Authority in testimony tothe Little Hoover Commission, May 26, 1994.154

EndnotesENDNOTES1 . Dr. Peter W. Greenwood of RAND in testimony to the Little Hoover Commission,February 28, 1994, with other experts concurring in an informal survey by Commissionstaff .2. Joan Petersilia, "California's Prison Policy: Causes, Costs and Consequences, n ThePrison Journal, 1993.3. Greenwood, op cit.4. "Crime and Delinquency in California, 1993 -- Advance Release, Tf California Departmentof Justice, 1994.5. "California's Juvenile Justice System Overview," California Youth Authority, February1994.6. "Study: Serious Juvenile Crime On Rise, II Sacramento Bee, July 25, 1994.7. Legislative Analyst's Office, written testimony for the Little Hoover Commission, May1994.8. "Characteristics of First Admissions to the California Youth Authority," California YouthAuthority, 1994.9. liThe State of California's Probation System," Legislative Analyst's Office, March 1994(reprint from the Analysis of the 1994-95 Budget).10. Los Angeles County Probation Department in data supplied to the Commission, andIICharacteristics of First Admissions to the California Youth Authority," California YouthAuthority, 1994.11. Ken Hurdle, "Confronting Violence in California, rr Senate Office of Research, February1994, Page 33.12. Dr. Hill M. Walker, "Path to Prison: Where Does It Begin?lI, Youth Violence Meeting,Western Legislative Conference, May 21, 1994.13. Stephen Buka and Felton Earls, IIEarly Determinants of Delinquency and Violence,"Health Affairs, Winter 1993.14. George L. Kelling and Catherine M. Coles, "Disorder and the Court," The Public Interest,Summer 1994.15. "Violence & Youth: Psychology's Response," American Psychological Association,1993.16. Greenwood, op cit.17. TfToward a State of Esteem," The California Task Force to Promote Self-Esteem andPersonal and Social Responsibility, January 1990, Pages 100, 103-104.153

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Endnotes

The Juvenile Crime Challenge150

AppendicesAPPENDIX EWelfare and Institutions CodeSection 202§ 202. Purpose; protective services; reunification with family; guidance for delinquents: accountabilityfor objectives and results; punishment defined(a) The purpose of this chapter is to provide for the protection and saiety or the public and eacn minorunder the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and to preserve and strengthen the minors family tieswhenever possible. removing the minor from the custody of his or her parents orJy when :1ecessary forhis or her welfare or for the safety and protection of the public. ""Vhen removal of a Ininor is determinedbv the 'uvenile court to be necess . reunification of the minor with lus or her fanul shaII be a ri ... 'nar'oDjective. en the minor is removed om nis or er own lamily, It is e purpose a t.lJ.is chapter tosecure for the minor custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which shouldhave been given by his or her parents. This chapter shall be liberally construed to carry out thesepurposes.(b) Minors under the juriscliction of the juver>ile court who are in need of protective services shallreceive care, treatment and guidance consistent with their best interest and the best interest Df thepublic. Minors under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a consequence of delinquent conduct shall,in conformity with the interests of public safety and protection, receive care, treatment and guidancewhich is consistent with their best interest, which holds them accountable for their behavior, and which isappropriate for their circumstances. This guidance may include punishment that is consistent wit.lt therehabilitative objectives of this chapter. '" '" • Ii a minor has been removed from the custody of his orher uarents, family preservation and familv reunification are aporooriate goals for the juvenile court toconsider when determining the disuosition of a minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as aconseguence of delinauent conduct when those goals are consistent with his or her best interests and thebest interests of the public.(c) It is ilio the purpose of this chapter to reaffirm that the duty of a parent to support and maintain aminor child continues, subject to the financial ability of the parent to pay, during any period in whic.."t theminor may be declared a ward of the court and removed from the custody of the parent(d) Juvenile courts and other public agencies charged with enforcing. interpreting. and a.d.mini.steringthe juvenile court law shall consider the safety and protection of the public and the best interests of theminor in all deliberations pursuant to this chanter. Participants in the juvenile justice system shall holdthemselves accountable for its results. They shall act in conformity with a comprehensive set ofobjectives established to improve system performance in a vigorous and ongoing manner.(e) A3 used in this chapter, "punishment" means the imposition of sanctions whic.'r:t include thefollowing:(1) Payment of a fine by the minor.(2) Rendering of compulsory service 'Nithout compensation performed for the benefit of the communityby the minor.(3) Limitations on the ~or's liberty imposed as a condition of probation or parole.(4} Commitment of the minor to a local detention or treatment facility, such as a juver>Jle hail. camo, orranch. .(5) Commitment of the minor to the Department of the Youth Authority.ItPunishment," for the purposes of this chapter, does not include retribution.(Added by Stats.1984. c. 756, § 2. Amended by Stats.1989, c. 569, § I, eff. Sept. 20, 1989.)Additions or changes Indicated by underline; deletJons by asterisks * * *149

The Juvenile Crime Challenge148

ARRESTSYear(s)199:3 ..................... 1 1.667.5221992 ..................... i 1.718.2541991 ..................... 1.791.3121990 ...._...............1,979.3551989 ..................... 1.969.1681988 ..................... 1.003,0671980 .... _...............1.542.8501992101993 ........1991 101992 ........19'00 to 1991 ........1989 10 1990 ........1988 to 1989 ........1968 to 1993 ........1980 to 1993 ........1993 .... _ ............... i1992 ..................... !1991 ............ _ ....... '~~::::=::::::::::~:::: '1988 ................... ..1980 .... _ ............. ..~~::::::::::::::::::::: ]1~1 .... _ ...... _ .......1990 .... _ ...... _ .......1989 .....................1988 .....................1980 .... _ ...... _ .......1992101993 ........1991 to 1992 ........1990 to 1991 ........198910 1990 ........1985 to 1989 .... _ ..1988 to 1993 ........1980 to 1993 ........Total-3.0-4.1·9.5.53.5·12.48.15.253.45,489.65,!?,.45.26.696.56,844.26.792.06.518.76.852.51,166.77,595.1B,539.48,742.48.662.18,196.1-4.4-5.6-11.1-2.3.9-20.9·15.4TotalAdult1.412.4311,471.0591,546.0021,736.8281,730.9271.573,8641.260.324-4.0-4.8·11.0.33.4'15.612.14.449.74,699.95.044.75,876.06.016.25,965.15,325.06,750,47.119.97,594.58.672.28,898.68.863.37,987.4·5.2-6.2.12.4·2.5.4-23.8-15.5TOTAL ARRESTS, 1980, '988-1993Number. Rats per 100.000 Population, and Percant Changei! Law violalionsJuvemle II TOlal A dt.Jl 1 Jwende j Total Adult JU'IIenlie i255.091247.196245.310242.527236,241229.203282,5253.2.81.1l.B2.911.3-9.7803.6189.B800.5820.5826.1816.81,193.77,478.77,458.17.599.07,696.07,753.77,430.59,277.8.3-1.9-1.3-.14.3.5-19.4!I~lI'II11!::,.li,'iIii1,543,4431,695,1531.767,1501,955,7441,946.2651,879,1931.512,454-3.1-4.1-9.6.53.6·12.58.75.177.55.415.85.768.36,616.75.164.65,696.85,390.3Number1,412,431 231.0121 564,3071.471.058 224.095 I 554,4161,546.002 221.748 ! 541,3461.736.628 218.916 I 571,2681,730,927 215.338 i 590.2851,673.B64 205.319 I 550,446 ,1,260,324 252,130 l 372.190Percent change In number-4.0 3.1 I .0-4.9 1.1 43·11.0 1.3 -6.2.:3 1.1; -2.23.4 4.9 7.2i·15.5 12.5 1 2.512.1 -8.41 SUSMate per 100.000 lotal popt:latJon l4.449.74.699.95,044.75,816.05.016.25,965.15,325.0727.8 i 1.777.8716.0 I 1.BD3.2723.5: 1.766.474.0.6 j 1.953.0748.4: 2.051.7731.7 i 1,961.51,065.3 1 1.572.5472.334410.932447.6B1485.895501.259469.688274,814.35.2·7.9·3.16.7.671.91,488.01.504.61,450.B1.643.9~ ,742.21,673.81,161.1Rate per 100 000 pooIJ!ation at nsk 45,753.5 6.750,4 6,n2.S 2,319.0 2.251.4 2.696,4 i7,010.3 7.119.9 6,761.1 2,254.1 2,279.3 2.820.57,495.2 7.594.5 6,889.1 2,295.3 2,199.2 2.001.58.437.6 8,572.2 6.946.8 2,490.5 2,426.1 2,899.58.640.7 8.898.6 7,008.3 2.620.6 2.576.9 2,B97A8,553.4 B,363.3 6.656.3 2.505.4 2,487.0 2,618.18,034.5 7,9B7A 8,279.5 1,9n.2 1,741.5 3,197.71Percent change In rale per 100 000 populatIOn at risk-4.5 -5.2 .2 ·1.5 -1.0-5.7 -6.2 -1.6 2.6 3.6-11.2 -12.4 -1.1 ·1.B-2.4 -2.5 -5.01.0 .4 4.5 3.5-21.0 -23.8 1.8 -1,4 -9.2-15.9 -15.S -18.2 17.3 29.691.91393.48493.66591.373B9.02680.75897.37516'.22.5 12.5,10.213.9i·5.5,289.8 i296.11305.61309.1 !309,4 I287.8 !411.4 l-4.41-2.B!10.7 ; I3.0 r.15.71Total Adult Juvenlie:11,079.1361.130.737l,226.4D41,378.4761.355,9801,329.7371.140.264-4.6-7.B-11.0~.72.1-18.8·5.43.399.73,612.54,001.84.663.14.713.04,735.24,817.74.434.64.716.:25,199.95.947.16,020.'6.048.05,057.4-6.0-9.3-12.6-1.2·.5-26.7-25.8~O,O971,000.1261.098,3211,250,9331,229.6681.204.176985.510-6.0-8.92.1·21.9-4.62,961.73.195.33,583.94,232.24,274.04.291.34,163.94.493.04.840.65.395.35.246.06,321.66,376.26.245.7-7.2-10.3·13.6-1.2-,9-29.5-28.1139.039 "130.611126.063127.543126.312124.561154,7546.52.0.41.0 ,1.4 ,11.6 '-10.2438.0 'I417.3 :417.9 I431.5439.0443.9553.8 !!! 4,016.3 il3,940.6 Ii3.967.6 !!4,047,3 '4,110.9 4.038.2 ',15,081.9SO!.I"!:e: Monthly Attest arKJ Citation Register (MACR) systetn.Note: RateG calculated hom 11'18 total poptiation m4y rIOl add to subtotals CIt total because of independent rounding.'Felony arrests nave increased 17.3 percent in rate pIIf 1 OO,OX) population at nsk SII'Ice 1980. Pan d this Increase is due to II 1986 law change wnlch required reportingdomestiC violence as criminal c:onduc:t. ThiS resulted in an increase In felony assault arrests.~Statu£ offenses Include 'Nancy, Il'Icomglbility, rumjng away. and curle..... yiolatlons. Tnese d1enses can only 00 commlttecl or engaged i/1 by a Juvenile.'Rates are based on 81'1nual population estlmate& proYidecl by tl'le DemographIC Research Unit. Caliiorma Departmenl 01 Ftnance.'These rates are based on Ihe populahon al risk lor each year. The calegones afe: lotal (10-69 years 01 age). adult (18-69 years 01 age), and Juvenile (10-17 years 01 age).3.4 i-.7 i-2.0 I-1.51.8.9·19.8Statusoffenses'JU'IIemle24.07923.10123,56223.61122,90323.86430.39642·2.0·.231·.. U.8·20.875.973.S76.979979.585.;128.4705.96970729.9749.2745.47743998.21.3-4.5-2.6.5-3.7..s.8-29.3• From 1992 to 1993, total arrests decreased 4.4 percent in rate per 100,000population at risk. Total arrests have decreased 16.4 percent in rate since 1980,• From 1992 to 1993, felony arrests decreased 1.5 percent in rate. Felony arrestshave increased 17.3 percent in rate since 1980.• From 1992 to 1993, misdemeanor arrests decreased 6.0 percent in rate.Misdemeanor arrests have decreased 26.8 percent in rate since 1980.

The Juvenile Crime Challenge146

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICELAW ENFORCEMENT INr-oRMATJON emJUVENILE HISDEHEAIiOR ARRESTSBY SEX, OFFEHSE AND ARREST RATESTATEIUOESEX. OFFENSE hNO RATE19831964198519861987190019B919901991992JUV. HISDEHEhHOR ARREST124,421126,334131 .66713

The Juvenile Crime Challenge144

CALIFORNIA DUPARTMHNT or JUSTICeLAW ENfoORCcMENT INIURMATION CENTERTABLE 3CJUYEHILE FELOHV ARRESTSBV SEX. OFFEHSE AHO ARREST RATESTATEIHOESEX, OFFENSE ANDRATE19S319841905198619B719991989199019911992JUV. FELONY ARRESTS71 ,18668,989. 73.52176,' 9273,58380,75889.02691 ,37393,66593,484HALEFE HALE63,2667,9226\,2447,74565,4038,11867,5218,67165,5228, 06171 .9928.86679.2B29,744eO,84310,53D62. 38711,27861 .56011 ,924VIOLEHT OFFEHSESHOHICIDE MfORCIBLE RAPEROEBERYASSAULT ~KIDIIAPPIHG12 ,3212865615.3675~90218511 ,85330655601.7196,09317912 .... 212364915,1 eo6.36615812,5412965614,9246,58317712.3363655204,3966.91414113.9983995431.8508.10411217,4695336066,' 6810,01814420,6586586307,78611 ,37920521.1586966657.96011 .69514221 .549645566a, 1 5112,0051 B2PROPERTY OfFENSESBURGLARYTHefTHOTOR VEHICLE THEFTFO~G CKS/ACC CARDSARSOH45,79327,83410,4475.97477176742.49725.2.BI9.5235,92482294745,89925,97610,4167,6348581,01546,27723.63111 .1499.791965041

The Juvenile Crime Challenge142

AppendicesAPPENDIX 0The following pages, which are excerpts from Department of Justice reports oncriminal justice trends, detail the following information:• Juvenile felony arrests for 1983 through 1992.• Juvenile misdemeanor arrests for 1983 through 1992.• Total arrests for both juveniles and adults for 1993, with comparative data from1980 and 1988 through 1992.(The footnotes for the juvenile felony arrests page indicate that homicide arrests from1981 to 1985 may be slightly inflated while assault rates for those years may beunderreported because of a law change that included assault with intent to includemurder in some homicide statistics. Also assault statistics began reflecting domesticviolence incidents as criminal conduct in 1986.)(The footnote for the juvenile misdemeanor arrests page indicates that disorderlyconduct arrests decreased because of a change in policy by the San Diego PoliceDepartment. )141

The Juvenile Crime Challenge140

AppendicesAPPENDIX CWitnesses Appearing atLittle Hoover CommissionJuvenile Justice Study Public HearingsMarch 17. 1994. SacramentoFrances LusterMother of murdered sonValerie RichardsMother of murdered sonPeter GreenwoodRAND, criminal justice expertJudge Arnold RosenfieldJuvenile Court Judges of CaliforniaWilliam Pruitt, ChairmanYouthful Offender Parole BoardFrank Alarcon, Chief Deputy DirectorCalifornia Youth AuthoritySylvia SantanaAunt of incarcerated youthDavid Steinhart, AttorneyJuvenile Justice SpecialistMay 26. 1994. Los AngelesCraig Cornett/Cliff CurryLegislative Analysfs OfficeMichael Schmacher, Chief ProbationOfficerOrange County Probation DepartmentFather Tom A vram isGuadalupe HomesMary MarksLong Beach Neighborhood DiversionProgramGary Yates, Program DirectorCalifornia Well ness FoundationFrank Alarcon, Chief Deputy DirectorCalifornia Youth AuthorityCaptain Chuck Byard, Redding PoliceDepartmentSerious Habitual Offender (SHO)ProgramSandra Moss-Manson, Los AngelesCounty Probation DepartmentGang Alternative and PreventionProgramBob Polakow, ChairmanLos Angeles County Interagency GangTask Force139

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION FACT SHEETThe Little Hoover Commission, formally known as the Milton Marks Commission onCalifornia State Government Organization and Economy, is an independent state oversightagency that was created in 1962. The Commission's mission is to investigate stategovernment operations and -- through reports, and recommendations and legislativeproposals -- promote efficiency, economy and improved service.By statute, the Commission is a balanced bipartisan board composed of five citizenmembers appointed by the Governor, four citizen members appointed by the Legislature,two Senators and two Assembly members.The Commission holds hearings on topics that come to its attention from citizens,legislators and other sources. But the hearings are only a small part of a long and thoroughprocess:*****Two or three months of preliminary investigations and preparations comebefore a hearing is conducted.Hearings are constructed in such a way to explore identified issues and raisenew areas for investigation.Two to six months of intensive fieldwork is undertaken before a report -­including findings and recommendations -- is written, adopted and released.Legislation to implement recommendations is sponsored and lobbied throughthe legislative system.New hearings are held and progress reports issued in the years following theinitial report until the Commission's recommendations have been enacted orits concerns have been addressed.

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