Goldman and Kalimtgis presentedthe facts on the HongShang wasthe bank's lawyer, Steuert L. Pittman.A former Air Force official,Pittman had created the Office ofPreparedness during the Kennedyadministration, a virtual governmentinside the government. Bythe time the HongShang case camebefore the Federal Reserve, Pittman'sold agency had become theFederal Emergency ManagementAgency, an octopus reaching insideevery Cabinet department.HongShang had hired one of thekey men in Washington's actualbehind-the-scenes government.Pittman did not even attempt torespond to the exhaustive documentationagainst HongShang. Instead,he worked through closecontacts, including House BankingCommittee Chairman HenryReuss (D.-Wi.), a prominent supporterof marijuana decriminalization.Another close Pittman colleaguefrom the Kennedy administrationwas then Treasury SecretaryWerner Michael Blumenthal.New York State officials alsoheard testimony from the Dope xInc. co-authors in December 1978.Initially skeptical, New YorkState's Banking SuperintendentMuriel Siebert grew more convincedthat something foul was atwork the better she got to knowHongShang—and the more Dope,Inc. circulated among outragedNew York State legislators.Under banking law, any mergerof a state bank with a foreign bankmust be approved both by the FederalReserve and the officials ofthat state. Superintendent Sieberttried to go about her duties in arun-of-the-mill way, requestingthe usual balance sheets from theHongShang, and wound up, to herdismay, with the worst set ofcooked books she had ever seen.As she later told the Treasuryofficials who approved the HongShang takerover of Marine Midland,"Profits, deposits, and capitalare not fairly stated in the publishedfinancial statements ofHongkong and Shanghai BankingCorporation." She added, "A glaringexample of this is the practiceof Hongkong and Shanghai BankingCorporation to credit an accountcalled 'Inner Reserves' withthe true profit of the bank andthen to take from this account theamount of profit that managementwants to publish. The secrecy ofthe true profit is further reinforcedby the practice of burying the InnerReserves Account in the Depositsaccount." Siebert complainedbefore public hearings thatthe HongShang would not even tellher what companies it owned, letalone how much profit it made!New York State's BankingSuperintendent Muriel Siebertrequested the usual balancesheets from HongShangand wound up, to her dismay,with the worst set ofcooked books she had everseen.In the transcript of an Oct. 23,1979 hearing on the HongShangtakeover, the record reads:Question: Would it be possible foran American bank regulator to determinewhether or not Hongkongand Shanghai Banking Corporationis still financing narcoticstraffic without having access to thetype of information that you requestedunsuccessfully from theHongShang?Miss Siebert: No, I could not confirmor deny.That was enough for New YorkState, but not for the Federal Reserve.Despite the fact that theFederal Reserve had not obtainedany better data than New YorkState had, and despite the factthat HongShang's own Americanaccountants, Peat Marwick andMitchell, had quit in disgust theprevious July over the same issue,the Fed gave the HongShang takeoverof Marine Midland its stampof approval in March 1979. In itsofficial pronouncement, the Fedadmitted that it had conducted noinvestigation into the charges thatHongShang was up to its neck inthe dope trade.Desisted after war?But New York State was still anobstacle, and the international financialpress went crazy over theissue. In February 1979, the leadingbusiness magazine BusinessWeek quoted HongShang's responseto the charges: the bankhad indeed financed the opiumtrade until the end of World WarII, but desisted after that! Ofcourse, the opium heir John HenryKeswick who ran the bank duringthe period when it admitted runningdope—dope that began toflood the United States in the1920s—is still on the bank's board.In Washington and elsewhere,the dope money issue simmeredjust below boiling point. Under thegun, New York State officials triedto pass the buck to Congress. ButHongShang lawyer Pittmanblocked Congressional hearingswith one letter to Banking CommitteeChairman Henry Reuss.Pittman's old friend G. WilliamMiller at the Federal Reservesoonto replace Blumenthal as Secretaryof the Treasury—twistedNew York State Governor HughCarey's arms in an attempt toforce approval of the HongShangtakeover.Carey was not hard to persuade.During his gubernatorial electioncampaign in 1978, he had taken ahuge, and illegal, loan from theBronfman family, the old bootleggerswho "went legit" with SeagramCorporation. The scandalthat emerged when the loan wasreported could have cost him theelection. The Bronfmans are theHongShang Bank's chief NorthAmerican operatives. As Dope,Inc. documents, they run the HongKong to Canada opium route thatgoes through Canadian Pacific andex-Hong Kong policemen residentin Canada's West Coast.And the Bronfmans had Careyon a string. The New York StateGovernor, accordingly, publiclyJuly <strong>1980</strong> / War on Drugs 25
dollar. It is the correspondentbank for every expatriate Chineseor Thai banker in the region, includingthose detected by the DrugEnforcement Administration asdope financiers. It was created in1864 for the explicit purpose offinancing narcotics traffic and admitssuch activity up through theend of World War II. The onlything that changed since then,Dope, Inc. documented, is thatHongShang employs expendableCh'ao Chou Chinese frontmen(among others) to handle the dirtiersides of the business. Its empireof transport, shipping, airline,warehousing and chemical companies—thefull list of which is stillHugh Carey: a New York governor onthe Bronfmans' stringsecret—is thje physical infrastructureof the opium and herointrade.denounced his own banking supervisor'sobjections to the merger as"invalid" at a May 15, 1979 pressconference. He let the press knowthat if Siebert did not approve thetakeover, he would fire her andfind a superintendent who would.But New York State legislatorsalready had outraged constituentsat their backs. Tens of thousandsof copies of Dope, Inc. were inprint, and the facts were too glaringto ignore. Hong Kong is a barrenisland, first settled in 1837 byBritish opium traders as a supplydepot for the Chinese opium trade.In 1978, its money supply was only$5 billion, yet its banks processedmore than $10 billion of illegalopium and heroin revenues. Its policeforce is the most corrupt in theworld, accepting—in the official estimateof the Independent CommissionAgainst Corruption—$1billion in bribes every year! EveryAmerican Congressional investigationon the dope trade has pointedto that British Crown Colony asthe center of the financing anddistribution of the world's heroinsupply.On top of this sits the Hong-Shang, with half of the island'sbanking deposits, traditionallycontrolling the local government.HongShang officially prints the island'scurrency, the Hong KongSiebert backedAt stormy hearings held appropriatelyat the New York StateOffice Building in Harlem, theBanking Committee of the NewYork State Legislature backed upthe beleaguered Superintendent.The same day, the IndependentBankers Association of New YorkState demanded, "The continuedproliferation of takeovers of U.S.banks and banking holding companiesby foreign banks or otherforeign interests should bebrought to an immediate halt."Backers fearful that they would benext to be taken over by the Britishfinancial octopus, including thebillion-dollar Long Island Trust,lobbied behind the scenes in Siebert'sbehalf. The New York Stateruling stood:! no balance sheet, noapproval of the application.That was in June 1979. But afterJuly 1979, America's politicalstructure had been drastically altered.The Federal AmergencyManagement Agency slitheredinto existence that month, immediatelytaking control over the socalleddisaster at the Three MileIsland nuclear plant. FEMA beganto run the emergency functions ofthe Treasury and Federal Reserve,a government within a government.HongShang lawyer SteuertW. Michael Blumenthal: an old cronyof HongShang's lawyer in the cabinetPittman, the godfather of the newentity, then pulled a trick that anyother administration would havelaughed out of court.Tore up its own rulesIn July, Marine Midland, underthe new chairmanship of LehmanBrothers partner John Petty, appliedto change its charter fromstate to national status. Under itsstate charter, Marine Midland'smerger with the HongShang wassubject to approval by New YorkState. However, if it changed to anational charter, it could bypassNew York State entirely.What makes Pittman's eventuallysuccessful gambit so extraordinaryis that the rules of theTreasury office which decides onnational charters, the Comptrollerof the Currency, state specificallythat a bank may not change itscharter merely to "circumventstate regulation." Yet that is preciselywhat Marine Midland andHongShang proposed to do, as MarineMidland's counsel Frank J.Laski told Oct. 22 hearings:"By June of 1979, it became clearthat the Superintendent probablywould not approve the transaction. .. the Board of Directors of MarineMidland then concluded thattheir duties . . . gave them no otheralternative than to pursue all26 War on Drugs / July <strong>1980</strong>