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9756 PAYNE v. PENINSULA SCHOOL DISTRICT than the IDEA, a plaintiff is entitled to hold the school responsible under those other laws. 4 The National School Boards Association (“NSBA”), as amicus, suggests that our conclusion is at odds with the Supreme Court’s decision in Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001), a case in which the Court construed the exhaustion requirement in the PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Indeed, Booth’s language factored “strongly” in Robb’s conclusion, since we noted in that case that “[t]he PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is framed in language similar to the IDEA’s.” Robb, 308 F.3d at 1050-51 (comparing “administrative remedies . . . available” under the PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), to “relief that is also available” under the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l)). In Booth, the Court concluded that the PLRA “mandate[s] exhaustion . . . regardless of the relief offered through administrative procedures.” 532 U.S. at 741. We held in Robb that, applied to the IDEA, this language meant that “a plaintiff must exhaust a mandatory administrative process even if the precise form of relief sought is not available in the administrative venue.” 308 F.3d at 1051. This wording suggests that even if a plaintiff has available non-IDEA forms of relief in addition to potential relief under the IDEA, the plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies before pursuing any of them. While this conclusion was correct in Booth, there are important differences between the PLRA and the IDEA, and Robb incorrectly applied the same conclusion to the IDEA. The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement specifies that “[n]o action shall be brought . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (emphasis added). The language is unequivocal and makes no reference to parallel forms of relief. Booth sensibly interpreted the prohibition on bringing an action to mean that the PLRA restricted unexhausted prisoner litigation altogether. By contrast, the IDEA’s exhaustion provision applies only to “the filing of a civil action . . . seeking relief that is also available
PAYNE v. PENINSULA SCHOOL DISTRICT 9757 under [the IDEA]”; otherwise, the IDEA does not “restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies” available under § 1983, the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, or other federal laws. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). The difference between these two statutes is critical — unlike the PLRA, the IDEA requires exhaustion only from plaintiffs who are pursuing non-IDEA claims that compel the same forms of relief as the IDEA. The NSBA also appeals to the inevitability of parent-school disputes and argues that “[r]elaxing the IDEA’s administrative exhaustion requirement does violence” to Congress’s goal of expediting the resolution of these disputes. We are mindful of “the general rule that parties exhaust prescribed administrative remedies before seeking relief from the federal courts.” McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144-45 (1992). The general rule is a salutary one allowing agencies to exercise their expertise, to correct their own errors, and to provide relief that may be both swifter and more satisfactory than relief available through more formal litigation. Even where the parties ultimately file suit in federal court after exhausting their administrative remedies, we may benefit from a process that has developed the factual record and narrowed the issues contested by the parties. The reasons for administrative exhaustion do not change the fact that the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement is not as broad as the NSBA urges. Moreover, the NSBA’s reading would actually place disabled students in a disadvantaged position relative to students without special needs. As Payne accurately notes, a student who had no disability — and therefore had no need for an IEP — would be able to challenge the constitutionality of his teacher’s confinement procedures without first resorting to administrative procedures. The student could simply advance a § 1983 claim alleging violations of his constitutional rights. No exhaustion would be required. If a disabled student would be able to make out a similarly meritorious constitutional claim — one that need not reference his disability at all — it is odd to suggest that the IDEA
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