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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

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9778 PAYNE v. PENINSULA SCHOOL DISTRICT<br />

who seeks monetary damages because a school district’s<br />

implementation of some educational program resulted in a<br />

claimed failure adequately to instruct him in reading. 6 Such a<br />

child could allege either: 1) the school district failed to provide<br />

a “free appropriate public education” as required by the<br />

IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9), or, as the plaintiffs here claim, 2)<br />

the school district’s actions caused the child’s “academic<br />

prowess and abilities” to be diminished, entitling the child to<br />

general and special damages for his emotional and psychological<br />

pain and suffering. Although the facts underlying both of<br />

these claims would be identical, the majority holds that the<br />

IDEA requires exhaustion of administrative remedies only if<br />

the plaintiff styles his complaint as a failure to provide a “free<br />

appropriate public education” under the IDEA, or explicitly<br />

measures damages as the cost of counseling, tutoring, or private<br />

schooling. Only then, according to the majority, is the<br />

does not involve the adequacy of the plaintiffs’ pleadings, but the adequacy<br />

of the evidence adduced by the parties to establish or eliminate triable<br />

issues of material fact. The district court entertained and ruled on a<br />

Rule 56 motion, not a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.<br />

6 The majority contends that “a claim for failure to adequately instruct<br />

a student in reading can arise only under the IDEA because there is no<br />

other federal cause of action for such a claim.” Maj. Op. at 9759-60. With<br />

respect, the majority underestimates the potential creativity of plaintiffs’<br />

attorneys. Consider, for example, a child whose IEP provides that he<br />

should spend 30 minutes each school day reading independently in a quiet<br />

room by himself. If that child were to suffer anxiety and claustrophobia<br />

while in the quiet room—leading to a regression in his reading scores—he<br />

might sue the school district under § 1983 for improper detention in violation<br />

of the Fourth Amendment and seek compensation for his academic<br />

injuries. Indeed, such a case would be largely analogous to the facts in<br />

Robb v. Bethel School District #403, 308 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2002), in<br />

which the plaintiff sought monetary damages for academic injuries which<br />

resulted from a child’s participation in “peer tutoring” sessions which took<br />

place on the floor of a dimly-lit hallway. As I read the majority, so long<br />

as an alleged violation is cast as a federal Constitutional or statutory<br />

claim, the plaintiffs are not required to exhaust their administrative<br />

remedies—regardless whether the claim is actually based upon the school<br />

district’s failure adequately to instruct the child.

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