04-473 - Garcetti v. Ceballos - Supreme Court of the United States

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006)7SOUTER, J., dissentingsubstantial concern to the public. Were they not able tospeak on these matters, the community would be deprivedof informed opinions on important public issues. Theinterest at stake is as much the public’s interest in receivinginformed opinion as it is the employee’s own right todisseminate it.” San Diego v. Roe, 543 U. S. 77, 82 (2004)(per curiam) (citation omitted). This is not a whit less truewhen an employee’s job duties require him to speak aboutsuch things: when, for example, a public auditor speaks onhis discovery of embezzlement of public funds, when abuilding inspector makes an obligatory report of an attemptto bribe him, or when a law enforcement officerexpressly balks at a superior’s order to violate constitutionalrights he is sworn to protect. (The majority, however,places all these speakers beyond the reach of FirstAmendment protection against retaliation.)Nothing, then, accountable on the individual and publicside of the Pickering balance changes when an employeespeaks “pursuant” to public duties. On the side of thegovernment employer, however, something is different,and to this extent, I agree with the majority of the Court.The majority is rightly concerned that the employee whospeaks out on matters subject to comment in doing hisown work has the greater leverage to create office uproarsand fracture the government’s authority to set policy to becarried out coherently through the ranks. “Official communicationshave official consequences, creating a needfor substantive consistency and clarity. Supervisors mustensure that their employees’ official communications areaccurate, demonstrate sound judgment, and promote theemployer’s mission,” ante, at 11. Up to a point, then, themajority makes good points: government needs civility inthe workplace, consistency in policy, and honesty andcompetence in public service.But why do the majority’s concerns, which we all share,require categorical exclusion of First Amendment protec-