FROM OuR PARTNERSICAO contributes to better practice innational identity managementby Mauricio Sicilianointernational Civil AviationOrganization MRTD ProgramLast December, during the 19th meetingof the International Civil AviationOrganization (ICAO) Technical AdvisoryGroup on Machine Readable TravelDocuments (TAG-MRTD), the NewTechnologies Working Group (NTWG)presented a working paper calling for aglobal focus on the weaknesses in breederdocuments (documents used to establishidentity) <strong>and</strong> civil registries.These documents <strong>and</strong> registries remaina significant security vulnerability thatcan compromise machine readable traveldocuments <strong>and</strong> electronic MRTDs. WhileMRTD specifications are well established,little international regulation, if any, appliesto breeder documents.Breeder documents <strong>and</strong> civil registry gapsrequire additional attention <strong>and</strong> global effortsto codify best practices so that this knowledgemay be used for action <strong>and</strong> capacity buildingworldwide. While ICAO has no directm<strong>and</strong>ate to address breeder document norms,the technical advisory group agreed thataddressing such norms is a legitimate <strong>and</strong>important area for ICAO involvement.The TAG-MRTD acknowledged theimportance of the breeder document issue,<strong>and</strong> authorized the NTWG to engage inwork directed to those ends.As outlined in the working paperpresented before the Technical AdvisoryGroup, over the past several years, manynations have invested time, money <strong>and</strong> greatexpectations in enhanced travel documentprograms, especially in machine readableePassports employing biometrics.By all accounts, the current generationof ICAO-compliant travel documents isthe best <strong>and</strong> most secure the world hasever known.However, there is a threat affectingvirtually all issuing authorities that canu nder mine or indeed subver t this impor tantwork: national identity management.National identity management deals withthe kinds of documents, civil registrysystems <strong>and</strong> other media that are usedWhile the current generation of travel documents are more secure than ever, the threat that someone could present a genuinepassport issued using false breeder documents is very real.to verify <strong>and</strong>/or validate an applicant’sidentity.Currently, many of the judgmentsthat countries reach regarding issuance oftravel documents are based in large parton the representations of the applicant invalidating their bona fides.In managing identity for the benefit oftheir communities <strong>and</strong> citizens, NationalCivil Registration <strong>and</strong> passport issuingauthorities must do the following:• establish identity;• confirm citizenship;• assess entitlement.While the latter two areas are primarilysovereign matters determined by nationallaws <strong>and</strong> policies, all of the issues involvedin establishing identity are universal,common <strong>and</strong> shared.Every applicant for a certificate, identitycard or travel document is making a claimto a particular identity. The first step ofthe issuing authority is to test the claim, inother words, to establish identity.The claim to an identity is tested by thenational authority checking three things:what does the applicant “know” aboutthe identity that is claimed; who “is” theapplicant; <strong>and</strong> what does the applicant“have” to support the claimed identity.In this final category, the civilregistration <strong>and</strong> identity documentsthat accompany an application for atravel document, <strong>and</strong> the application foran identity card that entitles passportissuance, are called breeder documents.Breeder documents are the fundamentalphysical evidence accepted by nationalauthorities to establish a prime facie claimto an identity.Current challengesThe threat of an individual presenting agenuine passport that was issued on thebasis of false breeder documentation isvery real. In today’s document-issuingenvironment, presentation of these falsedocuments <strong>and</strong> false claims of entitlement34<strong>Gazette</strong> Vol. 72, No. 3, 2010
FROM OuR PARTNERSwill be rewarded with a travel, residenceor identity document that has far morecredibility than ever before — a documentthat in many countries contains a chip withbiometric information of the bearer.Today’s documents contain advancedsecurity features of great capability <strong>and</strong>when present, generally attest to theveracity of the documents themselves <strong>and</strong>,hence, the bearer. With the advances thathave been made in the documents, there is amuch quicker <strong>and</strong> widespread presumptionon the part of inspection authorities toaccept the legitimacy of the documents <strong>and</strong>the bearer.Many countries have also movedfrom a decentralised to a centralisedpersonalisation system. This changeallows issuing authorities to apply highqualitypersonalisation techniques, suchas including personal data — first <strong>and</strong> lastname, date of birth, photo of the bearer —on the data page, <strong>and</strong> to respond quicklyto the latest developments in the area ofdocument fraud.The introduction of new securityfeatures, production methods <strong>and</strong>personalisation techniques has made themost recent generation of identificationdocuments more difficult to forge.Moreover, improved staff training hasincreased the likelihood of a forged orcounterfeit ID document being detected.These kinds of improvements haveresulted in an increasingly prevalent globalshift from document fraud to identity fraud.Over the next few years, a large numberof identity, travel, residence <strong>and</strong> otheridentity documents will contain a biometricidentifier that will enable verification,within an automated environment, <strong>and</strong>remotely if desired.breeder documents <strong>and</strong> registriesWe live in an increasingly global contextthat relies on high-quality identitydocumentation, including all underlyingcivil <strong>and</strong> administrative systems <strong>and</strong>processes.Although we have taken extensive <strong>and</strong>successful steps to improve the qualityof identity documents, we must stilladdress the foundations upon which thesedocuments ultimately reside. This includesthe paper documents themselves as well asthe registries <strong>and</strong> other databases that formthe cornerstone for verification.Therefore, as well as the documentsthat are the “usual suspects” used byapplicants for travel documents — birthcertificates, cards of national identity <strong>and</strong>driver’s licences — often the informationthat is captured in these <strong>and</strong> other breederdocuments also resides in a database ofnational content.While the existence, quality <strong>and</strong>ease of accessing such databases variesdramatically from country to country,increasingly governments have beenfocusing on these database sources ofinformation either in lieu of or in additionto the documents themselves. While thisis a very useful approach to verifying thelegitimacy of entitlement claims, there aresometimes limitations of a legal or privacynature that impedes the use <strong>and</strong> utility ofthese databases.Some countries are beginning to linkdata sources, such as birth <strong>and</strong> deathrecords, to serve as automatic checks <strong>and</strong>v e r i fi c a t i o n s .This integration initiative seeks toacknowledge the importance of thesesecure sources of information <strong>and</strong> to offersuggestions on their use in addition to thedocuments themselves.Possible avenues forwardTo limit the impact <strong>and</strong> effect of thisendemic <strong>and</strong> pervasive vulnerability asmuch as possible, the document communitymust develop <strong>and</strong> articulate best practices,successful approaches <strong>and</strong>, where feasible,minimal security norms for civil statusdocuments <strong>and</strong> the databases on whichthey depend.While ICAO has the authority <strong>and</strong>capability to develop <strong>and</strong> publish traveldocument st<strong>and</strong>ards, the nature of breederdocumentation does not neatly fall withinthat m<strong>and</strong>ate.However, since the veracity <strong>and</strong>validity of the travel documents depend onbreeder documentation, ICAO does have aresponsibility to take any <strong>and</strong> all measuresavailable to improve this foundation. Thereare two fundamental vehicles that ICAOTAG has used to develop, assess <strong>and</strong> conveyguidance <strong>and</strong> technical expectations:Document 9303 <strong>and</strong> the technical report.The ICAO’s document 9303 containsinformative material that, while notm<strong>and</strong>atory st<strong>and</strong>ards, outlines minimumsecurity expectations for travel documents.While admittedly requiring a carefulapproach, this “st<strong>and</strong>ards” concept shouldbe explored.Second, historically, the NewTechnologies Working Group has focused ona number of specific issues <strong>and</strong> matters, <strong>and</strong>addressed them through drafting technicalreports.For breeder documentation, whosebreadth <strong>and</strong> scope <strong>and</strong> sovereigntyimplications suggest that st<strong>and</strong>ards might notbe appropriate, using a technical report couldbe the vehicle to capture <strong>and</strong> memorializebest practices <strong>and</strong> other forms of guidance.Work on a technical report could also serveto underscore the specific nature of thebreeder document problem <strong>and</strong> provide waysin which issuing authorities could enhancetheir abilities to assess such documents.The path forward must be an integralcomponent of the larger spectrum ofgovernment direction, purpose, policy <strong>and</strong>need. It will seek to:• address the global threat to traveldocument integrity caused byentitlement judgments that areaffected by the weaknesses ofthe current reliability on breederdocumentation.• focus broad international attentionon the importance <strong>and</strong> magnitudeof these threats with a view towardtheir mitigation <strong>and</strong> ultimateelimination.• create a forum <strong>and</strong> foundation forthe development of the worldwidesecurity enhancement of breederdocumentation.In addition, work will be required overtime in the other two areas for establishingidentity: testing what the client “knows”<strong>and</strong> checking who the client “is.” ▪For moreinformation, visit:www.icao.int<strong>Gazette</strong> Vol. 72, No. 3, 2010 35
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