Volume 12:2 - Shepard Broad Law Center - Nova Southeastern ...

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596 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative <strong>Law</strong> [Vol. <strong>12</strong>:593provide assurance to the international community that all nuclear activities inthat country are exclusively for peaceful purposes. The agreement reached inBeijing at the six-party talks—after two years of complex negotiations—on theprinciples that should govern a comprehensive settlement, is a significant stepforward. It is particularly welcome that North Korea has expressed itscommitment “to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programsand [to return], at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation ofNuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards.” 2This past September the IAEA Board of Governors expressed the view thata successfully negotiated settlement of this longstanding issue of maintainingthe essential verification role of the IAEA would be a significantaccomplishment for international peace and security.II. IRANFor the past two and a half years, the IAEA has been investigating thenature and extent of Iran’s nuclear program, with a view to assuring ourselvesthat all past activities have been declared to the IAEA, and that all nuclearmaterial and activities in the country are under safeguards. Iran has failed in anumber of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligationsunder its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclearmaterial, its processing and its use, as well as the declaration of facilities wheresuch material had been processed and stored.Since October 2003, however, Iran has made good progress in correctingits past breaches and the IAEA has been able to verify certain aspects of Iran’snuclear program. As a result, some aspects of that program—such as thoserelated to uranium conversion, laser enrichment, fuel fabrication and heavywater—are now being followed up as routine safeguards implementationmatters.Since last November, our verification efforts have focused primarily ontwo aspects of Iran’s centrifuge enrichment activities. Regarding the firstaspect, the origin of uranium particle contamination found at various locationsin Iran, we have made good progress, with the active cooperation of Pakistan.Regarding the second aspect, clarifying the chronology of Iran’s centrifugeactivities, we still have a number of unanswered questions and we have maderepeated requests to Iran for additional information and access.As our latest report in September made clear, Iran continues to fulfill itsobligations under the safeguards agreement and additional protocol byproviding timely access to nuclear material, facilities and other locations. This,2. Christopher R. Hill, Asst. Sec. for East Asian & Pac. Aff. (U.S. Dept. of State), Statement beforethe House International Relations Committee (Oct. 6, 2005), available athttp://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2005/54430.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
2006] Zlauvinen 597however, is a special verification case that requires additional transparencymeasures as a prerequisite for the IAEA to be able to reconstruct the history andnature of all aspects of Iran’s past nuclear activities, and to compensate for theconfidence deficit created. By promptly responding to these IAEA requests,Iran would well serve both its interests and those of the internationalcommunity. The more thoroughly we are able to clarify all of Iran’s pastnuclear activities, the more we will be in a position to understand and confirmthe nature of the program.As a confidence building measure, the Board has also, in a number ofresolutions beginning in December 2003, urged Iran to maintain a voluntarysuspension of all its enrichment related and reprocessing activities and hasasked the IAEA to continue to monitor Iran’s application of this suspension.Since August 8, Iran has been conducting conversion activities at the IsfahanUranium Conversion Facility under IAEA verification. Other aspects of Iran’ssuspension remain intact.The IAEA Board of Governors has continued to devote considerableattention to the implementation of Iran’s NPT safeguards agreement. Lastmonth the Board adopted a resolution that, inter alia, found Iran to be innoncompliance with its safeguards agreement and urged Iran to implement thetransparency measures necessary for the IAEA to be able to clarify outstandingissues. The IAEA will continue to call on Iran to do its utmost to work with theIAEA and the international community, to provide assurance that its nuclearprogram is exclusively for peaceful purposes.III. NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLECountries with nuclear industries have set up elaborate accounting andprotection measures to ensure strong national oversight of their nuclearmaterial. The IAEA inspects regularly to verify the accuracy of what countriesreport. Export controls restrict the transfer of sensitive technologies that couldbe misused for nuclear-weapons production.However, controlling access to nuclear-weapons technology has grownincreasingly difficult. The technical barriers to designing weapons and tomastering the processing steps have eroded with time. Much of the hardwarein question is “dual-use;” for example, it is hard to justify restrictions onexporting “hot cell” technology that could be used for plutonium separationwhen the same equipment is vital for producing radioisotopes used in modernmedicine. Changes in political fortunes or economic downturns have at timesfound nuclear scientists without jobs and reportedly willing to offer theirknowledge and services elsewhere. And with the passage of time, the sheerdiversity of technology has made it harder to control both procurement andsales. In pre-1991 Iraq, for example, scientists were simultaneously pursuing
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I am especially indebted to the Exe
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Filling the Void: Providing a Frame
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INTERNATIONAL LAW WEEKEND PANEL ONL
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2006] Dugot 391thousands of looted
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2006] Dugot 393physically examining
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2006] Fairley and Archibald 419coul
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2006] Fairley and Archibald 421of i
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2006] Fairley and Archibald 423the
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2006] Fairley and Archibald 425init
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2006] Fairley and Archibald 427B. T
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APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIE
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2006] Dennis 461recent military occ
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2006] Dennis 463Hence, on the basis
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2006] Dennis 465reading of Article
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2006] Dennis 467[The] grammatical (
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2006] Dennis 469[Lopez Burgos v. Ur
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2006] Dennis 471By way of example,
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2006] Dennis 473One important doorw
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2006] Dennis 475letter from the U.S
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2006] Dennis 477decisions at very s
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2006] Dennis 479to the catalog of n
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2006] Corn 483international human r
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2006] Corn 485force regulated by su
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2006] Corn 487This mandate has been
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2006] Corn 489The military aspect o
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WHAT IS WAR? TERRORISM AS WAR AFTER
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2006] Dalton 525died in the attacks
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2006] Dalton 5271998, 14 though he
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2006] Dalton 529done so. Because of
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2006] Dalton 531One also hears the
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2006] Dalton 533Secretary of Homela
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“WAR” IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYS
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2006] Vagts 543conspicuously the Ko
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Page 179 and 180: IS INTERNATIONAL LAW A THREAT TODEM
Page 181 and 182: 2006] Strauss 557least to the exten
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Page 185 and 186: 2006] Gould 561waste from Canada. C
Page 187 and 188: 2006] Gould 563Beyond this, we can
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Page 191 and 192: 2006] Herrera 567“final battle”
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Page 195 and 196: 2006] Bertoni 5715) any imposition
Page 197 and 198: 2006] Bertoni 573Convention says th
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Page 201 and 202: 2006] Lowry 577B. UNCITRAL Model La
Page 203 and 204: 2006] Lowry 579This subjected plain
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Page 227 and 228: 2006] Paust 603whether or not perso
Page 229: 2006] Paust 605duties that are also
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