<strong>Global</strong> <strong>Peace</strong> - Incident Analysis Team Report5ADEQUACY AND EFFECTIVENESS OFWILDLIFE RESCUE AND REHABILITATIONIssue: Adequacy and Effectiveness of WildlifeRescue and RehabilitationBackgroundGiven the limited wildlife rescue andrehabilitation associated with this incident therewas no real effectiveness testing of this responsecomponent. Appropriate equipment and responsepersonnel were deployed, but the small numberof impacted wildlife, less than 10 birds, meant thatthe response was completed in a relatively shortperiod of time with all personnel being stooddown after six days.Queensland Parks and Wildlife Service (QPWS)reported that there were some minor problemswith the local oiled wildlife response plan notbeing regularly updated to reflect changesin personnel, contacts details and availableequipment.During the response, two pods of marinemammals were monitored. A pod of dolphinsnear the Marina moved away during the incidentand subsequently returned. While another pod,located in the Calliope River, seemed unaffectedby the spill.QPWS received reports of two dead dugongssome three to four weeks after the oil spill. Whileno oil was reported in the gut or intestines of theseanimals, no chemical analysis was undertaken dueto their decayed state.The area is not a bird breeding area so there wereno migratory or intertidal birds in the area duringthe spill.ConclusionThe IAT noted that the staged and structuredapproach adopted by QPWS in establishing awildlife stabilisation centre as an initial step andthen planning for additional actions as and whenrequired, was entirely appropriate. There is also aneed for all response agencies to regularly reviewand update their oiled wildlife response plans.Calliope River12
<strong>Global</strong> <strong>Peace</strong> - Incident Analysis Team Report6ENVIRONMENTAL ADVICE AND SUPPORT(a) Issue: Use and Effectiveness of the Oil SpillResponse Atlas (OSRA)BackgroundThe IAT believes that OSRA was not wellappreciated as a resource in this incident. Instead,reliance was placed on local based knowledge,which while timely, cost effective and accuratewas outside of the OSRA system.The IAT noted that in this instance, environmentalplanning for the <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Peace</strong> response wasprimarily a paper-based exercise. This arose as aresult of:• a strong preference in the ICC for paper basedpresentation of information;• no available trained OSRA operators in the first24-36 hours after the spill;• the use of only one OSRA operator to check,verify, interpret and present information whensuch a range of tasks normally requires twopeople; and,• the belief that the Gladstone OSRA systemwould not interconnect with other computerbased planning and response systems, that itwould not produce up to date maps, that itsinformation was out of date and that it waspreferable to rely on locally based knowledge.ConclusionNotwithstanding a considerable data gatheringexercise in the recent past, the combined benefitof OSRA and local data was not achieved. Thisresulted from a lack of appreciation of the benefitsof a well operated OSRA during a response and alack of preparatory work prior to an incident.OSRA has been designed to provide, in aneffective and efficient manner, rapid access to arange of environmental information for planningwhen responding to a spill. Like any tool it isonly as effective as its operator, the information itcontains and the interpretation of that informationand ultimately the training and competence of theoperator(s).The IAT believes that there is a need for a betterunderstanding of the OSRA system at all levelsthrough a greater emphasis on training and thecollection and input of data and that the skillsets afforded by an OSRA operator should berecognised as a specific element for inclusion inthe NRT.RecommendationThe IAT recommends that AMSA and theStates/NT identify and reconcile any differencesin philosophy or strategy regarding both themaintenance and operation of the OSRA system.(b) Issue: Shoreline AssessmentBackgroundShoreline assessment and subsequent clean-upwas largely effective. However, considerable timewas lost due to inexperienced personnel beingassigned to foreshore assessment and out of dateMOUs with local councils.Whilst CQPA staff believed that they haveresponsibility for shoreline areas to the highwater mark on Port lands, this is neither statedin, nor supported by the Oil Pollution First-StrikeResponse Deed between themselves and MSQ.While the shoreline clean-up was effective andadequately resourced, there were some concernsregarding the safe deployment of staff withparticular reference to adequate supplies ofwater and management of personnel working inconditions of high tropical heat and humidity.There were also some other problems in thatQEPA staff, while well trained in oiled wildliferesponse, were not as familiar in shorelineassessment, in particular clean-up planning andoperations. As a result this necessitated up tothree visits to an area to undertake the requisiteshoreline assessment, planning and clean-up.ConclusionThe IAT believes that, overall the foreshoreassessment and clean-up was largely effective butthere is need to clarify areas of responsibility andjurisdiction between agencies.Further, the IAT believes that shoreline assessmentshould not be the sole responsibility of the ESCbut rather should utilise a multidisciplinarycapability so that environmental, heritage,planning, cultural and operational issues areaddressed at once.13