Global Peace - Australian Maritime Safety Authority

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Global Peace - Incident Analysis Team ReportExecutive SummaryFollowing the Global Peace oil spill in Gladstoneon Tuesday 24 January 2006 an analysis wasundertaken to examine the effectiveness of theresponse to the spill. The Australian MaritimeSafety Authority (AMSA) and Maritime SafetyQueensland (MSQ) established the investigationjointly under the auspices of the National PlanManagement Committee (NPMC) and theNational Plan to Combat Pollution of the Sea byOil and Other Noxious and Hazardous Substances(the National Plan).The IAT found that overall a good outcome wasobtained in cleaning up the Global Peace spill. Theresponse was effective with some 18 tonnes of25 tonnes of oil recovered within five days andminimal environmental damage to Gladstoneharbour and the surrounding environs. Thisis a testament to the success of the operation.The Gladstone harbour, foreshores, marina andaccessible surrounding mangroves were cleanedas far as practicable. The oil that could not beremoved has degraded over time and is expectedto continue to do so.The Port Curtis Integrated Monitoring Program,established under the auspices of the Universityof Central Queensland to monitor Gladstoneindustry’s environmental effects on the marineenvironment, is well positioned to monitor anylonger-term effect of the spill.While in hindsight some response decisionscould be questioned by the IAT, at the time oftheir making there was a clear process in place.However, the IAT has identified a number ofsystemic problems. While these problems did notmaterially affect the overall outcome, they didcontribute to making the response more difficult.Like all oil spill response scenarios, the IATbelieves there are lessons that can be learnt fromthis incident and areas where improvements canbe made in order to enhance any future responses.Fourteen recommendations have been made,mostly of an operational nature. It needs to beemphasised that the majority of the issues givingrise to the recommendations may have impactedon the effectiveness and efficiency of the activities,however they did not materially affect the overalloutcome of the response. There is concern by theIAT that unless these issues are addressed theycould have a serious impact in a more complex orlarger spill.While the recommendations address a range ofissues, the IAT has identified 4 key strategic areaswarranting further consideration by the NationalPlan Management Committee/National PlanOperations Group.Firstly, the application of the Oil Spill ResponseIncident Control System (OSRICS). The IATbelieves that the flexibility and the utility of theOSRICS structure was not fully appreciated andapplied to its full advantage during the responseand this tended to create a number of problems initself.Secondly, Occupational Health and Safety(OH&S). While a reasonable OH&S outcome wasachieved, it appeared more attributable to thecommitment and experience of individuals ratherthan a well constructed and promulgated strategy.Thirdly, media and communications. The spillcreated a good deal of media interest both locallyand internationally. However, the timing of thespill just prior to Australia Day and the vacuumcreated by the lack of timely, factual and accurateinformation provided to the media, caused themto develop their own headlines and stories greatlyexacerbating the actual size, extent and impact ofthe spill.Finally, the IAT is particularly concerned aboutthe manner in which the dispersant testingeffectiveness was undertaken, the conclusionsdrawn and as a consequence the reductionin response options available to the IncidentController.iv
1INCIDENT DESCRIPTIONGlobal Peace - Incident Analysis Team ReportOn Tuesday 24 January 2006, at about 2354, thetug Tom Tough experienced engine problemsand landed heavily against the port side of thePanamanian registered bulk carrier Global Peace(132,049 DWT – built 1982). The incident occurredduring a berthing operation at the Clinton Wharfcoal terminal facility in the port of Gladstone,Queensland.The impact breached the ship’s hull and ruptureda port side fuel tank. Heavy fuel oil flowed intoGladstone harbour from the hole in the ship’s sidefor about 45 minutes. At the time of the incident,the vessel’s port side fuel tank contained about150 tonnes of heavy fuel oil. An amount of heavyfuel oil, later confirmed by an independent bunkersurvey to be 24.53 tonnes was lost into the harbouron the flood tide. No injuries to personnel oneither the ship or the tug were reported.The Port of Gladstone and surrounding areascontain a number of diverse environments, someof which are highly sensitive to the effects ofmarine pollution. These include large areas ofmangroves, intertidal mudflats and seagrass bedsclose to the shipping channel and port area. Themarine environment around Gladstone is alsodocumented as a habitat for seabirds and wadersas well as for turtles, dolphins and dugong. Thearea is also important for the prawn and fishingindustries.The Gladstone Marina, Auckland Creek andBarney Point beach, as well as the islands withinthe harbour, are important recreational areas forthe local community.At 2357, pollution response personnel in the portwere notified and the Port of Gladstone’s FirstStrike Oil Spill Response Plan was activated.MSQ assumed statutory and combat agencyresponsibility almost immediately. The IncidentControl Centre (ICC) was setup in the MSQoffices in Gladstone during the early morning ofWednesday 25 January.The Incident Controller made an initial fielddecision based on personal observations thatdue to OH&S considerations no equipmentdeployment would be undertaken during thehours of darkness.To augment local resources, a range of spillresponse equipment was prepared through thenight for deployment at first light about 0530 onWednesday 25 January. These resources weredrawn from the major stockpiles in Brisbane andTownsville and included four Marco oil recoveryvessels from Townsville, Mackay, Gladstone andBrisbane. AMSA, as manager of the NationalPlan, assisted with mobilising equipment andpersonnel to support the clean-up effort.An overflight was carried out at 0530 to determinethe extent of the oil impacted area and supportdetailed planning to respond to the incident. Anamount of heavy fuel oil was observed in themain channels and waterways system extendingfrom east of Barney Point to Black Swan Island atthe start of The Narrows. Heavy oiling was alsoobserved along the banks and mangroves in theCalliope River (Map 1, refers).A second overflight was carried out at 0900 andtwice daily thereafter. The information gainedfrom the overflights was critical in planning theresponse to the incident. By the end of Day 1,response equipment both local and intrastatehad arrived and been deployed to facilitatecontainment and recovery. Given the inherentgeographical challenges, this was a good result.Early in the morning of Wednesday 25 Januarya decision was made to boom off the mouth ofAuckland Creek with boom that was stored at,and hence readily available in, Gladstone.Calliope River first FlyoverWednesday 25 January at 05:301
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Global Peace - Australian Maritime Safety Authority

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