Public Sector Enterprises in India: Restructuring and Growth

Khannaare today enterprises under the Companies Act and follow commercialaccounting practices, including IFRSiii.iv.Some autonomous bodies are set up as registered societies (e.g. Council ofScientific and Industrial Research, Indian Council of Agricultural Research) undergovernment resolutions. They are established both at the central and stategovernment levels and are either substantially or partly funded by the respectivegovernments.Government owned or controlled companies outnumber any other form of publicenterprises by far. These companies are established under the Companies Act incommon with companies in the private sector, and comprise companies in whichnot less than 51 per cent of the paid up share capital is held by the centralgovernment or by any state government. All follow corporate accounting anddisclosure norms, applicable to all firms, whether private or public, as laid out inthe Companies Act. For this study, we confine our study and analysis to this lastcategory and only to firms owned by the central government.The Prowess Database on the Indian Corporate Sector, maintained by the Centre forMonitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) lists about 311 Central Government Enterprises(excluding enterprises in the financial and insurance sectors), of which about 198 aremanufacturing and services enterprises. Of these, about 41 are bankrupt private sectorenterprises taken over by the central government, and three oil firms nationalised in mid1970s.The CMIE data base also lists, 267 commercial enterprises owned by different state(provincial) governments. These include state owned electricity generation anddistribution companies. Data-base also lists 37 statutory corporations and twodepartmental undertakings. In contrast to the state owned enterprises and banks, theProwess Data base lists about 18663 private sector non – financial enterprises.As the chart below shows, the central SOEs account for about 90-80 per cent of all SOEassets.3

KhannaIn response to these suggestions, the Boards of the better SOEs were to be mademore professional and given greater powers. Soon the government announced a listof companies that was designated as NavRatnas where the company board wouldhave substantial enhanced powers to undertake investments, acquire assets andcompanies in India and abroad and enjoy greater autonomy. Such enterprises wereusually the better managed and profitable ones, often with a dominant position in asector or a branch of industries. Over the years the list of such enterprises wasexpanded with graded levels of autonomy. 1In contrast to the better managed SOEs, government was impatient with the lossmaking and underperforming SOEs. Though a large number of them were bankruptprivate sector enterprises, the government had largely failed to turn them around. Withgreater bureaucratic control and interference, most were unable to modernise andacquire modern technology and compete with private enterprises. Also all of them foundit impossible to shed excess workforce and restructure to lower costs and compete.Now, in the changed environment, and with support from the government and the helpof the National Renewal Fund established to minimise the human cost of SOEsrestructuring, they were asked to seek financial viability or be shut down. Thegovernment encouraged all the SOEs, but specially the loss-making enterprises toreduce their workforce wherever possible through a scheme of `VoluntaryRetirement'(VRS) 2 . It is estimated that approximately half a million workers werepersuaded to leave their jobs during the decade of 1990s.As competition from private enterprises increased, the SOE managers complainedabout the lack of adequate autonomy to effectively compete in the marketplace. Inresponse to these criticisms as well as due to reversal of BJPs privatisation programme,the Congress Party-led government appointed in 2004 a committee under Dr. ArjunSengupta to look at ways of granting `full managerial and commercial autonomy' tocentral SOEs, with a view to enhance their ability to respond to market basedcompetition from private sector firms.The committee recommended sweeping changes in the relationship between thecontrolling ministry and the SOEs, since it felt that the ministry's numerous and detailedinterventions in routine operations of SOEs, was a serious erosion of their autonomy tocarry out business. It wanted all major decisions, both strategic and operational, to beunder the control of the Board of Directors where at least half the Board members wouldbe independent directors. In case the ministry wanted to issue any instructions to anSOE, it should issue a `Presidential Decree' which would require the approval of theentire cabinet. It also sought to insulate SOEs from `Parliamentary interference' thatcould require SOEs to reveal commercially sensitive information that could help itsprivate sector competitors. It recommended a `negative list ' where the government willhave no say including decision on pricing, distribution, import/export, appointment ofdealers and agents and promotion of employees. The powers of NavRatnas to set up1 By 2008 there were 5 Maha-Ratna's (Great-Jewels) with power to invest upto Rs. 50 bn, 16 Navratnas (NewJewels) with power to invest upto Rs. 25 bn, and 66 Mini-Ratnas (small Jewels) with lower powers. See IndianDepartment of Public Enterprises site at http://dpe.nic.in/newsite/navmini.htm2 Unlike the private sector, VRS schemes in SOEs were entirely voluntary, with little force or coercion. Their successdepends on the attractiveness of the financial package offered to employees accepting early retirement.6

Khannajoint ventures or invest were to be enhanced. In addition it recommended sector specificsupervisory bodies to review the performances of SOEs (India, 2005).Despite the break with the Communist parties and the formation of a new Congress ledcoalition government in 2009, the policy of privatisation has not been resumed. Thegovernment continues to sell small amount of shares in the SOEs listed on the stockexchange, with view to raise resources to bridge its rising deficit. In recent years it hasalso asked SOEs to increase the rate of dividend.To sum up, despite strident demand from many economists and multilateral institutions,the Indian government has found it difficult to carry out any further privatisation orstrategic sale of CSOEs. However, some SSOEs (SOEs owned by provincialgovernments) have been sold in some states. The Central government has howevercontinued its policy of sale of shares held by the government in enterprises to mutualfunds, financial institutions, workers and public at large, but the sale (fractional equity)have not resulted in the change of control or privatisation .Political Economy of Reforms and Reconstitution of the CSOEsWhy did the successive governments in India fail to undertake large-scale privatisation?Why did the BJP government fail to carry out its mandate to sell all SOEs in allindustries except units in the defence and the atomic energy sectors as Disinvestmentcommission had suggested? We turn to the political economy of the reformsprogramme.Firstly, though the successive governments espoused their commitment to the reformsand privatisation, there is overwhelming evidence that the majority of electorate wereopposed to the economic reforms in general and privatisation in particular 3 .Secondly, the governments that carried out these reforms faced resistance from tradeunions and middle class consumers, who were afraid of increased prices of goods,services etc. Trade union power in CSOEs has been considerable, with almost all theworkers (including short term contract workers) being unionised 4 .Thirdly, successive governments were defeated in elections (India had 5 governmentsduring 1991-1999 period) forcing the political parties to be wary of the electoral costs oflarge-scale privatisation.Fourthly, several cases of privatisation in India by the BJP invited sharp criticismsespecially when assets sold by government were re-sold by the acquiring parties atsubstantially enhanced prices. Privatisation came to be associated with corruption andsale to special interests.Lastly, given the large weightage of SOEs in industrial assets and sales, large-scaleprivatisation could result in economic dislocation, jeopardising growth. Indeed as, itbecame clear to political establishment that privatisation was fraught with high risk, newrole for SOEs began to be envisaged. This was also possible due to significant change3 For example, in Feb. 2003, a speaker from the consulting firm Deloittes noted a “growing political opposition toprivatization in emerging markets due to widespread perception that it does not serve the interests of thepopulation at large,…. And the perception that only special interests are served – privatisation is seen servingoligarchic domestic and foreign interests”. India was the largest economy in the survey. (Hall, Lobina andMotte:2005)4 This is unlike the private sector, where an increasing casualization of workforce is accompanied with lowerunionization.7

Khannain the governance structures and autonomy to managers, as well as substantialimprovement in the profits and growth by SOEs.SOEs and Accumulation and Growth in the Indian Corporate SectorTo examine the question of the role of state owned enterprises in the economy, weneed to assess their impact on the growth acceleration and resource use in the Indianeconomy in recent times. As mentioned above, most CSOEs were registered ascompanies under the Companies Act, just like the private sector joint-stock companies.They were however, not listed on stock exchanges and the entire equity of most SOEswas held by Central or State governments. Like China, SOEs in India are controlled bythe Central government (CSOEs) and by the state (provincial) governments (SSOEs),with few controlled by city municipalities. The SSOEs are controlled by respective state(provincial) governments. However, as Chart I above has shown, SSOEs form a smallpart of the total corporate sector. Hence in the Indian statistics, the CSOEs and SSOEsare part of what is called the `corporate sector'.As we mentioned, though few SOEs were privatised by the BJP government, themajority have remained in the public sector. Thanks to the reforms, the betterperforming CSOEs now enjoy greater autonomy, are listed on the Indian stockexchanges and have more independent directors on board.Have these changes made any difference to their growth and their role in the economy?To answer this, it is important to analyse the actual performance and the changing roleof SOEs in the economy. The public sector has historically been the driver of economicgrowth in the Indian economy. From the period of the Second Five Year Plan (1956),the public sector has accounted for about 45-50 per cent of gross capital formation.(Table 1). Despite bulk of the economy being in the private sector, it has been a minorsite of accumulation. Till 1985, private corporate sector accounted for less than 20percent of the total capital formation (less than 3 per cent of the GDP). Even the householdsector (that includes medium and small enterprises, largely in the unorganised sector)till very recently accounted for 30-40 per cent of the total national investment or doublethat of the private corporate sector (Table 1). In fact, in terms of savings, the bulkcomes from the household sector. Both the private corporate sector and the publicsector have had small savings, between 2-4 per cent of GDP.The Table I also reflects the changes in the Indian savings and investment ratios duringthe last two decades. The recent acceleration of the economic growth rates in India arelargely explained by rising domestic savings and investment (Mohanty & Reddy, 2010).The domestic savings rate rose from about 18 per cent in 1980s to about 22-23 per centin 1990s and further to about 33 per cent since 2004. Over the entire period ofderegulation and reforms (1991-2010), the foreign savings or FDI have played a minorrole 5 .But since the policy of liberalisation beginning 1991, the accumulation in the privatecorporate sector has accelerated. By 1995, the private sector had overtaken both thepublic sector as well as the household sector in terms of investment and capitalformation. This expansion has been entirely at the expense of the public sector so much5 With a small current account deficit during 1992-2004, the role of foreign savings was marginal. However, since2005, current account has widened to between 2-3 per cent of GDP, with larger FDI inflows to balance the savingsand foreign exchange gap.8

Khannaso that the capital formation has fallen from a high of 49 per cent in 1980s to about 25per cent in the year 2000 (Table 1). Not only has the private corporate sector emergedas an important driver of increasing accumulation, its savings too have shown a sharpincrease in the last 10 years, jumping to 8-9 per cent from about 3.5 per cent of GDP.Table 1: Savings and GCF as per cent of TotalYear Household Sector Private Corp Sector Public Sector TotalSavings GCF Savings GCF Savings GCF SavingsAs per centof Total(Base Year : 1999-2000)1955-56 73,08 41,41 9,88 17,10 17,04 41,49 1001960-61 58,20 27,07 14,40 22,77 27,41 50,12 1001965-66 62,85 29,59 10,57 16,49 26,58 53,95 1001970-71 66,52 41,60 10,23 15,35 23,25 43,05 1001975-76 64,55 33,14 7,63 14,81 27,82 52,04 1001980-81 69,66 37,51 8,70 14,30 21,64 48,19 1001985-86 69,19 27,88 10,16 23,55 20,64 48,57 1001990-91 80,60 40,08 11,66 18,59 7,74 41,33 1001995-96 69,08 30,07 20,33 39,09 10,60 30,84 1002000-01 91,15 47,17 16,24 21,46 -7,39 28,47 100(Base Year : 2004-05)2005-06 70,04 34,41 22,63 39,27 7,33 23,06 1002008-09 69,63 34,27 25,96 35,70 4,42 26,42 1009

KhannaSavings andInvestment asShare of GDP (percent)Year Household Sector Private Corp Sector Public Sector TotalSavings GCF Savings GCF Savings GCF Savings1955-56 8.98 5.1 1.21 2.1 2.09 5.1 12.291960-61 6.53 3.91 1.61 3.29 3.07 7.23 11.211965-66 8.6 4.77 1.45 2.66 3.64 8.7 13.681970-71 9.45 6.49 1.45 2.39 3.3 6.71 14.211975-76 10.88 6.23 1.29 2.78 4.69 9.78 16.861980-81 12.88 6.96 1.61 2.65 4 8.94 18.491985-86 13.13 6.54 1.93 5.53 3.92 11.4 18.981990-91 18.4 9.68 2.66 4.49 1.77 9.98 22.821995-96 16.87 8 4.96 10.4 2.59 8.2 24.422000-01 21.64 11.4 3.86 5.19 -1.75 6.88 23.74(Base Year:2004-05)2005-06 23.17 11.8 7.49 13.47 2.42 7.91 33.082008-09 22.63 12.2 8.44 12.71 1.44 9.4 32.5Source: Central StatisticalOrganisation (CSO),National accountsStatisticsSo would it be correct to assume that the public sector in general and SOEs in particularhave little to contribute to Indian growth? Are they really as inefficient and marginal asBhagwati and Srinivasan have described them?However, disaggregation of public sector savings and investment shows an interestingpicture. As table 2 shows, the SOEs (shown as non-departmental commercialenterprises in the table) have been the major, if not the only site of public sector savingsand an important site of investment and accumulation. General public administrationhas begun to incur very large and growing deficits, undermining the roe log public sectoras a whole. In absence of savings and investment by SOEs , the picture would havebeen dismal.The CSOEs in India have continued their pivotal role in the economy, and despiteopening up most sectors to private players, most industrial SOEs have continued theirgrowth and expansion. Contrary to the conclusion of declining savings and investment,at least the CSOEs have improved their performance and increased their rate ofinvestment.Chart II and III, show us the assets controlled by different ownership groups in theIndian non-financial corporate sector, that is firms incorporated under the IndianCompanies Act and not engaged in the financial services. The ownership groups wehave chosen are the SOEs [both controlled by Central and state (provincial)10

Khannagovernments], Business Groups (BGAs) or families whose conglomerates dominate theprivate sector, non-family controlled independent forms (NBA) and the foreign controlledfirms (MNC and NRI) divided into firms controlled by multinational companies and nonresidentIndians.It is clear from the two charts that SOEs in India have kept pace with the accumulationand investment in the private corporate sector, both in the manufacturing as well as theservices sector.In the manufacturing sector, the SOEs assets exceed all other groups till 2006, whenthe large business groups overtook the SOEs as the largest site of accumulation. Whatis more significant, despite government decision to reduce budgetary support toCSOEs, the SOEs continued accumulation at a faster pace than before. This was partlydue to increasing savings and investment rates in the economy especially from 2000-01and increasing savings of the SOEs from internal resources (see Table 2A and B).The increase in total assets controlled by Indian business groups (BGA) from 2007,shows that accumulation amongst large conglomerates has accelerated. The overtakingof SOEs in asset size, we suspect, is due to several large acquisitions by a few Indianbusiness groups abroad. Thus, Tatas' acquired Corus Steel in a deal valued at US $ 12bn., and then Jaguar and Daewoo's commercial vehicle business, besides acquisitionsin Indonesia and South Africa in steel and mines. Similarly, large scale acquisitionshave been made in aluminium by the Aditya Birla group, in coal and minerals byVedanta and Adani groups and in telecommunications by the Bharati group. Since2007, the outward FDI from India has matched or exceeded inward FDI. This seems tohave altered the balance between SOEs and business groups.Of the total SOEs in the Prowess database, CSOEs (controlled by the centralgovernment) have a dominant share. As Chart I above has shown us, about 80-90 percent of all SOE assets are accounted for by the 217 CSOEs. Part of the reason for thesmall decline in CSOEs share (from 90 per cent to about 80 per cent) is due to theprivatisation of a few large SOEs by the BJP headed government during 2000-2003period. As the Chart I shows, the dominant share of SOEs in chart I and II is entirelydue to the investment by the CSOEs consisting of 217 firms.But if the assets controlled by SOEs are inefficiently used as many economists argue,(see Bhagwati and Srinvasan: 1993, Goswami & Bhandari 2000:,Seabright, 1993) theSOEs may actually be a drag on the Indian economy. In the absence of these or theirfull-scale privatisation, the rate of growth as well as accumulation may have been faster!11

KhannaTable 2A: Public Sector Savings-by InstitutionYear Enterprises TotalMarch Public Adm. Deptmtl. Cos.&Corp savings1971 793 272 397 16181976 2519 344 893 41921981 3467 237 1857 61351986 1946 1374 7539 113221991 -9644 3549 16810 106411996 -15815 9627 38019 315272001 -107467 16823 61377 -292662006 -76881 18602 147234 889552010 -203500 26403 188893 11796Source: CSO: National Accounts Statistics12

KhannaIt not our intention here to compare the performance and efficiency between the privateand public sectors. Since CSOEs are the main players in the Indian economy, we focusthe following analysis only on them. First thing to note is that the number of suchenterprises is miniscule (only 217) compared to several thousand SOEs in China.Secondly, they are limited in their scope and confined largely to the sectors reserved forthem by the Industrial Policy of 1956.Table 3 below shows the profile of Central SOEs during the last 10 years. As can beseen from the Table, the number of loss-making enterprises has fallen from 110 to 55-59 and their losses have been contained at Rs. 12-14 bn. This is largely due thefinancial re-structuring carried out at the recommendation of the BRPSE (Board forReconstruction of Public Sector Enterprises) and strengthening of their managementteams. These losses are largely confined to sick private sector firms that centralgovernment took over and failed to turn around. It may be noted that these losses are amere 10-15 per cent of the profits generated by profit making SOEs.The profit making CSOEs have shown exemplary performance during this decade.While their capital employed has jumped 274 per cent (from Rs. 3313 bn to Rs. 9088bn) their profits after tax have risen by 380 per cent (from Rs. 284 bn to Rs. 1084 bn)and their dividends by 402 per cent (from Rs. 82 bn to Rs. 332 bn). What is moresignificant the retained profits have increased by 827 per cent (from Rs. 65 bn to Rs.542 bn).(table 3)The profits are despite the price control on several commodities manufactured and soldby CSOEs. The government has not allowed the CSOEs in the petroleum sector toincrease prices of petrol, LPG and diesel in line with the increase in price of crude oil.Similarly, prices of fertilizer manufactured by CSOEs have been controlled to providesubsidised inputs to farmers.Table 4 below reflects the return on assets by CSOEs (from Prowess Database figures).As can be seen, during the last decade, the profitability of CSOEs has substantiallyimproved. At about 7-8 per cent return on total assets in compares favourable with thePAT/total asset ratio for all private firms in prowess data base, which shows privatesector return at only 4.6 per cent 6 .6 This is not a very good comparison as we have taken the PAT for all 18,662 private sector firms with their assets,without checking for data consistency, or accounting for several thousand companies whose data for 2010 wasmissing. The limited point we make is that SOE returns are comparable to private sector as a whole.13

KhannaTable 3: India: Performance of Central State Owned Enterprises(unit Rs. Crore = 10 million)2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10ParticularsNo. of operatingEnterprises 234 231 226 230 227 226 217 214 213 217Capital employed 331372 389934 417160 452336 504407 585484 661338 724009 792232 908842Turnover 458237 478731 572833 630704 744307 837295 964890 1096308 1271529 1235060Total Income 479838 498315 548912 613706 734944 829873 970356 1102772 1309639 1264523Net Worth 171406 225472 241846 291828 341595 397275 454134 518485 583144 653801Profit before dep, int,tax &EP 69287 89550 72539 127320 142554 150262 177990 195049 186836 211011Depreciation 20520 26360 28247 31251 33147 34848 33141 36668 36780 41595DRE/Prel. Exps. Wittenoff - - 905 1025 986 992 5841 5802 7661 9570Profit before int., tax&EP 48767 63190 72539 95039 108420 114422 139008 152579 142395 159846Interest 23800 24957 23921 23835 22869 23708 27481 32126 39300 35720Profit before Tax & EP(PBTEP) 24967 38233 48618 71144 85550 90714 111527 120453 103095 124126Tax provisions 9314 12255 17499 22134 21662 24370 34352 40749 33828 40007Profit of profit makingCPSE 28494 36432 43316 61606 74432 76382 89581 91577 98488 108435Loss of loss makingCPSE 12841 10454 10972 8522 9003 6845 8526 10303 14621 15842Profit making CPSEs 123 120 119 139 143 160 154 160 158 158Loss Incurring CPSE 110 109 105 89 73 63 61 54 55 59CPSEs Making noprofit/loss 1 2 2 2 - 1 1 - - -Dividend 8260 8068 13769 15288 20718 22886 26819 28123 25501 33223Dividend tax 842 8 1193 1961 2852 3215 4107 4722 4132 5151Retained profit 6551 17902 17382 35835 41394 43435 50129 48429 54233 54220Source: India (2011). Department of Public Enterprises, Public Enterprises Survey, 2009-10,New DelhiFurther, we divided the sample in two groups: 1991-2000 and 2001 -2009 to explorewhether profit making CPSUs (i.e. positive PAT) are doing well in the later phase ofliberalization. To compare the means of healthy PSUs in the first decade with healthyPSUs in the second decade of liberalization we conducted t-tests among these twosamples. We observed that the mean ROA in the second phase is 0.158 whereas themean ROA in the first phase was 0.075. This descriptive statistics indicate that healthyPSUs are doing better in the later stage. Our t-tests weakly suggests that healthy PSUsare doing better during the period 2001 -2009. However, the Mann-Whitney testsstrongly suggests (p

KhannaTable 4: Performance of Profit makingCSOEsYear No. PAT Assets ROANo. Rs. Million (%)1991 61 31313.6 933079.9 3.361992 81 52109 1618688 3.221993 94 62241.3 1929549 3.231994 90 78596.7 2067073 3.81995 90 109169 2071479 5.271996 113 127030 2625275 4.841997 108 145644 2820184 5.161998 93 169501 3287010 5.161999 104 189286 3218296 5.882000 101 204627 3590629 5.72001 97 250444 4656301 5.382002 107 337360 5312023 6.352003 129 405252 5824538 6.962004 144 585202 7406480 7.92005 151 710517 8598367 8.262006 156 711194 9277345 7.672007 156 849966 10500000 8.092008 165 870126 12000000 7.252009 156 789130 13700000 5.76Source: Computed from Prowess Database16

KhannaChart IV: Share of Investment by Ownership GroupSource: Our estimates from CMIE: Prowess DatabaseTable 5: CSOE Investment in Total Indian InvestmentYearGross(GB)BlockAdditionGBtoGrowthIndiaGFCFCPSEs-Inv. /GFCFRs. Crore (%) Rs. Cr (%)2002-03 525301 34903 7.12 584366 5.972003-04 596727 71426 13.6 687150 10.392004-05 649245 52519 8.8 896774 5.862005-06 715108 65863 10.14 1109160 5.942006-07 782668 67560 9.45 1343843 5.032007-08 862240 79563 10.17 1630513 4.882008-09 978167 115927 13.45 1838499 6.312009-10 1129942 151775 15.52 1993347 7.61Source: Our Computation from PSE Survey and National accountsConclusionThe period of economic reforms and shift in public policy towards market based reformsand an end to protection and reservations provided to SOEs, along with imminent threatof privatisation, has posed a serious challenge to SOEs in India. Increasing competitionand entry of private sector in most industries reserved for SOEs, along with liberalimports provided impetus for reform and shift in their corporate strategy.Opposition to full scale privatisation, shifted governments strategy of using SOEs togenerate resources by demanding enhanced dividends and listing them on the stockmarkets, with small sale of equity.On the other hand, government agreed to provide them with greater autonomy andimprove corporate governance by changing the composition of their boards and17

Khannaenhancing the powers of these boards on investment and strategic decisions. Thoughthese reforms were limited to better performing SOEs, they partially changed therelationship between the ministries and the enterprises. Simultaneously, underpressure from the communist parties on whose support the Congress party governmentwas dependent, limited re-structuring of sick SOEs was carried out. It helped about 40enterprises to turn around and emerge as profitable and competitive units.But the SOEs major role has been in supporting and expanding the industrial base inthe country. During the last decade, the rate of profitability of SOEs has doubled and iscomparable to the private sector enterprises. They account for a significant share of themarket capitalisation on the National Stock Exchange.SOEs account for about 30 per cent of all corporate sector investment. They have keptpace with the increasing investment rate. The CSOEs which are controlled by thecentral government account for about 7 per cent of total gross capital formation in India.The recent surge in GDP growth rates in India, is largely explained by the increasinginvestment. Though the central government has found it difficult to maintain its historicalshare in total investment due to its rising fiscal deficits, the SOEs have not onlymaintained their share but marginally increased it.This is quite like the picture in China, where the SOEs have been the major site ofinvestment and accumulation. However, unlike China, SOEs the Indian SOEs face apolicy environment that assumes that private capital is more efficient and where a largeprivate sector is able to successfully influence public policy in its favour, sometimesthrough lobbies and on other occasions through direct bribes. The scandals in thetelecom sector under investigation are a potent example.Despite this improved performance, it is not clear that the threat of privatisation andoutright sale to private investors is over. A lot will depend on the actual evolution of theIndian political economy.ReferencesAhluwalia, I J. Rakesh Mohan and O. Goswami.1997, Policy reform in India, Oxford &IBH Pub.Co. New DelhiBhagwati, J N and T N Srinivasan (1993): India's Economic Reforms, Ministry ofFinance, New DelhiBhandari L and O. Goswami, (2000), "So Many Lost Years: The Public Sector Beforeand AfterReforms" NCAER, New DelhiHall D., E Lobina, and Robin de la Motte (2005), "Public resistance to privatisation inwater and energy", Development in Practice, Volume 15, Numbers 3 & 4.India. 2007. `White Paper on Disinvestment of Central Public Sector Enterprises' –Department of Disinvestment, New Delhi.India, 2011, Public Enterprises Survey 2009-10, DPE, New DelhiKhatua, A 2011, "Essays on Developing Economy Business Groups" doctoraldissertation, Indian Institute of Management Calcutta.Mohan, Rakesh. 2000, "Public Sector Reforms and Issues in Privatisation" in Aluwalia,Mohan and O. Goswami (ed) Policy reform in India, New Delhi.Mohanty, M and N Reddy . 2010 " Some Explorations into India's Post-IndependenceGrowth Process, 1950/51-2002/03: The Demand Side", Economic and Political Weekly,VOL XLV No. 4118

KhannaSeabright, P. (1993), "Infrastructure and Industrial Policy in South Asia: Achieving theTransition to a New Regulatory Environment," Washington, D.C.: World Bank(processed).19