CTBTO Spectrum - December 2002 Issue 1 - Comprehensive ...

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In the spotlightSergei A. Ordzhonikidzecontinued from page 7Organizations or between InternationalOrganizations. The Commission has alarge number of bilateral agreements andarrangements with States hostinginternational monitoring facilities for theCTBT.International Monitoring System(IMS) facility agreements andarrangements are foreseen in the Treatyand are based on models adopted by theCommission to regulate theestablishment and provisional operationand maintenance of the facilities. Todate, the Executive Secretary has signed22 such agreements and arrangements onbehalf of the organization, of which 15have entered into effect and two areapplied provisionally.Negotiating IMS facilityagreements can take time. Early on itwas realized that the Commission'sprogramme of work could not wait forthem to be finalized. The practice thusevolved for host States to authorize thenecessary work by means of interimexchanges of letters, pending conclusionof the formal facility agreement. Thishas been a successful approach and legalarrangements in the form of IMS facilityagreements, or exchanges of letters, nowgovern the Commission's activities at309 of the 337 monitoring facilities in 76of the 90 host States.Mr. Ordzhonikidze,a Russian nationaland career diplomat,was appointedDirector-General ofthe United NationsOffice at Geneva inMarch 2002. Healso serves as theSecretary-Generalof the Conference on Disarmament.Mr. Ordzhonikidze joined theSoviet diplomatic service in 1969 andhas held several positions at thePermanent Mission of his country to theUnited Nations in New York, includingDeputy Permanent Representative. InMoscow he served as Deputy Chief ofthe International Legal Department ofthe Foreign Ministry and Director ofInternational Organizations of theForeign Ministry. In 1999, Mr.Ordzhonikidze was appointed DeputyMinister of Foreign Affairs.Q: The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT) was negotiated at theConference on Disarmament in Genevabetween 1993 and 1996.Where do you as the Secretary-General of this Conference place theCTBT in the overall historic context of theConference on Disarmament?A: In the nuclear context, I place theCTBT in the logical, and I hopehistorical, chain that leads fromuncontrolled nuclear proliferation tomultilaterally agreed and verifiedelimination of all nuclear weapons. Theconclusion of the CTBT in theConference on Disarmament marked thecompletion of an important step in thisprocess that essentially started with thenegotiation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in one of theConference on Disarmament’spredecessor bodies.More broadly, I see the CTBT,together with the Biological WeaponsConvention and the Chemical WeaponsConvention, as a link in the fence thatwill ultimately keep out all weapons ofmass destruction. The job of theConference on Disarmament is tocontinue building this fence.Q: In the Final Declaration of theConference on Facilitating the Entry intoForce of the CTBT adopted in New Yorkon 13 November 2001, 109 ratifying andsignatory States affirmed “…that theconduct of nuclear-weapon testexplosions or any other nuclearexplosion constitutes a serious threat toglobal efforts towards nucleardisarmament and non-proliferation.”In your view, what effect will theentry into force of the CTBT have onglobal non-proliferation efforts and thedisarmament process?“The entry into force of the CTBTwould provide an immediate boostto both non-proliferation efforts andthe whole disarmament process.”PAGE 8CTBTO SPECTRUM 1 | WWW.CTBTO.ORG
A: The entry into force of the CTBTwould provide an immediate boost toboth non-proliferation efforts and thewhole disarmament process. Mostimmediately, there would be a solidguarantee against the resumption oftesting, backed up by confidence thatany illegal testing would be detected.This would deliver many governmentsthe assurance they need that the NPTregime is protected, and that theirdecision not to pursue nuclear weaponsis justified.of the Treaty can be detected in a timelyand effective manner.What political significance does theverification regime have in constrainingthe proliferation of nuclear weapons?A: The verification regime is the teethof the Treaty, and the politicalsignificance is that the teeth are sharpand strong enough to bite anyone whoconducts a nuclear text explosion. Forcountries which do not have nuclear“The verification regime is the teeth ofthe Treaty, and the political significanceis that the teeth are sharp and strongenough to bite anyone who conducts anuclear test explosion.”Secondly, entry into force wouldrestore confidence in multilateralsecurity arrangements in general, andwould boost efforts to negotiate furtherinstruments for nuclear disarmament,such as a treaty banning fissile materialproduction. I think there would also bevery positive effects in other areas, suchas biological weapons, where generalscepticism and lack of political interestis detracting from the development ofpotentially important multilateralbarriers to proliferation.Q: The world witnessed over 2000nuclear test explosions before the CTBTopened for signature on 24 September1996. CTBT's global verification regimeis the result of many years ofnegotiations led by an internationalGroup of Scientific Experts at theConference on Disarmament to ensurethat non-compliance with the provisionsweapons, there is a strong disincentive todeveloping them – essentially, there is nochance that tested and reliable weaponscould be developed undetected. For thecountries which do have nuclearweapons, there are serious constraints todeveloping and expanding their arsenals.This in turn both reduces the pressure onthem to keep up with their nuclear rivals,and represents an effective tool toprevent any non-nuclear State fromdeveloping a nuclear capability.Q: 44 States listed in its Annex 2 mustratify the CTBT before it can enter intoforce. These 44 States formallyparticipated in the work of the 1996Conference on Disarmament andpossessed nuclear reactors at that time.So far 31 Annex 2 States have ratifiedthe Treaty.What could be done in youropinion to further signature andratification of the Treaty, in particular ofthese 13 outstanding Annex 2 Stateswhose signature is still needed for theCTBT to enter into force?A: To be frank, I think the mainobstacle to entry into force of the CTBTis the lack so far of political commitmentto the concept of the nuclear-test-ban byone of the nuclear weapon States.Without leadership from all five of thepermanent members of the SecurityCouncil, we are unlikely to see the 13outstanding Annex 2 States join anytimesoon. So it is essentially a question ofbuilding political support for the test banwithin the nuclear weapon States. I thinkit is important that other, smallercountries, who rely for their security onthe guarantees contained in the NPT,make it clear how important it is to them– in pure national security terms – thatthe CTBT enters into force. Thismessage needs to be delivered throughall available channels: bilateral, regionaland multilateral.In the meantime, it is vital thatthose countries which have ratified thisinternational legal instrument, workenergetically with the ComprehensiveNulcear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization toensure that when the Treaty does enterinto force, everything will be ready andwill operate effectively. It will be all themore difficult to get the necessarypolitical support where it counts, ifinterest and support is dissipatingelsewhere.CTBTO SPECTRUM 1 | WWW.CTBTO.ORG PAGE 9
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CTBTO Spectrum - December 2002 Issue 1 - Comprehensive ...

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