ctbto Spectrum

Cover designed by Todd VincentDisclaimer:The views expressed in articles by external contributors do not necessarily reflect the positions and policies of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission.The boundaries and presentation of material on maps do not imply the expression of any opinion on the part of the Provisional Technical Secretariatconcerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

Inside this issueE d i to r i a lCTBTO Executive Secretary Tibor Tóth....................................................................................................... 2G l o b a l stat u s of signat u r e s and rat i f i c at i o n s .................................................................................... 3I n the spotlightThe Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: The Way ForwardInterview with President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica...................................................................................................... 4V o i c e sNuclear Testing: A Bygone Eraby IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei............................................................................................................ 7C o v e r Sto ryNuclear Dangers: The Race between Cooperation and Catastropheby Senator Sam Nunn................................................................................................................................................... 8F e at u r e A rt i c l eNuclear Weapons: An Existential Threat to Humanityby Ambassadors Max M. Kampelman and Thomas Graham, Jr......................................................................................10P e r s p e c t i v e sThe Enduring Value of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treatyand New Prospects for Entry Into Forceby Daryl G. Kimball....................................................................................................................................................12V e r i f i c at i o n scienceLooking for the nuclear needle in the haystack: The Integrated Field Exercise 08 in Kazakhstanby Kirsten Haupt and Thomas Mützelburg....................................................................................................................14S tat u s of cert i f i e d IMS fa c i l i t i e s ......................................................................................................................17V e r i f i c at i o n highlightsBuilding monitoring facilities in the coldest, driest and windiest continent on Earth: Antarcticaby Denise Brettschneider.............................................................................................................................................18S e c r e ta r i at snapshotsA Global Scientific Endeavour: The International Scientific Studies Projectby Yvonne Yew ............................................................................................................................................................22V e r i f i c at i o n science and potential civil applicat i o n sThe importance of Atmospheric Transport Modelling:Over ten years of cooperation between the World Meteorological Organization and the CTBTOby Peter Chen, Gerhard Wotawa and Andreas Becker...................................................................................................24Who we areThe Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans all nuclear explosions on Earth. It opened forsignature on 24 September 1996 in New York. The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization(CTBTO) consists of the States Signatories and the Provisional Technical Secretariat. The main tasksof the CTBTO are to promote signatures and ratifications and to establish a global verification regimecapable of detecting nuclear explosions underground, underwater and in the atmosphere. The regimemust be operational when the Treaty enters into force. It consists of 337 monitoring facilities supportedby an International Data Centre and on-site inspection measures.C T B T O S p e c t r u m 1 1 | S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8Pa g e

EditorialIn March 1963,President JohnF. Kennedy said:“I am haunted bythe feeling thatby 1970, unlesswe are successful,there may be 10nuclear powersinstead of 4, andby 1975, 15 or20.” Fortunately,Kennedy’s timetable was averted. However,there has been a sense over recent yearsthat his prediction could come true, severaldecades later.In today’s world, the ban on nucleartesting is more important than ever.The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) prevents the spread ofnuclear weapons to additional States andrestricts the development of advanced,new types of nuclear warheads. It actsas a catalyst for progress on nucleardisarmament, aiding measures such asde-alerting and strategic and non-strategicarms reductions.Climate change and the energycrisis are two priorities on the globalagenda. Closely related is the resurgenceof nuclear energy as nations strive tomeet their growing energy demands whileminimizing their potential impact on theenvironment. This results in an increasein the production of fissile material asthe number of countries and facilitiesmanaging the nuclear fuel cycle alsogrows. In such a world, it is essential thatthe line between prohibited and permittednuclear activities is drawn clearly andirrevocably. The CTBT provides the lastand most visible barrier against nuclearweapons development. A CTBT in forcewould also be an incentive for ending theproduction of fissile material for weaponsuse, pending the negotiation and entryinto force of a Fissile Material Cut-OffTreaty, as well as reducing stocks of suchmaterials.When Kennedy made his speech,great leadership combined withmultilateral arms control initiatives, suchas the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963 andthe Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in1968, succeeded in limiting the spread ofnuclear weapons. Today we need the samestrong leadership, with the United Statesat the forefront in international nonproliferationand disarmament efforts.The political momentum for the Treatycontinues to grow. Colombia, Malaysiaand Iraq are key countries that recentlysigned or ratified the Treaty. Strong supportfor the Treaty has also been expressed atthe highest political levels by PresidentNicolas Sarkozy of France, Prime MinisterGordon Brown of the United Kingdom andnumerous foreign ministers. Former U.S.foreign affairs and defense policy leaders– George Shultz, William Perry, HenryKissinger and Sam Nunn, supported bymore than 40 others – have called for theCTBT’s entry into force from a bipartisanplatform. The U.S. Democratic Partynominee, Barack Obama, has made hissupport for CTBT ratification clear onseveral occasions and U.S. RepublicanParty nominee, John McCain, has pledgedto have another look at the Treaty.The CTBT’s global alarm system isalso constantly expanding. 256 monitoringfacilities have been installed to date. Thenumber of these facilities transmittingdata to Vienna from around the world hastripled since 2004 and the volume of datamade available to users has doubled. Over100 countries and over 1000 individualusers now access data bulletins andanalyzed products. A brand new GlobalCommunications Infrastructure has been putin place, completing a ten year programmeworth tens of millions of dollars. Thefirst ever on-site inspection field exercise(IFE08) is being conducted on anunprecedented scale at the former nucleartest site at Semipaltinsk in Kazakhstan: theexercise involves over 200 participants andover 50 tonnes of equipment deployed over1000 square kilometres of terrain.In view of the current politicalclimate, this edition of CTBTO Spectrumfocuses on the role of the CTBT in thewider non-proliferation and disarmamentcontext. We are privileged to have receivedarticles from several internationallyacclaimed leaders. President OscarArias of Costa Rica gives his views onthe steps necessary to ensure the Treaty’sentry into force. The Director Generalof the IAEA, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei,stresses the CTBT’s key role in globalsecurity. Former U.S. Senator SamNunn expounds on the “race betweencooperation and catastrophe.” U.S. seniordiplomats, Ambassador Max Kampelmanand Ambassador Tom Graham, explorethe threat that nuclear weapons pose tohumanity, and the Executive Directorof the Arms Control Association, DarylKimball, examines the reasons for theenduring value of the CTBT. This editionalso includes highlights about the IFE08,the cooperation between the CTBTO andthe World Meteorological Organization,the challenges of establishing monitoringstations in Antarctica, and the ongoingInternational Scientific Studies project toassess the readiness and capabilities of theCTBT’s verification regime.As was the case 45 years ago, thegovernments of today will need to visualizethe larger picture and ask themselves whatworld they would like their children to livein. Would they want to go back to a “freefor-all”with the risk of a new nuclear armsrace? Or would they prefer to continuebuilding the global security architecturewith multilateral treaty arrangements suchas the CTBT at its core?I deeply hope they will choose thelatter.Tibor tóthExecutive SecretaryPreparatory Commission for the ComprehensiveNuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organizationpa g e C T B T O S p e c t r u m 1 1 | S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8

Treaty signatures and ratificationsCTBT signatures and ratifications as of 12 September 2008Signatory States Ratifying States Non-Signatory StatesTotal States: 195 179 144 16Annex 2 States: 44 41 35 3C T B T O S p e c t r u m 1 1 | S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8Pa g e

In the spotlightThe Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT):The Way ForwardPresident Oscar Arias of Costa Rica presents his views on the CTBTQ: Since the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) opened forsignature in 1996, Costa Rica has beenunwavering in its political and technicalsupport. It is coordinating the Conferenceon Facilitating the Entry into Force of theComprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty(Article XIV Conference) until 2009. Italso chaired the Preparatory Commissionfor the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-BanTreaty Organization (CTBTO) in 2007 andthe current Director of the InternationalMonitoring System Division of the CTBTOis a Costa Rican national.of Korea, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran,Israel, Pakistan, and the United States.The probable exception here isIndonesia, which is likely to respond tointensified lobbying efforts from like-mindedStates and ratify in the near future.In the case of India and Pakistan, itis important to work out a creative dealwhereby the lack of trust between the twocountries can be overcome, by proposing thatsignature/ratification be a joint action by bothStates. It is very important for the internationalRegarding the Democratic People’sRepublic of Korea (DPRK), as it dependslargely on China, it is foreseeable that it willfollow suit after the Chinese ratification. Inaddition, the CTBT will be a logical additionto the DPRK denuclearization commitmentsunder the Six-Party Talks, particularlyafter the U.S. ratification is secured.Which brings us now to the United States.Q: How important do youconsider U.S. leadership in theCTBT ratification process to be?In view of this backgroundand of Costa Rica’s commitment toglobal nuclear disarmament, whatsteps do you consider necessaryover the next few years to ensurethe Treaty’s entry into force?A: Costa Rica reiteratedits strong support for theCTBT when it assumed,together with Austria, theco-chairmanship of the fifthArticle XIV Conference heldin Vienna from 17 to 18 September 2007.The Conference’s final declarationcalled for measures to promote the entryinto force of the CTBT. Therefore, renewedefforts must be made to call on outstandingStates to sign and ratify the Treaty.While continuing to take advantageof bilateral occasions as well as multilateralfora for this purpose, I believe that newconcerted efforts and strategies must bedefined for the nine outstanding countries.Let us review the list of States whosesignature/ratification is still outstanding,and who need to ratify the Treaty for itto enter into force (Annex 2 countries):China, the Democratic People’s Republic“It is necessary that theUnited States resumesits leadership role andcommitment to the CTBTas one of the proponentsof the Treaty.”community to be attentive to developments ofthe U.S.-India deal, as it has a direct bearingon the CTBT and the norm against nucleartesting. It is regrettable that the documentsrelating to civil nuclear cooperation with Indiawhich have so far been agreed upon, includingthe safeguards agreement with the IAEA, havefailed to place conditions on India to maintainits test moratorium and have not mentionedthe importance of CTBT signature/ratification.Regarding the outstanding MiddleEast countries, the strategy will not beeffective unless it is integrated into thelarger peace efforts for the region.China has openly indicated thatit is looking towards the United Statesbefore moving to ratification.A: It is necessary that the UnitedStates resumes its leadership role andcommitment to the CTBT as one of theproponents of the Treaty. The upcomingelections provide an excellentopportunity to start new lobbyingefforts within the policy-makingapparatus in the new administration.The two major presidentialcandidates have already declaredthat they would make major changesto the national security and foreignpolicies carried out by the George W.Bush administration over the last sevenyears. Although the United States has notconducted a nuclear test explosion since1992, the Bush administration has notput the Treaty forward for a new vote onratification to the Senate.Barack Obama has been clear inhis support of the bipartisan group ofsenior and former government officialswho have called for moving toward a“world free of nuclear weapons. He haspromised: “As president, I will take thelead to work for a world in which theroles and risks of nuclear weapons canbe reduced and ultimately eliminated.”Furthermore, he has promised to makethe CTBT a priority of his first termpa g e C T B T O S p e c t r u m 1 1 | S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8

“... the CTBT will be alogical addition to the DPRKdenuclearization commitmentsunder the Six-Party Talks,particularly after the U.S.ratification is secured.”in office and pledged to work to rebuildbipartisan support for the Treaty.In a recent speech, John McCain alsoendorsed the concept by stating: “A quarterof a century ago, President Ronald Reagandeclared, ‘our dream is to see the day whennuclear weapons will be banished from theface of the Earth.’ That is my dream, too.”McCain voted against the CTBT in1999, stating at the time: “The viabilityof our nuclear deterrent is too central toour national security to rush approval of atreaty that cannot be verified and that willfacilitate the decline of that deterrent.”However, more recently, he has committedto continuing the moratorium on nuclearweapons testing that has existed since1992, and promised to take “another look”at the Treaty.In order to give effect to internationalarms control and disarmament agreements,States must bring their domestic law intoconformity with their obligations underinternational law. The need to implementnational measures was highlighted bythe adoption of UN Security CouncilResolution 1540 in April 2004. Thisresolution obliges States to enact andenforce effective laws and supportingmeasures to prevent the proliferation ofnuclear, biological and chemical weapons,related materials and their means ofdelivery, and toprohibit non-Stateactors, especiallyterrorists, fromdeveloping and usingsuch weapons.Costa Rica assumeda non-permanentseat at the UNSecurity Councilon 1 January 2008and as Chair of the Terrorism/Weaponsof Mass Destruction Committee underresolution 1540, it is strongly advocatingthe enhancement of international securityby improving transparency over andassessing the quality of States’ nationalimplementation of this resolution.Q: For the last two years, special meetingsof the Organization of American States (OAS)Committee on Hemispheric Security have beenconvened, to consolidate the nuclear-weaponfreezone in Latin America and the Caribbeanthrough the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and to promotethe full force and effect of the CTBT.One of the goals of the OAS is tostrengthen peace and security on the continent.As a fellow member of the OAS, what influencecan be exerted on the United States to ratifythe Treaty?A: With the welcomed ratification byColombia in January 2008, the United Statesis the only country from the OAS MemberStates listed in Annex 2 of the Treatywhose ratification is still outstanding.From the very beginning, Costa Ricahas sponsored the resolution in support ofthe CTBT, which has been approved bythe OAS General Assembly since 2000.We will continue to work together withother OAS members to exert pressureon the USA to consider ratification assoon as possible, particularly through theCommittee on Hemispheric Security.In this regard, it is very important toachieve the ratification of the remainingfive States from the Latin America andCaribbean region (singling out the USAas the only outstanding OAS MemberState whose ratification is still pending).The OAS special sessions have playedan important role in keeping the CTBT on thetable of international discussions, even at a timewhen the global situation was not so conduciveto its entry into force, and they have also servedas a lobbying platform. Further such sessionsshould serve to foster more synergy with otherWashington-based organizations/institutionsto create a stronger momentum within thepolitical arena in the USA, particularly inthe light of the upcoming elections andlater on with the new administration.Biographical notecontinues on next pageFirst elected aspresident of CostaRica in 1986and re-elected in2006, PresidentOscar Arias haswon internationalrecognition asa spokespersonfor developingnations and forpromoting democracy, human development,demilitarization and disarmament.President Arias played a pivotal rolein the signing of the Esquipulas PeaceAgreement, which led to the cessationof various conflicts in Central Americaduring the 1980s and for which he wasawarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1987. ■C T B T O S p e c t r u m 1 1 | S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8Pa g e

VoicesNuclear Testing: A Bygone Eraby Mohamed ElBaradeiThe Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-BanTreaty (CTBT) has been the longestoutstanding objective of the nuclear age.Envisaged more than half a century agoin 1954, this goal remains unmet – thougha CTBT was successfully negotiated andopened for signature in September 1996.Virtually all post-World WarII U.S. Presidents have grappledwith this issue and President DwightEisenhower described the failure toachieve a permanent ban on nucleartesting as the greatest disappointmentof any administration, of any decade,of any time, and of any party.Jewel in the crown ofnuclear arms controlThe CTBT, not surprisingly, has beenconsidered arms control history’s longestsought, hardest fought for prize. Achievingthe entry into force and implementationof the CTBT would undoubtedly be thejewel in the crown of nuclear arms controland disarmament, supplementing theNuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty(FMCT), which is still to be negotiated.For the past several years, I havebeen advocating the need to take the boldsteps necessary to achieve a world freeof nuclear weapons in our time and, inthis regard, to fashion a new collectivesecurity system that relies not on nuclearweapons, but rather on concepts such asinterdependent responsible sovereignty.Achieving a new collectivesecurity systemAchieving such a system requiresrebuilding confidence in the authorityand integrity of the NPT; securingthe entry into force of the CTBT;“The CTBT remains crucial for globalsecurity. I believe we owe it toourselves, we owe it to humanity, weowe it to people everywhere that wedo our utmost to have the CTBT comeinto force as early as we can.”negotiating a verifiable global FMCT;engineering a new framework for thenuclear fuel cycle; devaluing the role ofnuclear weapons through de-alerting;and concrete verified nuclear weapondismantlement and elimination.The CTBT is essentially atreaty to end all nuclear explosionspermanently, in all environments, forall time. And, there has always been apermanent and indissoluble link betweenending nuclear explosive testing andmoving down the path of achievinga world free of nuclear weaponsKey role in global securityWhy is the CTBT so important? Becauseit would send a very clear, very concretesignal that the nuclear-weapon Statesare taking seriously the commitmentunder the NPT to move towards nucleardisarmament. But more importantly,I think, because it will also makedifficult the qualitative development ofnuclear weapons and the developmentof nuclear weapons by new countries.Without the CTBT it would betempting for new countries to acquirenuclear weapons without violating legalnorms, as we have seen recently. Withoutthe CTBT we might continue to see thequalitative development of nuclear weapons.Another reason I am concernedabout the CTBT not coming into force isbecause it is unfortunately symptomaticof the slow progress overall with regardto moving towards nuclear disarmament.The CTBT remains crucial for globalsecurity. I believe we owe it to ourselves,we owe it to humanity, we owe it to peopleeverywhere that we do our utmost to have theCTBT come into force as early as we can. ■Biographical noteDr. MohamedElBaradei hasbeen the DirectorGeneral of theInternationalAtomic EnergyAgency (IAEA)since 1997.An expert ininternationalpeace and securityand internationaldevelopment, his diplomatic careerbegan in 1964 in the Egyptian Ministryof External Affairs whilst he completedhis Doctorate in International Law atthe New York University School of Law.Dr. ElBaradei and the IAEA were jointlyawarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2005. ■C T B T O S p e c t r u m 1 1 | S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8Pa g e

Cover storyNuclear Dangers: The Race between Cooperation and Catastropheby Sam NunnAt the dawn of the nuclear age – afterthe devastation of Hiroshima andNagasaki – General Omar Bradley said:“The world has achieved brilliance withoutwisdom...We know more about war thanwe know about peace, more about killingthan we know about living.”It might surprise General Bradley, if hewere alive today, to know that we have made it60 years without a nuclear attack. We were good,we were diligent, but we were also very lucky.Making it through 60 years without anuclear attack should not make us complacent.If we’re to continue to avoid a catastrophe,all nuclear powers will have to be highlycapable, careful, competent, rational – and ifthings go wrong, lucky – every single time.The world is heading in avery dangerous directionWe do have important efforts underway andsome important successes, but the risk of anuclear weapon being used today is growing,not receding. The storm clouds are gathering:▪ Terrorists are seeking nuclear weapons,and there can be little doubt that if theyacquire a weapon that they will use it.▪ There are nuclear weapons materials inmore than 40 countries, some secured bynothing more than a chain link fence.▪ A number of countries are consideringdeveloping the capacity to enrich uraniumto use as fuel for nuclear energy, butthis would also give them the capacityto move quickly to a nuclear weaponsprogram if they chose to do so.▪ Meanwhile, the United States andRussia continue to deploy thousands ofnuclear weapons on ballistic missilesthat can hit their targets in less than30 minutes, encouraging both sides tocontinue a prompt launch capabilitythat carries with it an increasinglyunacceptable risk of an accidental,mistaken or unauthorized launch.The bottom line: The world isheading in a very dangerous direction.New vision for our globalnuclear policyWith these growing dangers in mind, formerU.S. Secretaries of State George Shultz andHenry Kissinger, former U.S. Secretary ofDefense Bill Perry and I published an op-edin January 2007, and a follow-up piece in2008, in The Wall Street Journal that calledfor a different direction for our globalnuclear policy with both vision and steps.The four of us, and the many othersecurity leaders who have joined us, arekeenly aware that the quest for a nuclearweapon-freeworld is fraught with practicaland political challenges. We have takenaim at the practical problems by linkingthe vision of a nuclear-weapon-free worldwith a series of steps for reducing nucleardangers and carving a path towards aworld free of the nuclear threat.Without the bold vision, the actionswill not be perceived as fair or urgent.Without the actions, the vision will notbe perceived as realistic or possible.We don’t believe our example is likelyto inspire Iran, North Korea or al Qaeda todrop their weapons ambitions, but we believeit would become more likely that many morenations will join us in a firm approach tostop the proliferation of nuclear weapons andmaterials and prevent catastrophic terrorism.I believe that we cannot defend ourselvesagainst the nuclear threats facing the worldtoday without taking these steps. We cannottake these steps without the cooperation ofother nations. We cannot get the cooperationof other nations without the vision andhope of a world that will some day endthese weapons as a threat to mankind.Strategic cooperationagainst nuclear weaponsThis will be a challenging process that mustbe accomplished in stages. The United Statesmust keep nuclear weapons as long as otherUS senior statesmen George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger andSam Nunn renewed their call for a nuclear-weapon-free world by supporting,among other measures, the adoption of a process for bringing the CTBTinto effect, “which would strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT) and aid international monitoring of nuclear activities. This calls for abipartisan review, first, to examine improvements over the past decade of theinternational monitoring system to identify and locate explosive undergroundnuclear tests in violation of the CTBT; and, second, to assess the technicalprogress made over the past decade in maintaining high confidence in thereliability, safety and effectiveness of the nation’s nuclear arsenal under atest ban. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization is putting in placenew monitoring stations to detect nuclear tests – an effort the U.S shouldurgently support even prior to ratification.”Opinion Editorial, Wall Street Journal, 15 January 2008pa g e C T B T O S p e c t r u m 9 | w w w. c t b t o . o r g

“But we will be safer, and the worldwill be safer, if we are workingtoward the goal of deemphasizingnuclear weapons and keepingthem out of dangerous hands – andultimately ridding our world of them.”If we are to be successful in dealingwith the hydra-headed threats of emergingnew nuclear weapon States, proliferationof enrichment, poorly secured nuclearmaterial and catastrophic terrorism – manynations must cooperate. We must recognize,however, that these tasks are virtuallyimpossible without the cooperation ofRussia. It is abundantly clear that Russiaitself faces these same threats and that itsown security is dependent on cooperationwith NATO and the United States.nations do. But we will be safer, and theworld will be safer, if we are working towardthe goal of deemphasizing nuclear weaponsand keeping them out of dangerous hands– and ultimately ridding our world of them.Strategic cooperation must become thecornerstone of our national defense againstnuclear weapons. Even a quick glance atthe steps we are proposing in our two WallStreet Journal essays reveals that noneof the steps can be accomplished by theUnited States and our close allies alone:▪ Changing nuclear force posturesin the United States and Russia togreatly increase warning time.▪ Reducing substantially nuclear forcesin all States that possess them.▪ Moving toward developing cooperativemultilateral ballistic-missile defenseand early warning systems.▪ Eliminating short-range“tactical” nuclear weapons.▪ Working to bring the ComprehensiveTest Ban Treaty into force – in theUnited States and in other key States.▪ Securing nuclear weapons and materialsaround the world to the highest standards.▪ Developing a multinational approach tocivil nuclear fuel production, phasingout the use of highly enriched uraniumin civil commerce, and halting theproduction of fissile material for weapons.▪ Enhancing verification andenforcement capabilities – andour political will to do both.▪ Building an international consensusbehind ways to deter and, whennecessary, respond stronglyand effectively to countries thatbreach their commitments.The most difficult and challengingstep is the need for redoubling our efforts toresolve regional confrontations and conflictsthat give rise to new nuclear powers.Establishing a durable securityrelationship with RussiaThere can be no coherent, effective securitystrategy to reduce nuclear dangers that doesnot take into account Russia – its strengths,weaknesses, aims and ambitions. So, itis remarkable – and dangerous – that theUnited States, Russia and the North AtlanticTreaty Organization (NATO), have notdeveloped an answer to one of the mostfundamental security questions we face:What is the long-term role for Russia inthe Euro-Atlantic security arc? Whethercaused by the absence of vision, a lack ofpolitical will, or nostalgia for the Cold War,the failure of both sides to forge a mutuallybeneficial and durable security relationshipmarks a collective failure of leadership inWashington, European capitals and Moscow.Global security dependson regional securityAs NATO prepares for its 60th anniversary,we must address a fundamental question.In the years ahead, does NATO wantRussia to be inside or outside theEuro-Atlantic security arc? The sameBiographical notecontinues on page 27Former SenatorSam Nunn is cochairmanand ChiefExecutive Officerof the NuclearThreat Initiative(NTI), a charitableorganizationworking to reducethe global threatsfrom nuclear,biological and chemical weapons. Heserved as a United States Senator fromGeorgia for 24 years from 1972 to 1996.During his tenure in the U.S. Senate,he was chairman of the Senate ArmedServices Committee and the PermanentSubcommittee on Investigations. ■C T B T O S p e c t r u m 9 | w w w. c t b t o . o r gPa g e

Feature articleNuclear Weapons: An Existential Threat to Humanityby Max M. Kampelman and Thomas Graham, Jr.Sixty-three years ago last month, the beautifulcity of Hiroshima was devastated by theexplosion of an atomic bomb. The bombreleased the explosive equivalent of 12,500tons of TNT and killed – outright, or over timeby radiation poisoning – nearly 75 percent ofthe population of that city. Three days latersimilar devastation was brought to the cityof Nagasaki, and a few days after that, theSecond World War, the bloodiest and mostdestructive in the history of humanity, cameto an end.Capability to destroy theEarth several times overMany thought then, and in subsequent years,that the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasakiwere the harbingers of the future and thatnuclear weapons were destined to spreadaround the world and be part of future wars,threatening the survival of humanity. Theseviews were reinforced by the commencementin a few years of a vast nuclear arms racewith both the United States and the SovietUnion rapidly developing the capability todestroy the Earth many times over.Over 40 States have capacityto build nuclear weaponsPresident John F. Kennedy was one of thosewho feared that nuclear weapons wouldinherit the Earth. There were predictionsduring his administration that, by the end ofthe 1970s, there could be as many as 15 to20 nuclear weapon States in the world, withnuclear weapons fully integrated into nationalarsenals. If this had happened, there wouldlikely be twice or more that many today. In2004, for example, the Director General ofthe International Atomic Energy Agency,Mohamed ElBaradei, asserted that there weremore than 40 States in the world that currentlycould build nuclear weapons, if they so chose.Such a development would have placed theworld community in a situation where everyconflict would run the risk of going nuclear andthere would be no way to keep nuclear weaponsout of the hands of terrorist organizations.Such an international security situation wouldhave made today’s time of troubles seem likeparadise by comparison.Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty prevents catastropheFortunately, such nuclear weapon proliferationdid not happen. President Kennedy’s darkestfears of catastrophe were not realized. Thechief reason that this did not happen wasthe entry into force of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970, alongwith the extended deterrence policies of theUnited States and the Soviet Union. The NPTconverted what had been an act of nationalpride into an act of international outlawry.In 1960, after the first French nucleartest in the Sahara, the French newspapers wereoverflowing with nationalistic sentiment: “ViveLa France” and “Vive De Gaulle.” Switzerlandheld two national referenda and the Swisspublic twice voted to build nuclear weapons.Sweden had an active nuclear weapons researchprogram. After the NPT was in force, however,when India conducted its first nuclear weapontest in 1974, they were condemned by the entireworld and they had to hasten to declare thattheir nuclear explosion was “peaceful.”184 non-nuclear weaponStates agree not to acquirenuclear weaponsThe NPT essentially drew the line where theworld was in 1970; it recognized five existingnuclear weapon States: the United States, theSoviet Union (Russia), Britain, France, andChina. It provided that the rest of the worldwould agree not to acquire nuclear weapons.And most of the world did agree to thatproposition. Today, 184 NPT non-nuclearweapon States are committed to this obligation.Non-proliferation in exchangefor nuclear disarmamentBut the NPT did not come as a free gift fromthe rest of the world to the five nuclear weaponStates; rather it is a strategic arrangementfounded on a central bargain. That bargainwas, and is, non-proliferation in exchange forthe sharing of peaceful technology and nucleardisarmament. Nuclear disarmament wasperceived by the non-nuclear weapon States asthe five nuclear weapon States agreeing overthe long term to negotiate away their nucleararsenals so that ultimately all States wouldreceive equal treatment under the NPT.A comprehensive nuclear test banSince it was recognized that this would takesignificant time, the non-nuclear weapon Statespressed the nuclear weapon States to agree tointerim measures to include a comprehensivenuclear weapon test ban, a prohibition onthe further production of nuclear explosivematerial, a significant world-wide reduction inthe number of nuclear weapons, and bindingobligations not to use nuclear weapons againstnon-nuclear NPT parties.None of these measures 40 years laterhas been realized. One of these measures,which was seen in 1970 as a sort of litmustest which would indicate whether or not thefive nuclear weapon States would, over time,live up to their side of the central bargainwas a comprehensive nuclear test ban, whichwas included in the preamble to the NPT.Review conferences failed several times overthe years because of disagreement over thisissue. When the NPT was made a permanenttreaty in 1995, there was a recommitment toconclude a test ban in one year - that is, by1996. The non-nuclear weapons States’ viewwas, and is, that, if they are going to give upnuclear weapons, the five nuclear weaponStates could at least agree to stop testingtheir weapons.pa g e 1 0 C T B T O S p e c t r u m 1 1 | S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8

CTBT rejection contrary towishes of most AmericansA Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty(CTBT) was in fact agreed to and signed in1996, but it was defeated in the U.S. Senatein 1999 and has not yet come into force- some 12 years later and some 40 years afterentry into force of the NPT itself. The U.S.Senate’s rejection of the CTBT in 1999 was,incidentally, contrary to the wishes of theAmerican public. A poll taken immediatelythereafter disclosed that two thirds of theAmerican public disapproved of the Senate’saction. This remains a problem.The next U.S. administrationand the CTBTThere are two periods in the four-year cycleof the American presidency when the UnitedStates is most likely to review policies andrespond to the political exigencies of themoment: during a presidential campaignyear when issues are raised, and duringthe first six months after a presidentialelection, when a newly-elected or re-electedpresident is generally empowered to carryout commitments made or judgments held.In that connection, Senator Obama has statedthat he will support CTBT ratification andSenator McCain has said he will consider it.Goal of eliminating nuclearweapons can be realizedSince the publication of two Wall StreetJournal articles authored by George Shultz,William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and SamNunn in January 2007 and 2008 basedon President Ronald Reagan’s dream toeliminate nuclear weapons worldwide, theworld community has taken new hope thatsome day this objective could actually beaccomplished, and the NPT central bargainof non-proliferation in exchange for peacefulcooperation and disarmament finallyredeemed. The articles have contributed topaving the way for the realization of thegoal of zero nuclear weapons that has beensought since the beginning of the nuclearage. It is recognized that this goal may takea long time to achieve, but for the first timeit is actually conceivable - indeed imperative- given the current existential dangers thatthreaten civilization.UN can help ensure thatthe disaster of Hiroshimanever happens againBut if there is to be any hope of actuallyrealizing the goal of zero nuclear weaponsworldwide, crucial for world security in thelong run, it is also essential that the NPTregime not only survive but flourish and actas a real ban against the further proliferationof nuclear weapons. Further, proliferationwould substantially derogate from the goalof the elimination of nuclear weapons. Thenear-term ratification by the United Statesand entry into force of the CTBT wouldsignificantly contribute to the strengtheningof the NPT. Thus it must be pursued withurgency. In addition, we must look for othermore direct ways to outlaw the furtherproliferation of nuclear weapons.Important to the future of the nonproliferationregime, is the utilization ofthe United Nations, which represents thepeople of the world. The United Nationsshould call for the elimination of nuclearweapons as an integral part of humansurvival. If we want to be absolutelycertain that the disaster of Hiroshima willnever happen again, then our dedicatedobjective must be for the United Nationsto propose a negotiating schedule toreach a world-wide, verifiable andenforceable agreement on zero nuclearweapons and declare that the developmentand possession of nuclear weapons isan international crime punishable bytotal political, economic, cultural, andif necessary, military world isolationand pressure. The continuing role of theUnited Nations, after this, would then beto prevent and punish violations. This issomething that we can achieve and thatwe must achieve. Let us all work togetherto help make it happen. It is appropriateand timely for the United Nations to liveup to its potential. ■Biographical noteAmbassador MaxM. Kampelmanheld majornegotiatingposts under bothDemocraticand Republicanadministrationsduring the 1980s.He served as U.S.Ambassador to theConference on Security and Cooperationin Europe from 1980 to 1984 and thenas Ambassador and Head of the U.S.Delegation to the Negotiations with theSoviet Union on Nuclear and SpaceArms in Geneva from 1985 to 1989.Between 1987 and 1989 he also served asCounselor of the Department of State.AmbassadorThomas Graham Jr.was involved in thenegotiation and/orreview processof every majorinternational armscontrol agreementin which the UnitedStates participatedbetween 1970and 1997. Theseincluded the Strategic Arms LimitationsTalks (SALT) Treaties, the StrategicArms Reduction Talks (START) Treaties,the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty,Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty,the NPT, Conventional Armed Forces inEurope (CFE) Treaty, and the CTBT.Both Ambassador Kampelman andAmbassador Graham acted as motivatingforces behind and signatories of theopinion-editorial Wall Street Journalarticles: A World Free of NuclearWeapons and Toward a Nuclear-Weapon- Free World in January 2007and January 2008 respectively. ■C T B T O S p e c t r u m 1 1 | S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8Pa g e 1 1

PerspectivesThe Enduring Value of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treatyand New Prospects for Entry Into Forceby Daryl G. KimballThe history of the nuclear age makes it clear thatopportunities to reduce the risks posed by nuclearweapons are often very fleeting. When the rightpolitical conditions are in place, governmentalleaders must seize the chance to make progress.In 1958 and again in 1963, U.S. and Sovietleaders attempted to negotiate a comprehensiveban on all nuclear test explosions. They cameclose but failed to seal the deal. While the lattereffort led to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, ittook another three decades of on-and-off effortsto conclude negotiations on a comprehensivetest ban treaty. During that time, hundreds moreunderground tests propelled further arms racingand proliferation.Treaty (NPT) regime. The nuclear weaponStates’ commitment to achieve the CTBTwas a crucial part of the bargain that won theindefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 andthe 2000 NPT Review Conference document.U.S. Senate’s untimely rejectionof the CTBT in 1999Over the years, the importance of theTreaty to global security has only increasedand international support has grown. Today,179 countries have signed the CTBT, and144 countries have ratified. Unfortunately,the U.S. Senate’s brief debate anduntimely rejection of the CTBT in OctoberThe situation is self-defeatingand counterproductive. Given the U.S.signature of the CTBT and its testmoratorium policy, the United Statesbears most CTBT-related responsibilities.Yet Washington’s failure to ratify hasdiminished its ability to prod other nationsto join the Treaty and refrain from testing.At the same time, there is no need—nor isthere any political support—for renewedU.S. testing for new nuclear warheads orfor any other reason.Treaty helps preventregional conflicts and avertnuclear arms race“The global norm against testing remainsstrong, for now. Yet the absence of CTBTentry into force also means that the fullrange of verification and monitoring tools,confidence building measures, and the optionof on-site inspections, are not available tohelp strengthen the international community’sability to detect, deter, and if necessaryrespond to possible nuclear testing.”The CTBT is also needed to help headoff and deescalate regional tensions.With no shortage of conflict and hostilityin the Middle East, ratification by Israel,Egypt, and Iran would reduce nuclearweapons-related security concernsand bring those States further into thenuclear non-proliferation mainstream.Action by Israel to ratify could putpressure on other States in the regionto do so. Iranian ratification would helpaddress concerns that its nuclear programcould be used to develop and deploydeliverable nuclear warheads.Today, the 1996 ComprehensiveNuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) remainsa vital disarmament and non-proliferationinstrument. By prohibiting all nuclear testexplosions it impedes the ability of Statespossessing nuclear weapons to field new andmore deadly types of warheads, while alsohelping to prevent the emergence of newnuclear-armed States.Moving forward on the CTBT is also anessential step towards restoring confidencein the beleaguered Nuclear Non-Proliferation1999, coupled with the George W. Bushadministration’s opposition to the Treaty,has slowed the momentum. Nine key Statesmust still ratify to achieve entry into force.Partially in response to U.S policy onthe CTBT, some countries that have signedthe CTBT, such as China and Israel,have delayed their ratification processes.Others, including India and Pakistan, haveyet to sign the Treaty and are unlikely todo so unless the United States, China, andperhaps other hold-outs, finally ratify.Likewise, North Korean accessionto the CTBT would help demonstratethe seriousness of its commitment toverifiably dismantle its nuclear weaponsprogram through the Six-Party process 1 .The ongoing India-Pakistan nuclear armsrace could be substantially slowed to thebenefit of both countries if they signed1The Six-Party talks process aims to find a peacefulresolution to security concerns raised by theNorth Korean nuclear weapons programme. Theprocess began in response to Democratic People’sRepublic of Korea’s (DPRK) withdrawal from theNPT in 2003 and involve China, the Republic ofKorea (South Korea), DPRK, the United States,the Russian Federation and Japan.pa g e 1 2 C T B T O S p e c t r u m 1 1 | S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8

and ratified the CTBT or agreed to anequivalent legal instrument.The global norm against testingremains strong, for now. Yet the absenceof CTBT entry into force also meansthat the full range of verification andmonitoring tools, confidence buildingmeasures, and the option of on-siteinspections, are not available to helpstrengthen the international community’sability to detect, deter, and if necessaryrespond to possible nuclear testing.Moving forward – prospects ofratification by the U.S. SenateTo begin to break the ratification logjamand pave the way for entry into force,leaders in key States must make the rightchoices in three key areas.First, it is essential that the nextoccupant of the White House buildsupon growing bipartisan calls forU.S. reconsideration of the CTBT andinitiates a serious effort to engagethe new Senate on the issue with thegoal of winning two-thirds support forratification by the end of 2010.Notes & quotesMost notably, former RepublicanSecretaries of State, George Shultz andHenry Kissinger, former DemocraticSecretary of Defense, Bill Perry, andretired Democratic Senator, Sam Nunn,have called for a bipartisan push to ratifythe CTBT as a key step toward a nuclearweapon-freeworld.U.S. presidential candidates stressimportance of nuclear test banMost importantly, the two major U.S.presidential candidates have both stressedthe importance of a nuclear test ban.Democratic nominee, Senator BarackObama, has repeatedly expressed supportfor the CTBT. He said on 16 July 2008 that“…we’ll work with the Senate to ratify theComprehensive Test Ban Treaty and thenseek its earliest possible entry into force.”Republican presidential nominee,Senator John McCain, who voted againstthe Treaty in 1999, said in a speech on27 May 2008 that, if elected, he would“begin a dialogue with our allies, and withthe U.S. Senate, to identify ways we canmove forward to limit testing in a verifiablemanner that does not undermine the securityor viability of our nuclear deterrent. Thiswould include taking another look at theComprehensive Test Ban Treaty to see whatcan be done to overcome the shortcomingsthat prevented it from entering into force.”Whether McCain is interested in some newBiographical noteDaryl G. Kimballis the ExecutiveDirector of theArms ControlAssociation(ACA) inWashington DC.He previouslyworked atPhysiciansfor SocialResponsibility, which lobbied for theU.S. nuclear test moratorium legislationof 1992. He also served as Directorof the Coalition to Reduce NuclearDangers, which led NGO efforts to winsupport for U.S. CTBT ratification. ■“Today, eight nations in the world have declared they have conducted nucleartests. I am proposing to the international community an action plan to which Icall on the nuclear powers to resolutely commit by the 2010 NPT Conference.Thus I invite all countries to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,beginning with China and the United States, who signed it in 1996. It is timefor it to be ratified.”Speech by French President Nicolas Sarkozy,in Cherbourg, France, on 21 March 2008.continues on page 28C T B T O S p e c t r u m 1 1 | S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8Pa g e 1 3

Verification scienceLooking for the nuclear needle in the haystack:The Integrated Field Exercise 08 in Kazakhstanby Kirsten Haupt and Thomas MützelburgK a z a k h s ta n h o s t e d p r e v i o u s e x e r c i s e s o n t h r e e o c c a s i o n s i n 1 9 9 9 , 2 0 0 2 a n d 2 0 0 5 .Against the backdrop of the remoteemptiness of the steppe in northernKazakhstan, a most peculiar sceneunfolds: seemingly materializing out ofnowhere, figures clad in white plasticoveralls pour out of vehicles while at thesame time, truckload after truckload ofodd-looking contraptions are unloaded.Within a short time, the landscape isspeckled with shiny white tents.What might seem to the unsuspectingonlooker like a scene from a science-fictionmovie actuallymarks thebeginning of aninspection exercisecarried out bythe PreparatoryCommission forthe ComprehensiveNuclear-Test-Ban TreatyOrganization(CTBTO). This so-called “Integrated FieldExercise 2008” or IFE08 is taking placethroughout September 2008 in the formerSoviet Union nuclear test site in Kazakhstan'sSemipalatinsk Region.Largest-ever exerciseundertaken by the CTBTOThe exercise is unprecedented in scopeand size: it involves over 200 participants,consisting of an international team of 40inspectors, the Kazakh hosts, an evaluation“The Integrated Field Exercise is a major priority for us in2008. It’s important for preparing for the entry into force ofthe Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.”CTBTO’s Executive SecretaryTibor Tóthteam, observers and an operation supportcentre in Vienna. In addition, almost 50tonnes of equipment – the equivalent of sixtruckloads – have been flown to Kazakhstan.For all its scale and complexity, this exercisebears greater resemblance to a humanitarianaid operation than an inspection under aNon-Proliferation Treaty regime.The IFE08 is the first comprehensive onsiteinspection (OSI) exercise to encompassall phases of a nuclear test detection, fromthe first suspicious-looking seismic waveappearing on the screens at the CTBTO’sInternational Data Centre (IDC) in Vienna, tothe findings presented in the inspection report.On-site inspections:the ultimate verification measureAn OSI is the ultimate verificationmeasure of the CTBT. Real OSIs will bepossible only after the Treaty has enteredinto force. Until then, all procedures andmethods developed for such inspectionshave to be applied on an experimentalbasis, and equipment has to be tested forOSIs to be operational when the Treatyenters into force. From then on, theCTBTO must be in a position to launchan OSI at a few days notice because theevidence of a nuclear explosion, such asseismic aftershocks or certain radioactiveparticles, fades with every passing hour.The CTBTO’s OSI team must thereforebe veritable logistical wizards.The state-of-the-art technicalmethods that inspectors useon-site are diverse. Theymay include: multi-spectralimaging, gamma radiationmonitoring, visual observationto detect anomalies in thesurroundings, monitoring ofseismic aftershocks, magneticand gravitational field mapping,pa g e 1 4 C T B T O S p e c t r u m 1 1 | S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8

“What counts isto show the worldthat the CTBT’sverification systemreally works.”CTBTO’s Executive Secretary,Tibor Tóthground penetrating radar and many more.Some of these methods are applied from theair, typically from helicopters.In spite of this technicalsophistication, the OSI regime strikesa careful balance between the abilityto detect signs of nuclear testing andsafeguarding the national security interestof the inspected Member State. In orderfor the OSI to be as unobtrusive aspossible, the technical methods permittedare prescribed very precisely, even downto which type of radionuclide may bemeasured for inspection purposes andwhich must be ignored.The area to be inspected is alsolimited to 1000 square kilometres, whichis still larger than New York City with itsfive boroughs – a vast area for a handfulof inspectors. Therefore the search forevidence of a nuclear explosion can bethe proverbial search for the needle in thehaystack!All OSI procedures are set out inthe OSI draft operational manual, whichhas been worked on since the inceptionof the CTBTO in 1996, and currentlycomprises – around 1000 pages includingall subsidiary documents.The final verdictIt is important to note that, according tothe Treaty, it is the Member States andnot the CTBTO who will pronouncethe final verdict on whether a nuclearexplosion (and hence a Treaty violation)H e l i c o p t e r o v e r f l i g h t s a r e e s s e n t i a l t o o b ta i na g e n e r a l o v e rv i e w o f t h e i n s p e c t i o n a r e ahas indeed taken place. The CTBTO’srole will be limited to presenting thetechnical analysis on which the MemberStates base their verdict. In light of theconstantly increasing sophistication ofthe verification system, however, thesetechnical findings are likely to becomeever more unambiguous.The system went through its baptism offire in October 2006, when the DemocraticPeople’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) declaredD e c o n ta m i n at i o n s tat i o n p r o c e d u r e s . F i e l d o f f i c e r s u s i n g S tat e - o f - t h e - a r t s e i s m i c e q u i p m e n t .C T B T O S p e c t r u m 1 1 | S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8Pa g e 1 5

Verification sciencePhases of Nuclear Test Explosion DetectionPhase 1: The International Monitoring System (IMS) watches for signs of a nuclear explosionWhen complete, the International Monitoring System (IMS) will consist of 321 monitoring stations and 16 laboratories worldwide. These337 facilities will monitor the planet permanently for any sign of a nuclear explosion. 230 of these facilities are already operational.The IMS uses four complementary monitoring methods, utilizing the most modern technologies available. Seismic, hydroacoustic andinfrasound stations monitor the underground, the oceans and the atmosphere respectively. Radionuclide stations detect radioactive debrisfrom atmospheric, underground or underwater nuclear explosions.Phase 2: Transmission of Signals to ViennaOnce one or more stations have detected signals indicating a possible nuclear explosion, relevant data on the time, location and magnitude ofthe ‘event’, as CTBT experts refer to it, are transmitted via the Global Communications Infrastructure (GCI) to the CTBTO’s headquartersin Vienna. As the GCI uses modern communication technology such as satellites and secure data connections on the ground, it only takesup to 30 seconds for the data to be transmitted to Vienna from the time the station first registers the signal.Phase 3: Processing and analyzing the data and transmission to Member StatesAt the IDC in Vienna, scientists process and analyze the incoming data. The raw data and analysis results are then distributed electronicallyto CTBT Member States all around the world.Phase 4: Launching an OSI at the request of a Member StateAt the request of one or more Member States, the CTBTO launches an OSI in order to clarify whether or not a nuclear explosion has beencarried out. During such an inspection, facts are gathered to identify a possible violator of the Treaty.that it had conducted a nuclear test. Despite theestablishment of only two thirds of the IMSmonitoring facilities at the time, the CTBTOproved that its verification capabilities alreadysignificantly exceeded the expectations of theTreaty’s negotiators in 1996.After the DPRK test, the IFE08 is thenext milestone in demonstrating the Treaty’sverifiability. ■Dr. Kirsten Haupt is a historian who has beenworking as a Public Information officer at theCTBTO since 2004. Previously, she worked for11 years in the field of public information inpeacekeeping missions in Cambodia and in theformer Yugoslavia.Thomas Mützelburg is a career diplomat withthe German Foreign Service. He was the deskofficer for the CTBT between 2005 and 2008and has been seconded to the CTBTO forone year, where he is working in the PublicInformation section. ■P r e pa r i n g t o f ly a m a g n e t i c p r o b e . T h i s i s o n e o f t h e o s i t e c h n i q u e s t h at wa s e x e r c i s e d i n t h eK a z a k h s t e p p e i n 2 0 0 5 .pa g e 1 6 C T B T O S p e c t r u m 1 1 | S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8

Status of certified IMS facilities232 certified International Monitoring System (IMS) facilities as of 12 September 2008Notes & quotes“The Australian Government has today renewed calls for universal adherence to theComprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Its entry into force is an immediatedisarmament and non-proliferation priority. The CTBT offers a vital framework forthese disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, but a decade after its negotiationit is not yet in force. The Australian Government strongly supports efforts to bring theCTBT into force, and to see the completion of its verification system.”Stephen Smith, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs,in a media release issued on 12 May 2008.C T B T O S p e c t r u m 1 1 | S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8Pa g e 1 7

Verification highlightsBuilding monitoring facilities in the coldest, driest andwindiest continent on Earth: Antarcticaby Denise BrettschneiderJ o u r n e y t h r o u g h t h e i c e t o Pa l m e r S tat i o n , A n ta r c t i c a .“It was the darkness that did it. I don’tbelieve minus seventy temperatures wouldbe bad in daylight, not comparativelybad, when you could see where you weregoing...” In The Worst Journey in the World:A Tale of Loss and Courage in Antarctica,Apsley Cherry-Garrard describes the lastexpedition to the Antarctic by the explorer,Robert Scott, and his team in 1910.Total darkness for sixmonths a yearThe long periods of constant darkness duringthe winter contrast starkly with the summermonths in Antarctica, when it is light foralmost 24 hours a day. Renowned for havingthe harshest and most extreme environment onearth, the world’s lowest temperature of minus89 degrees Celsius was recorded in 1983 atthe Russian (former Soviet) Vostok researchstation in the centre of East Antarctica. Themean annual temperature of the interior isminus 37 degrees Celsius. And althoughAntarctica has more fresh water than anyother continent, it also receives the leastprecipitation, with only slightly morerainfall on average than the Sahara Desert.Its reputation as the windiest andleast hospitable continent on Earth iswell-deserved. Strong katabatic windscaused by the drainage of cold air downthe steep slopes of the ice sheet fromthe higher interior of the continent, havebeen measured at over 250 km/h. Thesewinds sometimes ravage the continent forseveral days. Blizzards are another typicalAntarctic phenomenon which can last fora week at a time, reducing visibility to afew feet. Whiteouts, in which there areno shadows or contrasts between objectscausing a loss of depth perception, arealso commonplace. Explorers have beenknown to get lost and freeze to deathwhile only metres away from their tents.Unsurprisingly, Antarctica has never hadan indigenous population of humans. Yet itsimportance as a natural reserve is recognizedinternationally. Approximately 30 nations, allsignatory to the 1961 Antarctic Treaty, sendpersonnel every year to perform seasonaland year-round research on the continent andin its surrounding oceans. The populationof scientists varies from approximately4,000 in summer to 1,000 in winter.Hostile environment andlogistical challengesIn order to provide uniform coverage ofthe globe, the Preparatory Commissionfor the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-BanTreaty Organization (CTBTO) has alreadyestablished several of its monitoringfacilities in remote areas that are difficultto access. These facilities are part ofthe International Monitoring System(IMS) and include a number of stationspa g e 1 8 C T B T O S p e c t r u m 1 1 | S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8

in Antarctica: eight seismic, infrasoundand radionuclide stations have alreadybeen certified by the CTBTO as meetingdefined requirements and specificationsand another five stations are planned.The IMS comprises a globalnetwork of stations and laboratoriesthat monitor the Earth for evidence ofa nuclear explosion in compliance withthe provisions of the ComprehensiveNuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), whichbans all nuclear explosions on the planet.As well as contending with an extremelyhostile environment when constructing stationsin Antarctica, the CTBTO is also confrontedwith logistical and engineering challenges: thetransportation of installation equipment needsto be meticulously planned and coordinatedand stations must be specially designedin order to withstand polar conditions.There are no developed ports on thecontinent and only a few locations have abasic wharf facility. Most coastal stationshave offshore anchorages, and supplies aretransferred by boats, barges and helicopters.Satellite communication is extremely difficultdue to the high latitudes — Antarctica is thehighest continent in the world, with an averageheight of 2,400 m above sea level —–and it isonly possible from certain research facilities.s e a i c e a n d s t o r m s c a n s l o w t h e j o u r n e y d o w n .D i g g i n g o u t t h e w i n d n o i s e r e d u c i n g p i p e a r r ay a n d e q u i p m e n t va u lt s at I S 5 5 .P h o t o c o u rt e s y o f d u n c a n m a r r i o t t, G e o p h y s i c a l I n s t i t u t e , U n i v e r s i t y o f A l a s k a , Fa i r b a n k s .Buried in snowWindless Bight is a desolate ice plaindevoid of any vegetation, wheretemperatures plummet to below minus 40degrees Celsius. Infrasound station IS55is part of the IMS and uses very sensitivemicrobarometers todetect low frequencysound waves which areinaudible to humans.These waves cantravel thousands ofkilometres and areproduced by a variety ofnatural and man-madesources, includingnuclear explosions. Thelatter events have anidentifiable signaturewhich distinguishesthem from other typesof infrasound sources.Windless Bight was chosen asa location since, as the name implies,there are virtually no surface winds therein contrast to the rest of Antarctica. Inaddition, the infrastructure of the Antarcticbase that already existed provided crucialsupport for the establishment of the station.The site is powered by a hybriddiesel/solar power supply to ensurecontinuous operations and uses the UnitedStates National Science Foundation’s(NSF) communication system (which fundsand manages the United States AntarcticProgramme) to transmit data to Denver,Colorado. The data are then transmittedvia the CTBT’s Global CommunicationsInfrastructure (GCI) to the InternationalData Centre (IDC) in Vienna, wherethey are processed to detect, locateand analyse events. The raw data andanalyzed data, so-called IDC products,are transmitted to Member States.C T B T O S p e c t r u m 1 1 | S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8Pa g e 1 9

Verification highlightsShipping supplies and personnel to palmer stationPhoto Courtesy of NSF/USAP by David Bresnahan, National Science Foundation.Windless Bight receives about 1.5metres of snow accumulation every year. Theequipment vaults where the microbarometersare located must, therefore, be dug out everyseason and replaced on top of the snow.Infrasound waves can generally penetratethe snow for several centimetres with littleattenuation (in the presence of attenuation,the signal becomes weaker over distance,i.e. with smaller amplitudes), but when thelayer of snow becomes too thick, the risk ofattenuation becomes higher. It is thereforealso necessary to dig the wind noise reducingsystem, which is connected to the equipmentvaults, out of the snow every year duringthe annual maintenance of the station.Communicating with thesouthernmost point on thesurface of the EarthWhile the Earth’s Polar Regions offerunique scientific research possibilities,their isolation and extreme climatesrender such opportunities extremelychallenging. The North and SouthPoles are the only places on Earththat cannot see geosynchronouscommunication satellites becauseof the distance from the Equator.In conjunction with the United StatesGeological Survey (USGS), the IMS operatesan auxiliary seismic station at the South Pole– AS114. This station providesdata on seismic events to theIDC to supplement informationgathered by primary seismicstations. By the time theIMS has been completed, atotal of 120 auxiliary seismicstations will have beencertified by the CTBTO.The issue of no satellitecoverage for up to 12 hoursa day needed to be addressedand the gap has now beenfilled by satellites belonging to the Iridiumnetwork. The Iridium network is a commercialconstellation of 66 communication satellitesthat circle the Earth on pole-to-pole orbitsat a height of 780 kilometres. The Iridiumnetwork is unique in that it covers the wholeEarth, providing communication coverageat the poles from where other satellites arenot visible. The CTBTO has collaboratedclosely with the USGS to develop thisservice, which has been heralded as abreakthrough in satellite communicationtechnology. Using this network and withthe support and assistance of USGS andNSF, AS114 has been able to transmitimportant seismic data from the South Polevia Denver to the IDC on a 24-hour basiswithout interruptions since February 2007.To facilitate operations, the IMShas provided AS114 with a special stationinterface computer so that it can respondto automatic data requests from the IDC.Despite the remoteness of the station andthe climatic extremes, AS114 has nowbeen fully integrated into the IMS.1,400 km sea voyage fromPunta Arenas to Anvers IslandRadionuclide monitoring station RN73 islocated at the United States owned PalmerStation on a protected harbour on the southwestern coast of Anvers Island off theAntarctica Peninsula. The station has beenC T B T O ’ s c o m m u n i c at i o n o f f i c e r o u t s i d e A s 11 4 at t h e s o u t h p o l e .pa g e 2 0 C T B T O S p e c t r u m 1 1 | S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8

Re-attaching wind noise reduction pipe array to vault At IS55.Photo courtesy of Duncan Marriott, Geophysical Institute, University of Alaska, Fairbanks.built on solid rock and consists of two majorbuildings and three smaller ones, one ofwhich accommodates station RN73, as wellas two large fuel tanks, a helicopter pad,and a dock. Palmer Station can occupy amaximum of 46 people and is staffed allyear round, although the population duringthe winter months is usually about 15.Delivering supplies to stations inAntarctica requires careful planning andaccess to specially constructed vessels. TheResearch Vessel R/V Laurence M. Gould, aship with an ice-strengthened hull designedfor year-round polar operations, supportsresearch in the Antarctic Peninsula regionby transporting supplies, researchers andstaff between Punta Arenas in Chile andPalmer Station. The 1,400 km journey takesapproximately four days, although sea iceand storms can slow the journey down.RN73 is part of a network of 80radionuclide monitoring stations thatenables the continuous worldwideobservation of aerosol samples of solidradionuclides or radionuclide particles.The station contains a RadionuclideAerosol Sampler Analyser (RASA),which is a fully integrated and automaticsystem for monitoring airborneradionuclides. The meteorologicalsystem is located on a mast on the roofof the building and is connected to theRASA computer. It includes sensorsto measure temperature, barometricpressure, humidity, precipitation, windspeed and wind velocity. The RASAsoftware controls the station equipmentand gathers information about theairflow, air sampler temperature andpressure etc. and meteorological data.As with IS55 and AS114, thisinformation is sent through the NSF’scommunication system from Palmer Stationto Denver and from there to the IDC viathe GCI. RN73 has been transmitting datavia the United States to the IDC everytwo hours since November 2005.The radionuclide station is operated byGeneral Dynamics - Advance InformationSystems (GD-AIS), with the local support of theNSF. The station is unmanned most of the timewith a local operator visiting the station at leastonce every two weeks to perform a physicalsecurity and operational check on the RASA.Complete global coverageThe extreme geographical and climaticconditions in Antarctica mean that installing andmaintaining monitoring stations is a costly andcomplicated exercise. By establishing stationsin such places, the IMS network providescomplete global coverage, thereby acting as apowerful deterrent to potential violators. ■Denise Brettschneider is working as awriter and editor with the CTBTO’s PublicInformation section. She has a number ofyears of editorial experience working fororganizations in Kenya including the UnitedNations Educational, Scientific and CulturalOrganization. ■C T B T O S p e c t r u m 1 1 | S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8Pa g e 2 1

Secretariat snaphotsA Global Scientific Endeavour:The International Scientific Studies Projectby Yvonne YewHydroacoustic technology first evolved atthe beginning of the 20th century to increasethe safety of sea travel and was soon usedfor submarine navigation and detection.Nowadays, it also helps in the research ofwhale populations and their migration patterns,in climate change studies and in tsunamiwarning systems.This is one of the cutting-edgetechnologies – together with seismology,infrasound and radionuclide monitoring – thatthe Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty(CTBT), which bans all nuclear explosions onEarth, uses to monitor the planet for evidence ofTreaty violations. These four technologies arepart of the CTBT’s verification regime, whichhas been established to ensure compliancewith the Treaty. The resulting verification dataalso offer a wide range of civil and scientificapplications with the potential to contributesignificantly to sustainable development,knowledge expansion and human welfare.Launched in March 2008, the InternationalScientific Studies (ISS) project involves a seriesof independent scientific studies and assessmentsdesigned to addressthe readiness andcapability of the CTBTto detect nuclearexplosions worldwide.Progress made in allfour technologiesover the last ten yearswill be highlighted.The project willexamine the performance of the CTBT’s globalverification system and its ability to detect andlocate observed events. It will also evaluate thetimeliness, quality and quantity of data which areproduced, transmitted, processed and distributedand the effective use of the data for potential civiland scientific applications.The project is particularly importantsince the CTBT’s verification regime mustbe fully operational by the time the Treatyenters into force.Global undertakingThe project is a global undertaking that isopen to experts and institutions from around“To cooperate with science is not a luxury thatwe can have or not, but a necessity for thelong-term sustainability of this organization.”Ola Dahlman, Special Advisoron the ISS projectthe world. The CTBTO is the facilitator andcoordinator of the project but will not beperforming the evaluation. This will be the taskof the international scientists and institutionsparticipating in the project. Internationalparticipation is essential in order to assess theCTBT’s verification regime both independentlyand credibly. The studies and assessmentswill be carried out between 2008 and 2009,culminating in a final report highlightingthe key findings. These findings will also bepresented at a large scientific conference inVienna in June 2009.This will be a major priority forthe Preparatory Commission for theComprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban TreatyO p e r at i o n C e n t r e at t h e I D C , C T B T O H e a d q u a r t e r s , V i e n n a , A u s t r i aI n f r a s o u n d P r o pa g at i o npa g e 2 2 C T B T O S p e c t r u m 1 1 | S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8

importance. Through the ISS project, thismutually beneficial relationship between theCTBTO and the global scientific community isbeing developed and strengthened continuously.International interestS e i s m i c S tat i o n at J a n M ay e n , N o rwayOrganization (CTBTO) in its 2009calendar. Keynote addresses across relevantdisciplines, presentations, round-tablediscussions and poster sessions are envisagedat the conference. The conference resultswill be published in August 2009 and itscomprehensive findings could assist MemberStates in their assessment of the verifiabilityof the Treaty.Capacity buildingIt is the CTBTO Member States that areresponsible for making an assessmentof the data received from the CTBTO’sInternational Data Centre (IDC). As such,it is important for States to increase theirtechnical knowledge base, as well as developthe facilities needed to participate fully in theimplementation and monitoring of the Treaty.In maintaining and developing the CTBT asa global Treaty, the ISS project contributesto the capacity building potential of MemberStates.Civil and scientific benefitsThere are many potential applications of theCTBT’s verification data in addition to thosementioned earlier. These include research onocean processes and marine life; volcaniceruption monitoring for aviation safety; andresearch on the structure of the Earth, its oceansand the atmosphere. By rapidly acquiring anddisseminating data on earthquakes, especiallytsunami-generating earthquakes, seismic datacan also assist in disaster management andresponse efforts, thus helping to save lives.For CTBT verification data andtechnologies to be used most effectively forcivil and scientific purposes, the exchange ofideas needs to be encouraged. An on-goingdialogue with the scientific community helpsraise awareness about the considerable scientificand technological advances which are ofrelevance to the CTBT. An analysis of thesedevelopments in relation to the establishment ofthe Treaty’s verification regime is of immenseSeveral phases have been planned for the ISSproject leading up to the 2009 Conference.The Planning Meeting took place in March2008 and concluded the first phase of the ISSproject. Over 100 experts and officials from33 countries participated, reflecting the greatinterest generated by the project. The meetingdiscussed scientific work on eight topic areasthat were identified as relevant to the ISSstudies: system performance, seismology,hydroacoustics, infrasound, radionuclides,atmospheric transport modelling, on-siteinspections, and data mining.The ISS has now progressed beyondits planning phase. Scientific studies andresearch projects are currently beingundertaken by the participating scientificinstitutions. Several planned ISS-relatedworkshops and PTS activities will also feedinto the ISS process, including the findingsrelated to the On-Site Inspection IntegratedField Exercise (IFE08) that is taking placein September 2008, at Semipalatinsk,Kazakhstan (see article on page 14).The ISS project is an inclusive anddynamic process. It continues to remainopen to experts and institutions withrelevant interests in the Treaty’s verificationtechnologies. ■Yvonne Yew is a consultant with theCTBTO working on the ISS project. Priorto this, she was a career diplomat with theSingapore Foreign Service covering regionaland multilateral issues including theInternational Atomic Energy Agency’s Boardof Governors meetings from 2004 to 2006. ■C T B T O S p e c t r u m 1 1 | S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8Pa g e 2 3

Verification science and potential civil applicationsThe importance of Atmospheric Transport Modelling: Over ten years ofcooperation between the World Meteorological Organization and the CTBTOby Peter Chen, Gerhard Wotawa and Andreas BeckerFact box – Atmospheric Transport Modelling (ATM)ATM is an integral part of radionuclide monitoring, which is carried out by the CTBT’s radionuclide facilities that belong to theInternational Monitoring System. Radionuclide monitoring technology is complementary to the three waveform verification technologies– seismic, infrasound and hydroacoustic – employed by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty’s (CTBT) verification regime tomonitor compliance with the Treaty. While waveform monitoring is utilized for event detection and location and could be used todifferentiate between an earthquake and an explosion, detecting relevant radionuclides or noble gases is essential for the unambiguousidentification of the nuclear origin of an event. Radionuclide technology combined with ATM thus provides the means to identifythe “smoking gun” needed to prove a possible violation of the Treaty. With its “forensic proof” of nuclear explosions, radionuclidetechnology is of crucial importance to the entire verification effort.When high levels of radiation (caesium-137)set off alarms at the Forsmark Nuclear PowerPlant in Sweden on 26 April 1986, the world wastaken by surprise. There had been a completemelt down of the reactor core at a nuclear powerplant in Chernobyl in the Soviet Union, on 25April at 21:23 local time. Over the next 10 days,the amount of radioactive caesium 1 released intothe atmosphere amounted to 10 percent of all thecaesium injected into the environment duringthe entire period of atmospheric nuclear testingbetween 1945 and 1980.Major advances in ATMcalculations since ChernobylAt the time of the Chernobyl nuclear accident,provisions for near-real-time ATM calculations,which would have helped to detect the sourceof the caesium radionuclides earlier, hardlyexisted.Nowadays, the measurement ofradionuclides with concentrations dramaticallylower than the 1986 values detected in Swedenwould trigger a swift response: several WorldMeteorological Organization (WMO) Centreswould be requested to supply atmosphericbacktracking calculations to the PreparatoryCommission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) tosupplement their own calculations. In the eventof an anomalous radionuclide being detected,the CTBTO’s International Data Centre (IDC)staff would try to identify its possible sourceregion and then provide Member States withrelevant information.ATM backtracking revealssources of radionuclidesThis was the case when measurements ofcaesium as low as one micro-Becquerel 2 perm3 were detected in northern Canada between2003 and 2004. They were analyzed carefullyby the IDC and traced back to forest fires inSiberia and Alaska. The burnt trees had takenup the caesium decades earlier during nucleartesting and later during the Chernobyl accident.This study was carried out in cooperation withexperts from the WMO Centre in Montreal andother organizations in Canada.Another example illustrating theimportance of ATM backtracking was whenthe Democratic People’s Republic of Korea(DPRK) announced that it had conducted anuclear test on 9 October 2006. Two weekslater, the CTBTO’s International MonitoringSystem (IMS) radionuclide noble gas station atYellowknife, Canada, registered an unusuallyhigh concentration of xenon 3 133 (in the orderof milli-Becquerel per m3). Applying ATM tobacktrack the dispersion of the gas, the noblegas detection at Yellowknife was found to beconsistent with a hypothesized release fromthe event in the DPRK.Potential civil, humanitarian,and scientific applicationsThese cases illustrate the importance of ATMtechnology: it is not surprising that this is thekey area among meteorological applications inwhich the CTBTO and WMO work together. Inaddition to emergency response, data from theCTBT’s IMS have been useful in other areassuch as disaster mitigation. In 2007, for instance,the CTBTO entered into a collaborative projectwith WMO, involving one of its centres atToulouse, France, which has been designatedas an International Civil Aviation Organization(ICAO) Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre (VAAC).Volcanic ash represents a serious aviationhazard. Its prompt detection and location throughthe use of infrasound data and the prediction ofits movement through forward ATM calculationscan be very useful. Such information providesaircraft with early warnings of possible airborneash plumes and could also provide guidance forair traffic re-routing decisions. The exploratoryphase of this project covers selected volcanoesin the European and African regions and someinitial contacts have been established with other1Caesium (or cesium) is a soft, silvery-gold alkali metal with a melting point of 28° C.Radioactive forms of caesium areproduced by the fission of uranium in fuel elements during the normal operation of nuclear power plants, or when nuclearweapons are exploded.2Becquerel is the amount of radioactive material in which 1 atom transforms every second.3Xenon is a chemical element in gaseous form, which is called a noble gas since it is inert and rarely reacts withother chemicals. Several of its radioactive isotopes, of which one of the isotopes is xenon-133, can only beproduced by a nuclear reaction and are therefore measured to detect clandestine underground nuclear explosions.pa g e 2 4 C T B T O S p e c t r u m 1 1 | S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8

S u r f a c e g r o u n d d e p o s i t i o n o f C a e s i u m - 1 3 7 r e l e a s e d i n E u r o p e a f t e r t h e C h e r n o b y l a c c i d e n t .I l l u s t r at i o n c o u r t e s y o f E C / I G C E , R o s h y d r o m e t ( R u s s i a ) / M i n c h e r n o b ly ( U k r a i n e ) / B e l h y d r o m e t ( B e l a r u s ) , 1 9 9 8 .VAACs to extend the investigations to otherregions in the world.ATM also plays an important role inthe CTBTO’s International Scientific Studiesproject (see article on page 22), which aimsto estimate the capabilities of current ATMprocedures and explore ways of furtherimproving their accuracy. WMO acts as theTopic Coordinator for ATM in this project.Future cooperation may be extended to otherimportant areas such as climate change.WMO’s role in the design of theCTBT’s radionuclide networkEven before the formation of the CTBTO,WMO and several of its members wereinvolved in the design of the CTBT’sradionuclide network. During the CTBTnegotiations from 1994 to 1996, the Groupof Scientific Experts (GSE) that had beencreated to lay the scientific and technicalground for the Treaty negotiations, conductedseveral global experiments in internationaldata exchange. WMO provided its GlobalTelecommunications System (GTS) for use inthese exchanges.At the same time, ATM was used togetherwith historical global weather data to simulatethe spread of airborne radionuclides in variousfictitious atmospheric explosion scenarios. Theresults enabled the GSE to make significantadvances towards designing what later becamethe model for the current IMS, especially theATM is an advanced computer-basedtechnology for the calculation of thetravel path of a given radionuclide, usingmeteorological data. This calculationcan be performed in one of two ways:▪ As backtracking ATM, which triesto identify the area from which aradionuclide may have been releasedcalculated from the location where itwas observed; or as▪ Forward ATM, which predictswhere radionuclides may travelfrom their known point of release.C T B T O S p e c t r u m 1 1 | S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8 Pa g e 2 5

Verification science and potential civil applicationsfinal configuration of the CTBT’s radionuclidenetwork. WMO also conducted research on theuse of measurement-based ATM to determinethe possible source region of an airbornematerial detected at the surface of the Earth, andpresented its findings to the Treaty negotiators.The “Informal Meeting to Discuss theApplications of Atmospheric Modelling toCTBT Verification” hosted by the WMO Centrein Canada, also provided a forum for scientiststo exchange ideas and ongoing research thatwere thought at the time to contribute to ATMapplications for Treaty verification.Mutual organizationalarrangementsPrior to the establishment of the CTBTO,Ambassador Wolfgang Hoffmann ofGermany, who became the CTBTO’s firstExecutive Secretary in March 1997, contactedWMO to explore the possibility of applyingATM in conjunction with radionuclidetechnology as part of the proposed IMS.This would enhance Treaty verification andwould mean that the proposed monitoringsystem would not rely primarily on seismicmonitoring, as had been foreseen initially.A small WMO-CTBTO task group alsoreviewed possible areas of technical cooperationbetween the two organizations in 1998 andidentified mutual benefits in ATM and potentialdata exchange. WMO’s Commission for BasicSystems, the technical commission responsiblefor the World Weather Watch Programme, firstinvited CTBTO representatives to its meetingsof technical experts involved with ATMtechnologies in 1999. These meetings initiallyfocused on environmental emergency responsesuch as in the event of a nuclear accident, laterincorporating new requirements related toCTBT verification.Joint activities and exchangeof data and expertiseThe two organizations formalized theircooperation in an agreement in 2000, whichentered into force in May 2003 after approvalby the CTBTO and the WMO Congress. Theexchange of data and expertise within thisframework has greatly contributed to the workof both organizations.Below are a few examples of thiscollaboration, which dates back to 2002 inanticipation of the agreement entering intoforce:▪ Continuous provision of meteorologicaldata measured at the Treaty’s radionuclidestations by the CTBTO to WMO since2002. These data are then distributedglobally through WMO’s GTS.▪ First coordinated experiment between theorganizations on source region estimationin 2003. This was a major breakthroughin terms of real-time data exchange andanalysis and was repeated in 2005.S e l e c t e d v o l c a n o e s ( r e d t r i a n g l e s ) u n d e r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f VA A C i n T o u l o u s e a n d I M Si n f r a s o u n d s tat i o n s u s e d f o r d e t e c t i o n r e v i e w ( b l a c k d i a m o n d s ) .▪ Agreement by the CTBTO, in principle, inearly 2005 to release IMS data on naturalradionuclides for WMO Programmes (seeSpectrum 7, December 2005). These datapa g e 2 6C T B T O S p e c t r u m 1 1 | S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8

Cover storyThe Race between Cooperation and Catastropheby Sam Nunncontinued from page 9can be used for the verification of weathermodels as well as for science and research.▪ Inclusion of the CTBTO-WMO responsesystem for atmospheric backtracking inthe WMO Manual for the Global DataProcessing and Forecasting System in2007. A third joint exercise was conductedin December 2007 to perform a finalverification of this response system, whichbecame operational on 1 September 2008▪ Joint article on quality assessment ofATM backtracking in support of CTBTverification, published in AtmosphericEnvironment 41 (2007) pp 4520-4534.This article will continue in the nextedition of Spectrum, describing in more detailthe 2007 CTBTO-WMO exercise mentionedabove and other ongoing activities. ■“The common interests of the UnitedStates, Europe, Russia, China, Japan,and many other nations are more alignedtoday than at any point in modern history.I believe that we must seize this historicopportunity and act accordingly.”question, of course, must be asked bythe Russians. If our answer is outside,then it’s simple – we both just keep doingwhat we are now doing. If the answeris inside, we and Russia must makeadjustments in strategy and tactics.To me, the goal of a world free ofnuclear weapons is like the top of a verytall mountain. It is tempting and easy tosay: “We can’t get there from here.” Itis true that today in our troubled worldwe can’t see the top of the mountain.Biographical notePeter Chen is Chief of the Data Processingand Forecasting Systems Division at WMO.He joined WMO in 2004 and is currentlyin charge of coordinating operationalweather forecasting for NationalMeteorological Services of WMO, includingnumerical weather prediction, and ATMfor environmental emergency response.Dr. Gerhard Wotawa is a specialist inthe modelling of atmospheric chemistryand transport. He joined the CTBTO inOctober 2000 and currently works as anAtmospheric Sciences Officer at the IDC.Dr. Andreas Becker is an AtmosphericSciences Officer in charge of ATMsoftware development at the IDC. Hejoined the CTBTO in 2001 and is aspecialist in the field of coupling of ATMsystems in support of environmentalmeasurement campaigns. ■The common interests of theUnited States, Europe, Russia, China,Japan, and many other nations are morealigned today than at any point in modernhistory. I believe that we must seize thishistoric opportunity and act accordingly.Bottom line: In an age fraught withthe dangers of nuclear proliferation andcatastrophic terrorism, global securitydepends on regional security. Twentyyears after the fall of the Berlin Wall,establishing a more cooperative andproductive relationship with Russia willrequire Europe’s leadership as well as theUnited States’.A world free ofnuclear weaponsThe reaction of many people to the visionand steps to eliminate the nuclear threatcomes in two parts – on the one hand theysay: “That would be great.” And their secondthought is: “We can never get there.”But we can see that we are headingdown – not up. We can see that we mustturn around, that we must take pathsleading to higher ground and that wemust get others to move with us.Nearly 20 years ago, U.S. PresidentRonald Reagan asked an audience toimagine that “all of us discovered that wewere threatened by a power from outerspace—from another planet.” The Presidentthen asked: “Wouldn’t we come togetherto fight that particular threat?” Afterletting that image sink in for a moment,President Reagan came to his point: “Wenow have a weapon that can destroy theworld -- why don’t we recognize that threatmore clearly and then come together withone aim in mind: how safely, sanely, andquickly can we rid the world of this threatto our civilization and our existence.”If we want our children andgrandchildren to ever see the mountain top,we must begin to answer this question. ■C T B T O S p e c t r u m 1 1 | S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8 Pa g e 2 7

PerspectivesThe Enduring Value of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty andNew Prospects for Entry Into Forceby Daryl G. Kimballcontinued from page 13test limitation initiative or will eventually finda way to endorse the 1996 Treaty is not clear.It is clear that in order to gain thenecessary support for ratification, thenext U.S. president must do more thanstudy the CTBT and should not try torenegotiate or amend it. A full-scale effortwill require strong presidential leadership,a high-level CTBT coordinator, and aneffective NGO advocacy campaign.High-level diplomaticpressure must continueon “hold-out” States“... it is incumbent upon each of theworld’s major nuclear suppliers andCTBT signatories to unequivocallystate that if India tests, they wouldterminate nuclear trade with India.Each also has a responsibility toactively seek India’s early considerationand support for the CTBT.”Second, leaders of States committed to theCTBT must exercise much more consistent,top-level diplomacy in support of entry intoforce. The numerous statements by individualgovernments and regional groupings ofStates are essential but are not sufficient. Toooften, they fail to press their counterparts inthe nine CTBT hold-out States.One important opportunity will be the“Friends of the CTBT” Foreign Ministersmeeting in New York this September, whenforeign ministers from CTBT ratifyingStates will gather to issue their biennialjoint statement calling for the Treaty’s entryinto force. Another is the next Conferenceon Facilitating the Entry into Force ofthe CTBT, likely to take place in the fallof 2009, to help prod the U.S. presidentand other hold-outs to approve the Treaty.China merits special attention. For years,Beijing has reported that the Treaty isbefore the National People’s Congress forconsideration but has apparently taken noaction to win legislative approval.U.S. nuclear trade with IndiaUnfortunately, the 45 participating countriesof the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) faileda third important leadership test on the CTBTwhen they approved an India-specific waiverfrom NSG guidelines on 6 September 2008without any call for New Delhi to translateits political pledge not to test into a legallybindingand enforceable commitment byjoining the CTBT.Worse still, the United States, France, theUnited Kingdom, and Russia, each of whomstand to profit from nuclear trade with India,opposed a group of six responsible like-mindedNSG States, plus Japan, that sought to establisha clear and unambiguous NSG policy toterminate trade if India resumes testing.Following the NSG’s reluctant approvalof the India-specific waiver, several Statesdelivered national statements to clarify theirviews on how the NSG’s policy on Indiashould be implemented. Japan, and perhapsothers, noted that if India resumed testing,“the logical consequence is to terminatetrade.”Indeed, paragraph 3 of the NSGstatement undeniably says the “basis” ofthe India specific waiver is the July 2005pledge and the 5 September 2008 statementby India’s External Affairs Minister, PranabMukherjee, which included a pledge tomaintain India’s nuclear test moratorium.To address the severe shortcomingsof the NSG’s decision, it is incumbentupon each of the world’s major nuclearsuppliers and CTBT signatories tounequivocally state that if India tests,they would terminate nuclear trade withIndia. Each also has a responsibility toactively seek India’s early considerationand support for the CTBT. If, as PrimeMinister Manmohan Singh said in July2005, India is prepared to take on theresponsibilities expected of other advancednuclear nations, it is reasonable to expectthat India should agree to a legally-bindingtest moratorium, as the five originalnuclear-weapon states have all done.Securing the Treaty’sentry into forceCTBT entry into force is within reach. Withthe 2008 U.S. election and the 2010 NPTReview Conference approaching, it is vitalto redouble efforts to secure ratification bykey CTBT hold-out States, accelerate workto complete the International MonitoringSystem, and avoid developments that woulddamage the CTBT regime. The next one totwo years may represent the best opportunityto secure the future of this long-awaited andmuch-needed Treaty. ■pa g e 2 8 C T B T O S p e c t r u m 1 1 | S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8

Editor-in-Chief:Annika Thunborg, Spokesperson, Chief of Public InformationPrepared, coordinated and edited by: Denise BrettschneiderCTBTO staff contributors:Awoba Bagshaw, Michael Balgavy, Marion Berrens, NicolasBrachet, Paola Campus, Luis Cella, Herbert Gohla, Boris Kvok,Adrea Mach, Mordechai Melamud and Yuri StaravoitLayout and design: Todd VincentDistribution: Christian EvertzPhotographs and illustrations are at the courtesy of the authorsand the Provisional Technical Secretariat.If you wish to subscribe to the online version of the CTBTO Spectrum,please visit the ‘email-alert’ area of our web site at www.ctbto.org.p u b l i s h e d b y :Public InformationPreparatory Commission for theComprehensive Nuclear-Test-BanTreaty Organization (CTBTO)Vienna International CentreP.O. Box 12001400 Vienna, AustriaT +43 1 26030 6200F +43 1 26030 5823E info@ctbto.orgI www.ctbto.org© 2008 CTBT Preparatory CommissionCTBTO Spectrum – ISSN: 1680-533Xprinted in Austria, September 2008

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