Verification scienceLooking for the nuclear needle in the haystack:The Integrated Field Exercise 08 in Kazakhstanby Kirsten Haupt and Thomas MützelburgK a z a k h s ta n h o s t e d p r e v i o u s e x e r c i s e s o n t h r e e o c c a s i o n s i n 1 9 9 9 , 2 0 0 2 a n d 2 0 0 5 .Against the backdrop of the remoteemptiness of the steppe in northernKazakhstan, a most peculiar sceneunfolds: seemingly materializing out ofnowhere, figures clad in white plasticoveralls pour out of vehicles while at thesame time, truckload after truckload ofodd-looking contraptions are unloaded.Within a short time, the landscape isspeckled with shiny white tents.What might seem to the unsuspectingonlooker like a scene from a science-fictionmovie actuallymarks thebeginning of aninspection exercisecarried out bythe PreparatoryCommission forthe ComprehensiveNuclear-Test-Ban TreatyOrganization(CTBTO). This so-called “Integrated FieldExercise 2008” or IFE08 is taking placethroughout September 2008 in the formerSoviet Union nuclear test site in Kazakhstan'sSemipalatinsk Region.Largest-ever exerciseundertaken by the CTBTOThe exercise is unprecedented in scopeand size: it involves over 200 participants,consisting of an international team of 40inspectors, the Kazakh hosts, an evaluation“The Integrated Field Exercise is a major priority for us in2008. It’s important for preparing for the entry into force ofthe Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.”CTBTO’s Executive SecretaryTibor Tóthteam, observers and an operation supportcentre in Vienna. In addition, almost 50tonnes of equipment – the equivalent of sixtruckloads – have been flown to Kazakhstan.For all its scale and complexity, this exercisebears greater resemblance to a humanitarianaid operation than an inspection under aNon-Proliferation Treaty regime.The IFE08 is the first comprehensive onsiteinspection (OSI) exercise to encompassall phases of a nuclear test detection, fromthe first suspicious-looking seismic waveappearing on the screens at the CTBTO’sInternational Data Centre (IDC) in Vienna, tothe findings presented in the inspection report.On-site inspections:the ultimate verification measureAn OSI is the ultimate verificationmeasure of the CTBT. Real OSIs will bepossible only after the Treaty has enteredinto force. Until then, all procedures andmethods developed for such inspectionshave to be applied on an experimentalbasis, and equipment has to be tested forOSIs to be operational when the Treatyenters into force. From then on, theCTBTO must be in a position to launchan OSI at a few days notice because theevidence of a nuclear explosion, such asseismic aftershocks or certain radioactiveparticles, fades with every passing hour.The CTBTO’s OSI team must thereforebe veritable logistical wizards.The state-of-the-art technicalmethods that inspectors useon-site are diverse. Theymay include: multi-spectralimaging, gamma radiationmonitoring, visual observationto detect anomalies in thesurroundings, monitoring ofseismic aftershocks, magneticand gravitational field mapping,pa g e 1 4 C T B T O S p e c t r u m 1 1 | S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8
“What counts isto show the worldthat the CTBT’sverification systemreally works.”CTBTO’s Executive Secretary,Tibor Tóthground penetrating radar and many more.Some of these methods are applied from theair, typically from helicopters.In spite of this technicalsophistication, the OSI regime strikesa careful balance between the abilityto detect signs of nuclear testing andsafeguarding the national security interestof the inspected Member State. In orderfor the OSI to be as unobtrusive aspossible, the technical methods permittedare prescribed very precisely, even downto which type of radionuclide may bemeasured for inspection purposes andwhich must be ignored.The area to be inspected is alsolimited to 1000 square kilometres, whichis still larger than New York City with itsfive boroughs – a vast area for a handfulof inspectors. Therefore the search forevidence of a nuclear explosion can bethe proverbial search for the needle in thehaystack!All OSI procedures are set out inthe OSI draft operational manual, whichhas been worked on since the inceptionof the CTBTO in 1996, and currentlycomprises – around 1000 pages includingall subsidiary documents.The final verdictIt is important to note that, according tothe Treaty, it is the Member States andnot the CTBTO who will pronouncethe final verdict on whether a nuclearexplosion (and hence a Treaty violation)H e l i c o p t e r o v e r f l i g h t s a r e e s s e n t i a l t o o b ta i na g e n e r a l o v e rv i e w o f t h e i n s p e c t i o n a r e ahas indeed taken place. The CTBTO’srole will be limited to presenting thetechnical analysis on which the MemberStates base their verdict. In light of theconstantly increasing sophistication ofthe verification system, however, thesetechnical findings are likely to becomeever more unambiguous.The system went through its baptism offire in October 2006, when the DemocraticPeople’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) declaredD e c o n ta m i n at i o n s tat i o n p r o c e d u r e s . F i e l d o f f i c e r s u s i n g S tat e - o f - t h e - a r t s e i s m i c e q u i p m e n t .C T B T O S p e c t r u m 1 1 | S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8Pa g e 1 5