The United States, China, and Taiwan - Public International Law ...

But China also needs to have the U.S. and China--watching establishment arguing and bickeringamong itself over China's future course, particularly its military. This is happening, and in a wayit reminds me of the global warming debate.Both China watchers and environmentalists share a body of data which is common to both sidesof the debate and is based partly on scientific or technical data collection. This data is analyzedby so--called experts who come to widely different interpretations. The two sides then fight andthe arguments become emotional and fixed, often ending in ad hominem attacks which are usedagainst the opposition. The debate becomes mired in disagreement, and policy can becomestultified and at times even paralyzed. It could be tragic, because, as in global warming, thestakes are very high for all mankind.President Clinton's first term China policy was bogged down in groping experimentation, littleunderstanding of the forces at work, and a distorted view of how to manage policy with bothChina and Taiwan. The result was the crisis in March of 1996. Perhaps the Administration hasnow learned to act more wisely after that scare. But the problem of understanding andevaluating the Chinese military remains. Cassandras are popping up all over, warning thatTaiwan could be the catalyst for military confrontation. The necessity remains for us to beclear—headed when we look at the meaning of Chinese military acquisitions from Russia.Unfortunately, our data is only the tip of the iceberg. What is then the Chinese revolution inmilitary affairs? Its research and development appears targeted on dealing with advanced U.S.weapons systems which they observed being used in the Gulf War and which could eventuallybe used against a hostile China. Chinese research is aimed at using Russian torpedo technologyagainst our aircraft carriers; other programs counter--act our stealth bombers, and they seek withlaser weapons to put out the eyes of our satellites on which so much of our warfare depends. Allof these programs are being pursued by China. Where they stand is a matter for our intelligenceagencies.In any case, getting back to the Chinese security belt and its inner island chain strategy, in eachof its selected areas it runs into U.S. military commitments or into U.S. forward deployed forces.In the Spratlys, we demonstrated, in May 1995, that the sea lanes passing through that area arecritical to the U.S., our friends, and allies. The Chinese belatedly acknowledged our position. InTaiwan, we have the TRA and have shown as recently as March 1996 our resolve to back it up.The Senkakus issue is not clear, and the U.S. insists it takes no position on the issue ofsovereignty, but the Japanese have insisted, mostly privately, that our security treaty covers theseislands and they have the back--up data to make their case. We are still the major player on theKorean Peninsula, and we are essential in deterring war and bringing about peaceful economicchange in the north. China also is. Can these two giant countries agree to share influence whilethe Koreans themselves are left to work out their own destiny peacefully? China and the U.S.both know well the bitter cost of warfare on that peninsula. Striking progress has been madewhen we have cooperated, but the dangerous dilemma remains of an obnoxious over--militarizedand failed regime in the North clinging to power and resisting real change for fear it will end itsrule. The oversized military is its only card ---- the threat of force ---- this is an immediateproblem calling for Chinese--American cooperation.