4. Perspectives on the Evolution of European Social Policy

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26from a reactive, corrective, compensating and passive welfare edifice to a moreproactive social investment strategy, with much greater attention to prevention,activation, and capacity buildingThroughout this process of convergence, Hemericjk maintains that the EuropeanUnion has played an increasingly influential role in sustaining a form of ‘doubleengagement’ between member-states in terms of setting a cross-national agendaon vital social matters and creating a space for sharing the experiences of domesticpolicy reform. This increasingly important role for the EU meant that it is no longerpossible for the national welfare state and the European Union to be regarded asdiametrically opposed, to be positioned along clear demarcation lines. What thisentails is not whether the EU should play a role in the formulation of national socialand employment policy, since it is already doing this, but how the EU can make aneffective and legitimate contribution to current processes of recalibration and reformin the national welfare states of the EU. The central question is not ‘how much’or ‘how little’ Europe we wish to have, but rather ‘what kind of’ social Europe themember states are willing and able to build’. Formulating the matter thus suggestthat it is possible to strike a balance not only between the EU and member-statesthat respects the capacities and competences of both but also that can mediatebetween economic and social concerns.<strong>4.</strong>5 Striking a Balance?It is not unusual to hear criticisms that there is an imbalance at the heart of theprocess of European Integration. Much of this criticism centres around the ideathat the ideals underlying the notion of ‘social Europe’ have never been accordedequal weight as the emphasis on the four economic freedoms. Debates overthe services directive in the European Parliament were couched in terms of thedirective undermining national welfare regimes. Among labour unions thereis anxiety over the implications of many recent ECJ cases concerning the freemovement of workers. And the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in France in2005 has been attributed to a suspicion that the EU was devoted to a ‘neo-liberal’economic agenda that disregarded or eroded the social dimension of the EU(Pelkmans 2007; Ferrara 2009).Other commentators offer a more precise diagnosis of the alleged problem. FritzScharpf (2009) argues that there is a ‘double asymmetry’ or imbalance in relation tothe formation of national social policy within the EU. The first relates to how the axisof decision-making has tilted toward non-political actors such as the ECJ and awayfrom national governments who find it increasingly difficult to strike a consensus. Thesecond asymmetry or imbalance relates to how the increasingly non-political processfavours negative integration — the removal of impediments to the operation of thefour freedoms — over policies of positive integration that involved the formation ofcommon policies to realise necessary goods. Arising from this ‘double asymmetry’or imbalance is a process that undermines social market economies at the nationallevel and impedes efforts to recreate similar institutions at the European level. Thissection first reviews how the gradually increasing size and diversity of the EuropeanUnion made it increasingly difficult to forge a common political consensus; the ECJthen assumed a much greater role in forwarding European integration — the first
perspectives on the evolutionof european social policy 27asymmetry. Section <strong>4.</strong>5.2 analyses how this led to the emphasis of negative overpositive integration, which has been accentuated by the stream of jurisprudencedocumented in section <strong>4.</strong>3.1. An assessment of imbalance position is offeredin <strong>4.</strong>5.3.<strong>4.</strong>5.1 The First Imbalance: Law dislodges PoliticsScharpf believes that there was a time when EU integration was conditionedprimarily by politics. It was to be achieved either by intergovernmental agreementon amendments to the Treaties or by European legislation initiated by theCommission and adopted by the Council of Ministers (Scharpf 2009: 7). After tariffbarriers had been removed, future progress was to be achieved through legislativeharmonization of national rules, allowing governments to decide the pace ofliberalization pertaining to the four freedoms. In retaining the ‘whip-hand’ overliberalization, the original six member-states were able to control the interactioneffects between economic liberalization and the processes and systems associatedwith national welfare regimes. Thanks to this form of control, member-stateswere, according to Scharpf, able to maintain the regimes of ‘embedded liberalism’typical of postwar Western economies in which markets were maintained withinpolitically defined limits that did not perturb the conditions of social cohesion andstability with national societies.This model of ‘embedded liberalism’ was also able to operate within the then EECbecause all six original members were fairly homogenous in terms of their politicaleconomy. All had fairly large Bismarckian-type pension and health care systemsthat were primarily financed by wage-based contributions; they enjoyed highlyregulated labor markets and industrial-relations systems, and all had a large sectorof public services and infrastructure functions that were either provided directly bythe state or in other ways exempted from market competition (Scharpf 2009: 8).This equilibrium was disturbed by the first enlargement of the EU which broughtcountries with different systems of political economy: liberal in the case of theIreland and the UK, and social democratic in the case of Denmark. Harmonizationof national rules through European legislation became more difficult and somefeared that the EEC would not be able to proceed beyond the custom union built inthe first decade of its existence.It was then, according to Scharpf, that the European Court of Justice assumeda much greater role in the process of European integration. Although it hadalready established the principles of supremacy (EU law took precedence of thelaw of member-states), and ‘direct effect’ (EU law constituted a legal order whichbestowed enforceable rights for individuals of member-states, the ECJ still had alimited reach. In the 1960s, it had only intervened against national violations ofunambiguous prohibitions in the Treaty and against protectionist measures thatwere clearly designed to prevent the market access of foreign suppliers. In 1974, theCourt adjudicated on the Dassonville case (8/74) which concerned Art. 28 of theEC Treaty which prohibited ‘quantitative restrictions on imports and all measureshaving equivalent effect’. The ECJ interpreted this provision as entailing that alltrading rules which are capable of hindering intra-community trade are to beconsidered as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions.
Page 1: ackground paper4.
Page 4 and 5: Table of ContentsBackground Paper 4
Page 6 and 7: 64backgroundThe Provision paperof S
Page 8 and 9: expenditure but rather to a recalib
Page 10 and 11: 4.2.1 Toward a Soc
Page 12 and 13: in conjunction with the completion
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Page 16 and 17: 10and social exclusion, as well as
Page 18 and 19: 12s Agreed common objectives at EU
Page 20 and 21: 14enforceable rights applicable to
Page 22 and 23: 164.3 Sovereignty
Page 24 and 25: 18assistance eligibility and reside
Page 26 and 27: 20it is subject to competition rule
Page 28 and 29: 226. The health area is a first and
Page 30 and 31: 24Across (Adema & Ladaique) countri
Page 34 and 35: 28Did this mean that measures that
Page 36 and 37: 30Figure 4.2 The E
Page 38 and 39: 32In portraying enlargement as prov
Page 40 and 41: 34Sabel and Gerstenberg (2010: 31)
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Page 46 and 47: 40ReferencesAdema, W. and Ladaique,

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