Transformation after two decades of agrarian reform ... - RCSD

Transformation after two decades of agrarian reform programPamela CrosbyMSc in Geography CandidateDepartment of GeographyUniversity of the Philippines DilimanIntroductionIn the Philippines, a large proportion of the population is involved in the agricultural sector.According to the Bureau of Agricultural Statistics (BAS), an office under the Department ofAgriculture (DA), about 12.03 million were employed in the agriculture sector. It representsabout 35 percent of the country's employment in 2008. In terms of wage, an agricultural workerearns on average Php325 (7.3 US dollars)* daily, if employed in agricultural lands within theNational Capital Region, the political and economic center of the Philippines or betweenPhp185-257 (4.2-5.8 US dollars), if employed outside NCR (National Wages and ProductivityCommission, 2008). Comparing these figures to earnings from non-agricultural employment,Php325-362 (7.3-8.1 US dollars) in NCR and Php183-287 (4.1-6.5 US dollars) outside NCR, thedifference is quite significant.Oftentimes the terms “agricultural” is often equated to “rural” although they are not necessarilyso. These words in turn are associated with poverty, backwardness, and underdevelopment. Thebleak characterization of the rural-agricultural areas is attributed to landlessness, or more aptly,to unequal access to land, which in turn, maintains the dependency of the landless on landedentities, be they traditional landlords or huge commercial companies. In both cases, tenantfarmers and farm workers are treated as mere tillers of land and have no decision-making powerover the utilization of the land and the resources in it.For rural developers, the way then to correct stagnation and poverty in the rural areas is toredistribute land, which is tantamount to redistributing wealth and power (Thiesenhusen, 2001;Borras, 2008b). By having access to land, tillers are no longer forced into an iniquitous sharing*Based on the average exchange rate in 2008.

system with landlords or pressed into oftentimes-onerous wage labor system. Access to land alsomeans freedom to diversify their livelihoods, directly join in the agricultural market, or evenmove away from agriculture.On the other hand, landlords attempt to preserve their landholdings by sidestepping the agrarianreform programs using overt and covert means, from converting agricultural lands into other usesto employing outright armed resistance. Two decades after the implementation of theComprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) in the Philippines, what has happened then tothe “former” landlords, the beneficiaries of the CARP, and their respective lands?This paper outlines some of the findings of my masteral thesis which examines the impacts ofagrarian reform on the social relations in the study area and on the production and reproductionspaces in the said community. The study is being conducted on three agrarian reform (AR) sitesin the municipality of Buenavista, namely, Poblacion, Catulin, and Lilukin.Agrarian Reform Impact Studies in the PhilippinesIn the Philippines, most “CARP impact assessment” studies focus on the socioeconomic effectsof the CARP, particularly on poverty alleviation and policy implications (see studies done byBalisacan, Borras and the PIDS). Many of these have been concerned with evaluating the“success” rate of the CARP and only a few have been concerned with the spatial effects of theprogram on the physical land itself. Among these few is a study done by Ballesteros & de laCruz (2006) who examined the impacts of the CARP on land ownership concentration in therice-growing areas in Nueva Ecija, Central Luzon. One of the evitable effects of the CARP is thedecline of large consolidate rice lands and the increase of small rice farm landholdings, at leastfor a certain period of time. In one of the conclusions of the author, these agrarian reform sites inNueva Ecija did not experience much change since farmers who benefited from the CARPeventually re-sold or pawned their lands not necessarily to their old landlords but to new landbuyers, which is also a common practice among the CARP beneficiaries of Buenavista, Quezon..What happens is that a new breed of landowners is emerging in these villages.2

In relation to this, a study done by Llanto & Dingcong (1991) examine the frequently forgottenactors/stakeholders in the CARP, which are the landowners. Among the important focus of thestudy are “the factors that encourage or discourage the shift of landowners from agriculture toindustry” and the “impact of agrarian reform on their income and investment behavior”.However, the authors discussed only the economizing behaviors and response of landowners tothe CARP and portrayed them as rational “entrepreneurs” which is not always the case,especially in the Philippines where land is laden with political and social functions. It is acommon fact that land reform programs are often met with resistance from large land owningentities.Area of StudyBuenavista was established as the 37 th municipality of the Province of Quezon in thenortheastern Philippines on August 26, 1950. However, it already existed as a small village (or asitio) in the 1800s, founded by Spaniards who settled in the area. It has 37 barangays (thesmallest administrative unit in the Philippines), with a total area of 16,135.07 hectares and a totalpopulation of 23,834 (as of 2003), such that 1.48 people live in an hectare of land.Buenavista is a fifth-class municipality, meaning, it has an annual income of 10 million pesos to20 million pesos (217,037.4 US dollars to 434,074.9 US dollars), which is practically at thebottom of the income classification of municipalities in the country. It is part of the BondocPeninsula, a sub-region located in the southern portion of the province. Buenavista isapproximately 226 km southeast of Manila and about 114 km southeast of Lucena, QuezonProvince’s capital and lone city.Buenavista is an agricultural municipality, with 62% of its total land area (or 10,009 hectares),devoted for agricultural use. Of these 10,009 hectares, 8,153.8 or 81% of the agricultural area isplanted with coconut. However, just like the rest of the Bondoc Peninsula subregion, has beenhandicapped by its physical geography. This area is characterized by a hilly and mountainoustopography, high soil erodibility, and by leached upland soils. Moreover, this municipality isoften in the path of typhoons that originate in the Pacific area.3

Land, Agriculture and the Rise of Agrarian ElitesIn the Rise and Fall of Elites, the English translation of Pareto’s Un applicazione di teoriesociologiche, elite was defined as “the strongest, the most energetic, and the most capable – forgood as well as evil”, and that, “peoples are always governed by an elite.” Mosca, on the otherhand, defined the elite by distinguishing two classes of people in a society: one that rules and onethat is ruled. He continued,“The first class, always the less numerous, performs all politicalfunctions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages thatpower brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, isdirected and controlled by the first, in a manner that is now moreor less legal, now more or less arbitrary and violent.”While Pareto’s and Mosca’s definitions did not particularly discuss the rise of agrarian elites,their definitions provide a good starting point in discussing the assent of agrarian elites and theirroles in rural politics in the Philippines. Questions like how do the elites come to power, andmaintain their ‘legitimacy’ in the countrysides need to be addresses.Wolters (1984), in his Politics, Patronage and Class Conflict in Central Luzon, stated that thelocal elites rose to power when they started to amass lands in rural areas where most of suppliesof land were. This process was a result of two developments that happened in the country duringthe colonial times: first, the “incorporation of prominent native members of the population intothe colonial government” and, second, “the opening of the Philippine archipelago to the worldmarket” through commodity production. The Spanish colonial government forcibly opened to theinternational market by mandating exportation of agricultural products. To produce more cashcrops, many of the land owners had their hacienda tilled by peasants under the kasamásharecropping system (or the landlord-tenant system). This started the feudalistic feature of therural-agricultural Philippines.The feudalistic relationship between the landlord and the tenants, however, did not remaineconomic. As the landlords flourished economically, they did also politically. Due to their4

financial power, they became the financiers of political parties and even became the candidatesthemselves that they eventually became part of the Philippine political system (von Albertini,1971; McCoy, 1998). What the country then had at this time were economic and politicallandlords (McCoy, 1998; Hutchcroft, 2000).“Landlordism” and Agrarian Reform in the PhilippinesThe notion and reality of power that is equated to ownership of land is deeply entrenched in thePhilippine society, even before Christianity and Islam arrived in the country. However, the widescaleacquisition and (mis)appropriation of land proliferated during the Spanish period in thecountry, particularly in the lowlands (Wolters, 1984; McCoy, 1993; Veneracion, 2001). Villagesor pueblo, and later on, municipalities were set up while land grants were handed out to obedientimplementers of the colonization project of the Spanish crown through the encomienda, alcadiaand estancia systems. These systems, wherein large tracts of lands were cultivated for cash cropsor used for ranching (Veneracion, 2001:85-103), are feudalistic in nature. Because of the prestigeassociated with “owning” large areas of land, many individuals started acquiring them on theirown. It was during this period that land grabbing became rampant despite the regalian doctrine.The Spanish Period, and the American Period, subsequently, in the Philippines gave birth to thepresent landlords in the country.‘Landlordism’ or the landlord-tenant system was abolished since the passing of the institution ofthe Republic Act 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL of 1988),which is the legal basis for the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). TheComprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) is a ten-year program that is implemented bythe Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The deadline for CARP was 1998 but it wasextended until 2008, a decade late of the original deadline. However, a recent resolution of thePresidential Agrarian Reform Committee (PARC), signed this February 2007, states a plan toextend the program beyond 2008.‘Agrarian reform’ is defined as:“the redistribution of lands, regardless of crops or fruits produced,to farmers and regular farm workers who are landless, irrespective5

of tenurial arrangement, to include the totality of factors andsupport services designed to lift the economic status of thebeneficiaries and all other arrangements alternative to the physicalredistribution of lands, such as production or profit-sharing, laboradministration, and the distribution of shares of stock, which willallow beneficiaries to receive a just share of the fruits of the landsthey work.” (RA 6657, Section 3a)This was reiterated by DAR, the main body tasked to implement the CARP:“Agrarian reform is the redistribution of agricultural lands tofarmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, irrespective oftenurial arrangement. It includes the provision of support servicessuch as: credit extension, irrigation, roads and bridges, marketingfacilities, human resource and institutional development.”Agrarian reform, therefore, does not only mean redistribution of lands but providing thebeneficiaries with extension services and incentives to the beneficiaries.However, despite the delay in meeting the deadline for the CARP, the government is positivethat it is producing concrete results as evidenced in DAR’s 2006 Annual AccomplishmentReport. DAR reported that it was able to distribute 96% of its targeted 130,000 hectares for thatparticular year. The government’s optimism was bolstered by positive praises from internationalobservers, as reflected in a news article published in DAR’s website citing the country as amodel for agrarian reform implementation (“Int’l. rural dev’t planners: laud RP agrarianprogram”, May 31, 2007, http://www.dar.gov.ph). Ironically, at the same page, another headlinereads, “Police, soldiers key to CARP’s success” (May 31, 2007, http://www.dar.gov.ph). Thismentions the violence associated with the implementation of the CARP in areas that arecontrolled by prominent figures, usually politicians and businessmen. This same conflict echoesthe same resistance from many of the lawmakers, staged at the time when CARL was still a bill.Many congressmen objected to the provisions of the bill because it threatens their own large6

landholdings back in their provinces. These legislators were not only political elites, but were,firstly, agrarian elites.Fragmentation of Land, Redistribution of Power?In the Philippine countryside, land remains in the core of resource conflicts, and parallel to these,of the rural development agenda. The dichotomy between the landed and the landless continuesto define the political, economic, and socio-cultural landscapes of the rural areas. In a countrywhere most people still depend on agriculture, land remains one of the most important “factor ofproduction” or capital. However, it is also true that land is more than an economic factor. It haspolitical and social functions such that in many rural areas in the Philippines, control of the landmeans control of the people within this land. Land-owning entities occupy the upper tier ofsociety – they are the wealthy, the force that can dictate the development trajectory (or lackthereof) of barangays, towns, even provinces, they are the ones whereupon the landless aredepending on for socioeconomic and political security. Land means power.The series of agrarian reform programs in the Philippines aimed to rectify the problem ofinequality based on land ownership through the redistribution scheme. The ComprehensiveAgrarian Law of 1988 mandated the abolishment of the tenancy system in the country to makeway for a society where first, no one is excluded from access to land and other capitals, and two,access to these resources is equal for everyone.More than the fragmentation of lands, land redistribution projects have more profound effects.Going back to the premise of the CARP, it aims to upset the existing power relations between thetenants, farm workers and other beneficiaries and the landlords by providing a “level” playingfield. For the past decades, a number of studies conducted particularly by the Popular Institutefor Democratic Studies (PIDS) (see Llanto & Dingcong, 1991; Sanchez, 1991; Geron, 1994;Reyes, 2002; Llantos & Ballesteros, 2003; Ballesteros & de la Cruz, 2006; Adriano, 2008;Ballesteros & Cortes, 2008; Leonen, 2008) assessed the socioeconomic impacts and policyimplications of the CARP. Most of these studies reflect the failure of the program in achievingits goals, thereby, presenting only pictures of a “stagnant” rural, i.e., low-density in terms ofsettlements; agricultural, i.e., land use is still predominated by crops production, countryside,7

which are not particularly accurate; and one that is still defined by traditional patron-clientbonds.Buenavista presents a classic example of what seems to be “feudalistic” society, or one that ischaracterized by landlord-tenant/patron-client relationship. Ownership of most of the lands isconcentrated to only a few families, among them the Reyes and the Uy families (Franco, 2005).During the Marcos regime, the Reyeses in particular, rose to political power and held theleadership of the local government unit of Buenavista from 1972 until 1986. It was during thistime that they supposedly amassed most of the lands in the municipality. After the collapse of theMarcos government, they were able to re-establish their power as economic and political elites inthe area by employing the classic “guns, goons, and gold” operandi. To counter these forces, theNew People’s Army (NPA) has also entered the area. Since then, this municipality, just like theBondoc Peninsula in general, has become a hotspot for violent encounters between the armedlandlords, the NPA, and the military. Because of the “reign of terror” in this municipality,Buenavista is practically cut off from other outside influences.By exercising various forms of power play, those in power aim that certain persons, perspectives,issues or conflicts never enter the overt political arena, thereby, maintaining the status quo. Theimplementation of the CARP has led many landlords to practice all their means of power to resistthe program. Either they overtly refuse to participate in the program or they circumvent the law.Yet, despite this resistance, Buenavista has a strong farmers cooperative and a functioningMunicipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO). These two were instrumental in winning the casebetween a group of farmers in one of the agrarian reform sites and the Domingo Reyes estate,owned by the one of the most influential and powerful families in Bondoc Peninsula. InDecember 1998, the farmers were granted almost 164 hectares of the hacienda (Franco, 2005).As of 2006, other pockets of agrarian reform areas have dotted the once consolidatedlandholdings of the said family.It is important to note the complexities of Buenavista. The “success” of the land redistributionprogram in this municipality is said to be attributed to several factors: 1) the presence oforganized farmers group, in the form of a cooperative, that openly fought for its members’8

claims to the land; 2) a functioning Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO), which is themain implementer of the CARP in the local communities, 3) the entry of local and foreignnongovernmental organizations (NGOs), civil society and other agrarian/rural reform advocategroups that assist the farmers/tenants in their fight for their lands, and 4) the overt and covertinitiatives practiced by the farmers at the individual level to oppose the existing large landowners in the area. On the other hand, there are also factors that stall the success of the agrarianreform program in Buenavista: 1) the continuing influx of migrants, mostly landless farmers,from the Bicol region, who eventually become dependent on land owning entities; 2) the new“propaganda” and tactics used by these landlords to halt the CARP program like conversion oftheir remaining landholdings into non-agricultural lands and re-buying back lands from theCARP beneficiaries; and 3) CARP grantees who re-sell or pawn their lands to their formerlandlords.Agrarian Reform and the PeasantsThe remaining hacienda of the Reyeses in Buenavista has about 155 tenants, subject to the 70-30crop sharing system (locally known as tersyohan), in favor of the landlord. Among these tenantsare caretakers or overseers cum ‘estate managers’, locally known as enkargados, of the coconutplantations. They are the most trusted men of the landowner. The landowners do not directlynegotiate with their tenants but through these enkargados. This implies a hierarchy within thetenants: the caretakers/overseers/managers/enkargados above the ordinary tenants who workdirectly on the land.Prior to the agrarian reform, harvests of the tenants are turned over to the enkargados who, inturn, would oversee the processing of the nuts into copra. Ordinarily, the same tenants whoharvested the nuts would transport the nuts to the drying area, de-husk and cook (throughsmoking) the nuts to become copra. The enkargado would then sell the copra to coconut buyers,usually, in the capital town of Quezon, Province. The profit from this would be divided betweenthe landlord who gets 70% of the share and the enkargado who gets the remaining share. Theenkargado, in turn, ‘pays’ the tenants at a rate of P10 per kilo of copra that were produced, withadditional payments for their extra labor. However, during the land redistribution program, thisReyeses started to engage the services of non-tenants who are willing to work as farm workers in9

the hacienda. This has been a source of conflict between the ‘legitimate’ tenants and theoutsiders.According to some of the tenants of the hacienda, during and after the process of theredistribution of the Reyes’ lands to the beneficiaries, the landowners, through the enkargados,started hiring farmworkers from other barangays and municipalities into the plantation. It was aploy to show the local agrarian reform office that the Reyeses have no remaining tenants.However, this scheme displaced more than ten families who are legitimate tenants of theplantation. The displaced households are now ‘squatters’ on the land they once tilled.Moreover, the landlords have been blaming the agrarian reform for the shutting down of the twooil mills, reasoning that because their coconut plantations were reduced to more than half of theiroriginal sizes, the supply coconut coming from the remaining area of the plantation can notsupport the operation of the oil mills.Emerging Actors in the Agricultural IndustryWhile the Reyeses remain to dominate and control the municipality and its political andeconomic structures, a number of actors and groups are starting to emerge as players in thecoconut industry of this locality. They may be in the form of independent coconut traders,individuals who took the land redistribution program as an opportunity to provide alternatives tothe new small holders of lands by setting up relatively higher buying price for copra (12-14 pesosversus the fixed ten pesos rate at the hacienda).Corporations have also started to tap the human labor of the municipality by contracting them tobe farmworkers in their own plantations. One of these attempts was the plan of San MiguelCorporation to initiate a cassava planting program in Buenavista. Produce from these farmswould be used to supply the beer manufacturing of this corporation. However, this plan did notpush through, much to the disappointment of the local people.One of the significant events in Buenavista is the emergence of peasant organizations andfarmers cooperatives which, after winning their battles against the Reyeses for their rights to10

their own lands, became an empowering tool for its members. These cooperatives and groupsprovide its members capital through credit system to start up their own farms.Despite the changes brought about by the agrarian reform program and the emergingopportunities for the population of Buenavista, this place and its people remain tied to theReyeses. Why this is so?This may be explained by the persisting patron-client culture in Buenavista. While some tenantswere able to acquire their own lands, they were not fully emancipated from their bondage to theirformer landlords. For one, they cannot freely exercise their new-found ‘freedom’ because themunicipality is militarized. This can be observed by the presence of military checkpoints andmilitary personnel regularly patrolling the municipality. These are supposedly means to interceptmembers of the NPA. Some farmers, however, claim that these are surveillance ploys of theReyeses to identify individuals or groups, like the farmers associations, who are plotting againstthe clan. This paranoia is so obvious that new comers in the municipality like migrants have toendure frequent ‘visitations’ from the military or the police. Even researchers are treatedcircumspectly, and kept close, by the mayor’s minions, under the guise of protecting the peoplefrom possible NPA harassment while in the area. The Reyeses also try to proliferate this anti-NPA attitude by casting the latter into bad light and accusing them of extortion (in the form ofrevolutionary tax collection, which, according to the government, the proceeds do not go to thepeople but to the NPA members’ pockets), theft and harassment. The military is necessary toprotect the people from these aggravations. The whole municipality then becomes under the‘protection’ of the government, which, in this case, is the Reyeses.Migrants and the Persistence of Patron-Client RelationshipBecause of its proximity to the Bicol and Visayas regions, Buenavista has been experiencing asteady inflow of migrants. Ironically, these migrants are landless families escaping poverty intheir own hometowns. All of those who ended up in Buenavista became squatters in the Reyeses’lands. These people have been permitted by Mayor Reyes to put up their houses in his lands butforbidden them to till the land. This leads to total dependency on the part of the migrants to the11

Reyeses. Some of them seek and are able to work as farmworkers in the hacienda, either asharvesters, nut collectors, or de-huskers. However, these ‘jobs’ do not pay much and tootemporary. There are no other employments available in the municipality. Clerical positions inthe municipal hall were already occupied by people who have connections with the mayor.Engaging in the transportation sector is not an option either since the migrants do not have thecapital to buy or rent vehicles, in the first place. The only option left is farming or fishing, thelatter still underdeveloped, and so, unprofitable. Since the migrants do not have access to lands,some of them resort to stealing coconuts (or paglulusot) or other crops from the plantation.Others have no choice but to use a portion of their ‘backyard’ to plant vegetables or corn, even ifthis is prohibited. Many of them are caught by the military who are regularly monitoring themigrants/squatters in the Reyeses’ lands.Persisting PatronageThe Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 aims first, “promote social justice justice”,second, “move the nation toward sound rural development and industrialization”,and third,establish “owner cultivatorship of economic-sized farms as the basis of Philippine agriculture”by prioritizing the “welfare of the landless” and a “more equitable distribution and ownership ofland.” With the CARP, large landholdings of family elites like the Reyeses were alreadyfragmented, if not completely presumably, and distributed to once landless tenants. However,bondage to these elites persists. Does it only show that the agrarian reform has freed thesetenants in title only but not politically, economically and socially? This is so the case, at least inBuenavista, where the agrarian reform program did not necessarily emancipated the peasantsfrom the onerous patronage system. For many years to come, this will be the case if thegovernment itself is dominated by agrarian elites who control the economic and political powersthat legitimize their authority over the masses.REFERENCESAdriano, F.D. (2008). CARP institutional assessment in a post-2008 transition scenario: Towarda new rural development architecture. Discussion Paper Series 2008-06. Quezon City:Philippine Institute for Development Studies.12

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