Transformation after two decades of agrarian reform ... - RCSD

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which are not particularly accurate; and one that is still defined by traditional patron-clientbonds.Buenavista presents a classic example of what seems to be “feudalistic” society, or one that ischaracterized by landlord-tenant/patron-client relationship. Ownership of most of the lands isconcentrated to only a few families, among them the Reyes and the Uy families (Franco, 2005).During the Marcos regime, the Reyeses in particular, rose to political power and held theleadership of the local government unit of Buenavista from 1972 until 1986. It was during thistime that they supposedly amassed most of the lands in the municipality. After the collapse of theMarcos government, they were able to re-establish their power as economic and political elites inthe area by employing the classic “guns, goons, and gold” operandi. To counter these forces, theNew People’s Army (NPA) has also entered the area. Since then, this municipality, just like theBondoc Peninsula in general, has become a hotspot for violent encounters between the armedlandlords, the NPA, and the military. Because of the “reign of terror” in this municipality,Buenavista is practically cut off from other outside influences.By exercising various forms of power play, those in power aim that certain persons, perspectives,issues or conflicts never enter the overt political arena, thereby, maintaining the status quo. Theimplementation of the CARP has led many landlords to practice all their means of power to resistthe program. Either they overtly refuse to participate in the program or they circumvent the law.Yet, despite this resistance, Buenavista has a strong farmers cooperative and a functioningMunicipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO). These two were instrumental in winning the casebetween a group of farmers in one of the agrarian reform sites and the Domingo Reyes estate,owned by the one of the most influential and powerful families in Bondoc Peninsula. InDecember 1998, the farmers were granted almost 164 hectares of the hacienda (Franco, 2005).As of 2006, other pockets of agrarian reform areas have dotted the once consolidatedlandholdings of the said family.It is important to note the complexities of Buenavista. The “success” of the land redistributionprogram in this municipality is said to be attributed to several factors: 1) the presence oforganized farmers group, in the form of a cooperative, that openly fought for its members’8
claims to the land; 2) a functioning Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO), which is themain implementer of the CARP in the local communities, 3) the entry of local and foreignnongovernmental organizations (NGOs), civil society and other agrarian/rural reform advocategroups that assist the farmers/tenants in their fight for their lands, and 4) the overt and covertinitiatives practiced by the farmers at the individual level to oppose the existing large landowners in the area. On the other hand, there are also factors that stall the success of the agrarianreform program in Buenavista: 1) the continuing influx of migrants, mostly landless farmers,from the Bicol region, who eventually become dependent on land owning entities; 2) the new“propaganda” and tactics used by these landlords to halt the CARP program like conversion oftheir remaining landholdings into non-agricultural lands and re-buying back lands from theCARP beneficiaries; and 3) CARP grantees who re-sell or pawn their lands to their formerlandlords.Agrarian Reform and the PeasantsThe remaining hacienda of the Reyeses in Buenavista has about 155 tenants, subject to the 70-30crop sharing system (locally known as tersyohan), in favor of the landlord. Among these tenantsare caretakers or overseers cum ‘estate managers’, locally known as enkargados, of the coconutplantations. They are the most trusted men of the landowner. The landowners do not directlynegotiate with their tenants but through these enkargados. This implies a hierarchy within thetenants: the caretakers/overseers/managers/enkargados above the ordinary tenants who workdirectly on the land.Prior to the agrarian reform, harvests of the tenants are turned over to the enkargados who, inturn, would oversee the processing of the nuts into copra. Ordinarily, the same tenants whoharvested the nuts would transport the nuts to the drying area, de-husk and cook (throughsmoking) the nuts to become copra. The enkargado would then sell the copra to coconut buyers,usually, in the capital town of Quezon, Province. The profit from this would be divided betweenthe landlord who gets 70% of the share and the enkargado who gets the remaining share. Theenkargado, in turn, ‘pays’ the tenants at a rate of P10 per kilo of copra that were produced, withadditional payments for their extra labor. However, during the land redistribution program, thisReyeses started to engage the services of non-tenants who are willing to work as farm workers in9
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Page 3 and 4: In relation to this, a study done b
Page 5 and 6: financial power, they became the fi
Page 7: landholdings back in their province
Page 11 and 12: their own lands, became an empoweri
Page 13 and 14: Bachrach, P. and Baratz, M.S. (1962
Page 15 and 16: Hutchcroft, P.(2002). Colonial mast
Page 17: Scott, J. & Kerkvliet, B. (1973). T

Transformation after two decades of agrarian reform ... - RCSD

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