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NEW YORK UNIVERSITYiCENTER ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIONGetting Smart and Scaling UpResponding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Governancein Developing CountriesCamino KavanaghEditor and Lead ResearcherPrincipal Project Contributors/Case Study AuthorsKwesi Aning, Vanda Felbab-Brown, James Cockayne, Enrique Desmond Arias, Charles Goredema,Sampson B. Kwarkye, John Pokoo, Summer WalkerJune 2013

NEW YORK UNIVERSITYCENTER ON INTERNATIONALCOOPERATIONThe world faces old and new security challenges that are morecomplex than our multilateral and national institutions arecurrently capable of managing. International cooperation is evermore necessary in meeting these challenges. The NYU <strong>Center</strong> onInternational Cooperation (CIC) works to enhance internationalresponses to conflict, insecurity, and scarcity through appliedresearch and direct engagement with multilateral institutionsand the wider policy community.CIC’s programs and research activities span the spectrum ofconflict, insecurity, and scarcity issues. This allows us to see criticalinter-connections and highlight the co<strong>here</strong>nce often necessaryfor effective response. We have a particular concentration on theUN and multilateral responses to conflict.

Table of ContentsGetting Smart and Scaling UpResponding to the Impact of Organized Crime onGovernance in Developing CountriesCamino Kavanagh, Editor and Lead ReseacherBackground 4Methodology and Survey Design Definitions 5I. Executive Summary 7On Current Development Assistance Policy Regarding Organized Crime 7On the Findings of the Case Studies 8On How Development Actors Can Support More Effective Responsesto Organized Crime 14II. Suggestions for Targeted Programming 17Protecting the Political Process from Organized Crime 17Modernizing and Strengthening the Criminal Justice System 22and Law EnforcementSupport Smart, Crime Sensitive Socio-Economic Policy Development 26Engaging Civil Society 27Deepening the Knowledge Base 29III. Knowing When to Engage and W<strong>here</strong> to Prioritize Efforts 31Political Economy Assessments 31Typology Analysis 33IV. Conclusions 40Annexes 52Annex I - Nepal In-Country Case Study 53Annex II – Ghana In-Country Case Study 97Annex III – Mozambique In-Country Case Study 135Annex IV – Sierra Leone Desk Study 161Annex V – Guyana Desk Study 197Annex VI – Jamaica Desk Study 216

2Responding to the Impact of OrganizedCrime on Governance in DevelopingCountriesAcknowledgementsThis study was prepared for the UK Department forInternational Development (DFID). The <strong>Center</strong> onInternational Cooperation is grateful to DFID’s PolicyResearch Fund for the support it provided, and for thepersonal engagement of its programme staff on the manycomplex issues the research raised.. CIC is also gratefulto the support provided by the Carnegie Corporation ofNew York and the Netherlands Institute for Multi-PartyDemocracy.Special thanks also to CIC Director, Dr. Bruce Jones for hissupport and guidance, and to Dr. Stephen Ellis, DesmondTutu Professor at the University at the Faculty of SocialSciences at the VU University, Amsterdam, for his richinsights and constructive suggestions on various piecesof the research, and to Brooke Stearns, Judith Vorrath andKathryn English on their comments and/or participation inthe validation workshop.The team is particularly grateful to Tristan Dreisbach,Yannick Lewis, and Farah Hegazi for the excellent researchsupport provided to this project over the past year, toAntonie Evans for his patience and attention to detail inpreparing the report for publication, and to Ben Tortaloniand Lynn Denesopolis for supporting the team throughoutthe year.Finally, the <strong>Center</strong> on International Cooperation is deeplygrateful to all the government representatives, civil societyorganizations, international and bilateral actors, mediarepresentatives, and others who facilitated the work of t<strong>here</strong>searchers over the past year.Project leadCamino Kavanagh is a Senior Fellow at NYU’s <strong>Center</strong> onInternational Cooperation and currently serving as anadvisor to the Kofi Annan Foundation on drug traffickingin West Africa. She has worked with United Nationspeace operations in Guatemala (MINUGUA) and Burundi(ONUB) and other international organizations in Africa,Asia, and Latin America & the Caribbean. Prior to joiningCIC she was Special Adviser to the Secretary-General ofInternational IDEA (2006-2009). Her policy research at CICincludes co-authorship of Shaky Foundations: A Review ofUN Rule of Law Support and Flying Blind? Political MissionResponses to Transnational Threats. Alongside her interestin transnational crime, she is pursuing a Ph.D. at theDepartment of War Studies at King’s College London onhow cyberspace has evolved into a domain of strategiccompetition between states, and engages in differentinitiatives and projects on this subject.Project Contributors/ Case Study AuthorsDr. Kwesi Aning currently serves as the Director of theFaculty of Academic Affairs and Research (FAAR) at the KofiAnnan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Accra,Ghana. Prior to taking up this job, he served with theAfrican Union (AU) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. He has writtenextensively on conflict and security, and transnationalcriminality in West Africa.Dr. Enrique Desmond Arias is an associate professorat the John Jay College of Criminal Justice of the CityUniversity of New York. He received his M.A. and Ph..D.from the University of Wisconsin, Madison and his B.A.from Johns Hopkins University. He is the author of Drugsand Democracy in Rio de Janeiro: Trafficking, Networks,and Public Security (University of North Carolina Press,2006) and he co-edited Violent Democracies in LatinAmerica (Duke University Press, 2010). He has publishedarticles in Comparative Politics, Latin American Politics andSociety, the Journal of Latin American Studies, Policing andSociety, Studies in Comparative International Development,and Qualitative Sociology. The United States FulbrightCommission, the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation,the American Council of Learned Societies, and the TinkerFoundation have funded his research.Dr. Vanda Felbab-Brown is a senior fellow with the<strong>Center</strong> for 21st Century Security and Intelligence inthe Foreign Policy program at Brookings. She is an experton international and internal conflicts and non-traditionalNYUCICResponding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries

security threats, such as counterinsurgency, organizedcrime, urban violence, and illicit economies. Her fieldworkand research have covered South and Southeast Asia, theAndean region, Brazil, Mexico, and eastern Africa. Dr.Felbab-Brown is the author of Aspiration and Ambivalence:Strategies and Realities of Counterinsurgency and State-Building in Afghanistan (The Brookings Institution Press,2012) and Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War onDrugs (Brookings Institution Press, 2009) which examinesmilitary conflict and illegal economies in Colombia, Peru,Afghanistan, Burma, and Northern Ireland. Dr. Felbab-Brown is also the author of numerous policy reports,academic articles, and opinion pieces, such as on slumsand urban violence, nuclear smuggling, illegal logging,wildlife trafficking, Mexican drug cartels, Colombia’s drugconflictnexus, counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, andillegal mining in Indonesia. A frequent commentator inU.S. and international media, Dr. Felbab-Brown regularlyprovides congressional testimony on these issues. S<strong>here</strong>ceived her Ph.D. in political science from MIT and her B.A.from Harvard University.James Cockayne (B.A., LL.B, LL.M.) is an internationallawyer, strategist, and author based in New York. Hepreviously served as Co-Director of the <strong>Center</strong> on GlobalCounterterrorism Cooperation in New York, leading theirwork in Africa and on the UN; and as a Senior Fellow atthe International Peace Institute. James was also PrincipalLegal Officer in the Transnational Crime Unit of theAustralian Attorney-General’s Department, and Chair ofthe Editorial Committee of the Journal of InternationalCriminal Justice. He is a founding editorial committeemember of the Journal of International Humanitarian LegalStudies. His books include Peace Operations and OrganizedCrime: Enemies or Allies? (Routledge, 2011, edited withAdam Lupel); and Beyond Market Forces: Regulating theGlobal Security Industry (IPI, 2009).Charles Goredema is a Senior Research Consultantconducting research into the impact of trans-nationalcrime networks on governance in some of Africa’s coastalcities. He has previously worked on projects within theTrans-national Threats & International Crimes divisionat the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). A lawyer bytraining, Charles’ career includes a stint in the prosecutionof economic crime. He subsequently lectured in criminaljustice in Zimbabwe and South Africa, while undertakingresearch and managing research projects in criminal justice.After joining the ISS in August 2000, Charles focused onstudying emerging forms of transnational organized crimeand money laundering. Most of his recent work focuseson the challenges of preventing and regulating moneylaundering in Eastern and Southern Africa. He has sharedhis findings with policy-designing institutions, regulators,law enforcement practitioners, and civil society in thesesub-regions and beyond at seminars, workshops, andconferences. Some of his findings have been publishedand can be accessed through the website of the ISS.Sampson B. Kwarkye is currently a researcher at theDirectorate of Research & Planning of ECOWAS’ Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Launderingin West Africa (GIABA). Prior to joining GIABA, he wasa research officer at New York University’s <strong>Center</strong> onInternational Cooperation (NYU/CIC) w<strong>here</strong> he providedresearch support to projects on transnational organizedcrime and other transnational threats and their impactson governance, security, and development in developingcountries. Mr. Kwarkye holds an MA in InternationalDevelopment from the University of Kent’s (Canterbury,UK) Brussels School of International Studies (Brussels,Belgium) and a B.S. in financial information analysis fromClarkson University (New York, USA, 2008). His researchinterests relate to issues of money laundering, terroristfinancing, transnational organized crime, governance,and other issues pertaining to peace and security in WestAfrica.John Pokoo is Head of Regional Small Arms and LightWeapons Control Training Programme at the Schoolof Research and Academic Affairs of the Kofi AnnanInternational Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra,Ghana (KAIPTC). He previously worked with the GermanTechnical Cooperation/GTZ at the KAIPTC on theinstitutional strengthening and capacity development ofthe KAIPTC. In that role, he helped in the expansion of theKAIPTC range of training programmes and increased civilsociety partnerships with the KAIPTC and ECOWAS in the3Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing CountriesNYUCIC

4context of the collaborative design and delivery of civiliandriventraining courses in conflict prevention, peace, andsecurity. John has written on civil society and conflictearly warning in West Africa and has co-authored paperson DDR and SSR processes in Liberia and also, the impactof drug trafficking on national and sub-regional securityin West Africa with Dr. Thomas Jaye and Dr. Kwesi Aning,respectively.Summer Walker is a freelance researcher and writerfor international policy living in Berlin. Until mid-2012, Summer worked at the <strong>Center</strong> on InternationalCooperation on transnational organized crime,development, and governance. Prior to this, Summerfocused on peacebuilding issues at CIC. Additionally,Summer has worked as a researcher with HumanitarianPolicy and Conflict Research International and NYU LawSchool’s <strong>Center</strong> on Law and Security. She holds a Master’sdegree from the London School of Economics and a B.A. inPeace and Conflict Studies from Colgate University.BackgroundTackling organized crime is listed as a priority for theUK Government under its National Security Counciland Strategic Defense and Security Review. It is, first, aclear domestic threat to the UK, causing economic andsocial costs of between £20 and £40 billion per year. 1 Italso impacts the UK’s development assistance as manysources suggest that organized crime has a significantlydetrimental impact on governance in many developingcountries. 2 In some states, circumstantial evidencesuggests deep interdependent links between organizedcrime, politics, and the public sector, fostering, in somecases, a form of symbiosis between the state and criminalorganizations, and in more extreme cases, both deep ortransitory links between crime, terror, and militant groups. 3Despite these disconcerting signs, investment in academicresearch on the effects of organized crime on governanceremains limited. T<strong>here</strong> is a wide range of criminologicalliterature, and some relevant work on the fringes of thegovernance and conflict field, but few, policy-orientedstudies specifically examining the impact of organizedcrime on governance exist. The World Bank’s WorldDevelopment Report 2011 cited organized crime as onefactor linked to post-conflict violence in fragile states andhinted at the role weak institutions and corruption play inthis regard, but did not provide any detailed analysis ofthese links.This report presents an overview of the research team’sfindings and is divided into four parts: Section I presentsthe main Policy Summary. Section II presents the mainfindings and lays out five areas for targeted action asthe basis of an ‘organized crime-sensitive’ programmingframework. Section III provides donors with options forassessing when to engage on organized crime-relatedissues and, depending on the nature of relations betweenorganized crime and political and governance institutions,an analysis framework to help determine what specificallywithin the five areas of action to focus on. The final1. Home Office (2010), United Kingdom Threat Assessment of Organized Crime 2010/11.2. Summarized in Coffey International Development (2010), Evidence to Underpin DFID Policy onOrganized Crime and Development. Unpublished but available from Justin Williams at DFID.3. Marie Chene (2008), Organized Crime and Corruption, U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre,Bergen.NYUCICResponding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries

section provides concluding remarks and a suggestedprogramming framework, combining elements of sectionsII and III.We anticipate that the research will also be of interest toGovernment departments beyond DFID and to a smallbut growing policy community interested in developinga deeper understanding of the impact of organized crimeon governance in a range of development settings.Methodology and Survey Design DefinitionsThe project was launched with a comprehensive reviewof primary and secondary literature on organized crime,political settlements, governance, and development(Annex I), and a baseline review of four countries – Ghana,Nepal, Mozambique, and Pakistan [Karachi]. The finalreport includes in-depth case studies on the impactof organized crime on governance in Ghana, Nepal,Mozambique (field), and Jamaica and Sierra Leone (desk),as well as a broader overview of the impact of organizedcrime on governance in Latin America and the Caribbean.The field research was implemented on the basis of semistructuredinterviews with a broad range of stakeholders,including:––National officials, including government officials,opposition political parties, members of parliamentarycommittees––Members of the state security apparatus––Private security actors––National and international investigative journalists––National and international analysts and researchers––Detainees (when relevant, and to the extent possible,case authors interviewed people who have beendetained for organized criminal activity in the countryin question)––To the extent possible, members of organized criminalgangs, networks––National development and civil society actors––The main development assistance providers in thecountry––Officials of key intergovernmental organizations suchas the UN and the World BankThe team developed an interview framework for thecountry case studies. A questionnaire, drawn from thefindings of the literature review and an experts’ meetingheld in New York on 24th February 2012, provided moredetail on the range of questions raised during the courseof the field research. The decision on which countries totarget for the in-country case studies was made by DFIDon the basis of responses from its country offices. CICincluded the additional studies to provide additionaldepth and bolster the final product.Challenges EncounteredThe main challenge encountered for this research projectwas the initial time frame provided, which was limitedto nine months, although the majority of the work hadto be conducted over a six-month period. The decisionto focus on ‘organized crime’ writ-large rather than aspecific organized criminal activity also presented theteam with difficulties. Other challenges included accessto information, tight in-country schedules, and a limitedbudget.DefinitionsOrganized CrimeThe research team used the loose definition of organizedcrime adopted by the UN Convention on Organized Crime:“a structured group of three or more persons, existingfor a period of time and acting in concert with the aimof committing one or more serious crimes or offencesestablished in accordance with this Convention, in orderto obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other materialbenefit.” “Structured group” indicates the group was notformed solely to commit one offense, but rather enduresover time; however, within the group, roles do not have to5Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing CountriesNYUCIC

e defined formally and structure and membership maychange.The research team also noted that criminal enterprisesoperate as networks rather than hierarchical structures,and that these connected nodes have significant linkagesamong themselves and others, as well as varying levels ofparticipation in network activities, including a core andperiphery. 4 We paid particular attention to the organizedcriminal groups or networks which acquire political capital,and political, economic or social identities over time.Organized Criminal Activities6For the purpose of this project the following wereconsidered organized criminal activities: drug trafficking,human trafficking, illicit trade in counterfeit goods andother illegal commodities, small arms manufacture, smalland conventional arms trafficking, illegal logging, illegaltrade in wildlife, money laundering, advanced fee andInternet fraud, piracy, corruption, forgery, oil bunkering,extortion and kidnapping and racketeering.GovernanceIn this paper, the term ‘governance’ refers toinstitutionalized modes of social coordination throughwhich actors produce and provide collective rules andgoods. While the case study authors used this definitionas a broad guideline when conducting their research, theywere also encouraged to capture the more nuanced formsof governance that play out in reality in the countriesin question, particularly traditional, informal, or eventransitory forms.4. Phil Williams (1998), “The Nature of Drug-Trafficking Networks.” in Current History, Vol. 97, No.618, pp.154-159: 155.NYUCICResponding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARYOn Current Development Assistance PolicyRegarding Organized CrimeThe development landscape is rapidly changing andnew centres of economic dynamism are emerging. Atthe same time, organized criminal activity, includingillicit trafficking and financial flows, is increasing in thesesame settings, often fuelling tension or violence amongelites or other groups vying for control of illicit markets.Criminal groups and networks have been quick to adaptto rapid technological developments and increasedglobal connectivity, using cyberspace as a tool or platformfor pursuing financial interests, and, in some contexts,fostering fear and promoting instability. Organized crime,whether transnational or domestic in nature, is establishedin countries around the world irrespective of their levelsof development. As noted by the OECD, “it is a fluid anddiversified industry that engages in a host of illicit activities”and while “it may affect strong states, it is above all conflictaffectedor otherwise weakened states that are vulnerableto transnational organized crime predations and mayserve as bases for international criminal enterprises.” It isalso increasingly evident that “one of the most importantimpacts of [transnational organized crime] on a state isthe harm it does to the quality of its governance. 5 (…). [B]y corrupting and otherwise compromising the integrityof public officials and institutions through corruptionand threat, organised crime erodes the state’s long termcapacity to provide for the common good.” At the sametime however, public officials and political and businesselites are not always the hapless victims of organizedcrime as often portrayed, but rather consciously engagein illicit activity with the aim of achieving specific politicalor financial goals. These features of how organized crimeand the state interact can lead to a loss of legitimacy andeventually “heighten fragility.” 6The relationship (both formal and illicit) among states,markets, and individuals is undergoing continuouschange, requiring an evolution in the manner in which5. In Paula Miraglia, Rolando Ochoa and Ivan Briscoe (2012) Organized Crime and Fragile States:A thematic paper supporting the OECD DAC INCAF project ‘Global Factors Influencing the Risk ofConflict and Fragility,’ OECD DAC.6. Ibiddevelopment assistance is delivered, with greater emphasison the ‘qualitative’ dimensions of development and policychange. 7 Yet, the development community has been slowto integrate an ‘organized crime- sensitive’ approach toits programming, despite a growing acknowledgementthat organized crime can have important impacts ongovernance and development, and that organized crimeand politics frequently interact to provoke varying degreesof instability. The 2011 World Development Report notedthe need “to increase coordination between developedstates and fragile states” on organized crime, particularlytrafficking; yet to date limited action has been taken inthis regard. Oftentimes it is only when organized crimeis connected to overt violence that external actors react,and even then, development actors have limited toolsat their disposal to engage on these issues. However, asevidenced in our research, if left unchecked, organizedcrime, even at a small scale, can produce long-termnegative impacts, particularly in development settingsw<strong>here</strong> institutions remain weak and democratic processesare still consolidating. Over time, it can slowly erode thecapacity and will of a state to respond to the needs ofcitizens. In addition, premature and inappropriate kneejerkpolicy responses can significantly worsen the situationand even reinforce organized crime.Until relatively recently, the majority of policy-orientedliterature has tended to oversimplify the nature and role oforganized crime, the actors involved, and their interactionwith the state. Participants in criminal activities may havemultiple (sometimes reinforcing) identities within stateinstitutions and criminal networks. Moreover, certain typesof criminal markets (e.g. heroin trafficking) generate moreviolence and social harm than others (e.g. cannabis). Theliterature rarely focuses on the interaction of political andeconomic elites and organized criminal groups, and howthis interaction serves to undermine, reinforce or replacepolitical institutions and processes. Underlying structuralfactors receive scant attention, with both observers andpractitioners falling back on the facile ‘lack of political will’argument to describe government failures to effectivelyrespond to organized crime. Rarely do they assess how7. Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review of Operational Activities for Development of theUnited Nations System (A/67/93-E/2012/79)7Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing CountriesNYUCIC

8political structures (both weak and strong) serve asenablers of organized criminal activity, or the pervasiveeffects of organized crime on weak political structures,institutions, and processes, particularly in developingcountries w<strong>here</strong> democratic consolidation has stagnated.Moreover, surprisingly little is known about the impactof organized crime on governance and development.Partial exceptions include the ‘economic drivers of conflict’literature, which shows how the economic incentives incriminal activity can serve as a deterrent for some groupsto forge or implement a settlement (e.g. Northern Ireland,Colombia). Recent studies by the World Bank Institute 8and the OECD 9 have shed light on how organized crimeaffects fragile states, while a USAID study has tabledsuggestions for how development actors can betterassess when to provide support in countries w<strong>here</strong> drugtrafficking is prevalent. 10 The objective of this researchproject is to feed into these policy discussions by helpingaddress the “critical research gaps” on the impact oforganized crime on governance in development settings,tabling recommendations for targeted programmingin governance areas affected by organized crime, andproviding options for determining when to engage in agiven setting.On the Findings of the Case StudiesAcross all of this report’s case studies – Nepal, Ghana,Sierra Leone, Mozambique, Guyana, and Jamaica –organized crime is prevalent and has important impactson governance.NEPALNepal is a country transitioning out of conflict. It is acountry and a nation in flux, stuck in a political morasssince May 2012. Behind much of the political contestationin this deeply impoverished, resource-rich country isthe desire by politicians and political groups to controlthe state in order to capture resources from foreign aid,tourism, and existing hydropower. This includes beingable to issue exceptions from law enforcement and tenderprocedures to supporters.Corruption, nepotism, and patronage are deeply ingrained.The culture of impunity is as pervasive as corruption, andgrowing. Formal justice mechanisms are either inaccessibleto most, particularly for marginalized groups, or seen aspatronage-based and corrupt. Institutions, such as lawenforcement and civil service bureaucracies, are mostlyweak and increasingly politicized. Many urban and ruralresidents still believe that they need to provide payoffsto, and engage in complex negotiations with powerfulactors in their locality, whether powerful local politiciansor armed and criminal gangs, to assure their safety andsecure their elementary and everyday transactions.Organized crime in Nepal, encompassing both politicallymotivatedand economically-driven crime, is still in itsinitial developmental stages. The nexus between crimeand political parties has been thickening and few politicalparties are immune from using criminal groups forpolitical purposes, including demonstrating street power,raising money for the party, and securing contracts forclients. Usurpation of public funds, including funds frominternational donors, is prevalent. Criminal groups inturn seek to cultivate politicians to escape prosecutionand obtain immunity for their nefarious actions. T<strong>here</strong>lationship between political parties and criminal groupsis robust and perhaps growing, but it is the political actorswho take the lead.Criminal groups in Nepal have now<strong>here</strong> near the levelof sophistication and organizational complexity of thecriminal groups operating in India or Pakistan, for example.Nor do they yet systematically deliver “public” goods tolocal populations to cultivate support independent ofthe state, as other criminal groups – from India to Japan,Italy, and Colombia – have learned to do. The level ofviolence Nepali criminal groups perpetrate in support oftheir profit-seeking activities is also fairly limited whencompared with criminal organizations in other parts of theworld, such as Colombia or Mexico.8. 2011 World Development Report: Conflict, Development & Security9. Paula Miraglia, Rolando Ochoa and Ivan Briscoe, (2012), Transnational Crime and FragileStates. OECD-DAC Working Paper10. USAID (2013), The Development Response to Drug Trafficking in West Africa.In addition to crime in support of political parties, the mostsignificant illicit economies in Nepal include extortion,NYUCICResponding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries

tax evasion, drug smuggling, illegal logging, illegal tradein wildlife, and human trafficking. Some of these illiciteconomies, such as illegal logging and wildlife trade,emerged during the civil war, with various political actorsand the Maoist insurgents participating in them back then.Others, such as human trafficking, precede the civil warand are deeply socially ingrained. Some illicit economies,such as environmental crime, are rapidly intensifying.Rather than organized crime itself, it is the pervasiveculture of impunity, corruption, nepotism, and clientelismthat most negatively impacts the lives of ordinaryNepalis. While organized crime intensifies and exploitsthis corruption and the lack of rule of law, in Nepalpolitical corruption and a deeply entrenched system ofpatronage are the primary drivers of the usurpation ofpublic funds and violence at the local level. Politicizationof formal institutions deeply compromises bureaucraticand administrative competencies and service delivery,enabling the penetration of organized crime into stateinstitutions.The rather primitive stage of organized crime formationand the limited sophistication of illicit economies presentimportant opportunities for policy initiatives. However,in the absence of careful design many anti-crime policiescan be counterproductive. Intensified interdiction withoutcareful planning can merely weed out less sophisticatedcriminal enterprises while the toughest and leanestcriminal groups survive law enforcement actions andacquire a greater market share and political and economicpower. Law-enforcement actions can thus inadvertentlyencourage the vertical integration of organized crimegroups and undermine the constraints preventing criminalgroups from resorting to violence.Countering such inadvertent negative outcomes requiresa very sophisticated interdiction strategy that privilegestargeting the most violent groups or those with thegreatest capacity to corrupt first – in another wordsfocused deterrence strategies rather than zero-toleranceapproaches. The effectiveness of such a strategy in turndepends on the intelligence capacity of law enforcementinstitutions and their ability to resist corrupting politicalpressures. Both are likely to remain elusive in Nepal for along time.Out of the range of Nepal’s illicit economies, counteringenvironmental crime promises greatest policy payoffs,while prioritizing countering drug production andtrafficking the least benefit. Many interventions againsthuman trafficking, a crime topic much favored by outsidedonors, have been ineffective. Fostering institutionbuilding and promoting the rule of law are critical, butcannot be divorced from the highly politicized context.Whatever policy initiatives outside donors do adopt, theyshould be guided above all by a do-no-harm principle.GHANAGhana is experiencing significant economic growthand the country has remained resilient to the types ofchallenges that some of its neighbours have had tocontend with over the past decades. At the same time,however, cracks in its own democratic system, includingdeeply entrenched corruption, an increasingly expensiveelectoral process, weak accountability mechanisms, anda series of political economy and governance-relatedchallenges that date back to the post-independenceyears, have rendered its institutions and citizens highlyvulnerable to the influence of organized crime. As in SierraLeone, trafficking of hard drugs such as cocaine, heroin,and methamphetamines represents a serious governancechallenge in Ghana, particularly given the degree towhich political and security actors at all levels have beeninvolved in the trade, and also because the increase intrafficking through these countries and the broader WestAfrica sub-region has led to an increase in drug use andmoney laundering. As in Nepal, Mozambique, and SierraLeone, in Ghana both national and foreign criminal groupsillicitly exploit natural resources, and increasingly its virtualresources. The illicit international trade in electronic wastehas found a home in Ghana and the dumping of e-waste isplacing citizens’ health and the environment at risk whilealso posing important information security challenges tothe countries from w<strong>here</strong> the e-waste originated.Ghanaian political life and governance are characterized bya deeply entrenched culture of patronage and clientelism.9Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing CountriesNYUCIC

10The country’s winner-take-all politics has created anelaborate network of political patronage in which partyloyalists and supporters are rewarded for their allegiance.Patron-client relationships are particularly relied uponby parliamentarians and municipal and district politicalappointees in maintaining power, notwithstanding ongoingefforts to decentralize governance. The strength ofthese relationships is such that at times formal rules aremostly disregarded; informal ties are more important thanformal ones, creating opportunities for corruption and theinfiltration of organized crime. Bureaucracies run in parallelto patronage networks that fuel corruption and undermineadministrative transparency and accountability. Despiteanti-corruption efforts, petty and grand corruption isendemic in Ghana’s civil service and among sections of itspolitical elite.The important number of high-level officials and midandlow-level cadres that have been found to be involvedin organized crime in Ghana over the past decade,particularly drug trafficking and money laundering,indicates deep structural challenges and indications thatcrime is also being used in support of the political process.While t<strong>here</strong> have been positive results in investigating andprosecuting different cases involving mid- to high-levelpublic officials implicated in drug–related offences, themajority have gone unpunished, seriously underminingthe legitimacy of state institutions and providing limiteddisincentives for citizens not to engage in illicit activity.Like many countries struggling to deal with complexchallenges, Ghana lacks the requisite institutionalcapacity and frameworks for responding to organizedcrime. Institutions are constrained by inadequatelogistical, human and financial resources as well as deeplyentrenched patronage systems. Inter-agency coordinationis limited, while personnel of the judiciary and specializedagencies lack the expertise for responding to the differentforms of organized crime that have emerged in the country.Moreover, t<strong>here</strong> appears to be limited political appetite tobuild strong checks and balances into the current systemsof governance – both formal and traditional - as a meansto delink them from organized crime. The latter will bekey to Ghana’s longer-term development perspectives.Meanwhile, however, the country continues to serve asa regional hub for planning and executing organizedcriminal activity. 11Efforts to counter organized crime in Ghana today aregenerally focused on strengthening law enforcementand are rarely linked to other core areas of support. Multiprongedstrategic interventions that go beyond merelaw enforcement measures to ensure a focus on thosehigh-level targets that are in the strongest position tocorrupt and disrupt; ensuring vertical and horizontalaccountability measures; enhancing delivery of services instrategic areas, and providing incentives for unemployedyouth. In addition, these measures will only be effectiveif they seriously consider the duality in the Ghanaianlegal and governance systems, namely the existenceof the modern/formal state based on legal conceptsthat are often viewed as alien to the Ghanaian way oflife alongside a powerful traditional/informal state thatembodies Ghanaian customs and traditions and wieldsthe allegiance of the populace. Traditional chiefs, eldersand family heads, queen-mothers, and opinion leadersshould be consulted and mobilized; and interventionsmust be carefully tailored to reflect existing ethnic andcultural norms. Such an approach is key to breaking thegrowing relationship between organized crime, politics,governance and society.MOZAMBIQUEIn Mozambique, organized crime became entrenchedfollowing the post-conflict transition, and, as in Jamaica andGuyana, is closely tied to the political process and system.Organized criminal activity in the country includes drugtrafficking, trafficking in counterfeit medication, humantrafficking, stolen vehicle trafficking, illicit exploitation ofnatural resources and money laundering.Organized crime first captured public attention inMozambique in the wake of the highly publicizedmurders of two investigative journalists who had beeninvestigating the extent to which emerging economic andpolitical elites were implicated in banking sector-related11. Francois Soudain, Coke en Stock, Jeune Afrique, 28 avril au 11 mai 2013 (No. 2729-2730)NYUCICResponding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries

fraud. The complex web of informal relations betweenpolitical actors, civil servants, legitimate business, andorganized criminals that was exposed in a range ofscandals concerning privatization processes in the mid1990s appears to have endured. To this day, political andpublic sector corruption and organized crime remainstrongly connected. These connections partly have theirroots in the political settlement concluded after the civilwar and relations are sustained by widespread corruptionwithin the public and private sectors.Corruption has also served to bolster the resilience oforganized crime, mainly by lowering the risks attachedto engaging in illicit activity. Illicit organizations andnetworks are known to have exploited geographicalareas in Mozambique that are either weakly governed orw<strong>here</strong> the state has no presence, to provide commoditiesor broker the provision of basic services. In this manner,criminal organizations have managed to establishthemselves while simultaneously mustering political andsocial capital. These groups have not sought to displacestate institutions but have rather benefited from a degreeof complicity, as they use the state to facilitate movementof goods and to ensure the protection of the proceeds oftheir illicit activities. The civil war also yielded a dichotomyin terms of how the two main parties influence organizedcrime, with FRELIMO exerting dominance in urban centres,and RENAMO more influential in urban areas. As organizedcrime has sought to consolidate itself in the post-warera, it works through actors within these constituenciesdifferently.The impact of unchecked organized crime on governancein Mozambique has been important. It has reducedprospects for political pluralism, t<strong>here</strong>by reducingalternative policy options. It has also served to widen t<strong>here</strong>source gap between the main political parties at a timewhen across the region engaging in politics has becomeincreasingly expensive. The illicit, unrecorded exploitationof natural resources erodes tax base has deprived the stateof revenue that could be used to invest in services andbuild or improve capacity of state institutions. Finally, ithas drawn huge numbers of unemployed youth into nonproductiveactivities.The capacity of Mozambique to respond effectively toboth organized crime and corruption (and the fusion ofboth) remains low. It would be naive to attribute theseweaknesses entirely to the strength of organized crime.Structural deficiencies that date back to the initial daysof independence and that have yet to be overcome arepartly responsible. Significant amounts of developmentassistance funds have been invested in both anticorruptionefforts and countering organized crime to date;yet these efforts do not seem to form part of an integratedstrategy linked to longer-term development objectives. Atthe same time, the nature of the political system and thecorruption that is tied to it hardly lends itself to introducingthe reforms needed to counter the reach of organizedcrime in Mozambique. Indeed, efforts aimed at ensuringboth vertical and horizontal accountability are consistentlyhampered by the very fact that one’s political, social, andeconomic survival is tied in some way or another to theParty. Nonetheless, the system does remain responsive tothe needs of citizens, and it would be un-intuitive of boththe ruling party and opposition parties (both new and old)to ignore the increasing levels of discontent, especiallyamongst the more educated urban populations, regardingincreasing wealth disparities, social and economicexclusion, and heightened levels of violence. On the basisof this discontent a more strategic approach to respondingto organized crime should be developed, encompassingvertical and horizontal accountability measures, moresophisticated and context specific law enforcementmechanisms, and linking these to development and notjust security outcomes.SIERRA LEONEEmerging from a decade-long civil war, Sierra Leone iswitnessing many of the dividends of ongoing stabilitywithin the country and the robust internationalcommitment to peacebuilding. Notwithstanding strongeconomic growth over the past few years, Sierra Leonecontinues to face many challenges. Different forms oforganized crime including drug trafficking, illegal timberlogging, the illicit trade in minerals, human trafficking, andthe trade in small arms and light weapons have becomeincome generating activities across the country, at times11Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing CountriesNYUCIC

12involving high-level public officials, and more oftenrequiring the acquiescence of security services and privatebusiness. While t<strong>here</strong> are limited examples of crime beingused in support of politics in the post-conflict phase, theprevalence of entrenched patronage systems dating backto the 1970s have the potential of nurturing and openingthe country’s doors to organized crime if left unchecked.Other more recent vulnerabilities such as the country’sfragile political settlement, its porous borders, unequaldistribution of wealth and high youth unemploymentrates have created permissive conditions for the growthin illicit criminal activity. 12 Notwithstanding, Sierra Leonehas survived some thirteen military coups, twenty yearsof one-party rule, eleven years of brutal civil war, thevirtual collapse of the state and its institutions, an almostcomplete loss of territorial control, the displacement of50 percent of its population and a youth that only knewviolence and drugs. It stands as an important example ofa state that turned from a prime candidate for becominga major narco-state along the cocaine route in WestAfrica to a relatively stable and peaceful country in whichthe international drug trade and organized crime play asomewhat limited role…at least for now. 13The national and international response to respondingto organized crime in Sierra Leone has been robust,yet traditional law enforcement efforts still need to befully integrated with anti-corruption efforts so as to fullyunravel the links between organized crime and politicaland business elites. In addition, the robust internationalresponse to peacebuilding in Sierra Leone has at timesnurtured corrupt practices slowing down efforts to shaperesponsible behavior within public office and the securityservices with regards to organized crime. If left unchecked,the potent mix of structural political-economy challengeswith endemic corruption, and unemployed youthcould seriously undermine efforts to rebuild the state,consolidate peace and development and keep organizedcrime at bay. Continued support to core governanceinstitutions, as well as continued external support can help12. Sierra Leone’s porous borders with Guinea and Liberia have historically facilitated the crossborderflow of illegal goods. Already in 2005, the Government of Sierra Leone and UNDP inidentified more than 150 illegal crossing points between Sierra Leone and Guinea.United NationsSecurity Council (2011). Seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations IntegratedPeacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone, p. 5; Government of Sierra Leone & UNDP (2005). Border ThreatAssessment, Report.13. Communication with Michael von Schulenburg, former ERSG to Sierra Leone, June 2013.provide a buffer against organized crime as Sierra Leonemoves forward. Recent examples of organized criminalactivity reveal that prevalent norms of behavior and thestructural weaknesses within and beyond Sierra Leone’sborders that nurture organized criminal activity needto be addressed by an integration of national, regional,and international efforts. This will mean going beyondthe kind of traditional law enforcement efforts that havebeen implemented to date to ensure an effective blendof security, socio-economic and governance support toSierra Leone. It will also require investment in supportingSierra Leone’s participation in inter- and intra-regionalinitiatives aimed at prevention, as well as responding tothe impacts of organized crime.GUYANAIn Guyana, a shaky political settlement and a governancestructure that subsists through strong political-criminalties, corruption, and impunity, have also nurturedorganized crime. Organized criminal activity in or throughthe country includes drug trafficking, arms trafficking andthe illicit acquisition of high-grade surveillance equipment,human trafficking, money laundering and gold smuggling.The country’s ethno-political system has promoted a zerosumapproach to political contestation and has led to theuse of criminal gangs to intimidate the opposition duringelection cycles and at other times throughout its history 14Its entrenched political leadership and weak law andorder has made Guyana’s political environment vulnerableto corruption and involvement with organized criminalactivity.The latter, coupled with its geographic location and remoteterritories w<strong>here</strong> the state has limited presence make ita very attractive location for trafficking and other illicitactivity. Guyana lies in close proximity to major cocaineproduction and consumption zones in South America, haslargely uninhabited border regions coupled with limitedcapacity to monitor its borders. It shares a long and porousborder with Brazil and with parts of Suriname. Accordingly,criminal actors and groups – particularly drug traffickers– have taken advantage of the country’s location, vast14. Owen, Taylor, and Alexandre Grigbsy, 2012, “In Transit: Gangs and Criminal Networks inGuyana,” Small Arms Survey.NYUCICResponding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries

unpopulated regions, weak institutions, and corruptiblecivil servants and political figures as a means to generatean illicit economy that is believed to represent between40-60 percent of the formal economy. 15Failure to effectively respond to these issues sinceindependence and bolster the legitimacy and reach ofstate institutions has resulted in periods in which thestate has used crime to advance its interests, leadingto increased violence and growing mistrust of stateinstitutions, regardless of the party in power. The securityapparatus is complicated by a multi-layered system thatin addition to the formal security institutions also includesinformal paramilitary groups and gangs backed by eitherof the major parties. Political actors operate with limitedchecks and balances. Lax oversight, weak law enforcementand governance structures, and favorable geographicconditions provide an attractive operating base fororganized criminals. Guyana’s shaky political settlement,particularly its zero-sum identity politics, has providedexcellent entry points for organized crime to shape andbenefit from political decision-making.The lack of commitment of the government to introducesweeping reforms and hold key officials accountable forfacilitating the operations of high-level targets in thecountry is an indicator of the complexity of the issues atstake and the degree to which all levels of governmentmight have been penetrated. Efforts that focus solelyon bolstering law enforcement capacity have not beeneffective, not least because the ethnic divides andinequalities that underpin political governance in Guyanaextend into the country’s security and justice institutions.The absence of strong accountability mechanisms hasonly served to cement these institutional realities.Providing direct assistance to government institutionswithout additional efforts to improve the government’saccountability to citizens will not help Guyana in its efforts15. Freedom House, 2011, Country Report: Guyana, Freedom House, 2011; and United StatesDepartment of State, 2010, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume I: Drug andChemical Control, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, March 1, 2010.to respond to organized crime and related issues. Indeed,the longstanding connections between political partiesand coercive gang activity, and more recently to organizedcriminal activity, indicates that institution building ortargeted law enforcement efforts alone cannot overcomethe organized crime related challenges that Guyana iscurrently facing. Rather targeted law enforcement supportefforts should be implemented in tow with efforts toimprove political governance as well as transparency andaccountability measures.JAMAICAOrganized crime manifests itself in a range of mannersin Jamaica, ranging from extortion, drug trafficking,money laundering and racketeering to large-scale fraud.Such activities have matured significantly over the pastdecades. At the same time, Jamaican political life has longbeen marred by violent clashes between the country’stwo dominant parties: the Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) andthe People’s National Party (PNP). The long-standingassociation between politics and violence stems from thestructure of the political system itself and the way it hasevolved since the decolonization movement in the 1930s.The nature of the current single-member district pluralitysystem helped create a two-party system comparable tothat of the United States. Each party enlisted the help ofcriminal gangs to secure power and pressure opponents.Inter-party violence and crime are thus an important andhistoric component of local political life.Hence, a shaky political settlement among the political elite,leading to periods of intense political violence has allowedorganized crime to fester in Jamaica, and allowed criminalgroups to develop strong connections with the elite athome, and with organized criminal networks abroad. Moreimportantly, it has allowed Jamaica’s political system todevelop and nurture strong ties with, if not dependencyon, organized criminal groups. Jamaica’s organized crimelandscape is also linked to an economic crisis that haspersisted since the mid-1970s, the involvement of criminalgangs throughout the region in the international drugtrade, and the fact that the Caribbean still serves as animportant international hub for money laundering. It iswell known that the island serves as a major transit point13Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing CountriesNYUCIC

14for cocaine entering the United States from Latin America,although the flows ebb and flow depending on w<strong>here</strong> thepressure is being placed at a given time. Jamaica is also aprimary source of marijuana.The key to resolving Jamaica’s political-criminal nexus lieswith the country’s political elite. Organized criminal gangsare linked to the government through electoral politics,urban security, government development contracts, andother public works projects. Politicians remain in controlof funds that are distributed through local area leaders,many of whom are criminals. As long as public funds flowfrom government to local criminal leaders, the residentsof those areas will remain dependent on the politicalcriminalpatronage network. Yet, so far, political leaders,while paying lip-service to making some very limitedchanges, do not appear to understand the possibleprecariousness of the decline in homicide rates over thelast year and the need to act rapidly to take advantage ofthis lull in conflict to implement changes that can helpreduce corruption and reestablish political legitimacy. Ingeneral discussions about criminal activities in Jamaicahave mainly focused on reduction in crime rather than theneed to deal with pernicious contacts between organizedcriminals and politicians. Bolstering the office of theContractor General which seeks to protect the integrity ofthe public procurement system will also be key to breakingthese links.On How Development Actors Can Support MoreEffective Responses to Organized CrimeIn each of these countries one core issue remains aconstant: political and public sector corruption has allowedorganized crime to develop or flourish, undermining thelegitimacy of state institutions, and providing limitedincentives for citizens not to engage in, or benefit from,organized crime. 16 While in some countries such as SierraLeone a robust international presence had managed tokeep organized crime at bay, if left unchecked, organizedcrime can further extend the corruption and pervasiverule of law challenges affecting these countries, and havean important impact on their development trajectory. The16. Each of the countries studied has ratified the UN Convention Against Corruption and all saveSierra Leone have ratified the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and relatedProtocols.latter is part of a broader problem regarding the mannerin which efforts to counter organized crime have beenheavily focused on law enforcement and specialized formsof international assistance such as bilateral extraditiontreaties. Undoubtedly, these efforts are helping to respondto some aspects of organized crime across the countriesstudied yet they remain insufficient. We generallyunderestimate their longer-term impact. As in the caseof Ghana and elsew<strong>here</strong>, they can have the reverse effectof bolstering the legitimacy of convicted criminals, asthose who are whisked away to spend time in US orEuropean prisons have often delivered services, security,or employment to citizens in the absence of the state.Delinking organized crime from politics and governancewill remain the most important challenge for developingcountries. A first step in this direction should includereducing the ‘thickness’ or the extent of the links betweengovernance and organized crime by shaping responsiblestate, institutional and societal behavior regarding illicitactivity while ensuring the protection of fundamentalrights. While strengthened law enforcement and judicialaction will continue to be imperative for respondingto organized crime, we suggest a smarter and morestrategic approach in which development agencies canplay an important role, addressing weaknesses identifiedin the broader governance framework, identifying andprioritizing organized crime actors and activities that domost harm in a given context, supporting deterrencerather than zero-tolerance strategies, and ensuring thatcitizen needs and respect for fundamental human rightsare central to proposed remedies.Suggested Areas for Targeted Action (see Figure 3)To this end, in Section II we propose a programmingframework centered on the following five core areas, whichprovide direct or backdoor entry points for targeted actionagainst organized crime:• Protecting the political process• Modernizing and strengthening law enforcement and thejudiciaryNYUCICResponding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries

• Supporting crime-sensitive economic and social policydevelopment• Engaging civil society and the media• Deepening the knowledge baseUnder the five programmatic areas we have included arange of specific actions aimed at strengthening verticaland horizontal accountability mechanisms. We detail howdifferent national actors can be either recipients of supportin these areas, or actively engaged in strengthening them.Knowing when to respond and w<strong>here</strong> to focuseffortsWe also acknowledge that while development assistanceand the processes surrounding it are in<strong>here</strong>ntly political,development actors’ room for political maneuver is oftennarrow, particularly in traditional development settingsw<strong>here</strong> political leverage is limited. If a recipient country’score interests (or the interests of elite groups within acountry) are threatened by external actors, it can easilyplay the sovereignty card or impose a range of obstaclesto prevent donor agencies from overstepping nonarticulatedboundaries. This is all the more complex incountries w<strong>here</strong> decision-makers might be complicit indifferent forms of organized criminal activity. With thisin mind, we stress that the framework is meant to serveas a guide for development actors and their nationalcounterparts to inform broader programming andshould be preceded by deep assessment and analysis todetermine the nature of organized crime in the country(at national and local levels), and how it interacts withgovernment institutions and business and political eliteswithin the country and broader region. This can allow fora better picture of knowing when to engage and whatspecifically within the five recommended areas to focuson.In this regard, Section III recommends that developmentactors make smarter use of a range of tools to determinewhen to engage, and w<strong>here</strong> to prioritize efforts in a givensetting. For example, certain factors can serve as importantindicators for assessing a country’s exposure to the risk oforganized crime penetration and gauging the degree ofstate involvement in organized crime. These include theexistence of internal and external checks and balances; astrong culture of freedom of, and access to, information;a culture of asset disclosure among elected officials andpolitical parties; the existence, strength, and independenceof anti-corruption bodies; legislative drafting capacity(particularly regarding resource extraction and traffickingin illicit substances); and citizen perceptions of organizedcrime or specific illicit activities. Applying these indicatorsin different settings (conflict, post-conflict, transition,traditional development settings) will likely yield verydifferent results, and t<strong>here</strong>fore development responsesshould evidently be attuned to the political realities of agiven setting, not least because they will also have varyingdegrees of leverage to influence change depending on thesetting. 17We also suggest that development actors should makemore strategic use of political economy assessments andanalytical tools. Hence, building on the findings of a recentUSAID study, 18 we suggest examining who in governmentmay be complicit in, and which actors oppose, organizedcriminal activity through a detailed assessment of interestsand stakeholders. Such assessments would enabledevelopment actors to determine political obstacles toengagement. In addition to political economy assessmenttools, we provide the option of a typology analysisframework, grouping forms of relations between organizedcrime and politics into two broad typologies: enclave ormafia. The framework is sharply underpinned by the ‘do noharm’ principle. We do not argue that any of our case studiesfit neatly or entirely within either one of these ‘ideal types’.Different aspects may be present in one country at thesame time, or the dynamics of a country may force a shiftfrom one ideal type to the other. The ideal types should beseen merely as analytical lenses, whose use in examiningspecific country cases may help draw out certain aspectsof the impact of organized crime on governance, t<strong>here</strong>byimproving the prospects of effective, do no harm-baseddevelopment interventions. The typology analysis could17. For a more detailed discussion on the question of context and leverage, see for example,Kavanagh and Jones (2011), Shaky Foundations: An Assessment of UN Rule of Law Support, NYU<strong>Center</strong> on International Cooperation.18. USAID (2013), The Development Response to Drug Trafficking in Africa: A Programming Guide.15Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing CountriesNYUCIC

also serve as a useful framework for determining priorityactions within the five pillars outlined above. Throughfurther research, conceptual development, and testing,similar frameworks may eventually provide a basis formore sophisticated analytical and programming tools.Finally, an ‘organized crime-sensitive’ approach todevelopment will require important shifts in developmentpolicy and the delivery of assistance. The 2011 WDRstresses the importance of cross-regional approaches forresponding to organized crime, particularly in relation tothe spill over effects of domestic policies. Yet, developmentagencies and the broader international system continueto be “hampered by structures and processes that are notsufficiently adapted to current challenges,” with effortstargeted more at the national than the regional level.” 19 Inthis regard, the WDR recommended a focus on “smarterassistance tools” particularly in light of the “currentenvironment of constraints on aid budgets.” 2016The latter will require scaling-up and leveragingdevelopment assistance around accepted principles suchas shared responsibility and accountability, commongoals and agreed actions. Today, however, only threedevelopment agencies - DFID, USAID, and GTZ - seemdirectly interested in addressing organized crimethrough development practice. 21 Notwithstanding, it isan opportune moment to further the debate and ensurestronger engagement and smarter responses to organizedcrime in developing countries.19. 2011 World Development Report: Conflict, Development & Security20. Ibid21. In addition to these three, the government of Norway, through its foreign affairs office, isfunding an initiative aimed at deepening understanding of the challenges posed by transnationalorganized crime to governance and development.NYUCICResponding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries

II. SUGGESTIONS FOR TARGETEDPROGRAMMINGUntil recently, limited focus has been placed onunderstanding the degree to which structural governancechallenges, including the nature of the political economyor political settlements, nurture organized crime. Incountries emerging from conflict, the prioritization ofstability and economic growth has at times overshadowedconcerns about the entrenchment of relations betweenpolitical elites and organized crime in the post-conflictphase. In both post-conflict and traditional developmentsettings (w<strong>here</strong> a country has not gone through an armedconflict), democratic deficits or perhaps a stagnation ofdemocratic consolidation appear to be principal enablingfactors of organized crime. Corruption, weak accountabilitymechanisms (particularly with regard to political actors andpublic officials), weak service delivery, flaws in the electoralsystem, weak or inexistent political party, campaignfinancing and asset declaration regulatory frameworks,and the absence of state services in rural areas, arecommon in our cases. This section identifies some of thesechallenges and suggests a range of targeted actions thatcan help build resistance against them into governancesystems. We do not suggest that each and every one ofthese actions be implemented across countries. Rather,as we note in Section III, we suggest that developmentactors need to use smart assessment and analysis tools toguide prioritization of action in a given setting and that acore guiding principle in responding to organized crimeshould be the protection of fundamental rights.1. PROTECTING THE POLITICAL PROCESS FROMORGANIZED CRIMEOrganized crime poses enormous governance challengesfor developing countries. All of the countries studiedfor this project (except Nepal) are formal multi-partydemocracies. However, in most of the cases (includingNepal), formal institutions are underpinned by extensiveinformal systems sustaining patronage and corruption,and a political economy providing limited servicesand protection for citizens. In each of the case studies,organized crime takes advantage of systemic weaknesses,for example, through corruption of the electoral, legislative,and public procurement processes, and corruption oflocal administrations. Coercion of politicians and publicservice officials by organized criminals also plays into thissituation, as does the reverse side with political actorstaking advantage of organized crime for political gain. Inmost cases, a weak or politicized civil society and media, oran academia with limited voice, provide limited checks ongovernment complicity with organized crime.As evident in the cases of Mozambique, Nepal, and SierraLeone, countries in and emerging from conflict provideexcellent entry points for organized criminal activity, first tooil the wheels of war and, later, to obtain or sustain politicaladvantage. What commences as a domestic enterprise(or as a transnational enterprise taking advantage of adomestic problem) often evolves into a complicatednetwork of local, regional, and international organizedcrime actors that penetrate the political system. Unfetteredaccess to the spoils of organized crime underminesfledgling democratic institutions, state legitimacy, and thedelivery of services to citizens.In post-conflict settings, for example Sierra Leone, certainpolicy responses, such as disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR), have often been effective inmeeting specific goals such as contributing to stability.Such efforts have not, however, effectively integrateda focus on how to build resilience within the politicalsystem against organized crime and the threats itposes to democratic consolidation and development.In Mozambique, for example, the Demobilization andReintegration Programme (DRP) has been considered a‘success.’ Notwithstanding, in the absence of employmentopportunities, many of the mid-to-higher level formercombatants have reintegrated themselves into existing oremerging illicit networks or have served as intermediariesor ‘fixers’ between organized crime and the state. Thefailure to ensure broad disarmament and destructionof weapons also provided lucrative entry points to illicitmarkets in Mozambique’s near-abroad w<strong>here</strong> organizedcrime was also on the rise, creating a destabilizing effectin the region. It also provided easy access to instruments17Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing CountriesNYUCIC

18of violence (used for both political and financial gain) athome.Research findings from Nepal and other more recent postconflictsettings suggest that many of these lessons havenot been fully learned. In Nepal for example, external actorshave seldom analyzed the extent to which organizedcriminal activity sustained armed groups during theconflict. Our research suggests it was significant. Nor haveexternal actors invested resources to understand if theseillicit activities continue to sustain political actors today.Evidence from our research is mixed, but the fact thatthe same forms of illicit activity largely remain the same,coupled with the absence of a culture of asset disclosurefrom political parties and high-level public officialssuggests a significant problem. In contrast, in Sierra Leone,the UN Peacebuilding Commission has ensured thatorganized crime-related issues remain on the country’stransition agenda. This is an important development, yetit is unclear how these efforts will be accompanied inpractice. Sierra Leone, along with Liberia, Côte d’Ivoireand Guinea Bissau, form part of the West Africa CoastalInitiative (WACI), a multi-institutional regional effort aimedat mitigating the impact of organized crime along theWest Africa coast, which has led to the establishment oftransnational crime units in each of these countries. At thesame time though, it is unclear how the structural driversof organized crime in Sierra Leone will be addressed. Thecombination of organized crime with a still fragile politicalsettlement, entrenched patronage, corruption, and massyouth unemployment place the country’s reconstructionand peace consolidation efforts at risk.A focus on stability and positive economic growth oftenovershadow important democratic deficits in transitioncountries. In Mozambique, for example, politics has beenoverwhelmed by rampant corruption and organizedcrime, not least because the ruling party itself has blockedeither the establishment or the effective implementationof different transparency and accountability mechanisms.A historically weak political opposition has not helped.The emergence of a new opposition party and growingdiscontent with corrupt practices and mafia-likemanagement of the state might, however, result in a shiftin policy and practice in the long-term. In the meantime,the gap between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ continuesto grow on a par with violence related to both organizedand ‘disorganized’ crime. The overall governance anddevelopment impacts have been substantial. In Nepal,while crime appears to be more ‘disorganized’ thanorganized at present, the manner in which criminalactivity has been used both during and after the conflictto support political aims does not bode well for politicalstability. Given the culture of public sector corruption inNepal, such practices risk becoming more entrenched asthe country transitions toward a more ‘democratic’ formof politics. Western development actors are attempting tosupport certain measures aimed at enhancing governanceand strengthening political parties, yet it is unclearwhether these efforts will have an effect in a countryw<strong>here</strong> the West holds limited sway.In several of the case studies, political contestation isregularly affected by organized crime, or by how politicalactors use organized crime to defend interests. Forexample, in Nepal, Jamaica, and Guyana, political leadershave mobilized gangs to support their electoral goalsor hamper those of others. In none of these cases havepolitical leaders been held accountable for their behavior.In Ghana, political parties are suspected of using the spoilsof drug trafficking to support electoral campaigns and tounderwrite voter turnout. Again, the absence of accessto information laws, regulatory frameworks for assetdisclosure, campaign financing ceilings, political partyfunding, media investment ceilings, and strong electoraland financial management and compliance bodies leavesmuch of this behavior unchecked.“Illicit markets breed violence” is a widespread themein the literature. Our research confirmed that this is notalways the case; the relationship between illicit marketsand violence is very complicated. The use of violencecan be understood, for example, as an importantcharacteristic of the strategies of political or businessgroups. In Nepal, Guyana, and Jamaica, political leadersorganize criminal gangs to exercise violence in support ofpolitical objectives. Political parties also use the threat ofNYUCICResponding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries

violence by criminal gangs to provide security or securepublic contracts and other services. In Ghana, a majorcocaine and heroin transshipment point marked bysignificant involvement of political and security actors,no drugs market-related violence has yet been registered.This suggests a modus operandi that currently benefitsall those involved. In some settings, however, violencecan be provoked by efforts to break those links. Manyobservers trace the huge upsurge in homicides in Mexicoto the country’s shift to a multi-party system, a processthat saw the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) loseits hold on power and the unraveling of the PRI’s informalarrangements with organized crime, a political-criminal“settlement” minimizing violence. In Jamaica, violencealso became more independent of the political process ascriminal groups such as the Shower Posse gained relativeindependence from political patrons. In Mozambique,many fear that violence might increase if the ruling partywere to lose its relative control of organized criminalactivity in the country. In Sierra Leone, a country emergingfrom a brutal civil war in which criminal activity playeda crucial role, criminal violence has been minimal andcontrary to expectations, ex-combatants have not formedcriminal gangs or become involved in the drug trade. 22In many settings w<strong>here</strong> organized crime is prevalent,it is the absence of violence that should be of concern.Peter Gastrow argues that organized criminal groupsand networks can constitute real threats to the state“not through open confrontation but by penetratingstate institutions through bribery and corruption and bysubverting or undermining them from within.” 23 He notesthat, “[g]overnments that lack the capacity to countersuch penetration, or that acquiesce in it, run the risk ofbecoming criminalized or “captured” states” over time.Despite this reality, many development and securityactors continue to assess organized crime solely from thescale of violence it produces. The current situation in Maliis an important example. Despite broad knowledge oflinks between high-level officials in Bamako and criminalgroups operating in northern Mali, the country was largelyportrayed as a development success. It was only when the22. Communication with Michael von Schulenburg, former ERSG to Sierra Leone, June 2013.23. Peter Gastrow (2012), Termites at Work: Tansnational Organized Crime and State Erosion inKenya, International Peace Institute, NY.situation turned violent did attention turn to some of themore structural issues underpinning these relations. 24In several of the case studies – Ghana, Guyana, Jamaica,and Sierra Leone – public sector officials or politicalactors have been implicated in organized crime cases.The former Minister of Transport and Aviation of SierraLeone was allegedly linked to a broad cocaine networkin which the Minister’s brother played an importantrole. An investigation led to the seizure of 700 kilos ofcocaine in 2008. The Attorney General and Minister ofJustice allegedly blocked the Minister’s arrest in the faceof a judicial order. 25 The importance of this case for othertransition/developing settings cannot be under-stated.Before the drugs were seized, Sierra Leone did not prohibitdrug trafficking; a law had to be drafted, adopted, andimplemented retroactively in order to prosecute thoseinvolved. 26 The judge who presided over the trial listedseveral lessons from the case, noting in his final judgmentthat “it is imperative to regularly assess old and new threatsand pass the appropriate legislation as soon as possible,”and stressing that the details of the case “shed light onhow easily penetrable Sierra Leone’s security sectorstill is as [s]pecial branch officials, intelligence officers,police officers, could all be got at with ease w<strong>here</strong> largeamounts of money were concerned.” 27 Insights from suchtrials or commissions of inquiry can inform developmentassistance efforts to strengthen governance structures andidentify gaps in the criminal justice system or the scopeand depth of the government complicity in the case. Theycan also help identify direct or backdoor entry points fordevelopment interventions.24. For a more detailed assessment of this issue. see Wolfram Lacher (2012), Organized Crime andConflict in the Sahara-Sahel Region, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, WashingtonD.C.25. In his sentence, the presiding judge implied that the government had been guilty ofobstruction of justice in preventing the trial of the former Minister, noting that “the stateprosecution was withholding vital evidence and was prepared to jeopardize the case in order tosave one person (the minister), constituting an act of perjury.” See Sierra Leone case study.26. As noted in the Sierra Leone case study, the decision to apply a piece of legislationretroactively placed some strain on existing constitutional provisions, but as noted by aformer Sierra Leonean judge, “Sierra Leone’s hitherto lethargic attitude to the incorporation ofinternational conventions and treaties into its domestic law forced it to have recourse to politicalexpediency in the cocaine case presided over by Justice Browne-Marke rather than uphold theprincipal of legality precluding, as a rule, the enactment of retroactive penal laws, an issue thatcame up for litigation before the judicial committee of the Privy Council in the case of Akar vAttorney-General.” Interview with Justice Bankole-Thompson, Accra, Ghana, 29 April 2013. Seealso African Law Reports: Sierra Leone Series (1964-66), and Bankole Thompson (1997), TheConstitutional History and Law of Sierra Leone (1961-1995), Maryland: University Press of AmericaInc. for a legal analysis of the decision in that case (pp. 21-25)27. Justice Nicholas Browne-Marke (2012).19Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing CountriesNYUCIC

20Access to case files of convicted public officials can alsoshed light on the nature of their criminal activities, thedegree of cooperation between national law enforcementofficers in different jurisdictions, and the narratives ofcriminals across cultures. For example, the case againstformer Ghanaian MP Eric Amoateng, tried and convictedin a Brooklyn court for trafficking heroin to the UnitedStates, illustrates how under-development in his villagein central Ghana played an active role in his defense.While much of the case details remain unavailable, thedefendant’s lawyer presented his client as a local RobinHood, characterizing him as “a one-man Peace Corpsfor this area of Africa” while noting that “[he] did morethings for his people than probably his government did.” 28Despite the state prosecutor’s attempt to argue againstthe philanthropic nature of Mr. Amoateng’s character,not least by highlighting the damage heroin can do tocommunities in the United States, the circuit judge tryingthe case demonstrated a more lenient approach towardthe defendant when presented with insights into povertyand other development challenges in Ghana. 29 The judgewas evidently not aware of the serious governancechallenges posed by organized crime in Ghana, and thedeep-rooted illicit network within which the former MPhad been operating.Monitoring national responses to the findings ofjudicial processes and administrative inquiries and theimplementation of related recommendations for reformcan also shed light on the willingness or capacity of agovernment to respond to organized crime. In Guyana,several commissions of inquiry have examined periods ofviolence in which organized criminals such as Roger Khanplayed a pivotal role, yet recommendations to overhaulthe security sector or enhance governance structurescontinue to gather dust. In Ghana, administrative inquiriesinto the M.V. Benjamin case, in which a significant amountof cocaine was seized on a vessel in Ghanaian waters onlyto subsequently disappear, became highly politicized.Many government officials were implicated, but only lowerlevel cadres were convicted. The former President, whohad placed the fight against drug trafficking at the centerof his election campaign, committed to re-opening thecase in the form of a judicial inquiry, but it was once againshelved due to political opposition. Notwithstanding, theM.V. Benjamin case did lead to some institutional changesand reforms.Finally, in settings such as Nepal, Guyana, and Jamaica,national procurement/government contracting processesare often manipulated by political actors to sustain theloyalty of criminal actors or used as bargaining tools tomobilize criminal groups to do their will during periodsof political contestation. In these and other settings suchas Mozambique, criminal actors avail of weaknesseswithin the system, including public sector corruption, tomonopolize government contracts.Combined, these and other deep-rooted factors nurtureor provide entry points for organized crime to affect thepolitical process. Despite the in<strong>here</strong>nt political challengesof engaging on these issues, development actors canget smarter and help build the resilience of the politicalprocess through indirect measures. For example:Targeted Action1.1 As a mean to safeguard the legitimacyand integrity of the political process and politicalcontestation from organized crime, donors can:1.1.1 Support the establishment of baseline datacollection and mechanisms to regularly monitor andreport on how organized crime is affecting the politicalenvironment. As noted in the WDR 2011, baseline data is“crucial to measuring the risks and results of engaging in arange of different settings and developing the foundationsof more targeted and prioritized responses to needson the ground.” 30 In many settings, international bodieshave undertaken such efforts, but donors must investmore in developing national capacities to undertakethese exercises as a means to strengthen and sustainaccountability mechanisms.1.1.2 Support the monitoring of judicial processes oradministrative inquiries in which public officials or politicaland business elites have been implicated in organized28. Ibid29. Ibid30. WDR 2011, Conflict, Security and DevelopmentNYUCICResponding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries

criminal activity in order to build constituencies againstimpunity and for reform.1.1.3 Support the establishment of multi-party policyplatforms on organized crime. Depending on severalfactors – including the degree of political polarization in agiven setting and the level of organized crime penetrationof politics – donors might consider supporting theestablishment of a multi-party policy platform onorganized crime (or on a specific category of organizedcrime such as resource extraction or drug trafficking). Thisplatform might help open political space by enhancingmechanisms of communication between parties, andbetween parties and their constituencies, on organizedcrime-related issues. They can also serve the purpose ofdefusing or confirming speculation regarding the use ofillicit funding to bankroll political processes (through forexample, the establishment of joint commissions of inquiryetc.). Such mechanisms are integral to building mutualconfidence among political parties, and for the creationof effective work plans. Multi-party issue platforms canalso provide a safe space for dialogue in which partiesdo not have to play the role of ‘enemies’ but rather aretransformed into political opponents. 31 To underwritethe legitimacy of such an endeavor and inform the workof the multi-party platform, donors could support theconduct of a public perception survey on organized crimeand its perceived impacts, and ensure that their owndevelopment assistance is geared towards supportingimplementation of policy responses.1.1.4 Support special legislative commissions in thedrafting of legislation on party campaign financing,political party laws, asset disclosure and media legislation,and monitoring and reporting on their implementation.1.1.5 In settings w<strong>here</strong> criminal groups have beenmobilized in support of political contestation, donorscan encourage the development of Political PartyCodes of Conduct that rule out recourse to violence,and condition support to the electoral process or otherstrategic areas to the effective implementation of the31. Greg Power and Oliver Coleman (2011), The Challenges of Political Programming: InternationalAssistance to Parties and Parliaments, A Discussion Paper for International IDEA.Code of Conduct. Similar approaches can be encouragedto guide the conduct of election campaigns and internalparty functioning, with the aim of safeguarding theseinstitutions and processes from illicit funding. 321.1.6 Support the development or strengthening ofindependent investigative journalist capacity, and providesecurity safety nets such as asylum when targeted bycriminals or business and political elites or technologysolutions such as monitoring circumvention tools to avoidsurveillance.1.1.7 Support the conduct of national, regional, or interregionalmeetings of independent electoral commissionsor electoral tribunals to discuss electoral processes andorganized crime, and share lessons on building resilienceagainst organized crime into the electoral system.Electoral management body networks already exist at t<strong>here</strong>gional level and should be taken advantage of for thesepurposes. 331.1.8 Support the creation of incentive structures thatreward the conduct of ‘clean’ electoral processes and ‘clean’public officials.1.1.9 Support the establishment of inter- and intraregionalplatforms and discussions on different forms oforganized crime and how they are affecting society. Donorscould support the establishment of inter- and intra-regionalplatforms aimed at coordinating international responsesto domestic policies, including spillovers from successfulaction against organized crime and illegal trafficking (theso-called balloon effect). As noted in the WDR 2011, suchplatforms “could help governments identify potentialimpacts in advance, debate costs and benefits at a regionallevel, and consider options to coordinate domestic policyor to take action to mitigate impacts in countries affectedby policies implemented in others.” 3432. In West Africa, for example, such support could be linked to the implementation of the PraiaDeclaration on Elections and Stability (2011), and specifically Art. 13 on “Prevent[ing] the financingof political parties and their campaigns by criminal networks, in particular drug traffickingnetworks.” http://unowa.unmissions.org/Portals/UNOWA/PRAIA%20DECL_ANG.pdf33. See ACE project on EMB networks and collaboration: http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/em/emk34. 2011 WDR Conflict, Security and Development http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/WDR2011_Overview.pdf21Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing CountriesNYUCIC

221.2 As a means to safeguard the legitimacy andintegrity of the legislative process from organizedcrime, donors can:1.2.1 Monitor (or support civil society and journalists’efforts to monitor) legislative processes around importantpieces of organized crime-related legislation, and shareinformation on these processes across donors. Suchprocesses can help identify insider spoilers, and helpdetermine whether t<strong>here</strong> is political appetite to passimportant pieces of legislation directly or indirectly relatedto organized crime.1.2.2 Provide direct support to the legislative process,including through investment in resources. Such effortscould include ensuring that legislators and legislative staffhave access to research/ information on organized crimeand its perceived impacts; or supporting the organizationof closed-door expert seminars and workshops.1.2.3 Strengthen the access of civil society, policy thinktanks,journalists, academia etc. to the legislative process,including through supporting efforts to enhance reportingon legislative processes, and commissioning research incountrythat can inform the debate on organized crimeand its related impacts.1.3 As a means to safeguard the integrityof public procurement and public contractingprocesses donors can:1.3.1 Support efforts aimed at guaranteeingtransparency of these processes, for example bysupporting the development and passage of access toinformation bills, supporting efforts to regularly publishinformation related to public procurement and contractingprocesses, and supporting civil society and media effortsto monitor and report on these processes. The support oftechnology companies should be leveraged to support thedevelopment of easily accessible and nimble monitoringtools. Experiences can be drawn from smart approachesalready in place such as Ipaidabribe.com.1.3.2 Support efforts aimed at bolstering the resilienceof national procurement bodies, particularly w<strong>here</strong> t<strong>here</strong>is strong evidence of monopoly of government contractsby illicit actors, or political actors using public contractsas leverage to secure the support of criminal groups forleveraging voter turnout or other political ends.1.3.3 Strengthen the capacity of public services byenhancing skills and supporting reform of the publicprocurement process.2. MODERNIZING AND STRENGTHENINGTHE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND LAWENFORCEMENTAcross the case studies, criminal justice systems arestruggling to respond to the challenges posed byorganized crime. The organized crime identified in thestudies can be divided into two main categories: crimein support of political contestation, and economicends. In every case, criminal justice systems have beenineffective in responding to the first category, mainly dueto interference in the investigative or judicial process. Inthe second, progress has been mixed. No matter w<strong>here</strong>they stand on the development scale, each country lacksthe capacity to investigate and prosecute cases againstpersons suspected of participation in organized crime;the situation is even more complex when dealing withdifferent legal and political systems and when the suspect,the victim, key evidence, key witnesses, key expertise, orthe profits of crime are located outside one’s jurisdiction.As in many of the cases studied for this project, organizedcriminals take advantage of such situations, fleeing andsending profits to other countries, particularly thosewith weaker law enforcement capacity, w<strong>here</strong> politicalinterference in the judicial process can be guaranteed,w<strong>here</strong> cash transactions dominate the economy, andhiding among the population is easy. Strengtheninglaw enforcement capacity is critical, but the absence ofchecks and balances and effective vetting mechanisms forstrengthened security services in many countries has leadto increases in violence. Indeed, many fear (particularlyin countries w<strong>here</strong> institutional independence is notguaranteed) that strong criminal justice institutionsor empowered economic or financial crimes units canactually lead to enhanced corruptibility and the use ofNYUCICResponding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries

organized crime-related intelligence tools for political andfinancial gain.Traditionally, most efforts to prevent or respond toorganized crime have been centered on developing thecapacity of law enforcement agencies, ensuring sharingof intelligence across agencies and across borders,strengthening criminal justice systems, and establishingand developing the capacity of specialized agencies.These efforts are implemented by a range of actors andare generally quite narrow in scope in the sense that theyare geared towards direct provision of technical assistanceand advice. This type of assistance is warranted as stronglaw enforcement bodies and criminal justice systemsare needed in any setting. At the same time, however,given the degree of penetration of many of these sameinstitutions by organized crime, they need to be mademore accountable to citizens.Efforts such as the Anti-Money Laundering and Financingof Terrorism Regime, the U.S. Drug Kingpin Act and bilateralextradition treaties are helping to respond to some aspectsof organized crime across the countries studied, yet remaininsufficient. In addition, these efforts are often seen in anegative light by citizens and, as in Ghana, can have t<strong>here</strong>verse effect of bolstering the legitimacy of convictedcriminals, as those who are whisked away to spend timein US or European prisons have often delivered services,security, or employment to citizens in the absence of thestate. Responding to crime without responding to theneeds of those who have silently acquiesced is hardly asmart approach. Better collaboration between specializedagencies and development bodies, might help identifysurge activity in these types of circumstances to cover thesocio-economic void left by effective law enforcementefforts. In other situations, unless the proper checks andbalances are put in place, strengthened security servicescan lead to an increase in violence, while a strengthenedjudiciary or empowered economic or financial crimes unitcan actually lead to enhanced corruptibility and the useof organized crime-related intelligence for political gain.Of equal concern to law enforcement efforts is themanner in which organized crime groups and networksuse technology to facilitate efficient operations, conductsurveillance of, and gather intelligence on those whomay be intent on exposing their activities, and terrorizethose who threaten their survival. For example, as earlyas 1994, a Colombian counter-narcotics cell accidentallydiscovered a computer centre manned in shifts aroundthe clock by 4-6 technicians. A front man for Cali cocainecartel leader Santacruz Londoño owned the building.The facility boasted a $1.5 million IBM AS400 mainframe,the kind once used by banks. It was networked with halfa dozen terminals and monitors. The computer allegedlyheld a database of residential and office phone numbersof US diplomats and agents (both known and suspectedUS law enforcement, intelligence, and military operatives)based in Colombia. In addition, the phone company wassupplying the cartel with complete records of all telephonecalls in the form of the originating and destinationphone numbers. The cartel’s intelligence arm then usedcustom-designed software to cross-reference the phonecompany records against their own list of suspected lawenforcement, military, and intelligence officials or agentsto produce a list of potential informants. Law enforcementofficials never revealed the fate of the informants inthe Santacruz computer. It is believed they were eithertortured to reveal information or killed outright. 35More recently in Mexico, the Zeta organized crimecartel was discovered to have established an extensiveshadow communications network to “conduct encryptedconversations” outside the official cell phone network,which is relatively easy for authorities to monitor, and inmany cases does not reach far outside urban centres. 36According to news coverage, the radio network, establishedwith legally available material, stretched from the Texasborder through the Gulf region and down into Guatemala.The person behind the network was Jose Luis del ToroEstrada – a.k.a. El Tecnico – who was arrested by the DEA in2008 in Houston, Texas, and later sentenced for conspiracyto distribute cocaine. According to his plea agreement,del Toro acknowledged that he had been responsible forestablishing the system in most of Mexico’s 31 states andparts of northern Guatemala “under the orders of the topleaders in the Gulf cartel and the Zetas.” 37 Cartel bosses in35. Paul Kaihla, The Technology Secrets of Cocaine Inc., Business 2.0, July 200236. AGORA, La Marina arresta a fundador de Los Zetas ‘Lucky’ y desconecta las comunicaciones delcartel37. FoxNews (Latino), Dec. 2011, Drug Cartels in Mexico Have a Clandestine National radio Network23Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing CountriesNYUCIC

24each drug-smuggling territory were “responsible for buyingtowers and repeaters as well as equipping underlings withradios and computers.” 38 Del Toro was also responsible for“employing specialists to run the network and researchnew technology.” 39 This highly elaborate system alsoallowed the highest-ranking Zeta operatives to engage inhighly encrypted communications over the Internet. JointUS-Mexican investigations have since led to several arrestsand the seizure of some 167 antennas, 155 repeaters,166 power sources, 71 pieces of computer equipment,and 1,446 radios. 40 Other cartels operating in Mexico arereported to have also developed similar, albeit narrower interritorial scope, communications systems. Beyond Ghana,w<strong>here</strong> the incidence of ICT-related crime is significant yetnon-violent, t<strong>here</strong> is limited, if any knowledge of how ICTsare being used by organized criminals in the other casesthat were part of this research project. Again, monitoringjudicial processes involving serious organized crime canshed light on the technological tools criminals are availingof at national and regional levels to conduct their business,and indicate their level of sophistication.While external actors (generally specialized agenciessuch as the US DEA, UK SOCA, INTERPOL, EUROPOL, orUNODC) have often provided specialized training forresponding to specific forms of organized crime (forexample, counter-narcotics, anti-money-laundering,environmental or economic, financial and cybercrimes), ineach of the countries, the capacity to absorb this trainingis limited, and unless the issue area has been identified asa priority by the government or an international partner,limited resources also hinder action. A lack of contiguousmonitoring and post-training reach-back capacity byexternal donors/trainers means that often, trained unitsgo rogue and become highly competent criminals. Thiswas the case of efforts in West Africa to establish crossbordercrime units in the past. Despite these experiences,no vetting or monitoring mechanism has apparentlybeen established to protect the new Transnational CrimeUnits operating under the umbrella of the WACI from thesame fate. 41 In addition, unless the mechanisms are in38. Ibid39. Ibid40. Ibid41. See Camino Kavanagh and Bruce Jones (2011), Shaky Foundations, An Assessment of UNRule of Law Support. According to one ECOWAS official, an earlier project aimed at developingregional capacity to deal with organized crime through the establishment of joint operation unitsplace, strengthened security can also lead to increases inviolence, while a strengthened judiciary or empoweredeconomic or financial crimes unit can actually lead toenhanced corruptibility and the use of organized crimerelatedintelligence tools for political and financial gain.Indeed, cross the six case studies, organized crime-relatedpolitical and public sector corruption enormously affectslaw enforcement efforts, while deep-rooted corruptionwithin law enforcement agencies, specialized securityservices and the judiciary often derails investigations andcriminal proceedings.In relation to drug trafficking in particular, capacitybuilding of national drug law enforcement agencies rarelyconsiders developments and trends in the global drugpolicy arena, particularly in terms of introducing harmreduction principles into policing efforts. Recent efforts bythe London-based consortium involving the InternationalInstitute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the International DrugPolicy Consortium (IDPC), and Chatham House throughtheir Modernizing Drug Law Enforcement (MDLE) initiativeis analyzing new strategies for drug law enforcement thatfocus on “reducing the consequential harms that arise fromdrug markets and drug use, rather than just on seizingdrugs or arresting users.” 42 Several of the case studies inthis project confirmed many of the findings in the MDLEinitiative, including the fact that citizen trust in the policeis undermined “when procedural fairness, lawfulness andeffectiveness of police actions come into question,” orthat “zero-tolerance approaches to drugs and crime havefailed to reduce criminality while increasing human rightsviolations and police abusiveness,” and generally target“low-level offenders.” In Ghana for example, first time usersof drugs face prison sentences of 1-5 years; those caughtin possession of or selling drugs face sentences of 10 yearsto life imprisonment, regardless of the amount of drugsbeing carried or sold. Generally it is small-time peddlersand/or dependent drug users who experience the bruntof these laws. Meanwhile, in post-conflict or transitiononly served to produce highly sophisticated criminals in the sense that a large number of thosetrained later left the police for a more lucrative life of crime. Similar situations have emerged withelite trained units in Latin America and elsew<strong>here</strong>. Interviews, July 2011. See also Vanda Felbab-Brown and James J.F Forest (2012), Political Violence and the Illicit Economies of West Africa,Brookings Institution, Washington D.C.42. Modernising Drug Law Enforcement (MDLE) Seminar: http://idpc.net/publications/2013/04/idpc-chatham-house-iiss-seminar-modernising-drug-law-enforcement?utm_source=IDPC+Monthly+Alert&utm_campaign=aa8b2aaea8-IDPC+May+2013+Alert&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_e2e88d9477-aa8b2aaea8-19295501NYUCICResponding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries

countries, security sector reform efforts tend not toinclude a strong focus on community or citizen policing,w<strong>here</strong>by policing efforts are accompanied with social andeconomic development policies, and even less focus ondrug dependency, even if in cases such as Sierra Leone,consumption of both hard and soft drugs was a feature ofthe conflict, and has persisted in the post-conflict phase.These situations often result in over-crowded prisons,‘ghettoizing’ of urban areas, and longer-term health andsocial problems.2.4 Involve the private sector in policy discussionsand debates regarding how to combat organized crime,and support learning from other experiences such asthe Business Against Crime of South Africa (BAC(SA))initiative. BAC(SA)’s original purpose was to work with thegovernment and civil society on specific crime preventionprojects that impacted on the country’s transformationby increasing confidence, investment and job creation. 43It is still active today focusing on eliminating crime withinbusiness and supporting government responses to crime.Targeted Action2.1 Support the strengthening of specializedagencies such as those responsible for dealing witheconomic and financial crimes, and the establishmentof specialized crime units. Ensuring strict and continuousvetting procedures in recruitment and performancereview processes as well post assignment incentives anddisincentives for operatives and family members can helpsafeguard these units from corruption, manipulation, andinterference, and prevent individual operators from goingrogue. The effectiveness of US DEA experiences in theestablishment of vetted units in Ghana and Nigeria wouldbe important to monitor in this regard.2.2 In cases w<strong>here</strong> it is evident that criminals areknown to have been providing services to citizens,specialized law enforcement agencies should work moreclosely with development actors and national authoritiesto fill the socio-economic void left by successful lawenforcement efforts. Citizen security experiences fromBrazil’s favelas or Jamaica’s garrison towns can be exploredfor this purpose, but local context should drive t<strong>here</strong>sponse as violence is not always the logical outcome ofthe void.2.5 Use sector specific political economy analysisto develop a better understanding of the informationtelecommunications (ICT) sector, how organized criminalgroups might be using ICT to advance their goals withina country, and who within the government or the privatesector might be complicit in this activity. Monitoring ofjudicial processes and evidence tabled in the investigationleading to a trial might provide back-door entry points todetermining the level of sophistication of criminal groupsand which public or private entities (including technologycompanies) might be directly or inadvertently supportingtheir work.2.6 Support policy debates at the national andregional level with law enforcement, the judiciary, andspecialized agencies on how to better target organizedcriminals through effective deterrence strategies,selective targeting, sequential interdiction efforts, and thestrengthening of prosecutorial capacity. 442.7 W<strong>here</strong> t<strong>here</strong> are important incidences of drugtrafficking and consumption, support discussions withpolicy makers and law enforcement on how to introduceharm reduction policies and practices for people whoinject drugs to the policing of retail markets. 45252.3 Use political economy assessment tools (seeSection III) to deepen understanding of how politicaland business elites provide entry points for organizedcriminals and for what purpose (political/ideological,financial), and to identify initiatives that raise the businesscosts of engaging in illicit activity, including through moreeffective anti–money laundering initiatives.43. BAC(SA) was established in 1996 when the then State President, Nelson Mandela, invited SouthAfrican businesses to join hands with the government to combat crime. It has two distinct roles.The first is to get business’ ‘own house in order’ by eliminating crime-enabling processes, systemsand approaches, and improving crime prevention measures within the control of business. Thesecond is to partner with Government, when invited, by sharing expertise, information, processesand technologies resident in business. See: http://www.bac.org.za/44. See for example, Vanda Felbab-Brown (2013) Focused deterrence, selective targeting,drug trafficking and organised crime: Concepts and practicalities, IDPC Modernising Drug LawEnforcement Report 245. See for example, Geoffrey Monaghan and Dave Bewley-Taylor, (2013) Police support forharm reduction policies and practices towards people who inject drugs; and Alex Stevens (2013),Applying harm reduction principles to the policing of retail drug markets, IDPC Modernising DrugLaw Enforcement Reports 1 and 3Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing CountriesNYUCIC

262.8 Invest in mapping judicial processes and nonjudicialcommissions of inquiry regarding the involvementof state officials in organized criminal activity as a meansto better understand weaknesses and gaps in legislationand the criminal justice process and to identify appetitefor reform.2.9 Support the establishment of national, regional,and inter-regional platforms via existing organizations asa means to enhance cooperation between policy makers,law enforcement officials, civil society, and academia inresponding to organized crime.2.10 Invest in monitoring and assessing the impact ofexternal efforts to enhance the capacity or the judiciaryand security services to respond to organized crime.3. SUPPORTING SMART, CRIME-SENSITIVE SOCIALAND ECONOMIC POLICY DEVELOPMENTAcross the case studies, criminal entrepreneurs tookadvantage of the limited ability of national authorities todeliver basic services and the ineffective governance ofsocio-economic space to turn their own provision of “socialservices” and illicit employment into social capital. InNepal and Jamaica, these entrepreneurs sometimes workwith the acquiescence of political actors or public servantswho, in turn, reap short-term political benefit from dallyingwith criminal actors. In Nepal, Ghana, and Mozambique,formal or traditional institutions have taken advantageof organized criminal structures to extend their presenceand deliver services, earning political capital, which in turnhas allowed them to sustain control over economic, social,and political life. In Mozambique, business elites haveplayed this card. In most of the cases, lack of employment,particularly among young and marginalized populations,has propelled many to support criminal enterprises, inresponse to both needs and interests.While knowledge on the overarching impact of organizedcrime on development is still limited, we have found that,under dire socio-economic conditions, people are morereceptive to supporting, engaging in, or turning a blindeye to illicit activity. Indeed, organized crime becomes acoping strategy for those with few alternatives, especiallyin low income and conflict-affected countries. In SierraLeone for example, the high farm-gate price for illegalcrops such as cannabis can lead to displacement of theproduction of subsistence crops in many areas, withsignificant implications for food security and broadernational security. When the production and traffickingof illegal drugs also generate secondary consumptionmarkets, a variety of adverse public health and socialeffects ensue. Again in Sierra Leone, many youths becameaddicted to drugs during the war; in many other settings,youths often turn to drugs to escape a difficult reality.Drug use, in turn, renders them unfit for work (w<strong>here</strong> itbecomes available), leading to further frustration, which– together with other challenges such as marginalization– can have a destabilizing effect on the country. In all ofthe case studies, consumption is viewed as a crime ratherthan a health issue, even for first time ‘offenders.’ The overemphasison law enforcement vis-à-vis public healthplaces enormous pressure on over-burdened and weakcriminal justice and prison systems. More importantly,it can lead to longer-term public health issues sincedrug users, including those using needles, have limitedrecourse to treatment both when in prison and afterrelease, let alone access to social services that might easethem back into society. In addition, targeting the mostvulnerable, low level individuals results in criminalizationof users and petty dealers (a strategy that can increasesocial instability and violence), while not addressing thecore threats to political stability and governance posedfrom elite involvement in the trade.As evident in several of the cases, the illicit extractionof resources can have a detrimental impact on theenvironment and on citizens’ health, polluting limitedwater resources or arable land. Organized criminal groupshave built a lucrative business in illegal logging and theillegal trade in wildlife (Nepal); illicit gold mining anddumping of electronic waste (Ghana); and illegal loggingand diamond extraction (Sierra Leone). The specialized lawenforcement capacity required to respond to these typesof economic crimes is limited; in general, the impact ofthis form of criminal activity is not considered in nationalenvironment, health, or development policies, nor is ininternational development assistance strategies.NYUCICResponding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries

The growing incidence of cybercrime (both organized and‘disorganized’), with its low entry barriers and low risks indeveloping countries, carries serious social implications,many of which remain unexplored by development actors,not least because it is generally assumed that cybercrimedoes not have direct implications for the poor. This is anerroneous assumption since high incidences of cybercrimeand weak cyber security in a specific jurisdiction can placesignificant strains on judicial systems and, by extension,the public purse. It also impacts businesses and can serveas a deterrent to potential investors. And while cybercrime might provide large swathes of unemployed youthwith low-risk income, their technical skills might be put tobetter and more sustainable use through innovative startupschemes supported by public-private partnerships orby employing these young entrepreneurs in legitimatee-governance initiatives.With the latter in mind, as a means to support crimesensitivesocial and economic policy development,development actors can:Targeted Action3.1 Ensure citizens’ participation in the developmentof smarter crime-sensitive social and economicdevelopment policies. This can be achieved throughstrengthening the capacity of civil society and communitygroups to engage the government and political actors onorganized crime-related issues. For example, recent effortsto reduce violence in crime-ridden localities in Jamaica’sgarrison towns or Brazil’s favelas through the introductionof vertical accountability measures into citizen securitypolicies have yielded some interesting results, at leastin terms of reduction of violence. It is unclear, though,whether, and under what structure, organized criminalactivity still continues. Investing in research on theseadditional elements would help determine w<strong>here</strong> toallocate additional resources for citizen security measureswhile simultaneously tackling organized crime. 4646. See also Vanda Felbab-Brown (2011), Bringing the State to the Slum: Confronting OrganizedCrime and Urban Violence in Latin America: Lessons for Law Enforcement and Policymakers,Brookings Institution; and Vanda Felbab-Brown (2011), Calderon’s Caldron: Lessons from Mexico’sBattle Against Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking in Tijuana, Ciudad Juárez, and Michoacán(particularly the section on Ciudad Juarez).3.2 Map socio-economic impacts of efforts to counterorganized crime. Donors can invest more in understandingthe impacts of alternatively formalizing or prohibitinginformal or illicit markets.3.3 Support public participation and debate onthe development and implementation of smarter drugtreatment policies in response to drug dependency, andprioritizing citizens’ health and social development overcriminalization.3.4 Increase support to specialized bodiesresponsible for investigating, monitoring, and prosecutingenvironmental crimes such as illegal logging, the illegaltrade in wildlife, and e-waste dumping.3.5 Increase support to governments to develop,with strong citizen participation, more effective livelihoodopportunities to prevent and respond to the harmfuleffects of illicit resource extraction, particularly waterbodies that are the only source of potable water for localpopulations; and as a means to reduce environmentalcrime. The effectiveness of the latter will be contingent ondemand reduction strategies for natural resources acrossthe board and the provision of socio-economic alternativesfor those most dependent on them.3.6 Invest in understanding the incentives drivingyoung people to engage in cyber criminal activity, and itsimpact on employment and economic growth.4. ENGAGING CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE MEDIAOrganized crime can lead to a weakening or firewallingof vertical accountability bodies and mechanisms suchas civil society, academia, and the independent media. InGhana, for example, the space for discussing organizedcrime, and the suspected involvement of members ofthe political and economic elite, is very limited. Manysuspect that this is due to the politicization of academia,civil society, and the media, which prevents these actorsfrom playing an oversight role. Across the case studies, lackof access to accurate and transparent data is a problem.Civil society organizations are often reluctant to engage27Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing CountriesNYUCIC

28in organized crime-related activity, not least because ofthe security implications it entails. The manner in whichorganized criminal groups have adopted technology as ameans to counter activism is a case in point. For example,recent cases point to organized criminal groups usinghighly sophisticated measures to monitor negative onlinecoverage of their activities. This can be dangerousespecially in areas w<strong>here</strong> citizens take up police functionsthemselves, using blogging sites or Twitter to fill thevoid left by weak and corrupt police forces or a silencedor co-opted traditional media. In Mexico for example,the country’s main media outlets have largely ceasedcovering ‘drug-war stories’ and have been largely replacedby bloggers who face enormous risks. 47 In late 2011,several bloggers working out of Nuevo Laredo, Mexico,were violently killed by members of drug cartels such asthe Zetas who berated them post-facto for participating inonline discussions about the drug situation in Mexico andfor tipping off authorities about their activities. Victimswere beheaded or disemboweled, and messages, suchas “this happened to me because I didn’t understand Ishouldn’t post things on social networks,” were left onwhat was left of their bodies. 48 Mexican bloggers andjournalists fear that the recent attacks will prevent peoplefrom using the Internet to circulate information on what ishappening in different parts of the country.Meanwhile, in light of the attacks on bloggers, the hacktivistgroup Anonymous established ‘OpCartel,’ an operationthat threatened to release details of Zeta operatives andcollaborators obtained through hacking into the emailsof Mexican government officials. 49 Following the allegedkidnapping of an Anonymous member by the Zetas,and the threat that ten people would be killed for eachcollaborator identified, Anonymous publicly abandonedits OpCartel campaign. 50 In 2010, two Mexican students atColumbia University in New York City who were trackinginformation on organized crime-related violence inMonterrey were also stopped in their tracks. The US-basedsite administrator received threatening phone calls, after47. The Spider and the Web: The Fog of War Descends on Cyberspace, The Economist, 24 November2011. In 2010 alone, five newspapers admitted in print that due to the risks to their reporters, theywould stop covering sensitive drug-war stories. See: http://www.economist.com/node/2153014648. Gang Sends Message with Blogger Beheading, The Houston Chronicle, November 11th 2011.49. UpDate: Anonymous vs. the Zetas, Borderland Beat, 4 November 201150. Anonymous cancela #OpCartel por amenazas, El Universal, 4 de noviembre 2011.which the project was cancelled. 51 This inability to capturecitizen information and empirical data on the scope ofviolence and organized crime seriously impacts attemptsto build effective responses to organized crime. 52In some of our own case studies, media reporting onorganized crime tends to be sensationalist, often onlyproviding fodder for political opponents to use againsteach other when their interests are at stake. Bad reportingor politically motivated disinformation can exacerbatealready volatile situations, and fuel speculation andrumor around political participation in criminal activity.Meanwhile, serious journalists and analysts often (andjustifiably) fear reprisals if they attempt to name andshame political and business elites allegedly involved inillicit activity. This situation is further exacerbated by weakcapacity and investment in academia and the near-absenceof policy-oriented think tanks in each of the countries. Attimes, civil society actors themselves benefit from thespoils of organized crime and have limited incentives todemand a change. Donor support to civil society actorscan help bolster vertical/citizen accountability, althoughas in the other areas of suggested action, a decisionto work with civil society should be preceded by anassessment of civil society, how it is organized in a givensetting, and the interest groups it represents. Followingsuch an assessment, donors might:Targeted Action4.1 Support efforts by civil society or jointgovernment-civil society efforts to conduct campaignsagainst organized crime and political and public sectorcorruption, including around electoral processes. Donorsmight draw lessons from civil society-led campaignsaimed at fostering civilian resistance against organizedcrime and violence, and determine how and why they areperceived as successful. Interesting examples include theAddiopizzo campaign in southern Italy, efforts in Medellin,Colombia, aimed at cleansing core governance structures,and the joint government-civil society cross-sectoralprogramme Todos Somos Juarez, in northern Mexico,aimed at enhancing citizen security and safety.51. The Spider and the Web: The Fog of War Descends on Cyberspace, The Economist, 24 November2011. http://www.economist.com/node/2153014652. US Department of State (undated), Meridia Initiative, available at http://www.state.gov/j/inl/merida/.NYUCICResponding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries

4.2 Apply the principle of shared responsibility toensure the safety of journalists and civil society actors (andtheir families) who are involved in monitoring or reportingorganized crime. In this regard, donors can support effortsto secure asylum for those who are targets of threats, andleverage the support of technology companies to providemonitoring circumvention tools and tools to support safeand rapid reporting.4.3 Support evidence-based debates on corepolicies that have a strong impact on governance anddevelopment across countries. Regardless of their positionon some of the more sensitive issues, donors shouldsupport the emergence of much-needed global, regional,and national discussions and debate on organized crime.Initiatives such as the Latin America Commission onDrugs and Democracy, the Global Commission on DrugsPolicy, and the more recent West Africa Commission onDrugs are helping to open space for a more evidencebaseddebate on the highly controversial ‘war on drugs’and the somewhat out-dated counter-narcotics regime.The recent decision by the Organization of AmericanStates to conduct a comprehensive review of drug policyacross the Americas is another interesting step towardsmore evidence-based policies. 53 Donors could contributethrough supporting the ‘evidence-gathering’ aspects ofthese bodies and initiatives, as they tend to be the leastunder-funded, or supporting the establishment of groupsof networks or non-governmental ‘champions’ on specificissue areas related to organized crime. The government ofNorway has taken one step in this direction by establishingThe Global Initiative against Transnational OrganizedCrime. 545. DEEPENING THE KNOWLEDGE BASEAcross the case studies, the glaring lack of basic informationon organized crime investigations, prosecutions, andconvictions emerged as a core problem. Accurate datacan play an important role in addressing the sourcesand nature of criminal behavior in particular contexts,and informing mitigation strategies aimed at dealingwith health, environmental, and other effects. Access to53. See http://transform-drugs.blogspot.com/2012/09/how-organization-of-american-states.html54. The initiative will be launched in Rome, Italy in May 2013financial data is also essential for targeting high-rankingcrime targets, their financial advisors, and more legitimatepartners. Journalists and civil society can publish thisinformation to make the public aware of corruption andhold public officials and private sector actors to account.Organized crime-related research is generally conductedwithin a predominantly Western understanding ofinstitutions, and little is known about the relationshipbetween organized crime and traditional or informalgovernance structures. The Ghana, Sierra Leone, andNepal studies shed some light on these issues, althoughunderstanding the interaction of organized crime andcomplex systems of social and cultural norms requiresmuch deeper and careful research, not least becauseaccepted norms of behavior in one setting are notnecessarily acceptable in another. Development programsignoring these differences might do more harm than goodin the mid- to long-term. In this regard, developmentactors can:Targeted Action5.1 Support efforts aimed at providing differentsources for collecting and monitoring crime and financialdata. Donors should explore potential partnershipsbetween government and the private sector, includingmajor information technology companies as a means toleap-frog some of the traditional challenges encounteredin the collection and processing of baseline data andsupport more participatory forms of data collection.5.2 Invest in strengthening the capacity ofnational and regional policy think-tanks, academia, andinvestigative journalists to conduct research on organizedcrime, particularly in relation to the political, social,cultural, and developmental impacts of different formsof organized crime. The Open Society Foundation’s (OSF)Drugs, Security and Democracy fellowship model aimed atsupporting policy relevant research in Latin America andthe Caribbean would be worth exploring. 555.3 Invest in mapping development actor effortsagainst organized crime (particularly support to justice55. 2011 WDR29Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing CountriesNYUCIC

and security institutions and legislative bodies) andassessing their effectiveness. In particular, and in respect ofthe principles of shared accountability and responsibility,donors should also become more transparent andaccountable for the limited impact of the significantresources spent on supporting better political andeconomic governance in developing countries.5.4 Invest in strengthening internal [developmentagency] analytical capacity and tools and those of nationalstakeholders to better understand the nature of organizedcrime and associated impacts.30Finally, as noted in the Executive Summary, thedevelopment community must invest more heavily inthe development of political economy assessment andanalytical frameworks to understand when to engageon organized crime-related issues, and w<strong>here</strong> to focusefforts within these five core areas. The next sectionprovides deeper insights into how this might be achieved.It also provides an outline for longer-term research: aframework developed on the principle of ‘do-no harm’for analyzing types of relations between organized crimeand political institutions and how they impact on politicalarrangements and governance.NYUCICResponding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries

III. KNOWING WHEN TO ENGAGE ANDWHERE TO PRIORITIZE EFFORTSThe previous section highlighted core areas aroundwhich to target development assistance in settings w<strong>here</strong>organized crime is prevalent, or w<strong>here</strong> it risks becomingso because of its interactions with the political process.As noted earlier, development actors’ room for politicalmaneuver is often limited, particularly in traditionaldevelopment settings w<strong>here</strong> political leverage is limited.If a recipient country’s core interests (or the interests ofelite groups within a country) are threatened by externalactors, it can easily play the sovereignty card or imposea range of obstacles to prevent donor agencies fromoverstepping non-articulated boundaries. This is all themore complex in countries w<strong>here</strong> decision-makers mightbe complicit in different forms of organized criminalactivity. For development actors, knowing when to engageon organized crime-related issues is t<strong>here</strong>fore critical.The following section provides options for frameworksthat can help donors assess and analyze organized crimein a given setting, and inform decisions on w<strong>here</strong> toprioritize engagement within the five suggested areas fortargeted action.1. Political Economy AssessmentsAs noted earlier, certain factors can serve as importantindicators for assessing a country’s exposure to the risk oforganized crime penetration and gauging the degree ofstate involvement. These include the existence of internaland external checks and balances; a strong culture offreedom of, and access to, information; a culture of assetdisclosure among elected officials and political parties; theexistence, strength, and independence of anti-corruptionbodies; legislative drafting capacity (particularly regardingresource extraction and trafficking in illicit substances);and citizen perceptions of organized crime or specific illicitactivities. Applying these indicators in different settings(conflict, post-conflict, transition, traditional developmentsettings) will likely yield very different results, and t<strong>here</strong>foredevelopment responses should evidently be attuned tothe political realities of a given setting, not least becausethey will also have varying degrees of leverage to influencechange depending on the setting. 56In addition to these indicators, we also suggest thatdevelopment actors should make more strategic use ofpolitical economy assessment tools to determine whento engage and guide prioritization of action. For example,a recent USAID study included a focus on i) sources ofsupport for/ tolerance of drug trafficking; ii) sources ofopposition to drug trafficking; iii) government complicityand opposition; and iv) stakeholder interest and influenceas core elements of a political economy assessment to guidedonor engagements in their responses to drug trafficking.The section on government complicity and oppositionaimed at “examin[ing] who in government is complicit inthe trade, and who opposes it (…)” is particularly insightful(see Figure 2 below). More specifically, it suggests that:“Complicit officials, like their opponents, may beconcentrated within offices, ministries, levels ofgovernment, political factions, or political parties ormay have networks working across these divides. Thecomplicity of higher-level officials denotes a greaterthreat to governance than the involvement of just56. For a more detailed discussion on the question of context and leverage, see for example,Kavanagh and Jones (2011), Shaky Foundations: An Assessment of UN Rule of Law Support, NYU<strong>Center</strong> on International Cooperation.31Organized Crime Sensitive Programming FrameworkCore Area for Targeted Action1. Protecting the2. Mondernizing and3. Supporting Smart,4. Engaging Civil Society5. Deepening thePolitical ProcessStrengthening thecrime-sensitive,and the MediaKnowledge BaseCriminial Justice Systemeconomic and SocialPoliciesFigure 1Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing CountriesNYUCIC

32lower-level officials, but the stance of other officials inthe government influences the contours of the threat(…)” When high-level government actors are complicitin drug trafficking and opposition from other parts ofthe government is weak, the situation is stable and theprognosis for [counternarcotics] efforts is poor. Directinterventions to reduce drug trafficking are unlikely tohave an impact. When high-level government actorscomplicit in drug-trafficking face strong anti-traffickingfactions in other parts of the government, the prognosisfor reform is hard to predict; direct interventionsmay be possible but are potentially destabilizing. Bycontrast, when government involvement only extendsto lower-level officials, the threat to governance islower. The prospects for reform are strongest whenhigh-level officials champion counternarcotics efforts,but are less clear when no high-level officials do so,though political pressure may advance reform in thisscenario.” 57Such an assessment would enable development actorsto determine initial political obstacles to engagement ondrug trafficking (and broader organized crime) issues, evenif commitment has been anchored in theory, in nationaldevelopment or security strategies, bilateral agreementsor other. It can also help determine the degree to whichcivil society can be engaged in the response to organizedcrime.For example, in the case studies conducted for our ownresearch, high-level officials in two of the countries –57. USAID (April 2013), The Development Response to Drug Trafficking in Africa: A ProgrammingGuideGhana and Sierra Leone – have publicly condemnedgovernment involvement in drug trafficking. Despite hugeexternal investments to bolster capacity in these countries,significant challenges remain. Notwithstanding, directinterventions in these countries are still possible and donot appear to be destabilizing. External support to thesecountries has, however, been front-loaded to supportingtraditional law enforcement efforts, with limited focus ontargeted deterrence or accompanying law enforcementmechanisms with efforts aimed at bolstering vertical andhorizontal accountability mechanisms, although the lattermight be destabilizing if core interests are threatened.In Nepal and Mozambique, high-level officials have notmade any obvious statements signaling their oppositionto state involvement in drug trafficking (or other formsof organized crime). Given how organized criminal gangshave been used to support political objectives in Nepal,direct intervention might not be advisable, although effortscan be channeled to supporting inter-party dialogue andthe development of Codes of Conduct to guide behaviorduring periods of tense political contestation. In Jamaica,and until 2009, empty statements were often made byhigh-level officials to signal their opposition to stateinvolvement in organized crime. Direct interventions werepossible, but were fruitful only when accompanied bysignificant political pressure from the United States, whichin turn was driven by its own national interest of stemmingthe flow of drugs and arms to its territory. Meanwhile, inGuyana, government involvement in organized crimeor criminal penetration of government at all levels isobvious, but t<strong>here</strong> are no champions for counteringLevel of Corruption /InfiltrationLow Level OfficialsHigh-Level OfficialsOpposition within GovernmentStrong: High-level officialsBest scenario for directDirect interventionsoppose state involvement ininterventionspossible but potentiallytraffickingdestabilizingWeak: Relatively few high-Direct interventions mostDirect interventions notlevel officials oppose stateeffective when combined withadvisableinvolvement in traffickingincreased political pressureFigure 2. Drawn from USAID The Development Response to Drug Trafficking in Africa (p.20)NYUCICResponding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries

these challenges within government or limited voicesand limited leverage among external actors to increasepolitical pressure to advance reform efforts.2. Typology analysis 58Based on our own research and the core areas we haveidentified for targeted programming, we have alsodeveloped the option of a typology analysis framework,grouping forms of organized crime/politics relations intotwo broad typologies: enclave or mafia. The frameworkis sharply underpinned by the ‘do no harm’ principle andcould, with more research and field testing, be coupledwith a political economy assessment such as the onesuggested above, to set the broad outlines for an organizedcrime-sensitive development strategy. For now, we do notargue that any of our cases studies fit neatly or entirelywithin either one of these ‘ideal types’. Different aspectsmay be present in one country at the same time, or thedynamics of a country may force a shift from one idealtype to the other. The ideal types should be seen merely asanalytical lenses, whose use in examining specific countrycases may help draw out certain aspects of the impact oforganized crime on governance, t<strong>here</strong>by improving theprospects of effective, do no harm-based developmentinterventions. The typology analysis could also serve as auseful framework for determining priority actions withinthe five areas outlined above. Through further research,conceptual development and testing, similar frameworksmay provide a basis for more sophisticated analytical andprogramEnclave ScenariosSome organized crime groups – including gangs, drugcartels, and warlords – use violence to develop and retaincontrol over territorial or social enclaves within states,such as Jamaica’s garrison neighborhoods, Brazil’s favelas,or hinterland communities in Somalia, Afghanistan, andMyanmar. Mark Duffield has described rulers of theseenclaves as local strongmen able to control an area andexploit its resources while, at the same time, threatening58. The following section was developed by James Cockayne, one of the principal contributorsto the research project. The examples provided are drawn from the case studies but have notbeen tested in-country. For further discussion on the approach, see Cockayne, ‘Chasing Shadows:Strategic Responses to Organized Crime in Conflict-Affected Situations’, RUSI Journal, April 2013,vol. 158, no. 2.central authority or keeping it weak. 59 In these cases, anorganized criminal group can take advantage of the state’sweak territorial, social, or administrative reach to assume agovernance role within a defined enclave within the state.As Desmond Arias describes, states can – and frequently do– extend control over these enclaves through incorporatingthese strongmen into the political order, creating a systemof “violent pluralism”. 60 This produces a kind of politicalsettlement based on indirect rule through criminal proxiesand local powerbrokers. 61 Our research highlights theprevalence of such systems in Latin America and Caribbean,and points to signs of a related, but somewhat differentsystem emerging in Nepal, as Box 1 below explains.Box 1: Enclaves and Violent Pluralism – fromKingston to KathmanduArmed gangs with historic affiliations to Jamaica’s politicalparties dominate working class neighborhoods in the Kingstonand Saint Andrews Corporate Area and the neighboringmunicipality of Spanish Town. These armed groups control‘garrison’ communities, delivering voting blocs to Jamaica’stwo main political parties, while using the communities asenclaves for drug trafficking, extortion, and violent crime. 62In many cases, local criminal leaders also seek to control thestructure of local state spending in the areas they dominate,deciding who will work on street repair projects or on the yearlyefforts to clear the gullies running through the city to preventflooding during the rainy season, and controlling governmentconstruction contracts within those neighborhoods. Thesegangs also have contacts with Jamaicans engaged in illegalactivities abroad. Transnational networks support small-scalesmuggling operations with Jamaicans sending drugs to theUnited States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, and importingarms mostly from the United States and Haiti. Funds from thesecontacts help criminal organizations offer limited social servicesto local residents and provide for a measure of independencefrom elected officials. Like many criminal strongmen in Latin59. Mark Duffield (1998), “Post-modern Conflict: Warlords, Post-adjustment States and PrivateProtection,” in Civil Wars, Vol. 1, pp. 65-102: p. 81.60. Desmond Enrique Arias, “Understanding Criminal Networks, Political Order, and Politics in LatinAmerica,” pp. 115-135; See also Schulte-Bockholt, Alfredo (2006), The Politics of Organized Crime andthe Organized Crime of Politics, Lanham MD/Oxford: Lexington Books.61. Mónica Serrano (2002), “Transnational Organized Crime and International Security: Business asUsual?” in Mats Berdal and Mónica Serrano (eds.), Transnational Organized Crime and InternationalSecurity: Business as Usual?, Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, pp. 21-22; A. Smart, ‘Predatory Rule andIllegal Economic Practices’, in J. M. Heyman (ed.), States and Illegal Practices, Oxford: Berg, 1999.62. Anthony Harriott (1996), “The Changing Social Organization of Crime and Criminals in Jamaica,”in Caribbean Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 2/3, pp. 68-69.33Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing CountriesNYUCIC

34America, these gang leaders thus exist apart from, butconnected to, the national political settlement, serving as amechanism of indirect rule.Our research points to signs of related dynamics emerging inNepal – though perhaps only temporarily, given that country’sconstitutional flux. During the civil war, the Maoists taxedillegal logging in areas of their operations – an illegal enterprisethey still directly engaged in after the civil war in areas aroundcantonments that housed their ex-combatants. 63 Economicnecessity – namely, an alleged usurpation of the combatants’salaries by the Maoist party headquarters 64 – may have driventhe illegal logging, while the broader local community hadfew means to oppose the deforestation. Madhesi politicalparties also cultivate particularly strong relations with criminalgroups in the troubled and neglected Terai region, w<strong>here</strong>state presence is often minimal. Approximately half of Nepal’s26 million people live in the Terai. Between 2005 and 2009,many Madhesi armed groups proliferated in the region, andat their peak in 2008 numbered over one hundred. 65 (Some ofthe groups, however, only had membership in single digits. 66 )After the end of Nepal’s civil war, the absence of strong politicalparty, campaign financing and asset declaration regulationallowed political actors to exploit these relationships with localcriminal actors for electoral purposes. In order to demonstratestreet power via bandhs, political parties hire criminal groupsto recruit young men to staff the barricades. The squatterand urban slum communities, in particular, represent primetargets for such bandh recruitment by criminal groups, butpolitical parties also bus rural residents to strike areas for suchpayoffs. Youth wings of political parties extort businesses for“contributions” to the political parties, secure public tenders(such as construction projects) for their network of clientsand party-supported contractors, and create an atmosp<strong>here</strong>of threat and insecurity to obtain votes and decision-makingoutcomes favorable to their interests. 67Unlike the situation in Latin America, however, in Nepalpolitical parties, rather than local criminal actors, seem to bethe dominant actor in the political-criminal collaboration. Inboth cases, however, political influence is extended to enclaveareas through cooperation with local criminal groups.T<strong>here</strong> is a key difference between governance anddevelopment within these enclaves themselves andgovernance and development within many other modern,developed states. That difference can be understood interms of the absence, within the enclaves, of the kind ofpolitical deals that Charles Tilly and others have identifiedas the basis for early modern European state development– the deals that were cut between organized violence andproductive capital. 68 Criminal groups in enclaves live notoff the taxation of a productive economy based on stateprovidedpublic goods (such as justice, roads, education,and healthcare), but often off the proceeds of organizedcrime, especially its transnational version. As a result, theydo not always need to tax local populations, and in turn donot need to construct an open-access system of protection,or the state institutions and differentiated bureaucraciesthat have historically characterized such arrangements. 69Instead, the rulers of these enclaves can developgovernance arrangements that are less differentiated,more personalized, more violent, and more arbitrarily-runthan a developed state’s governmental apparatus. 70 AsVanda Felbab-Brown has shown, they offer just enoughjustice, and just enough pay-offs, to maintain the politicalsupport of the populations involved. 71 Though the actualhistory of the development of particular modern Europeanstates may not always hew entirely to the Tillyan scheme,the analytical framework does seem to offer some insightsinto understanding the relationship between productive(legitimate) and criminal capital, on the one hand, andcoercion on the other.63. Author’s interviews with a high-level Nepal officials in charge of the cantonment oversightand Maoists integration into the Nepal Army, Kathmandu, May 12, 2012.64. See, for example, International Crisis Group, Nepal’s Peace Process: The Endgame Nears.65. For details on their emergence and growth, see Interdisciplinary Analysts, Nepal MadheshFoundation, Small Arms Survey, and Safer World, Armed Violence in the Terai, August 2011.66. For a background on these armed groups, see International Crisis Group, Nepal’s TroubledTerai Region, Asia Report No. 136, July 9, 2007.67. Authors’s interviews with businessmen in Kathmandu, Bharatpur, Nepalganj, and Pokhara,May 2012. See also, Carter <strong>Center</strong>, Clashes between Political Party Youth Wings Have Decreasedbut YCL and UML Youth Force Continue to Seek Financial Gain, February 28, 2011, http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/democracy/nepal-political-partyyouth-wings-022811-en.pdf.68. Charles Tilly (1985), “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Peter Evans (ed.),Bringing the State Back In, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 169-191; Tilly, Charles(1992), Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992, Cambridge MA and Oxford UK:Blackwell.69. Douglass North, John Wallis and Barry Weingast (2009), Violence and Social Orders: AConceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History, New York: Cambridge UniversityPress.70. Paul Jackson (2003), “Warlords as Alternative Forms of Governance,” in Small Wars &Insurgencies, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 131-150; Marten, Kimberly (2006/07), “Warlordism in ComparativePerspective,” in International Security, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 41-73.71. Vanda Felbab-Brown (2009), Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs,Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.NYUCICResponding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries

W<strong>here</strong> criminal enclaves emerge, states often exert controlover them by mediating enclave strongmen’s accessto transnational illicit flows. 72 The result is sometimes akind of ‘violent pluralism,’ involving a significant dose ofcriminal activity as we have seen especially in Africa, 73and also Latin America. 74 This has important implicationsfor development interventions. Development outcomeswithin these territorial and social enclaves may becontrolled as much by local criminal actors as state politicalactors. Development actors must t<strong>here</strong>fore anticipateinteraction with actors implicated in crime, and considerthe dynamics and implications of such engagement.Engagement with such actors can legitimize them, perhapseven at the expense of central state institutions. Howevera refusal to engage with such actors may, at best, meanthat development actors cannot influence developmentwithin those outcomes. As the Dudus Coke case in Jamaicademonstrates, external pressure on political actors to turntheir backs on local criminal strongmen may even lead toviolence (see Box 2, below).Box 2: The Results of External Pressure on thePolitical-Criminal Nexus in JamaicaIn May 2010, under pressure from the US government, formerPrime Minister Bruce Golding ordered Jamaican securityforces to invade the neighborhoods of Denham Town andTivoli Gardens in Kingston, Jamaica’s capital, to execute anarrest warrant for Christopher “Dudus” Coke, the local “don.”Coke was the head of the infamous Shower Posse, a gangthat controlled sizable portions of organized crime activity onthe island and was accused by the United States governmentof drug trafficking and racketeering. Gangsters from aroundthe Kingston area converged on these neighborhoods inan effort to protect Coke who ran a sizable and complexcriminal operation in western Kingston. Residents of thecommunity had turned out several days before to demand thegovernment give up its efforts to bring Coke to justice. Facedwith considerable and well-organized armed opposition,72. William Reno (1998), Warlord Politics and African States, Boulder CO and London: LynneRienner, pp. 8-10.73. Jean-François Bayart, Bayart, Stephen Ellis, and Beatrice Hibou (2009). The Criminalization ofthe State in Africa, Bloomington: Indiana University Press; Reno, William (2009), “Illicit Commerce inPeripheral States,” in H. R. Friman (ed.), Crime and the Global Political Economy, Boulder, CO: LynneRienner, pp. 67-84.74. Desmond Enrique Arias (2010), “Understanding Criminal Networks, Political Order, andPolitics in Latin America,” in Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas (eds.), Ungoverned Spaces:Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty, Stanford CA: Stanford SecurityStudies, an Imprint of Stanford University Press, pp. 115-135.Golding warned residents to evacuate. On 28th May, troopsentered the area and carried out an operation that killed some70 residents.These events represented the culmination of eight months ofintense political and diplomatic wrangling following a requestby the United States government for Coke’s extradition. TheGolding government had done everything in its power andmore to avoid arresting Coke, including hiring a US-basedlaw firm to lobby the Obama Administration to withdrawits request. When Golding’s attempt to evade Jamaica’sinternational treaty obligations came to light, the country’spolitical establishment shuddered. Golding resigned as leaderof the Jamaica Labor Party (JLP), potentially opening thedoor to new elections. His party, however, refused to accepthis resignation and the administration staggered onwards.The US government found innovative ways to pressure hisgovernment, including cancelling the US visa of prominent JLPsupporters, t<strong>here</strong>by creating significant business difficultiesand embarrassment for a portion of the Jamaican elite.Ultimately, the violent military incursion into Kingston Westernwas unsuccessful in that Coke managed to escape. But withno place to hide, he soon surrendered and was extradited tothe US. He pled guilty to racketeering charges in a New Yorkcourt and in June 2012 received a maximum prison sentenceof 23 years. 75 Golding, on the other hand, offered exemptionfrom prosecution to other prominent gang leaders acrossKingston in exchange for relative peace. Lower violence ratesin late 2010 and early 2011 testify to those arrangements. Theonly powerful figure to suffer from the Coke debacle in theimmediate term was Attorney General and Justice MinisterDorothy Lightbourne who was forced to step down. Goldingand his party went on to lose the general elections.The Mafia ScenarioThe second analytical ‘ideal type’ is one we describe as a‘mafia scenario’. In the mafia scenario an organized criminalgroup’s political power flows not from its monopoly ofviolence in a defined territorial space (though it may enjoyconsiderable influence or even control); rather, a mafia’spower flows from the relative absence of the state fromcriminal markets. Organized crime groups wield power75. “Dudus gets his due,” The Economist, June 13, 2012, http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2012/06/ organised-crime-jamaica35Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing CountriesNYUCIC

36through cooperation with state actors, 76 generating acriminal version of the “mediated state” discussed in recentdevelopment literature. 77In the mafia scenario, if powerful enough, organizedcrime can become a mediating power, using its controlof social networks to help state actors control (and evenbenefit from) criminal markets, and allowing actorswithin criminal markets to interface with (and benefitfrom) state institutions. Unlike the rulers of enclaves,mafias do not need to construct a separate governmentalapparatus; instead they can corrupt and co-opt stateinstitutions. 78 As Anton Blok has explained, mafias can(but not always) become “a pragmatic extension of thestate” 79 through control of “markets, services, and votes,”in return for political protection. 80 The mafia and stateactors can serve as complementary collaborators in theexercise of governmental functions, particularly theuse of clandestine coercion in the form of corruption, toachieve political purposes and regulate illegal markets. 81As a result, the middlemen who bring state patronageto local communities in return for their votes canenjoy considerable political legitimacy. The case of EricAmoateng in Ghana might be used as an example (seeBox 3).Box 3: Drug Trafficker as Political Broker: TheAmoateng CaseIn 2005, Eric Amoateng was a tribal chief and Member ofParliament for the south Nkoranza District for Ghana’s thenrulingNew Patriotic Party. Amoateng was arrested in the US forconspiracy to transport and distribute 136.4 pounds of heroininto the US, smuggled inside ceramics shipments. 82 Followinga plea bargain in March 2007 Amoateng was sentenced to 12076. Cesare Mattina (2011), “The transformations of the contemporary mafia: a perspective reviewof the literature on mafia phenomena in the context of the internationalization of the capitalisteconomy”,in International Social Science Journal, Vol 62, No. 203-204, pp. 229-245: p. 236.77. Ken Menkhaus (2008), “The Rise of a Mediated State in Northern Kenya: the Wajir story and itsimplications for state-building,” in Afrika Focus, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 23-38; Wennmann, Achim (2009),“Getting Armed Groups to the Table: Peace Processes, the Political Economy of Conflict and theMediated State,” in Third World Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 6, pp. 1123-1138.78. Jean Cartier-Bresson (1997), État, Marchés, Réseaux et Organisations CriminellesEntrepreneuriales,, pp. 1-16: p. 5.79. Anton Blok (1974), The Mafia of a Sicilian Village, 1860-1960: A Study of Violent PeasantEntrepreneurs, Cambridge: Waveland Press, pp. 94-96.80. Anton Blok (2008), “Reflections on the Sicilian Mafia: Peripheries and Their Impact on <strong>Center</strong>s,”in Dina Siegel and Hans Nelen (eds.), Organized Crime: Culture, Markets and Policies, Springer,,pp.7-13: p. 8.81. Henner Hess (1970/1973), Mafia and Mafiosi. The Structure of Power (Westmead: Saxon House,p. 29.82. Aning (2009).months in prison, with supervised release after five years. 83 Heis currently serving his term in New York.The arrest prompted a joint Ghanaian/US/UK investigationinto the activities of foundations to which both Amoatengand a former Ghanaian Minister of Defense, Albert KanDapaah were connected. Both foundations had receivedceramics shipments from the same supplier in the US. Ourinterviews indicated a broad perception in Ghana that bothfoundations were involved in the drug trade. 84 Nonetheless,following questioning by Ghanaian Narcotics Control Board(NACOB) investigators in the Amoateng case, Daapah wasappointed Minister of the Interior in a sudden ministerialreshuffle by former President John Kufuor, effectively stallingand discontinuing the investigation. 85 This was significant inthat the Ministry of the Interior also supervises NACOB. Also,several of the trained NACOB personnel implicated in the casewere either dismissed or transferred to other positions andposts. 86Despite his conviction and detention in the US, which led toa prolonged absence from Parliament in Accra, Amoateng’sparty – the NPP – fought a fierce rearguard action to preventhim being removed from parliament. Only after sixteenmonths was a deal reached, which saw a by-election held in hisconstituency and another NPP candidate elected in his place.Amoateng’s local constituents remained equally supportive,cognisant of the patronage Amoateng had controlled anddispensed. His arrest in the U.S. led to major demonstrations inhis district, even after it became known that he was traffickingan illicit substance, and important personalities in hisNkoranza district – including the paramount chief – initiallydiscredited news of his arrest in the US. 87 In 2011 Amoatengwas honoured by the chiefs of his district for contributing tothe socio-economic development of the area and a road hasbeen named after him.83. United States of America vs Eric Amoateng, Transcript for Criminal Cause for SentencingBefore the Honorable David G. Trager, December 21, 2007. Copy in author’s possession.84. Interviews with Ghanaian officials, May 2012.85. Presentation by John Pokoo at Inter-Regional Dialogue on Organized Crime and StateCapture, February 2011, Lima, Peru.86. Ibid87. See Modern Ghana, Brong Ahafo Citizens Stunned, November 23, 2005, at (http://www.modernghana.com/news/90686/1/brong-ahafo-citizens-stunned.html). The Chief of NkoranzaTraditional Area said “Akan names are identical. Maybe someone sharing a similar name with EricAmoateng might have been mistaken for the MP…”NYUCICResponding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries

Organized criminal corruption can take a variety of forms,from ”paying off the official in the vehicle licensing officeto installing your allies in senior cabinet or civil servicepositions.” 88 Electoral financing is a favored tactic, because,as Glenny notes “traffickers want to create a relationship ofgoodwill that will pay off in subsequent access to the newincumbent.” 89 It is a form of criminal regulatory capture, 90which can blur with bribery by legitimate business, asthe Trafigura scandal in 2006, discussed in the Jamaicacase study, shows. Another example of this strategy inoperation appears to be provided by the Mozambicanbusiness tycoon Mohamed Bachir Suleman, discussed inBox 4 below.Box 4: Political and Criminal Financing as MafiaBusiness Strategy in MozambiqueMohamed Bachir Suleman is a popular figure in Mozambique,famous for his ‘generosity’ to the poor. He is also believedto have given millions of dollars over the years to the rulingFRELIMO party. 91 Following years of investigations, in 2010 theUS Department of the Treasury placed Suleman on its ForeignDrug Kingpin list and blacklisted several of his businessinterests, accusing him of “capitalizing on Mozambique’scorruption and porous borders to facilitate the transit ofillegal drugs to Europe.” 92 Suleman was also accused of usingseveral proxy trading interests to smuggle drugs. 93 In 2011, thegovernment of Mozambique initiated an investigation intoSuleman’s alleged involvement in drug trafficking but found“insufficient evidence of drug trafficking to prosecute on thatcharge.” Instead, it found extensive tax, customs, and foreignexchange violations, and commenced administrative actionagainst him for payment of back taxes and fines. 94 He is nowpaying off the money owed and is unlikely to face a prisonterm. 95 Other information emerged at the time of writing88. Glenny, Misha (2008), McMafia: A Journey through the Global Criminal Underworld, London:The Bodley Head, p. 196.89. Ibid, p. 88.90. Kelly, Robert (2003), “An American Way of Crime and Corruption,” in Roy Godson (ed.), Menaceto society: political-criminal collaboration around the world, New Brunswick/London: TransactionPublishers, p. 106.91. Interviews in Maputo, April 2012.92. “Another Bank Pulls Out from Maputo Shopping Centre” available at http://allafrica.com/stories/201006181101.html93. For example, Rassul Trading Co., run by Ghulam Rassul, and Niza Group, owned by theAyoub family. According to a U.S. report, Rassul, a Mozambican based ethnic South Asian, hasbeen smuggling hashish and heroin through Nampula province since 1993. 2012 InternationalNarcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR).94. 2012 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR)..95. Potal do Governo de Moçambique (2006), “Fuga ao fisco: Bachir já começou a pagar ao Estado”,available at http://www.portaldogoverno.gov.mz/noticias/governacao/setembro-2011-1/fugaao-fisco-bachir-ja-comecou-a-pagar-ao-estado/?searchterm=pgr;and http://allafrica.com/that Suleman was also a supplier of mobile telephones to theMozambican police, raising questions about the potential risksof having someone so implicated in the illicit sector providingcore hardware to the security services.The arrangement between political and criminal actorsin the mafia scenario may be based on “mutuality, w<strong>here</strong>the political and economic systems become dependentupon and subject to many of the services the criminalorganizations have to offer,” 96 while criminal organizationsmight themselves be dependent on state protectionor other resources. Control of state prerogatives andinstitutions may give these actors a competitive advantageover other criminal actors; 97 and it may allow politicalactors to reach into “realms beyond day-to-day politics,”often via clandestine commercial networks. 98 This doesnot necessarily require state actors to participate in illicitbusiness themselves. Instead it may be enough for themto acquiesce in the operation of criminal businesses by”refrain[ing] from enforcing the law or, alternatively,enforc[ing] it selectively against the rivals of a criminalorganization.” 99 The M.V. Benjamin case discussed in Box5, seems to hint at such a dynamic possibly emerging inGhana.Box 5: State Law Non-Enforcement: The M.V.Benjamin CaseIn 2006, Ghanaian security and law enforcement officialsreceived intelligence that a vessel called the MV Benjaminentering Ghanaian waters was carrying a shipment of cocaine.Seventy-six of a total of 77 cocaine parcels seized subsequentlydisappeared and the vessel was set ablaze. 100 Investigationby a government-instituted commission of inquiry headedby Chief Justice Georgina Wood implicated the Ghana PoliceService’s director of operations, Assistant Commissioner ofstories/201109090451.html.96. Stanley A. Pimentel (2003), “Mexico’s Legacy of Corruption,” in Roy Godson (ed.), Menace tosociety: political-criminal collaboration around the world, New Brunswick/London: TransactionPublishers, pp. 175-197.97. William Reno (2010), “Persistent Insurgencies and Warlords: Who Is Nasty, Who Is Nice, andWhy?” in Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas (eds.), Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to StateAuthority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty, Stanford CA: Stanford Security Studies, an Imprint ofStanford University Press, p. 60.98. Bayart, Ellis and Hibou (1999), The Criminalization of the State in Africa, International AffairsInstitute.99. Richards Snyder and Angelica Duran-Martinez (2009), “Does illegality breed violence? Drugtrafficking and state-sponsored protection rackets,” in Crime, Law and Social Change, Vol. 52, pp.253-273: p. 254.100. Ibid pp. 3. Between 2-3am on 26 April, two armed fishermen “…collected seventy-six sacksof cocaine from the BENJAMIN and conveyed the consignment to a landing site at KPONE.” It wassubsequently “…delivered to ASEM DARKEI SHERIFF and KWAK SEONG…who had them packedinto a waiting vehicle and driven away to an unknown destination.”37Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing CountriesNYUCIC

38Police (ACP) Kofi Boakye, and Detective Sergeant Samuel YawAmoah of the Ghana Police Service. 101 In a secretly recordedconversation at his house, ACP Boakye bragged that he hadraided the vessels with his men and stolen the cocaine. 102 Thetape further revealed that ACP Boakye was asked to stay in thebackground and sort out” the owners of the drugs in the eventthat they proved difficult. 103 The commission discovered fromthe tape ”other acts of corruption, abuse of office, professionalmisconduct and unsatisfactory service on the part of ACP KofiBoakye” and recommended his arrest and prosecution. 104In response to the commission’s recommendations, thegovernment of Ghana arrested and prosecuted some of thesuspects. Some received sentences of up to fifteen years. 105The most notable exception, however, was ACP Boakye;instead of being prosecuted, he was sent on extended leave,during which he studied at the Ghana Law School and laterpassed the Bar exam. The Police Council, comprising of theVice President, Minister of the Interior, Attorney-Generaland Minister of Justice, and th Inspector of General of Policeinvestigated ACP Boakye’s conduct, subsequently clearinghim of wrongdoing. On its last day office in January 2009, theoutgoing NPP government under John Agyekum Kufuourordered the Council to reinstate Boakye with full benefits. 106The same year, however, the NDC government of PresidentJohn Atta Mills removed Boakye from office again andindicated its intention to conduct a service enquiry into ACPBoakye’s involvement in the case. 107 In October 2009, ACPBoakye was nonetheless reinstated and appointed Director ofthe Police Education Unit. 108 He was subsequently promotedto the rank of Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCOP) andis currently serving as Director of Education at the PoliceTraining School in Accra. 109The research suggests that mafia scenarios seem likely toimpair the development of state capacity across the fiveareas for targeted action suggested in Section II and Table1 above. More specifically, they might affect:1) Political institutions and processes (Targeted Area1). Mafias look to control legislators so that they can shapethe rules of the game in their own interest. Mafia-likecriminal organizations also intervene in electoral processesas part of the “electoral machinery,” selling their support toone candidate (whether with money, the mobilization ofvotes, or through attacks against the other candidates ortheir supporters).2) Public procurement and contracting decisions(Targeted Area 1). Mafias may seek to steer public worksand service contracts to their own preferred recipients.3) Criminal justice and law enforcement (TargetedArea 2). A mafia’s control of enforcement institutions canallow it to protect its own, threaten rivals, and create aprotection racket.Development strategies dealing with mafia scenariosshould t<strong>here</strong>fore be especially attuned to the penetrationof criminal networks into legislative, electoral, and publicprocurement processes, and criminal justice and lawenforcement structures. They should also aim to strengthencivil resistance to organized crime (Targeted Area 4) andaddress the weak public service delivery capacity of thestate (Targeted Area 3) that creates opportunities forcriminal entrepreneurs in the first place.Different Kinds of Development Strategies Needed101. Georgina Wood Committee Report, p. 4.102. Ibid103. Ibid104. The Commission also found that Detective Sergeant Amoah, who possessed importantinformation that could have led to the immediate arrest of one of the traffickers, withheld suchinformation in exchange for a bribe of USD 3,000. Ibid, pp. 5-6.105. Myjoyonline.com, “Tagor, Abass Jailed 15 Years Each,” 14 September 2011, athttp://edition.myjoyonline.com/pages/news/200711/10871.php, (Accessed 29 May 2012).106. Modern Ghana, “Kofi Boakye Reinstated,” 6 January 2009, at http://www.modernghana.com/news/197584/1/kofi-boakye-reinstated.html, (Accessed 29 May 2012).107. Ghana Pundit, “Police Council to Consider Kofi Boakye’s Reinstatement,” 28 July 2009, athttp://ghanapundit.blogspot.com/2009/07/police-council-to-consider-kofi-boakyes.html(Accessed 4 June 2012 ). See also, Peacefmonline, “Mills Probes Kofi Boakye,” 10 October 2009, athttp://news.peacefmonline.com/news/200910/28779.php (Accessed 29 May 2012).108. Ghana Daily News, “Kofi Boakye Heads Police Depot,” 9 October 2009, at http://www.ghanadailynews.com/1085/kofi-boakye-heads-police-depot/ (Accessed 4 June 2012).109. Myjoyonline.com, “Kofi Boakye Promoted to DCOP,” 16 January 2012, at http://edition.myjoyonline.com/pages/news/201201/79771.php (Accessed 4 June 2012)The governance arrangements associated with eachorganized crime scenario are quite different – and differentdevelopmental strategies may be needed in each case.In the enclave scenario, development actors may need todeal with quasi-governmental institutions that stand apartfrom the state, and are controlled by political actors withsignificant links to organized crime. This is the scenario theinternational community faces in Jamaica, parts of LatinAmerica, and arguably may face in Nepal, not to mentionNYUCICResponding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries

Afghanistan, Somalia, and Myanmar. Developmentstrategies in this scenario will require finding ways to:a) strengthen local institutions without fracturing theunderlying political settlement; b) neutralize or integratepolitically and economically powerful local actors into theoverall political settlement, without incentivizing furthercriminal activity; and c) achieving effective and efficientdevelopment interventions without violating basicdevelopment principles such as do no harm or supportingactivity that violates human rights or international law.Since enclave scenarios involve a delicate balance of powerbetween the center and local enclaves, developmentstrategies should also anticipate overt confrontationbetween political actors, and moments of crisis or evenorganized violence. Further research on each of theseissues may be needed; further guidance to developmentactors on how to handle criminal actors will be needed.Ultimately, development planning for enclave scenarioswill be highly context-dependent and case-specific, andmust be undertaken both with a realistic and pragmaticassessment of the leverage and capacity of externaldonors to influence such dynamics, and with a view to thedo no harm principle.In the mafia scenario, development actors confront amore covert and clandestine game. As the Ghana andMozambique cases suggest, more may need to bespent within development programming on trackingand monitoring progress of the political environment,particularly opaque political and economic dynamicsthat might emerge in relation to electoral and legislativeprocesses. Criminal networks may be working within stateinstitutions to corrupt these processes – and to corruptdevelopment programs themselves. In the mafia scenario,particular attention should be paid to strengtheningpolitical processes and institutions, with efforts particularlygeared towards safeguarding the legitimacy and integrityof electoral, legislative, and public procurement andcontracting processes and law enforcement and judicialinstitutions. Efforts can also be aimed at bolstering verticalaccountability measures, particularly the role that nonstateactors such as media, civil society organizations,research entities, and academia can play in monitoringand reporting on organized crime related activity.While in the enclave scenario organized violence is central,in some settings mafias rely more heavily on corruption –while in others mafias can and do rely on armed violenceif they believe their essential interests are threatened. 110Their preference is however to remain hidden powers,operating from behind the scenes. 111 Only in extremecases will they resort to open confrontation with the state.Development actors will need to look for entry pointsw<strong>here</strong> they can reduce the influence of mafia actors withinthe political process, without necessarily precipitating aspike in violence. Identifying those entry points once againrequires highly context-dependent analysis and planning.Since one of the key services mafia groups are providingthe state is access to social networks, mafia groups maysee alternative forms of mediating governance – such astraditional authority and religious authority, as well ascivil society organizations – as more of a threat than stategovernment itself, with which it closely collaborates. 112They may manage this threat by corrupting and co-optingthose civil institutions. That in turn suggests, however,that strengthening ‘civil resistance’ to organized crimemay be a valuable entry-point for development strategiesin mafia scenarios. Civil resistance has been a key part ofthe anti-mafia strategy in Italy. 113 And Roy Godson haspointed to cases such as Sicily and Hong Kong in arguingthat “[c]hanges in culture can facilitate a breakup” of t<strong>here</strong>lationship between politics and organized crime. 114110. Anton Blok (2008), “Reflections on the Sicilian Mafia: Peripheries and Their Impact on<strong>Center</strong>s,” in Organized Crime: Culture, Markets and Politics, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 7-13: p. 7.111. Carlo Morselli (2010), “Assessing Vulnerable and Strategic Positions in a Criminal Network,” inJournal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 382-392.112. Blok, Anton (2008), “Reflections on the Sicilian Mafia: Peripheries and Their Impact onCentres,” p. 8.113. Parini, Ercole G. (2003), “Civil resistance: Society fights back,” in Felia Allum and RenateSiebert (eds.), Organized Crime and the Challenge to Democracy, Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 147-160.114. Godson, Roy (2003), “The Political-Criminal Nexus and Global Security,” in Roy Godson(ed.), Menace to society: political-criminal collaboration around the world, New Brunswick/London:Transaction Publishers, p. 13.39Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing CountriesNYUCIC

40IV. CONCLUSIONSAs noted in this report, organized crime is a problemaffecting many countries across the globe. It is not anemerging or new challenge, but rather a long-standingfeature of global society, very unfortunate for some,bringing illicit fortunes to others. Public and privatesector corruption, and the involvement of political actorsin criminal activity, are also long-standing features ofpolitical societies, regardless of country. These challengeshave become more complex because of organized crime’stransnational nature in a tightly connected world. Buildingresilience into governance systems against organizedcrime, political, and public sector corruption (and theirpotent mix) is critical for development and security.Indeed, in each of the case studies conducted for thisproject, one core element was a constant throughout:political and public sector corruption, including withinpolitical parties, the judiciary, and the security services,allow organized crime to flourish, undermining thelegitimacy of core governance institutions and theirresponsibility to develop and deliver effective social andeconomic policies at national and local levels. In somecountries, organized crime is used as an instrumentof politics, leaving citizens with few disincentives forengaging in, or benefiting from illicit activities. In othersit is a major driver of insecurity, leading to extreme levelsof gang-related violence and homicides or provokingimportant health and environmental risks. Delinkingorganized crime from politics while enhancing legitimategovernance and the delivery of services will remain themost important challenge for developing countries. Afocus on reducing the ‘thickness’ or the extent of the linksbetween governance and organized crime through effortsaimed at shaping responsible state, institutional andsocietal behavior with regards to organized crime whilesimultaneously ensuring the protection of fundamentalrights, should be the starting point.The pressures of the international financial crisis have leddonors to reduce development assistance in political andeconomic governance and strengthening the rule of law.If serious about organized crime, development actors (andtheir legislatures) must rethink assistance approachesin these areas, and how they can better support theintegration of organized-crime sensitive programminginto development and security strategies. In doing so, theywill also need to pay more attention to aid’s unintendedconsequences, inadvertently nurturing or reinforcingthe illicit economy and organized crime. These steps willrequire bold engagement. They will also require equallybold responses from national stakeholders, as long as theright safety nets are in place. Citizens should be at thecenter of these engagements.Development actors can play a smarter role in respondingto the impacts of organized crime and reducing theextent of its grip on governance in developing countries.They need smarter and more targeted analytical andprogramming frameworks to strategically determinewhen to engage and w<strong>here</strong> to focus efforts, particularlywith regard to addressing weaknesses identified ingovernance frameworks, identifying and prioritizingorganized crime actors and activities that do most harmin a given context, supporting deterrence rather thanzero-tolerance strategies, and ensuring that citizen needsand respect for fundamental human rights are centralto proposed remedies. Certain countries – the UK, US,Germany and Norway - are moving in this direction, atleast in terms of funding research, but better efforts needto be made to support national and regional stakeholdersbuild resilience against organized crime from within.Drawing extensively from the case studies and ourresearch, we have suggested five core areas w<strong>here</strong> webelieve donors can play a smarter role in responding tothe impacts of organized crime and reducing the extentof its grip on political processes (Section II). In supportof those efforts, we have laid out options for assessmentand analytical frameworks to help donors strategicallydetermine when to engage and w<strong>here</strong> to focus efforts(Section III). We have combined these under one broadorganized crime-sensitive programming framework (seefigure 3 below) to be used on its own or in conjunctionwith broader development strategies. Our hope is thatthe framework and the tools might assist developmentactors become smarter at programming for developmentin countries w<strong>here</strong> organized crime and corruptionNYUCICResponding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries

are prevalent, or w<strong>here</strong> t<strong>here</strong> are strong indicationsthat organized crime is emerging. With the post-2015development agenda negotiations coming to an end andnew development actors and development assistancearrangements emerging, it is certainly an opportune timefor discussions and debate on these issues.41Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing CountriesNYUCIC

42Organized Crime Sensitive Programming FrameworkASSESSMENT & ANALYSIS TOOLS TO INFORM PROGRAMMING1. Political economy assessment to determine, for example government complicity or opposition to organized crime; sources of support or tolernace oforganized crime; sources of oppossition to organzied crime, and stakeholder interests. 1152. Typology analysis for a deeper assessment of the nature of realtions between organized crime and political elites.115. USAID (2013)Areas for Targeted Action1.PROTECTING THE POLITICAL 2. MODERNIZING AND 3. STRENGTHENING ECONOMIC AND 4. ENGAGING CIVIL SOCIETY & THE 5. DEEPENING THEPROCESSSTRENGTHENING CJ & LAW SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT POLICYMEDIAKNOWLEDGE BASEENFORCEMENTSpecific Activities1. PROTECTING THE POLITICAL PROCESS1.1 AS A MEANS TO SAFEGUARD THE LEGITIMACY AND INTEGRITY OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS AND POLITICAL CONTESTATION FROM ORGANIZEDCRIME1.1.1 SUPPORT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASELINE DATA COLLECTION, THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEYS AND RELATED MECHANISMS TO REGULARLYMONITOR AND REPORT ON HOW ORGANIZED CRIME IS AFFECTING THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT.1.1.2 SUPPORT THE MONITORING OF JUDICIAL PROCESSES OR ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRIES IN WHICH PUBLIC OFFICIALS OR POLITICAL AND BUSINESS POLITICAL ELITESHAVE BEEN IMPLICATED IN ORGANIZED CRIMINAL ACTIVITY IN ORDER TO BUILD CONSTITUENCIES AGAINST IMPUNITY AND FOR REFORM.NYUCICResponding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries

1.1.3 SUPPORT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MULTI-PARTY POLICY PLATFORMS ON ORGANIZED CRIME .1.1.4 PROVIDE ON-GOING SUPPORT TO THE CONDUCT OF NATIONAL, REGIONAL OR INTER-REGIONAL MEETINGS OF INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSIONS ORELECTORAL TRIBUNALS.1.1.5 SUPPORT SPECIAL LEGISLATIVE COMMISSIONS IN THE DRAFTING OF LEGISLATION ON PARTY CAMPAIGN FINANCING, POLITICAL PARTY LAWS, ASSET DISCLOSURE,MEDIA LEGISLATION (REGARDING CAMPAIGN CEILINGS) ETC. AND THE MONITORING AND REPORTING ON THEIR IMPLEMENTATION.1.1.6 ENCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL PARTY CODES OF CONDUCT THAT RULE OUT RECOURSE TO VIOLENCE, AND CONDITION SUPPORT TO THE ELECTORALPROCESS OR OTHER STRATEGIC AREAS TO THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT. SIMILAR APPROACHES CAN BE ENCOURAGED TO GUIDE THECONDUCT OF ELECTION CAMPAIGNS, AND INTERNAL PARTY FUNCTIONING, WITH THE AIM OF SAFEGUARDING THESE INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES FROM ILLICITFUNDING.1.1.7 SUPPORT THE DEVELOPMENT OR STRENGTHENING OF INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALIST CAPACITY, AND PROVIDE SECURITY SAFETY NETS SUCH AS ASYLUMWHEN TARGETED BY CRIMINALS OR BUSINESS AND POLITICAL ELITES OR TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS SUCH AS MONITORING CIRCUMVENTION TOOLS TO AVOIDSURVEILLANCE.1.1.8 SUPPORT THE CREATION OF INCENTIVE STRUCTURES THAT REWARD THE CONDUCT OF ‘CLEAN’ ELECTORAL PROCESSES AND ‘CLEAN’ PUBLIC OFFICIALS.1.1.9 SUPPORT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INTER- AND INTRA-REGIONAL PLATFORMS ON DIFFERENT FORMS OF ORGANIZED CRIME AND HOW THEY ARE AFFECTING SOCIETY.1.2 AS A MEANS TO SAFEGUARD THE LEGITIMACY AND INTEGRITY OF THELEGISLATIVE PROCESS FROM ORGANIZED CRIME1.2.1 MONITOR (OR SUPPORT CIVIL SOCIETY AND JOURNALIST EFFORTS TO MONITOR) LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES AROUND IMPORTANT PIECES OF ORGANIZED CRIME-RELATED LEGISLATION, AND SHARE INFORMATION ON THESE PROCESSES WITH NATIONAL STAKEHOLDERS AND ACROSS DONORS. SUCH PROCESSES CAN HELPIDENTIFY INSIDER SPOILERS AND HELP DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS POLITICAL APPETITE TO PASS IMPORTANT PIECES OF LEGISLATION DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLYRELATED TO ORGANIZED CRIME.1.2.2 PROVIDE DIRECT SUPPORT TO THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, INCLUDING THROUGH INVESTMENT IN RESOURCES. SUCH EFFORTS COULD INCLUDE ENSURINGTHAT LEGISLATORS AND LEGISLATIVE STAFF HAVE ACCESS TO RESEARCH/INFORMATION ON ORGANIZED CRIME AND ITS PERCEIVED IMPACTS; SUPPORTING THEORGANIZATION OF CLOSED-DOOR EXPERT SEMINARS AND WORKSHOPS.1.2.3 STRENGTHEN THE ACCESS OF CIVIL SOCIETY, POLICY THINK-TANKS, JOURNALISTS, ACADEMIA ETC. TO THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, INCLUDING THROUGHSUPPORTING EFFORTS TO ENHANCE REPORTING ON LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES, AND COMMISSIONING IN-COUNTRY RESEARCH THAT CAN INFORM THE DEBATE ONORGANIZED CRIME AND ITS RELATED IMPACTS AT CRUCIAL TIMES IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS.43Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing CountriesNYUCIC

441.3 AS A MEANS TO SAFEGUARD THE INTEGRITY OF PUBLIC TENDERING/PROCUREMENT PROCESSES1.3.1 SUPPORT EFFORTS AIMED AT BOLSTERING THE RESILIENCE OF NATIONAL PROCUREMENT BODIES, PARTICULARLY WHERE THERE IS STRONG EVIDENCE OFMONOPOLY OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS BY ILLICIT ACTORS, OR POLITICAL ACTORS USING PUBLIC CONTRACTS AS LEVERAGE TO SECURE THE SUPPORT OFCRIMINAL GROUPS FOR LEVERAGING VOTER TURNOUT OR OTHER POLITICAL ENDS.1.3.2 SUPPORT EFFORTS AIMED AT GUARANTEEING TRANSPARENCY OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PROCESSES, FOR EXAMPLE BY SUPPORTING THE DEVELOPMENTAND PASSAGE OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION BILLS, SUPPORTING EFFORTS TO REGULARLY PUBLISH INFORMATION RELATED TO PUBLIC PROCUREMENT ANDCONTRACTING PROCESSES, AND SUPPORTING CIVIL SOCIETY AND MEDIA EFFORTS TO MONITOR AND REPORT ON THESE PROCESSES. THE SUPPORT OFTECHNOLOGY COMPANIES SHOULD BE LEVERAGED TO SUPPORT THE DEVELOPMENT OF EASILY ACCESSIBLE AND NIMBLE MONITORING TOOLS. EXPERIENCES CANBE DRAWN FROM SMART APPROACHES ALREADY IN PLACE SUCH AS IPAIDABRIBE.COM.1.3.3 STRENGTHEN THE CAPACITY OF PUBLIC SERVICES BY ENHANCING SKILLS AND SUPPORTING REFORM OF THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PROCESS.2. MODERNIZING AND STRENGTHENING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND LAW ENFORCEMENT2.1 SUPPORT THE STRENGTHENING OF SPECIALIZED AGENCIES SUCH AS THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR DEALING WITH ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIMES, AND THEESTABLISHMENT OF SPECIALIZED CRIME UNITS. ENSURING STRICT AND CONTINUOUS VETTING PROCEDURES IN RECRUITMENT AND PERFORMANCE REVIEWPROCESSES AS WELL POST ASSIGNMENT INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES FOR THEMSELVES AND FAMILY MEMBERS CAN HELP SAFEGUARD THESE UNITS FROMCORRUPTION, MANIPULATION, AND INTERFERENCE, AND PREVENT INDIVIDUAL OPERATORS FROM GOING ROGUE.2.2 IN CASES WHERE IT IS EVIDENT THAT CRIMINALS ARE KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN PROVIDING SERVICES TO CITIZENS, SPECIALIZED LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIESSHOULD WORK MORE CLOSELY WITH DEVELOPMENT ACTORS AND NATIONAL AUTHORITIES TO FILL THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC VOID LEFT BY SUCCESSFUL LAWENFORCEMENT EFFORTS. CITIZEN SECURITY EXPERIENCES FROM BRAZIL’S FAVELAS OR JAMAICA’S GARRISON TOWNS CAN BE EXPLORED FOR THIS PURPOSE,BUT LOCAL CONTEXT SHOULD DRIVE THE RESPONSE AS VIOLENCE IS NOT ALWAYS THE LOGICAL OUTCOME OF THE VOID AND THEREFORE IMPACT CAN BE MOREDIFFICULT TO DETERMINE.2.3 USE POLITICAL ECONOMY ASSESSMENT TOOLS (SEE SECTION III) MORE EFFECTIVELY TO DEEPEN UNDERSTANDING OF HOW POLITICAL AND BUSINESS ELITESPROVIDE ENTRY POINTS FOR ORGANIZED CRIMINALS AND FOR WHAT PURPOSE (POLITICAL/IDEOLOGICAL, FINANCIAL), AND TO IDENTIFY TARGETED LAWENFORCEMENT INITIATIVES THAT RAISE THE BUSINESS AND POLITICAL COSTS OF ENGAGING IN ILLICIT ACTIVITY.2.4 INVOLVE THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN POLICY DISCUSSIONS AND DEBATES REGARDING HOW TO COMBAT ORGANIZED CRIME, AND SUPPORT LEARNING FROMOTHER EXPERIENCES SUCH AS THE BUSINESS AGAINST CRIME OF SOUTH AFRICA (BAC(SA)) INITIATIVE. BAC(SA)’S ORIGINAL PURPOSE WAS TO WORK WITHTHE GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY ON SPECIFIC CRIME PREVENTION PROJECTS THAT IMPACTED ON THE COUNTRY’S TRANSFORMATION BY INCREASINGCONFIDENCE, INVESTMENT AND JOB CREATION. IT IS STILL ACTIVE TODAY FOCUSING ON ELIMINATING CRIME WITHIN BUSINESS AND SUPPORTING GOVERNMENTRESPONSES TO CRIME.NYUCICResponding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries

2.5 USE SECTOR SPECIFIC POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS TO DEVELOP A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE INFORMATION TELECOMMUNICATIONS (ICT) SECTOR, HOWORGANIZED CRIMINAL GROUPS MIGHT BE USING ICTS TO ADVANCE THEIR GOALS WITHIN A COUNTRY, AND WHO WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE COMPLICITIN THIS ACTIVITY. MONITORING OF JUDICIAL PROCESSES AND EVIDENCE TABLED IN THE INVESTIGATION LEADING TO A TRIAL MIGHT PROVIDE BACK-DOORENTRY POINTS TO UNDERSTANDING THE LEVEL OF SOPHISTICATION OF CRIMINAL GROUPS, AND WHICH PUBLIC OR PRIVATE ENTITIES (INCLUDING TECHNOLOGYCOMPANIES) MIGHT BE DIRECTLY OR INADVERTENTLY SUPPORTING THEIR WORK.2.6 SUPPORT POLICY DEBATES AT THE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL LEVEL WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT, THE JUDICIARY, AND SPECIALIZED AGENCIES ON HOW TO BETTERTARGET ORGANIZED CRIMINALS, INCLUDING THROUGH EFFECTIVE DETERRENCE STRATEGIES, SELECTIVE TARGETING, SEQUENTIAL INTERDICTION EFFORTS, AND THESTRENGTHENING OF PROSECUTORIAL CAPACITY.2.7 WHERE THERE ARE IMPORTANT INCIDENCES OF DRUG TRAFFICKING AND CONSUMPTION, SUPPORT DISCUSSIONS WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT ON HOW TOINTRODUCE HARM REDUCTION POLICIES AND PRACTICES TOWARDS PEOPLE WHO INJECT DRUGS, AND HOW TO APPLY HARM REDUCTION PRINCIPLES TO THEPOLICING OF RETAIL MARKETS2.8 INVEST IN MAPPING JUDICIAL PROCESSES AND NON-JUDICIAL COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY REGARDING THE INVOLVEMENT OF STATE OFFICIALS IN ORGANIZEDCRIMINAL ACTIVITY AS A MEANS TO BETTER UNDERSTAND WEAKNESSES AND GAPS IN LEGISLATION AND IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS, AND TO IDENTIFYAPPETITE FOR REFORM.2.9 SUPPORT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND INTER-REGIONAL PLATFORMS VIA EXISTING ORGANIZATIONS AS A MEANS TO ENHANCECOOPERATION BETWEEN POLICY MAKERS, LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND ACADEMIA IN RESPONDING TO ORGANIZED CRIME.2.10 INVEST IN MONITORING AND ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF EXTERNAL EFFORTS TO ENHANCE THE CAPACITY OR THE JUDICIARY AND SECURITY SERVICES TO RESPONDTO ORGANIZED CRIME.3. SUPPORTING SMART AND EMPIRICALLY INFORMED CRIME-SENSITIVE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES3.1 STRENGTHEN THE CAPACITY OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND COMMUNITY GROUPS TO ENGAGE THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL ACTORS ON ORGANIZED CRIME-RELATEDISSUES AT NATIONAL AND LOCAL LEVEL.3.2 MAP SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF EFFORTS TO COUNTER ORGANIZED CRIME. IN THIS REGARD, DONORS CAN INVEST MORE IN UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACTS OFFORMALIZING OR PROHIBITING OF INFORMAL OR ILLICIT MARKETS.3.3 SUPPORT PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND DEBATE ON THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SMARTER DRUG TREATMENT POLICIES IN RESPONSE TO DRUGDEPENDENCY, AND PRIORITIZING CITIZENS’ HEALTH AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OVER CRIMINALIZATION.45Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing CountriesNYUCIC

463.4 INCREASE SUPPORT TO SPECIALIZED BODIES RESPONSIBLE FOR INVESTIGATING, MONITORING, AND PROSECUTING ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES SUCH AS ILLEGALLOGGING, ILLEGAL TRADE IN WILDLIFE, AND E-WASTE DUMPING.3.5 INCREASE SUPPORT TO GOVERNMENTS TO DEVELOP MORE EFFECTIVE LIVELIHOOD OPPORTUNITIES TO PREVENT AND RESPOND TO THE HARMFUL EFFECTS OF ILLICITRESOURCE EXTRACTION, PARTICULARLY WATER BODIES THAT ARE THE ONLY SOURCE OF POTABLE WATER FOR SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF PEOPLE; AND AS A MEANSTO REDUCE ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME.3.6 INVEST IN UNDERSTANDING THE INCENTIVES DRIVING YOUNG PEOPLE TO ENGAGE IN CYBER CRIMINAL ACTIVITY, AND THE IMPACT CYBER CRIME HAS ONEMPLOYMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH.4.1 SUPPORT EFFORTS TO SECURE ASYLUM FOR THOSE WHO ARE TARGETS OF THREATS, AND LEVERAGE THE SUPPORT OF TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES TO PROVIDEMONITORING CIRCUMVENTION TOOLS AND TOOLS TO SUPPORT SAFE AND RAPID REPORTING.4.2 SUPPORT EFFORTS BY CIVIL SOCIETY OR JOINT GOVERNMENT-CIVIL SOCIETY EFFORTS TO CONDUCT CAMPAIGNS AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME AND POLITICAL ANDPUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPTION, INCLUDING AROUND ELECTORAL PROCESSES.4.3 SUPPORT EVIDENCE-BASED DEBATES ON CORE POLICIES THAT HAVE A STRONG IMPACT ON GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT ACROSS COUNTRIES.4. ENGAGING CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE MEDIA5.1 SUPPORT EFFORTS AIMED AT PROVIDING DIFFERENT SOURCES FOR COLLECTING AND MONITORING CRIME AND FINANCIAL DATA. DONORS SHOULD EXPLOREPOTENTIAL PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR, INCLUDING MAJOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES AS A MEANS TO LEAP-FROG SOME OF THE TRADITIONAL CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED IN THE COLLECTION AND PROCESSING OF BASELINE DATA AND SUPPORT MORE PARTICIPATORYFORMS OF DATA COLLECTION.5. DEEPENING THE KNOWLEDGE BASE5.2 INVEST IN STRENGTHENING THE CAPACITY OF NATIONAL AND REGIONAL POLICY THINK-TANKS AND ACADEMIA TO CONDUCT RESEARCH ON ORGANIZED CRIME.5.3 INVEST IN MAPPING DEVELOPMENT ACTOR EFFORTS AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME (PARTICULARLY SUPPORT TO JUSTICE AND SECURITY INSTITUTIONS ANDLEGISLATIVE BODIES) AND ASSESSING THEIR EFFECTIVENESS. IN PARTICULAR, AND IN RESPECT OF THE PRINCIPLES OF SHARED ACCOUNTABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY,DONORS SHOULD ALSO BECOME MORE TRANSPARENT AND ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE LIMITED IMPACT OF THE SIGNIFICANT RESOURCES SPENT ON SUPPORTINGBETTER POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.5.4 INVEST IN STRENGTHENING INTERNAL [DEVELOPMENT AGENCY] ANALYTICAL CAPACITY AND TOOLS AND THOSE OF NATIONAL STAKEHOLDERS TO BETTERUNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF ORGANIZED CRIME AND ASSOCIATED IMPACTSFigure 3NYUCICResponding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries

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