Seven Pines Specific Rules - MMP Gamers Archive

Seven Pines CWB #121.7 NorthNorth is toward the 1.xx hexrow ofeach map. Map D is in the west, Map F is inthe east.2.0 Union SpecialRules2.1 Historical McClellanRestrictionsFor all of the restrictions listed below,note that they remain in effect even ifMcClellan becomes a casualty.2.1a Union Anti-initiative Ratings. Forany initiative that would require Uniontroops to attack, McClellan has an antiinitiativeof -2. For orders involvingmovement or defense (only), McClellanhas no anti-initiative. No Union corpscommander has anti-initiative.2.1b McClellan’s Paranoia. McClellanwas convinced that the Rebel army greatlyoutnumbered his own forces at all times.Therefore, he was extremely cautious aboutany aggressive move made by his ownforces, always alert to an enemycounterattack.To reflect this fear, subtract 2 fromany Corps Attack Stoppage Check (if usingthe defensive orders option, do not use thismodifier for defensive checks.)2.2 Attachments andDetachmentsNo Union Corps can attach units toanother corps. A corps can detach up to onedivision to operate on Divisional Goals.Brigades cannot be detached or givenDivisional Goals.2.3 Heintzelman inCommandFor scenarios 5.1 through 5.5,Heintzelman, not McClellan, is in commandof the Union troops on the map. A replleader—not one of the divisioncommanders—is commanding the 3rdCorps, and all orders from Heintzelman tothe 3rd Corps must go through the regularorder issue and acceptance procedures.2.4 Union options2.4a Grover’s Brigade. In any scenariothat calls for the arrival of Hooker’s Division(2-3) allow 1-2-3 to enter with it. Thisoption gives the CSA player 1 VPThis brigade was left behind to guardthe Union rear, where it proved unneeded.It was a fine unit, and could have been putto good use in the battleline.2.4b More rapid response of 3rd Corps.In any scenario that has 3rd Corps unitslisted as reinforcements, move the arrivaltime for Hooker’s Division (2-3) units up 4game-turns. This option gives the CSAplayer 5 VPThe Union army was alert to the peril4th Corps was in, and had taken steps tosupport it. 3rd Corps was specifically taskedwith supporting Keyes in the event of anattack. However, Hooker’s Division wasleft further from the battlefield, and couldhave been stationed much closer.2.4c McClellan Attacks! Ignore thehistorical McClellan restrictions listed in2.1a and 2.1b. This option gives theConfederate Player 2 VPThe historical McClellan restrictionsare pretty limiting for the Union player.This option simply assumes that McClellanshowed a little more aggressiveness thanwas the case historically.3.0 ConfederateSpecial Rules3.1 CSA CommandarrangementsThe CSA forces are organized intowings, which function exactly like corps inthe game. Huger’s Division (Hu Division)does not belong to any wing, and can onlybe given orders via Divisional Goal directlyfrom the Army HQ.3.2 CSA separate unitsThe CSA player has three separateartillery units, designated ANV. At anytime, each of these artillery units must tracecommand radii to any friendly divisioncommander, and can act upon any ordersthat division may have. Actual issued ordersare not needed to switch divisions, etc,simply tracing radii to another divisioncommander during the command phase isall that is needed.3.3 Attachments andDetachmentsNo unit can attach subordinate units.Divisions can detach individual brigades(or be detached themselves) to operate underDivisional Goals.3.4 ConfederateOptions3.4a The Longstreet Two-step. In allthe Seven Pines scenarios, Longstreet israted 0. The CSA player may exercise thevariant option of flipping Longstreet to his“4” rated side, instead. Exercising thisoption would give the Union player 5 VP.Somewhere between Johnston andLongstreet communications broke downentirely. What exactly happened will neverbe entirely clear, given the verbal nature ofJohnston’s orders, but the results weredisastrous for Johnston’s plan of attack.Usually, Longstreet had a gift for graspingthe details of a plan clearly, and here weallow him the benefit of the doubt.3.4b The rest of the Left Wing. In anyof the scenarios which include the LeftWing, under Smith, players may addMagruder’s Division (M-L) comprised of6 Brigades of infantry and 2 artillery units.These units may set up within 6 hexes ofthe Left HQ, but no closer than 5 hexes toany Union unit. This option awards theUSA player 10 VP.These troops were busy guarding thecrossings of the Chickahominy so that therest of the Union army did not cross thatriver and march directly on Richmond.Their use would be a much more daringgamble by Johnston, and require a swift,decisive victory to preclude just such acrossing. This option heavily favors theCSA Player.4.0 VictoryVictory is decided via theaccumulation of points by each side basedon their performances. Victory Points areawarded in four categories: for overall lossesinflicted on the enemy, for terrain capturedon the map, for structural damage inflictedon enemy organizations, and for use ofoptions. At the end of each scenario, totalup the Victory Points awarded to eachplayer based on the tables below. Subtractthe Confederate Victory Points from theUnion Victory Points, and using thisdifference, check the specific scenario todetermine the level of victory.Page 2

The Gamers, Inc.4.1 Victory Points Awarded for TerrainPoints are awarded for control of specific hexes on maps D and E. To control a hex,the player must have a unit occupying that hex, or have been the last player to pass a unitthrough that hex. Points are only awarded at the end of the scenario.Hex USA Award CSA AwardD27.19 5 0D29.11 5 0D10.15 5 0Each Urban Hex 10 0E5.06 3 0E28.01 3 0E45.16 3 1E26.20 2 3E19.16 2 3E27.35 0 10E8.32 0 5E8.23 0 54.2 Victory Points Awarded for CasualtiesThese awards are given only for permanent losses. Ignore stragglers and artillerylosses in this calculation. Then compare the total to the chart below, and give the opposingplayer that number of victory points. For instance, if the Union army lost 57 permanentcasualties, the CSA Player would get 10 VP.CSA Losses (with Optionals) USA Losses VP Award17 24 19 125 36 28 334 48 37 543 60 46 751 72 55 1068 96 74 1485 120 92 19102 144 111 25119 168 130 31136 192 148 39153 216 167 504.3 Victory Points Awarded for WreckedFormationsVictory points are also awarded for wrecking larger formations. Awards are made foreach division of either army that is permanently wrecked (do not count stragglers) at the endof the scenario. Each division is worth the number of points given on the chart below.CSA Divisions VP Award USA Divisions VP AwardL-R 6 1-2 3dH-R 4 2-2 3Hu Div 2 2-3 3S-L 5 3-3 3M-L (opt) 5 1-4 22-4 25.0 Scenarios5.1 Scenario 1: May 31st.This scenario covers the historical action onMay 31st, and as such is quite limited in scope.Despite the initial CSA advantage in numbers, playerswill quickly see how few troops were actually sentforward to engage the Federals; namely the fourbrigades of D H Hill’s division, virtually unsupportedby the vast force arrayed behind them.General Information:First Turn: 1:00 p.m. May 31stLast Turn: 8:00 p.m. May 31stScenario Length: 15 TurnsMaps used: D and EFirst Player: CSAUnion Information:Set Up:2-4, 4b—w/i 2 E22.131-4, 4b(3) 4b—w/i 1 E26.204 HQ and Supply, Keyes—E27.232-3-3, 3-3-3, 3b—w/i 2 E26.31Artillery Ammunition: 30Reinforcements:3 p.m. May 31stHeintzelman, 3 HQ and Supply E27.35Sumner, 2 HQ, Sedgwick, 1-2-2 E1.351-3-3 E25.353:30 p.m2-2-2 E1.35Richardson, 1-1-2 E6.344:00 p.m3-2-2, 2 Corps supply E1.352-1-2 E6.344:30 p.m.3-1-2 E1.355:00 p.m2b E1.356:00 p.mHooker, 2-3 Division, 3b E27.35Page 3

Seven Pines CWB #12Orders:4 Corps—defend the vicinity of SevenPines3 Corps—move to the support of 4Corps, and help defend Seven Pines,counterattack if necessary to restore theSeven Pines position.3-3—Has a divisional goal as statedfor 3 Corps order, above, reverts to theCorps command when its HQ arrives.2 Corps—Move to vicinity of FairOaks and defend that position, and protectthe flank of the Seven Pines position.Any reinforcements that arrive out ofcommand range, have standing orders tomove to their join their HQ and becomesubject to any orders that its commandmight have.Confederate Information:Set Up:G-dH-R—E24.08 ex E23.08Ro-dH-R—E26.08 ex E27.09Rs-dH-R—E26.07 ex E27.08F-dH-R—E24.06 ex E23.06dH-Rb, D H Hill—E25.07Hu Div—w/i 3 E48.10Right HQ and Supply—D27.20L-R—w/i 3 D27.20Hm-S-L, Ht-S-L—w/i 1 E2.10rest of S-L—w/i 2 E5.05Left HQ and Supply, ANV HQ and Supply,3xANVb—w/i 2 E5.05Artillery Ammunition: 35Reinforcements: NoneOrders:dH-R—has a divisional goal to attackto capture Seven Pines, and then to continuethe attack to capture the crossroads at E26.31L-R—P-L-R has a Divisional Goalto move to the Rail Road at D17.25 anddefend. W-L-R, C-L-R, and Pr-L-R havedivisional goals to move to join Huger’sDivision (Hu Div) and support it if attacked.No other units of the division have divisionalgoalsHu Div—has a Divisional Goal todefend the Charles City RoadRight Wing—The RW has no ordersLeft Wing—attack towards Fair Oaksin support of dH-R attack. Once Fair Oaksis captured, the attack will continue tocapture Orchard Station. These orders havea D2 status, and the Confederate playercannot start rolling for delay removal untilthe 2:00 p.m. turn command phase.VictoryUSA Massive Victory 10 or moreUSA Major Victory 7 to 9USA Minor Victory 3 to 6Draw -2 to 2CSA Minor Victory -3 to -6CSA Major Victory -7 to -9CSA Massive Victory -10 or lessHistorically, the result was a draw, with afinal value of -1. The USA won 7 VP forCSA losses, 4 for wrecking dH-R, andnone for terrain. The CSA won 5 VP forUSA losses, and 7 for terrain5.2 Scenario 2: May31st, the failedapproachThis scenario recreates all of thehistorical action of May 31st, including theconfusion within the CSA command whichso badly disarranged Johnston’s originalplan. The CSA player will find himselfstuck with some strange orders indeed.General Information:First Turn: 6:00 a.m. May 31stLast Turn: 8:00 p.m. May 31st.Scenario Length: 29 TurnsMaps Used: D and EFirst Player: CSAUnion Information:Set Up:2-4, 4b—w/i 2 E22.131-4, 4b(3) 4b—w/i 1 E26.204 HQ and Supply, Keyes—E27.232-3-3, 3-3-3, 3b—w/i 2 E26.31Artillery Ammunition: 30Reinforcements:The following Union reinforcementsdo not have a specific appearance timelisted. Instead, they have a number—+2,for example. This number is the number ofturns following the first turn of any Unionunit being fired upon from a range of 3hexes or less that the listed units appear.For instance, if the first such fire occurs atNoon, then all units with the reinforcementcode of “+2” appear at 1:00 p.m.+2 Heintzelman, 3 HQ and Supply E27.35Sumner, 2 HQ, Sedgwick, 1-2-2 E1.351-3-3 E25.35+3 2-2-2 E1.35Richardson, 1-1-2 E6.34+4 3-2-2, 2 Corps supply E1.352-1 E6.34+5 3-1-2 E1.35+6 2b E1.35+8 Hooker, 2-3 division, 3b E27.35+15 2x 2b E1.35Orders:4 Corps—defend the vicinity of Seven Pines.3 Corps—move to the support of 4 Corps, andhelp defend Seven Pines, counterattack if necessaryto restore the Seven Pines position.3-3—Has a divisional goal as stated for 3 Corpsorder, above, reverts to the Corps command when itsHQ arrives.2 Corps—Move to vicinity of Fair Oaks anddefend that position, and protect the flank of theSeven Pines position.Any reinforcements that arrive out of commandrange, have standing orders to move to their jointheir HQ and become subject to any orders theircommand may have.Confederate Information:Set Up:Ro-dH-R—E48.10dH-R—w/i 3 D27.22L-R —w/i 3 D10.15Left HQ and Supply—D10.15S-L —w/i 3 D6.01Right HQ and Supply—D6.01ANV HQ and Supply, 3x ANVb—w/i 2 D11.10Artillery Ammunition: 35Reinforcements:7:30 a.m.—Hu Division—D17.00Orders:L-R—has a Divisional Goal to move west viathe Nine-Mile Road to the Darbytown Road, andthen southeast to cross Gillie’s Creek at hex D26.07.Once all units are across, the division must move offthe road and halt, and wait for all of Hu Div to pass.Once Hu Div has cleared the Williamsburg Road,the L-R is to move via the Williamsburg Road to thevicinity of D27.30, halt and defend the WilliamsburgRoad.Hu Division—has a Divisional Goal to movevia the Darbytown Road, cross Gillie’s Creek viahex D26.07—After L-R has crossed and cleared theroad—proceed to the Williamsburg Road. Fromthere, the division must move to the Charles CityRoad, and advance to hex E48.10, where it willPage 4

Seven Pines CWB #12Historically, the result was a draw, with a finalvalue of -1. The USA won 7 VP for CSA losses,4 for wrecking dH-R, and none for terrain. TheCSA won 5 VP for USA losses, and 7 for terrain5.4 Scenario 4: The Battleof Seven PinesThis scenario recreates the full two days’battle of Seven Pines, warts and all. TheConfederate initial orders make it an especiallydifficult scenario for the CSA player.General Information:First Turn: 1:00 p.m. May 31st.Last Turn: 8:00 p.m. June 1st.Scenario Length: 55 Turns.Maps used: D and EFirst Player: CSAUnion Information:Set Up:2-4, 4b—w/i 2 E22.131-4, 4b(3) 4b—w/i 1 E26.204 HQ and Supply, Keyes—E27.232-3-3, 3-3-3, 3b—w/i 2 E26.31Artillery Ammunition: 55Reinforcements:3 p.m. May 31stHeintzelman, 3 HQ and SupplyE27.35Sumner, 2 HQ, Sedgwick, 1-2-2 E1.351-3-3E25.353:30 p.m.2-2-2 E1.35Richardson, 1-1-2 E6.344:00 p.m.3-2-2, 2 Corps supply E1.352-1-2 E6.344:30 p.m3-1-2 E1.355:00 p.m.2b E1.356:00 p.m.Hooker, 2-3 Division, 3bE27.351:00 a.m. June 1st2x 2b E1.35Orders:4 Corps—defend the vicinity of SevenPines.3 Corps—move to the support of 4Corps, and help defend Seven Pines,counterattack if necessary to restore theSeven Pines position.3-3—has a divisional goal as statedfor 3 Corps order, above, reverts to theCorps command when its HQ arrives.2 Corps—move to vicinity of FairOaks and defend that position, and protectthe flank of the Seven Pines position.Any reinforcements that arrive out ofcommand range, have standing orders tomove to their join their HQ and becomesubject to any orders their command mayhave.Confederate Information:Set Up:G-dH-R—E24.08 ex E23.08Ro-dH-R—E26.08 ex E27.09Rs-dH-R—E26.07 ex E27.08F-dH-R—E24.06 ex E23.06dH-Rb, D H Hill—E25.07Hu Div—w/i 3 E48.10Right HQ and Supply—D27.20L-R—w/i 3 D27.20Hm-S-L, Ht-S-L—w/i 1 E2.10rest of S-L—w/i 2 E5.05Left HQ and Supply, ANV HQ and Supply,3x ANVb—w/i 2 E5.05Artillery Ammunition: 45Reinforcements: NoneOrders:dH-R—has a divisional goal to attackto capture Seven Pines, and then to continuethe attack to capture the crossroads atE26.31.L-R—P-L-R has a Divisional Goalto move to the Rail Road at D17.25 anddefend. W-L-R, C-L-R, and Pr-L-R havedivisional goals to move to join Huger’sDivison (Hu Div) and support it if attacked.No other units of the division have divisionalgoals.Hu Div—has a Divisional Goal todefend the Charles City Road.Right Wing—The RW has no orders.Left Wing—attack towards Fair Oaksin support of dH-R attack. Once Fair Oaksis captured, the attack will continue tocapture Orchard Station. These orders havea D2 status, and the CSA player may notstart rolling for delay removal until the2:00 p.m. turn command phase.VictoryUSA Massive Victory 10 or moreUSA Major Victory 7 to 9USA Minor Victory 3 to 6Draw -2 to 2CSA Minor Victory -3 to -6CSA Major Victory -7 to -9CSA Massive Victory -10 or lessHistorically, the result was a draw, with afinal value of 0. The USA won 10 VP forCSA losses, 4 for wrecking dH-R, andnone for terrain. The CSA won 7 VP forUSA losses, and 7 for terrain5.5 Scenario 5:Johnston’s OffensiveThis scenario presents Johnston’soriginal offensive scheme, a two prongedattack on Fair Oaks and Seven Pines by theconverging forces of the Right Wing,supported by Smith’s men of the Left Wing.It. more than any other, represents the battleSeven Pines should have been.General Information:First Turn: 6:00 a.m. May 31stLast Turn: 8:00 p.m. June 1stScenario Length: 69 TurnsMaps used: D and E (and F, if desired)First Player: CSAUnion Information:Set Up:2-4, 4b—w/i 2 E22.131-4, 4b(3) 4b—w/i 1 E26.204 HQ and Supply, Keyes—E27.232-3-3, 3-3-3, 3b—w/i 2 E26.31Artillery Ammunition: 55Reinforcements:The following Union reinforcementsdo not have a specific appearance timelisted. Instead, they have a number—+2,for example. This number is the number ofturns following the first turn of any Unionunit being fired upon from a range of 3hexes or less that the listed units appear.For instance, if the first such fire occurs atNoon, then all units with the reinforcementcode of “+2” appear at 1:00 p.m.Page 6

The Gamers, Inc.+2 Heintzelman, 3 HQ and Supply E27.35Sumner, 2 HQ, Sedgwick, 1-2-2 E1.351-3-3 E25.35+3 2-2-2 E1.35Richardson, 1-1-2 E6.34+4 3-2-2, 2 Corps supply E1.352-1-2 E6.34+5 3-1-2 E1.35+6 2b E1.35+8 Hooker, 2-3 division, 3b E27.35+15 2x 2b E1.35Orders:4 Corps—defend the vicinity of Seven Pines.3 Corps—move to the support of 4 Corps,and help defend Seven Pines, counterattack ifnecessary to restore the Seven Pines position.3-3—has a divisional goal as stated for 3Corps order, above, reverts to the Corps commandwhen its HQ arrives.2 Corps—move to vicinity of Fair Oaks anddefend that position, and protect the flank of theSeven Pines position.Any reinforcements that arrive out of commandrange, have standing orders to move to their jointheir HQ and become subject to any orders theircommand may have.Confederate Information:Set Up:Ro-dH-R—E48.10dH-R—w/i 3 D27.22L-R —w/i 3 D10.15Left HQ and Supply—D10.15S-L —w/i 3 D6.01Right HQ and Supply—D6.01ANV HQ and Supply, 3x ANVb—w/i 2 D11.10Artillery Ammunition: 45Reinforcements:7:30 a.m.—Hu Division—D17.00Orders:L-R—has a Divisional Goal to move west viathe Nine-Mile Road to the Darbytown Road, andthen southeast to cross Gillie’s Creek at hex D26.07.Once all units are across, the division must moveoff the road and halt, and wait for all of Hu Div topass. Once Hu Div has cleared the WilliamsburgRoad, the L-R is to move via the WilliamsburgRoad to the vicinity of D27.30, halt and defend theWilliamsburg Road.Hu Division—has a Divisional Goal to movevia the Darbytown Road, cross Gillie’s Creek viahex D26.07—After L-R has crossed and clearedthe road—proceed to the Williamsburg Road. Fromthere, the division must move to the Charles CityRoad, and advance to hex E48.10, where it willrelieve the Ro-dH-R brigade and defendthe Charles City Road.Ro-dH-R—Until relieved by Hu Div,this brigade has a Divisional Goal to defendthe Charles City Road. Once Hu/RWarrives, this brigade has a Divisional Goalto move north, in the direction of SevenPines, rejoin the rest of its division astridethe Williamsburg Road, and participate inthat Division’s attack.dH-R—has a Divisional Goal to moveeast on the WilliamsburgRoad. Once Ro-dH-R rejoins the command,dH-R has a Divisional Goal to attack theUnion troops along the Williamsburg Roadwith the objective of capturing Seven Pinesand the crossroads at E26.31.S-L—has a Divisional Goal of movingvia the secondary road northeast aroundthe racetrack to the Nine Mile Road, andthen east along the Nine Mile Road to OldTavern. There it will halt and defend theNine Mile Road around the vicinity ofE5.05.Design Note: The above orders faithfullyrecapture the degree of confusion theConfederate Army faced on May 31st.While some units technically had orders toattack (S-L, for instance) those orders wereso conditional and vague that it would, ineffect, take another order issue from ArmyHQ to actually convert that attack intoreality.VictoryUSA Massive Victory 10 or moreUSA Major Victory 7 to 9USA Minor Victory 3 to 6Draw -2 to 2CSA Minor Victory -3 to -6CSA Major Victory -7 to -9CSA Massive Victory -10 or lessHistorically, the result was a draw, with afinal value of 0. The USA won 10 VP forCSA losses, 4 for wrecking dH-R, andnone for terrain. The CSA won 7 VP forUSA losses, and 7 for terrainPage 7

Seven Pines CWB #12Confederate Loss Chart—The Seven Days Volume 2: Seven PinesUnit ID Brigade Morale Fire LevelsC-M-L Cobb D AAA ❏❏❏ AAB ❏❏❏❏❏ AA ❏✔❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏G-M-L Griffith A AAB ❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏✔❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏J-M-L DR Jones C AAB ❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏✔❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏K-M-L Kershaw C AAB ❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏✔❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏M-M-L McLaws B AA ❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏✔❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏T-M-L Toombs C AAB ❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏✔❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏M-L Magruder ❏❏❏✔❏❏❏Hd-S-L Hood A AA ❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏✔ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏Hm-S-L Hampton A AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏✔ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏Ht-S-L Hatton C AA ❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏✔❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏L-S-L Law B AA ❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏✔ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏P-S-L Pettigrew C AA ❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏✔❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏S-L Whiting ❏❏❏✔❏❏F-dH-R Featherston C AA ❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏✔❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏G-dH-R Garland C AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏✔❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏Ro-dH-R Rodes B AAB ❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏✔❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏Rs-dH-R Rains C AAB ❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏✔❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏dH-R DH Hill ❏❏✔❏❏A-L-R Anderson B AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏✔❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏C-L-R Colston C AA ❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏✔❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏K-L-R Kemper B AA ❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏✔❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏P-L-R Pickett A AA ❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏✔❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏Pr-L-R Pryor C AA ❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏✔❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏W-L-R Wilcox C AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏✔❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏L-R Anderson ❏❏❏✔❏❏❏A-Hu Armistead B AAB ❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏✔❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏B-Hu Blanchard C AAB ❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏✔❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏M-Hu Mahone C AA ❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏✔❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏Hu Div Huger ❏❏✔❏Page 8

Seven Pines CWB #12Union Loss Chart—The Seven Days Volume 2: Seven PinesUnit ID Brigade Morale Fire Levels1-1-2 Howard B AAB ❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏✔❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏2-1-2 Meagher A AA ❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏✔❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏3-1-2 French C AAB ❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏✔❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏1-2 Richardson ❏❏✔❏1-2-2 Gorman C AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏✔❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏2-2-2 Burns B AAB ❏❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏✔❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏3-2-2 Dana C AAA ❏ AAB ❏❏❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏✔ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏2-2 Sedgwick ❏❏✔❏1-2-3 Grover C AAB ❏❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏✔ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏2-2-3 Sickles B AAB ❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏✔❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏3-2-3 Patterson B A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏✔❏❏ C ❏❏❏2-3 Hooker ❏❏✔❏1-3-3 Jameson C AAB ❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏✔❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏2-3-3 Birney C AB ❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏✔❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏3-3-3 Berry C AAB ❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏✔❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏3-3 Kearny ❏❏✔❏1-1-4 Peck C AAB ❏❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏✔ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏2-1-4 AbercombieD AAB ❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏✔ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏3-1-4 Devens C AAB ❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏✔❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏1-4 Couch ❏❏✔❏1-2-4 Naglee C AAB ❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏✔❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏2-2-4 Wessells D AA ❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏✔❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏3-2-4 Palmer C AAB ❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏✔❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏2-4 Casey ❏✔❏❏Page 14

The Gamers, Inc.5.6 Historical LossesUnit 31 May 1 June Total1-1-2 - 6 62-1-2 - - -3-1-2 - 2 21-2-2 2 - 22-2-2 - - -3-2-2 1 - 11-2-3 - - -2-2-3 1 - 13-2-3 - 1 11-3-3 4 - 42-3-3 - 2 23-3-3 5 - 51-1-4 4 - 42-1-4 6 - 63-1-4 2 - 21-2-4 6 - 62-2-4 4 - 43-2-4 4 - 4Total 39 11 50Unit 31 May 1 June TotalA-L-R 4 - 4C-L-R - - -K-L-R - - -P-L-R - 4 4Pr-L-R - - -W-L-R 1 - 1F-dH-R 9 - 9G-dH-R 7 - 7Ro-dH-R 11 - 11Rs-dH-R 4 - 4Hd-S-L - - -Hm-S-L 3 - 3Ht-S-L 3 - 3L-S-L 3 - 3P-S-L 4 - 4A-Hu - 4 4B-Hu - - -M-Hu - 4 4Total 49 12 61Bibliograhical NotePlease see the Savage Station Rulebook. Thebibliography there covers both battles.Historical NotesSeven Pines may bear the distinction of being themost mis-managed battle of the entire American CivilWar. While many battles did not go as planned, fewcame apart so completely as did Joseph E. Johnston’s inhis first offensive effort. The result was a confused clashin the woods and fields east of Richmond, and bitterrecriminations afterwards.The battle itself was intended to be Johnston’ssupreme effort to drive the Union invaders from the verygates of the Confederate Capitol, since the Rebel armyhad simply run out of room to do anything else. Johnstonhad been retreating all spring, retiring first from his exposed position aroundManassas to positions near Fredericksburg (and incidentally disruptingUnion General George B. McClellan’s first plan to outflank the Rebels vianaval movement: a planned debarkation at Urbanna, Virginia) and then, onceMcClellan landed on the Peninsula, hurrying south to join ConfederateGeneral John B. Magruder’s small command in opposing the might of theUnion Army of the Potomac in front of Yorktown. Finally, after a month ofinaction and waiting on the Yorktown line, Johnston retreated again, fallingback up the length of the Peninsula towards Richmond.Three months of retrograde action only worsened the tension betweenJohnston and Confederate President Jefferson Davis, tension that had initiallydeveloped over a rank and seniority dispute between the two men thatprevious winter. Now, with Johnston getting ever closer to Richmond, andwith McClellan looming behind him, Davis was losing confidence thatJohnston would ever put up a serious fight to save the city.This distrust on Davis’ part was partially unfair, because Johnston wasclearly handicapped by numbers. The Union army was over 100,000 menstrong, while Johnston’s command was closer to 55,000 troops, a hugedisadvantage to face, especially offensively. A month later, during the morefamous Seven Days’ fighting, Davis gave Robert E. Lee almost numericalparity with the Federals by drawing in reinforcements from the ShenandoahValley, southern Virginia, and North Carolina; Johnston got no suchaugmentation.Still, Johnston was well aware of the impossibility of giving upRichmond without a fight, and was always looking for some chance to strikea portion of McClellan’s huge army on something approaching even odds.By the end of May, Johnston thought he found just such a chance.The Chickahominy River was the agent for that opportunity. TheChickahominy flows generally southeast, starting north of Richmond andsplitting the Peninsula in two before flowing into the James River furthereast, and any approach to Richmond from the Peninsula will at some pointhave to cross this stream. Worse for the Federals, McClellan still expected theUnion First Corps—originally part of his army but retained by Washingtonto provide adequate defenses for the Union Capitol—to march overland fromFredericksburg and join the rest of the Army of the Potomac in front ofRichmond. This meant that McClellan was actually forced to straddle theChickahominy, with the 2nd, 5th and 6th Corps on the north bank, and the 3rdand 4th Corps on the south bank. Realizing that the Federals were vulnerablehere, Johnston decided to strike a blow at the two Union corps south of theriver.On the 28th of May, Johnston and his chief subordinates met to finalizeplans for the attack. Two roads were the best avenues to approach the UnionLines: the Nine-mile Road to the north, and the Williamsburg Stage Road tothe south. Both ran east from the Capitol, with the Nine-mile Road curvingsouth after some miles to intersect with the Williamsburg Road at SevenPines. Hence, these two routes offered parallel approaches and naturallyconverged on the Union position, making them ideal for Johnston’s plans.Further, the Charles City Road ran southeast, providing a route towards theUnion southern flank.Johnston intended to mass two thirds of his army against the two Federalcorps, using all three roads to facilitate the approach. Here, however,communication broke down badly. Johnston’s orders were both vague andverbal: the lack of anything written not only confused commanders at thetime, but also badly muddied the waters in trying to figure out exactly whatwent wrong afterwards.The crux of the problem lay with General James Longstreet. Johnston’sorders called for Longstreet to have overall initial direction of the approachand battle. Longstreet’s large division was supposed to move up the NineMile Road, join General G. W. Smith’s division, and attack the Union right.General D. H. Hill’s division was to move down the Williamsburg Road andopen the action by attacking the Union center. Finally, Huger’s division wasto move via the Charles City Road and threaten the Union left flank nearWhite Oak Swamp. The signal to Hill’s men to start the attack was the arrivalPage 21

Seven Pines CWB #12of one of Hill’s brigades—Rodes’—stationed out on the Charles City Road,which was to move out when Huger arrivedin its place.Certainly these orders were rathercomplicated, with the entire movementkeyed to the arrival of Rodes’ command onHill’s front after being replaced by Huger’scolumn. Worse yet, Huger was unclear asto whether he was merely a threat or part ofthe actual attack: Johnston’s orders to himdid not specify. With everything linked insuch a manner, any one mis-step couldbreak the chain of cause and effect, therebyderailing the whole concept.However, alternatives were discussed.Longstreet had a simpler proposal: hiscommand would march straight down theWilliamsburg Road, join Hill, and attack.Once Smith heard that firing, Smith wouldjoin in from his positions on the Nine MileRoad. Huger’s mission was unchanged.Unfortunately, during a further meeting onthe 30th, Johnston rejected this concept,but that must not have been clear inLongstreet’s mind. This, coupled withHuger’s uncertainty as to the exact natureof his own role, meant that two of Johnston’sthree columns were not clear on their rolein the plan.On the morning of the 31st, totalconfusion reigned. Longstreet started offdown the wrong road, still intending tomove down the Williamsburg Road asLongstreet suggested, rather than down theNine Mile Road as Johnston’s plan calledfor. Worse, Longstreet and Huger got intoa bizarre dispute over crossing priorities atGillie’s Creek, a raging torrent from rainsthe night before. The bridge was washedout, and the only crossing was hastily made,with two wagons parked in the middle ofthe flood and a footbridge rigged. DespiteHuger’s need for speed in order to relieveRodes’ brigade out on the Charles CityRoad so his arrival in turn could signal thestart of D. H. Hill’s attack, Longstreetinsisted in crossing his 12,000 men first, inan argument that was ultimately settled byseniority of rank. Once across, Longstreetpromptly halted and let Huger’s men crossand move ahead to proceed down theCharles City Road, wasting further time.All the while, the other commandswaiting impatiently. Johnston was waitingwith Smith’s division on the Nine MileRoad, his anxiety further sharpened by thepresence of Davis himself. Relationsbetween the two were so strained thatdespite several hours in close proximitythey barely spoke, except for Davis’periodic inquiries as to why the delay,which cannot have helped Johnston’s mood.By mid-morning, couriers were sent out tofind Longstreet, one of whom returnedwith word that Longstreet was found on theWilliamsburg Road. Given thatLongstreet’s men had started out near theWilliamsburg Road and would have had totravel on a portion of it anyway to reach theNine Mile Road, Johnston assumed thatthis was in fact happening, and whileLongstreet was late, he was not off course.This proved a fatal assumption, for it meantthat Johnston, still not grasping that theplan was derailed, elected to simply waitmore instead of personally going to seekclarification.Simultaneously, D. H. Hill waswaiting for Rodes to arrive. Being the triggerfor what was supposed to be a dawn attack,naturally Hill grew increasingly worriedand impatient as the day reached Noonwithout either any sign of Rodes or wordfrom Huger. Finally, Hill felt he could waitno more, and sent his three availablebrigades forward into the attack. Rodeswas in fact not far off by this time, andquickly followed the rest of Hill’s divisioninto the fight. At last the battle had opened.As Hill’s men swept forward, theyencountered a Union line no more preparedto receive an attack than the Rebels wereprepared to deliver one. The initial Federalline was held by General Silas Casey’s 2ndDivision of the 4th Corps, Surprised,Casey’s men were swept back, and GeneralKeyes—the Union 4th CorpsCommander—quickly called forreinforcements from the Union 3rd Corps,stationed some distance to the rear.Heintzelman, the Union 3rd Corpscommander, responded rapidly, but it wouldbe some time before the two divisions ofhis corps—under two of the most aggressiveGenerals in the Union army, Hooker andKearney—would arrive to support Casey.Keyes’ other division, under DariusCouch, soon found itself being drawn intoCasey’s fight, and further reinforcementswere needed. McClellan’s response was tosend Sumner’s 2nd Corps south of the riverin support, which proved no mean feat. Thesame flood that had turned Gillie’s Creekinto a torrent and delayed the Rebels sobadly had also swollen the Chickahominyto the point where the available bridges that2nd Corps needed were in danger of beingswept away. Sumner, however, wasadamant concerning his orders, and begancrossing his infantry immediately, ricketybridges or no. While the better part of aninfantry division made it across thatafternoon, almost no artillery did, and theremaining division of Sumner’s corps didnot get across until well after dark. Nonethe less, his immediate response aidedKeyes’ embattled line at a critical time.McClellan, who was feeling ill, nevercrossed to the south bank at any time,despite the manifestly large battle occurringon Keyes’ front.All told, D. H. Hill’s command drovethe Union troops for about a mile, attackingthree distinct battle-lines. Few ofLongstreet’s men even got into the fight—only parts of two brigades were engagedtowards the end of the battle on theWilliamsburg Road.It was not until late afternoon—around4:00 p.m., that Johnston began to get a clearpicture of what had happened. Until then,the sounds of the battle on the Williamsburgroad were muted, and Johnston dismissedthem as long range artillery dueling insteadof a major attack. Not until a belated courierarrived from Longstreet was it apparentthat those sounds were the main attack, andthe Rebels there had been fighting forseveral hours.At that point, Johnston ordered G. W.Smith to commit his division, originallyintended to be the reserve for Longstreetalong the Nine Mile Road. Thus, it wascloser to 5:00 p.m. before the lead elementsof this column, under General ChaseWhiting, advanced to attack the Unionlines. Whiting’s men ran into the newlyarrived elements of the Federal SecondCorps who had filed in to replace Couch’sdivision, and despite several furiouscharges, got nowhere.Clearly the result was disappointing.Johnston had intended to use 22 brigades ina concentrated attack on 6 Federal brigades:instead only 10 Confederate brigades evensaw action, and their piecemealcommitment allowed Union reinforcementsto intervene significantly, saving the Federal4th Corps from a disaster. Finally, almostthe last casualty of the day was perhaps themost disruptive at all: Johnston himselfwas wounded observing the fighting alongthe Nine Mile Road, and forced to give upcommand to G. W. Smith.Nightfall found Smith newly thrustinto command of a very confused situation,and at one point Smith asked PresidentDavis himself if there was any news fromLongstreet—hardly filling Davis withconfidence in the new commander. Finally,Smith issued orders for a renewal of theattack the next morning, per Johnston’sintentions. The plan as conceived was notreally sound: Longstreet and Hill were torenew the attack at dawn, driving northinstead of east this time, while Whiting’scolumn was to attack south along the NineMile Road once Longstreet’s attack wasPage 22

The Gamers, Inc.fully developed. The problem was thatwhile Sumner’s Federals did project muchfurther east than did the dented lines of the3rd and 4th Corps, the Union 2nd Corpswas still fresh and very strong. Worse, anydrive north by Longstreet would expose hisflank to the Federal 3rd Corps which wasstill effective.However, Longstreet’s solution to thisconundrum was not a good one. He simplyignored Smith, and placed the bulk of theattack once again on Hill, who sent forwardthree brigades (none from his own division,which was pretty badly beaten up by theprevious day’s fighting) in a probing attackthat was mainly directed west instead ofnorth. When these three brigades faltered,more men were committed, but fed intoaction piecemeal. In the end, Longstreetcommitted six brigades—four of his ownand two from Huger—into a series of frontalattacks on the Union 3rd Corps, but theFederals were not driven an inch. Smithheard the fighting, but elected not to commitWhiting’s men, and by midday the actionwas over.The final act in the drama was asignificant one. At 2:00 p.m., PresidentDavis and his entourage rode up to Smith’sHQ on the Nine Mile Road, where Smithwas informed that he was being relieved,and that Davis’ advisor, General Robert E.Lee, was assuming command of the army.With little fanfare, Smith handed overcommand; he would resign in Novemberof that year, and ended the war commandingthe Georgia State Troops in the Atlantacampaign.As can be imagined, the recriminationsover what went wrong at Seven Pines weremassive. Longstreet’s report blamed Hugerfor the mix-up at Gillie’s Creek, andJohnston accepted much of this in his ownreport, despite it being clearly at odds withhis own battle plans for the 31st. Huger, forhis part, did not see either Longstreet’s orJohnston’s reports until much later, andonce he did spent much of his post-warcareer trying to absolve himself of blame,mostly by attacking Longstreet. Smith alsospent much time attacking Longstreet forthe aborted effort on June 1st, ultimatelyblaming the latter general for most of whatwent wrong on that day as well.The truth is likely beyond reach.Certainly Longstreet took the wrong road,and his criticism of Huger seems misplaced.The darker view of Longstreet has himdeliberately sabotaging Johnston to advancehis own career visibility, and setting upHuger to take the blame once things wentbadly. However, none of this explains awaythe central problem of this theory: namely,that Johnston acquiesced to much ofLongstreet’s view of what happened in hisown report. I feel the real reason is somewhatless sinister: Longstreet was genuinelyconfused about the route, quite possiblegiven that it was one of the attackpossibilities debated prior to the fight.Johnston’s orders were manifestly unclear,as evidenced by Huger’s own report onthem, and the lack of written orders at allsimply makes the possibility of confusioneven more likely.Even the most sympatheticexplanation of Longstreet’s actions,however, cannot escape the fact that thetwo days of Seven Pines were a blot on hisrecord, marked by confusion and poortactical thinking, and his treatment of Hugerwas shabby. Worse, Longstreet seems tohave decided simply to ignore Smith’sdirect order for the June 1st attack, withonly a very limited commitment of forceson the second day. Had Longstreet turnedin a similar performance a month later,during the Seven Days, there can be littlequestion that he, along with Huger andMagruder, would have been sent off tointernal exile in some remote post.However, the reality is that Longstreet’sactions during the Seven Days were almostthe antithesis of his Seven Pinesperformance: solid, responsive, anddisplaying a great deal of tactical control inseveral actions. Whatever else it was, SevenPines was a learning experience forLongstreet.Designer’s NotesThe most interesting aspect of SevenPines is how badly the attack was actuallyrun. I wanted to create a game that wouldgive the player some idea of just howconfused the Confederate side was, and thedifficulties inherent in orchestrating a morecoherent attack out of the mess in place onthe morning of May 31st, 1862. I think thatthe historical scenarios recreate that puzzleas well as any boardgame can.On the other hand, the basic plan wasquite sound, and Johnston did see a realopportunity. I think the contrast betweenthe actual situation and the plan as intendedare quite striking, and bode ill for the Federalwho has to play that one out. I’m pleasedthat this game offers such a detailed look atthis battle, since it has been largely lost tohistory and wargaming alike, usuallyglossed over as an abortive prelude to theSeven Days. For those of you who claimthat we never offer up the obscure, orcomplain about the umpteenth iteration ofGettysburg: here is a chance to spend sometime with the largest unknown battle of thewar.Longstreet also provides an interestingproblem here. Over the years, a number ofgamers have asked me how I would dealwith Longstreet at Seven Pines. It would behard to argue that he was anything otherthan a “Zero” in game terms, certainly Ihave no compunctions about doing so here.I have always tried to limit the evaluationof leadership values to the battle in question:hence ratings for Jackson, for example,that vary between zero and four from gameto game. Longstreet fumbled badly here,and was rated accordingly. A month later,of course, he was doing well, and his SevenDays’ ratings reflect that. I’m not sure I canfully explain the inherent schizophreniahere, but I can justify it in game terms.Students of the battle might well notice afew discrepancies. Featherston’sConfederate Brigade was really led by G.B. Anderson; Featherston was ill. However,I already had enough Andersons runningaround, I left Featherston’s name on theunit to help reduce confusion. Alternatively,I left R. A. Anderson in command ofLongstreet’s Division, despite the fact thatthis, too, was only a temporary promotion:Longstreet made a point of leavingAnderson in charge and commanding onlythe wing, and I wanted to simplify thecommand situation here. The alternativewas to add rules leaving Longstreet incommand of both, or using (and noting ineach case) a Repl leader. Neither solutionwas very clean, so I simply accepted thesituation as is.There is one other aspect ofConfederate command that was a problem:demi-divisions. G. W. Smith’s wing wasactually divided into demi-divisions, wherea brigade commander would take commandof his and a couple of other brigades, on afairly informal basis. The main problemwith following this practice in the game isthat it conferred substantial—andunrealistic—advantages to the Confederateplayer in the form of more leaders forcombat and morale purposes. In reality,these formations did not work well, and Ididn’t want to reward the player for anunsuccessful mechanic. I prefer that theplayer deal with the larger, morecumbersome formations.The Union army is much easier to dealwith here, since it exists in a formal Corpsstructure. The only significant absence isthe army commander, a situation bound tobe familiar to those of you who have beenplaying the Seven Days’ Scenarios.McClellan was somewhat indisposed, andnever set foot over the river for the battle,Page 23

Seven Pines CWB #12despite the obviously significant actionraging across the Chickahominy.Heintzelman, the Union 3rd Corpscommander, assumed tactical control ofthe battle. Originally, I had thought ofallowing the Union player only to send inorders from off-map, and rely on initiativefor the rest, but I find this mechanic to bevery limiting. To many Confederate playerscan find ways to artificially manipulatethat knowledge to their advantage,something I wanted to avoid. Further, theUnion chain of command was pretty clear,and everyone knew Heintzelman was incharge, allowing him to act historicallymore like an army commander than merelya corps commander. His leadership, whilenot spectacular, was good enough toorchestrate a solid Union response to theattack once the initial surprise wore off,and I wanted the Federal to have that sameability.All in all, Seven Pines is more thanjust a way to fill out the box for the middlethird of the Seven Days’ trilogy. It was abloody and critical action in its own right,in some ways more interesting an action forits mishandling than for any potentialgeneralship skills that might have beendisplayed. I hope that you all give it a run.Order of Battle andCounter ManifestUnion Forces—Seven Pines2 Corps:Sumner2 Corps HQ2 Corps Supply2 Corps Artillery ( 3x 5-rated batteries)1-2 Division:Richardson1-1-2 Howard2-1-2 Meagher3-1-2 French2-2 Division:Sedgwick1-2-2 Gorman2-2-2 Burns3-2-2 Dana3 Corps:Heintzelman3 Corps HQ3 Corps Supply3 Corps Artillery ( 2x 5-rated batteries)2-3 Division:Hooker1-2-3 Grover (opt)2-2-3 Sickles3-2-3 Patterson3-3 Division:Kearney1-3-3 Jameson2-3-3 Birney3-3-3 Berry4 Corps:Keyes4 Corps HQ4 Corps Supply4 Corps Artillery ( 3x 5-rated batteries)1-4 Division:Couch1-1-4 Peck2-1-4 Abercrombie3-1-4 Devens2-4 Division:Casey1-2-4 Naglee2-2-4 Wessells3-2-4 PalmerConfederate Forces—Seven PinesArmy of Northern VirginiaCommand:JohnstonA NVa HQA NVa SupplyA Res Artillery (3x 5-rated batteries)LongstreetRight Wing HQRight Wing SupplySmithLeft Wing HQLeft Wing SupplyAnderson’s Division:AndersonA-L-R RH AndersonC-L-R ColstonK-L-R KemperP-L-R PickettPr-L-R PryorW-L-R Wilcox1x 5-rated Artillery BatteryDH Hill’s Division:DH HillF-dH-R FeatherstonG-dH-R GarlandRo-dH-R RodesRs-dH-R Rains1x 5-rated Artillery BatteryHuger’s Division:HugerA-Hu ArmisteadB-Hu BlanchardM-Hu Mahone1x 4-rated Artillery BatteryMagruder’s Division (opt):MagruderC-M-L CobbG-M-L GriffithJ-M-L DR JonesK-M-L KershawM-M-L McLawsT-M-L Tombs2x 5-rated Artillery BatteryWhiting’s Division:WhitingHd-S-L HoodHm-S-L HamptonHt-S-L HattonL-S-L LawP-S-L Pettigrew2x 5-rated Artillery BatteryUnion Forces—Savage StationArmy of the PotomacCommand:McClellan (opt)A Pot HQTGD CaseyA Pot 10x Trains3 Corps:Heintzelman3 Corps HQ3 Corps Supply3 Corps Artillery ( 2x 5-rated, 1x 3-rated batteries)Cav-3 Averell2-3 Division:Hooker1-2-3 Grover2-2-3 Sickles3-2-3 Carr3-3 Division:Kearney1-3-3 Robinson2-3-3 Birney3-3-3 Berry4 Corps:Keyes4 Corps HQ4 Corps Supply4 Corps Artillery ( 2x 5-rated, 1x 2-rated batteries)Cav-4 Gregg1-4 Division:Couch1-1-4 Howe2-1-4 Abercrombie3-1-4 Palmer2-4 Division:Peck1-2-4 Naglee2-2-4 Wessells3-2-4 Wessells-2Confederate Forces—Savage StationArmy of Northern VirginiaCommand:Cav StuartRight Wing HQRight Wing SupplyHuger’s Division:HugerA-Hu ArmisteadM-Hu MahoneR-Hu RansomWa-Hu WalkerWb-Hu WalkerW-Hu Wright1x 5-rated, 1x3-rated Artillery BatteryJones’s Division:JonesA-Jo GT AndersonT-Jo Toombs1x 5-rated Artillery BatteryMagruder’s Division:MagruderG-Mg BarksdaleC-Mg Cobb1x 5-rated Artillery BatteryMcLaws’s Division:McLawsK-Mc KershawS-Mc Semmes1x 5-rated Artillery BatteryPage 24