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How to Plead Around the Federal Gun Industry Legal Shield Law ...

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<strong>How</strong> <strong>to</strong> Bring a Successful Case Against <strong>Gun</strong> Manufacturers and Sellers andAvoid Dismissal Under <strong>the</strong> <strong>Federal</strong> <strong>Gun</strong> <strong>Industry</strong> <strong>Legal</strong> <strong>Shield</strong> <strong>Law</strong>Daniel R. Vice, Senior At<strong>to</strong>rney, Brady Center <strong>to</strong> Prevent <strong>Gun</strong> ViolenceIn recent years, courts have recognized that under longstanding common lawprinciples, civil liability should be imposed on gun manufacturers and dealers whosenegligence arms criminals with firearms. Some of <strong>the</strong>se cases resulted in landmarksettlements, such as a $2.5 million settlement in a lawsuit brought by Brady Centerat<strong>to</strong>rneys on behalf of Washing<strong>to</strong>n, D.C. sniper victims. These legal vic<strong>to</strong>ries struckfear in<strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> firearms industryand its gun lobby allies that<strong>the</strong> threat of liability forreckless practices might force<strong>the</strong> industry – that had beenprofiting from its gun salesheaded for criminal hands – <strong>to</strong>also take responsibility for itsdistribution systems thatfunnel a continuous stream of firearms in<strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> criminal market.Following Republican vic<strong>to</strong>ries in <strong>the</strong> 2004 elections, <strong>the</strong> gun lobby succeededin enacting in<strong>to</strong> law sweeping legal protections that some feared (and <strong>the</strong> gunindustry hoped) would wipe out most <strong>to</strong>rt liability for gun dealers and manufacturers.Yet reports of <strong>the</strong> demise of gun liability cases were premature. While this new


federal law, <strong>the</strong> Protection of <strong>Law</strong>ful Commerce in Arms Act, 1 is an ill-advised andunwarranted attempt <strong>to</strong> discriminate against <strong>the</strong> civil rights of gun violence victims,it has failed <strong>to</strong> shut <strong>the</strong> courthouse doors <strong>to</strong> all legitimate claims. Well-pleaded,carefully crafted cases can still proceed against irresponsible gun companies. Thispaper explains how <strong>to</strong> plead and litigate successful cases <strong>to</strong> hold gun dealers andmanufacturers accountable for reckless conduct that arms dangerous criminals withdeadly weapons.Overview of Liability Theories Against <strong>Gun</strong> Manufacturers and Dealers<strong>Law</strong>suits against gun manufacturers and dealers have generally focused ontwo <strong>the</strong>ories of liability – irresponsible (although, due <strong>to</strong> weak gun laws, frequentlynot illegal) distribution of firearms that arms criminals, and unsafe design of firearms.This paper focuses on gun manufacturer and dealer liability relating <strong>to</strong> gundistribution. 2 <strong>Gun</strong> distribution cases are generally based on two causes of action –negligence and public nuisance. About two dozen courts in recent years haveallowed <strong>the</strong>se types of cases <strong>to</strong> go forward against gun manufacturers and dealers. 3115 U.S.C. §§ 7901-03.2For information about lawsuits relating <strong>to</strong> unsafe firearms design, see, e.g., Allen Rostron, <strong>Gun</strong>ningfor Justice, TRIAL (Nov. 2001); Brian J. Siebel, The Case Against <strong>the</strong> <strong>Gun</strong> <strong>Industry</strong>, PUB. HEALTH REP.(Sept./Oct. 2000); Jonathan E. Lowy, Litigating Against <strong>Gun</strong> Manufacturers, TRIAL (Nov. 2000); all ofwhich are available at http://www.gunlawsuits.org/features/articles/. The Protection of <strong>Law</strong>fulCommerce in Arms Act permits certain product liability cases under 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(v), <strong>the</strong>scope of which is presently being considered by <strong>the</strong> Illinois Supreme Court. See Adames v. Sheahan,378 Ill.App.3d 502, 880 N.E.2d 559 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007), appeal allowed, 227 Ill.2d 577, 888 N.E.2d 1182(Ill. Mar 26, 2008).3 Appellate Vic<strong>to</strong>ries: City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind. 2003) (appellatereversal of lower court dismissal); Ile<strong>to</strong> v. Glock, 349 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2003) (appellate reinstatemen<strong>to</strong>f case); James v. Arms Tech, 820 A.2d 27 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 2003) (trial and appellate denials ofmotion <strong>to</strong> dismiss; case later voluntarily dismissed without prejudice <strong>to</strong> refile); Hicks v. T&M Jewelry,Inc., No. 97-Ci 2617 (Fayette County Circuit Ct., Lexing<strong>to</strong>n, Kentucky), dismissal reversed on appeal 2003WL 21771968 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta, 768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002) (appellatereversal of lower court dismissal; case later voluntarily dismissed without prejudice <strong>to</strong> re-file); Smith v.Bryco Arms, 33 P.3d 638 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001), cert. denied, 34 P.3d 610 (N.M. 2001); Morial v. Smith &2


In each case, Brady Center at<strong>to</strong>rneys served as pro bono co-counsel with local triallawyers or assisted <strong>the</strong> plaintiffs’ at<strong>to</strong>rneys in litigating <strong>the</strong>ir cases against gunindustry defendants. 4The Brady Center report Smoking <strong>Gun</strong>s highlights some of <strong>the</strong>evidence uncovered in this litigation against <strong>the</strong> gun industry – including previouslysecret gun industry documents, statements from industry whistle-blowers, andsworn testimony from industry executives – showing how <strong>the</strong> gun industry hasknowingly funneled guns in<strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> illegal market. 5In cases concerning irresponsible gun distribution, a dealer or manufacturercould have acted <strong>to</strong> prevent a firearm from getting in<strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> hands of an irresponsibleperson. These cases typically involve ei<strong>the</strong>r a direct sale <strong>to</strong> a dangerous person or anWesson, 785 So.2d 1 (La. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 951 (2001) (dismissal based on state immunitylaw); Kitchen v. K-Mart Corp., 697 So.2d 1200 (Fla. S. Ct. 1997) (appellate reinstatement of jury award).Trial Court Vic<strong>to</strong>ries: NAACP v. AccuSport, Inc., 271 F.Supp.2d 435 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (gun industry held<strong>to</strong> have created public nuisance after trial; case was dismissed due <strong>to</strong> lack of organizational standing);People of <strong>the</strong> State of California v. Arcadia Machine & Tool, No. 4095, 2003 WL 21184117 (Cal.Super. Ct. Apr. 10, 2003) (denying summary judgment <strong>to</strong> gun dealers and distribu<strong>to</strong>rs, each of whomsettled before trial) (case brought by 12 cities and counties); Lemongello v. Will Co., Inc., 2003 WL21488208 (Cir. Ct. W.Va. June 19, 2003) (denying motions <strong>to</strong> dismiss gun dealer and manufacturer;settlement for $1 million); Johnson v. Bulls Eye Shooter Supply, 2003 WL 21639244 (Wash. Super. June27, 2003), reconsideration denied, interlocu<strong>to</strong>ry appeal denied (commissioner ruling) (denying motions<strong>to</strong> dismiss gun dealer and gun manufacturer; settlement for $2.5 million); White v. Smith & Wesson 97F. Supp. 2d 816 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (Cleveland, OH) (motion <strong>to</strong> dismiss denied); Maxfield v. Bryco Arms,et al, No. 841636-4 (Super. Ct. Cal., Alameda County 2003) (jury verdict - trial vic<strong>to</strong>ry); Hernandez v.Kahr Arms, Inc., Civil No. WOCV2002-01747 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 2003) (denying motion <strong>to</strong> dismissgun manufacturer); Anderson v. Bryco Arms Corp., No. 00-L-007476 (Circuit Ct., Cook County, Ill., April,10, 2002) (denial of motion <strong>to</strong> dismiss); Jefferson v. Rossi, No. 02218 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pleas, Aug. 2, 2002)(denying motions <strong>to</strong> dismiss gun dealer and distribu<strong>to</strong>r; settlement for $850,000); Isaac v. Sou<strong>the</strong>rn Ohio<strong>Gun</strong>s International, Inc., C.A. No. 98-4618 (Mass. Super. Ct.) (denial of motion for summary judgment;confidential settlement); Bos<strong>to</strong>n v. Smith & Wesson, 2000 WL 1473568 (Mass. Super. July 13, 2000)(motion <strong>to</strong> dismiss denied; settled in 2001); Mathieu v. Fabrica D’Armi Pietro Beretta SPA and BerettaU.S.A., No. 97-CV-12818-NG (D. Mass.) (motion <strong>to</strong> dismiss denied, case settled in 2000); McNamara v.Arms Tech. Inc., 71 F. Supp. 2d 720 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (dismissal based on state immunity law).4For descriptions of o<strong>the</strong>r cases brought by Brady Center at<strong>to</strong>rneys see http://www.gunlawsuits.org.See also Brian J. Siebel, <strong>Gun</strong> <strong>Industry</strong> Immunity: Why <strong>the</strong> <strong>Gun</strong> <strong>Industry</strong>’s “Dirty Little Secret” Does NotDeserve Congressional Protection, 73 U.M.K.C. L. Rev. 911 (2005).5 Brady Center <strong>to</strong> Prevent <strong>Gun</strong> Violence, Smoking <strong>Gun</strong>s: Exposing <strong>the</strong> <strong>Gun</strong> <strong>Industry</strong>'s Complicity in <strong>the</strong>Illegal <strong>Gun</strong> Market (2003), available at http://www.bradycenter.org/reports/index.php#sg.3


irresponsible sale that allows a gun <strong>to</strong> enter <strong>the</strong> criminal market and ultimately causeharm <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> plaintiff. Examples of <strong>the</strong>se types of transactions are:• Sales <strong>to</strong> an irresponsible person. The sale of a firearm <strong>to</strong> a dangerousperson or irresponsible buyer can be evidence of negligent entrustmen<strong>to</strong>r negligent distribution. A dealer that sells a gun <strong>to</strong> someone who ismentally unstable, underage, in<strong>to</strong>xicated, or demonstrates o<strong>the</strong>r signsof dangerousness may be liable for negligence. 6• Straw sales. Straw sales are sales <strong>to</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rwise legal buyers who buyguns on behalf of a prohibited purchaser. <strong>Gun</strong> traffickers use strawpurchasers <strong>to</strong> obtain guns from irresponsible dealers. Properly traineddealers could identify and prevent straw purchases. Manufacturers anddistribu<strong>to</strong>rs could require dealers who sell <strong>the</strong>ir guns <strong>to</strong> properly trainsalespeople <strong>to</strong> detect and prevent straw sales. 7• Multiple sales or repeat sales. Under federal law, multiple sales aresales of more than one handgun <strong>to</strong> an individual within five businessdays. 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(3)(A). The federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,Firearms and Explosives (ATF) has characterized multiple sales as highrisksales that may indicate gun trafficking. 8 Likewise, repeat sales ofmultiple handguns <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> same buyer may be a sign of gun trafficking. 9• “Missing” guns. <strong>Gun</strong> dealers frequently claim that guns that wereillegally sold “off <strong>the</strong> books” were lost or s<strong>to</strong>len <strong>to</strong> explain a lack oflegally mandated records or Brady background checks. Large numbersof missing guns can demonstrate irresponsible business practices andprovide evidence that a dealer and its suppliers have created a publicnuisance. 106 See, e.g., Kitchen v. K-Mart, 697 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1997) (K-Mart liable for selling a rifle <strong>to</strong> anin<strong>to</strong>xicated buyer); Angell v. F. Avanzini Lumber Co., 363 So.2d 571 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (dealercould have reasonably foreseen that injury could have resulted from sale due <strong>to</strong> purchaser’s erraticbehavior); Diggles v. Horwitz, 765 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (finding triable issue of fact as <strong>to</strong>whe<strong>the</strong>r selling gun and giving ammunition <strong>to</strong> person with mental problems was negligent).7 See, e.g., Lemongello v. Will Co., Inc., 2003 WL 21488208 (W.Va. Cir. Ct. 2003) (pawnshop settledlawsuit for $1 million in case brought by police officers injured by a gun sold <strong>to</strong> a straw buyer); Hoosierv. Lander, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (“strawman” sale constitutes a breach of <strong>the</strong> gunseller's duty of care and can form <strong>the</strong> basis for a negligence action against <strong>the</strong> dealer).8Dep’t of <strong>the</strong> Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Commerce in Firearms in <strong>the</strong> UnitedStates 22 (Feb. 2000).9 See, e.g., Lemongello, 2003 WL 21488208 (pawnshop settled lawsuit for $1 million in case involving 12handguns sold <strong>to</strong> individual buyer); Jefferson v. Rossi, No. 02218 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pleas, Aug. 2, 2002)(gun dealer engaged in repeat sales of handguns <strong>to</strong> trafficker; settlement for $850,000).10See Johnson v. Bull’s Eye Shooter Supply, 2003 WL 21639244 (Wash. Super. Ct. June 27, 2003), infra.4


• S<strong>to</strong>len guns. Many <strong>the</strong>fts from gun dealers could be prevented if s<strong>to</strong>resimplemented a few simple, feasible security measures, many of whichhave been recommended by ATF for years. <strong>Gun</strong>s are often s<strong>to</strong>len fromgun s<strong>to</strong>res as a result of <strong>the</strong> dealer’s negligent security system. 11The successful lawsuit filed on behalf of Washing<strong>to</strong>n, D.C. sniper victimsillustrates one successful gun distribution case, involving a high-risk dealer withlarge numbers of crime guns, multiple sales, and missing firearms. Following <strong>the</strong> fall2002 sniper attacks in <strong>the</strong> Washing<strong>to</strong>n, D.C. area, victims of <strong>the</strong> shootings filed alawsuit against <strong>the</strong> gun’s manufacturer and dealer, alleging negligence and creationof a public nuisance that caused <strong>the</strong> snipers <strong>to</strong> obtain <strong>the</strong>ir Bushmaster gun. Thefederal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives had traced <strong>the</strong> snipers’Bushmaster XM-15 assault rifle (like <strong>the</strong> one pictured here) <strong>to</strong> dealer Bull’s EyeShooter Supply in Tacoma,Washing<strong>to</strong>n. The sniperswere able <strong>to</strong> obtain <strong>the</strong>irrifle even though federallaw barred <strong>the</strong>m from possessing a gun. 12When law enforcement contacted Bull’s Eye <strong>to</strong> find out how <strong>the</strong> rifle got in<strong>to</strong><strong>the</strong> snipers’ hands, <strong>the</strong> s<strong>to</strong>re claimed not <strong>to</strong> know that <strong>the</strong> prominently displayedthree foot long assault rifle was even missing. Lee Malvo, <strong>the</strong> 17-year-old sniper, <strong>to</strong>ldpolice that he simply walked in<strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> s<strong>to</strong>re and walked out with <strong>the</strong> gun, apparentlywith no one noticing. ATF audits showed that <strong>the</strong> “disappearance” of <strong>the</strong> rifle fromBull’s Eye was not an isolated instance. Indeed, Bull’s Eye had repeatedly failed <strong>to</strong>11Id.12 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (John Muhammad was barred from buying a gun because of a domestic violencerestraining order and Lee Malvo was barred because he was under 18 years old).5


secure or track its inven<strong>to</strong>ry, with 238 firearms missing from its shop in three yearswithout any record of sale. Bull’s Eye ranked in <strong>the</strong> <strong>to</strong>p 1% nationwide in numbers ofcrime guns traced <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> shop, with more than fifty traces including murders,kidnappings, and assaults. 13<strong>Federal</strong> ATF audits and Bull’s Eye’s gun records demonstrating its recklesspractices were obtainable by gun manufacturer Bushmaster, such that Bushmasterhad constructive notice that a dealer it picked as a <strong>to</strong>p nationwide seller of its assaultweapons was one of <strong>the</strong> most irresponsible in <strong>the</strong> country. 14Bushmasternone<strong>the</strong>less supplied Bull’s Eye without requiring even a minimum code of conduct<strong>to</strong> ensure that its products were being sold responsibly.Armed with <strong>the</strong>se facts, <strong>the</strong> plaintiffs’ suit alleged that Bull’s Eye negligentlyran its s<strong>to</strong>re with irresponsible business practices that allowed <strong>the</strong> snipers <strong>to</strong> easilyobtain <strong>the</strong>ir weapon. It is worth noting that <strong>the</strong>re is reason <strong>to</strong> be skeptical about gundealers’ claims that guns from <strong>the</strong>ir inven<strong>to</strong>ry that were traced <strong>to</strong> crime were“missing” or “s<strong>to</strong>len.” As any profit-seeking business would seek <strong>to</strong> preventrepeated <strong>the</strong>fts of its products, it is possible that a gun dealer who has a continualstream of “missing” guns actually illegally sold those guns “off <strong>the</strong> books,” without arecord or background check. Regardless of how <strong>the</strong> snipers obtained <strong>the</strong> gun fromBull’s Eye, reasonable security, inven<strong>to</strong>ry control, and o<strong>the</strong>r business practices wouldprevent a prohibited purchaser from obtaining a gun, via <strong>the</strong>ft or o<strong>the</strong>r means. As <strong>to</strong>Bushmaster, <strong>the</strong> suit alleged that it negligently entrusted and distributed firearms <strong>to</strong>13 See Mike Carter et al., Errant Tacoma, Wash., <strong>Gun</strong> Dealer, Wary Agents Paved Way for SniperTragedy, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 29, 2003.14 For example, Bushmaster could have required that Bull’s Eye provide this information <strong>to</strong> Bushmasteras a condition of Bushmaster’s sale of firearms <strong>to</strong> Bull’s Eye.6


one of <strong>the</strong> worst dealers in <strong>the</strong> country, and knew or should have known thatentrusting <strong>the</strong>se <strong>to</strong> Bull’s Eye would foreseeably lead <strong>to</strong> injuries and death. 15The sniper victims’ public nuisance claim was based on Bull’s Eye’s andBushmaster’s business practices that led <strong>to</strong> guns frequently “disappearing” fromBull’s Eye and ending up in <strong>the</strong> hands of criminals, including <strong>the</strong> snipers’ Bushmasterrifle. To prove a public nuisance, a plaintiff must show that <strong>the</strong> defendant created acondition that is an “unreasonable interference with a right common <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> generalpublic,” and that <strong>the</strong> plaintiff suffered specific harm because of <strong>the</strong> nuisance. 16Thismay be shown with proof that a defendant’s conduct “generates injury orinconvenience <strong>to</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs that is both sufficiently grave and sufficiently foreseeablethat it renders it unreasonable <strong>to</strong> proceed at least without compensation <strong>to</strong> thosethat are harmed.” 17Because a focus of public nuisance claims is on harm <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong>public, evidence of o<strong>the</strong>r similar acts may be admitted <strong>to</strong> prove <strong>the</strong> extent of <strong>the</strong>nuisance. Thus, it was relevant <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> public nuisance claim that Bull’s Eye “lost”scores of o<strong>the</strong>r weapons, had dozens of guns traced <strong>to</strong> crime, and sold hundreds ofguns in suspect “multiple sales” (sales of multiple handguns <strong>to</strong> individual buyers).In June 2003, <strong>the</strong> trial court denied motions <strong>to</strong> dismiss filed by Bull’s Eye andBushmaster. As <strong>to</strong> Bushmaster, <strong>the</strong> court held that based on <strong>the</strong> facts alleged,“Bushmaster Firearms, Inc., knew or should have known that Bull’s Eye ShooterSupply was operating its s<strong>to</strong>re in a reckless or incompetent manner, creating an15Note that Plaintiffs did not claim that Bushmaster was liable simply for manufacturing <strong>the</strong> gun – <strong>the</strong>claim was based on Bushmaster’s negligent conduct in its distribution of firearms.16 Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 821B, 821C.17City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1231 (Ind. 2003) (allowing lawsuit againstgun manufacturers and dealers for distribution practices that funnel guns <strong>to</strong> criminals and create apublic nuisance).7


unreasonable risk of harm.” 18As <strong>to</strong> Bull’s Eye, <strong>the</strong> court ruled that gun dealers “owea common law duty <strong>to</strong> third parties injured by weapons made available <strong>to</strong> an unfitperson by a firearms dealer.” 19Additionally, <strong>the</strong> court held:The facts in <strong>the</strong> present case indicate that a high degree of risk of harm<strong>to</strong> plaintiffs was created by Bull’s Eye Shooter Supply’s allegedlyreckless or incompetent conduct in distributing firearms. …Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, intervening criminal acts, such as <strong>the</strong> sniper shootings in<strong>the</strong> case at bar, may be found <strong>to</strong> be foreseeable, and if so found,actionable negligence may be predicated <strong>the</strong>reon. 20Bushmaster filed an interlocu<strong>to</strong>ry appeal <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> Washing<strong>to</strong>n State Court of Appeals,which was likewise denied. 21Shortly <strong>the</strong>reafter, Bull’s Eye and Bushmaster agreed<strong>to</strong> settle <strong>the</strong> case for $2.5 million.Ano<strong>the</strong>r successful case involved <strong>the</strong> shooting of two New Jersey policeofficers with a gun trafficked from a West Virginia pawnshop that engaged in strawsales. Lemongello v. Will Co., Inc., 2003 WL 21488208 (W.Va. Cir. Ct. 2003). In thatcase, a gun trafficker, James Gray, traveled <strong>to</strong> a West Virginia pawnshop, WillJewelry and Loan, <strong>to</strong> purchase guns <strong>to</strong> be trafficked. Gray and a female companion,Tammi Lea Songer, visited <strong>the</strong> shop, with Songer acting as a “straw purchaser” andbuying a gun for Gray. Gray and Songer <strong>the</strong>n returned <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> shop seventeen dayslater and purchased twelve more guns, which Songer bought and paid for withthousands of dollars in cash. Gray picked out guns for Songer in full view of <strong>the</strong>shop’s personnel – a clear sign that <strong>the</strong> purchase was an illegal straw purchase – and18 Johnson v. Bull’s Eye Shooter Supply, 2003 WL 21639244, at *5 (Wash. Super. Ct. June 27, 2003).19 Id. at *2.20Id. at *4.21 Johnson v. Bull’s Eye Shooter Supply, No. 30641-7-II (Wash Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2003) (commissionerruling).8


one of <strong>the</strong> guns was trafficked <strong>to</strong> New Jersey and used in <strong>the</strong> shooting of <strong>the</strong> twoofficers.The legal <strong>the</strong>ory behind <strong>the</strong> suit was that <strong>the</strong> pawnshop acted negligently infailing <strong>to</strong> detect and prevent suspect sales, including straw purchases and multiplesales of handguns <strong>to</strong> individual buyers. The case alleged that gun maker SturmRuger acted negligently in not moni<strong>to</strong>ring, training or preventing its distribu<strong>to</strong>rs anddealers from engaging in straw purchases and multiple sales. These sales practicesalso created a public nuisance that endangered <strong>the</strong> public and caused <strong>the</strong> arming ofa felon prohibited from possessing guns, and <strong>the</strong> shooting of Officers McGuire andLemongello. The pawnshop and gun maker moved <strong>to</strong> dismiss, claiming that <strong>the</strong>yowed no legal duty <strong>to</strong> support a negligence claim and did not create a publicnuisance. The court denied <strong>the</strong> motion:Given <strong>the</strong> inherent nature of firearms and that Defendants have anability <strong>to</strong> guard against negligent distribution of firearms, this Courtfinds it is not unreasonable <strong>to</strong> place this duty on <strong>the</strong> manufacturerand/or seller of a firearm. Imposing this duty simply requires <strong>the</strong>Defendants <strong>to</strong> act reasonably given <strong>the</strong> nature of <strong>the</strong>ir business, and is<strong>the</strong> same duty that is required daily of o<strong>the</strong>r businesses.Lemongello, 2003 WL 21488208 at *2. Following <strong>the</strong> court’s ruling, <strong>the</strong> plaintiffsagreed on a $1 million settlement. 2222 Jonathan Casiano, Former Orange officers get $1M from W. Va. gun seller, Pawn shop sold weaponused in shooting that forced cops <strong>to</strong> retire, THE (NEWARK, NJ) STAR LEDGER, June 24, 2004. After <strong>the</strong>settlement against <strong>the</strong> dealer, <strong>the</strong> court entered summary judgment for Sturm Ruger because <strong>the</strong> gunhad changed hands a number of times – over a number of years – after Ruger sold <strong>the</strong> gun <strong>to</strong> adistribu<strong>to</strong>r and before <strong>the</strong> dealer sold <strong>the</strong> gun <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> straw purchaser. <strong>How</strong>ever, <strong>the</strong> facts thatsupported summary judgment for Ruger do not exist in every case, and may not be deemeddispositive by every judge.9


The Protection of <strong>Law</strong>ful Commerce in Arms ActFollowing settlement of <strong>the</strong> D.C. sniper case, Lemongello, and ano<strong>the</strong>r similarcase for a <strong>to</strong>tal of $4.4 million, <strong>the</strong> gun lobby ratcheted up <strong>the</strong>ir efforts <strong>to</strong> shield <strong>the</strong>gun industry from liability for <strong>the</strong>ir negligent or reckless conduct. In 2005, Congresspassed and President Bush signed in<strong>to</strong> law <strong>the</strong> so-called Protection of <strong>Law</strong>fulCommerce in Arms Act (PLCAA). 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901-03. The PLCAA bars <strong>the</strong> filing ofnew cases and requires <strong>the</strong> immediate dismissal of pending cases against gundealers or manufacturers unless certain exceptions apply.The PLCAA bars cases against gun manufacturers and sellers for harm“resulting from <strong>the</strong> criminal or unlawful misuse of a [firearm].” 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A).It contains several limitations, however, that allow cases <strong>to</strong> proceed, <strong>the</strong> mostimportant of which are:1) An action against a gun dealer (but not a manufacturer) for negligententrustment or negligence per se, 23 and2) An action against a gun manufacturer or dealer who “knowinglyviolated a State or <strong>Federal</strong> statute applicable <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> sale or marketing of<strong>the</strong> product, and <strong>the</strong> violation was a proximate cause of <strong>the</strong> harm forwhich relief is sought….” 24The PLCAA also states that its purpose is <strong>to</strong> block lawsuits concerning “harm solelycaused by <strong>the</strong> criminal or unlawful misuse of firearm[s],” 15 U.S.C. § 7901(b)(1)(emphasis added), allowing a plaintiff <strong>to</strong> argue that <strong>the</strong> PLCAA should not bar caseswhere <strong>the</strong> gun manufacturer or dealer is an independent cause of harm.23 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(ii).2415 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii). The o<strong>the</strong>r exceptions generally relate <strong>to</strong> civil causes of action based ontransfers by gun dealers <strong>to</strong> criminals where <strong>the</strong> dealer knows that <strong>the</strong> criminal will use <strong>the</strong> gun in acrime, breach of contract or warrant claims, and certain product liability claims. Id. § 7903(5)(A).10


Courts interpreting <strong>the</strong> PLCAA have reached differing conclusions about how<strong>the</strong> PLCAA affects pending lawsuits against <strong>the</strong> gun industry. In several cases,courts have held that <strong>the</strong> PLCAA’s exceptions apply and thus have rejected attemptsby gun industry defendants <strong>to</strong> dismiss cases pursuant <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> PLCAA. The PLCAA’sretroactive dismissal of pending cases also raises serious constitutional questions,leading one trial court <strong>to</strong> conclude that <strong>the</strong> law is unconstitutional.One case examining <strong>the</strong> impact of <strong>the</strong> PLCAA on pending litigation was filedby <strong>the</strong> City of Gary, Indiana against handgun manufacturers and sellers for publicnuisance and negligent distribution. Before enactment of <strong>the</strong> PLCAA, <strong>the</strong> IndianaSupreme Court had unanimously held:[T]he City alleges that all defendants intentionally and willingly supply<strong>the</strong> demand for illegal purchase of handguns…. Taken as true, <strong>the</strong>seallegations are sufficient <strong>to</strong> allege an unreasonable chain of distributionof handguns sufficient <strong>to</strong> give rise <strong>to</strong> a public nuisance generated by alldefendants.City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1241 (Ind. 2003).On a subsequent motion <strong>to</strong> dismiss filed by <strong>the</strong> gun industry defendants basedon <strong>the</strong> PLCAA, an Indiana trial court ruled that <strong>the</strong> PLCAA is unconstitutional in partbecause it purports <strong>to</strong> “direct[] <strong>the</strong> outcome of this pending case.” City of Gary vSmith & Wesson Corp., No. 45D05-0005-CT-00243 (Lake Super. Ct. Oct. 23, 2006). Onappeal, <strong>the</strong> Indiana Court of Appeals held that <strong>the</strong> case could proceed because <strong>the</strong>PLCAA did not apply, and so it did not reach <strong>the</strong> constitutional question. Smith &Wesson Corp. v. City of Gary, 875 N.E.2d 422 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), petition for transferfiled (Feb. 7, 2008). The Court of Appeals held that because public nuisance inIndiana is a statu<strong>to</strong>ry claim, and <strong>the</strong> public nuisance statute is “applicable <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> sale11


or marketing of firearms” in a manner that creates a nuisance, <strong>the</strong> PLCAA’sexception for conduct that violates a statute applied and <strong>the</strong> case was not barred by<strong>the</strong> PLCAA. Id. at 430.Likewise, in two cases filed in Philadelphia on behalf of individual victims ofgun violence, <strong>the</strong> trial court rejected motions by gun industry defendants <strong>to</strong> have <strong>the</strong>cases dismissed pursuant <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> PLCAA. One case, Oliver v. Lou's Loans, No. 1836(Ct. Common Pleas Phila. Cty., July 20, 2005), involved <strong>the</strong> shooting death of AnthonyOliver, Jr., a 14 year-old boy who was unintentionally shot and killed by a friend witha .25 caliber Phoenix Arms semiau<strong>to</strong>matic handgun. His friend mistakenly thought<strong>the</strong> safety was on and pulled <strong>the</strong> trigger, shooting Anthony in <strong>the</strong> s<strong>to</strong>mach. The suitalleged that Lou's Loan of Upper Darby, Pennsylvania, <strong>the</strong> <strong>to</strong>p supplier of crime gunsin Pennsylvania, negligently sold guns <strong>to</strong> a gun trafficker, one of which made its wayin<strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> hands of <strong>the</strong> shooter. Phoenix Arms, <strong>the</strong> maker of <strong>the</strong> "Saturday NightSpecial" handgun used <strong>to</strong> kill Oliver, was charged with negligently enabling a guntrafficker <strong>to</strong> obtain <strong>the</strong> gun. Phoenix Arms continued <strong>to</strong> supply Lou's Loan even afterrepeated public disclosures of Lou's record of supplying crime guns. The suit alsoalleged that <strong>the</strong> defendants helped <strong>to</strong> create a public nuisance in Philadelphiathrough <strong>the</strong>ir reckless sales practices. 25The o<strong>the</strong>r case, Arnold v. American Security, No. 3118 (Ct. Common PleasPhila. Cty., July 28, 2005), concerned <strong>the</strong> shooting death of 10-year-old FaheemThomas-Childs, who was shot and killed as he walked through <strong>the</strong> gates of hiselementary school in Philadelphia. The suit alleged that gun dealer American <strong>Gun</strong>25 More information on this case is at <strong>the</strong> Brady Center <strong>to</strong> Prevent <strong>Gun</strong> Violence website docket athttp://www.gunlawsuits.org/docket/currentdocket.pdf#page=16.12


and Lock negligently sold <strong>the</strong> weapon in a “straw sale” <strong>to</strong> gang members. Acriminal, who was not permitted <strong>to</strong> buy guns, accompanied <strong>the</strong> straw purchaser <strong>to</strong><strong>the</strong> s<strong>to</strong>re, picked out <strong>the</strong> gun, and supplied <strong>the</strong> money <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> straw purchaser whocompleted <strong>the</strong> transaction. The s<strong>to</strong>re's clerk even charged a "handling fee" for <strong>the</strong>straw purchase, which <strong>the</strong> criminal paid. American <strong>Gun</strong> had sold guns <strong>to</strong> severalo<strong>the</strong>r gun traffickers over <strong>the</strong> years. The suit charged that American <strong>Gun</strong> negligentlysold <strong>the</strong> handgun <strong>to</strong> a straw purchaser, and that <strong>the</strong> dealer created a public nuisancein Philadelphia through its reckless sales practices. The lawsuit also included claimsagainst Sturm Ruger, <strong>the</strong> manufacturer of <strong>the</strong> gun who continued <strong>to</strong> supply American<strong>Gun</strong> without any reasonable conditions, even after <strong>the</strong> s<strong>to</strong>re had supplied o<strong>the</strong>rtraffickers. Sturm Ruger did not require its dealers <strong>to</strong> follow industry guidelines forpreventing straw sales. 26After a consolidated hearing on a motion <strong>to</strong> dismiss by <strong>the</strong> gun industrydefendants in Oliver and Arnold, <strong>the</strong> trial court ruled that both cases could proceed. 27The court held that <strong>the</strong> plaintiffs were entitled <strong>to</strong> factual discovery <strong>to</strong> determine <strong>the</strong>applicability of any exceptions <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> PLCAA. Following <strong>the</strong> denial of <strong>the</strong> gunindustry defendants’ motions <strong>to</strong> dismiss, <strong>the</strong> defendants reached confidentialsettlements with <strong>the</strong> plaintiffs in each case.O<strong>the</strong>r courts have given <strong>the</strong> PLCAA an overly broad reading and required <strong>the</strong>dismissal of pending cases against gun industry defendants. These cases, however,are all currently on appeal or may soon be appealed. In one such case, District of26More information on this case is at <strong>the</strong> Brady Center <strong>to</strong> Prevent <strong>Gun</strong> Violence website docket athttp://www.gunlawsuits.org/docket/currentdocket.pdf#page=15.27Oliver (Ct. Common Pleas June 22, 2006); Arnold (Ct. Common Pleas June 22, 2006).13


Columbia v. Beretta, 940 A.2d 163 (D.C. 2008), <strong>the</strong> court ruled that claims filed under<strong>the</strong> District’s unique strict liability act for assault weapon manufacturers had <strong>to</strong> bedismissed pursuant <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> PLCAA. The court held that a strict liability statute couldnot be “violated” for purposes of <strong>the</strong> PLCAA’s statu<strong>to</strong>ry violation provision because<strong>the</strong> District’s statute imposed no “duty on firearms manufacturers or sellers <strong>to</strong>operate in any particular manner or according <strong>to</strong> any standards of care orreasonableness.” District of Columbia, at 170. The court, however, distinguishedcases which “claim that gun manufacturers engaged in unreasonable distributionpractices.” Id. Because most cases against gun manufacturers or dealers concernnegligent distribution or <strong>the</strong> creation of a public nuisance, ra<strong>the</strong>r than statu<strong>to</strong>ry strictliability claims, <strong>the</strong> District ruling is not likely <strong>to</strong> be relevant in o<strong>the</strong>r gun litigation. 28Bringing a Case That Will Not Be Blocked By <strong>the</strong> PLCAANotwithstanding <strong>the</strong> limitations of <strong>the</strong> Act, gun companies can be expected <strong>to</strong>attempt <strong>to</strong> use <strong>the</strong> PLCAA <strong>to</strong> win dismissals of virtually any gun lawsuit. Therefore,it is important <strong>to</strong> prepare for that likelihood. In several cases filed since enactment of<strong>the</strong> PLCAA, Brady Center at<strong>to</strong>rneys have worked with local trial counsel <strong>to</strong> craftcomplaints so that <strong>the</strong>y highlight <strong>the</strong> facts and claims necessary <strong>to</strong> survive motions<strong>to</strong> dismiss based on <strong>the</strong> PLCAA.One case, Kim v. Coxe, No. 1-JU-08-761 (Alaska Super. Ct., July 31, 2008),stems from <strong>the</strong> death on August 4, 2006 of Simone Young Kim, a 26-year-old painterworking in Juneau, Alaska. He was shot and killed by Jason Coday, a felon,methamphetamine user, and fugitive from justice, who was prohibited by federal law28O<strong>the</strong>r cases dismissed by courts pursuant <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> PLCAA are Ile<strong>to</strong> v. Glock, Inc., 421 F.Supp.2d 1274(C.D. Cal. 2006) (on appeal) and City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384 (2nd Cir. 2008)(pending possible appeal).14


from purchasing or possessing a firearm. None<strong>the</strong>less, on August 2, 2006, he wasable <strong>to</strong> walk in<strong>to</strong> Rayco Sales, a gun shop in Juneau, Alaska owned by Ray Coxe, andwalk out with a Ruger .22 rifle without submitting himself <strong>to</strong> a background check.According <strong>to</strong> Coxe’s statements, Coxe left Coday alone on <strong>the</strong> sales floor, surroundedby unlocked firearms. Coday <strong>the</strong>n simply left <strong>the</strong> s<strong>to</strong>re with <strong>the</strong> firearm of hischoosing. The plaintiff alleges that Rayco Sales is liable for Kim’s death fornegligently and potentially illegally providing <strong>the</strong> rifle <strong>to</strong> Coday. In light of <strong>the</strong>negligent entrustment by <strong>the</strong> gun dealer <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> shooter, and <strong>the</strong> potentially unlawfulsale of a firearm without a background check, <strong>the</strong> case should not be subject <strong>to</strong>dismissal under <strong>the</strong> PLCAA. 29Similarly, <strong>the</strong> case of Tuft v. Rocky Mountain Enterprises, Inc., No. 080902325(Utah Judicial Dist. Ct., Feb. 8, 2008), concerns negligent entrustment and creation ofa public nuisance by a gun dealer. On February 12, 2007, five people were killed andfour were wounded by a gun-wielding 18-year-old, Sulejman Talovic, at <strong>the</strong> popularTrolley Square shopping mall in Salt Lake City, Utah. Among his victims were 15-year-old Kirsten Hinckley, who was killed, and her mo<strong>the</strong>r, Carolyn Tuft, whosurvived. Talovic was armed with a Mossberg 12-gauge pump action pis<strong>to</strong>l gripshotgun (like <strong>the</strong> one picturedhere), which he used <strong>to</strong> shootKirsten, Carolyn, and all but one ofhis victims. After shooting hisvictims, he fought a gun battle with police in <strong>the</strong> mall’s hallways and was killed by29 More information on this case is at <strong>the</strong> Brady Center <strong>to</strong> Prevent <strong>Gun</strong> Violence website docket athttp://www.gunlawsuits.org/docket/currentdocket.pdf#page=4.15


police. The lawsuit alleges that because Talovic was 18, <strong>the</strong> gun dealer violatedfederal law that prohibits <strong>the</strong> sale of pis<strong>to</strong>l grip shotguns <strong>to</strong> anyone under 21. Thenegligent entrustment and illegal sale of a firearm <strong>to</strong> Talovic should exempt this casefrom <strong>the</strong> PLCAA. 30ConclusionAlthough <strong>the</strong> gun industry hoped that enactment of <strong>the</strong> PLCAA would end itsliability for supplying criminals with firearms, <strong>the</strong> courts have shown a willingness <strong>to</strong>allow cases <strong>to</strong> proceed under <strong>the</strong> PLCAA. Specific pleading of <strong>the</strong> facts that bring acase within limitations <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> PLCAA should allow many cases <strong>to</strong> proceed <strong>to</strong> trialwithout being hindered by <strong>the</strong> PLCAA. As <strong>the</strong>se cases illustrate, <strong>the</strong> gun industryshould not and cannot evade all liability for its conduct in arming criminals withdangerous firearms.30 More information on this case is at <strong>the</strong> Brady Center <strong>to</strong> Prevent <strong>Gun</strong> Violence website docket athttp://www.gunlawsuits.org/docket/currentdocket.pdf#page=6.16

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