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45commentators indicate that while local resource mobilisation still remains a weak area,there exists a lot of scope for revenue generation on a voluntary basis. One influentialminister notes in a recently held interview (conducted on November 13, 2002) that voluntarycontributions may yield considerable amount, although this area remains relativelyunderstudied. Also there exist wide variations across local bodies in this respect, accountingfor corresponding differences in per capita revenue across panchayats (M. Shanthi, 2002). 26D. Bandyopadhyay, in a workshop held in the recent past, gives an example of suchinnovative practices of revenue raising in one panchayat in West Bengal. Levying taxes onpaan will be considered as agricultural income tax and therefore prohibited. So the panchayatpresident raises resources through donation of Rs.10 per head from those who grow paan.Social forestry proceeds may constitute another promising source of revenue. But oneinterviewee argues that too much emphasis on local resource mobilisation or generation ofresources from social forestry etc. may lead to excessive of felling of trees and causeenvironmental damages. 27The question of resource use prompts us to raise three additional queries: i) use foreffective and equitable management of local public services (e.g., schools, health centres,drinking water facilities and so on); ii) use for productivist purposes and strategies (asmentioned above, contract farming, agro-business etc are the emerging priorities in ruralWest Bengal) and their alleged benefits; and iii) resource misuse and corruption. The factof the widespread corruption and embezzlement of public resources associated with variouslocal development programmes is well-known; such ‘development rackets’ are sometimesknown to involve the local traders/contractors, the sarpanch, the BDO or the junior engineer,and the local landlord or upper-caste leader. Does decentralized spending start off a cycleof ‘competitive corruption’ or does it lead to redistributive gains?d) fiscal responsibility – alongside the issue of expenditure autonomy there remainsthe attendant question of expenditure transparency and accountability. Do local peoplehave the right to information on past accounts and future spending priorities? Simply put,are the expenditure decisions transparent? Are the local authorities accountable to thepeople? Is there a scope for social audit of performance in addition to traditional audits?These issues will prompt us to focus on the mandatory village constituency meetings (i.e.,gram sansad meetings) in the panchayat system of West Bengal. Gram sannsad meetingsare deliberative public meetings where the elected members of the GP and all the voters ofa constituency meet to i) to review past and proposed programmes, ii) to monitor the