Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq - United States Department ...

Measuring Stability andSecurity in IraqMarch 2007Report to CongressIn accordance with theDepartment of Defense Appropriations Act 2007(Section 9010, Public Law 109-289)

Table of ContentsIntroduction....................................................................................................................................11. Stability and Security in Iraq .................................................................................................31.1. Political Stability......................................................................................................31.1.1. Strong Democratic Institutions...................................................................31.1.2. National Reconciliation..............................................................................31.1.3. Transnational Issues ...................................................................................31.1.4. Rule of Law ................................................................................................51.2. Economic Activity ...................................................................................................81.2.1. Building the Iraqi Economy .......................................................................81.2.2. Indicators of Economic Activity ................................................................91.3. The Security Environment .....................................................................................141.3.1. Overall Assessment of the Security Environment....................................141.3.2. Recent Developments in the Security Environment.................................151.3.3. The Nature of the Conflict........................................................................161.3.4. Attack Trends and Violence .....................................................................181.3.5. Infrastructure Attacks ...............................................................................201.3.6. Public Perceptions of Security..................................................................201.4. Transferring Security Responsibility .....................................................................221.4.1. Progress in Assuming Leadership in Counter-Insurgency Operations.....221.4.2. Process for Implementing Provincial Iraqi Control..................................231.4.3. MNF-I Basing Construct ..........................................................................242. Iraqi Security Forces Training and Performance...............................................................252.1. Assessed Capabilities.............................................................................................252.2. Ministry of Interior ................................................................................................292.2.1. Ministry of Interior Capacity Development .............................................292.2.2. Iraqi Police Service...................................................................................322.2.3. National Police .........................................................................................342.2.4. Directorate of Border Enforcement and Directorate of Ports of Entry ....352.2.5. Facilities Protection Service.....................................................................362.3. Ministry of Defense ...............................................................................................372.3.1. Ministry of Defense Capacity Development ............................................372.3.2. Army ........................................................................................................412.3.3. Iraqi National Counter-Terror Capability ................................................412.3.4. Special Operations Forces .......................................................................422.3.5. Navy ........................................................................................................422.3.6. Air Force ..................................................................................................42Annex AList of AcronymsiMarch 2, 2007

IntroductionThis report to Congress, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, is being submitted pursuant toSection 9010 of the U.S. Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007, Public Law 109-289. 1 Thereport includes specific performance indicators and measures of progress toward political,economic, and security stability in Iraq, as mandated in the above-referenced legislation. This is theseventh in a series of reports on this subject. The previous report was submitted in November 2006.The strategic goal of the United States forIraq remains a unified, democratic, federalIraq that can govern itself, defend itself, andsustain itself, and that is an ally in the war onterror. One year ago, as described in theFebruary 2006 edition of this series ofreports, the Iraqi people were on their way toachieving these goals. The national constitutionalreferendum and elections in 2005 werevictories for the Iraqi people. Unfortunately,these positive events were followed by aseries of attacks that initiated a cycle ofsectarian violence, undermined politicalgains, and challenged the Government of Iraq(GOI). To regain the initiative, the GOI isworking with the United States and its Coalitionpartners, embarking on a new approachto restore the confidence of the Iraqi peoplein their government; to build strong securityinstitutions capable of securing domesticpeace and defending Iraq from outsideaggression; and to gain support for Iraqamong its neighbors, the region, and theinternational community.Improving the security situation in the capitalcity of Baghdad is a central component of thenew approach. Baghdad is Iraq’s center ofgravity and its conditions drive conditions inother parts of the country. As sectarian violencein the capital increases, for example, sodoes support for al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI)among Sunnis and for the Jaysh al-Mahdi(JAM) among Shi’a. AQI and JAM remainthe key actors in fueling sectarian violence—which has become the greatest impediment tothe establishment of security and effectivegovernance in Iraq. Both groups areattempting to establish strongholds andexpand their zones of influence in the capital,with ordinary Iraqis getting squeezed in themiddle and often fleeing for other parts of thecountry or leaving Iraq altogether. Any strategyfor success must be designed to turn thistrajectory around.The strategic review commissioned by thePresident in November found that priorefforts to stabilize Baghdad failed for twoprincipal reasons: the lack of adequate Iraqiand Coalition forces to hold areas cleared ofterrorists and extremists and restrictive Iraqirules of engagement that allowed Iraqipolitical interference in operations.Reinforcing the capital is an essential part ofthis endeavor. The President’s new wayforward extends beyond Baghdad andemphasizes a renewed diplomatic program, abetter level of civilian and militaryintegration, increased training of andembedding with Iraqi forces, and a commitmentby Iraqi leaders to compromise on keycomponents of reconciliation, including anew hydrocarbon law, genuine and crediblelocal elections, constitutional review, and de-Ba’athification reform. All of these effortsmust work in tandem and all relevant agenciesin the U.S. Government must mobilize todo their part in order to maximize the chancesfor success. While the early signs are promising,it will be a period of months before wecan measure with certainty whether the newapproach is succeeding or requires furtheradjustments.1March 2, 2007

This report, like those preceding it, discussesmeasures of progress in political development,economic activity, and the securityenvironment, noting the inextricable linkbetween these areas and the Islamic, ethnicand tribal contexts that define Iraq as a state.This information predates the new approachand sets the frame around which the newapproach was designed. The report should beread as a baseline from which to measurefuture progress, and indications of successmust be heavily caveated given the dynamicsituation in Iraq. The situation in Iraq cannotbe measured by daily or weekly trends; it istrend lines over the course of months thathelp fill in a picture from isolated and anecdotalevents.2March 2, 2007

1. Stability and Security in Iraq1.1. Political StabilityThe United States and its Coalition partnersare working with the GOI to build strongdemocratic institutions that impartially serveall Iraqis; to support national reconciliation;and to gain support for Iraq from its neighbors,the region, and the international community.Fundamental to all of this is securityand the effective rule of law.1.1.1. Strong Democratic InstitutionsIraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki haspromised to reform his government, beginningwith his cabinet and the ministries. 2 Thispromise recognizes the poor performance ofthe ministries, and the reform is meant toredress their failure to counter corruption andreduce sectarianism. The majority of PrimeMinister Maliki’s current cabinet reflects theresults of the December 2005 election and ismajority Shi’a with generally proportionalrepresentation from the other main ethnic andsectarian communities. Prime Minister Malikihas also promised that the GOI will engageall illegally armed groups, regardless ofsectarian affiliation.1.1.2. National ReconciliationSince the last report, a series of high-casualtyand high-profile attacks primarily againstShi’a civilians—likely perpetrated by AQI—have hampered efforts to demobilize militiagroups and have set back the reconciliationprocess. Likewise, some Shi’a extremistgroups have used “death squads” to kill andintimidate Sunni civilians. This type ofsectarian violence in Baghdad and the failureto reliably apprehend and punish criminalsand terrorists has hampered progress towardreconciliation.The new approach adapts to new conditionsby emphasizing the precondition of securityin advancing meaningful reconciliation andsetting realistic and achievable goals that arevital to stabilizing Iraq in the medium andlong term. Whereas prior efforts had emphasizedan all-encompassing “national compact”as the vehicle for political progress, thecoming months will seek to advance fourspecific national reconciliation goals—ahydrocarbon law, local elections, constitutionalreview, and de-Ba’athificationreform—while also focusing more onpolitical accommodations at the provincialand local levels. There have already beensome achievements, including passage of aframework hydrocarbon law by the Councilof Ministers on February 26, 2007 to bepresented for final passage by the Council ofRepresentatives (CoR) when it returns tosession in March.The last two months of 2006, however, sawlittle progress on the reconciliation front. Thefirst two of four planned reconciliation conferenceswere described in the last report(November 2006). These conferences laidsolid groundwork for subsequent conferences,but there has been little progress sincethen and the conferences had no effect onquelling violence. On December 16–17,2006, the Political Parties Conference washeld in Baghdad. Speeches given by thePrime Minister and other Iraqi officialsfocused on political participation and nationalunity, and welcomed former Ba’athists intothe political process, so long as they showedloyalty to the new national government. TheSadrist bloc, top Ba’athists, and many Sunnifactions did not participate. A fourth conferenceof religious leaders has not yet beenscheduled due to lack of financial support andattendance challenges.1.1.3 Transnational IssuesTransnational issues addressed in the Novemberreport, including water-sharing agreements,drug trafficking, and negative foreigninfluence, continue to shape regional rela-3March 2, 2007

tions. The overall regional environmentremains poor, and there is great suspicionamong Sunni Arabs whether a Shi’a-majoritygovernment can act independent of Iran,advance the national interests of Iraq, andserve the interests of the region as a whole.Prime Minister Maliki has begun intensiveefforts to correct these perceptions withenvoys dispatched throughout the region inthe past six weeks. Maliki’s government thisyear has also restored diplomatic relationswith Syria for the first time in three decadesand reopened an Iraqi Embassy in SaudiArabia for the first time since the First GulfWar. Transnational issues that bear particularattention in the near term include the following.• Iranian and Syrian Influence. TheUnited States and Prime Minister Malikihave publicly noted the lethal Iraniansupport to Shi’a militias as well as theSyrian provision of safe haven to someIraqi insurgents, especially formerSaddam-era Iraqi Ba’ath party members. 3Iran and Syria are discussed in greaterdetail later in this report.• Tensions on the Border with Turkey.The President’s new approach calls forincreased efforts to counter the KurdistanWorker’s Party (PKK), a Kurdish terroristorganization with a history of terror activitiesin Turkey, often launched from northernIraq. 4 Countering the PKK is essentialto accomplishing regional goals, preventingunilateral Turkish military action, andmaintaining good U.S.-Turkish and Iraqi-Turkish relations. In 2006, General (ret.)Joseph Ralston was named Special Envoyfor Countering the PKK in Northern Iraq.Both Turkey and Iraq have appointedcounterparts to work with General Ralstonto attempt to arrive at a diplomatic solution.While there has not yet been a trilateralmeeting, there has been progress inbreaking the hold of the PKK at theMakhmour refugee camp.• Refugees. Significant population displacement,within Iraq and into neighboringcountries, diminishes Iraq’s professionaland entrepreneurial classes and strains thecapacities of the countries to which theyhave relocated. According to the Office ofthe United Nations High Commissionerfor Refugees, approximately 2 millionIraqis are living outside of Iraq, with morethan a million in Syria and Jordan. It isestimated that as many as 9,000 people arefleeing Iraq every month.International CompactThe International Compact with Iraq providesa 5-year framework for economic reformcommitments between Iraq and the internationalcommunity. This is an important initiativeand a key component of the diplomaticline of action under the new strategic framework.The Compact is a joint initiative of theGOI and the United Nations (UN) and willcommit Iraq to reforming its oil and agriculturesectors, establishing new investmentlaws and regulations, building the institutionsneeded to combat corruption, ensuring goodgovernance, and protecting human rights. Inreturn, members of the international communitywill commit to providing financial, technical,and other forms of assistance needed tosupport Iraqi efforts to achieve economicself-sufficiency. The main text of the Compacthas been approved and finalized;background material can be found atwww.iraqcompact.org. The GOI would liketo conclude the Compact during a ministeriallevelevent in spring 2007. To facilitate thatobjective, Prime Minister Maliki has askedUN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon to host asub-ministerial meeting in New York to finalizethe Compact text and secure commitmentsfrom international partners.4March 2, 2007

1.1.4. Rule of LawStability and security depend on establishmentof, and respect for, the rule of law bygovernment institutions that represent thestate and by the citizens whom the rule of lawseeks to protect. The rule of law is foundedon clear, understandable legislation that isapplied equally to all, respect for and adherenceto such laws by the public and governmentalofficials, governmental authority toenforce adherence to the law and to bringviolators to justice, and the means to holdgovernment officials accountable for themisuse of power.Legislative ActionThe Iraqi Constitution sets forth a list ofrights and freedoms, but additional legislationis needed to implement these guarantees.Iraq’s Constitutional Review Committeeofficially began work on November 15, 2006.The committee has another two months tocomplete its work and to recommend constitutionalchanges to the CoR. In accordancewith Iraq’s Constitution, recommendedamendments will be voted on in a nationalreferendum within two months of CoRapproval.The CoR did not achieve a quorum fromDecember 10, 2007 to January 6, 2007, dueto significant absenteeism and a boycott bythe Sadrist bloc, which holds about 10% ofthe CoR’s 275 seats. The speaker of the parliamenthas attempted to improve CoR attendanceby threatening to fine members foreach missed session. The Sadrists have sincereturned to the CoR without having thedemands met that they initially declared whenannouncing the boycott in November.Legislative highlights of the last quarterinclude the following.• The Constitutional Review Committee meton November 15, 2006, and formed threesubcommittees with fair representationfrom all major party blocs. The committeeis working with technical advisors fromthe UN to help ensure that the constitutionis technically sound and improved uponwhere possible.• On January 23, 2007, the CoR passed alaw establishing the Independent HigherElection Commission. The CoR must nowappoint commission members and passlegislation to set a date for provincial elections.Successful local elections and apossible constitutional referendum willrequire sufficient Iraqi and internationalresources, and the United States will beworking through diplomatic channels totake the necessary steps to help ensure thatthese electoral events—like the electoralevent in 2005—are genuine and credible.• The CoR passed the Military Court ProceduresLaw on January 24, 2007, and theMilitary Punishment Law on February 5,2007. Although Coalition ProvisionalAuthority Order 23 promulgated a Code ofMilitary Discipline for the Iraqi Army, itwas not formally institutionalized. Thesenew laws formally establish Iraq’s militaryjustice system, which will include due processprotections and judicial review. Thisis a major step toward institutionalizingthe rule of law within the Iraqi military.• The CoR passed the 2007 Federal Budgeton February 8, 2007, before adjourninguntil March. The US$41 billion budgetwas a significant achievement for the GOI.The US$7.3 billion committed to IraqiSecurity Forces (ISF) is evidence of theGOI commitment to the fight. This 35%increase over the 2006 budget is a sign ofgrowing Iraqi self-sufficiency.The CoR failed, however, to move forwardon other critical pieces of legislation, includinga law to reform the de-Ba’athificationsystem and a law to clarify the powers ofprovinces that are not part of regions. On de-5March 2, 2007

Ba’athification, there are currently three differentproposals—one from the Sunni IraqiIslamic Party, one from the cross-sectarianIraqiyya Party, and one from the CoR De-Ba’athification Committee. Iraqi leaders areworking to synthesize these drafts and reachan agreeable compromise position, with thethree-member Presidency Council taking aleading role on this issue. On the provincialpowers legislation, a draft law has been readtwice on the floor of the CoR and appearsheaded for passage, though key issues, suchas a date and structure for local elections,remain unresolved. These pieces of legislationare among the most important stepstoward meaningful national reconciliation,and the United States will continue toencourage the GOI to achieve agreementwhen the CoR returns to session this month.CrimeCriminal activities remain elevated and areoften difficult to distinguish from sectarianand other violence. White collar crime is anentrenched practice stemming from decadesof nepotism and organized criminal activitiesby government institutions of the formerregime; it will remain a serious obstacle forthe GOI for years to come. The Board ofSupreme Audit, the Commission on PublicIntegrity, and ministry inspectors generalcontinue to work with the Ministry of Justice(MOJ) to promote transparency and to curbthis entrenched practice.Public CorruptionBudget execution and corruption problemscontinue to hamper the GOI’s ability to performand turn good intentions into results.The United States is helping the GOI targetand spend the US$10 billion in Iraqi fundsdedicated to capital investment,reconstruction, and job creation programsthrough an effort headed by Ambassador TimCarney, appointed by Secretary Rice inJanuary to serve as an Economic TransitionCoordinator in Baghdad. To be fullyeffective, however, Iraq must also reformSaddam-era laws that allow cabinet ministersto shield government officials fromprosecution, and all Iraqi leaders mustcommit to ensuring the neutral andindependent application of the law. TheUnited States is also working with the WorldBank and other international institutions tosupport the three primary anti-corruptioninstitutions in Iraq: the Commission on PublicIntegrity, the Supreme Board of Audit, andthe inspectors general assigned to the governmentministries. The U.S. Embassy in Baghdadrecently restructured its rule of law andlaw enforcement offices to improve theireffectiveness in achieving civilian rule of lawobjectives in Iraq.PoliceThe Ministry of Interior (MOI) views its primaryrole as that of providing security. Anemphasis on tactical skills is understandable,considering the nature of the violence in Iraq,but little time is left for training in the conductof criminal investigations. To addressthis shortcoming, Multi-National SecurityTransition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) isstrengthening the Iraqi Major Crimes TaskForce and the Major Crimes Unit. Additionally,MNSTC-I and the MOI are working toimprove Iraq’s forensic investigative capabilitiesby adding several thousand forensicspecialists to the police forces. Militia infiltrationof local police remains a problem andPrime Minister Maliki has demonstrated acommitment to retraining and reformingpolice units that are shown to be servingsectarian or parochial interests. Thoughimproving, the lack of a fully functionaljustice system has led to unreliable detentionpractices, and police have often disregardedrelease orders signed by Iraqi judges. Securityforces also remain prone to intimidationby or collusion with militias and criminalgangs, thereby decreasing the confidenceamong ordinary Iraqis in their legitimatesecurity force.6March 2, 2007

CourtsAs of January 2007, Iraq had approximately870 investigative and trial judges (up 70 fromthe last report) and 100 criminal courts. TheGOI recognizes the need to expand judicialcapacity. To meet the growing demands ofthe judiciary, the number of judicialinvestigators is scheduled to reach 700 in2007 and 1,000 in 2008. The MOJ nowoperates a Judicial Training Institute. Thefirst class of 178 judges and prosecutors isscheduled to graduate in summer 2007. Asecond class of 60 trainees is scheduled tograduate in fall 2008. These are positivesteps, but to meet the growing demand acrossthe judicial sector, the MOJ needs to increasethe system’s capacity.Judges frequently face threats and attacks,and thus absenteeism and resignations underminethe workforce. Those who remain oftenfear handing down guilty verdicts againstdefendants with ties to insurgent groups ormilitias. In the provincial courts, judges oftendecline to investigate or try cases related tothe insurgency and terrorism.The United States has obligated roughlyUS$38 million since 2004 for judicialsecurity. To counter judicial intimidation,secure criminal justice complexes are underdevelopment. A criminal justice complexmay include a courthouse, detention facilities,forensic labs, and judicial housing—alllocated within the same secure perimeter.This concept provides enhanced security forthe judges and staff and creates synergyamong the judiciary, police, and detentionofficials. The first such complex will belocated in the Rusafa district of Baghdad,outside the Green Zone. Investigative judgesof the Central Criminal Court of Iraq will behoused there; it will also have detentionfacilities and housing for judicial and courtpersonnel.Prisons and DetaineesConcerns remain that the Iraqi CorrectionsService is increasingly infiltrated by criminalorganizations and militias. Detentionfacilities in Iraq do not meet incarcerationneeds. Pre-trial detention facilities in Iraq,administered by the MOI, the Ministry ofDefense (MOD), and the MOJ, are reportedto be overcrowded, substandard facilities withpoor detainee accountability practices. 5 Posttrialprisons, administered by the MOJ,generally meet international standards, butare at maximum capacity. To address thisproblem, Prime Minister Maliki and theMinister of Justice are demanding greateroversight of prison facilities, and U.S.advisors are encouraging the MOJ to increasethe salaries of corrections officers to bringthem more in line with those of policeofficers and thus to reduce the temptations ofbribery. The Embassy and Multi-NationalForce-Iraq (MNF-I) are also working with theGOI to increase detention capacity in the nearterm through additional compounds withadequate oversight in Baghdad and in thelong term through hardened facilities to beadministered by the MOJ.7March 2, 2007

1.2. Economic Activity1.2.1. Building the Iraqi EconomyThe GOI has taken significant steps toimprove its economy, although securityconcerns continue to restrain Iraq’s economicgrowth. In February 2007, the Iraqi Cabinetapproved a framework hydrocarbon law thatprovides the structure and principles for foreigninvestment in Iraq’s energy sector,decentralized management for the oil industry,and equitable distribution of oil revenuesto provincial and regional governments. Veryrecent Cabinet approval of the oil lawdemonstrated the importance of thislegislation in promoting the economicdevelopment and political unity of thecountry. It is anticipated the frameworkhydrocarbon law and related revenue-sharinglegislation will be submitted to the CoR inMarch.In 2006, the CoR passed the Foreign InvestmentLaw and the Fuel Import LiberalizationLaw to facilitate the expansion of privatesector activity. To become effective, theselaws require promulgating regulations toprovide a sufficient legal framework. TheGOI is drafting these regulations, whichshould be implemented later this spring. Anincrease in foreign investment will beeffective in stimulating growth, buildingtrust, and strengthening the Iraqi dinar.Stand-By ArrangementThe GOI met most of the performance criteriaand benchmarks of the Stand-By Arrangement(SBA) with the International MonetaryFund (IMF) in 2006. The GOI met again withthe IMF in mid-December 2006 to discuss thecombined third and fourth SBA reviews. Afollow-up meeting was held in Paris on February1, 2007. The participants agreed toschedule the Executive Board meeting,during which the reviews will be completedand the program extended for six months,dependent on the GOI implementing the nextmandated fuel price hikes on March 5. Threeyears of satisfactory performance on an uppercredit tranche IMF program are required forIraq to receive the final 20% tranche of ParisClub debt relief. Therefore, if fuel prices arenot raised and reviews are not completed byMarch 22, the IMF program may expire.Diversification IssuesThe Iraqi economy depends on the oil sector,which generates 67% of Iraq’s gross domesticproduct (GDP) and 95% of the government’sinternal revenues. To reduce its reliance onoil, the United States is supporting Iraq’s economicdiversification through increased agriculturalexports and private sector development.The Department of Defense’s (DoD)Task Force to Improve Business and StabilityOperations in Iraq aims to re-energize existingstate-owned enterprises, with the ultimateintent of privatization to promote economicdiversity. The United States Agency for InternationalDevelopment’s (USAID) agriculturaldevelopment projects include increasing agriculturalexports. Strengthening the growth ofhigh-value crops, such as olives, has demonstratedincreased export potential. USAID’smicrolending project has been very successfulat addressing private sector development.Government of Iraq Budget ExecutionThe GOI has available assets, the product oflast year’s under-spent budget and profitsfrom higher-than-anticipated oil prices, but itdoes not yet have the mechanisms to spendthem. The GOI will need to make significantinvestments in oil infrastructure, publicworks, and agriculture to expand theeconomy.In the 2006 Iraqi budget, 9.3 trillion dinar(US$6.2 billion) was allocated to capitalprojects, but less than 40% was obligated. Anumber of factors contribute to the consistentunder-spending of Iraq’s budget. The GOIlacks a public accounting framework andsuffers from outdated procurement processes.8March 2, 2007

To address procurement problems, the UnitedStates is helping the GOI formulate simplifiedcontracting procedures that will aid inbudget execution.In addition, the MOD and the MOI havetaken steps to spend significant portions oftheir procurement budgets—anticipated to bein excess of US$2 billion in 2007—throughU.S. Foreign Military Sales cases.1.2.2. Indicators of Economic ActivityEconomic indicators are collected and publishedregularly, largely by the Iraqi Ministryof Planning and Development Cooperationand international organizations. TheWorld Bank projects that 2006 GDP wasUS$48.5 billion, due largely to higherworld oil prices, with a per capita GDP ofUS$1,687. Real GDP growth was projectedto have been 3.0% in 2006, including 10.0%growth in the non-oil sector.InflationIraq’s high rate of inflation is a seriousobstacle to economic stability. Inflation in2006 averaged 50%, well above the IMF’srevised 2006 target of 30%. Because fuelshortages contributed to inflation in 2006, theGOI took nominal steps to remove obstaclesto private fuel imports. However, the GOI’sinability to craft an adequate regulatory structurehas so far prevented its efforts fromyielding any results. Over the past threemonths, in an attempt to curb inflation, theCoR passed the Fuel Import LiberalizationLaw, approved a deal with Kuwait to increasethe availability of refined fuel, and agreed tosell imported fuel at market prices. To reducethe rate of core (i.e., non-fuel) inflation, theCentral Bank of Iraq (CBI) implemented 14%exchange rate appreciation between November1, 2006 and February 1, 2007. As a signalingmeasure, the CBI also raised its benchmarkpolicy interest rate from 12% to 16% inNovember and to 20% in December. The CBIGDP Estimates and Projections, 2004 – 200820042005 e2006 e2007 p2008 pNominal GDP (in USD billion)25.734.548.561.071.0Government Oil Revenue (in % of GDP)69.669.466.966.567.4Per Capita GDP (USD)949.01,237.01,687.02,060.02,319.0Real GDP (% change)46.53.73.014.412.9Overall Fiscal Balance (in % of GDP)-40.69.8-6.1-2.1-0.8Consumer Price Inflation (annual %)31.731.650.017.010.0Source: World Bank Estimates (e), January 2007IMF Projections (p), August 20069March 2, 2007

has indicated its commitment to continueduse of monetary policy measures to maintainprice stability.UnemploymentEstimates of unemployment vary from 13.4%to 60%. Underemployment may be a muchmore significant factor. For example, a January2007 survey by Multi-National DivisionBaghdad indicated that only 16% of Baghdadisresponded that their current incomemeets their basic needs.The GOI must, with Coalition and internationalhelp, create an effective strategy to providejobs. This program must be seen as fairand nonsectarian by ordinary Iraqis. It mustproduce tangible results for the majority ofIraqis or it will decrease the legitimacy of theGOI. According to the U.S. Chamber ofCommerce, since the fall of Saddam Husseinin 2003, new businesses have increased from8,000 to more than 34,000. In addition, theTask Force to Improve Business and StabilityOperations in Iraq is working to improve contingencycontracting in Iraq and to reinvigorateoperations at targeted state-owned enterprisesby driving demand and establishingconnections with international businessexecutives. The Task Force has identified10 state-owned factories that show the mostpromise to increase productivity and employthe idle labor force, with minimal investmentby the GOI; the GOI’s 2007 budget includes1.4 trillion dinars for revitalizing state-ownedfactories. The Task Force has estimated thatreactivating these factories will create 11,000full-time jobs within six months.3.0Oil ProductionNovember 2006 – February 2007Millions of barrels per day2.52.02.212.202.182.14 2.172.232.051.991.992.052.091.51.721.701.01.210.50.0November 13-19November 20-26November 27-December 3December 4-10December 11-17December 18-24December 25-31January 1-7January 8-14January 15-21January 22-28January 29-February 4February 5-11February 12-18Source: Iraq Reconstruction Management Office10March 2, 2007

Oil Production, Distribution, and ExportDamage to pipelines, fires, poor maintenance,and attacks have combined to slow productionof refined products and crude oil forexport, primarily in central and northern Iraq.Production and exports in the south remainthe primary driving force of Iraq’s economy,although aging infrastructure and maintenanceproblems impede near-term increasesin production and exports. Crude oil productionfor the October-December 2006 quarterwas 2.2 million barrels per day (mbpd), andoil exports were 1.49 mbpd, short of theGOI’s 2006 goal of 1.65 mbpd. Fall andwinter months generally have low productionrelative to the spring and summer. Otherfactors, such as high market prices for crudeoil, overcame this shortfall and resulted inrevenues of US$1.5 billion above thatforecast for 2006.Critical fuel shortages occurred throughoutthe fall and early winter, including gasoline,diesel, kerosene, and liquid petroleum gas,largely as a result of poor domesticproduction, reduced imports from Turkey,and continued distribution problems. Theregulated price of regular gasoline(87 octane) in Iraq is currently about250 dinars per liter (US$.72 per gallon);premium gasoline (92 octane) is about350 dinars per liter (US$1.03 per gallon).Gray marketeers continue to profit from thesale of stolen fuel, both within Iraq and inneighboring countries. Gray market prices inmany central and northern provinces werereported at 100%–2,000% above officialsubsidized prices for key fuels.Electricity Production and DistributionEstimated peak daily demand for electricitybetween October and December 2006 was9,091 megawatts (MW), an increase of 20%over the same period in 2005. During thisquarter, the actual average daily peak generationoutput was 4,226 MW, an increase of 2%over the same period in 2005, and 51% of theaverage peak daily demand of 8,237 MW.Many Iraqi citizens have established privateentrepreneurial generator arrangements toproduce electricity on a neighborhood orbuilding basis, therefore underestimating totalelectrical production. The gap between government-producedsupply and consumerdemand continues to increase due to the failureto add or rehabilitate capacity, as well asinadequate security, operations, and maintenancepractices for the generation and transmissioninfrastructure. A surging demand isexacerbated by the fact that Iraqis pay verylittle, if anything, for electricity. Reform ofelectricity charges for consumers is key to thelong-term viability of Iraq’s electricity sector.Government-produced electricity averaged10.7 hours per day over the reporting period(October-December 2006) and 9.1 hours perday for the month of December. Baghdad,however, averaged only 6.6 hours of powerper day this quarter, falling to 6.3 hours inDecember—5.7 hours short of the target goal.11March 2, 2007

Electricity Supply and Demand2003 to 200610000900080007000Megawatts60005000400030002000100002003Q12003Q22003Q32003Q42004Q12004Q22004Q32004Q42005Q12005Q22005Q32005Q42006Q12006Q22006Q32006Q4Average Peak Daily Supply (MW)Average Peak Daily Demand (MW)Source: Defense Intelligence AgencyAverage Daily Hours of Electrical Power per ProvinceJanuary 200716Source: Iraq Reconstruction Management Office12March 2, 2007

Water and SanitationAs of December 2006, Iraqi Relief andReconstruction Fund (IRRF)-funded waterprojects have added or restored potable watertreatment for approximately 5.35 millionIraqis who did not have access to potablewater in April 2003. This is an increase of150,000 since the November 2006 report. Todate, IRRF-funded projects have also restoredsewage treatment capacity sufficient to servearound 5.1 million Iraqis, 100,000 short ofthe U.S. end state goal.The agricultural sector uses approximately90% of the water consumed, but has tremendouspotential to improve the efficiency ofwater use. Toward this end, in 2005 and2006, the U.S. Government funded Phase I ofa new national water master plan for Iraq,which, once completed, will guide waterresource development in Iraq for the nextthree decades.Nutrition and PovertyIn 2006, the UN World Food Programme(WFP) continued to provide assistancethrough a 12-month operation targeting themost vulnerable groups in Iraq. The operationwill continue in 2007, providing food assistanceto more than 3.7 million malnourishedchildren and their family members. WFP“safety net” activities include school feedingand supplementary feeding, which buildalternative safety net mechanisms for thePublic Distribution System.AgricultureTo help revitalize Iraq’s agricultural sector,the U.S. Department of Agriculture initiated aprogram to enhance agricultural training atIraqi universities. In addition, Department ofAgriculture personnel are participating inprovincial and ministerial capacity-buildingefforts as agricultural officers and advisors atIraq’s Ministry of Agriculture and in the U.S.Embassy and Provincial ReconstructionTeams.The Ministry of Agriculture and othersassociated with agriculture in Iraq have notmade adequate progress in leveraging Iraq’spotential. Lack of modern seed and fertilizer,under-developed irrigation systems, and lackof pesticides have all contributed to underachievementof potential. This, in turn, hascaused Iraq to continue to be overly dependenton imported food and to fail to achieve amarked increase in employment for the agriculturalsector.13March 2, 2007

1.3. The Security EnvironmentThe conflict in Iraq has changed from a predominantlySunni-led insurgency againstforeign occupation to a struggle for the divisionof political and economic influenceamong sectarian groups and organized criminalactivity. As described in the January 2007National Intelligence Estimate, the term “civilwar” does not adequately capture the complexityof the conflict in Iraq, which includesextensive Shi’a-on-Shi’a violence, al-Qaidaand Sunni insurgent attacks on Coalitionforces, and widespread criminally motivatedviolence. Some elements of the situation inIraq are properly descriptive of a “civil war,”including the hardening of ethno-sectarianidentities and mobilization, the changingcharacter of the violence, and populationdisplacements. 6 Illegally armed groups areengaged in a self-sustaining cycle of sectarianand politically motivated violence, usingtactics that include indiscriminate bombing,murder, and indirect fire to intimidate peopleand stoke sectarian conflict. Much of thepresent violence is focused on local issues,such as sectarian, political, and economiccontrol of Baghdad; Kurdish, Arab, andTurkomen aspirations for Kirkuk; and thepolitical and economic control of Shi’aregions in the south. Although most attackscontinue to be directed against Coalitionforces, Iraqi civilians suffer the vast majorityof casualties. Given the concentration ofpolitical power and population in Baghdadand the city’s ethnic and sectarian diversity,Baghdad security remains the key to stabilityin Iraq. An Iraqi-conceived and -led BaghdadSecurity Plan is the centerpiece for addressingthe escalating violence.1.3.1. Overall Assessment of the SecurityEnvironmentThe level of violence in Iraq continued to riseduring this reporting period as ethnic, tribal,sectarian, and political factions seek powerover political and economic resources. Consistentwith previous reports, more than 80%of the violence in Iraq is limited to four provincescentered around Baghdad, although italso exists in other population centers, suchas Kirkuk, Mosul, and Basrah. Sectarian violenceand insurgent attacks still involve avery small portion of the population, butpublic perception of violence is a significantfactor in preventing reconciliation on keyissues. The conflict in Iraq remains a mosaicand requires maximum flexibility on the partof the Coalition and the GOI to uproot themain drivers of violence in different areas ofthe country.• The conflict in the north is characterizedby sectarian tensions, insurgents andextremist attacks, and competition amongethnic groups (Kurd, Arab, Turkomen) forpolitical and economic dominance,including control of the oilfields centeredaround Kirkuk. Violence remainedfocused primarily in and around thenorthern cities of Kirkuk, Mosul, andTal’Afar, where ethnic competition forpower is exacerbated by violence fromSunni extremists.• Violence in Anbar is characterized bySunni insurgents and AQI attacks againstCoalition forces. AQI and affiliated Sunniextremists are attempting to intimidate thelocal population into supporting the creationof an Islamic state. However, in apositive development, these efforts areprovoking a backlash among some tribalfigures and Sunni insurgent leaders, whoare encouraging local opposition to AQI,particularly in ar-Ramadi. Local Sunnisheikhs are leading this opposition andhave strengthened recruiting efforts forlocal police forces.• Violence in Baghdad, Diyala, and Balad ischaracterized by sectarian competition forpower and influence between AQI andJAM, principally through murders, executions,and high-profile bombings. AQI andJAM elements rarely clash directly; most14March 2, 2007

Total Attacks by ProvinceNovember 11, 2006 – February 9, 2007Number of Attacks per Day5045403530252015105These four provinces have approximately 37% ofthe population but account for 80% of attacks.0BaghdadAnbarSalah ad DinDiyalaNinewahBasrahTamimBabilWasitQadisiyahDhi QarKarbalaMaysanMuthannaDahukNajafIrbilSulaymaniyahPopulationweighted mapSource: MNC-Iof their reciprocal violence is against Shi’aand Sunni civilians through high-profilebombings or campaigns of sectariancleansing.• The conflict in the southern provinces ischaracterized by tribal rivalry; factionalviolence among the Supreme Council forthe Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)/Badr Organization, the Office of theMartyr Sadr/JAM, and smaller militias forpolitical power; and attacks on Coalitionforces.1.3.2. Recent Developments in theSecurity EnvironmentAs described above, the new way forward inIraq focuses on security where violence ishighest—in Baghdad and Anbar. While theoverarching strategic goals remainunchanged, securing the population willassume a top priority to help set conditionsfor political and economic progress. We willincrease our forces in Baghdad by 21,500personnel to give our commanders anenhanced ability to hold previously clearedneighborhoods. The ISF are also reinforcingthe capital with three additional brigades.Prime Minister Maliki has established aBaghdad Security Command with 10 SecurityFramework Districts, with an Iraqi brigade,partnered with a U.S. battalion, permanentlylocated in each. More than 40 Joint SecurityStations will be established to facilitate cooperationbetween Coalition and Iraqi forcesand to build trust and confidence with thelocal population. In Anbar, U.S. Marines willbe added to provide more forces to consolidaterecent gains against AQI networks.Throughout Iraq, our embedded teamsadvising Iraq units are being substantiallyincreased in size to improve ISF operationalcapabilities more rapidly. As securityimproves, economic reconstruction programs15March 2, 2007

enabled by Iraqi and Coalition funding andexpanded Provincial Reconstruction Teamswill move in to assist with basic services andimproving economic opportunities for Iraqicitizens.As of the end of 2006, the primary endingpoint of data collection for this report, Shi’amilitias and Sunni insurgent groups wereengaged in sectarian cleansing in Baghdadneighborhoods and forcibly displacing bothSunni and Shi’a Baghdad residents. The newapproach is designed to help the Iraqis endthis trend. In January 2007, Prime MinisterMaliki announced that the ISF would renewtheir efforts to lead operations to secureBaghdad from insurgents and militias.Demonstrating support for the PrimeMinister’s efforts, the CoR voted to supportthe principles of his Baghdad Security Planon January 25, 2007. This newfound GOIwillingness to challenge the militias, especiallyJAM, and the announcement that theISF would pursue all illegally armed groups,regardless of affiliation, is a positive development—thoughultimate success will requiresustained and consistent commitments toaction and even-handed application of therule of law by all Iraqi leaders.GroupSunni InsurgentsAQIJAM1.3.3. The Nature of the ConflictViolent opposition to the GOI and Coalitionforces comes from a variety of groups withpolitical, religious, ethnic, or criminal objectives.Some groups receive support fromoutside Iraq. Although much of the violenceis attributable to sectarian friction, each of theviolent factions is driven by its own politicalpower relationships, and the factions areoften hostile to one another. Shi’a sectarianmilitias have differing objectives, whichoccasionally lead to violence. JAM, which isassociated with Muqtada al-Sadr, conductsattacks and provides services in support ofSadr’s efforts to dominate the Shi’a areas ofBaghdad and the south. The Badr Organizationoften works against JAM and in supportof SCIRI and its political agenda ofautonomy in the south. AQI and associatedforeign fighters attack Coalition and GOItargets and both Shiites and Sunnis to furtherAQI’s goal of establishing an Islamic state inIraq and to build a sanctuary to supportoperations against targets outside Iraq, whileSunni insurgents attack Coalition forces andthe Shi’a-dominated GOI to promote apredominantly secular Sunni Arab agenda.This rivalry will be most evident duringcoming months as Maysan, Qadisiyah, andWassit provinces assume Provincial IraqiControl (PIC).Goals of Key Destabilizing Elements in Iraq 7Goals• Expel U.S. and Coalition forces from Iraq• Topple the “unity” government• Re-establish Sunni governance in Anbar and Diyala• Force Coalition forces withdrawal• Gain territory to export conflict• Provoke clash between Islam and others• Establish caliphate with Shari’a governance• Force Coalition forces withdrawal• Consolidate control over Baghdad and the GOI• Exert control over security institutions• Implement Shari’a governance16March 2, 2007

1400Sectarian Murders* and IncidentsJanuary 2006 – January 2007120010008006004002000JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JANSectarian IncidentsSectarian Murders*Sectarian incidents and murders as recorded in MNC-I Significant Activities Database. Sectarian incidents are threats andviolence with apparent sectarian motivations. Multiple casualties can result for a single incident. Sectarian murders aremurders with distinct characteristics, and are a subset of total civilian casualties (not depicted in this chart).Source: MNF-IIranian Support. Iranian lethal support forselect groups of Shi’a militants intensifies theconflict in Iraq. Consistent with the NationalIntelligence Estimate, Iranian support to Shi’amilitias, such as JAM and the BadrOrganization, includes providing lethalweapons, training, financing, and technicalsupport. 8 This includes supplying some Shi’aextremist groups with explosively formedprojectiles (EFPs), the most effective of theroadside bombs. Shi’a extremist groups havebeen implicated in direct attacks againstCoalition forces, including with EFPtechnology. EFPs require advancedmanufacturing processes and training foremployment that clearly place them outsidethe category of “improvised explosivedevices.”Syrian Support. Although Iraq resumed diplomaticrelations with Syria in November2006, Damascus appears unwilling to cooperatefully with the GOI on bilateral securityinitiatives. Syria continues to provide safehaven, border transit, and limited logisticalsupport to some Iraqi insurgents, especiallyformer Saddam-era Iraqi Ba’ath Party elements.Syria also permits former regime elementsto engage in organizational activities,such that Syria has emerged as an importantorganizational and coordination hub for elementsof the former Iraqi regime. AlthoughSyrian security and intelligence servicescontinue to detain and deport Iraq-boundfighters, Syria remains the primary foreignfighter gateway into Iraq. Despite its heightenedscrutiny of extremists and suspectedinsurgents, Damascus appears to want toappease Islamist extremist groups. Damascusalso recognizes that Islamist extremists andelements of the former Iraqi regime shareSyria’s desire to undermine Coalition effortsin Iraq.17March 2, 2007

1.3.4. Attack Trends and ViolenceFor this report, the term “attacks” refers tospecific incidents reported in the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) SignificantActivities Database. It includes knownattacks on Coalition forces, the ISF, thecivilian population, and infrastructure.Attacks typically involve improvised explosivedevices; small arms, including sniperfire; and indirect fire weapons.The total number of attacks on and casualtiessuffered by Coalition forces, the ISF, andIraqi civilians for the October-Decemberreporting period were the highest for any3-month period since 2003. These attackswere concentrated in the provinces of Baghdad,Anbar, Salah ad Din, and Diyala, withBaghdad experiencing a record 45 attacks perday. The other 14 provinces of Iraq experiencecomparatively low levels of attacks.Coalition forces continued to attract themajority of attacks, while the ISF and Iraqicivilians continued to suffer the majority ofcasualties. Casualties from these attacksdecreased slightly in January, but remainedtroublingly high. In addition, as these dataonly include violence reported to or observedby Coalition forces, they only provide apartial picture of the violence experienced byIraqis. The UN estimates civilian casualtiesbased on the number of casualties reported byhospitals throughout the country. For themonth of December, the UN estimated thatmore than 6,000 civilians were killed orwounded. This is about twice as many casualtiesas were recorded by Coalition forces.18March 2, 2007

12001000Attacks Targeting Iraqi CiviliansAttacks Targeting Iraqi Security ForcesAttacks Targeting Coalition ForcesAverage Weekly AttacksApril 1, 2004 – February 9, 20078006004002000Pre-Sovereignty:1 Apr - 28 Jun 04Sovereignty:29 Jun - 26 Nov 04Election:27 Nov 04 - 11 Feb 05Pre-Constitution:12 Feb - 28 Aug 05Referend/Elect:29 Aug 05 - 10 Feb 06Gov Transit ion:11 Feb 06 - 19 May 06Gov Established: Tran. t o Self Reliance:20 May 06 - 31 Dec 06 1 Jan - 9 Feb 07Source: MNC-I120CiviliansAverage Daily Casualties*April 1, 2004 – February 9, 2007100Iraqi Security ForcesCoalition806040200P re-Sovereignty:1 Apr 04 -28 Jun 04Sovereignty:29 Jun 04 -26 Nov 04Election:27 Nov 04 -11 Feb 05P re-Co nstitutio n:12 Feb 05 -28 Aug 05Referend/Elect:29 Aug 05 -10 Feb 06Gov Transition:11 Feb 06 -19 M ay 06Go v Established:20 M ay 06 -31 Dec 06Trans to SelfReliance: 1 Jan-9Feb 07* Casualty data reflect updated data for each period and are derived from unverified initial reports submitted by Coalition elementsresponding to an incident; the inconclusivity of these numbers constrains them to be used only for comparative purposes.Source: MNC-I19March 2, 2007

1.3.5. Infrastructure AttacksThis past quarter (October-December 2006)saw an average of 1.4 attacks per week oninfrastructure providing essential services,such as electrical power, water, and fuel. Theattack rate is down from an average of 6.7attacks per week in the pre-sovereigntyperiod of April-June 2004. However, thetiming and location of more recent attacksresulted in greater disruption of service. Inaddition, weak ministerial oversight, ineffectualrapid-repair teams, and criminal harvestingof infrastructure assets (e.g., copper frompower lines) have proved to be majorimpediments to improving the supply ofessential services. Since poor delivery ofessential services adversely affects thelegitimacy of the government in the minds ofthe civilian population, Iraq’s infrastructurewill remain a high-value target for insurgentsand criminal elements.1.3.6. Public Perceptions of SecuritySurveys of the Iraqi people consistentlydemonstrate a rejection of violence, particularlyviolence against civilians. More than80% of the population rejects violenceagainst the government under any circumstance,and more than 90% rejects attacksagainst women and children. 9,10 However,two-thirds of Iraqis express a sense that conditionsfor peace and stability are worsening,and the population is roughly split on whetherthe government is moving in the right or thewrong direction to quell the violence. 11,12This situation is consistent with polling datadescribed in previous reports. Almost twothirdsof the population feel personallypowerless to do anything to stop the violence.13 Nevertheless, the number of actionabletips—something individuals can do toimprove the situation—continues to rise.3500National Hotline Actionable Tips*August 2006 – January 2007300025002000150010005000August September October November December JanuarySource: MNF-I (includes tips reported to multiple sources)* Not all actionable tips result in the apprehension of enemy forces or the seizure of illegal weapons.20March 2, 2007

Many Iraqis feel more positive at the locallevel than they do at the national level. 14 Asnoted above, the number of community watchgroups is increasing, indicating Iraqis aretaking personal responsibility for the securityof their neighborhoods. However, effortsmust be made to coordinate these groups withGOI security efforts and prevent them fromacting as “mini-militias” outside ISF control.Almost 80% of Iraqis polled said that theythought militias should be dissolved, 15 withmore than half reporting that they thoughtmilitias make conditions more dangerous. 16Overall, confidence in the GOI to provideprotection has improved nationally. 17 Iraqisindicate a steady increase in confidence intheir security forces, both Army and police.This national improvement is reflected inimprovements in the confidence in the IraqiArmy and Iraqi Police to improve the situation.18 These aspects vary widely byprovince, with most support coming from theShi’a-dominated south and the Kurdishdominatednorth.How would you describethe tensions in yourneighborhood today?(Scale of 1 to 10)How would you describethe tensions in thecountry today?(Scale of 1 to 10)Jan 07 Jan 07More TensionLess TensionSource: Nationwide Poll10 121March 2, 2007

1.4. Transferring SecurityResponsibilityThe President of the United States and thePrime Minister of Iraq met in Amman,Jordan, in November 2006, to review therecommendations regarding the transfer ofsecurity responsibilities to the GOI. Theserecommendations included the establishmentof nine committees focused on the followingissues: MOD training and equipping, MOItraining and equipping, transfer of operationalcontrol of Iraqi Army Divisions to the GOI,transfer of provincial control to the GOI,development of ministerial capacities,improved security coordination betweenMNF-I and the GOI, development of an Iraqicounter-terrorism capability, development ofan Iraqi National Intelligence system, anddevelopment of a National Security Architecture.With the approval of the Iraqi PrimeMinister, implementation of this effort isunder way. The first series of reports from thenine committees was completed on February19, 2007. The committees will continuetheir efforts toward acceleration and transferenceof security responsibilities until completion.After the transfer of securityresponsibilities is complete, a long-termsecurity relationship serving the interests ofthe United States, Iraq, the region, and therest of the world can be established.1.4.1. Progress in Assuming Leadershipin Counter-Insurgency OperationsAs part of the process of transferring securityresponsibility, an Iraqi unit assumes the leadonce it has been assessed and demonstratedsufficient capability to plan and executecombat operations. As of February 13, 2007,8 Division Headquarters, 31 Brigade Head-Iraqi Army and National Police with Lead Responsibility forCounter-Insurgency Operations in Their AreasMay 06Baghdad AreaFeb 07Baghdad AreaTal’AfarMosulTal’AfarMosulKirkukKirkukSamarraSamarraRamadiFallujahRamadiFallujahNajafNajafBasrahBasrahComponentIraqi ArmyNational PoliceTotalDIV HQs BDE HQs BNs214 5702 6216 63Source: MNC-I, C3 as of May 7, 2006Iraqi Army LeadNational PoliceLeadComponent DIV HQs BDE HQs BNsIraqi Army831 93National Police 00 0Total831 93Source: MNC-I, C3 as of February 13, 200722March 2, 2007

quarters, and 93 Iraqi Army battalions hadassumed the lead for counter-insurgencyoperations within their assigned areas ofoperations, and Iraqi Ground Forces Command(IGFC) had assumed command andcontrol of 6 of 10 Iraqi Army divisions (1st,2nd, 3rd, 4th, 8th, and 10th). Although theseunits lead security in their respective areas ofoperations, most still require substantiallogistics and sustainment support fromCoalition forces.The Coalition is focusing on improving theproficiency of all military and police units,primarily through the efforts of TransitionTeams. These teams, composed of 6,000advisors in more than 480 teams, areembedded at all levels of Iraqi units in allmajor subordinate commands.1.4.2. Process for ImplementingProvincial Iraqi ControlThe transfer of security responsibility fromCoalition forces to the GOI reflects Iraq’sability to protect its citizens and safeguard itsterritory. As Iraqis take on more responsibilityfor security, Coalition forces move intosupporting roles, while maintaining sufficientforces on the ground to help Iraq consolidateand secure its gains.The Joint Committee to Transfer SecurityResponsibility (JCTSR) has developed criteriato guide the transfer of security responsibilityto Iraq. Recommendations for transferinclude an assessment of conditions in fourcategories: Threat Assessment, ISF Readiness,Local Governance Capability, andMNF-I Ability to Respond Quickly to MajorThreats (if needed). The appropriate Multi-National Force division commander andProvincial Security Transition AssessmentAs of February 2007DahukNinewahIrbilTamimSulaymaniyahAnbarSalah Ad DinDiyalaBaghdadKarbala BabilWasitProvincial Iraqi ControlReady For TransitionPartially Ready For TransitionNot Ready For TransitionQadisiyahMaysanAn NajafDhi QarMuthannaBasrahSource: MNF-I23March 2, 2007

provincial governor, assisted by representativesof the Iraqi Ministries of Interior andDefense and U.S. and United KingdomEmbassies, conduct monthly assessments ofprovinces and provincial capitals. Once adecision is made to transfer security responsibilities,the JCTSR provides transitiondirectives, develops a public affairs plan, andarranges a post-transfer security agreementbetween MNF-I and provincial governors.In December 2006, responsibility for securityin An Najaf Province was transferred fromMNF-I to the provincial government andcivilian-controlled Iraqi Police. An Najaf isthe third of Iraq’s 18 provinces to be designatedfor transition to PIC. The joint decisionof the GOI and MNF-I to hand over securityresponsibility is the result of the An Najafcivilian authorities’ demonstrated ability tomanage their own security and governanceduties at the provincial level.Events in January 2007 validated the posttransfersecurity concept. When the local AnNajaf police were unexpectedly fired upon,they assessed the situation to be beyond theirmeans to control. The provincial governorthen requested assistance from the NationalCommand Center (NCC), which alerted anddeployed additional units from outside theprovince. Once those units arrived, an additionalcall for support was sent. The NCCrequested helicopter and airplane supportfrom Coalition forces, which also sent aQuick Reaction Force to assist. The outcomewas a decisive victory by the ISF.On December 17, 2006, the Prime Ministerand the Ministerial Committee for NationalSecurity approved the transfer of securityresponsibility for Dahuk, Irbil, andSulaymaniyah to the Kurdistan RegionalGovernment (KRG). These provinces willtransition to PIC on completion of negotiationsbetween the GOI and the KRG toresolve a national budgetary issue concerningthe defense budget. These three provincesand three others—Qadisiyah, Maysan, andNinewah—are expected to transition to PICby the spring of 2007. The remaining provincesare expected to achieve PIC in 2007except for Anbar, which is projected to transferto PIC in early 2008.1.4.3. MNF-I Basing ConstructMNF-I is consolidating its locations in Iraq toreduce its temporary basing requirementsusing a “bottom-up” conditions-based processto synchronize basing requirements withCoalition forces requirements and theprojected command-and-control structure.The timeline for this process is being adjustedto support the short-term surge for theBaghdad Security Plan. However, MNF-I hasalready reduced its presence in major citieswhile developing the flexibility and maintainingthe force level required to support otherelements in Iraq, including Coalition partners,Provincial Reconstruction Teams, TransitionTeams, other supporting entities, and theDepartment of State. This process will maximizesupport through a minimum number ofstrategically located forward operating basesand convoy support centers. Because most ofthe ISF have been strategically based onformer Coalition bases, MNF-I is activelyengaging the Ministry of Finance and otherentities in the GOI in order to identify futuretenants to take possession of the remainingbases.24March 2, 2007

2. Iraqi Security Forces Training and PerformanceBy the end of 2006, the United States and itsCoalition partners met their force generationtargets, while continuing their efforts toexpand the size and capability of the ISF tomeet emergent requirements. As of February19, 2007, approximately 328,700 forces(not including replenishments) have beentrained. The actual number of present-fordutysoldiers is about one-half to two-thirdsof the total due to scheduled leave, absencewithout leave, and attrition. The police havealso experienced significant attrition ofpersonnel who have been through Coalitiontraining, but provincial and localgovernments have hired additional policeoutside the train-and-equip program. Both theMOD and the MOI have assumed control ofmost force generation tasks and havedeveloped a plan to continue routinereplenishment of the force. The table on thispage depicts the number of ISF trained byCoalition forces since 2003.2.1. Assessed CapabilitiesAs of February 19, 2007, there were 112 IraqiArmy combat battalions. One hundred threeare conducting operations at varying levels ofcapability; an additional nine battalions arebeing generated. There are two SpecialOperations Battalions, both conductingoperations. Of the 17 planned Strategic InfrastructureBattalions (SIBs), 14 are assessed asconducting operations at various levels. Ofthe 103 Iraqi Army combat battalions conductingoperations, 93 have the lead incounter-insurgency operations in their areasof responsibility. Additionally, 27 NationalPolice battalions are operational, with 6 in thelead. All but one of the National Policebrigades are currently conducting securityoperations in Baghdad. A brigade-sizedoperational reserve consisting of amechanized battalion from the Army, aCurrent Number of Trained* Iraqi Security ForcesComponent # TrainedMinistry of Interior ForcesPolice ~135,000National Police ~24,400Border Enforcement ~28,400Dignitary Protection ~500MOI Forensics Unit ~4,000Total MOI ~192,300Ministry of Defense ForcesArmy ~120,000Support Forces ~12,800Special Operations ~1,500Air Force ~900Navy ~1,100Total MOD ~136,400Total Trained ISF ~328,700* These numbers are not the same as those present forduty and do not include troops trained as individualreplacements.Data of as February 19, 2007National Police battalion, and a SpecialForces company has been establishedLogistics and Sustainment of Ministry ofDefense and Ministry of Interior ForcesThe most significant shortcoming in bothMOD and MOI forces’ capabilities is inplanning and executing logistics and sustainmentrequirements. Factors underlying thisdeficiency include inadequate levels of sustainmentstocks and limited capacity of theMOD and the MOI to execute the planning/acquisition/sustainment cycle. 19 DoD isaddressing the challenges to reduce Iraqireliance on U.S. support. For example, the13th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary)is partnered with Iraqi logistics units to assistin the development of Iraqi Army divisionalsupport capabilities. Embedded civilianadvisors are assisting senior MOD and MOIofficials in developing their capacity toorganize, train, equip, sustain, and upgradetheir forces.25March 2, 2007

MOD Forces’ Assessed Capabilities1601401201002492Units in the Lead with Coalition Enablers or Fully IndependentUnits Fighting Side by Side with Coalition ForcesUnits Not Ready806040552720034 36Jun-05 Feb-07 Jun-05 Feb-07 Jun-05 Feb-07 Jun-05 Feb-07Iraqi Army, SpecialOperations CombatForces, and StrategicInfrastructure BattalionsLogistics Enablers Air Force NavySource: MNF-I as of February 19, 2007MOI National Police Forces’ Assessed Capabilities30256Units in the Lead with Coalition Enablers or Fully IndependentUnits Fighting Side by Side with Coalition ForcesUnits Not Ready201522110502137 7111 23Jun-05 Feb-07 Jun-05 Feb-07 Jun-05 Feb-07National Police CombatBattalionsNational Police BrigadeHeadquartersNational Police DivisionHeadquartersSource: MNF-I as of February 19, 200726March 2, 2007

Current Manning InitiativesThe generation of the Objective Counter-Insurgency and Civil Security Forces is complete.The GOI, with Coalition support, isnow executing several manning initiatives toreplenish the force to allow units to be temporarilyrelieved to refit and retrain, and toincrease present-for-duty levels in combatunits. These initiatives will add more than60,000 personnel to the ISF during 2007.MNF-I estimates that the MOI will require32,000 new police annually to replenish theranks. Training bases are established andfully functioning to achieve these replenishmentgoals.• Replenishment of 30,000. MNSTC-I isfunding the training and equipping of30,000 soldiers to replace personnel lossesand to increase the manning of combatunits to 110% to improve present-for-dutystrength.• Prime Minister’s Army ExpansionInitiative. In consultation with the U.S.Government, the GOI decided to increasethe size of the Army by approximately24,000 soldiers. The additional forces willincrease the MOD’s ability to commandand control its forces, enhance its operationaland tactical flexibility, and allowbattle-weary units to be pulled off-line toretrain and refit. This GOI initiative alsocame with fiscal resources from the MODbudget.• Replenishment of National PoliceBrigades. The Civilian Police AssistanceTransition Team (CPATT) is working toreplenish all National Police units withpersonnel and key pacing items of equipmentin support of the Baghdad SecurityPlan and Phase II training at Numaniyah.• Expansion of National Police to 10Brigades. The CPATT is supporting theprime minister’s initiative to build a multicomponent(Iraqi Army and NationalPolice) division-sized force to protect theSamarra Shrine reconstruction project. Theteam is generating a 10th National PoliceBrigade in support of this effort.• Establishment of Three EmergencyResponse Unit Battalions in Anbar. TheCPATT, in cooperation with the MOI andprovincial authorities, is assisting with thetraining and equipping of three battalionsof auxiliary policemen, to assist the IraqiPolice Service primarily in the greaterRamadi area. This is a very positive initiativeto take advantage of increased Sunniparticipation in the police forces of AnbarProvince.Complexity of Personnel Management inMaturing MinistriesThe security ministries continue to strugglewith immature personnel management practices.Personnel strength reporting by Iraqimilitary and police units is assessed as weak.The primary shortfalls in the personnel managementsystem are as follows.• Lack of Confidence in Retirement andDeath Benefit Payments. The GOI isformulating a Retirement/Pensions Law.Until this legislation is in place and effective,the security ministries will continueto pay pensions and martyr pay. The currentsystem is based on an upfront lumpsum payment and a pension of 80% of thetotal basic pay and allowances. This providedadequate financial support to families.These benefits have received significantattention from the MOI, and potentialchanges that would have undermined theseinitiatives have been strongly resisted.This effectively means that the MOI’semployment rolls are enlarged; this iscurrently seen as being the most effectivemeans of “looking after their own.”• Wounded Remaining on the Rolls. TheMOI and the MOD are in the process ofdeveloping an effective system to care forseverely wounded soldiers and policemen.27March 2, 2007

Like those killed in action, many woundedremain on the rolls in order to receivemedical care and financial compensation.The MOD recently created medical“follow-up” units across the country.These units are holding companies towhich severely wounded soldiers areassigned. This allows soldiers who arephysically incapable of conducting theirduties to be dropped from their unit rollswhile still retaining pay and benefits. Asimilar plan will be implemented in theMOI.• Corruption. Corruption remains a factorat both the unit and ministerial level. In thepersonnel system, the Ministers ofDefense and Interior are aware of “ghost”soldiers and policemen who exist only onthe rolls. By maintaining these soldiersand policeman on their roles, units are ableto receive additional resources based onper capita planning factors. Additionally,corrupt leaders often collect pay and othercompensation designated for these soldiersand policemen. The ministries have madesignificant strides in reducing corruptionwithin the personnel and pay systems andare well along in the automation of thesesystems to reduce corruption further and totackle the absenteeism resulting fromsoldiers leaving their units to deliver theirpay in cash to their families in their homedistricts.28March 2, 2007

2.2. Ministry of InteriorMOI forces consist of the Iraqi Police Service,the National Police, the Directorate ofBorder Enforcement, and other, smallerforces. 20 MNSTC-I has completed its initialtraining and equipping goal for the ObjectiveCivil Security Force (OCSF) of 188,300 MOIsecurity forces and is in the process ofexpanding the MOI forces to 194,800.Although the MOI is implementing anautomated personnel management system,there are currently no reliable data to indicatehow many of the OCSF are still serving withthe MOI. Additionally, the MOI has hired asignificant number of police beyond thosetrained by MNSTC-I. MNSTC-I estimatesattrition for the MOI as approximately 20%per year, with the Iraqi Police Service and theNational Police attrition remaining higherthan the Directorate of Border Enforcementand other personnel due to the variance ofrisks in the duties. 212.2.1. Ministry of Interior CapacityDevelopmentEmbedded transition teams continue to reportmodest improvements in the MOI’s ability toperform key ministry functions, such asdeveloping and implementing plans andpolicies, intelligence, personnel management,logistics, communications, and budgeting.MNSTC-I assesses MOI as being partlyeffective. As was described in the November2006 report, the CPATT’s MOI TransitionTeam works with the MOI on developing andassessing these capabilities. The MOITransition Team is composed of slightlymore than 100 advisors.Life Support, Logistics, and AccountabilityAmmunition. On January 15, 2007, theresponsibility for ammunition procurement,storage, and distribution for MOI forces wastransferred from Coalition forces to MOIheadquarters. The first of three ammunitiondeliveries to the MOI headquarters hasoccurred. Storage space, material handlingequipment, and request quantities continue tobe challenges. Future ammunition purchasesthrough Foreign Military Sales will potentiallyresolve quantity issues.Warehousing. Three warehouses at theBaghdad Police College (BPC) transferred tothe MOI Director of Logistics on January 13,2007. One warehouse has the capability to beused as an armory, providing the MOI headquarterswith additional storage space forweapons and ammunition. The Director ofLogistics has a staff prepared to assumeresponsibility for warehouse operations.Vehicles. The MOI is initiating actions foroversight and policy for maintenance andvehicles (acquisition and distribution). Tooffset MOI headquarters’ limited control overthe provinces, the MOI plans to centralize thepurchase of both vehicles and parts. Provincialindependence; lack of trained mechanics,manuals, special tools, repair parts, and adequatemaintenance facilities; and the currentsecurity situation have hampered this effort.The GOI is purchasing limited numbers ofsmall non-American-manufactured vehicleswith its own budget.Fuel. Shortfalls of adequate fuel continue tohinder mission performance. To correct this,the MOI established a Fuel ManagementOffice under the Director of Vehicles. Thisoffice continues to refine fuel allocation,request, and distribution issues.Life Support. Life support contracts for eightIraqi Police Academies transitioned to theMOI on December 31, 2006. This brings thetotal number of contracts transitioned to theGOI in 2006 to 18, valued at US$195 million.Efforts are under way to establish an MOIreporting mechanism to assess the quality oflife support services at the academies followingtransition from the Coalition forces.29March 2, 2007

Personnel Management. The MOI does notyet have accurate personnel accountabilityand reporting procedures, and it is unknownhow many of the more than 306,000employees on the ministry’s payroll arepresent for duty on a given day. MNSTC-Iestimates that, on an average day, less than70% of MOI personnel are present for duty.This is a combination of authorized absences(leave, school, sickness) and unauthorizedabsences. The problem of personnel accountabilityis being addressed through the purchaseof an automated human resources andpayroll system. The equipment and softwarefor this system were installed in January2007, and training has begun. Full deploymentof the system is expected to take 18months. Once complete, the personnel managementsystem will be integrated fully withemployee biometrics, improving the accuracyof employment rosters and facilitatingemployee criminal background screening.Equipment Accountability. Due to decentralizedcontrol and funding of elements thatcomprise the MOI, there is no standardizedunit equipment accountability procedure. Theresponsibility for proper equipment accountabilityis delegated to the subordinate organizations,with most elements maintainingequipment accountability through the use ofhand receipts and manual ledgers.Financial Accountability. Certain functionalareas of the MOI operate under an assortmentof financial authorities intended for a command-and-controlstructure that no longerexists. In this uncertain regulatory environment,proper financial reporting is inconsistentand results in difficulty for the MOI tobudget centrally and execute fundseffectively and transparently. Nevertheless,budget execution under Minister of InteriorJawad al-Bolani is improving and the ForeignMilitary Sales program will mitigate some ofthe risk of mismanagement in this area.Command and Control. The MOI TransitionTeam is focusing on developing the minister’sability to delineate authority,responsibility, and accountability clearlythroughout the MOI. The chain of commandis relatively clear and effective for NationalPolice and Border Forces. However, commandand control for the provincial police isunclear. The decentralized nature of the IraqiPolice Service often results in conflictingguidance and directives coming simultaneouslyfrom the central ministry and the provincialgovernment.Internal Audit FunctionsThe Audit Department within the MOI fallsunder the Inspector General’s (IG) office. PerCoalition Provisional Authority Order 57, theAudit Department is responsible for audits ofthe economy, efficiency, and effectiveness ofthe ministry’s operations and facilities.Currently, audit functions conducted for theIraqi Police Service and the National Policeare done via a separate audit element thatreports directly to the Minister of Interior.The Office of the Director General for Auditsprovides a person to fill the audit functionwith that element.During the fourth quarter of 2006, the MOIIG focused on improving MOI’s internalcapacity to identify, deter, and prevent corruption.Recent funding approval by theMinistry of Finance for increased force structureenabled the IG to embark on planningefforts to increase the number of employeesby 1,000 individuals during 2007. Theseresources will significantly improve the IG’sability to evaluate and report independentlyon the performance of MOI programs andoperations throughout Iraq. For the first time,the IG has developed an Annual InspectionPlan aimed at formalizing the use of IGspecial inspection committees to conductinspections of pre-selected MOI organizationsthroughout Iraq based on approvedinspection checklists. Additionally, the IG30March 2, 2007

formalized a professional developmentprogram for serving IG employees andexpanded the core Program of Instruction forbasic training of IGs. During this period, theIG increased its number of trained investigatorsfrom 81 to 125, to include employeesserving in outlying provinces.From January 1, 2006, through December 31,2006, MOI Internal Affairs opened 3,403corruption-related investigations. Of these,775 (22%) resulted in disciplinary punishment,312 (9%) were forwarded to the Commissionof Public Integrity or to a court forsubsequent adjudication, 49 (1.5%) wereclosed because of insufficient evidence, and106 (3%) were handled as internal MOIdiscipline. The other 2,161 (63%) remainopen pending judicial review, ministerialreview, or the completion of further investigationby Internal Affairs.The Internal Affairs Directorate conducted249 human rights-related investigations. Ofthese, 76 (30%) resulted in disciplinary punishmentand 10 (4%) were closed because ofinsufficient evidence. The other 163 (65%)remain open pending judicial review, ministerialreview, or further investigation. In 2006,Internal Affairs initiated a specialized trainingcurriculum tailored to the needs of theInternal Affairs investigators. ThroughDecember 31, 2006, 915 of 1,250 full-timeemployees (73%) had received specializedtraining. Training will continue until allInternal Affairs Officers have graduated fromthis training course. Additionally, the AutomatedFingerprint Identification Projectidentified 3,371 cases of employees making afalse application for employment to the MOIor having a criminal history. This resulted in1,383 dismissals during 2006.2006 MOI Internal Affairs Investigations by Outcome100%90%49 1080%70%60%50%40%30%20%10%2,16131277510616376No Guilt EstablishedRemain OpenInternal MOI DisciplineForw arded for Judicial ActionDisciplinary Punishment0%Corruption-RelatedInvestigationsHuman Rights-RelatedInvestigationsSource: Iraqi Ministry of the Interior31March 2, 2007

Sectarian Issues at the Ministry of InteriorThe Iraqi Police Service is generally representativeof the demographic makeup of itsneighborhoods, although there are someneighborhoods in Baghdad and other citieswhere the percentage of Shi’a in the IraqiPolice Service is disproportionately high.Initial estimates, compiled during implementationof the National Police Transformationand Retraining program in late 2006,show that the National Police are disproportionatelyShi’a. The U.S. Government iscommitted to helping the GOI create an MOIthat reflects the diversity of the Iraqi people.The goal is to create ethnically integratedunits at the national level, while still allowinglocal police to reflect the ethnic compositionof the communities in which they serve.MNSTC-I continues to advocate recruitinginitiatives targeting Sunnis to improvediversity and to provide a force that willimpart even-handed law enforcement.Foreign/Political/Militia InfluenceCorruption, illegal activity, and sectarianinfluence constrain progress in developingMOI forces. Although the primary concern ofthe GOI remains the Sunni insurgency, toleranceof and influence exerted by Shi’a militiamembers within the MOI are troubling. Militiainfluence affects every component of theMOI, particularly in Baghdad and severalother key cities. Recruits take an oath ofoffice denouncing militia influence andpledging allegiance to Iraq’s constitution.Whenever actionable evidence is found, it isacted on by the MOI Internal Affairs Directorateand the minister.2.2.2. Iraqi Police ServiceThe Iraqi Police Service is composed ofpatrol, traffic, station, and highway police, aswell as specialists, such as forensic specialists,assigned throughout Iraq’s 18 provinces.Its mission is to enforce the law, safeguardthe public, and provide internal security at thelocal level. The Iraqi Police Service constitutesthe majority of MOI forces.Iraqi Police Service Training andPersonnelCPATT has met the nationwide OCSF goalof training 135,000 Iraqi Police Service personnel.However, distribution of that 135,000has not been according to original programgoals, leaving some provinces with more thantheir programmed allocation and some withless. Basic training continues in those provincesstill working to meet their individualrequirements. CPATT is working with theMOI to build institutional capacity and toidentify annual requirements for force sustainment,reconciling anticipated annualrequirements with institutional capacity.To meet local needs and dynamic requirements,the MOI authorized provincialgovernors to hire additional Iraqi PoliceService officers, but the MOI and thegovernors are responsible for the additionalofficers’ equipment and training. Every province,except Anbar, has more personnel thanagreed. However, many of these additionalpolice are put on the job with minimal or notraining. As the Coalition transfers the institutionaltraining base to MOI control, trainingof these “extra” local police will continue.As of December 31, 2006, the majority ofIraqi Police academies had transitioned toIraqi control. The two exceptions are the BPCand the Jordan International Police TrainingCenter. For all academies, the administrationand instruction functions transferred withrelative ease. Operational control of the BPCwas turned over to the MOI in 2006. Lifesupport for the BPC will transition to theMOI this quarter. Because sufficient trainingcapacity exists inside Iraq, the Jordan InternationalPolice Training Center is scheduled tocease basic-level training by March 2007,although the Department of State is lookingat options to keep it open, to train limitednumbers of Iraqi police officers in leadershipand specialized courses, after DoD fundingfor the facility ends.32March 2, 2007

Iraqi Police Service EquipmentFor Baghdad and nine other key cities, 100%of authorized vehicles and weapons havebeen delivered to the police. Overall, the IraqiPolice Service has received approximately83% of authorized critical equipment and isexpected to receive 100% by the summer of2007.Due to the immaturity of the MOI’s equipmentaccountability system, there are noreliable figures on how much of this equipmentremains in service, nor is it known howmuch equipment the MOI has purchased foradditional Iraqi Police Service staff and forstaff authorized by provincial governors. Themost accurate reports on equipment quantitiesand serviceability are provided by MNC-Ithrough the Police Transition Teams (PTTs).MNSTC-I continues to work with the IraqiPolice Service to implement standardizedreporting and tracking processes and mechanisms.In conjunction with MNSTC-I, theMOI is developing a comprehensive procurementplan to ensure that MNSTC-I funds andMOI equipping funds are spent coherently.Iraqi Police Service Operations andMentoringThere are 203 field-deployed PTTs (10 Provincial,44 District, and 149 Station) assistingthe development of the Iraqi Police Service.Each team has approximately 11–15 members;3 or 4 members of each team are InternationalPolice Liaison Officers (IPLOs)hired as contractors by the Department ofState, and the rest are typically military personnel,most of whom are Military Police.IPLOs provide civilian law enforcementexpertise in technical aspects of criminalinvestigation and police station management.To conduct their missions, PTTs travel tostations to coach the Iraqi police and toconduct joint patrols with them. These jointPTT/Iraqi Police Service patrols promoteactive community policing and work toimprove the reputation of the police amongthe Iraqi people.Each month, MNC-I uses PTTs to assess theoperational readiness of a portion of thepolice forces using the Transition ReadinessAssessment process. This process evaluatesthe ability of the police to perform core functionsrequired for effective law enforcementand community policing. Key assessmentcriteria include manning, leadership, traininglevel, equipment, facilities status, forceprotection measures, and station ability toconduct independent operations. Cost andrisk preclude deploying enough PTTs tocover all of Iraq’s police stations; at any time,only 5 of Iraq’s 18 provinces have sufficientPTTs to conduct the full range of activitiesdescribed above. Continued PTT presenceand participation at Iraqi Police Servicestations are needed to improve policereadiness and to sustain progress in reformingcommunity policing.Iraqi Police Service Recruiting and VettingThe Iraqi Police Service screened more than280,000 MOI employees, checking fingerprintsagainst Ba’ath Party and Saddam-eracriminal records. Of these, 8,000 werereported as possible derogatory matches,1,228 employees were dismissed, and 2,143were identified in late December 2006 andare pending dismissal. More than 58,000police candidates have been screened forliteracy, 73% of whom passed and wereallowed to enter basic training.Iraqi Police Service Quicklook InspectionProgramA Coalition-initiated, MOI-led Iraqi PoliceReform Program called Quicklook waslaunched in December 2006 to review allaspects of performance and effectiveness ofIraqi police stations, beginning in Baghdad.This program consists of stations visits by theMOI team, composed of representatives of33March 2, 2007

Police Affairs, Internal Affairs, HumanResource, Training, and Administrativedirectorates, and complemented by the localPTT, which provides both inspection preparationand on-site security. The team gauges thereliability of police forces as well as the moretraditional readiness metrics involving manning,equipping, and facilities. As of February1, 2007, the team had inspected ninestations. The Baghdad portion of the programwill take 3–4 months and will lead to a jointreport with recommendations for addressingidentified shortfalls and deficiencies. Oncecompleted in Baghdad, this program will beexpanded to all of Iraq’s police stations.MNSTC-I assesses that the MOI team isdoing a good job holding the station andstation commanders to the inspectionstandards.Iraqi Police Service Leadership TrainingThe Iraqi Police Service has three 2-weekleadership courses to improve the quality ofits leaders. The First Line Supervisor Courseis designed for company-grade officers; theIntermediate-Level Course is designed forfield-grade officers; and the Senior-LevelCourse is designed for general officers.Courses cover topics ranging from managementto ethics to field training. To date, 691officers have completed the First Line SupervisorCourse; 690 officers have completed theIntermediate-Level Course; and 606 officershave completed the Senior-Level Course.The MOI’s Intermediate Staff OfficersCourse, started in September 2006, teachessenior lieutenants and junior captains staffoperational functions. To date, 14 officershave completed this course. The AdvancedStaff Officers Course, which began inNovember 2006, teaches senior captains andmajors field-grade staff functions. The SeniorStaff Officers Course and the ExecutiveOfficers Course—designed for colonels andgenerals—are scheduled to begin in early2007.2.2.3. National PoliceThe National Police is a bridging forcebetween the local police and the Iraqi Army,allowing the Minister of Interior to projectpolice capabilities across provinces. TheNational Police is also charged with maintaininglaw and order while an effectivecommunity police force is developed. UntilOctober 2006, the National Police wastrained and served primarily in a paramilitaryrole and had received little traditional policetraining. MNSTC-I is implementing aNational Police Transformation and RetrainingProgram to reorient it toward policefunctions.National Police Training and PersonnelAs of February 19, 2007, 24,400 NationalPolice have completed entry-level training,meeting the OCSF goal of 24,400. The primeminister has announced a plan to expand theNational Police by three battalions. This willbring the authorized strength of the NationalPolice to 26,900.National Police EquipmentThe National Police was issued all of its keyauthorized equipment by the end of December2006. MNSTC-I tracks the end-itemsissued to the National Police and relies onNational Police Transition Teams (NPTTs) toreport periodically on the status of that equipment.The MOI is responsible for equippingNational Police hired in excess of the agreedauthorization, although CPATT providesadditional uniforms and key equipment toNational Police units as they rotate throughthe Phase II program at Numaniyah.During this reporting period, Iraqi and Coalitionforces leadership emphasized NationalPolice property and personnel accountabilityvia the Quicklook program. The MOIAdministration and Vehicles Directorates aremaking measurable improvements in propertyaccountability policies and processes. The34March 2, 2007

Administration Directorate developed andstaffed an electronic data repository to trackand account for items issued. This databasewill continue to be backed up by hard copiesof supply transactions until more robust andstable electronic media, such as the e-ministryprogram, are available. The VehiclesDirectorate is initiating an electronic databaseto track vehicles. Both directorates are writingpolicies and documenting accountabilityprocesses to enable future compliance auditsof their activities.National Police OperationsCurrently, all but one of the National Policebrigades not enrolled in the National PoliceTransformation and Retraining program areconducting counter-insurgency operations tosupport the Baghdad Security Plan. TwoNational Police battalions were assignedsecurity lead for their areas of responsibilitywithin Baghdad. One battalion has beendesignated as part of the prime minister’soperational reserve, and an additional (10th)National Police brigade has been requestedby the prime minister to provide security tothe Samarra Shrine reconstruction project.Thirty-nine NPTTs now support the developmentof National Police units by mentoring,training, and facilitating communication withCoalition forces. NPTTs assess the readinessand operational capability of the NationalPolice, similar to the tasks performed byMilitary Transition Teams with Iraqi Armyunits.National Police Recruiting and VettingThe MOI is responsible for recruiting andvetting the National Police force, assisted byCoalition forces advisors. Extensive re-vettingof serving National Police is part of thePhase II program at Numaniyah. This incorporatesidentification checks, fingerprints, aliteracy test, and criminal intelligence backgroundchecks. New recruits will be vetted inthe manner described above and approvedprior to undergoing any training. A vettingcommittee, consisting of senior NationalPolice leaders and MOI officials, has been setup at Camp Solidarity.2.2.4. Directorate of Border Enforcementand Directorate of Ports of EntryThe Directorate of Border Enforcement(DBE) and the Directorate of Ports of Entry(POE) are charged collectively with controllingand protecting Iraq’s borders. The DBEis organized into 5 regions, 12 brigades, and38 battalions, and includes forces that man420 border posts and forts, of which theCoalition has funded 258. There are 17 landborder Ports of Entry, 4 sea Ports of Entry,and 4 air Ports of Entry.DBE Training and PersonnelMNSTC-I has trained 28,400 DBE and POEpersonnel, meeting the OCSF goal. As elsewherein the MOI, Border Forces payrollexceeds its authorized initial training objective.Overstrength regional and brigade-levelheadquarters continue to divert personnelaway from border forts and POEs. The DBEhas begun cross-leveling of excess personnel,and current staffing levels at POEs are sufficient.Promotion opportunities across DBEand POE units are improving, and there havebeen fewer pay problems. There are still discrepanciesbetween MOI payroll numbersand actual assigned strength. The Iraqi leadershipis addressing these issues throughofficial investigations.DBE and POE OperationsThe DBE is supported by 28 Coalition BorderTransition Teams (BTTs). The 11-man BTTsmentor and support the development of theborder units. Additionally, four 3-manDepartment of Homeland Security (DHS)Border Support Teams mentor and monitorBorder Enforcement personnel at criticalPOEs. The BTTs and the Border SupportTeams are essential to the development of the35March 2, 2007

DBE and POEs. The CPATT, in coordinationwith DHS and the Department of State, isdeveloping a program to enhance transitionteams at all DBE headquarters, academies,BTTs, and POEs, with contracted civiliansubject matter experts.The DBE is in the lead on Iraq’s borders,backed up by Iraqi Army units in accordancewith an MOI/MOD Memorandum of Understandingthat was signed in January 2007. AllCoalition-planned border forts are completed.Refurbishing headquarters buildings andassignment of trained border police are complete.Seventy-nine percent of the authorizedcritical equipment for DBE and 61% for landPOEs have been issued. Remaining issuanceof equipment, logistics facilities, and otherinfrastructure will continue throughout 2007.The MOI has reduced the numbers of legalPOEs in an effort to concentrate on the readinessfor those border crossings that remainopen, and, since the last report, DBE andPOE units have improved in TransitionReadiness Assessment progression.2.2.5. Facilities Protection ServiceThe Facilities Protection Service (FPS) is adecentralized group of security guards whoprotect GOI buildings and act as personalsecurity details to protect government ministryofficials. Each ministry controls its ownforce of FPS personnel. Although they sharethe same name, FPS personnel are not acoherent force. More than 150,000 personnelwork for 27 ministries and 8 independentdirectorates, with half of the FPS personnelworking in Baghdad. The MOI’s FPS continuesto have better regulation, training, anddiscipline than do FPS staff of other ministries,and a higher proportion of them—possiblyhalf—have completed the FPS basictraining course.There continues to be evidence that FPSpersonnel are unreliable and, in some cases,responsible for violent crimes and otherillegal activity. On December 27, 2006, theprime minister signed a consolidation directivethat provided instructions placing all FPSpersonnel under the Minister of Interior andordered the transfer of money for salaries tothe MOI budget. The directive maintained theseparation of the Ministry of Oil, the Ministryof Electricity, and the Higher Juridical Councilforces. The MOI has a plan to assess thecurrent state of these forces and implementthe consolidation, including standardizingtraining, equipment, uniforms, and procedures.36March 2, 2007

2.3. Ministry of DefenseThe Iraqi MOD forces consist of the JointHeadquarters (JHQ), the IGFC, the IraqiSpecial Operations Forces (ISOF), the Army,the Air Force, and the Navy (includingMarines). The Iraqi military has an authorizedstrength of approximately 175,000personnel, 22 and is centered on an Army withnine infantry divisions, one mechanizedinfantry division, and associated combatsupport/combat support units. Two additionalinfantry divisions are in development as partof Prime Minister Maliki’s Expansion Plan.The Iraqi Air Force consists of six squadrons;the Navy has two squadrons and a Marinebattalion. The Iraqi Training and DoctrineCommand Headquarters reached initialoperating capability in July 2006 and willeventually command and control all Iraqiinstitutional training facilities. The IraqiTraining and Doctrine Command, under thedirect command of the JHQ, consists of theTactical Training Command and the NationalDefense University. The Tactical TrainingCommand will begin to assume control of theinstitutional tactical training facilities—sixRegional Training Centers and three IraqiTraining Battalions—in 2007. The NationalDefense University has reached initial operatingcapability and has started to operate institutionsof professional development (e.g.,Iraqi Staff Colleges, the National DefenseCollege, and the Strategic Studies Institute).As reported in November 2006, the JHQassumed control of the IGFC, which, in turn,assumed operational control of five divisionsfrom Coalition forces. Since November 2006,the IGFC has assumed operational control ofthree more divisions. By June 2007, it isexpected that the IGFC will gain operationalcontrol of all divisions. Embedded Coalitionadvisors continue to assist in the developmentof JHQ and IGFC command-and-controlcapabilities.The total number of trained-and-equippedMOD military personnel is about 136,400(not including replacements), of which about132,800 are in the Iraqi Army. 23 For fieldedunits, about 65% of authorized personnel arepresent for duty at any time; this percentagevaries widely among units. The greatest contributorto the difference between authorizedstrength and present-for-duty strength is aleave policy that places about one-quarter ofall soldiers on leave at any time so that theycan take their pay home to their families. Thisis driven by the lack of a nationwide bankingsystem. In addition, since the first Iraqi Armycombat units entered into service in November2003, more than 20,000 personnel havebeen killed or severely wounded or haveotherwise left the Army. The MOD is planningon replacing and expanding the overallforce structure with a 30,000-person ReplenishmentInitiative, organized and implementedby the Iraqi JHQ. This initiative willadd approximately 10,000 soldiers every twomonths over six months and will result in allcombat units manned at 110%. The MOD hascompleted recruiting for this initiative, andthe first training sessions began on October 1,2006. About 44% of the 30,000-soldierexpansion is complete.2.3.1. Ministry of Defense CapacityDevelopmentEmbedded transition teams continue to providemonthly Transition Readiness Assessments.The assessments measure personnelmanning, command and control, training,sustainment, logistics, equipping, and leadershipof their partnered Iraqi units. Thesecategories are assessed using both quantitativeand qualitative metrics. Overall, theMOD is assessed as being partly effective atmanaging these functions.The Minister of Defense has had some successin stabilizing the MOD, which sufferedthrough a string of assassinations, widespread37March 2, 2007

90%Combat Operations(Company level and above*)80%70%60%50%40%30%20%10%0%Jan 06 Feb 06 Mar 06 Apr 06 May 06 Jun 06 Jul 06 Aug 06 Sep 06 Oct 06 Nov 06 Dec 06 Jan 07Combined ISF Coalition*Includes MOD and National Police units; data include only those independentISF operations that are reported to the CoalitionIncrease in Coalition-onlyoperations in support of the newBaghdad Security PlanSource: MNF-Iintimidation and death threats againstemployees, and a major corruption scandal inthe year following its establishment in March2004. The current minister recognizes theimportance of forging a close partnershipwith the Coalition and is emphasizing jointinitiatives, such as force replenishment, generation,and deployability. MOD’s capacity todetermine priorities and translate them intoprocurement requirements is improving.However, competence levels in certain partsof the MOD remain low. The MOD suffersfrom a lack of strategic policy developmentand implementation and an inefficient procurementand budgeting process. A culture ofdistrust coupled with incompetence in certainkey areas has made committing and obligatingfunds very difficult. The Coalition’sMOD Transition Team is providing mentoringsupport to all senior MOD officials indeveloping their capacity to manage keyministerial functions, such as personnel management,budgeting, logistics, intelligenceand security, acquisitions and contracting,plans and policies, communications, andinspections and investigations. The currentMOD team consists of approximately 50advisors as well as 6 U.S. military personneladvising MOD civilians and 12 civilian advisorsfrom other Coalition countries. There areno U.S. Government civilian advisors at theMOD, which is problematic in that MODcivilians are not provided direct mentorshipby their U.S. counterparts. A similarly scaledeffort occurs at the JHQ, with U.S. militarypersonnel comprising about half of theadvisors and the rest roughly split betweenU.S. civilian contractors and militarypersonnel from other Coalition countries.38March 2, 2007

Force GenerationForce generation of Iraqi Army units isincreasingly focused on combat enablers andlogistics. Three Iraqi Training Battalions areformed and fully operational. These battalionsallow the Iraqis to train soldiers, independentof Coalition support, in sufficientquantities for force generation and replacementneeds. New recruits attend a 13-weekprogram of basic instruction. Upon graduation,soldiers receive additional trainingspecific to their military occupation. Dependingon their military skill, the length of trainingranges from three to seven weeks. Othertraining institutions, such as the MilitaryIntelligence School, the Signal School, theBomb Disposal School, the Combat ArmsSchool, the Engineer School, and the MilitaryPolice School, contribute to the growing professionalismof the Iraqi Army by teachingdiverse specialties necessary to executecounter-insurgency operations.Logistics and SustainmentMOD logistics and sustainment is still arelatively immature system that requiressignificant Coalition assistance, especially inwarehouse/depot operations and transportation.Development and implementation ofMOD strategic logistics policy is particularlyimmature. The Iraqi Army has been slow tosupport sustainment, and there is limitedindigenous capability and capacity to replacebattle-damaged equipment. MNSTC-I hasoversight of approximately 60 transitionteams (of the 400 total teams for the MODand the MOI) assigned to assist in logisticsand sustainment issues. Throughout 2007, thefocus will be on developing the areas of fuel,maintenance, budget, sustainment, ammunition,medical equipment and supply accountability,and national warehouse. Coalitionforces continue to provide Combat ServiceSupport by backstopping life support and fuelduring times of emergency. In April 2006, theMOD assumed management of life supportand its contracts, but Coalition forces are stillassisting in extremis. Overall, support to theIraqi Army provided by Coalition forces hasdecreased dramatically.Approximately 90% of the planned Headquartersand Service Companies have beenformed and are at some level of operationalcapability. MNSTC-I has distributed all keyequipment to the Headquarters and ServiceCompanies. Although the Headquarters andService Companies are gaining some capability,Coalition forces and MNC-I logisticsunits will continue partnering and mentoringthem as they assume their roles and in case ofemergency or failure within the new Iraqilogistics system.Planning and CoordinationThe MOD and the JHQ are developing processesto reduce the reliance on MNF-I todirect, support, and sustain MOD forces. Thetransition of Iraqi Army divisions and theIGFC to MOD control marks the first timesince the removal of the former regime thatany Iraqi Army combat forces are undercomplete Iraqi command and control.The transition also means that the MOD,through the JHQ, has assumed responsibilityfor support and sustainment planning forthese divisions as well as for forces transferringto JHQ command and control in thefuture. The JHQ planning and coordinationprocesses are immature and are currentlyhampered by bureaucracy, lack of trust andunderstanding, lack of experience with strategicplanning, and dependence on Coalitionsupport and funding.Equipment StatusThe focus of the Iraqi Army’s train-and-equipeffort shifted during this reporting periodtoward building combat support and combatservice support forces.39March 2, 2007

The Iraqi armed forces were issued 100% ofindividual authorized items by the end of2006. However, there is a problem withcross-leveling between and within units thatleads to shortages in some subordinate units.Equipment accountability is improving; however,it is still at a level below that desired bythe Coalition or by the GOI. MNSTC-I andthe GOI are now issuing other missioncriticalitems to the Iraqi armed forces, suchas up-armored HMMWVs, wheeled APCs,heavy machine guns, and fuel trucks.MNSTC-I is currently working with theMOD to transfer maintenance capabilities tothe Iraqi Army. The MOD will fund a contractthrough a Foreign Military Sales sustainmentcase planned to start on April 1, 2007.This contract will be monitored by a jointIraqi/Coalition forces board that will determinewhen the transition requirements havebeen met. The MOD agreed, in principle, tofund the National Maintenance Contract fromspring 2007 through March 2008 using aForeign Military Sales case. Total cost of themaintenance support contracts to be assumedby the MOD is estimated to be US$160million.TrainingThe institutional training base accounts forbasic and military occupational specialtytraining for soldier, squad leader, and platoonsergeant courses for non-commissionedofficers, and initial-entry cadet and staffofficer training for the officer corps. As thesepersonnel move to their units, embeddedtransition teams and partner units directed byMNC-I oversee and mentor collective trainingin counter-insurgency-oriented missionessentialtasks. A unit’s ability to demonstrateproficiency in these mission-essential taskscontributes to its overall Transition ReadinessAssessment, which is validated prior to theunit assuming lead in its area of responsibility.The high operational tempo faced bymany units makes it difficult to sustain thisinitial training proficiency. This is particularlytrue in the area of logistics specialtytraining. Approximately 2,500 additionalpersonnel are needed to allow both dailyoperations and focused training at the smallunitlevel.AbsenteeismAcross the Iraqi Army, Iraqi divisions facingsustained combat operations within theirnormal operational area report absentwithout-leaverates to be between 5% and8%. Passage of the Military CourtProcedures Law on January 24, 2007, willprovide Iraqi commanders with a tool to dealfairly and effectively with absenteeism anddesertion.DeployabilityAs a result of the inability of the Iraqi Armyto deploy units to Baghdad in August 2006,the Minister of Defense formed a committeeto determine how to improve the deployabilityof the Iraqi Army. The recommendationof the committee was to identify abattalion from each Iraqi Army Division toserve as the rapid deployment force for thatdivision, and provide incentive pay forsoldiers who volunteer to serve in this elitebattalion. To increase the predictability ofdeployments for soldiers, the committee alsorecommended a four-phase, 150-day deploymentcycle that all units complete prior tomovement from their home base. In February,five of the seven battalions recently orderedto Baghdad were successfully deployed, withthe rest expected within the month.Sectarian Issues in RecruitmentThe Coalition and the GOI are committed tocreating an Iraqi military that reflects theethnic and religious fabric of Iraq, withdiverse units loyal to the nation, not to sectarianinterests. Although competence and meritare deciding factors when selecting recruitsand leaders, ISF units mirror the demographic40March 2, 2007

make-up of Iraq generally. The evennumbereddivisions were assembled fromformer Iraqi National Guard battalions andtend to resemble the demographics of communitiesfrom which they were recruited. Theodd-numbered divisions were nationallyrecruited and represent the national fabric.The Minister of Defense, through an OfficerSelection Committee, has used normal transitionsto diversify the senior leadership in theIraqi Army. There are, however, indicationsthat political forces in Iraq have influencedsenior military appointments on the basis ofsectarian affiliation. MNF-I and U.S.Embassy Baghdad are working closely withthe GOI to discourage sectarian influences inthe senior ranks and to encourage a balancedrepresentation in leadership. The GOI is consideringother methods to balance representationacross the entire Army, Navy, and AirForce.2.3.2. ArmyThe Iraqi Army is central to MOD counterinsurgencyoperations and strategy. TheArmy component of the Objective Counter-Insurgency Force consists of 131,300 soldiersand officers in 36 brigades and 112 battalions.The Prime Minister’s Expansion Planincreases the Army by 2 division HQs, 6brigade HQs, and 24 battalions. NineMotorized Transportation Regiments(MTRs), 4 logistics battalions, 2 supportbattalions, 5 Regional Support Units, and 80Garrison Support Units provide logistics andsupport for divisions, with Taji NationalDepot providing depot-level maintenance andre-supply. Headquarters and Service Companiesprovide logistical and maintenancesupport for each battalion, brigade, and division.The Army also supports a SpecialOperations Forces Brigade and 3 StrategicInfrastructure Brigade headquarters commanding17 SIBs. Efforts to improve thecapability of these units are led by MilitaryTransition Teams, with U.S. and other Coalitionofficers and soldiers embedded in eachbattalion, brigade, and division headquarters;at IGFC headquarters; and at JHQ.By the end of 2006, the last two MTRs weregenerated and released to MNC-I. Althoughlack of trained maintenance personnel andequipment has delayed full capability, theMTRs provide mobility and sustainment forIraqi forces.2.3.3. Iraqi National Counter-TerrorCapabilityImplementation of the national counterterrorismcapability concept, approved by theprime minister on October 10, 2006, is onschedule for Initial Operational Capability inMarch 2007 and Full Operational Capabilityin December 2007. In March 2007, Iraqipersonnel will occupy positions within eachCounter-Terrorism headquarters and willbegin operations and training.Full Operational Capability consists of threecomplementary components:• Development of a national Bureau ofCounter-Terrorism, separate from theministries, that serves as the principaladvisor to the prime minister on counterterrorismmatters• Establishment of a coherent, nonsectarian,counter-terrorism “tiering”strategy that determines the level of theterrorist threat, assigns appropriateresponsibility for action, and definesapproval authority for execution; thisstrategy was established as part of theoverall counter-terrorism concept• Establishment of a separate major command,equivalent to the ground, air, andnaval forces commands, that providessupport to the Bureau of Counter-Terrorismin intelligence and targeting areas41March 2, 2007

2.3.4. Special Operations ForcesThe ISOF Brigade is the operational componentof the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Commandand is composed of approximately1,500 soldiers organized into a counterterrorismbattalion, a commando battalion, asupport battalion, and a special reconnaissanceunit. A key component in developingan Iraqi counter-terrorism capability is theexpansion of the ISOF Brigade. This expansionwill include an additional commandobattalion with forward-based commandocompanies in Basrah, Mosul, and Al Asad.2.3.5. NavyThe Iraqi Navy has approximately 1,100trained-and-equipped sailors and marinesorganized into an operational headquarters,two afloat squadrons, and five Marine companiesthat are stationed for point defense ofthe offshore oil platforms together withCoalition forces. It will grow to 2,500 personnelas the acquisition program progresses.The expansion will include the procurementof 21 naval vessels, 2 offshore supportvessels, and a number of small vessels. Acontract for the purchase of the offshorevessels and several of the small vessels iscomplete, with an anticipated in-service dateof February to December 2008. A contract forthe four patrol ships has also been completed,with in-service dates starting in April 2007.Notably, all contracts were completed usingIraqi processes and money.The Iraqi Navy faces significant challenges inmeeting the individual and collective trainingneeds for its ambitious acquisition program,including the leadership development of midgradeofficers and technical skills of sailors.Training efforts include mentorship conductedby the Naval Transition Team andactive skills training conducted by CoalitionNavy, Marine, and Coast Guard forces. Infrastructuredevelopment will remain the maineffort throughout 2007. Naval planning ismaturing and coherent across acquisition,training, and infrastructure lines of developmentout to 2010.2.3.6. Air ForceThe Iraqi Air Force is organized andequipped for counter-insurgency operations.Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance(ISR) aircraft are currently located atKirkuk Air Base (3rd Squadron with fourSAMA CH-2000s) and Basrah Air Base (70thSquadron with four SAMA CH-2000s andtwo Sea Bird Seeker SB7L-360s). Each unitperforms daily operational missions thatcollect intelligence for Iraqi and Coalitionforces. The intelligence gathered during dailyflights has provided timely evidence of perimetersecurity breaches and infiltration byinsurgent forces. As described in the previousreport, Iraq’s capabilities to conduct airborneISR are being developed with procurementsof interim and advanced aircraft platforms.The fielding of rotary-wing aircraft continues.The first 10 of 28 Mi-17 helicopters thatMOD procured were delivered to the IraqiAir Force. The MOD is also modifying 16UH-1s donated by Jordan to UH-IIs; deliveryis expected to be completed by April. Thesquadron receiving these UH-IIs will primarilyconduct casualty evacuation and isexpected to reach initial operational capabilityby the third quarter of FY07.The 23rd Squadron at New Al Muthanna AirBase has three C-130E aircraft. Consistentwith the Coalition Air Force TransitionTeam’s force generation plan, the Iraqi AirForce intends to request an additional threeExcess Defense Article C-130s from the U.S.Government to bring the squadron size to six.There are currently more than 900 personnelin the Iraqi Air Force. Development plans callfor a concentrated recruitment effort over thenext 12 months, with an interim goal of 3,285airmen by the end of 2007. Iraqi Air Forcetechnicians have been performing routinemaintenance, and Iraqi crews have been manningmost missions without Coalition forces.42March 2, 2007

Annex A. List of Acronyms and AbbreviationsAQIBPCBTTCBICoRCPATTDBEDoDDHSEFPFPSGDPGOIIGIGFCIMFIPLOIRRFISFISRISOFJAMJCTSRJHQKRGMBPDMNC-IMNF-IMNSTC-IMODMOIMOJMTRMWNCCNPTTOCSFPOEPICPKKPTTSBASCIRISIBUNUSAIDWFPAl-Qaida in IraqBaghdad Police CollegeBorder Transition TeamCentral Bank of IraqCouncil of RepresentativesCivilian Police Assistance Transition TeamDirectorate of Border EnforcementU.S. Department of DefenseU.S. Department of Homeland SecurityExplosively Formed ProjectilesFacilities Protection ServiceGross Domestic ProductGovernment of IraqInspector GeneralIraqi Ground Forces CommandInternational Monetary FundInternational Police Liaison OfficerIraqi Relief and Reconstruction FundIraqi Security ForcesIntelligence, Surveillance, and ReconnaissanceIraqi Special Operations ForcesJaysh al-MahdiJoint Committee to Transfer Security ResponsibilityJoint HeadquartersKurdistan Regional GovernmentMillion Barrels Per DayMulti-National Corps-IraqMulti-National Force-IraqMulti-National Security Transition Command-IraqMinistry of DefenseMinistry of InteriorMinistry of JusticeMotorized Transportation RegimentsMegawattNational Command CenterNational Police Transition TeamObjective Civil Security ForceDirectorate of Ports of EntryProvincial Iraqi ControlKurdistan Worker’s PartyPolice Transition TeamStand-By ArrangementSupreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in IraqStrategic Infrastructure BattalionUnited NationsUnited States Agency for International DevelopmentWorld Food Programme1March 2, 2007

1 The information in this report has been made available with the assistance of many departments and agencies ofthe U.S. Government, the U.S. Embassy in Iraq, and the Government of Iraq. The report complements other reportsand information about Iraq provided to Congress, and is not intended as a single source of all information about thecombined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its Coalition partners, or Iraq.2 In early November 2006, Prime Minister Maliki scolded lawmakers in a closed session of the Council ofRepresentatives and promised sweeping reforms of his cabinet. He also renounced militias on national television,saying, “There cannot be a government and militias together. One of the two should rule. I personally will not be ina government based on militias.”3 Ibid.4 National Intelligence Estimate: Prospects for Iraq’s Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead, January 2007, NationalIntelligence Council. www.dni.gov.5 As of October 2006, of the 999 known MOI detention centers, 794 were reporting data on prisoners. On average,the reporting facilities were at 79% capacity. However, 51 of these jails were overcrowded, with the Attica jail inQadisiyah being the most overcrowded, housing more than three detainees for every one bed it was designed tohold.6 National Intelligence Estimate, January 2007.7 Extracted from Davis, Jacquelyn K., Radical Islamist Ideologies and the Long War: Implications for U.S. StrategicPlanning and U.S. Central Command’s Operations, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Washington, D.C. January2007.8 National Intelligence Estimate, January 2007.9 Nationwide poll, December 2006: “Agree or disagree, violence is never justified even if the government does notmeet your needs.” 81% agree and 11% disagree. Sample size: ~5,000. Margin of error: < 1.5%.10 Nationwide poll, December 2006: “Agree or disagree, it is wrong to kill women and children even in jihad.” 94%agree and 3% disagree. Sample size: ~5,000. Margin of error: < 1.5%.11 Nationwide poll, December 2006: “Do you think the government of Iraq’s current policies to improve the securitysituation in Iraq are a step in the right or wrong direction?” Right direction: 44% Wrong direction: 42%. Samplesize: ~5,000. Margin of error:

20 This report and future reports will not discuss the Center for Dignitary Protection. MNSTC-I has completed itstraining goal and no longer has visibility on whether these personnel are serving. MNSTC-I continues to assist intraining bodyguards for high-ranking GOI personnel.21 This estimate is based on worldwide averages for police attrition with adjustment factors for conditions in Iraq. Asdescribed in the section on personnel accountability, no reliable data currently exist to validate present-for-dutystrength.22 This includes the approximately 137,000 authorization for the Objective Counter-Insurgency Force, approximately12,000 authorization for the 10% manning increase for the Iraqi Army, and approximately 26,000 for theprime minister’s initiative to expand the military with new units.23 This is based on a total authorization support personnel of 14,673. Special Inspector General for IraqReconstruction report SIGIR-06-032, ISF: Review of Plans to Implement Logistics Capabilities notes that, “ . . . wecalculated that between 37,800 and 44,500 personnel will be required for the total number of logistics units requiredby the Concept to support the Iraqi Army . . . . After reviewing a draft of this report, MNSTC-I officials providedinformation documenting that, as of September 30, 2006, a total of 42,900 ‘support forces’ have been trained since2004. This total includes not only logistics personnel but also military police and communications andadministrative personnel.”Endnotes 2March 2, 2007