disclose that (i) it simultaneously engaged in Repo 105 transactions for tens ofbillions of dollars in assets; (ii) it was recording the Repo 105 transactions as if theunderlying assets had been permanently sold and removed from the books; and (iii) ithad an obligation to repurchase these assets just days after the end of each quarter.This undisclosed practice had the effect of artificially and temporarily reducing<strong>Lehman</strong>’s net leverage ratio each quarter during the Class Period – an importantmetric to securities analysts, credit agencies and investors – rendering <strong>Lehman</strong>’sstatements concerning net leverage and financial condition materially false andmisleading when made and in violation of GAAP.Risk Management: <strong>Lehman</strong> publicly and consistently promoted its robust andsophisticated risk management system. In truth, however, <strong>Lehman</strong> regularlydisregarded and exceeded its risk limits, or simply raised the limits, as <strong>Lehman</strong>accumulated illiquid assets, including the largest in its history – the $5.4 billionArchstone project discussed below.Liquidity: Defendants’ statements concerning <strong>Lehman</strong>’s liquidity failed to disclosethat Repo 105 transactions had the effect of materially understating <strong>Lehman</strong>’sliquidity risk as <strong>Lehman</strong> had tens of billions of dollars in immediate short termobligations that were unreported, and as the Class Period continued, <strong>Lehman</strong>’sreported liquidity pool included large amounts of encumbered assets.Commercial Real Estate Assets: Defendants represented that all of <strong>Lehman</strong>’sassets were presented at “fair value.” <strong>Lehman</strong>, however, failed to consider marketinformation when valuing certain of its commercial real estate assets, therebymaterially overstating their value. Concentration of Credit Risk: GAAP requires disclosure of significantconcentrations of credit risk. <strong>Lehman</strong>, however, failed to disclose material factsconcerning its concentration of mortgage and real estate related assets, preventinginvestors from meaningfully assessing the Company’s exposure to these risky assets.2. In short, as the Examiner recently testified before the House Committee on FinancialServices, “the public did not know there were holes in the reported liquidity pool, nor did it knowthat <strong>Lehman</strong>’s risk controls were being ignored, or that reported leverage numbers were artificiallydeflated. Billions of <strong>Lehman</strong> shares traded on misinformation.”II.JURISDICTION AND VENUE3. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to Section22 of the <strong>Securities</strong> Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77v; Section 27 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa; and 28U.S.C. § 1331.-2-
4. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to Section 22 of the <strong>Securities</strong> Act,15 U.S.C. § 77v; Section 27 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa; and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), (c),and (d). Many of the acts and transactions described herein, including the preparation anddissemination of materially false and misleading public filings, occurred in this District. At alltimes relevant, <strong>Lehman</strong>’s headquarters and principal offices were located in this District.5. In connection with the acts alleged herein, Defendants used the means andinstrumentalities of interstate commerce, including, but not limited to, the United States mails,interstate telephone communications, and the facilities of national securities exchanges.III.PARTIES AND RELEVANT NON-PARTIESA. Plaintiffs6. Court-appointed Lead Plaintiffs Alameda County Employees’ RetirementAssociation (“ACERA”), Government of Guam Retirement Fund (“GGRF”), Northern IrelandLocal Government Officers’ Superannuation Committee (“NILGOSC”), City of Edinburgh Councilas Administering Authority of the Lothian Pension Fund (“Lothian”), and Operating EngineersLocal 3 Trust Fund (“Operating Engineers”), along with the additional plaintiffs identified inAppendices A and B, purchased or otherwise acquired <strong>Lehman</strong> common stock during the ClassPeriod, and/or various <strong>Lehman</strong> securities set forth in Appendices A and B, and were damagedthereby.B. Relevant Non-Parties7. <strong>Lehman</strong>, headquartered in New York, was a global investment bank. <strong>Lehman</strong>’scommon stock traded on the New York Stock Exchange. On September 15, 2008, <strong>Lehman</strong> filed forbankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. For this reason, <strong>Lehman</strong> is notnamed as a defendant in this action.-3-
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162. The Insider Defendants knew an
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169. Rather than disclose to the in
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setting of risk limits.” These st
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exceeded its risk appetite limits b
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most part that are in-the-money”
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y the Company on June 9, Callan sta
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198. The 2Q08 10-Q reported that th
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cover lending positions. Jane Buyer
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upon their conversation, McDade und
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(e) Lehman was motivated to manage
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c. On July 20, 2007, Nagioff emaile
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sell assets, and that the distresse
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accordance with the standards of th
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E&Y’s contemporaneous notes demon
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obligations when auditing and revie
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240. AU §§ 336 and 9336 address a
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A delinquencies and loss expectatio
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on behalf of Plaintiffs and other m
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involvement in the day-to-day opera
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(b)(c)(d)(e)(f)Awarding Plaintiffs
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APPENDIX ACOMMON STOCK/PREFERRED ST
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APPENDIX AISSUE DATEApril 4, 2008(t
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APPENDIX AISSUE DATEAugust 1, 2007A
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APPENDIX AISSUE DATEDecember 21,200
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APPENDIX AISSUE DATEFebruary 27,200
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APPENDIX AISSUE DATEMay 9, 2008May
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APPENDIX B
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APPENDIX BISSUE DATESECURITY(CUSIP)
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APPENDIX BISSUE DATESECURITY(CUSIP)
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APPENDIX BISSUE DATESECURITY(CUSIP)
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APPENDIX BISSUE DATESECURITY(CUSIP)
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APPENDIX BISSUE DATESECURITY(CUSIP)
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APPENDIX BISSUE DATESECURITY(CUSIP)
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APPENDIX BISSUE DATESECURITY(CUSIP)
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APPENDIX BISSUE DATESECURITY(CUSIP)
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APPENDIX BISSUE DATESECURITY(CUSIP)
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APPENDIX BISSUE DATESECURITY(CUSIP)
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APPENDIX C1. CW1, an underwriter in
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7. CW7 and CW8, investigators in Au