A Comprehensive Review of Reclaiming History Part VIII

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James DiEugenio 10 Bugliosi’s Bungle, Part VIII knew he wasn’t (Flagpole Magazine, November 19, 2003, “Sen. Richard Russell and the Great American Murder Mystery”). What even fewer people know is that Russell actually composed a letter of resignation from the Commission. Dated February 24, 1964, it was never sent to President Johnson. In it, he complains that the Commission “has been scheduling, holding, and canceling meetings without notifying him” (ibid.). If one adds in the Southern Wing’s performance with Marina to their hesitance in signing onto the Single Bullet Theory at the September 18, 1964 Executive Session hearing (see Part IV, Section IV.1), it’s easy to understand why the Troika didn’t want him. Russell disagreed with the Single Bullet Theory based on two strong pieces of evidence: (1) the testimony of John Connally as to hearing the first shot, and turning before he was hit; and (2) the Zapruder film (Flagpole Magazine, op. cit.) As I previously noted, Rankin tricked Russell into thinking that his objections would be noted at this meeting. There was a woman there who Russell thought was from the stenographic firm. She wasn’t; there is no stenographic record of this meeting (McKnight, p. 295). Harold Weisberg later informed Russell of Rankin’s deception (ibid., p. 296). To me, the emerging record of Russell as the first dissenter—perhaps the first critic—of the Commission is one of the most important developments in the scholarship on the Warren Commission to appear of late. Russell did not criticize the Commission in public until November 20, 1966, in The Atlanta Constitution. There he said that he harbored a lingering dissatisfaction with the Commission’s work, and that he disagreed with the Single Bullet Theory. In 1968, he went further and told Weisberg that the Commission had been deceived by the CIA and FBI in two key areas: (1) Oswald’s background; and (2) the ballistics evidence (op. cit., Dick Russell). Russell left the records of his work from the Commission at the University of Georgia Library; many people other than Dick Russell have used them, and there have been several unpublished scholarly papers based upon those records, by students like Gary Diamond and Dani E. Biancolli. (The last is supposed to be the best discussion of this subject yet to appear.) In 21 years, Bugliosi apparently never consulted those archives or read those research papers. This tells us much about what he was up to in Reclaiming History. “He is more or less inclined to be a Fascist.” VIII.3 ——Harold Ickes on John McCloy As critical as Russell was about the Warren Commission, he was never as vituperative or as specific as Hale Boggs. Boggs famously said that “Hoover lied his eyes out to the Commission—on Oswald, on Ruby, on their friends, the bullets, the gun, you name it” (Texas Observer, November 1998). The congressman’s regrets about his service on the Commission were well known to his family. In the 1970s, his widow Lindy Boggs took over his seat in Congress. In keeping with his wishes, she became one of the early backers of the bill to authorize a new inquiry into the JFK case, which became the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA). Senator Cooper once expressed concerns over contradictions ASSASSINATION RESEARCH / Vol. 6 No. 1 © Copyright 2009 James DiEugenio
James DiEugenio 11 Bugliosi’s Bungle, Part VIII between the testimony given by witnesses before the Commission, versus the interviews of those very same witnesses to the media. (Jim Marrs, Crossfire, p. 477). Senator Cooper also did not buy into the single bullet theory. In an interview he did in 1978 for a British documentary, he stated, “Yes there were disagreements. I think the most serious one … was whether the first shot went through President Kennedy and Governor Connally, who was sitting in the jump seat in front of him. I heard Connally testify he was not struck by the same bullet. I could not convince myself the same bullet struck both of them.” At this point, realizing the import of what Cooper had said, the interviewer jumped in and asked, “You mean you yourself were not convinced by the single bullet theory?” To which Cooper simply replied, “No, I was not.” By this, he was saying that there was a second gunman, and, by necessity, a conspiracy (DVD, The Assassination of President Kennedy). Cooper’s 1978 testimony means that Russell did not stand alone in his dissent from the Troika. One way to look at why the Troika and Warren did what they did is this: it was the easy way out. By January 11, 1964, it had become clear that Hoover, the White House, the Dallas Police, and the press all wanted a verdict of “no conspiracy”, with Oswald and Ruby as disturbed killers. Furthermore, all the above power centers were alive and kicking; Oswald was dead and gone. The path of least resistance was quite obvious. But something else was at work here: the clearly incredible power of the Establishment and the mainstream media pulling everything in one direction. But in a very real sense, the Troika was the Establishment and the mainstream. This is a significant point that Bugliosi simply does not confront. Beneath the surface of Reclaiming History lurks a rather disturbing fact: on one of the most controversial issues of the era, the author is siding with four of the most repellent characters in post-war American history: J. Edgar Hoover, John McCloy, Allen Dulles, and Gerald Ford. In Part VII I took some time to inform the reader about much of the rather unappetizing character and practices of Mr. Hoover; and you will find much more there about what a despicable ogre Hoover was than you will find in Reclaiming History. But as curtailed as his writing on Hoover is, I exaggerate only slightly when I say that, in comparison with his discussion of the Troika, it looks comprehensive. Yet it is hard to understand what the Commission did if one leaves out who McCloy, Dulles, and Ford really were, and what they represented. It is also necessary in understanding how the Southern Wing was marginalized, and, at the last meeting, duped into thinking that their objections would be recorded. The Troika was in control; and, from vast experience, they knew how to manipulate both people and events. In that regard, Cooper, Boggs, and Russell were provincial, almost amateurish. Dulles, McCloy, and to a lesser extent Ford, were masters at pushing levers behind the scenes: both of power and the press. Whether they knew it or not, the Southern Wing was being taken to school in how the Eastern Establishment controlled the national agenda. But to understand that, you need to know something about the unsavory background and acts of these three men. Bugliosi doesn’t give it to you, so I will. ASSASSINATION RESEARCH / Vol. 6 No. 1 © Copyright 2009 James DiEugenio
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A Comprehensive Review of Reclaiming History Part VIII

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