A Comprehensive Review of Reclaiming History Part VIII

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James DiEugenio 2 Bugliosi’s Bungle, Part VIII can legal system: Oswald would be presumed innocent and be given a vigorous defense. That defense team would view and study all the evidence concerning their client. They would then be able to use this knowledge to both call and cross-examine witnesses. And they would also be able to present their own experts in certain refined fields. For instance, illustrious New York City medical examiner Milton Halpern would be allowed to study the autopsy evidence and records. Based on that, he would participate in the examination of the pathologists about why they did what they during Kennedy’s autopsy. And, of course, all these official proceedings would be conducted in the open so that Americans would know their government had nothing to hide about President Kennedy’s murder. As we know, in a complete reversal of standard jurisprudence, nothing even like the above happened. In each category, the opposite occurred. Oswald was provided with no defense team. He was presumed guilty by the Commission in January, before the first witness was called. Many important documents and pieces of evidence were never presented to the Commission. Important witnesses were not called. Crucial areas of evidence, like the autopsy and ballistics, were never questioned—even though they could have easily been challenged. One of the most surprising twists in Reclaiming History is this: lawyer Bugliosi finds nothing wrong with any of this. What made the rush to judgment all the worse was the incessant pounding home by the press that Oswald was clearly the only gunman involved. During the months of November and December, the media carried deliberately leaked stories. They drummed into the public mind the “overwhelming guilt” of the dead Oswald. As I wrote in Part VII, the day after Oswald was killed, J. Edgar Hoover was the source for an Associated Press story declaring Oswald’s posthumous guilt. On December 1, 1963, the Washington Post did a long article that told its readers that “all the police agencies with a hand in the investigation … .. insist that the case against Oswald is an unshakable one.” TIME magazine assured its readers that the FBI report “will indicate that Oswald, acting in his own lunatic loneliness, was indeed the President’s assassin” (December 13, 1963, p. 26). Newsweek echoed this verdict by stating that “the report holds to the central conclusion that Federal and local probers had long reached: that Oswald was the assassin” (December 16, 1963, p. 26). The New York Times also served as a bullhorn for FBI Director Hoover. On December 10, 1963, it ran a front-page story, titled, “Oswald Assassin Beyond a Doubt, FBI Concludes.” What makes this publicity barrage even worse is that it seems to have been orchestrated by officers in the government who were responsible for finding out who actually killed President Kennedy—that is, both J. Edgar Hoover, and Acting Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach. Since the shabby FBI report was classified, and the Commission worked in secret, there was no one to show that the Emperor was wearing no clothes—that is, that the “unshakable” case against Oswald was anything but airtight. These irresponsible officials were bamboozling an all-too-gullible media. The Commission itself criticized the FBI report at an Executive Session of December 16, 1963: Representative Hale Boggs said, “There’s nothing in there about Governor Connally.” To which Sena- ASSASSINATION RESEARCH / Vol. 6 No. 1 © Copyright 2009 James DiEugenio
James DiEugenio 3 Bugliosi’s Bungle, Part VIII tor John S. Cooper replied, “And whether or not they found any bullets in him.” Commissioner John McCloy added, “This bullet business leaves me confused.” Chief Counsel J. Lee Rankin then summed it all up with, “It’s totally inconclusive.” What is important to remember about this conversation is that the Commission at this time had done almost nothing: materials and reports had begun to accumulate, but very little of it had been digested. That is because the Commission itself was a part-time body; the vast majority of its work was done by its legal staff—which had not been appointed at this time, and would not be until early January. Now, the way that Bugliosi deals with the above questions by the Warren Commission is notable: he describes their questioning of the FBI report as constituting a “very investigative mood” for the Commission (p. 331). What he doesn’t say is that the “mood” didn’t last very long—or go very far. For, by January 11, 1964, the December 16 “investigative mood” had been muzzled. The Commission was in firm agreement with the FBI and Dallas Police: Oswald did it by himself. We know this from their own records: in a document dated that day, and titled “Progress Report”, Rankin prepared a work outline to assist in the organization and evaluation of the materials received by the Commission. (He had been assigned to do this by Warren at the December 16 Executive Session meeting.) The second sub-head was titled, “Lee Harvey Oswald as the Assassin of President Kennedy”. The third sub-head was “Lee Harvey Oswald: Background and Possible Motives”. In other words, the verdict had been decided upon, in spite of the Commission’s previously expressed doubts— and three weeks before the first witness had been called. Bugliosi does not tell the reader that at this same December 16 meeting, Warren stated that he wanted a birth-to-death biography of Oswald, and a similar one on Ruby— which clearly influenced Rankin’s outline. What happened between December 16, 1963 and January 11, 1964? Formally, nothing was done. The December 16 meeting was the last Executive Session before Rankin prepared his fateful outline—from which there would be no turning back. Placing the question in a broader context, the Commission was announced on November 29, 1963. The first witness was called on February 2, 1964. To paraphrase Walt Brown: What did they do for the first sixty-six days? (The Warren Omission, p. 59) They had four Executive Session hearings, and they hired their support staff. This staff started to sift through the assembled reports of the FBI, the Secret Service, and the CIA. But in the roughly nine months left of their existence, they would not budge from Rankin’s outline. Why? Because at the very first meeting on December 5, 1963, during Chairman Earl Warren’s first speech, he said that the function of the Commission should be to evaluate evidence, not to gather evidence. And that the Commission could rely upon the reports of “the FBI and Secret Service and others that I may not know about the present time.” He sealed the deal by saying something that would discredit both him and the Commission: “I believe that the development of the evidence in this way should not call for a staff of investigators.” In other words, the Commission would accept the work of the Dallas Police, the FBI, and the Secret Service, and not in- ASSASSINATION RESEARCH / Vol. 6 No. 1 © Copyright 2009 James DiEugenio
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A Comprehensive Review of Reclaiming History Part VIII

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