The Individualization Fallacy in Forensic Science Evidence

218 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1:199frequencies to determine the joint probability of the occurrence of thatset of attributes in the population. This latter estimate then isreported to fact-finders to help them assess the probative value of theDNA evidence. 94Similar procedures, in principle, can be employed for othermaterials of forensic interest: fingerprints, handwriting, bitemarks,toolmarks, and so on. Criminalists face two challenges in developingsuch procedures. One challenge will be developing valid and reliablemeasures of the images of interest—of friction ridges, of toolmarkstriations, of bitemarks, of writing. A second challenge will bedeveloping databases that identify the frequency with which variousimages appear. In some areas (e.g., toolmarks, firearms, andshoeprints), the challenge of producing sound probability estimatesmay be especially difficult because the materials change over time andwith use.VI. CONCLUSIONThis Essay challenges the conventional wisdom about thecapabilities of the forensic identification sciences. Forensic scientistsare not able to link a fingerprint, a hair, a handwriting sample, atiremark, a toolmark, or any other evidentiary forensic item to itsunique source, but they assert that ability every day in court. Theissue is not the sincerity of the beliefs of workaday forensic scientists.Instead, it is whether any scientific evidence exists that can supportthose beliefs. No basis exists in theory or data for the core contentionthat every distinct object leaves its own unique set of markers thatcan be identified by a skilled forensic scientist. Their claimsexaggerate the state of their science. This sort of exaggeration,combined with public credulity, is the classic reason that common lawevidence doctrine required a heightened threshold for admission ofexpert testimony. Under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, asinterpreted by Daubert and Kumho Tire, such testimony would be aprime target for exclusion. 95 But, short of exclusion, the legalcommunity would do well to understand the individualization fallacy,94. Although the DNA typing model has much to offer the traditional forensic sciences,offering source identifications at trial for sufficiently low probabilities would not be animplication of the science but an evasion of it in the service of advocacy. See Bruce Budowle etal., Source Attribution of a Forensic DNA Profile, 2 FORENSIC SCI. COMM. (2000),http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/july2000/source.htm.95. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 138 (1999); Daubert v. Merrill DowPharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 580 (1993). FED R. EVID. 702 requires that expert testimony be“based upon sufficient facts or data.” The existing facts and data do not demonstrate thatforensic scientists can identify a unique set of markers for every distinct object.