218 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1:199frequencies to determ<strong>in</strong>e the jo<strong>in</strong>t probability of the occurrence of thatset of attributes <strong>in</strong> the population. This latter estimate then isreported to fact-f<strong>in</strong>ders to help them assess the probative value of theDNA evidence. 94Similar procedures, <strong>in</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple, can be employed for othermaterials of forensic <strong>in</strong>terest: f<strong>in</strong>gerpr<strong>in</strong>ts, handwrit<strong>in</strong>g, bitemarks,toolmarks, and so on. Crim<strong>in</strong>alists face two challenges <strong>in</strong> develop<strong>in</strong>gsuch procedures. One challenge will be develop<strong>in</strong>g valid and reliablemeasures of the images of <strong>in</strong>terest—of friction ridges, of toolmarkstriations, of bitemarks, of writ<strong>in</strong>g. A second challenge will bedevelop<strong>in</strong>g databases that identify the frequency with which variousimages appear. In some areas (e.g., toolmarks, firearms, andshoepr<strong>in</strong>ts), the challenge of produc<strong>in</strong>g sound probability estimatesmay be especially difficult because the materials change over time andwith use.VI. CONCLUSIONThis Essay challenges the conventional wisdom about thecapabilities of the forensic identification sciences. <strong>Forensic</strong> scientistsare not able to l<strong>in</strong>k a f<strong>in</strong>gerpr<strong>in</strong>t, a hair, a handwrit<strong>in</strong>g sample, atiremark, a toolmark, or any other evidentiary forensic item to itsunique source, but they assert that ability every day <strong>in</strong> court. <strong>The</strong>issue is not the s<strong>in</strong>cerity of the beliefs of workaday forensic scientists.Instead, it is whether any scientific evidence exists that can supportthose beliefs. No basis exists <strong>in</strong> theory or data for the core contentionthat every dist<strong>in</strong>ct object leaves its own unique set of markers thatcan be identified by a skilled forensic scientist. <strong>The</strong>ir claimsexaggerate the state of their science. This sort of exaggeration,comb<strong>in</strong>ed with public credulity, is the classic reason that common lawevidence doctr<strong>in</strong>e required a heightened threshold for admission ofexpert testimony. Under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of <strong>Evidence</strong>, as<strong>in</strong>terpreted by Daubert and Kumho Tire, such testimony would be aprime target for exclusion. 95 But, short of exclusion, the legalcommunity would do well to understand the <strong>in</strong>dividualization fallacy,94. Although the DNA typ<strong>in</strong>g model has much to offer the traditional forensic sciences,offer<strong>in</strong>g source identifications at trial for sufficiently low probabilities would not be animplication of the science but an evasion of it <strong>in</strong> the service of advocacy. See Bruce Budowle etal., Source Attribution of a <strong>Forensic</strong> DNA Profile, 2 FORENSIC SCI. COMM. (2000),http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/july2000/source.htm.95. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 138 (1999); Daubert v. Merrill DowPharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 580 (1993). FED R. EVID. 702 requires that expert testimony be“based upon sufficient facts or data.” <strong>The</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g facts and data do not demonstrate thatforensic scientists can identify a unique set of markers for every dist<strong>in</strong>ct object.
2008] FORENSIC EVIDENCE 219encourage reforms designed to put a scientific foundation beneathforensic identification, and place appropriate limits on what expertwitnesses may assert. <strong>Forensic</strong> identification scientists can helpthemselves immediately by forswear<strong>in</strong>g exaggerated, def<strong>in</strong>itiveconclusions <strong>in</strong> favor of humbler, scientifically justifiable, andprobabilistic conclusions.