A Presentation of the State of Societal Security in Norway - PRIO

degree, the value of the individual, as well as individualor isolated societal groups.Invisible ValuesNorwegian social values are often articulated interms of democratic culture, and democracy is oftenexpressed as the ultimate security referent tobe protected. Paradoxically, the protection of individualsin society or groups within society is notdirectly a part of the strategy, despite the obviousfact that it is individuals who make up society, andthat individualism is often praised as a democraticvalue. This paradox forms the tacit background formuch policymaking in security affairs. This is thecase despite the fact that most scholarly literaturehighlights this problem as underlying and sustaininga wide variety of social groups’ perceptions of insecurity.One can easily ask whether societal securityis indeed adequately assured when there are groupsthat feel threatened by the establishment that isintended as the provider of security. Such groupscan be political, ethnic, religious or generational,depending on circumstances. National and globalevents can affect these groups, or their perceptionsas a group, as with communist groups during theCold War or Muslim groups following the 2001World Trade Centre attacks. The exclusive andexclusionary potential of societal security must beconsidered in policymaking.Empirical and Ideational ComponentsIt is difficult to pinpoint the exact empirical andideational components of Norwegian societal security,as official understandings vary from the verybroad to the narrow. There are some elements,though, that are repeated and that may offer anoutline. Revenues from oil and gas resources formthe basis of the Norwegian standard of living in thefuture and give the state room to manoeuvre in theinternational arena. This is one critical empiricalaspect. In terms of ideational components, thereare two aspects that are visible across differentconceptualizations. First is the sovereignty of theNorwegian state. The impact of Norway’s colonialpast and its delicate position during the Cold Waris visible in the careful attention given to internationaldiplomatic and strategic positioning. Secondis a national image of an inherent Norwegian socialdemocratic culture, with principles that are understoodas highly concentrated, if not unique. Valuesoften pointed to are egalitarianism, individualismand peacefulness.Organizational Challenges in NorwaySince the end of World War II, Norwegian preparednesshas been built on a horizontal structure,with an extensive civilian support network for themilitary. With the increased reliance on societalsecurity concepts, a number of security responsibilitieshave been centred in the civilian arena.These are executed by both military and civil administrations.In matters of security political crises, command isreferred to military control. Owing to the primacyof the military in national defence, this is understandable.However, the military may face a potentialcommunication problem when it enters the civiliandomain while maintaining a military operationalizationthat is not necessarily in line withcivilian expectations of transparency and public access.The new Defence Study, FS-07, places considerableemphasis on a more professional military, ratherthan one based on conscription. It suggests reformsthat would revise the concept of ‘total defence’ –with a military less dependent upon civil supportthan previously – and limit the military’s tasks in thecivilian arena. This can be read as a wish to distancethe military from the civil, which would represent amove away from current political aims for ‘totaldefence’.However, one might ask: where do the limits go?As framed in PC 17 and by DSB, societal securityencompasses a wide variety of issues that at timeshave little in common. DSB issues warnings on issuesas diverse as terrorism and material flaws inhousehold products. The differentiation of tasksamong Norwegian institutions corresponds to asignificant differentiation in understandings of securityin Norway. Gathering the threads of the conceptof security in a new age of insecurity has becomeone of the central challenges of the new defenceconcept.Total DefenceIn 2000, the Willoch Commission set out to determinethe need for a reorganization of the ‘totaldefence’ system at a time when a number of voiceswere arguing for a more hierarchical and centralizedsystem. The Commission’s end report, A VulnerableSociety, resulted in some efforts to centralizethe work of civil crisis management without takingaway local responsibility. DSB (Directorate forCivil Protection and Emergency Planning) wasfounded in 2003 as part of this plan. DSB is underthe jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice and thePolice, reporting on issues ranging from terrorismto various local societal concerns.According to the ambitions of the ‘total defence’concept, the two complementary parts of Norwegiansecurity organization, the civil and the military,should cooperate more – for example, there should

e improved cooperation between military intelligenceand police intelligence. In 2006, a large-scalecrisis-management rehearsal was organized, comprisingresponses from all responsible parties. Thiswas carried out to test local responses and responsibilities,as well as communication between civilianand military responders, both horizontally and vertically.The concluding report, Øvelse Oslo 2006 –Evaluering, revealed, among other things, a certainlack of communication between responding groups.This weak communication link demonstrates one ofthe challenges involved in the approach of sharingresponsibilities between civilian and military actors,as well as between sectors. Basic understandings ofthe direction of command in civil–military operationsalso differ.Furthermore, while PC17 focuses on societal issues,it relies heavily on one particular source, theFFI (Norwegian Defence Research Establishment),to provide information, threat assessments andevaluations. The FFI’s principal analyses have used atechnical and ‘biological’ approach for understandingand measuring risk and (in)security as objectspresent in society.The result is that societal security is termed in alanguage close to the military establishment andtechnical analysis. Yet, the context of societal securityis non-military and often non-technical. Thehuman factor that is not included is critical formany of the identified risk areas such as radicalizedsocietal groups. An alternative structuring, based oninstitutions linked to softer ends of societal security,can be envisaged in order to bridge this lacuna.Norway at RiskNorway perceives itself as low at risk, yet the discourseon security in Norway has a high profile.The closer an event is to Norway, either geographicallyor culturally, the more elevated the intensityof the discourse within Norway. In otherwords, events need not take place in Norway inorder for them to become visible and relevant. So,Norway prepares itself for different eventualities.DSB performs a multitude of rehearsals (responseto potential scenarios and incidents), supervisionsand evaluations of what may be said to be internationallyrecognized risk areas, including evaluationof critical infrastructure – that is, infrastructure thatsociety is heavily reliant on in order to maintainitself and function. Some of DSB’s recent activitieshave included evaluating national electrical systems,organizing a terrorist attack response rehearsal,and testing crisis communication systems. On theother side of the security executive, the militaryparticipates in international interventions and operationsthat are politically, if not directly, connectedto societal and national security. The militarymay therefore also experience ‘risk’ differentlythan the civil administration.A Hub for New Security KnowledgeDSB regularly publishes its reports on and evaluationsof different societal concerns. This publishingis part of the political drive for a more open securitydialogue. One consequence may be the identificationsof risk areas, but also the communication ofthe state as a constant evaluating body of security,risk and threat. This may generate a sense that societyis insecure even when PC 17 and DSB statethat it is the low level of risk that provides opportunitiesto test identifiable security scenarios.What is essential to underscore is that, in an erawhere popular, political and strategic perceptionsof insecurity in Norway tend toward an intermixingof societal and strategic security questions, DSBrepresents a hub or meeting place of securityknowledge. DSB and the Joint Operative Headquarters(FOKH) alternate yearly in chairing the CentralForum for Total Defence, while the National SecurityAuthority (NSM) reports to both the Justiceand Defence departments on the civil and militarysectors, respectively. DSB possesses the analyticalstandpoint for a more unified implementation of anincreasing hybrid form of security knowledge. It isalso important to note that the military and informationnetworks (PST and military intelligence) arenot transparency-oriented. The articulation of securitycan therefore be expected to come, to alarge extent, from DSB.However, DSB does not measure any element ofinsecurity raised by securitization. Neither doesDSB move beyond the understanding of security orvulnerability as objects in society.Globalization and DemocracyIn PC 17, Norwegian security thinking is presentedas a total concept that can respond at any point toa given threat and that is also suited to identifyingsecurity issues that would be commonly handled bycivilian departments. An international ideational featureis also stressed, namely, that while internationalevents may have an impact on security at aspecific time, such events must not affect the organizationalstructure of security. Yet, Norway relieson alliances to help protect its sovereignty, whichcommits the state to non-national policies. Norway’straditional policy is one that adheres to theconviction that the advancement of democracy has along-term positive effect on security. At the sametime, lack of democracy elsewhere is not considereda direct threat to Norway. Preparedness is thus

highlighted as much as response. In this way, understandingsof risk comprises that future threat comesto play as much a role as planning for responses inreal time.It is essential to bear in mind that ‘security stress’ isseen to affect all matters on the security continuumand that overburdening of the very categories ofsecurity and insecurity could lead to an eroding ofthe usefulness of the concept of societal securityand, collaterally, of the sharpness of the concept ofsecurity in general. Furthermore, the civil emphasison security organization does not meet the challengeof individual or group insecurity faced by certainmembers of society, especially in relation toreligious and ethnic minorities.It is important to recall that the main provider ofinformation on risk and threat perceptions to bothcivil and military administrations is the military researchestablishment. The FFI’s primary focus hasbeen to deal with the national security of society as awhole, and not with potential alienation, fragmentationor insecurity among specific groups or individuals.On the contrary, the emphasis of currentresearch on threats to Norway at best focuses onthe reverse cause: the threat of alienated individualsand fragmented groups on society at large.National ValuesDistinct among the main interests of both traditionaland societal security is the protection of socialvalues. Yet, when one first begins to identify aset of national values, one quickly finds values thatare shared internationally. There is no clear or exclusiveNorwegian exception. Norway has, however,promoted some values over others based onneed, utility and the particularity of Norwegian geographyand traditions. Norway’s history of colonialoccupation and suppression has left a greater markon its security thinking, which influences strategiessought to uphold sovereignty.Effects of International Cooperation onNorwegian Security OrganizationNOU 2003, The Security of the Nation, stipulates thatit is the core interests of national concern that areto be protected, not indirect or related values suchas the interests of allied parties. Nevertheless, alliedforces or personnel on Norwegian soil are to beprotected. This conclusion is reached on the basisof the logic that it is the sovereignty of the stateand its security that are to be protected. However,in Norway – as elsewhere in an increasingly globalizedworld – there is no sharp delimitation betweenthe inner and the outer security of the stateNOU 2003 suggests that threats stemming fromterrorist attacks against critical infrastructureshould be added to the traditional issues of espionage,war, occupation and attacks on central governmentin the penal code section that deals withnational security. That this is suggested even thoughit is acknowledged that Norway is at little risk ofsuch attacks may demonstrate the impact of theinternational climate. Hence, the NOU suggestsslimming the understanding of ‘national interests’ tocore values with direct national interest, but it simultaneouslyrecognizes threats against othermember-states or allies as affecting Norwegian securitypreparedness.This brief suggests that Norway will continue toincorporate non-Norwegian security interests in itsnational agenda to a larger extent than it is able toexport its own security thinking, owing to the rolethe country plays internationally as a facilitator ofdecisions rather than an instigator of policy. Further,owing to the principles of equality, responsibilityand proximity, this has potential effects onregional and local levels. Ambiguities in the conceptualizationsof the civil and military administrationsand in executive roles also have an impact on boththe operative and the conceptual state of societalsecurity in Norway.About the authorsJ. Peter Burgess is a Research Professor and Leader of PRIO’sSecurity Programme; Naima Mouhleb is a Researcher withinthe Security Programme at PRIO. This policy brief was writtenwith the support of the Norwegian Royal Ministry of Defencefor the project Threats beyond Borders: Assessing SocietalSecurity in a Global Environment.ISBN: 978-82-7288-254-8